CENTRAL-LOCAL DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES, 2001 TO 2016 SOL DOROTEA ROSALES IGLESIAS (MA International Affairs, The Fletcher School, Tufts University M Soc Sci Political Science, National University of Singapore BA Public Administration, University of the Philippines) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2018 Supervisor: Associate Professor Douglas Kammen Examiners: Associate Professor Yoshinori Nishizaki Associate Professor Dominique Caouette, University of Montreal Professor Mark R. Thompson, City University of Hong Kong DECLARATION I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been used in the thesis. This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously. Sol Dorotea Rosales Iglesias 6 November, 2018 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe much to the people who lent a hand so that I could conduct my research at various institutions. My biggest debt is to Arpee Santiago, Executive Director of the Ateneo Human Rights Center, Ateneo de Manila University, for opening doors particularly at the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) on human rights of the government peace process with the Communist Party of the PhilippinesNew People’s Army-National Democratic Front. I am grateful to the following individuals for their assistance at the CHR. I thank Executive Director Marc Cebreros for agreeing to extend access to me and for kindly offering office space while I was there. At the Investigation and Case Monitoring Division, I am grateful to its chief, Diana de Leon, and Florante Enciso for hosting me. I am also grateful to Banuar Falcon for prolonging my access to records over long hours each day. I would have been unable to complete my data collection while in Manila otherwise. Finally, I am most indebted to Diana Figueras. She was the one who helped me navigate the maze of CHR databases, records and case documents. I would not have been able to work so efficiently without her kind assistance. I am grateful to Paulynn Sicam who very kindly facilitated approval of my access to the JMC records. I thank Editha Wayas for her invaluable help with the JMC documents and database. I thank Father Amado Picardal of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and the Coalition Against Summary Executions. I am indebted to DJ Acierto at Karapatan, Lomel Bautista at the Ibon Foundation, Cristina Guevarra at Hustisya/Selda/Desaparacidos, Sunshine Serrano at Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Luis Teodoro at the Council for Media Freedom and Responsibility, and Carol Mercado at the Asia Foundation in Manila. I am so grateful to Renato Reyes, Bayan Secretary-General, for allowing me to interview him and for the documents he entrusted to me. I thank Tarlac City counselor Emily Ladera-Facunla for kindly allowing me to interview her, and my sister Anna Iglesias for the introduction. I thank Karen Tañada at the Gaston Z. Ortigas Institute for Peace for the insights she shared. I am grateful to Prof. Herman Kraft at the University of the Philippines for his enriching analysis of political violence. I am thankful to the organizers of the Southeast Asia Research Group (SEAREG) for selecting me as a 2017 fellow. I gained valuable insight in the process of presenting my findings at the SEAREG workshop in Ho Chi Minh City in December 2017. Each opportunity I had to present preliminary findings helped me clarify my writing. For this, I am grateful to co-panelists and audiences of the Project Southeast Asia Symposium at Oxford University in April, 2016 and in Jakarta in March 2018. I am also thankful to fellow panelists at the Association for Asian Studies conferences in Kyoto in June, 2016 and Toronto in March, 2017. Particular thanks go to Adrian Morel at the Asia Foundation, Rafendi Djamin of the Indonesian Human Rights Resource Center, Ima Abdulrahim at the Habibie Center, Moe Thuzar at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Sriprapha Petcharamesree at Mahidol University, Alex Afrianto at the Rajeratnam School of International Studies and Ehito Kimura at the University of Hawaii Manoa. I thank Malcolm Cook iii for inviting me to speak about the political implications of the declaration of martial law in Mindanao at an ISEAS seminar in August 2017. I owe much thanks to Marianne Teo at the NUS Graduate Studies writing clinic for her editing advice and encouragement. I am grateful to my colleague at the World Bank, Chi Fung Fan, for his support at a critical period before my final submission. I thank my fellow PhD students at NUS who listened patiently and advised wisely: Simon Rowedder, Annisa Beta, Vila Somiah, Grace Concepcion. In Manila, I owe a debt to my friends Cherry Joy Veniles and Gisela Ordenes for answering my many random questions over the past threeand-a-half years as well as for sharing contacts and documents to help my research along. I am grateful to members of my dissertation committee, Oona Paredes and Jamie Davidson, for their invaluable feedback. I thank Itty Abraham for encouraging me to extend my research to other Southeast Asian cases and all the thoughtful conversations that often led me to new insights about my work. I cannot adequately express in words how much I owe to my dissertation adviser Douglas Kammen. He shepherded me through a difficult decision to abandon my original research proposal on East Timor and study political violence in the Philippines instead. I could always count on him when I needed to think ideas through. His enthusiasm for my research kept me going forward. He chided me for enjoying “being a student” too much, in the beginning. I will never forget when he observed that I had finally transitioned into “being a researcher”. I am grateful for the constant support of my sisters, Gay, May and Anna, and my closest friends, Natalia, Anjeli, Sohni, Ira and Rahiman. I thank my partner PJ for motivating me to write 300, 500, 1500, 2500 words a day at different stages, for our writing retreats together, and for his help with copying JMC documents in Manila. I am also grateful to him for articulating the support of all our critters at home: Grouchy, Plato, Tala, Inuka and Lisa. I thank my son Gabriel for being the best study buddy. We shared an extremely stressful last few months in 2017—him with his Primary School Leaving Examination and me writing against the clock, in time to submit the following January. We took turns, taking up the slack for each other at home. During the crunch time before my deadlines, he did his chores without the customary foot-dragging, asked very little of me and left me an occasional note of encouragement on my desk. His hard work, determination and perseverance inspire me. I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Gabriel Urquiola Iglesias, who sparked the ambition in me to become Dr. Iglesias just like him, and to my mother, Solina Rosales Iglesias, for getting me here. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................. iii LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................... vii LIST OF MAPS .............................................................................................. viii GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................... ix Chapter 1. Explaining Political Violence in the Philippines After Marcos ....... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 Violence in Democracies ............................................................................... 2 State Weakness .............................................................................................. 5 The Philippines: Weak State, Flawed Democracy ........................................ 9 Violent Repression without Authoritarian Reversal .................................... 15 Strategic and Particularistic Interests, Central and Local Capacities .......... 20 From the Periphery, to the Center ............................................................... 25 Dissertation Structure .................................................................................. 30 Chapter 2. Northern Luzon’s Bloody Contests ............................................... 34 A Game of Gods and Monsters ................................................................... 37 Local Elite Pact in Ilocos Sur ...................................................................... 46 Queen Takes King off Abra Chessboard ..................................................... 52 Insurgency in the North ............................................................................... 58 State Weakness and Violent Politics? ......................................................... 72 Chapter 3. The Communist Threat in Eastern Visayas ................................... 75 “The Butcher” in Eastern Visayas ............................................................... 79 Counter-insurgency Continues .................................................................... 85 The Fight Ends in Northern Samar .............................................................. 91 Electoral Violence ....................................................................................... 99 Draining the Sea to Catch the Fish ............................................................ 106 Chapter 4. Patronage and Punishment in Central Luzon ............................... 108 A Strong but Brittle Alliance: Hacienda Luisita ....................................... 111 The Butcher Arrives, Violence Shifts in Meaning .................................... 119 Violence De-escalates................................................................................ 134 The Red Vigilante Group .......................................................................... 137 “Seasonal” Electoral Violence................................................................... 140 A Weak State’s Show of Strength ............................................................. 146 Chapter 5. Safe City, Murder Capital in Southern Mindanao ....................... 148 Petty Despotism and Central Support ........................................................ 151 Duterte Outlasts Rift with Center .............................................................. 164 Next Stop, Malacañang.............................................................................. 170 Tagum City Death Squad, A Pale Imitation .............................................. 174 The Military and Investment Defense ....................................................... 179 The Violent South ...................................................................................... 189 Chapter 6. The Extra-Judicial Killing of Philippine Democracy?................. 191 Central-Local Dynamics of Political Violence .......................................... 191 Shock Therapy: Duterte’s War on Drugs .................................................. 202 War on Drugs, War on Democracy ........................................................... 213 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 215 v Appendices .................................................................................................... 253 Appendix 1. Private Armies and Guerrilla Fronts ..................................... 253 Appendix 2. Political Violence by Region and Pattern ............................. 254 Appendix 3. Political Violence by Type of Incident ................................. 255 Appendix 4. Political Violence by Target ................................................. 256 Appendix 5. Political Violence by Known or Suspected Aggressor ......... 257 Appendix 6. Political Violence in Northern Luzon ................................... 258 Appendix 7. Political Violence in Eastern Visayas ................................... 259 Appendix 8. Political Violence in Central Luzon...................................... 260 Appendix 9. Political Violence in Southern Mindanao ............................. 261 Appendix 10. Fatalities in “War on Drugs” .............................................. 262 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, by Region Figure 2. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, Number of Affected Individuals per 100,000 Voters in each Region Figure 3. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Northern Luzon Figure 4. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon Figure 5. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon, by Administrative Region Figure 6. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Eastern Visayas Figure 7. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Eastern Visayas Figure 8. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Central Luzon Figure 9. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Central Luzon Figure 10. Pattern of Wealth Control Violence in Central Luzon Figure 11. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Central Luzon Figure 12. Patterns of Political Violence in Southern Mindanao Figure 13. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Southern Mindanao Figure 14. Estimated Davao Death Squad Killings vii LIST OF MAPS Map 1. Northern Luzon Regions and their Provinces Map 2. Eastern Visayas Provinces Map 3. Central Luzon Provinces Map 4. Southern Mindanao Provinces viii GLOSSARY ACT AFP AMGL AMTG Anakpawis Azucarera Bantay Barangay Bayan Muna CAFGU CAR CHR COMELEC CPLA CPP DDS DENR DILG DOJ DPWH Hacienda Jueteng LDP Kagawad Karapatan KMP Lakas-Kampi-CMD Lumad Malacañang NBI NDF NGO NPA OBL Party-list PDEA PDP-Laban PhP Alliance of Concerned Teachers Armed Forces of the Philippines Alyansa ng Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon (Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers) Aguman da reng Maglalautang Talapagobra keng Gabun (Association of Farmers and Land Workers) “Laborer”, party-list political party Sugar mill “Watch”, party-list political party village “Nation First”, party-list political party Citizens’ Armed Forces Geographical Unit Cordillera Autonomous Region Commission on Human Rights Commission on Elections Cordillera People’s Liberation Army Communist Party of the Philippines Davao Death Squad Department of Environment and Natural Resources Department of the Interior and Local Government Department of Justice Department of Public Works and Highways plantation, estate illegal gambling game Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Fight of Democratic Filipinos), political party Councilor, member of local legislature Human right, also the name of a human rights nongovernment organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Philippine Peasants’ Movement) Lakas (Power)-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free Filipino)-Christian Muslim Democrats, political party indigenous, also refers to indigenous people Office of the President of the Philippines (colloquial) National Bureau of Investigation National Democratic Front Non-government organization New People’s Army, armed wing of the CPP Operation Plan Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch) System of representation of disadvantaged sectors in the lower house of Congress with a set list of nominees, also refers to the political parties themselves Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-Power of the Nation) Philippine pesos ix PISTON PNP RHB RPA-ABB RVG SDO SPARU Tanod UDS ULWU Pinagkaisang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (United Drivers and Operators Nationwide) Philippine National Police Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (National Revolutionary Forces) Revolutionary Proleteriat Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade Red Vigilante Group Stocks Distribution Option NPA Special Partisan Unit, assassins also referred to as “sparrows” Watchman Underground Death Squad (Tagum City) United Luisita Worker’s Union x Chapter 1. Explaining Political Violence in the Philippines After Marcos Introduction On May 25, 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared Martial Law in Mindanao, the southernmost of the country’s three main island groups, in response to a terrorist attack in Marawi City. Six months later, the president received Congressional approval to extend military rule until the end of 2018. He had earlier placed the country under a state of national emergency on September 4, 2016, which has yet not been lifted as of this writing. This is not creeping authoritarianism: the safeguards against the return of autocracy are being dismantled systematically and quickly. Since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, three decades of Philippine democracy may be coming to a close. From the day that Duterte took office in 2016, an estimated 7,000 to 13,000 people have died in a politically motivated, state-sponsored mass killing.1 While the president himself evokes the specter of Marcos’s strongman rule, this violence is something new. Philippine politics is notoriously bloody but the magnitude of state violence in such a short period of time is unprecedented. In comparison, under the Marcos dictatorship from 1972 to 1986 there were an estimated 2,427 extrajudicial killings and 10,000 insurgency fatalities.2 While the Marcos dictatorship is a natural reference point, the instructive comparison for understanding the on-going political violence is the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Until Duterte’s presidency, Arroyo’s long tenure produced the greatest amount of political violence coupled with the most political repression 1 I discuss the basis of the low and high estimates in the concluding chapter. Estimate of extrajudicial killings from 1975 to 1985. Richard Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 137. Combat deaths estimated from data available on Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia," Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2014, www.ucdp.uu.se/database. 2 1 since 1986. My research seeks to understand political violence in the Philippines during that time. The Arroyo government was the most violent presidency in the postMarcos period until 2016 yet the relevant literature is scant and thus sheds little light on the current state-sponsored violence. Yet the killings under President Duterte were made possible only in the post-Marcos, democratic period. This dissertation asks why political violence occurs in a democracy. I argue that the strategic interests of the state and the particularistic interests of political actors in society create a motive for the use of violence. However, interests alone cannot result in action: political actors located at the center and periphery must have the capacity to act alone, together or against each other. Specific patterns of political violence—including why violence is used, when it starts, and why it ends—are contingent upon these central-local dynamics. Violence in Democracies Coercion is the essential means of accumulating and maintaining power in autocracies.3 Democracies, in contrast, are expected to have developed less coercive ways of managing contention, opposition and protest.4 Democracy is premised on consent. A stable democracy habituates state and non-state actors to the resolution of political conflict through constitutionally legitimate processes, political parties and elections. 5 Davenport argues that the comparative literature has found consistent 3 Francisco Herreros, "The Full Weight of the State: The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned Violence," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (2006): 671. See also Ronald Francisco, "The Dictator's Dilemma," in Repression and Mobilization, ed. Hank Johnston and Caroline Mueller Christian Davenport (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2004), 59. George Lopez, "National Security Ideology as an Impetus to State Violence and State Terror," in Government Violence and Repression, ed. Michael Stohl and George Lopez (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 74. 4 Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State," Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 45 (1988): 54. 5 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 2 evidence that democratic political institutions inhibit violence “across time, space, measurements and methodological techniques.”6 Why then might political violence persist in democracies with a recent history of authoritarian rule? There are three key explanations for this puzzle in the literature: the failure of democratic consolidation, the persistence of authoritarian legacies, and state weakness. States undergoing democratization commit higher levels of violence than either consolidated democracies or stable authoritarian regimes.7 In unconsolidated democracies, elections may be held regularly even if the use of coercion and other forms of manipulation may be pervasive. These “imperfect” democracies have “somewhat higher levels of freedom” than authoritarian regimes, but may deploy state violence with little constraint. 8 Moreover, elections blur the line between centralized, state-sponsored violence against opponents—the focus of state repression studies— and particularistic, decentralized political violence against candidates and their supporters. Migdal, for instance, notes that it can be difficult to distinguish between non-state and state power centers because of the frequent alliances between officials and societal leaders.9 Elections may also exacerbate violence in places with a history of armed conflict or communal tensions. 10 Ultimately, the argument of flawed University Press, 1996), 44. Steve Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," The American Political Science Revew 88, no. 4 (1994): 855-56. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "Thinking inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights," International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005): 442. 6 Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (2007): 11. 7 Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World," Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1995): 184. 8 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 9-16. 9 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 223. 10 See for example, Jacqueline Klopp, "Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism," Canadian Journal of African Studies 35, no. 3 (2001); Kristine Höglund, "Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences," Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 3 (2009): 413-14. 3 democracy is limited by its circular reasoning: violent repression occurs in democracies because they are not fully democratic. Instead of assessing the institutional deficiencies of “failed” democratization against an idealized type, other scholars have focused on continuities from authoritarian rule as an explanation for violence in and by democracies.11 Specialized state agencies of coercion and violence, as well as rules, patterns and practices of an authoritarian past may remain durable in the democratic present.12 The military’s role may be preserved or expanded into such areas as drug interdiction, counterinsurgency and crime fighting. 13 These “everyday forms of state coercion” that constitute “routine politicking, intelligence work, and military operations” do not overtly challenge civilian rule but may result in violence.14 Such studies highlight the importance of the quotidian dimension of security forces in the public sphere. However, an authoritarian past may not fully clarify why violence might resurge then recede in a democratic polity. Meitzner, for instance, argues that Thailand had phases of military marginalization between 1992 and 2006 that defied the path dependency argument.15 In the Philippines itself after the Marcos dictatorship, the civilian government exercised firm control over the Armed Forces of 11 David Pion-Berlin, "Authoritarian Legacies and Their Impact on Latin America," Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 2 (2005): 160-61. 12 Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini, "Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies," in Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, ed. Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2004), 4. Christian Davenport, "The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment," International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2004): 542. 13 For instance, as a consequence of their subordination to political parties, the militaries in Colombia and Mexico continue to maintain a presence in the local state and contribute to growing violence in urban centers and the regions. Anthony Pereira and Diane Davis, "New Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas," Latin American Politics and Society 27, no. 2 (2000): 7. 14 Anthony Pereira cited in Jorge Zaverucha, "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil," Latin American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2000): 8-10. 15 Marcus Meitzner, "Conflict and Leadership: The Resurgent Political Role of the Military in Southeast Asia," in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (London: Routledge, 2011), 13. 4 the Philippines (AFP) for most of the 1990s and early 2000s prior to a period of weak oversight in the mid-2000s that cannot be explained by historical legacies.16 Nor does an authoritarian past readily account for violence generated by elections. Moreover, if similar kinds of violence might persist regardless of regime type, then does the explanation lie with the state rather than the regime? State Weakness The ability to monopolize the legitimate use of force to the exclusion of other forces in society is integral to the modern state. Weber defines the modern state as a political entity with monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and with a bureaucratic apparatus based on rational-legal authority. 17 He placed particular emphasis on the monopoly over the principle means of coercion in society as crucial element of “stateness”.18 Indeed, “Weberian minded comparativists” began labeling modern national states as “stronger” or “weaker”, according to how well they approximated the ideal type of centralized and fully rational bureaucracy.19 A key critique of the Weberian perspective is that it depoliticizes the bureaucracy. In contrast, Anderson observes that the nature of the capitalist state, “in any final contest”, is to defend the dominant position of capitalist class power.20 Poulantzas argues that the capitalist state is characterized, on one hand, by its relative 16 Aries Arugay, "The Military in Philippine Politics: Still Politicized and Increasingly Autonomous," in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (London: Routledge, 2011), 98-99. See also Eva-Lotta Hedman, "The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil," in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Mutiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 17 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 3-5. 18 Migdal, 18. 19 "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 351. 20 Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review I, no. 100 (1976): 76. 5 autonomy to class interests in that it can exact economic sacrifices from the ruling elite in the name of national interest—while never truly posing a threat to their political dominance. Thus, nowhere in the state’s institutions is the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes clearly defined: “everything takes place as if the class struggle did not exist”.21 However, Skocpol criticizes the society-centered assumptions in Marxist writings on the state as failing to recognize that states are not inherently shaped by classes or class struggles, nor do they function solely to preserve and expand modes of production. States reinforce the personal authority of state officials but policies may be demonstrably autonomous from social demands.22 It is essential to move beyond an uncomplicated Weberian bureaucratic rationality and expose how the state serves dominant classes in society. However, it is equally important to recognize that the state is not fully subordinate to societal elites. The concept of state autonomy from society thus provides an important key to how the literature on states has modeled state-society relations. Mann characterizes state autonomy as flowing from the ability of a state to establish centralized power and project itself across a defined territory. 23 State autonomy is taken to mean the capacity to intervene in society, on one hand, and the lack thereof is inferred from society’s ability to interfere with the state. This conception requires drawing a conceptual line between state and society. Migdal separates the notion of state from society, observing that the “strong men” of society may weaken the state by forcing it to seek accommodation with them, or by capturing 21 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1973), 188. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14-15. 23 Michael Mann, States, War and Capital (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988), 30. 22 6 parts of the state entirely.24 The distinction between state and society is useful for heuristic purposes. Nonetheless, Evans contributes the insight that states may possess an autonomy embedded in society such that state leaders are sufficiently influenced by social groups for the state to be developmental rather than predatory—yet autonomous enough to avoid capture by social forces.25 The extent to which states shape society, or social forces constrain the state, has been the crux of state strength versus state weakness in the literature. The tenacity of competing, well-organized social groups implies a weaker state that is less autonomous from society.26 Migdal argues that states are weak if they are unable to establish their predominance over networks of local strongmen and other powerful influences outside the central state, whereas certain social structures with highly centralized institutions make strong states.27 Weak states with charismatic leaders may manage social fragmentation by using personal appeal to compensate for the lack of a coherent political center.28 On the other hand, society may doggedly undermine attempts at state centralization so as to effectively subvert the state’s aims.29 The paradox of the weak state is that small social groups may have the ability to confound even a large army with no lack of instruments for enforcement.30 The binary of state strength versus weakness thus turns on an axis of state centralization versus social fragmentation. 24 Migdal, 182. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 26 Skocpol, 7. 27 Migdal. 28 Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1994), 105. 29 Catherine Boone, "Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geograpy of Electoral Violence: The Case of Kenya in the 1990s," Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 10 (2011): 308-9. 30 Migdal, 178. 25 7 Surprisingly, these influential works on state weakness do little to address the importance of the use of state violence, or the restraint from its use. Weber argued that while violence is neither the normal nor sole means of the state to govern, the bond between the state and violence was a particularly intimate one—as Kalyvas observes. Much of Michel Foucault’s work is based on this insight, in line with Hannah Arendt’s axiom of the inverse relation between the state and violence.31 In short, theorization about the modern state and violence is founded on the absence of the latter. Yet in the literature about weak states, violence is an important concern. The forms vary and may include state terror, state-sponsored dirty wars, electoral violence as well as crime. In Africa, the deployment of violence by state and non-state actors is a key constraint to state capacity. Jackson and Rosberg argue that states are “not empirically states” by the Weberian definition, especially due to the lack of monopoly over legitimate violence.32 Chabal and Daloz maintain that the state’s exercise of illegitimate violence against its citizens likewise contributes to state weakness considering that everyday violence in Africa is typically only either private crime or state violence. Local politicians are patrons in a clientelistic relationship moreover, and these patrons are licensees of violent state repression.33 Like the Philippines, the dimension of state capacity that pertains to violence is highly salient. In a way, we find the opposite problem: the weakness of the Philippine state—particularly in terms of its inability to control and regulate the use of violence—has become virtually axiomatic. Why state weakness and defective democracy in the Philippines form a 31 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 218. 32 Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35, no. 1 (1982): 10-12. 33 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington, Indiana: The International African Institute, Indiana University Press and James Currey Oxford, 1999), 78-80. 8 common explanation for political violence requires more careful examination, however. The Philippines: Weak State, Flawed Democracy The failure of democratic consolidation and state weakness are common explanations for political violence in scholarship on the Philippines. The underlying argument is that self-interested elites prey upon a weak Philippine state. The key to controlling state resources at different levels is in winning elections. Thus, the quality of democracy may be constrained as elites seek to dominate elections, through varying modes of persuasion and coercion, and thereby deprive voters of meaningful choice. The biggest rewards are control of resources, policy levers, lucrative state contracts and other rents at the national level. Hutchcroft, for instance, emphasizes the rent-seeking behavior of oligarchs who have plundered the Philippine “neopatrimonial” state for particularistic advantage.34 However, central contestation for political power has historically depended on relationships that link national elites with local ones. How elites are structured and why reciprocity works is a matter of perspective. In the post-war period, political relations structured by personal reciprocity persisted amid greater party professionalization. One model of these relations is a set of patron-client relationships between wealthy provincial “leaders” and local “followers”, with votes flowing upwards while patronage flows downwards and outwards.35 Lande’s study of the premartial law period in the Philippines argues that political factions were organized 34 Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philppines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 8-15. 35 See James Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American Political Science Revew 66, no. 1 (1972): 92. Also Allen Hicken, "Clientelism," Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 290-92. 9 around personal affiliations rather than the party system. 36 In contrast, due to economic changes and the professionalization of politics in the post-war period, Machado argues that the role of political factions around landed families had eroded and specialized party machines began to emerge.37 Provinces were important sites of political power, particularly in a political environment that prioritized elections over the development of a centralized bureaucracy.38 In 1972, just one year before his second and final term in office would have ended, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law. Anderson observes that Marcos became the “supreme cacique” by reversing the traditional flow of power toward the center, rather than outwards to the local political bosses or caciques at the periphery.39 Marcos exploited the state and enhanced it as an instrument for plunder while politicizing the military for social control and counter-insurgency. 40 Dictatorship thus disrupted the arrangements of power linking Manila to the provinces that had been organized around regular elections since the early twentieth century. Moreover, the degree to which Marcos centralized the state apparatus, underpinned by military and police violence, was unprecedented. Initially, scholars portrayed the ouster of dictatorship in the Philippines as a process of redemocratization, part of a third wave of democracy sweeping throughout 36 Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 78. See also his "Political Clientelism, Developmentalism and Postcolonial Theory," Phlippine Political Science Journal 23, no. 46 (2002). 37 Kit Machado, "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," Journal of Asian Studies 33, no. 4 (1974). 38 Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, "Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines," Journal of East Asian Studies 3, no. 2 (2003): 270. 39 Cacique refers to a local political boss in Latin America; Anderson applied the concept to analogous leaders in the Philippines. 40 Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," New Left Review I, no. 169 (1988). 10 Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.41 However, it quickly became evident that the end of authoritarianism also ushered in the return of oligarchic domination in electoral politics. The empirical evidence is difficult to refute: as early as the local elections in 1987, political clans were found to have been integrated into formal party structures—typically reconstituting and realigning themselves according to the “administration” party of the incumbent president. 42 These families sought to transform their electoral offices into lasting political dynasties with a strategy of rent seeking, typically in the capital, and political violence against opponents in the provinces.43 Although many deeply entrenched political dynasties survived the transition into the post-Marcos period, there were new entrants to electoral politics that aspired to establish their own dynastic rule. Political elites, especially at the local level, were no longer just the landed, cacique oligarchs of the post-war period. Illicit activities and protection rackets had become important sources of wealth. Sidel stresses the heightened importance of coercion, rather than patronage, as a means of amassing power. Local bosses were constrained from establishing durable political dynasties in places where the public sector dwarfs private wealth, so they tended to rely more on crime and violence.44 Winters observes that the dictatorship also disrupted intra-elite 41 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991). Also "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, no. Spring (1991). On the end of the third wave, see Marc Plattner, "The End of the Transitions Era?," Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014). 42 Eric Gutierrez, Ildefonso Torrente, and Noli Narca, All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines (Diliman, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992), 13-15. Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 276. 43 Alfred McCoy, "An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines," in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, ed. Alfred McCoy (Wisconsin: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993), 20-22; 24. 44 John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 19, 50. 11 arrangements of oligarchic rotation, which had played an important role in moderating the use of political violence.45 Thus, a “strong society, weak state thesis” informs much of the scholarship on the Philippines. Kuhonta, in a review of literature on the state in Southeast Asia, described the Philippines as being weak: it was on the “low end” in terms of state capacity for development.46 In a comparative study of state formation in Southeast Asia, Slater argued that the Philippines—unlike Singapore or Malaysia, which developed strong authoritarian leviathans as a result of elite coalitions against a communist threat—followed a pathway of fragmentation. Arrangements linking the state and social elites remained highly factionalized and power flowed from powerful societal actors to the state. Even under centralist, authoritarian rule, Marcos received only tepid social support from elites and so he ruled through intimidation rather than institutions.47 Weak elite support during Marcos’s martial law regime, resulted in weak institutions—authoritarianism without leviathan, according to Slater. Rather than state weakness however, Sidel argues that local bossism signifies the Philippine state’s “strength”. Sidel claims that by Migdal’s definition, local bosses in the Philippines had the capability of strong states to penetrate society—as a pronounced ‘predatory’ rather than ‘developmental’ strong state, however. 48 He describes bosses as “predatory power brokers” who control both coercive and 45 Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 137-39; 206. Kuhonta made a comparison with Thailand and Indonesia, adapting Hutchcroft’s characterization of the Philippines as a neopatrimonial oligarchic state, particularly manifested in the crony capitalism prevalent during the Marcos dictatorship. Erik Kuhonta, "Studying States in Southeast Asia," in Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis, ed. Erik Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 51. 47 Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97-104, 67. 48 Sidel, 146. See also Migdal, 4. 46 12 economic resources within their bailiwicks.49 Rather than the common portrayal of a fragmented society imposing its will upon a weak state, Sidel sees bossism as an “interlocking, multitiered directorate” of bosses that exploits its control over the state apparatus for particularistic gain. In stark contrast to Migdal and others, his study emphasizes the ability of local bosses qua state leaders to direct and penetrate society. In reference to Evans, Sidel argues that while the Philippine state appears relatively weak due to its failures as a developmental state, it is a muscular predatory state— prior to, and after the Marcos dictatorship—that plunders the country’s resources “without more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey.” 50 Although Sidel evokes Evans’s idea of predation, he conflates bosses’ predation on the state apparatus and predation by bosses, as state agents, on society. In either case, Evans was ambivalent on whether predatory states could be qualified as either “strong” or “weak”: they may be strong with despotic or infrastructural power but weak, if strength is defined by the state’s capability of transforming the economy and social structure.51 Sidel therefore inadvertently lends support to the insight that strongmen qua society have captured parts of the weak state apparatus. Abinales demonstrates the analytical value of state weakness by asking a crucial question: how does a weak state govern? He suggests that capacity is not determined by the state’s ability to dominate society but instead influence it, providing both a focus for politics where institutions are hollow and a middle ground with other centers of power.52 A weak state governs through mutual accommodation with local strongmen. Indeed, as Hagopian found, traditional clientelism can morph 49 Ibid.,John Sidel 19. Ibid. 146. 51 Evans, 45-47. 52 Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 181-83. 50 13 from a personal arrangement to a state-based system in which local political bosses serve as the mediators between the state and citizens.53 In sum, the scholarship on the Philippines underscores the futility of conceptualizing either democracy or the state in normative, idealized terms. Elections are manipulated to the advantage of an entrenched elite. There is little that constrains incumbents and challengers from deploying all sorts of underhanded and even criminal strategies, including violence, in order to win elections. However, theorizing why political violence has surged in the post-authoritarian period is focused mainly on electoral violence and struggles over public office. This does not extend to an explanation for a period of ruthless state violence against activists and civilians that intensified in the mid-2000s throughout the country. Why does political violence occur in the Philippines during the post-Marcos, democratic period? Violence persists in Philippine politics due to a weak state’s accommodation with society. Moreover, elites seek to win elections in order to access policy-making, lucrative state contracts and other rents. The weakness of the Philippine state encourages plunder rather than developmentalism. Moreover, because the Philippine state is developmentally weak, elites use the state security apparatuses for predation and to maintain their political power. In this, the state can manifest a capacity for addressing threats, being selectively repressive while remaining democratic in other respects. 53 Frances Hagopian, "Traditional Politics against State Formation in Brazil," ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, State power and social forces: domination and transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1994). 45-47. 14 Violent Repression without Authoritarian Reversal In 1986, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Manila and other cities, precipitating the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship. Corazon Aquino, who was widely believed to have won a snap election against Marcos, was subsequently installed into office as the country’s new president. A key democratic reform, the 1987 constitution imposes a limit of a single six-year term to the president without the possibility of re-election. National and local elections have proceeded regularly since then. In 2001, however, a second uprising unseated the popularly elected President Joseph Estrada after the failure of a senate impeachment process for corruption. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, then vice-president, assumed Estrada’s office and completed his term. Unprecedented in the post-Marcos period, she ran for a second term in 2004 as an incumbent president and won. However, a recorded phone call between Arroyo and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) official Virgilio Garcillano allegedly to alter the count, was made public in June 2005.54 Opposition politicians sought to impeach Arroyo but her allies defeated each attempt in Congress. She remained in office until the end of her term in 2010. Plagued by challenges to her electoral legitimacy, Arroyo’s time in office was distinguished by political violence, coercion and repression. 55 For instance, the Arroyo government revived a 1985 law under Marcos that imposed a strict “no permit, no rally” rule in 2005.56 The Human Security Act of 2007, more popularly known as the “Anti-Terrorism” law, rolled back protections from indefinite detention, 54 This became known as the “Hello, Garci” recording, for what Arroyo says to Garcillano in greeting. Arroyo, in an apology, verified its authenticity but denied any wrongdoing. Bobby Tuazon, ed. Fraud: Gloria M. Arroyo and the May 2004 Elections (Diliman, Quezon City: Center for People Empowerment in Governance, 2006). 55 Nathan Quimpo, "The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Features," The Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009): 347-8. 56 Alexander Remollino, "GMA Creating 'De Facto' Dictatorship--Ex-PCGG Commissioner," Bulatlat.com V, no. 34 October 2-8, 2005, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-34/5-34defacto.htm. 15 allowed warrantless arrests with limited judicial control as well as discouraged legitimate acts of protest.57 State violence was higher during Arroyo’s long incumbency than that of any other post-Marcos leader, until Duterte became president. 58 The United Nations, NGOs and independent investigations attribute the sharp rise in extrajudicial killings under Arroyo’s government, particularly in the years 2005 and 2006, to the military Operation Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch, widely abbreviated as OBL) against the communist insurgency.59 The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), were founded in the early years of the Marcos government in 1968 and 1969, respectively. The rebellion persists today as one of the longest running Communist insurgencies in the world. The government’s preoccupation with counterinsurgency in the Muslim south throughout most of the 1990s created room for the NPA to grow, reinvigorating conflict in 2001.60 In 1992, at the urging of President Fidel Ramos, Congress repealed a law that made the CPP illegal and membership in it a crime. Leftist political parties associated with the CPP subsequently emerged—a radical but legally legitimate Left that contested elections and engaged in political organization. 57 "Philippines: Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(C) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1," (Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 2008), 10. 58 Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2012). 59 "2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Diliman, Quezon City: Karapatan, 2011), 16. See also Al Parreño, "Report on the Philippine ExtraJudicial Killings, 2001 to 2010," (Manila: Supreme Court of the Philippines, Asia Foundation, 2011), 13-14. Peter Sales, "State Terror in the Philippines: The Alston Report, Human Rights and Counter-Insurgency under the Arroyo Administration," Contemporary Politics 15, no. 3 (2009). 60 ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," in Asia Report No. 202 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), 3-4; 8. 16 Rather than armed insurgents however, the military targeted civilians in a bid to undermine the NPA nationally and locally.61 An estimated three out of ten victims of alleged summary executions were officers or members of leftist party-lists like Bayan Muna.62 Party-lists are political parties formed from marginalized sectors (e.g. women, workers, peasants), voted upon nationally constituting 20 percent of all seats in Congress with a maximum of three seats per party-list.63 The party-list system was designed as a post-authoritarian electoral reform to include single-issue constituencies of under-represented groups. In 2001, Bayan Muna unexpectedly topped the vote with 26 percent of the 5.06 million votes cast for the party-list system.64 Consequently, the military designated groups like Bayan Muna as a communist threat. The government surmised that the leftist groups were a front for propaganda, recruitment and fundraising for the armed insurgency.65 The NPA in turn, they reasoned, helped candidates on the radical left get elected. Yet leftists groups may not have been targeted because they were a security threat but rather because they were a political one. Once represented in Congress, the radical left was part of the bothersome opposition.66 Moreover, members of Bayan 61 Jose Melo, "Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings Created under Administrative Order No.157 (S. 2006) Report," in Stop the Killings, Abductions, and Involuntary or Enforced Disappearances in the Philippines (Quezon City: IBON Foundation, Inc., 2007), 202-03. A subsequent investigation conducted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, lent credence to these findings. 62 Parreño, 5. 63 How many seats per party list is proportional to their vote share, and the actual representatives follow an ordered list of up to five candidates registered in the election. 64 Felix Muga, "How Seat Allocation Formulas Disenfranchise Millions of Voters," ed. Bobby Tuazon, 12 years of the Party List System: Marginalizing People's Representation (Quezon City: Center for People Empowerment in Governance, 2011). 89. 65 "The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas," (Knowledge Management Division, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns, 2003), 74-80. 66 See Julius Mariveles, "The Pawn in the Queen's Gambit? Palparan and the CounterInsurgency Game Plan," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism August 12, 2014, http://pcij.org/blog/2014/08/12/the-pawn-in-the-queens-gambit. 17 Muna and other leftwing party-lists also ran for local office under traditional parties.67 Left-wing politicians were vertically involved in national politics and horizontally situated in towns and villages throughout the country, a formidable political force for mobilizing votes. In response, Arroyo reversed the trend towards drawing the communists into mainstream politics. The policy was ultimately incompatible with growing conservative fears, sparked by the left’s electoral success.68 Not all the violence was a consequence of the overlap between the military’s anti-communist, “dirty war” and electoral politics. A number of agrarian reformrelated killings of farmers and peasant organizers were unconnected to counterinsurgency.69 For instance, local units of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the military and local government authorities were involved in protecting landowners and their interests.70 Motives behind the assassinations of elected officials, judges, lawyers and journalists were likewise a blend of the political and the personal. Nonetheless, as long as the violence was mainly trained on the radical left and outside Manila, the violence could be considered an aberration to democratic political values that otherwise were ostensibly still in effect.71 Over a two-year period from 2007 to 2009, the democratic institutions reasserted constraints on the military and government. Pressure from nongovernmental groups, the Supreme Court and the investigation of an independent commission into the violence culminated in a visit from the United Nations expert on 67 Nathan Quimpo, Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2012), 150. 68 Amado Doronila, "GMA's Hardline Policy vs Reds Will Crush Her," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 19, 2006. 69 Melo, 202. 70 Jennifer Franco and Patricio Abinales, "Again, They're Killing Peasants in the Philippines Lawlessness, Murder and Impunity," Critical Asian Studies 39, no. 2 (2007): 322. See also Parreño, 17. 71 Vincent Boudreau, "Elections, Repession and Authoritarian Survival in Post-Transition Indonesia and the Philippines," The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009). 18 extra-judicial killings Philip Alston in February 2007. On September 25, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated the writ of amparo as a legal remedy to extrajudicial killing and forced disappearances. The writ could be filed in court at no cost to the petitioner and requires a summary hearing within a week of filing. The court is allowed to issue a temporary protection order to the petitioner. Moreover, respondents—whether government officials or private persons—are required to respond within 72 hours.72 Families of victims were also given the right to access information pertaining to their cases in a writ of habeas data, common in Latin America. Ultimately, it would not be enough for state authorities or agents to simply deny that they have custody of the victims, as they had in the past when responding to the writ of habeas corpus.73 Violence against activists rapidly de-escalated in 2007. Karapatan estimated that from 185 extrajudicial killings in 2005 and 220 in 2006 nationally, the figure dropped to 94 killed in 2007.74 In response to the outcry over the violence, new legislation and administrative measures were instituted to increase protection and remedies available to victims of violent human rights abuses. For instance, Congress passed a law explicitly defining torture in 2009. Under the subsequent presidency of Benigno Aquino, the level of violence continued to decline with around 55 extrajudicial killings annually on average, nationally, from 2010 to 2016, compared to the 127 annual average from 72 "In the Know: Writ of Amparo," Philippine Daily Inquirer July 14, 2017, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/913827/in-the-know-writ-of-amparo. In November 2007, the first cases to successfully apply the writ of amparo included that of Luicito Bustamante, a young farmer who had been picked up at a Davao City checkpoint, held and tortured by the military on suspicion that he was a communist rebel. TJ Burgonio, "Davao Farmer Walks Home to Freedom on Amparo," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 17, 2007. 73 Jocelyn Uy, "Puno Says SC to Use Writ of 'Amparo'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 18, 2007. 74 "2008 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2008), 11. 19 2001 to 2010 during Arroyo’s terms in office.75 He issued an administrative order in 2012 on extra-legal killings as the basis for an inter-agency committee that expedited the resolution of certain human rights violation cases, including politically-motivated killings of members of “cause-oriented organizations”, activists and journalists. Congress also passed a new law on forced disappearance the same year. Strategic and Particularistic Interests, Central and Local Capacities Why does political violence occur in democracies? The literature suggests that weak states with unconsolidated democracies, such as the Philippines, will be prone to violence. The underlying argument laid out above is that self-interested elites prey upon a weak state. The key to controlling state resources at different levels is in winning elections. Thus, the quality of democracy may be constrained as elites seek to dominate elections and deprive voters of meaningful choice. Incumbents and challengers deploy a range of strategies to win, including violence. What is insufficient in these explanations? They do well in explaining electoral violence but are largely silent on other forms of political violence, including that related to counter-insurgency efforts and a range of local protection rackets. As such, they encourage an analytical bifurcation between elections and other forms of organized coercion. To put it another way, the overlap between electoral violence and state violence is often overlooked. For instance, counter-insurgency violence is in fact often another facet of regime building. In many regions, counter-insurgency strategies strongly influence the processes of setting the rules (particularly with regard to the legal opposition), cementing political coalitions and securing local power beyond the 75 "2016 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2016), 23. See also Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 16-17. 20 limited period of elections. In the post-Marcos democratic period moreover, state violence tends to be seen as an aberration in the face of democratic norms and institutions that continue to operate, particularly in the capital. I address such shortcomings by examining the relationship between central and local political actors involved in political violence. I provide evidence that political violence is not primarily locally-driven, as conventionally thought. Central actors and national institutions play a critical role in escalating violence or, at times, forcing deescalation. Opting to look at political violence in a broad sense, encompassing categories that are elsewhere treated as mutually exclusive, makes this study innovative. I argue that interests, married with capacity, can result in political violence. In this dissertation, I accept the main explanation in the literature that a weak state and flawed democracy fosters the persistence of political violence in a country like the Philippines. However, this broad explanation does not account for why some periods were more violent than others in the post-Marcos period, particularly in the mid2000s. The corrective presented here is the recognition of the overlap and interrelationship between political violence related to elections and state violence. Why violence is used, when it starts, and why it ends is contingent upon central-local dynamics. Central-local dynamics refer to the interaction and resolution of strategic and particularistic interests, enabled by the capacity of national and local political actors to use violence unilaterally, cooperatively or as antagonists. In the face of social fragmentation and the proliferation of powerful actors outside the state’s control, accommodation allows an infrastructurally weak state to govern as Abinales contends. However, I argue that a state’s strategic interest is still to exercise hegemony over competing coercive forces such as armed political clans 21 and insurgents in society. Primacy does not preclude accommodation. Unlike Abinales, I posit that accommodation need not be mutual and will more than likely be asymmetrically favorable to one side. The approach toward insurgency will be more unequivocally statist: the strategic interest is to end an insurgency through a political or a military solution. The conceptual opposite is the particularistic interests of political actors, who aim to augment or deploy coercive resources—the state and their own—for individual, personal motives. These interests can be reasoned from specific threats to specific political actors. Such threats include direct electoral challenges and other risks to desired electoral outcomes. Particularistic interests also form over any endangerment of access to predation of state or illicit wealth normally secured through political office, including policies of redistribution, exposure of corruption, violent intimidation and harassment.76 However, competing interests are resolved and decisions to use violence, where, when, how and against whom, are made by political actors who are centrally and locally situated. Kalyvas contends that central and local actors “jointly produce” political violence. Central elites seeking local advantage mobilize local actors seeking to settle private scores.77 These microfoundations of political violence aligned with national cleavages is only one possibility, however. I argue that other relationships between central and local actors are possible. Rather than coinciding, competing interests may pit central and local actors against each other. Central and local actors might also act independently of each other. Also contrary to Kalyvas, I argue that “local” should not be equated with the personal (nor “central” with “political”). 76 The idea of threats to particularistic interests here is similar to Winter’s conceptualization of oligarchy as the politics of wealth defense against such threats to elite property. Winters, 7; 20-26. 77 Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 476; 83-6. 22 Centrality and locality are the antipodes that denote both hierarchy as well as the uneven dispersion of capacity—i.e. power and resources—from the center to the periphery. The literature on Philippine politics connects central political actors with local ones through what Abinales calls “web-like” national elites and local strongmen or what Sidel terms an interlocking, multi-tiered “directorate” of political bosses that are activated, machine-like, for elections and for the flow of patronage.78 I argue that the use of violence may also activate other, non-electoral relationships between different central and local actors. In an irregular war such as the protracted communist insurgency in the Philippines, centrally located political actors connect with local ones over the contest for control of territory and population.79 Local commands of the military may assert authority over civilian governing structures, for instance. 80 Central-local interactions may thus be independent of existing arrangements around elections and patronage. Political violence can be considered in a broad sense as “any form of organized violence carried out by political actors” including government forces, politicians’ private armed groups (often including military or police), insurgents, among others. In a weak state with an unconsolidated democracy, violence is a form of politics. Rather than being something anomalous, it is prosaic.81 Central-local dynamics can therefore explain patterns of political violence. Threats to the state or to political actors’ personal interests may motivate aggressors to aim violence against specific targets. Interests marry with the capacity of central and local actors to carry 78 See, for instance, Gutierrez, Torrente, and Narca, 11-13. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 364-65. 80 Rosalie Arcala Hall, "Politics in the Frontline: Local Civil-Military Interactions in Communist Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines," Phlippine Political Science Journal 27, no. 59 (2006): 18-22. 81 Meredith Weiss, Edward Newman, and Itty Abraham, eds., Political Violence in South and Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives (New York: UNU University Press, 2010), 11-12. 79 23 out violence. Specific dynamics sustain violence at a high intensity for over a relatively long period. The onset and termination of political violence is a crucial empirical observation from which capacity for violence can be inferred. 82 For instance, violence that is sustained over a significant period of time may be suddenly halted from above or below. Who does the halting, for what reasons, can tell us whose dispensation allowed the violence to remain unchecked until it was finally restrained. The basic relationship between democracy and political violence is that of constraint. Constraint on the capacity of local and central actors for violence distinguishes a democratic regime from an authoritarian one. In addition to regular and competitive elections, there are three key limits: first, vertical accountability to the electorate, whether directly or indirectly; second, horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another; and, third, protection of political and civic pluralism so that contending interests and values may be expressed.83 Constraints are not activated automatically: political actors must invoke them. In an unconsolidated democracy, constraints will not always be effective—and even when they are, the effects may be temporary. This study identifies four distinct patterns of political violence: (1) electionrelated violence, driven by particularistic interests and mobilizing local capacity for violence that builds up and peaks at regular intervals during election seasons; (2) insurgency-related violence, mainly strategic in aim and typically centrally-directed, peaking at periods corresponding to national counter-insurgency campaigns or in response to local security threats; (3) wealth control-related violence, driven by particularistic interests in elite wealth defense and control over valuable assets; and, 82 This proposition is informed by Conley’s insight that the ending of violence does not imply the successful attainment of its object; rather, onsets and terminations may be contingent on political actors’ capacities for violence. Bridget Conley-Zilkic, ed. How Mass Atrocities End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11; 17-25. 83 Adapted from Diamond, 11-12. 24 (4) social control-related violence, mainly locally-led, with the strategic aim of regulating society through intimidation and lethal force against alleged petty criminals, who are painted with a broad brush as “social ills” and even as enemies of the state. While central-local dynamics in this framework may not predict increases or decreases in the level of violence over a period of time, they do explain the onset of violence, the maintenance of its intensity, escalation and de-escalation, and even its cessation. One of my key findings is that the convergence of political actors’ particularistic interests and the state’s strategic interests to mobilize central capacity produces violence of the greatest magnitude sustained over the longest period of time. This finding might seem obvious taken out of context but it is counter-intuitive considering the scholarly literature on the Philippines, which has emphasized the putative weakness of the Philippine state. When particularistic motives and strategic aims diverge, central actors have the means to mobilize an array of resources, including the capacity for violence, against antagonistic local actors. In a contest between the center and periphery, the center is likely to prevail. Moreover, in contrast to the focus on the country’s “defective” democracy and resurgence of electoral violence since the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, I have found that democratic constraints inhibit violence. For instance, term limits for elected officials and institutional checks by independent bodies like the Commission on Human Rights have restrained political actors’ capacities for violence—albeit with temporary and tenuous effect. From the Periphery, to the Center I seek to explain patterns of political violence from 2001 to 2016 in the Philippines. A decade earlier, Philippine democracy was considered flawed but 25 reasonably consolidated.84 The political turbulence of Joseph Estrada’s ouster in 2001 and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s electoral fraud scandal suggested otherwise and signaled possible democratic deconsolidation. Yet after violence intensified in 2005 and 2006, it declined considerably and remained low during the presidency of Benigno Aquino. Data collection in this study ends with Aquino’s term of office on June 30, 2016. Why did violence intensify then before sharply declining and remaining low? That is the empirical question pursued in this research. Drawing implications for the new scale of violence in the early period of the Duterte government is the subject of the concluding chapter. Most accounts by scholars, the media and activists perceived elections and counter-insurgency as separate causes for heightened political violence. Leftists posed a security threat to the state and a political threat to the conservative elite. However, that explanation did not account for violence against other groups at the same time: judges, lawyers, local politicians, and other civilians that were not affiliated with any political organization. It was also unclear how this violence against civilians affected military operations against armed insurgents, and vice versa. Ultimately, these explanations failed to recognize the importance of the overlaps between electoral politics and insurgency—as well as other distinct patterns that are neither—as key to understanding patterns of political violence. I collated national-level data from available sources on the presence of nonstate armed groups: private armed groups and insurgent guerrilla fronts. I concentrate on four areas: (1) Northern Luzon, consisting of the Ilocos, Cordillera and Cagayan Valley regions; (2) Central Luzon; (3) Eastern Visayas; and, (4) the Davao region in Southern Mindanao. These are regions where the number of private armed groups 84 See, for instance, Mark Thompson, "Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 28, no. 2 (1996): 197-98. 26 maintained by local politicians has an inverse relationship to the presence of communist fronts therein (see Appendix 1). The regions in Northern Luzon had a high number of private armed groups but few communist insurgent fronts. Eastern Visayas had a few private armies under local politicians but a considerable number of NPA guerilla fronts. Central Luzon was low on private armies but high on insurgent groups. Southern Mindanao had no recorded private armies but had as many as 11 guerrilla fronts. The Northern Luzon and Central Luzon have similar voter populations, as do Eastern Visayas and Southern Mindanao. The regions represent a fair geographic spread across the country. Finally, the communist insurgency is the only rebellion with a significant, active presence in these areas. Figure 1. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, by Region 800 Insurgencyrelated 700 600 Electionsrelated 500 400 Wealth control-related 300 Social controlrelated 200 100 Unknown 0 Northern LuzonEastern Visayas Central Luzon Southern Mindanao Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 2 for frequency distribution table My preliminary research on available datasets revealed that organizations tended to specialize in tracking specific types of violence. For example, the 27 Commission on Human Rights had rich documentation of rights violations like extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance and torture, particularly complaints against the military and police. However, it had little to no records on killings or abductions committed during election cycles or against local politicians. Newspapers, on the other hand, cover killings, attempted killings and violence around local politics, but typically only the more sensational cases.85 Non-government sources tend to have a precise focus. The NGO Karapatan reflects data on leftist activists and community organizers. The Center for Media Rights and Freedom collects data on journalists killed for reasons related to their profession. In order to understand political violence comprehensively, I constructed an original database from these sources. I included cases of violence in the dataset if either the targets or the perpetrators of violence were known or suspected to be political actors. These include activists, insurgents, journalists, holders of public office or politicians, soldiers and paramilitary members, police officers, and members of private armed groups. From 1,093 incidents of violence, 1,890 individuals were affected: most were killed (87 percent) or survived an attempt (4 percent); some were forcibly disappeared (6 percent); the rest were subjected to rape or torture (3 percent) (See Appendix 3). Looking at Figure 1 above, Southern Mindanao experienced the highest magnitude of violence, followed by Central Luzon. The total number of individuals affected was lowest in Eastern Visayas, with 323 people, followed by Northern Luzon with 327, Central Luzon with 541 and Southern Mindanao with 699. However, if we express this count per 100,000 voting population, Southern Mindanao (26) was the most 85 For newspaper sources, I conducted a daily search of the Philippine Daily Inquirer print and online archives, supplemented by online archives of the Philippine Star, Bulatlat, Rappler, GMA news and regional news outlet Sun Star. 28 violent, followed by Eastern Visayas (12), Central Luzon (9) and Northern Luzon (6) (See Figure 2). 86 Figure 2. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, Number of Affected Individuals per 100,000 Voters in each Region 86 Voter populations are as follows: Northern Luzon regions has 5.78 million; Central Luzon has 6.05 million; Eastern Visayas has 2.70 million; and, Southern Mindanao has 2.66 million. "Philippine 2016 Voters Profile by Province and City/Municipality," ed. Commission on Elections (Philippines2016). 29 I evaluated each incident to determine whether the violence was related to insurgency, elections or some other dynamic. Insurgency-related incidents were typically part of a broad military campaign or operation. Election-related incidents included violence during election cycles (filing of candidacy, campaign, polls, and post-poll counting) or outside these periods, if the object of the violence was the elimination of political rivals or undermining support for them. Insurgency and elections account for most of the violence in the four regional areas, overall (73 percent) while other patterns make up 25 percent and the number of victims in incidents that couldn’t be clearly classified—a category labeled “unknown”— comprises 2.28 percent of the violence. 87 While insurgency-related violence and electoral violence are prevalent in all regions, violence related to the control of wealth (natural resources, productive assets, etc.) is significant in Central Luzon (10.7 percent). Moreover, social control-related violence is substantial in Southern Mindanao (32.5 percent) and, to a smaller extent, in Central Luzon (14 percent). The numbers presented here are indicative of broad patterns and should not be understood as absolute counts. Dissertation Structure Why does political violence occur in democracies like the Philippines, long after democracy should have been consolidated? Democracy is “flawed” if compared to an ideal type, but that is a limited and circular argument. Others would argue that violence must be a legacy of authoritarian rule yet this does not account for periods of relatively low violence. Another explanation is that the state is weak and does not 87 Calculations based on data presented in Appendix 2. 30 have the capacity to monopolize the use of violence. Disagreeing with scholarly consensus on the weakness of the Philippine state, Sidel argues that the Philippines is developmentally weak but strong because local political actors are powerful—as predators are to their prey. However, my research shows that the Philippine state has shown some significant capacity for addressing insurgency and dislodging entrenched local “strongmen” and political “bosses” from their bailiwicks. I argue that even if the Philippine state is developmentally weak and unable to monopolize the use of force, it regulates the use of political violence and thereby achieves some of its statist aims. At the same time, the state is constrained by particularistic interests by political actors both at the central and local level. For this reason, this dissertation explains political violence that results from such central-local dynamics. Four distinct patterns of political violence can be discerned. Elections create particularistic interests to win or maintain local elected office and mobilize local capacity for violence. Violence waxes and wanes according to election cycles every three years. It scales up just prior to the filing of candidacy, is sustained during campaign period, peaks during the polls, and falls shortly afterwards with episodic violence until the next election. Intra-elite moderation of electoral violence was typified by politicians’ games of “gods and monsters” in Northern Luzon. Deescalation is usually locally-led but political violence can be stamped out through a centrally-led dislodgement of local strongmen. It took a falling out with the president to extricate powerful, long entrenched dynasts—as in the cases of Abra governor Vicente Valera and Nueva Ecija governor Thomas Joson. A strong central government is required to dismantle private armies and the Philippine state has demonstrated its capacity to do so, albeit selectively and according to the particularistic interests of national elites. 31 Insurgency activates strategic interests of the state and the capacity for violence is spread outwards, from the center, in accordance with the distribution of security forces. Political violence can be sustained and escalated—in response mainly to insurgency—and diffused across local municipal or provincial borders. Centrally coordinated, violence can be de-escalated in response to institutional checks. This was exemplified in the reassignment of General Jovito Palparan from Eastern Visayas to Central Luzon due to his extrajudicial excesses, which eventually resulted in his conviction over one case many years later. Violence also ends when military objectives are achieved such as routing of armed communists from Leyte and most of Samar island, before their final defeat in Northern Samar. Particularistic interests, such as the control and extraction of wealth like land and minerals, converge with statist aims, such as counter-insurgency. This motivates central and local actors to cooperate and jointly produce violence. In the defense of wealth, an analysis of military deployment against Hacienda Luisita strikers and activists yields important insight. Similarly, military mobilization in the defense of mining interests in Southern Mindanao, as well as in Northern Luzon, exemplify the use of violence for wealth control. Such violence is episodic—escalated or deescalated according to the exigencies of the situation, in response to activism and resistance, for instance, rather than for counter-insurgency aims. The violence is also localized, occurring where the stakes are high—as in the agricultural lands of Central Luzon, rather than in Eastern Visayas. Violence against social ills (such as drugs, criminality, gambling and other vices) presents an unusual pattern of violence. Apart from the cases covered in this research in Davao City, Tagum City and the Red Vigilante Group in Gapan, there are very few other well known cases: Metro Manila under the mayorship Alfredo Lim in 32 the late 1980s and 1990s and the anti-crime campaign of Mayor Tommy Osmeña in Cebu City. Statist interests in regulating crime coincided with local capacity for violence. Central support enabled violence to scale up and sustain intensity over years. For instance, President Gloria Arroyo’s anti-drugs rhetoric and endorsement of Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte’s methods prompted an escalation of violence in the Southern Mindanao city and sustained the violence over a decade. When the interests of Arroyo and Duterte diverged, democratic institutions and central control over the military almost enabled Arroyo to dislodge Duterte. However, she failed and Duterte survived—although barely. The cases of the Tagum Death Squad and Red Vigilante Group show that when interests diverge and capacities are antagonistic, the center still generally wins. After this introductory chapter, the subsequent chapters are organized by regional group (Northern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Central Luzon and Southern Mindanao), followed by a concluding chapter. Each chapter discusses the centrallocal dynamics of insurgency-related violence, election-related violence and other forms of political violence experienced in the region, explaining the immediate causes of onset, escalation, de-escalation, termination of violence. The final chapter summarizes key findings and discusses the so-called national War on Drugs in the Philippines that officially began with President Duterte’s term in July 2016. 33 Chapter 2. Northern Luzon’s Bloody Contests In Northern Luzon, the overall level of violence from 2001 to 2016 was low compared to the other regions in this study. Unlike other regions furthermore, elections have been the occasion for nearly as much violence as counter-insurgency. Of greater importance, in Northern Luzon there was a pronounced overlap between insurgency and local politics. Most cases of political assassinations were at the town and village level, typically proxy killings for their leaders at upper levels of the political hierarchy. Map 1. Northern Luzon Regions and their Provinces The northern part of Luzon (referred to as Northern Luzon in this study) includes the provinces of three administrative regions: Ilocos Region, composed of 34 the provinces Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union and Pangasinan; Cagayan Valley Region, comprised of the provinces Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino; and, the Cordillera Autonomous Region, composed of the provinces Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga and Mountain Province (see Map 1). This chapter explores the central-local dynamics of two main patterns of political violence: (1) local electoral violence, including the centrally led expulsion of a local strongman; (2) counter-insurgency and the subduing of security threats. In each of these patterns, the interests of central political actors were the deciding factor in managing the level of violence, for how long it was sustained and how it ended. Figure 3. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Northern Luzon 45 40 35 Other patterns of violence 30 25 20 Election-related 15 Election year 10 5 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table Across the Philippines, in the seven decades since independence, 55 political families have had uninterrupted control of an elective post for between twenty and forty years. Seven of the ten most durable politics dynasties have been located in Northern Luzon: the Abadillas clan in Ilocos Norte, the Albanos in Isabela, the Ortegas in La Union, the Gironellas in Ilocos Sur, the Mambas and Vargases in 35 Cagayan, and the Purisimas in Ilocos Sur.88 Incumbency and dynastic dominance often choke off competition to the point that a powerful politician can run unopposed, and when that happens only one vote is required for him or her to be declared the victor.89 Nevertheless, electoral politics produced regular violence every three years, although the scale of the violence diminished after the 2010 elections (see Figure 3 above). Figure 4. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 Other patterns of violence 10 Insurgency-related 5 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table Insurgency-related violence in Northern Luzon, as in most of the country, was most intense during the years 2005 and 2006. As in Central Luzon, however, leftist activists were lethally targeted even before the scale of such violence heightened and became prevalent nationally. Insurgency violence tended to diminish during election years, although insurgents were involved in the assassination of a number of local 88 Karen Tiongson-Mayrina, "55 Political Families Have Unbreakable Hold on Power, One Clan for 43 Years," GMA News Online July 5, 2013, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/316096/news/specialreports/55-political-familieshave-unbreakable-hold-on-power-one-clan-for-43-years. 89 Jocelyn Uy, "18 Lawmakers Don't Have Challengers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 5, 2013. 36 officials. More recently, the military became closely involved in the protection of mining interests—a pattern that is more pronounced in other regions, particularly in Southern Mindanao. This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section explains the dynastic politics of Northern Luzon, tracing a few of its bloody contests as well as some backlash against dynasties as well as a tendency for intra-elite moderation in the use of violence. One example is Governor Chavit Singson and the de-escalation of electoral violence in Ilocos Sur province, explained in the second section. The third section throws the contrast into high relief, comparing the central-local dynamics that led to the dislodgement of Governor Vicente Valera and diminishing violence in Abra. The final section explains the dynamics of insurgency violence in the region, highlighting the central cooptation of a local insurgency faction and a shift in the military-led violence from counter-insurgency towards resource exploitation. A Game of Gods and Monsters Dynastic politics dominate local elections in the Philippines, none more so than in some parts of Northern Luzon. Throughout elections from 2001 to 2016, many political clans in the region maintained their holds on political power. In power since 1901, the Ortega clan in La Union province made a nearly clean sweep of the 2001 local elections with 10 of its 11 candidates successfully elected. The Singsons in Ilocos Sur, the Valeras in Abra and the Dys of Isabela likewise dominated the elections at the time.90 Central levers. The central government regularly intervenes in local elections by deploying additional state security forces to locales designated as violent. The 90 Inquirer Bureaus, "Marcoses, Singsons, Dys, Ortegas, Josons Winning," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2001. 37 Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declares an area to be an “election hotspot” on the expectation that violence will erupt and political rivals will use intimidation. The police and military track election-related violence 120 days before and 30 days after election day.91 For example, police monitored the local arms build-up in view of several violent rivalries in Ilocos Norte towns in 2001.92 Even so, Edgar Quinto, an ally of the incumbent Currimao town mayoral candidate, Rosario Go, was gunned down two months prior to the 2001 elections.93 The widow of the former mayor Ernesto Go whose son Wilbur had been killed in 1999, Go accused her rival Cirilo Quilala of masterminding the murder and went on to retain her seat.94 A major source of electoral violence in Ilocos Norte was a thriving “cottage industry” of hired assassins in Ilocos towns. A hit could cost as much as PhP50,000 (US$ 1,000) or as little as a cigarette or bottle of gin between friends.95 Killers usually lived in one town but operated in another. Among them were former paramilitaries and many worked as bodyguards of local politicians. For instance, it is likely that a judge who had handled high profile election protests in Paoay and Currimao was killed by such guns-for-hire.96 The killing had a chilling effect on involved officials from the Commission on Elections.97 91 Luz Rimban, "Breaking the Cycle of Election Violence," in Democracy at Gunpoint: Election-Related Violence in the Philippines, ed. Yvonne Chua and Luz Rimban (Quezon City: Vera Files Inc., 2011), xiii-xiv. 92 Cristina Arzadon, "Ilocos Norte Arms Buildup Revealed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 8, 2001. 93 Cristina Arzadon, Kira Espino, and Edwin Fernandez, "2 Dead in Pre-Election Violence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 27, 2001. 94 Jerry Esplanada, "Guns-for-Hire Sow Terror in Ilocos Norte Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 6, 2001. 95 "Guns-for-Hire Thrives in Ilocos Towns," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 9, 2001. 96 "Resolution 1-008-62 For: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life (Murder, of Ariston Rubio)," (Commission on Human Rights, June 15, 2009). 97 Cristina Arzadon, "4 Gunmen Assassinate Ilocos Judge," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2001. See also "Judge's Slay Sends Fear to Officials of Comelec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 10, 2001. 38 Additional police and military personnel were also sent to critical areas where private armed groups were entrenched, including municipalities in Ilocos Sur, Abra, Cagayan, Isabela, Pangasinan, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur.98 Days before the polls, Abra was placed under full Commission on Elections (COMELEC) control.99 In San Pablo town, Isabela, the regional police director replaced the 21-member police force for allegedly interfering in partisan politics.100 However, active duty military, police, and paramilitary personnel often engaged in harassment, intimidation and lethal violence during elections, moonlighting as muscle for politicians’ private armies.101 As former high ranking officials in the military and police began running for office themselves, army deployment during elections raised fears in some places that the troops were there to “ensure” a favorable outcome for the ex-generals.102 The 2001 Congressional and local elections prompted a quick re-alignment of central-local alliances, severing ties with deposed president Joseph Estrada—ousted in January—in favor of Gloria Arroyo. During the swift and turbulent transition, the Northern Luzon races relied heavily on the support of national politicians. If they did 98 Volt Contreras, "100 Private Armies of Candidates Listed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19, 2001. 99 PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Abra Placed under Control of Comelec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 13, 2001. 100 Estanislao Caldez, "Isabela Town Cops Fall Victims to Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2001. 101 Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, "Executive Summary of "a Journey Towards H.O.P.E. The Independent Commission against Private Amies Report to the President," (2010). 102 During the 2010 elections in Pangasinan, for instance, while the military justified their presence by claiming that rebels had been sighted in the area, military activity fueled suspicions that they were there to ensure the victory in the congressional race of former Armed Forces chief of staff and retired general Hermogenes Esperon. Gabriel Cardinoza, "Pangasinan Execs Ask Comelec: Remove Troops Now from Villages," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 9, 2010. Moreover, the 2010 election ushered a number of former police and military officials into electoral races for local executive positions in towns and cities. Gabriel Cardinoza and Yolanda Sotelo, "Pangasinan New Battlefield for Lawmen-Turned-Pols," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 3, 2010. 39 not have direct access to the new president, it was prudent to gain Arroyo’s good graces and the advantages of incumbency with it.103 Ilocos Norte realignments. The Marcoses in Ilocos Norte were among the earliest to withdraw their support for Estrada.104 It initially seemed that the erstwhile “Solid North” voting bloc may have lived and died with former president Ferdinand Marcos. The Fariñas clan had expanded into the political vacuum left by the Marcos family, which President Fidel Ramos had allowed to return from exile in 1993 after Marcos had died in 1989. The split between Marcos and Fariñas influence divided electoral races across the Northern Luzon provinces in Ilocos Sur, La Union, Benguet and Isabela. A local analyst described the realignments created by the Marcos dynasty’s climb back to power in mythic terms, likening it to a game of gods and monsters.105 From 2001, the Marcoses began to “take back” Ilocos.106 The Marcos siblings ran unopposed for re-election to second terms – Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for governor and Imee Marcos for congress. 107 They resurrected their father’s party Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, Movement for a New Society) with a highly successful slate that mixed Marcos relatives and those from old, “familiar” clans who served in office at one point during Marcos’s 20-year rule.108 By 2007, the Fariñases were mainly 103 PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Singsons, Josons Lead Local Battles," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 2, 2001. 104 Tonette Orejas et al., "Ouster Reshapes Politics in North," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 22, 2001. 105 Frank Cimatu, "How Ilocano Politicians Play Gods and Monsters," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 17, 2001. 106 PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Poll Winners: Same Names, Same Families," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2001. 107 Cristina Arzadon, "Marcoses Take Back Ilocos Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 16, 2001. 108 Apart from the established political dynasties, 2001 also ushered in the rise to power of political families such as the Saleses in Pagudpud, despite suspicion that Reynolan Sales was behind the killing of his rival and former mayor Rafael Benemerito, a scion of the town’s 40 limited to Laoag City while the Marcoses consolidated their dominance in provincial and congressional positions, including three-term governor Marcos, Jr.’s unopposed bid for a congressional seat vacated by his sister.109 Despite Ilocos Norte being the site of much electoral violence in the region, the Marcoses were not directly implicated in any of the violence. Once Marcos, Jr. was provincial governor, however, the entry of additional troops and police during the 2004 elections prompted concern that the deployment meant to sow fear among his rivals.110 A dynasty topples in Isabela. Voters in Isabela province rejected dynastic politics and violence in the 2004 and 2010 elections. The scaling up of electoral violence in the province, blamed on incumbent Governor Faustino Dy, Jr., precipitated the shift. Several assassinations and attempted killings occurred prior to a 2003 special election, including the murder of a political operative who had been a long-time Dy ally but switched allegiance unexpectedly. 111 In the synchronized national and local polls the following year, the Dy clan attempted to silence unfavorable political commentary against them. Cauayan City mayor Caesar Dy ordered the closure of two radio stations, ostensibly for an alleged zoning infraction months prior to the May vote.112 Governor Dy approved the issuance of shotguns to longest standing political clan. "In Ilocos, Politics Is 'All in the Family'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 30, 2001. 109 Inquirer Northern Luzon and Inquirer Central Luzon, "After a Century, Political Clan Still Rules," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2007. 110 Cristina Arzadon et al., "More Troops Deployed to Ilocos Norte, Cavite," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2004. 111 Villamor Visaya, "Lone Gunman Shoots, Wounds Vice Mayor of Isabela Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2003. "NPAs Disown Killing of Village Chief," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 19, 2003. 112 "Mayor Orders Closure of 2 Radio Stations," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 20, 2004. "Bishop Asks Mayor to Let Radio Stations Go on Air," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2004. 41 over 1,000 village heads, denying that the firearms were meant to harass opposition candidates during the campaign period.113 Much was at stake in the 2004 gubernatorial election in Isabela. Governor Dy’s father and brother had held the office before him while several family members occupied seats throughout the province. He faced a formidable opponent in Grace Padaca, a popular radio commentator who nearly defeated his brother, Benjamin Dy III, in the 2001 third district congressional race. For decades, beginning with the family patriarch and long-time governor, Faustino Dy, Sr., the Dys dominated Isabela politics but left the province underdeveloped. Padaca had spent 14 years in broadcast journalism, speaking against the province’s stagnant rural economy, corruption, illegal gambling, logging and environmental degradation.114 Defeating Faustino Dy, Jr. in 2004, Grace Padaca took office as provincial governor and ended 32 uninterrupted years of the Dy clan’s dominance of the office.115 In the 2007 polls, the Dys suffered another blow and lost the support of the Albano family, ending a 30-year alliance between the two most prominent political dynasties in Isabela. The Dys fielded former governor Benjamin Dy, Jr. (another brother of Faustino Dy, Jr.) for governor, while the Albanos endorsed the incumbent Padaca.116 President Arroyo tried to broker a deal to limit the contest to only the Albanos and the Dys, to the exclusion of Padaca. Failing to do so, Arroyo then 113 "1,000 Village Chairs Armed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2004. "Grace Padaca (2008 Magsaysay Awardee for Government Service) ", Ramon Magsaysay Awardees, http://rmaward.asia/awardees/padaca-grace/. 115 Lito Salatan, "This Early, Dy Cohorts Plotting Padaca Recall," The Philippine Star June 14, 2004, http://www.philstar.com/nation/253870/early-dy-cohorts%C2%91plotting%C2%92-padaca-recall. 116 Villamor Visaya, "Palace-Brokered Isablea Deal Collapses," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 11, 2007. 114 42 endorsed the candidacy of Dy over Padaca.117 Padaca won the election with a lead of over 17,000 votes. The conflict continued to fester after the election and Benjamin Dy, Jr. maintained an election protest against the incumbent Padaca. Near the end of her second term, suspected contract assassins killed Michael Valdez, who was an election supervisor for Isabela and Cagayan provinces of the COMELEC.118 A month after the murder, the COMELEC unseated Padaca in favor of Dy after a recount of votes showed that Dy led Padaca by over 1,000 votes. The reversal was criticized for being part of a larger pattern of COMELEC decisions to oust opposition politicians from their seats at President Arroyo’s behest, including Bulacan governor Joselito Mendoza and Pampanga governor Eddie Panlilo. 119 COMELEC officials had also been increasingly targeted over recent years throughout Northern Luzon.120 117 Charlie Lagasca, "Arroyo Endorses Dy vs Padaca for Isabela Gov," The Philippine Star February 22, 2007, http://www.philstar.com/nation/386149/arroyo-endorses-dy-vs-padacaisabela-gov. 118 Villamor Visaya, "Top Isabela Comelec Exec Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 15, 2009. 119 Gabriel Cardinoza, "Poll Exec: Rule on Padaca Ain't Syndicate Work," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 12, 2009. 120 Two months prior to the election, gunmen assassinated Rodolfo Ruiz, the town election registrar of Natividad, Pangasinan; Ruiz’s house had been strafed with gunfire also in November the year before. Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Pangasinan Poll Exec Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2004. In 2005, Eugenia Vinluan-Campol, a lawyer at the Public Attorney’s Office who had won several election-related cases against Abra officials, was assassinated in Baguio City shortly after relocating from Abra. Vincent Cabreza, "Increased Protection for Lawyers Sought," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 10, 2005. In Luna, Apayao, COMELEC provincial supervisor Julius Angadol was killed on his way to work on September 7, 2006. Jolene Bolambot, Jhunnex Napallacan, and Joey Gabieta, "Bloody Thursday: Ex-Gov, Leftist, Poll Official Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2006. Although the case ultimately did not prosper, police filed murder charges La Union congressman Tomas Dumpit and his son, for allegedly ordering the assassination of Commission on Elections officer, Filemon Asperin. Asperin may have refused to fix an election to favor a Dumpit clan member. Luige del Puerto, "Solon Sued for Murder of Poll Exec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 5, 2006. Peter La Julian, "Prime Suspect Claims Police Torture," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2006. 43 After breaking the Dy dynasty’s hold on Isabela province for two terms, Padaca lost the gubernatorial seat to Benjamin Dy III in the 2010 elections. 121 Celebrated in the media as a “giant slayer”, Padaca led Isabela province’s brief detour from dynastic dominance. From above, she had no central support for the reforms she pursued. It is even likely that President Arroyo had targeted her and other reformist, opposition governors that lost their seats around the same time. Dy’s allies, entrenched in Isabela’s municipalities, stymied her efforts from below. 122 While Padaca played the role of David to the Dy dynasy’s Goliath, it is unclear how pivotal the support of other powerful dynasties in Isabela was to her success. Apart from the aforementioned Albanos, the Uy dynasty—a rival of the Dy clan—had also backed Padaca.123 Elections continued to be violent, although the violence shifted downwards to towns and villages—often directed against campaigners rather than candidates.124 Florante Raspado had been Jones town mayor for a maximum of three terms until 2013. That year, his wife Elaine ran for mayor and he won as her vice mayor. However, Leticia Sebastian defeated Elaine Raspado and took office. Raspado had planned to regain the mayoral post in 2016, with Councilor Melanie Uy as his running mate. A year before the elections, two former soldiers-turned-assassins barged into the Jones Town municipal hall and killed Raspado and one of Uy’s security aides.125 121 Villamor Visaya and Tonette Orejas, "Grace Padaca Weeps for Isabela; among Ed Goes Back to Priesthood," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2010. 122 Isa Lorenzo, "Isabela's Non-Dynasty Detour," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism April 11, 2007, http://pcij.org/stories/isabelas-non-dynasty-detour/. 123 Lito Salatan, "Padaca Vows Jueteng-Free Isabela under Her Watch," The Philippine Star July 1, 2004, http://www.philstar.com/nation/255930/padaca-vows-jueteng-free-isabelaunder-her-watch. 124 Jaymee Gamil, "Poll-Related Violence on the Rise--PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 30, 2016. 125 This could have been a second attempt against Raspado’s life. In September 2014, police arrested three men allegedly contracted to kill Raspado and Uy. Juliane Love De Jesus, "Jones, Isabela Vice Mayor, Security Aide Gunned Down in Municipal Hall," Philippine 44 A month before the May 2016 elections, the NPA’s Benito Tesorio Command killed Raspado’s successor, Vice Mayor Rolando Lucas, after first detaining him and his companions for allegedly violating the terms of the NPA’s permit to campaign by buying votes and carrying firearms.126 Hours later, a Lucas supporter named Heinrich Apostol was shot dead in Jones town. Apostol was San Isidro village chief and Nationalist People’s Coaltion (NPC) candidate for town councilor.127 Days prior to the election, three Uy supporters were killed, also in Jones Town.128 Unhappy families. Dynasty building, through keeping politics in the family, and domination, by limiting competition from outside the family, often resulted in bitter feuding within political families. For instance, by 2010, factionalism divided the Marcos dynasty. Imee Marcos squared off against her nephew and incumbent Michael Keon for the position of governor. Imee and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. had supported Keon in 2007 but they split along national party affiliations in 2007. Keon remained with the ruling party Lakas-Kampi-CMD while Marcos, Jr. joined the Nacionalista Party’s slate in a successful bid for the national Senate.129 In La Union, the Ortega dynasty was so entrenched that family members had to avoid running against each other in the 2016 elections. For example, three Ortega brothers in major elective posts each faced term limits barring them from running for re-election. As a result, different members of the Ortega clan began clamoring to run, Daily Inquirer June 19, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/699554/jones-isabela-vice-mayorsecurity-aide-gunned-down-in-municipal-hall. Villamor Visaya, "Isabela Town Hall Slays: 2 Former Soldiers Held," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 21, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/699786/isabela-town-hall-slays-2-former-soldiersheld#ixzz4PsMNCYVx 126 "Isabela Vice Mayor Shot Dead by Rebels--Police," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 13, 2016. 127 Villamor Visaya and Armand Galang, "2 Bets Dead in Gun Attacks in Isabela, N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2016. 128 Inquirer Bureaus, "Security Beefed up in Provinces for Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9, 2016. 129 Cristina Arzadon, "Politics Takes a New Turn in Ilocos Norte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 7, 2011. 45 even against each other.130 Brothers, nephews and other relations initially filed against each other for seats in Congress, the mayoralty of San Fernando City and the provincial governor’s office.131 Ultimately, San Fernando city mayor Pablo Ortega dissuaded two of his brothers and a sister-in-law from running against him as First District representative, and the eldest brother, Victor, ran for San Fernando mayor with the younger Jose Maria as his running mate. 132 Pablo’s nephew, Victor Emmanuel, persisted in running against him; another brother Mario ran for governor against his nephew Francisco Emmanuel. Local Elite Pact in Ilocos Sur Although there was considerable violence in the local elections, a large part of avoiding political violence is intra-elite moderation. Singson had a long history of deploying violence to eliminate rivals and threats to his incumbency. Yet after decades of brutal violence, Strongman Luis “Chavit” Crisologo Singson solidified his dynasty’s dominance by engineering contestless elections and distributing political offices among family members and cronies. An alliance with President Arroyo endorsed Singson’s consolidation of political power. Singson was born into an inconsequential offshoot of the Crisologo family, a prominent Ilocos clan. His uncle, Floro Crisologo, was the congressional representative of Ilocos Sur for 24 years immediately after World War II. Crisologo’s wife, Singson’s maternal aunt, was provincial governor from 1964 to 1971. In the 1960s, Crisologo imposed a blockade that prevented tobacco producers from transporting or selling outside the province, forcing them to sell only to the 130 Yolanda Sotelo, "Cracks in La Union's Ortega Clan Show," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 26, 2015. 131 Yolanda Sotelo and Anselmo Roque, "In La Union Elections, It's Ortega vs Ortega," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2015. 132 Inquirer Bureaus, "In Local Races, Same Faces, Same Families," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 13, 2015. 46 Crisologos’ Fortune Tobacco.133 Singson defied his uncle, and in retaliation Crisologo attempted to expropriate Singson’s Vigan Electric Company and remit its profits to the provincial treasurer. 134 After Crisologo was assassinated during mass at the provincial capital’s cathedral in 1970, suspicion fell on Singson. Over the years, even in the absence of proof or criminal conviction, the brazen assassination of Crisologo cemented Singson’s reputation as a quintessential local strongman.135 The murder prompted a public clamor to disband politician’s private armies and President Marcos vowed to do so in his 1972 State of the Nation Address.136 Months later, Marcos declared Martial Law and dismantled private armed groups selectively. As for Singson, he won the 1971 provincial election and remained governor of Ilocos Sur until the end of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. Pushed out for a term under the Corazon Aquino government’s purge of Marcos allies, Singson regained the gubernatorial office for three consecutive terms from 1992 to 2001, and was governor again from 2004 to 2007 and 2010 until 2013, when he retired from elected office. During the gaps, his trusted vice governor Deogracias Victor Savellano held the post. By the 1990s, Singson was one of three main operators of an illegal numbers game, jueteng, and the key player in Northern Luzon.137 Jueteng and similar betting schemes are popular throughout the country with bets as low as a few pesos making it widely accessible. The illicit business generates profits for operators as well as 133 Ellen Tordesillas, "Chavit Singson," in Hot Money, Warm Bodies: The Downfall of President Joseph Estrada, ed. Greg Hutchinson (Manila: Anvil, 2001), 42. 134 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "Chavit Singson: Ilocos 'Folk Hero' a Blast from the Past," GMA News Online May 4, 2007, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/content/40959/chavit-singson-ilocos-folk-hero-ablast-from-the-past/story/. 135 Caroline Hau, "Of Strongmen and the State," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, no. 1 March 2002, https://kyotoreview.org/issue-1/of-strongmen-and-the-state/. 136 Filemon Tutay, "Who Me?," The Philippine Free Press Online, February 5, 1972. 137 Alfred McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 475. 47 kickbacks for local politicians and police to turn a blind eye. In the late 1990s, bribery rates for Ilocos Sur went as high as PhP 1 million (US$ 20,000) for the regional Philippine National Police (PNP) director, PhP 500,000 (US$ 10,000) for the provincial police chief, and PhP 7,500 (US$ 150) to PhP 30,000 (US$ 600) for the municipal police chief, depending on the size of the town. 138 President Joseph Estrada’s ambition to centralize control of both illegal and legal gambling resulted in a power struggle between Singson and the other gambling operators.139 Claiming that he had survived an assassination attempt, on October 3, 2000, Singson publicly exposed Estrada’s acceptance of jueteng protection bribes as well as proceeds from a tobacco tax in Ilocos Sur. This precipitated impeachment proceedings against Estrada, street protests, and finally a military-backed succession to then vice president Gloria Arroyo, who was proclaimed president on January 20, 2001. During Arroyo’s long tenure from 2001 to 2010, Singson benefited from the pivotal role that he played in Estrada’s fall. First of all, Singson was pardoned for his own participation in the crimes for which Estrada was eventually convicted of plunder.140 In 2001, Singson kept to a pledge not to run in the elections. In the crucial May 2001 elections and the reorientation of political alignments to President Arroyo, Singson was given a free hand to choose the candidates for central support.141 He thus successfully fielded family members (including his wife, his brother, a son and a niece) and allies for positions at the Ilocos Sur provincial level for governor, vice 138 Peter Kreuzer, "Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime," (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2009), 23. 139 For an excellent account of the inter-connections between policing, jueteng and politics that led to Estrada’s ouster, see McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, 471-96. 140 While granted immunity from charges related to the Estrada case, Singson still faces graft charges filed in the Office of the Ombudsman for the diversion of Ilocos Sur’s tobacco excise tax in 2001. Reynaldo Santos and Michael Bueza, "Cast in Erap Plunder Case: Where Are They Now?," Rappler April 24, 2014, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/56022-cast-erap-plunder-case. 141 Tordesillas, 45. 48 governor, provincial board (legislature) member, congress as well as Vigan city mayor and councilor. He also reportedly reconciled with an estranged cousin to forestall competition over the gubernatorial contest. 142 Sheltered by President Arroyo’s favor, Singson allegedly wielded violence with impunity in the province. The widow of Ilocos Sur provincial auditor Agustin Chan, who was ambushed by gunman in September 2001, accused Singson of masterminding the assassination. Decrying police inaction on the case, the local group Save Ilocos Sur Alliance claimed that their own investigation found that Chan had been investigating Singson over the use of public funds from a tobacco excise tax.143 The group and other provincial organizations had been clamoring for corruption investigations against the governor even before Estrada’s downfall. Some members had kept to a “resign all” demand during the height of the anti-Estrada protests, arguing that Singson should also face the consequences for his crimes. However, the President Arroyo’s protection was likely to have reinforced Singson’s position as Ilocos Sur’s political kingpin and deflated moves to hold him to account.144 Singson was also implicated in an ambush attempt made on a known dzXE Vigan radio broadcaster and political rival, former Provincial Board member Efren Rafanan. Rafanan, one of Singson’s former closest political allies, had helped found Singson’s political party, Bileg, in 1998. The two fell out over the gubernatorial race in 2001, with Singson backing the candidacy of Victor Savellano and Rafanan defiantly running in opposition.145 Rafanan was wounded but his wife, teenage son, 142 Inquirer Bureaus, "Marcoses, Singsons, Dys, Ortegas, Josons Winning." Frank Cimatu and Leoncio Balbin, "Chavit Tagged Brains in Killing: Ex-Gov Says Accusation Part of Erap Plot to Extract Revege," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 10, 2003. 144 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism., “Chavit Singson: Ilocos Folk Hero”. 145 Anselmo Roque and Leoncio Balbin, "Homegrown Political Parties Test Their Mettle on May 14," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9, 2004. 143 49 brother and security aide were all killed when armed men fired on their vehicle.146 Rafanan claimed that he had been warned in the months prior that Singson had been “talking to soldiers and businessmen to arrange Rafanan’s assassination” and cautioned against further radio commentaries that would anger the powerful provincial boss.147 Moreover, another assassination bid linked to Singson was made on Robert Segismundo, the elder brother of the founder of Save Ilocos Sur Alliance and Rafanan ally Nestor Segismundo.148 Apart from investigating the Agustin Chan case, the group had initiated a string of graft cases against Singson and other Ilocos Sur officials. Nestor Segismundo was himself shot and wounded the following year.149 In 2007, Singson decided to run for a national senate seat on Arroyo’s slate while supporting family members locally.150 He lost the election and, as a consolation, Arroyo appointed him Deputy National Security Adviser. 151 When he brutally tortured his former domestic partner Rachel Tiongson and her boyfriend in 2009, he boasted on national television that he was able to keep them under surveillance using official equipment and personnel.152 Unscathed by the scandal, Singson served a final term in the governor’s office from 2010 to 2013. Meanwhile, the Singson scions 146 Leoncio Balbin, "Reward up for Arrest of Ilocos Attackers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 2, 2003. 147 Christian Esguerra, "It's Chavit, Massacre Survivor Insists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 14, 2003. 148 Blanche Rivera, "Killings Continue; Comelec Sees 80-85% Turnout," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2004. 149 Luige del Puerto and Armand Nocum, "Ilocos Sur Cop Chief Sacked over Shooting of Newsman," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 4, 2005. 150 Inquirer Northern Luzon and Inquirer Central Luzon., “After a Century, Political Clan Still Rules”. 151 "Arroyo Names Chavit Singson Deputy Nat'l Security Adviser," GMA News Online September 6, 2008, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/118617/arroyo-nameschavit-singson-deputy-nat-l-security-adviser/story/. 152 Marya Salamat, "Chavit Beating: Arroyo Denouced for Looking the Other Way," Bulatlat.com September 10, 2009, http://bulatlat.com/main/2009/09/10/arroyo-denouncedfor-looking-the-other-way-in-chavit-mess/. 50 maintained their clan’s dominance over the positions of provincial governor and congress. Scant months prior to the filing of candidacy for the 2013 elections, Singson pulled out of the race.153 Singson and son Eric held meetings with mayors and their rivals to push for a consensus to minimize electoral competition. Consequently, in the 2013 elections, 18 towns in Ilocos Sur had candidates for mayor running unopposed.154 This was an unprecedented number of unopposed candidatures in the Ilocos region and among them were several Singson clan members. The governorship itself was contested, however. Former police chief inspector and multi-awarded mayor of Tagudin town, Roque Verzosa, ran against Ryan Singson for Ilocos Sur governor with Singson adversary Rafanan as his running mate.155 Still, Ryan Singson trounced Verzosa, garnering more than twice the votes of the latter. The clan also expanded its reach into other realms of local office. While the party list system is meant to allow representation of marginalized sectors rather than mainstream political parties, a 2013 Supreme Court decision relaxed the rules and paved the way for political dynasties to field candidates for these congressional seats. In the 2016 elections, examples included the political party Abono in La Union and Pangasinan, and Ilocos Sur’s Grace Singson of the Association for the Development Dedicated to Agriculture and Fisheries.156 The Singson case demonstrates that a local strongman may have the wherewithal to consolidate political domination and de-escalate the use of political 153 Leoncio Balbin, "Chavit Drops out of Ilocos Sur Race," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 6, 2012. 154 Frank Cimatu, "Ilocos Sur Politics Still under Spell of Chavit," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2013. 155 Leoncio Balbin, "In Ilocos, an Unlikely Challenger vs Singson," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 7, 2012. 156 Tina Santos, "All in the Family: Pols Use Party-Lists for Dynasties," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2016. 51 violence. A period of unbroken central support during Arroyo’s long incumbency facilitated Singson’s ability to exclude serious contenders or co-opt them. Singson may have also applied strategies that served him as a regional and national jueteng kingpin. The long persistence of this poor man’s betting game has relied upon its shadowy operators to settle disputes, turf clashes and takeovers through mediation rather than outright violence.157 Often, like Chavit Singson, jueteng leaders were also community leaders, depended upon for patronage and other forms of economic and social assistance. Indeed, when he was Estrada’s jueteng bagman, Singson worked effectively with the gambling bosses of Northern Luzon, defining and allocating each one a territory in order to manage and forestall conflict.158 Queen Takes King off Abra Chessboard Abra province hosts the highest concentration of armed factions in Northern Luzon, including the NPA, the NPA breakaway Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), and politicians’ private armies. Political contests remain bloody, despite repeated central efforts to dismantle armed groups. Police describe the ultimate futility of the dismantling process as a “never ending cycle” of arrest, release, rearrest and further release.159 Yet several investigations have exposed practices like military “donations” of firearms, bullets and other supplies to politicians’ private armed groups in the province.160 The military and the police have also been known to support opposing factions in Abra’s ever-shifting political battlefield. The presence of insurgent group factions manifests itself in the partisan involvement of the military, in 157 Kreuzer, 25. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, 478. 159 Vincent Cabreza and Desiree Caluza, "Why Private Armies Thrive in Abra," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 5, 2010. 160 Artha Kira Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 224. 158 52 particular. The proliferation of political armed groups sustains a security dilemma, making private armies an indispensable political resource.161 In the 2000s, Governor Vicente Valera was the biggest employer of private armed groups in the province.162 Valera came from the Paredes-Valera dynasty that had dominated local politics in Abra until the mid-1960s.163 After the end of the Marcos regime, the central government purged local offices and appointed officers-incharge until elections. President Corazon Aquino had appointed Valera to the governorship in this manner in 1986. Winning in the 1988 election, he served as governor for the maximum of three successive terms until 1998. After a term in Congress, Valera immediately pledged allegiance to President Arroyo when Joseph Estrada was ousted, and he then successfully ran for governor in May, 2001. 164 Those polls and the run-up to the 2004 elections were marred with violence, including the assassination of two of Abra’s mayors and around seven barangay chairpersons.165 As observed by a Cordillera politician: “the pawns go first; the more pawns a player has on the board, the better shielded the king is from attack”.166 However, the fault-line in Abra politics was between Governor Valera and an alliance of the Luna and Bernos political clans.167 Valera and his followers commanded an estimated two-thirds of the ten major private armies in Abra.168 161 "The Assassins of Abra: 'Just Like Killing Chicken'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2004. 162 "Cops Says Private Armies Make Peace in Abra 'Elusive'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 16, 2004. 163 Ma. Ayn Ballesta, "The Blood Politics of Abra," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism February 14, 2007, http://pcij.org/stories/the-blood-politics-of-abra/. 164 Orejas et al., “Ouster Re-shapes Politics in the North”. 165 Frank Cimatu et al., "Mayor Shot inside Church," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 30, 2002. 166 Artha Kira Paredes, "Pawns in Abra Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2004. 167 In 2002, for instance, Tineg mayor Clarence Benwaren, a Cordillera leader allied then with the Lunas and Bernoses, may have been assassinated by his vice mayor and Valera ally, Edwin Crisologo. PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Abra Mayor's Kin Pin Murder on Vice 53 Violence continued even after the 2004 elections were over, prompting the central government to create Task Force Abra later that year, aimed at dismantling private armed groups in the employ of local politicians. Police kept close watch of Abra towns, particularly Lagayan, in anticipation of a possible outbreak of violence weeks before the election.169 Governor Valera successfully ran for re-election against Lagayan town mayor Cecilia Luna’s husband, while Valera’s wife, Ma. Zita ClaustroValera, ran for mayor of Bangued, the provinces capital and center of commerce. Four other Valeras of different lineages of the clan ran for office in Bangued and Lagayan.170 After the polls, an alleged Valera plot to kill Lagayan mayor Luna was exposed. Two soldiers claimed that Governor Vicente Valera plotted with their commanding officer, Lt. Col. Noel Mislang of the 41st Infantry Battalion and Governor Vicente Valera to kill Mayor Luna and her family.171 In December 2004, five days after executing sworn statements accusing Governor Valera of the assassination orders, gunmen ambushed the two soldiers when they were in Aurora, Isabela and one was killed. 172 The army discharged Mislang and the Department of the Interior transferred police officers out of the region, also suspending local executives’ supervision and control of the police.173 Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 31, 2002. The Cordillera People’s Liberation Army is discussed further in the last section of this chapter. 168 Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," 216. 169 Christian Esguerra, "PNP Fears Bloody Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2004. See also Villamor Visaya and Artha Kira Paredes, "Rebs Bar Mayor from Sorties, Says Gov," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 1, 2004. 170 PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Central Luzon: Aquino-Cojuangco Most Durable, Unique," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2004. 171 Christian Esguerra and Artha Kira Paredes, "Army Officer Sacked for Order to Kill Abra Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 24, 2004. 172 Norman Bordadora, "Corporal Files Murder Raps vs Abra Governor, Colonel," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 12, 2005. 173 Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra: Bloody Struggle for Control of Public Funds," in Democracy at Gunpoint: Election-Related Violence in the Philippines, ed. Yvonne Chua and Luz Rimban (Quezon City: Vera Files Inc., 2011), 227. 54 La Paz municipal mayor Marc Bernos decried Valera’s use of violence against his political opponents as a “reign of terror”.174 Yet the Luna and Bernos factions were also responsible for political violence in the province. La Paz Mayor Joseph Sto. Niño Bernos and his father, Andres Bernos, vice mayor of Danglas town, were charged with masterminding several political assassinations carried out by the younger Bernos’s bodyguard. The victims included Joel Afos in 2002, La Paz vice mayoral candidate Ruben Afos in 2004 and William Sagun in 2006. 175 Valera supporters were targeted in particular.176 Matters came to a head in 2006. Marc Bernos, was himself gunned down in January.177 Later that year, two assailants on a motorcycle shot and killed James Bersamin, a member of the Abra provincial board.178 Police initially filed charges against paid assassins, and dismissed the possibility that the killing was “politically motivated. 179 However, former army sergeant Rufino Panday shot dead Abra Congressman Luis Bersamin in December, 2006.180 Bersamin had planned to run for governor, ending a long-standing political alliance with Governor Valera.181 Panday 174 Norman Bordadora and Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra Mayor Sues Governor, Colonel for Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2005. 175 Vincent Cabreza, "Abra Congress Bet, Father Face Murder Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 2, 2016. In 2003, moreover, Luna’s son was charged with the killing of police officer Jesus Trinidad of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Jovelyn Reyes, "Cops Hunt Son of Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2003. 176 In 2004 for example, unidentified gunmen made an attempt on the life of Marino Bicera, consultant to Governor Vicente Valera in Bengued. Artha Kira Paredes, "Consultant Shot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2004. 177 Luige del Puerto and Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra Town Mayor Slain by Lone Assassin," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2006. 178 Artha Kira Paredes and Frank Cimatu, "Abra Provincial Exec Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 12, 2006. 179 Artha Kira Paredes, "2 Suspects in Murder of Abra Board Exec Charged," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 14, 2006. 180 See Philip Tuboza and Nancy Carvajal, "Solon Shot Dead at Church," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 17, 2006. 181 Artha Kira Paredes, "Solon Had Planned to Run for Gov," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 18, 2006. 55 testified that he assassinated Bersamin at Valera’s behest.182 Although witnesses later recanted as the case against Valera advanced, the families of the slain Bersamins, Benwaren and Bernos believe that Valera was responsible for the killings.183 From 2001 to 2007, one estimate of Abra’s electoral violence counts 19 Abra politicians and 13 barangay councilors murdered.184 Valera reportedly fell out with President Arroyo and the withdrawal of critical political support sealed Valera’s fate.185 The campaign season in 2007 was tense: Abra was once again placed under COMELEC control in view of potential violence and the previous year’s murders.186 Valera was the incumbent but, unable to run, he fielded his wife, Bangued mayor Ma. Zita Valera, for governor. The days surrounding the May 2007 election were fraught with violence.187 Brenda Cardenas-Crisologo, wife of Tineg town mayor, was shot while observing the canvassing of votes on May 17, and died a little over a month later.188 The gunman was a poll watcher of Crisologo’s rival and brother of the late Tineg mayor Clarence Benwaren, Lenin Benwaren. A local judge ordered the arrest of Benwaren, Bangued mayor Ryan Luna and six other suspects for the shooting.189 Ultimately, the Valeras lost their 20-year grip on the governorship as Eustaquio 182 Dona Pazzibugan, "Abra Gov Linked to Solon's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 23, 2006. 183 Frank Cimatu, "Widows, Orphans of Slain Abra Politicos Unite to Fight Valeras," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 29, 2006. 184 Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," 216-19. 185 "The Bersamin Killing: Who Really Benefited from His Death?," ABS-CBN News December 16, 2011, http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/12/15/11/abra. 186 Alcuin Papa and Nikko Dizon, "Abra Placed under Comelec Control," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 21, 2007. 187 An attack on mayoral candidate Esther Bernos resulted in the death of police officer Jeoffrey Ponce in Danglas amid the May 2007 polls. Inquirer Southern Luzon et al., "Violence Rages on Eve of Polls; 4 More Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 14, 2007. Barangay captain of Layugan village in Bucay town was killed by local councilor Jojo Sales on election day. Alcuin Papa et al., "10 Dead on Election Day, Including 3 in Masbate," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2007. 188 Frank Cimatu, "Abra Mayor's Wife Dies One Month after Shooting," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 25, 2007. 189 Vincent Cabreza, "Cops Try, Fail to Arrest Abra Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2013. 56 Bersamin, brother of the assassinated Luis Bersamin, triumphed over Vicente Valera’s wife. Lagayan town mayor Luna retained her seat.190 About a month before the 2010 elections, tension was high throughout the province and especially so in places like Bangued, where armed men in military uniforms were reportedly going door to door, asking villagers who they would vote for, taking down their names and forcing them to accept PhP 1,000 (US$ 20) to vote for a particular candidate.191 Nonetheless, while the 2010 elections were tense and marred by intimidation, as well as frustration with the high level of police and military presence around the elections, electoral violence was relatively subdued.192 Six months before the 2013 polls, the government announced that 15 provinces were considered at high risk for election violence, five of which were in Northern Luzon – including Abra.193 The national police continued a campaign to control Abra private armed groups, claiming a reduction from 86 to 31 groups in 2012 with maintained monitoring of such towns as Lagayan, Tineg, Bangued, Baay-Licuan, Malibcong, Bucloc and Langiden. 194 In January 2013, Abra governor Eustaquijo Bersamin and mayors or representatives from the province’s 27 towns “surrendered” 179 guns to the PNP: muzzles were covered with masking tape and an identification sticker signed by police officials then returned to their licensed owners, who retain the 190 Inquirer Northern Luzon, Inquirer Central Luzon, and Inquirer Southern Luzon, "Old Fiefdoms Going as Valeras, Josons Tumble," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2007. Valera’s ouster from power had other conseuqences. In December 2008, Nelson Parel, former official of the defunct Cordillera Executive Board and legal adviser to former Abra governor Vincent Valera, was killed in Bangued. His association with Valera had implicated him in the murder of Luis Bersamin. Vincent Cabreza, "Abra Exec Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 31, 2008. 191 Vincent Cabreza, Artha Kira Paredes, and Nestor Burgos, "Poll Terror Tactics Rear Ugly Head Again in Abra," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 9, 2010. 192 Vincent Cabreza, "In Time, Abra Will Change," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2010. 193 Dona Pazzibugan, "Police Launch Drive in 15 Poll 'Hot Spots'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 17, 2012. 194 Desiree Caluza, "Police Claim Success vs Abra Armed Groups," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 25, 2012. 57 right to use them in self-protection; the police only actually retained 45 weapons for safekeeping.195 Violence abated, however one casualty of the polls was recorded that year.196 In 2015, Valera and two other co-conspirators were convicted of masterminding the assassination of Luis Bersamin.197 Valera and police officer Joseph Barreras, one of his police escorts, were also charged with the 2010 murder of Mario Acena, a Luna clan campaigner.198 While the PNP admitted its failure in eliminating private armies nationally, it claimed the crackdown in Abra was its one success.199 Abra’s political leaders signed a peace covenant in the lead-up to the elections the following year.200 With Valera dislodged, violence continued as allegiances shifted and re-shifted among his erstwhile rivals—albeit at a smaller scale.201 Insurgency in the North In Northern Luzon, the NPA maintained four guerrilla fronts in the Cordilleras in the early 2000s, and was active in Ilocos provinces and the Cagayan valley.202 Another front operated from neighboring Central Luzon, also straddling the border into Cagayan Valley in Nueva Vizcaya and the Ilocos region in Eastern Pangasinan. 195 "Abra Politicians Surrender 179 Guns to PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2013. 196 Vincent Cabreza, "This Business of Fixing Abra," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2013. 197 Erika Sauler, "Ex-Abra Gov Found Guilty of Killing Political Rival," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 1, 2015. 198 Cabreza and Caluza. 199 Marlon Ramos, "PNP Admits Failure to Dismantle Private Armies," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 5, 2010. 200 Kimberlie Quitasol and Gabriel Cardinoza, "Abra Political Leaders Sign Covenant for Peaceful Elections," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 9, 2015. 201 See Paredes, "Abra: Bloody Struggle for Control of Public Funds." 202 "The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Diana Rodriguez and Soliman Santos, "Introduction," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 12. 58 The presence of several private armies, particularly in the Cordilleras, and the presence of the NPA and its breakaway Cordillera faction, produced considerable violence in three key periods: political realignment and insurgency tensions from 2001 to 2003; the peak of counter-insurgency and anti-activist killings in 2005 to 2006; and, renewed militarization and struggles over natural resource exploitation from 2011 to 2014 (See Figure 5 below). Figure 5. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon, by Administrative Region 30 25 20 Cagayan 15 Ilocos 10 Cordilleras 5 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table The interference of the NPA in the 2001 elections nationwide was particularly palpable in Northern Luzon. In Isabela, regional police officials reported that the NPA were collecting between PhP10,000 (US$ 200) and PhP50,000 (US$ 1,000) from local candidates for “permits” to campaign.203 Overall however, the chief of the military’s Northern Luzon command said that while the insurgency in the area was declining, rebels collected around PhP300,000 (US$ 6,000) for a “permit-to- 203 Estanislao Caldez, "NPA Campaign Fees," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2001. 59 campaign” in the 2001 elections. 204 In parts of Pangasinan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela, moreover, the NPA routinely extorted businesses to pay “revolutionary” taxes.205 In Isabela, the NPA’s imposition of “permit-to-campaign” fees on candidates before they were allowed into rebel controlled areas resulted in the disarming and holding of Rep. Giorgini Aggabao, Mayor Virgilio Padilla of San Agustin, Mayor Leoncio Kiat of Echague and 20 aides, in February 2004.206 NPA insurgents operating in Isabela stopped the Benito Soliven town mayor from campaigning in areas under their control, until she paid the “permit-to-campaign” fees—estimated at PhP150,000 (US$ 3,000) and weapons. 207 Actions like these eventually became rarer as the military cracked down on insurgent groups in the region. The overlap between the insurgency and local politics was also evident in Kalinga. Peter Dangiwan, a candidate for reelection as Balbalan municipal councilor and member of Bayan Muna, was killed days before the May 2001 election. Bayan Muna officials in Kalinga claim that Dangiwan was silenced for his opposition to militarization and calling for the disbandment of the CAFGU militia in the town.208 Army soldiers had arrested him in 1994 on insurgency suspicions. Tensions arose in 2001 over the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), an indigenous people’s faction that broke away from the NPA in 1986.209 As a consequence of the government’s peace agreement with the CPLA, some 1,200 CPLA 204 Tonette Orejas, "Pols Warned Not to Seek NPA Aid in 2004 Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 4, 2003. 205 "Insurgency Seen as 'Big Business'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2001. 206 Villamor Visaya and Delfin Mallari, "NPAs Hold, Disarm Isabela Congressman," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 26, 2004. 207 Visaya and Paredes., “Rebs Bar Mayor from Sorties, Says Gov”. 208 PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Foe of Militarization Gunned Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2001. 209 Artemio Dumlao, "GMA Coddling 'Terrorist' Force in Cordillera?," Bulatlat.com, no. May 19-25, 2002, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/2-15/2-15-dumlao.html. 60 fighters were merged into the regional security forces for the Cordilleras, with about 270 into the armed forces as soldiers (including 15 as officers), 530 into the paramilitary Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), and the remaining 400 as beneficiaries of government livelihood projects.210 After the 2001 election, Tubo municipal mayor Jose Segundo was assassinated on 27 December, 2001, possibly timed for the 33rd founding anniversary of the CPP and the second anniversary of the assassination of former rebel priest Conrado Balweg, head of the CPLA.211 Police claimed that Segundo had made himself an NPA target by supporting the unification of CPLA factions as a step toward integrating their militiamen into the Philippine military.212 In other cases, NPA members worked as mercenaries and lent their services in the guns-for-hire market in Ilocos. In 2003, suspected NPA insurgents assassinated Mayor Guerrero Zaragoza of Tayug, Pangasinan. 213 However, police identified former Tayug mayor Marius Ladio, who had lost to Zaragoza in the 2001 local elections, as responsible for the hit.214 Police suspected that NPA insurgents also killed Dammao village chief Jaime Baliwag in Gamu town, Isabela, but over a personal land dispute.215 Clashes between soldiers and the NPA, insurgent ambushes and military attacks on civilians were concentrated in Ilocos Sur and neighboring Mountain Province in 210 Soliman Santos, "DDR and 'Disposition of Forces' of Philippine Rebel Groups (Overview)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 143-46. 211 Nathan Alcantara, Yolanda Fuertes, and Tonette Orejas, "Abra Town Mayor Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 28, 2001. 212 Vincent Cabreza, "Slain Mayor Had Links to CPLA, Documents Say," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 3, 2002. The NPA is widely believed to have been responsible for Balweg’s assassination. 213 Dennis Santos and Anthony Allada, "Compostela Valley Mayor 3rd to Be Killed in a Week," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 30, 2003. 214 Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes and Tonette Orejas, "Ex-Mayor Tagged in Mayor's Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 6, 2003. 215 Villamor Visaya, "Village Chief Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 14, 2005. 61 the Cordilleras. Abra-based soldiers killed farmer Johnny Camareg in an alleged shoot-out with the NPA in a Mountain Province town. In a traditional peace pact (bodong) with provincial and town leaders, the military paid PhP 115,000 (US$ 2,300) and pledged a college scholarship to Camareg’s children but denied claims the farmer had died a “wrongful death”. 216 The following year, soldiers killed four unidentified New People’s Army (NPA) fighters who were reportedly members of the Sonang Guerrilla Uno of the NPA’s Ilocos-Cordillera regional party committee that was active in Northern and Southern Ilocos provinces.217 The NPA also exacted a number of losses from military and police targets.218 Local opposition to mining firms operating in an Ilocos Sur town at the border of Abra and Mountain Province also heightened counter-insurgency operations in the area.219 Farther south in the Ilocos region, insurgency-related violence was thick in Pangasinan province, and across in the Cagayan Valley region, in Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela provinces. A spate of violence in 2002 began when soldiers killed Victor Lazo, allegedly the military chief of the New People’s Army’s Josepino Corpuz Command.220 The Josepino Corpuz Command reportedly operated along the borders of the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya and, where the killing occurred, in 216 Frank Cimatu, "Army Pays for Farmer's Death," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8, 2001. 217 Villamor Visaya and Cesar Villa, "4 NPA Rebels Killed, Army Soldier Wounded in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002. 218 Two soldiers were killed in Magsingal town, Ilocos Sur by suspected NPA fighters at the end of 2001. Cristina Arzadon and Desiree Caluza, "2 Gov't Troopers Slain, 2 Injured in Reb Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2001. The NPA raided a Mountain Province detachment and ambushed soldiers from Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon who had been in the area, killing eight soldiers. TJ Burgonio and Nathan Alcantara, "NPAs Slay 8 Soldiers in Mountain Province," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 15, 2003. In September 2003, an NPA raid on an Ilocos Sur police station left one officer dead. Leoncio Balbin, "NPAs Raid Ilocos Sur Police Station," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 17, 2003. 219 Audrey Beltran, "Military Protecting Lepanto Mining in Ilocos Sur?," Bulatlat.com 3, no. 10 April 6-12, 2003, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/3-10/3-10-lepanto.html. 220 Tonette Orejas and Anselmo Roque, "Gov Tops List of NPA Targets," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 2002. 62 Eastern Pangasinan. 221 Four months later in June, soldiers killed Janet Taguba and four others, who were allegedly members of the Filomena Asuncion Front of the NPA operating in northern and eastern Isabela.222 Human rights NGO Karapatan alleged, however, that the rebels were killed while trying to surrender; Taguba was two months pregnant. The military denied the accusation and maintained that the five were killed in a firefight.223 Furthermore, the military began to use lethal violence against activists earlier in Northern Luzon than in other parts of the country.224 However, military violence against insurgents was marked with extrajudicial use of lethal force. In Pangasinan, police and army intelligence officers killed Pablo Buaga, whom they claimed was a “revolutionary tax” collector for the NPA breakaway group in Pangasinan, the Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (RHB, or National Revolutionary Forces). The CHR investigation concluded however that based on witness testimony and forensic analysis from the CHR-conducted autopsy— contrary to the autopsy report of the municipal health officer—that Buaga was summarily executed.225 In Cagayan province, soldiers killed Noel Capili, in what the military alleges to be a legitimate military operation. However, based on a CHR 221 Tonette Orejas, "2 Rebs Slain in Clash after End of Truce," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 2002. 222 Orejas et al. A year prior, soldiers killed two alleged rebels in Umingan, Pangasinan in armed clashes but human rights NGO Karapatan maintained that they were unarmed farmers Remy Rueda Rivera and Adelaida Cabiao. Tonette Orejas and Yolanda Fuertes, "3 Communist Rebels Slain in New Clashes with Gov't Troops in Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 2, 2001. 223 Villamor Visaya and Tonette Orejas, "Rights Groups Accuse Army of Executing Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 25, 2002. 224 In March, 2002, military intelligence took Warlito Nagasao was taken from his home in Isabela and was found dead several days later in Ifugao province in the Cordilleras. Nagasao was a member of Bayan Muna but “suspected as an NPA organizer. "Political Killings in Region 02 as Reported by Karapatan," (January 20, 2006). 225 "Resolution 1-003-26 For: Violation of the Right to Life without Due Process of Law Resulting to the Murder of the Deceased Pablo N. Buaga," (Commission on Human Rights, August 8 2005). 63 investigation of the incident, the CHR lodged a criminal case with the provincial prosecutor, who then charged the involved soldiers with murder.226 The NPA in Northern Luzon stepped up its attacks in the first half of 2005, raiding military installations and making off with armaments.227 In Ilocos Sur and the Cordilleras, the military suffered multiple losses. 228 Retaliation was fierce and civilians bore the brunt of it. For instance, in an Abra town, farmer Francisco Tangbawan was allegedly used by government soldiers as a human shield amid an armed encounter with NPA fighters.229 Tangabawan was killed as a result and BaayLicuan residents asked that the 41 Infantry Battalion be pulled out of Abra over such st violations of human rights. In Isabela province, the military claimed the lives of two fighters from the NPA Central Front of Cagayan Valley as well as the alleged team leader of the Northern Front and two of his fighters.230 Meanwhile, the NPA Benito Tesorio command in Cagayan Valley launched separate ambushes on December 15, 2005, killing four unidentified soldiers.231 Meanwhile, calls for President Arroyo’s impeachment over electoral fraud the year before intensified. As a result, there was a surge in lethal attacks against leftist activists in 2005. Deepening militarization in the Cordilleras, especially Kalinga province, and nearby parts of Ilocos Sur already began to affect civilians and activists 226 "Resolution II-2004-038 For: Murder (of Noel Capili)," (Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2004). 227 Alexander Remollino, "99 Soldiers Killed in NPA Offensives in 4 Months," Bulatlat.com IV, no. 1 June 18, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/06/18/99-soldiers-killed-in-npaoffensives-in-4-months/. 228 In 2005, Corporal Alvin Rambac and eight other soldiers of the 50th Infantry Battalion were killed by suspected NPA fighters in an ambush near Cervantes town, Ilocos Sur. Leoncio Balbin, "9 Soldiers Slain in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 15, 2005. In April 2005, suspected NPA fighters killed Diosdado Claveria, village chief in San Isidro, Abra. Artha Kira Paredes, "Village Chief Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 20, 2005. Suspected NPA rebels killed solders Ricardo Gabriel, Philip Domingo and Albert Again at the Pinukpok-Baiban boundary, Kalinga in November 2005. Dona Pazzibugan, "5 Troopers Killed in Clashes with NPA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 30, 2005. 229 Desiree Caluza, "Abra Townsfolk Seek Pullout of Army Troops," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 10, 2005. 230 Villamor Visaya, "2 Rebels Slain in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 5, 2005. "3 NPA Rebels Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2005. 231 "4 Soldiers Killed in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 19, 2005. 64 the year before.232 However, a series of killings in March signified a shift in the scale of the violence. Paramilitary forces augmented the military capacity, enabling heightened attacks. On March 9, 2005, a gunman from the Revolutionary Proleteriat Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) shot dead Romeo Sanchez in Baguio City. The group is one of the most prominent breakaways from the NPA. After a peace process with the government in 2000, the RPA-ABB was rumored to play a paramilitary role for the government and continued to clash with the NPA.233 Sanchez was the Ilocos regional coordinator for Bayan Muna. 234 The RPA-ABB claimed responsibility for the slaying, stating that Sanchez was a traitor to peasants. The local group Cordillera Human Rights Alliance claimed that the RPA-ABB of Ilocos served as paramilitary forces of the 50 Infantry Battalion in Ilocos Sur.235 In Aringay town th of La Union in March 2005, an unidentified gunman shot and wounded Charles Juloya. Juloya was a member of the Bayan Muna party, a former municipal councilor and brother of a former mayor of the town.236 As the year wore on, more violence mounted in the Cordillera and Ilocos regions.237 232 Abigail Bengwayan, "Groups Decry Atrocities in Cordillera," Bulatlat.com IV, no. 45 December 12-18, 2004, http://bulatlat.com/news/4-45/4-45-cordillera.html. 233 "Rebolusyonaryong Partido Ng Manggagawa Ng Pilipinas (Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines) and Its Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP/RPA-ABB)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups & Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010), 280. 234 Desiree Caluza, Michael Lim Ubac, and Norman Bordadora, "Another Bayan Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11, 2005. 235 "CHR Memorandum Re: Study/Analysis of Reported Political Killings," (2006). 236 Desiree Caluza and Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Cordillera Cops Identify Killer of Ilocos Bayan Muna Leader," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 29, 2005. 237 Jose Manegded, coordinator of the group Rural Missionaries of the Philippines in Cordillera and Ilocos, was allegedly murdered by army captain Joel Castro in November 2005. Desiree Caluza, "Ilocos Cops Tag Army Exec Suspect in Militant's Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2007. In Bangued, Abra, a sheriff of the Department of Agrarian Reform, farmer organizer and human rights activist Albert Terredaño was also murdered that month. "Resolution for CHR/CRC Case No. 06-39 (Re: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life of Albert Terredaño)," (Commission on Human Rights, January 15, 2007). 65 In February 2006, military agents were suspected of killing the Bayan Muna Vice Chair in Pangasinan, Mariano Sepnio.238 A police corporal, Jessie Caranto, was charged with the killing of Calanan village chair Gabriel Lumbican and his father in March 2006 as well as the ambush of Bayan Muna Kalinga chapter chair, Constancio Claver and his family, which resulted in the death of his wife.239 A lone gunman shot Jose Doton, Bayan Muna provincial general secretary, and his brother in San Nicolas town. Doton was the fifth activist murdered that week alone in May, throughout the country.240 Local police alleged that Doton was a victim of an internal purge within the NPA, but leftist groups denied this and accused them of covering up state involvement in the murders.241 The shooter, Joel Flores, was arrested and found guilty of Doton’s murder.242 On May 10, 2006, Bayan Muna Cagayan Valley secretary general Elena Mendiola was killed with her fellow Bayan Muna member and common law partner Ricardo Balauag in Echague, Isabela. This was the second assassination attempt on Mendiola within a 24-hour period. She had led several political protests in the locale, demanding an increase in the purchase price for rice and corn produced by farmers.243 The following month, Rafael Bangit, a key leader of the Cordillera People’s Alliance 238 Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Bayan Member Shot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 12, 2006. Manny Galvez, "Maybe They Killed Themselves, Says Palparan of Slain Activists," The Philippine Star February 9, 2016, http://www.philstar.com/nation/320745/maybe-theykilled-themselves-says-palparan-slain-activists. 239 Villamor Visaya, "Barangay Chief, Pa Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006. See also Jaime Laude, "Lawman Tagged in Ambush of Bayan Muna Leader," The Philippine Star September 25, 2006, http://www.philstar.com/nation/359656/lawman-tagged-ambushbayan-muna-leader. See also "CHR Memorandum Report Re: More Killings in Kalinga," (2006). 240 Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "2 New Slays for Task Force," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2006. 241 Tonette Orejas et al., "Pangasinan Militants Accuse Cops of Coverup," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 24, 2006. 242 "Resolution 1-006-47 For: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life (Violation of Right to Life, of Jose and Diosdado Doton)," (Commission on Human Rights, March 21, 2009). 243 Villamor Visaya, "2 More Leftists Shot Dead: Bayan Muna Members Killed in 5 Years Hit 91," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2006. 66 and member of Bayan Muna, and a bystander were shot and killed in San Isidro, Isabela.244 Bangit believed he had been subject to extensive surveillance prior to the attack and the CHR investigated the possibility of a “military death squad”, noting that “there is no group with overflowing logistics and without fear of being monitored by government agents ... suspected to be responsible in the killing of the victims except those sanctioned by the government itself.”245 Two months later, Madonna Castillo, who had replaced Mendiola at Bayan Muna, was also killed—allegedly by the military death squad.246 The Commission on Human Rights investigated a spate of killings with possible military involvement in Ilocos Sur that occurred in October and November 2006. Laureaneano Galicia, village chief of Tabloc, Candon City in Ilocos Sur, disappeared in mid-October 2006, and it was believed that he was abducted by the military. Prior to vanishing, he received a white envelope with a black ribbon. This was understood to be a threat, considering that several other local officials and activists received similar ribbons and were publicly “red tagged” as NPA supporters by the military. Shortly after, village chief and member of the local Peasant Group Against Exploitation, Robert Abaya, was gunned down by four unidentified persons on motorcycles in Sta. Cruz town. 247 Brothers Demstrio and Orlando Salvador, were also murdered in the same village but under unclear circumstances. Finally, an 244 Villamor Visaya and Desiree Caluza, "Police Say Cordillera Killing Was Well Planned," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2010.. See also "Another Militant Leader Gunned Down in Isabela," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 9, 2010. 245 "Memorandum Re: Investigation Report on the Killing of Rafael Markus Bangit and Gloria Casuga," (2006). 246 "Memorandum Re: Special Report on the Assassination of Madonna Castillo, a Student Activist and Bayan Muna Local Chairperson," (2006). See also Villamor Visaya and Tonette Orejas, "Woman Peasant Leader Fights for Life after Isabela Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 21, 2006.Also Villamor Visaya and Desiree Caluza, "1 More Militant Leader Added to Left Death Toll," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 22, 2006. 247 "Memorandum Re: Case of the Different Alleged HRV Committed ... Ilocos Sur," (Commission on Human Rights, November 26, 2006). 67 attempt was made on Billy Austin, pastor of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and provincial chair of the leftist party Bayan. He was shot and wounded by unknown armed men on his way to the local Bayan office after having conducted a human rights seminar.248 The insurgency-related violence that targeted members of the political left diminished considerably in 2007 until the end of the Arroyo presidency in 2010. Although the scale of the violence was much lower, similar dynamics were at play. Insurgency and local politics commingled, particularly during the 2007 elections in May and barangay elections in October.249 Some communist factions continued their attempt to press into the Northern Luzon regions.250 The NPA targeted the military, but were increasingly constrained from exacting losses as they had in previous years.251 The military still targeted activists but the pace no longer was at the staccato frequency as in the mid-2000s and the numbers remained low.252 In some ways, the 248 Leoncio Balbin, Desiree Calusa, and Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Ilocos Bayan Head Survives Gun Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 11, 2006. 249 The NPA’s Reynaldo Piñon Command “executed” Dibuluan village chief, Nicolas Collado, in October 2007 in San Mariano, Isabela. Collado, who ended his final term as barangay chair, was executed for “blood debts to the people.” Villamor Visaya, "Village Chair Killed in Isabela," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 5, 2007. Armed men “identified with a politician” in Barangay Alaoa-TApayen killed NPA guerilla Lilette Fatima Raquel, allegedly a member of the Agustin Begnalen Command, in October 2007 in Tineg, Abra. Desiree Caluza, "Up Journ Graduate-Turned-Reb Dies in Clash with Troops," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2007. 250 In 2007, police exchanged fire with alleged rebels and killed an unidentified woman and wounded two other in Bagulin town, La Union. The violence occurred as police captured two leaders of the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas-Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (MLPP-RHB). Active in Western Pangasinan and Zambales, the MLP-RHB splintered off from the Communist Party of the Philippines and New People’s Army and were reportedly expanding into La Union and Benguet. Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "2 Arrested Leaders of Red Group Brought to Police Headquarters," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2007. 251 In a significant NPA operation on August 1, 2008 in Malibcong Abra, 1st Lt. Eduard Siaed and privates Aurelio Begtang and Jones Andrade of the 41st Infantry Battalion were killed by insurgents suspected to be part of the Agustin Begnalen Command. Sia-ed had been suspected of the 2004 extra-judicial killing of farmer Etfew Chadyaas. Leoncio Balbin and Tonette Orejas, "At Least 2 Soldiers Slain in Abra Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 4, 2008. 252 One case, however, was the abduction and disappearance of indigenous rights activist and founding member of the Cordillera People’s Alliance, James Balao in September 2008. 68 military presence in the region settled into a form of casual excess, including sexual violence against women and young girls. 253 The army claimed that they had successfully pacified the Cagayan Valley provinces La Union and Nueva Vizcaya by 2009 as well as Pangasinan in Ilocos and Apayao and Kalinga in the Cordilleras by 2010.254 However, clashes between the military and communist insurgents swelled again, particularly from 2011 to 2014 (except during the 2013 election period), as well as against activists.255 The relative magnitude was smaller compared to the mid2000s. Moreover, central government support for military involvement in natural resource extraction indicated that different central-local dynamics were at play. The military had been involved in enforcing state encroachment into upland areas, precipitating resistance and Cordillera rebellion in particular during the Marcos dictatorship.256 In 2008, President Arroyo directed military deployment to Mindanao Shortly after, a Benguet court issued a Writ of Amparo and the CHR a resolution on the forced disappearance of Balao, the CHR proceeded to search several military and police detention centers, to no avail. "Chronology of Events on James Balao Case (CHR-CAR Case No. 0846)," (2014). See also Vincent Cabreza, "Militants Fail to Find Activist in Military Camps," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 6, 2008. 253 Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 56. 254 Lalaine Jimenea, "Military Says Northern Luzon 'Insurgency-Free'," The Philippine Star January 16, 2014, http://beta.philstar.com/nation/2014/01/16/1279535/military-says-northernluzon-insurgency-free. 255 For instance, in Abra province, soldiers killed eight NPA insurgents in Tineg town in 2011 and seven in Lacub town, 2014. Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2015 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2015), 27. In 2012, the NPA ambushed and killed soldiers Normandy Maravilla, Norie Cahena and Wendel Clemente in Asipulo, Ifugao.255 In 2012, the military reported that 6 suspected NPA fighters were killed in a clash in Natonin, Mountain province; while the Cordillera Peoples Democratic Front (CPDF) denied casualties on either side, 11 soldiers of the 86th Infantry Battalion were ambushed and killed by the NPA in Tinoc, Ifugao a few days later. Vincent Cabreza and Villamor Visaya, "11 Soldiers, 2 Others Die in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2012. 256 "Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 319-20. 69 to protect foreign investments in mining sites from NPA attacks, calling them “investment defense forces”.257 Elected president in 2010, Benigno Aquino refused to honor a campaign promise to revoke an Arroyo executive order paramilitary forces.258 Instead, President Aquino directed the military in 2011 to mobilize civilian militias in the provision of security for mining companies.259 The following year, Aquino issued Executive Order No. 79 on the mining sector, which included a general provision for the police and military to provide security at mining sites.260 Human rights groups decried this as “marching orders” to the army and paramilitary groups to clear mining areas.261 The mining policy also undermined local ordinances that banned mining in some provinces, but President Aquino insisted that national policy had primacy over local legislation.262 The expansion of mining activities in mineral rich regions like Northern Luzon led to violence against activists and conflict within communities. Randy Domingo and his sister-in-law Sheryl Ananayao-Puguon, were shot and killed by unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle at the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino border in 2012. Police investigators believed that Domingo was the assassination 257 "Arroyo Orders Military to Guard Mindanao Mining Areas," GMA News Online April 17, 2008, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/89872/arroyo-orders-military-toguard-mindanao-mining-areas/story/. 258 Marcos Mordeno, "Dismantle Paramilitary Groups Too, Ny Based Rights Monitor Urges Aquino," Mindanews March 31, 2012, http://www.mindanews.com/humanrights/2012/03/dismantle-paramilitary-groups-too-ny-based-rights-monitor-urges-aquino/. 259 "Philippines: Killings of Environment Advocates Unpunished," Human Rights Watch July 18, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/18/philippines-killings-environmentadvocates-unpunished. 260 ABS-CBN News, "Pnoy's Mining EO No. 79," ABS-CBN News July 9, 2012, http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/07/09/12/pnoys-mining-eo-no-79. 261 Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 9. 262 Christine Avendano and Vincent Cabreza, "Aquino on New Mining EO: Governors Can Go to Court," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 26, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/218529/aquino-on-new-mining-eo-governors-can-go-to-court. 70 target, under the alias Randy Nabayay, who may have had business dealings with the Australian firm OceanaGold Mining.263 On the other hand, activist groups suspected that the true object was Ananayao-Puguon, due to her membership in the group Didipio Earthsavers’ Multipurpose Association (DESAMA) that is opposed to the mining projects in the province.264 Some residents resisted OceanaGold’s efforts to clear land for the mining project, leading to violent confrontations between the company’s armed guards and protesters in the past.265 In 2014, unidentified gunmen killed village chief Paulino Baguilat in Didipio village in Kasibu, which had been deeply divided due to the OceanaGold project.266 The NPA often made common cause with villages that opposed mining activities. In Cagayan province, the NPA Danilo Ben Command-West Cagayan Front claimed to have assassinated Gonzaga town mayor Carlito Pentecostes because their “revolutionary court” sentenced him to death for his role in the arrest of a rebel leader and for being a proponent of black sand mining.267 Nonetheless, Pentecostes had been controversial for his vocal support for black sand mining undertaken by Chinese companies in the town. While the mayor argued that mining was a lucrative financial 263 Police also noted that Nabayay was involved in a series of robberies with homicide, murder and other offenses, as well as a land dispute. Police Senior Inspector John Rigomano, "Special Report on Shooting Incident (Randy Domingo Aka Randy Nabayyay)," (Cabarroguis Police Station, 2012). 264 Artemio Dumlao, "Lawman Tagged in Ambush of Bayan Muna Leader," The Philippine Star December 10, 2012, http://www.philstar.com/nation/2012/12/10/884131/anti-miningactivist-kin-killed-nueva-vizcaya. An initial CHR investigation found that Ananayao-Puguon was not a DESAMA member, although her mother was. "Initial Investigation Report on Killing of Randy Domingo Y Puguon A.K.A. Randy Nabayay and Sheryll Ananayao-Puguon by Unidentified Armed Men at Purok 7, Barangay Tucod, Cabaruguis, Quirino, on December 7, 2012," (2012). 265 Melvin Gascon, "Shooting Mars Lent in Mining Village," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 24, 2008. 266 Baguilat was popular among the pro-mining residents but he had disgruntled villagers with supposed inaction over the mining firm’s alleged violations—land evictions in particular. "Vizcaya Village Chief in Mining Row Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 31, 2008. 267 Separately, the military expressed doubt that the crime scene evidence supported the NPA’s claim of responsibility for the murder. Villamor Visaya, "NPA Admits Killing Mayor over Black Sand Mining," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2014. 71 base for the municipality’s economic development, residents were uneasy about the industry.268 In Ilocos Sur, local anti-mining advocates had successfully pressed for national government intervention on the illegal mining of magnetite or black sand in 2013, but the alleged resumption of magnetite extraction backed by local politicians prompted speculation that the NPA might act as it did in Cagayan by assassinating Pentecostes.269 State Weakness and Violent Politics? This chapter on Northern Luzon has demonstrated why some claims about violence in Philippine politics need to be examined more closely for their contextual dynamics. On the one hand, the central state contradicted its putative weakness in toppling Abra warlord Vicente Valera in 2007 and constraining private armies in the province. Although the scale of violence in Abra was out of proportion with the rest of election-related violence in Northern Luzon, the use of violence and coercive intimidation to underwrite the dominance of clans was not. In Northern Luzon, local political factions employed violence to forestall political competition by dissuading rivals from running in the first place. Assassinations and harassment continued during the intervals between election years, in part because central monitoring of violence is at its most intense only in the four months prior to, and a month after, an election. It is during this period that the Commission on Elections might begin designating towns, cities and provinces as sites for additional police or military presence. As the Abra 268 Marvin Gascon, "Gunmen Kill Cagayan Town Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2014. 269 Kyle Francisco, "Blacksand Mining Still Ravages Ilocos Sur," Bulatlat May 20, 2014, http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/05/20/blacksand-mining-still-ravages-ilocos-sur/. 72 case also demonstrates, some local political factions have either police or military backing – their presence can swing the balance of favor in an electoral outcome. However, the dynamics in Northern Luzon also contradict a common portrayal of Philippine local politics as inherently violent. Political dynasties constrain meaningful democratic competition but may also diminish violence. The Singson case in Ilocos Sur province illustrates this dynamic. Singson was a feared local strongman from the time of the Marcos dictatorship. Singson waited in the congressional wings until the Corazon Aquino government was over before resuming the governorship. His role in the Estrada impeachment entangled him in national politics, but he was ultimately unable to transcend provincial politics and failed a run for the senate. His political career coming to an end, he refocused his attentions from his own electability to transforming his dissipating clout into patrimonial endowment. Singson followed the pattern of other highly successful political dynasties in Northern Luzon who managed to perpetuate themselves in power far longer: reduce uncertainty by avoiding contestation. Ostensibly, he pulled this strategy off without recourse to further violence. In the waning of his political career, a preference for intimidation rather than annihilation could explain why targets were wounded rather than killed. With regard to non-electoral violence, the communist insurgency initially shaped the contours of political violence in Northern Luzon. The NPA’s ability to act as a force in local politics diminished under the pressure of military engagement and the co-optation of other insurgent groups into state troops. In 2005 and 2006, the military expanded violence against activists that were involved in peasant organization. Farmers were frequent victims of violent military excesses as well. The army successfully hemmed the NPA into the Cordilleras and bordering areas in Ilocos and Cagayan. However, after 2011, army and militia involvement in the violent 73 defense of natural resource extraction resulted in a new pattern of political violence for wealth control. First and foremost, the Northern Luzon case provides insight into particularistic, locally led political violence. Mainly related to elections, violence peaks and subsides according to campaign and poll schedules—every three years. A significant observation, however, is that intra-elite moderation and long-term domination by a few political dynasties has kept violence low overall in comparison to the other regional cases. Although the central government may tolerate the violence, if the violence escalates and central elites form an antagonistic attitude towards local ones, the state may act to dismantle the private coercive forces of entrenched local strongmen—as in the case of Governor Valera in Abra. Secondly, the Northern Luzon case highlights the ways in which counter-insurgency operations may escalate violence in response to security threats. The central government thus pursues a statist aim of regulating violence in society, despite its inability to achieve a monopoly over the use of force. 74 Chapter 3. The Communist Threat in Eastern Visayas The NPA insurgency posed a much greater threat to the state in Eastern Visayas than in the other regions in this study. Consequently, the military response to the insurgent activity is what explains the most dominant pattern of political violence in the region. Compared to Southern Mindanao or Northern Luzon, the military was less driven by particularistic interests in natural resource extraction. Moreover, unlike in Central Luzon, the military acted with more autonomy from local elites. Unable to root out insurgents and sympathizers from local communities, it pursued a strategy of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Because of the difficulties in combating insurgent guerrilla warfare, states tend to employ large-scale violence against entire populations—to quote a macabre counter-insurgency aphorism, “the surest way to catch the fish is by draining the sea”.270 A similar logic underpinned violence against civilian populations and displacement in Eastern Visayas. The NPA insurgency and military counter-insurgency accounts for most of the violence in attacks, ambushes and assassinations. The NPA proved to be a formidable foe, extracting higher casualty tolls on the military in Eastern Visayas than it did in other regions. In other words, the main driver of violence was the insurgency and the corresponding response of state security forces to the threat. Soldiers may have also vented their ire against villages in reprisal. It was in this region that the military began to escalate its use of lethal force against activists. Over time, the army successfully cut insurgents off from civilian support in Eastern Visayas, virtually routing the NPA from what once was a communist stronghold. 270 Mao Zedong had likened guerrillas among “the masses” to fish who inhabit the sea. Consequently, many political leaders and military commanders have made the analogy of draining the sea to the mass killing of civilians to combat guerrilla warfare. Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," International Organization 8, no. 2 (2004): 384-85. 75 Map 2. Eastern Visayas Provinces The Eastern Visayas region consists of three island groupings: Biliran, Leyte and Samar. Leyte island is divided into two provinces, Leyte and Southern Leyte, while Samar island is divided into Western Samar, Eastern Samar and Northern Samar (See Map 2 above). 271 Violence was concentrated the most on Samar island, particularly Western Samar, and to some extent in Leyte province. Remarkably, hardly any violence occurred in Biliran and Southern Leyte. Overall, 69 percent of the violence in Eastern Visayas was insurgency-related (see Appendix 2); moreover, unlike in other regions, military, paramilitary and police personnel were the most frequent targets (30 percent). 271 Officially “Samar province”, the locale is sometimes colloquially referred to as Western Samar. To avoid confusion with respect to the other similarly named provinces, “Western Samar” is used in this dissertation. 76 Figure 6. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Eastern Visayas 60 50 40 30 Other patterns of violence 20 Insurgency-related 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 10 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 7 for frequency distribution table There was a steady increase of violence between NPA and the military in the Samar provinces and Leyte until 2003 (see Figure 6 above). Insurgency-related violence intensified in 2005 when Major General Jovito Palparan was assigned to the region but dropped when he left. Violence heightened again in 2007 as the military resumed its counter-insurgency campaign. The overall level of insurgency-related violence decreased from 2008 onwards except in Northern Samar, where it was relatively quiet until 2009 and 2010. The government estimated that seven rebel fronts operated in Eastern Visayas in the early 2000s. The number may have dropped to as few as four by 2010 and violence became rare afterwards.272 With regard to elections, Eastern Visayas demonstrated the same pattern as in most of the other regions in this study. Violence peaked around election seasons, every three years starting in 2001, except in 2010 (See Figure 7 below). As with insurgency-related violence, Western Samar was the site of the most violence while 272 "The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Rodriguez and Santos, 12. 77 the provinces of Biliran and Southern Leyte experienced next to no violence at all. The NPA insurgency also figures prominently in elections in Eastern Visayas. Figure 7. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Eastern Visayas 60 Other patterns of violence Electionrelated violence 50 40 30 Election Year 20 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 0 2001 10 Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 7 for frequency distribution table This chapter is organized into the following sections: (1) the state of insurgency in the region from 2001 to 2004, characterized by a resurgence of the NPA; (2) the heightening of insurgency-related violence in 2005 and the persistence of state violence in Eastern Visayas until 2007; (3) the general decline of insurgency related violence afterwards except in Northern Samar; and, (4) election cycles that resulted in violence involving clans in Western Samar and Leyte and the complications of the communist insurgency as well as the curious lack of any violence in two provinces. 78 “The Butcher” in Eastern Visayas In Eastern Visayas, the NPA did not split into moderate and radical factions. 273 The communists in the region remained committed to an armed insurgency. By early 2001, the military reported that around 250 villages were infiltrated by the NPA.274 From 2001 to 2003, the NPA launched several attacks against the military.275 The army suffered multiple casualties—such as in a 2001 raid by suspected insurgents on an army detachment in a hinterland village of San Jose de Buan town, Samar that left seven soldiers dead.276 In 2002 in Leyte, suspected NPA insurgents killed Alex Ajenga and three other scout rangers in Mahaplag town.277 In 2003, a NPA attack on Quinapondan town in Eastern Samar was repulsed by two policemen and prominently reported in the national media. 278 Four days later, around 200 insurgents attacked an isolated army patrol base in another Eastern Samar town and killed 17 people: eleven militiamen, five army soldiers and one civilian. It was one of the biggest NPA raids since the 1980s, part of a series of attacks in the province and in other areas of the country.279 273 William Holden, "The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army on Samar," Journal of Geography and Geology 5, no. 4 (2013): 37-42. 274 Vicente Labro, "NPA Shadow Gov'ts in Samar Bared," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 7, 2002. 275 For example, suspected insurgents ambushed and killed Staff Sergeant Orlando Vinculado in Can-avid town, Eastern Samar in May, 2002. Lethal NPA ambushes also occurred in Tacloban, Leyte. Vicente Labro, Cynthia Borgueta, and Anthony Allada, "NPA Ambushes Continue in Samar, Davao Norte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2002. Cynthia Borgueta, "Soldier Slain, Civilian Hurt in NPA Ambush in E. Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2002. In January 2003 in Catamaran, Northern Samar, suspected NPA insurgents of the Rodante Urtal Command killed the operations chief of the 803rd brigade, major Danilo Bilion. Marc Villavicencio, "NPA Owns up Killing of Army Major," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 25, 2003. 276 Vicente Labro, "Judge Orders Arrest of 200 Rebels Who Killed 7 Soldiers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 27, 2002. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-01-36 Re: Ssgt. Luceno P. De Guzman et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, September 14, 2001). 277 "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-02-59 Re: Mahayahay Mahaplag Ambush Re: Killing of Msg Alex Ajenga et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, February 18, 2003). 278 Cyrain Cabueñas, "2 Policemen Repel 20 NPA Attackers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 23, 2003. 279 "17 Killed in NPA Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 27, 2003. 79 The NPA was deeply entrenched throughout the Samar island provinces, either by acting as a parallel government, providing some forms of social services and enforcing its dominance through coercive means and “revolutionary” justice.280 The military thus had a very difficult task in rooting out insurgents from among the population. 281 As a result, the military targeted civilians suspected of being NPA members or sympathizers, or went after known family members. For example, in Pinabacdao town in February 2002, soldiers killed civilians two men whom they accused of being NPA, claiming it was an armed encounter but it was more likely a summary execution.282 In another incident later that year, the daughter of National Democratic Front (NDF) consultant Abdias Guadiana was allegedly abducted by the army and was last seen on a bus with a military officer.283 The military also inflicted violence upon suspected insurgents and civilians in Leyte.284 280 Holden, 41. For instance, in November 2001 in Basey town, Samar, 20 suspected NPA insurgents seized bamboo farmer Bernardino Guiuan while he was in the midst of dispute mediation with the barangay chairman; the NPA accused him of involvement in the death of two people in the town. "CHR Resolution Case No.:08-2002-08 Re: Bernardino G. Guiuan," (Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2002). In January 2003 in Calbiga town, Samar, gunmen who identified themselves as NPA members killed Mario Ocasla, a rebel “returnee” granted amnesty in 2001. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-38 Re: Marlo Ocasla," (Commission on Human Rights, October 6, 2005). In March, in Basey, Celso Tabucao was abducted by six armed men; his wife subsequently received a letter from the NPA Jorge Bulito Command that he was “sentenced to death” by the NPA for involvement in killing, participating in anti-NPA intelligence, membership in a death squad, among other charges. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-19 Re: Celso Tabucao, Jr.," (Commission on Human Rights, May 22, 2003). 281 Marc Villavicencio, "Army Seeks Mayors’ Help against Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 20, 2003. 282 "CHR Resolution Case No.:08-02-09 Re: Alberto Ocenar and Roberto Cabueños," (Commission on Human Rights, September 9, 2002). 283 "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-006 Re: Rosa Guadiana," (Commission on Human Rights, June 15, 2003). Also Nestor Burgos, "Reb's Daughter 'Abducted' by Army," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 10, 2002. In addition to the violation of Guadiana’s daughter’s civil rights, the abduction breaches the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees that protects NDF consultants as they negotiate on behalf of the armed Left. Jodesz Gavilan, "Fast Facts: The Jasig in the Peace Talks," Rappler February 8, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/160828-fast-facts-jasig-peace-talks-ndf. 284 In April 2003 in Kanaga, suspected government soldiers killed Eugenio Tazan and eight others, including four teenagers. The army claims the nine were NPA members but the CHR investigation found evidence of torture and contradicted the military’s assertion that these 80 Violence escalated and peaked when the regional military command was led by a general with a history of extra-legal violence against leftist activists. Major General Jovito Palparan was assigned to Eastern Visayas in February 2005 to command the 8th Infantry Division. Palparan had served in Oriental Mindoro province from 2001 to 2003, where he gained the monicker berdugo, meaning butcher. He was linked to an estimated 32 alleged summary executions there, although he had been suspected of other violations in Central Luzon, the Cordilleras and other parts of Southern Luzon since the 1980s.285 In 2003, Palparan had been up for promotion from colonel to brigadier general. The promotion was delayed, but not denied, amid protests when two Karapatan activists investigating him for human rights violations in Mindoro were themselves abducted and found dead. In 2004, he was promoted to the rank of major general.286 By 2005, when Palparan was assigned to Eastern Visayas, the military estimated that there were 600 to 700 fully armed rebels on Samar island and about 200 more on Leyte.287 Palparan publicly called Bayan Muna, a left wing political party, as a front organization for the armed insurgency.288 In February 2005, the first target of state violence was Father Allan Caparro, a member of the Iglesia Filipina were combat deaths. Moreover, local NGOs in Tacloban maintained that the fatalities were not insurgents but were farmers. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-30 Re: Killing of Nine (9) Persons at Sitio Mahayahay, Brgy. San Isidro, Kanaga, Leyte," (Commission on Human Rights, December 11, 2003). Aubrey Makilan, "GMA Accused as 'Coddler of Killers in Uniform'," Bulatlat.com 3, no. 19 June 15, 2003, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/3-19/3-19killersinuniform.html. Joey Gabieta, "5 Soldiers, 10 Suspeted Rebels Killed in Holy Week Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 12, 2003. 285 "Terror in Mindoro: The Murders of Eden Marcellana and Eddie Gumanoy," (Quezon City: Ecumenical Consotium for a Just Peace, 2003), 43-51. Also Alexander Remollino, "Palparan: From Mindoro to Iraq," Bulatlat.com IV, no. 1 February 1-7, 2004, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-1/4-1-palparan.html. 286 Aries Hegina, "5 Things You Need to Know About Jovito Palparan," Philippine Daily Inquirer August 12, 2014, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/628418/5-things-you-need-to-knowabout-jovito-palparan. 287 Joey Gabieta and Jani Arnaiz, "NPA Kills 6 Soldiers in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 10, 2005. 288 Joey Gabieta, "Bayan Muna Decries Tag of CPP 'Front'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2005. 81 Independiente (Philippine Independent Church) and known critic of Palparan. Three unidentified gunmen who were suspected soldiers under Palparan’s command attempted to kill him in Abuyog town, Leyte.289 Shortly afterward, Palparan declared that he would rid Eastern Visayas of anti-government demonstrations. A month later, in March 2005, the legal counsel for Bayan Muna Eastern Visayas and local human rights NGO Katungod, Feledito Dacut, was murdered in Tacloban City by two unidentified men on motorcycle, suspected to be connected to Palparan’s 8th Infantry Division.290 In April, Palparan condemned an NPA attack in Calbiga municipality, Samar, in which six soldiers were killed, and warned that the military would launch a massive clearing operation in the town.291 Palparan vowed to vanquish the rebellion in six to twelve months. Within days, the military conducted aerial attacks, bombing villages, and set up blockades to disrupt the provision of food to insurgents and flush them out.292 A month after the Calbiga ambush, an estimated 900 people in eight villages of the same town fled in mortal fear after alleged military harassment.293 Counterinsurgency operations displaced another 2,500 residents of remote villages in Basey town that July. At a press conference, Palparan remarked that he hoped that the evacuation would “serve them a lesson…. They can make a choice as to whether they will support the government or the outlawed group”, alluding to the NPA.294 A succession of killings by government forces in Leyte and Samar continued 289 "Another Bayan Muna Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 16, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-19 Re: Murder of Atty. Feledito C. Dacut," (Commission on Human Rights, June 3, 2005). Norman Bordadora, "Salonga Laments Rising Number of Lawyers Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2005. 291 Gabieta and Arnaiz. “NPA Kills 6 Soldiers in Ambush” 292 Joey Gabieta, "Group Says Army Bombed Samar Villages, Blocked Food Supply," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2005. 293 "'Special Operations' Force Samar Folk to Flee," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2005. 294 "Palparan Says Villagers' Flight a Big Help to Troops," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 24, 2005. 290 82 until June. Some incidents involved multiple actions on the same day in different locations, while others were spread out over a course of several days.295 Palparan claimed that the military was gaining ground in its campaign against insurgency in Eastern Visayas, particularly in Samar.296 A key feature of this offensive was the targeting of activists of leftist political parties. After being threatened and subjected to surveillance by soldiers and paramilitary forces, Bayan Muna and Anakpawis member Alrico Barbas was attacked at home and killed along with one of his sons.297 Other activists were forcibly abducted and have not resurfaced since. 298 Suspected soldiers also tortured and killed several villagers and barangay tanod accused of being NPA insurgents.299 Prior to Palparan’s arrival, such cases were rare in this region. 295 In April 2005, spouses Bayan Muna municipal coordinator Alfredo Davis and Abanse Pinay (Filipina Advance) chair Imelda Davis were attacked in a tandem motorcycle shooting in Mahaplag municipality, Leyte, suspected to be part of the pattern of targeting “cause oriented” groups; Alfredo was killed while Imelda was wounded. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-20 Re: Alfredo Davis," (Commission on Human Rights, June 28, 2005). "Bayan Muna Supporter Shot Dead; Wife Hurt," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2005. United Church of Christ of the Philippines and former regional coordinator of Bayan Muna and Katungod chair Edison Lapuz was shot and killed along with Alfredo Malinao, a peasant leader, in San Isidro town. Lapuz had allegedly been subject to surveillance and death threats, frequently visited by a soldier named Mangohon and others prior to his death. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-27 Re: Murder of Rev. Edison Lapuz," (Commission on Human Rights, July 19, 2005). "Church Leaders Raise Alarm over Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2005. 296 Jani Arnaiz, "Palparan Dares Militants to Denounce Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 4, 2005. 297 "CHR Resolution Case No.: CHRP VIII-05-48 Re: Alrico Barbas et. al," (Commission on Human Rights, December 14, 2005). 298 For instance, in February 2004 in Baybay town, Bayan Muna members Rolando Portaleza and Jaqueline Paguntalan were forcibly abducted by seven armed men. Joey Gabieta, "Wife of Abducted Left Activist Joins Search," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 8, 2004. See also "Army Exec Denies Abduction of Bayan Muna Members," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2004. "AFP Faces Case on Missing Activists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 12, 2004. 299 In Villareal, Constancio Calubid, suspected NPA, was tortured and killed shortly after he and Ismael Solayao, a barangay tanod, were forcibly abducted by armed men believed to be members of the AFP; the CHR recommended that an administrative case be filed against General Palparan with the military ombudsman. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-36 Re: Constancio Calubid, Ismael Solayao," (Commission on Human Rights, September 1, 2005). Moreover, soldiers allegedly killed peasants Noel “Tuin” Versoza and Lindon “Boranting” Pacon in Paranas town in August 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0123 and Final Report Re: Noel Versoza Alias Twin and Boranting," (Commission on Human Rights, March 23, 2009). Pacon was only later identified and said to have been killed in 2006. "CHR 83 During his six-month tour of duty in Eastern Visayas, Palparan alleged that fifty to sixty percent of the Samar population sympathized with the NPA.300 He also accused local politicians of supporting the NPA, which he claimed had infiltrated local governments. In turn, Western Samar’s congressman, Reynaldo Uy, accused Palparan of being responsible for warrantless arrests, illegal searches, and the disappearance and murder of activists during House hearings on national defense.301 Ostensibly bowing to pressure from Samar’s congressmen and human rights groups, President Arroyo instructed the military to transfer Palparan out of Eastern Visayas in August. 302 Unlike Uy and other critics, some local politicians like Uy’s rival, Milagros Tan, and the governors of Southern Leyte and Eastern Samar, praised Palparan and echoed his calls to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines once more.303 Even after being transferred to Central Luzon in August, Palparan may have continued to exert an influence over military ground operations even after his transfer. On August 31, 2005, suspected military elements killed Bayan Muna regional coordinator Norman Bocar in Borongan town.304 Palparan quickly denied having Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0124 Re: Lindon Pacon "A.K.A. Boranting"," (Commission on Human Rights, May 20, 2009). 300 Figueroa pointed out that Palparan's allegation of the NPA's overwhelming infiltration explains the rationale for the general’s military operations, and so" he must kill/annihilate our population in order to win his war". Philip Tubeza and Bernice Mendoza, "Palparan: Deaths Small Sacrifices," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 2, 2005. Likewise, Palparan’s accusations that Bayan Muna was a communist front offended local officials like Villareal municipal Mayor Renato la Torre, who was also the Bayan Muna coordinator of Samar. Gabieta, "Bayan Muna Decries Tag of CPP 'Front'." 301 See also Philip Tubeza and Norman Bordadora, "Samar Solon Says Palparan ‘Friendly’ but with ‘No Soul’," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 26, 2005. 302 Joey Gabieta, "Palparan Leaving Samar, Says Solon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 19, 2005. 303 "Transfer of Army General Draws Mixed Reactions," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 22, 2005. "3 Govs Back Proposal to Outlaw CPP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2006. 304 The CHR noted that the slaying followed the pattern of assassinations of militant leaders such as Felididto Dacut, Rodrigo Catayong, Edison Lapuz and Jose Maria Cui. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-48 Re: Norman Bocar," (Commission on Human Rights, March 26, 2007). 84 anything to do with Bocar’s death. 305 But activists have charged that Palparan continued to direct the overt and covert operations of some of the soldiers formerly under his command.306 Counter-insurgency Continues Palparan’s departure from Eastern Visayas slowed the violence down temporarily, with a lull for two months before beginning again in Leyte. Assassinations of Bayan Muna activists and armed encounters with rebels left several dead.307 In the midst of the conflict, nine soldiers were killed in an explosion of rebelplanted land mines in neighboring Iloilo province.308 Two days later, on November 21, 2005, soldiers opened fire on a group of over forty people who had gathered together in a village “balik uma” (return to the land) ceremony in Palo town, Leyte. The ceremony marked the first day of tilling lands that they received through the government’s agrarian reform program.309 Seven farmers were killed in the attack, locally referred to as the San Agustin massacre. The CHR investigation rejected the military claim that the incident was part of a legitimate 305 Tonette Orejas, Cyrain Cabueñas, and Joey Gabieta, "E. Visayas Bayan Chair Gunned Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 2, 2005. 306 "Terror in Mindoro: The Murders of Eden Marcellana and Eddie Gumanoy," 51. 307 On November 7, 2005, former Bayan Muna organizer and community organizer for the ruling Codilla clan, Jose Ducalang was killed in Ormoc City by shooters riding on a motorbike; an alleged “Ormoc Death Squad” may have claimed responsibility (there are no other reported cases of such a group aside from this). "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-02 Re: Jose A. Ducalang," (Commission on Human Rights, January 4, 2006). The next day, Maricris Opo was killed in an armed encounter between suspected NPA insurgents and soldiers in Baybay town. Jani Arnaiz, "18-Yr-Old Woman Reb's Body Found in Leyte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 11, 2005. In Eastern Samar, unidentified gunmen riding tandem on motorcycle, suspected to be military elements, killed the provincial chair of Bayan Eastern Samar Ben Bajado in Maydulong town in November. Luige del Puerto, "Another Bayan Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 14, 2005. 308 Joey Gabieta and Vincent Labro, "Soldiers Raid Leyte Village, Kill 7 Farmers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2005. 309 Johann Arpon, "Bullets Rain over Palo Farmers," Bulatlat December 3, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/12/03/bullets-rain-over-palo-farmers/. The author of this article, Johann Arpon, claimed to have been present at the attack with a DYDW radio station reporter Jazmin Bonifacio; they had been invited to cover the balik uma ceremony. 85 counter-insurgency campaign.310 Under public scrutiny as journalists at the balik uma ceremony released a first-hand account of the violence, the military slowed down counter-insurgency activities in Leyte. Although overall levels of violence were significantly lower after Palparan’s departure, the focus of the counter-insurgency campaign shifted back to Samar.311 Violence began to scale up in Motiong town in Western Samar. In January, suspected NPA insurgents attacked a military convoy that had been near Karanas village on a medical mission, killing six military personnel and two civilians. This sparked an intense military operation in the area.312 On February 16, 2006, Generoso Labong was shot at his brother’s house.313 On March 5, Noel Labong was shot near his house and Levi Labong reported for duty as barangay watchman but did not return home afterwards.314 On April 5, 2006, in Motiong, suspected soldiers killed Rogelio Jabaan Dacutanan, a village councilor. He was shot twice in the back of his head.315 310 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-04 Re: Renato Dizon et. al," (Commission on Human Rights, March 20, 2006). 311 Initially, there were only a few insurgency-related violence occurred on Samar island. In one case, engineer Dalmacio Cepeda and two other members of the Samar Electric Cooperative were killed in Catbalogan in September 2005; the army blamed the NPA, the NPA blamed the military, claiming that the local army detachment had been accusing the association’s linemen of being NPA couriers and sympathizers. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-37 Re: Ryan Cabrigas, Dalmacio S. Cepeda, Jr., Benedicto Gabon," (Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2005). In December 2005 in San Jose de Buan, the NPA claimed responsibility for killing barangay Cataydungan chairman Pedro Dacles; they alleged that Dacles was military intelligence. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0170 Re: Pedro Dacles," (Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2009). 312 "Report Re: Fact-Finding Mission at Brgy. Calapi, Motiong, Samar on the Alleged Forced Evacuation from Brgy. San Andres, Brgy. Karanas and Brgy. Sto Niño, Motiong, Samar," (Commission on Human Rights, March 21, 2006). 313 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0174 Re: Generoso Labong," (Commission on Human Rights, October 12, 2009). 314 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-12 Re: Noel Labong, Levi Labong," (Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006). 315 The CHR investigation noted that the case followed the pattern of extralegal assassinations in the region "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0121 Re: Rogelio Dacutanan," (Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2009). Similarly, a Catbalogan barangay kagawad Oscar Laboc was told to report to a Corporal Rocky Tapalla, who asked him to confirm the contents of a barangay resolution signed by Laboc and other village councilors that stated the village would stop supporting the NPA in any form, money or in kind; Laboc 86 By mid-2006, the military estimated that there were about 1,000 active NPA fighters based in Eastern Visayas, most of whom were concentrated on Samar island.316 The military deployed over 600 soldiers to Western Samar and Leyte and vowed that the renewed counter-insurgency campaign would end the insurgency within two years.317 Over the following months, the NPA continued its attacks on military targets while the military continued to attack villagers they suspected of being NPA sympathizers or insurgents.318 In Villareal town, soldiers accused Eddie Albay of being an NPA insurgent and allegedly burned his family’s farmhouse and stole their coconuts; his wife claimed that Albay was then forcibly abducted.319 Reports from provincial newspapers and local human rights NGO Katungod (human rights, in the local language) claimed that as many as 14 farmers were killed in different towns in Samar from September to November 2006.320 Suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed several targets in Eastern Samar and Western Samar.321 One such target was Augusto Daclitan, former NPA and provincial was then released but found dead on the road home, suspected killed by the military. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0119 Re: Oscar Laboc," (Commission on Human Rights, January 23, 2009). 316 Gabieta, "3 Govs Back Proposal to Outlaw CPP." 317 President Arroyo earmarked PhP 1,000,000 for the training and redeployment of 3,000 troops for this purpose. Edra Benedicto, "AFP Beefs up Anti-Red Forces in Samar, Leyte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 26, 2006. 318 For instance, on June 30, 2006, suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed paramilitary member Pepe Legria in Catbalogan. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0075 Re: Pepe Legria," (Commission on Human Rights, April 9, 2008). 319 Months later, Albay remained missing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-53 Re: Eddie R. Albay," (Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2007). 320 Among the 14 peasants allegedly killed, the CHR investigated the cases of Emilio Jabulan (reportedly killed in September 2006 in Catbalogan City), Arturo Nablo and Rene Abina (allegedly killed on November 15, 2006 in Hinabangan town), Noel Verzosa and Lindon Pacon (allegedly killed on August 14, 2005 in Paranas town) but could not find substantiating evidence. "Final Investigation Report Case No.: VIII-2008-0131 Re: Emilio Jabulan," (Commission on Human Rights, December 22, 2008). The CHR could not corroborate that Nablo and Abina had lived in the village where they were reportedly from, according to Katungod as reported in San Juanico News. "CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: VIII-20080127, VIII-2008-0128 Re: Arturo Nablo and Rene Abina," (Commission on Human Rights, November 5, 2008). 321 “Sparrow” refers to the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit of specially trained assassins. 87 coordinator of the anti-communist group Alliance of Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in January, 2007.322 Within days of Daclitan’s murder, NPA assassins killed civilians whom they suspected of spying for the military. They killed Alfonso Sabillo in Catbalogan and Vestado Gabiana, a barangay chairman in Motiong town.323 In Las Navas, Northern Samar, suspected NPA sparrows killed off-duty soldier Jose Baccol, as he was harvesting rice in the field.324 In response to these actions, the military targeted Bayan Muna leaders and other community organizers.325 The military also sought to discourage electoral support for leftist parties and, in one incident, sent a chilling message to the public. On May 11, 2007, the couple Manuel Pajarito, who had been actively campaigning for labor group Anakpawis, and Juliet Fernandez, campaigning for women’s rights group Gabriela, were taken by the military along with another man. They were allegedly tortured and deprived of food. Fernandez was 322 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-25 Re: Augusto Daclitan," (Commission on Human Rights, August 16, 2007). Joey Gabieta, "Anti-Red Leader in Samar Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 21, 2007. 323 "Solon to Meet with Comelec on Spate of Killings in Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2007. Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0168 Re: Arturo Gabiana," (Commission on Human Rights, October 7, 2009). 324 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-59 Re: Sgt. Jose Baccol," (Commission on Human Rights, December 28, 2007). Assassins also killed Sergeant Reynaldo Bantayan in Can-avid town, Eastern Samar, on December 21, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII2008-0074 Re: The Killing of Sgt. Reynaldo Bantayan," (Commission on Human Rights, April 29, 2008). 325 In January, 2007, two men on motorcycles gunned down Bayan Muna member Dominador de Luna in Catbalogan; de Luna’s wife, Concepcion, is provincial coordinator of Bayan Muna and provincial board member. "Solon to Meet with Comelec on Spate of Killings in Samar." Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-24 Re: Dominador De Luna," (Commission on Human Rights, November 7, 2007). In February 2007 in Hinabangan town, suspected military gunmen killed Sixto Azilan, member of the community organization Hinabangan Alliance for Livelihood and Development. Azilan’s involvement in community organizations in Hinabangan and nearby towns like Catbalogan had previously prompted the army's 8th Infantry Division, then under Palparan, to invite him for questioning. "Urban Poor Leader Killed in Samar Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2007. Apart from Western Samar, similar attacks continued throughout the region. In January 2007,Jose Maria Cui, a professor of the University of Eastern Philippines, and leader of various groups like the local Alliance of Concerned Teachers and member of Bayan Muna was shot in his class, on campus in Catarman. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-001 Re: Extra-Judicial Killing of Jose Maria Cui," (Commission on Human Rights, March 19, 2007). "Another Activist Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 20, 2007. See also "Army Official Scores Left's Claim on Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 22, 2007. 88 pregnant and, according to witnesses’ accounts, several soldiers raped her while she was in detention.326 In retaliation, the NPA executed Elisabeth Fernandez whom they accused of being a military spy and responsible for the abduction of Fernandez and Pajarito.327 Seven months later, the military presented Fernandez and Pajarito to the media. Despite the AFP’s earlier denials that the couple had been in their custody, the military confirmed that they had arrested the two. The two claimed to have been treated kindly. Fernandez had given birth a month prior to her release and denied that soldiers had raped her.328 The CHR investigation indicates that Parajito’s parents had been active in the search for them until September 2007, when Parajito allegedly visited them in the company of soldiers. The CHR also could not conclude that the two had indeed been released despite being presented to the media and raised the possibility that they were collaborating with the military. 329 NGOs accused the military of coercing the couple and criticized the military’s publicity stunt, challenging the government to release them so they could speak freely.330 The military resumed violence against civilians, to deter support for the rebels 326 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez," (Commission on Human Rights, February 19, 2008). See also Benjie Oliveros, "Military in Samar Abducted, Tortured Three Organizers, One Luckily Escaped," Bulatlat.com October 20, 2007, http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/06/14/6-years-under-aquino-media-killingsunabated-press-freedom-under-siege/. 327 Miriam Desacada, "NPA Abducts Government Spy," The Philippine Star November 20, 2007, http://www.philstar.com/nation/28463/npa-abducts-government-spy. The CHR investigation also considered as motive that her husband was a ranking NPA leader and she was responsible for his capture by the military. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-54 Re: Elizabeth M. Gutierrez," (Commission on Human Rights, January 2, 2008). 328 Joey Gabieta and Jerome Aning, "Missing Activist Couple Released by Military in Leyte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 30, 2007; Miriam Desacada, "NPA Couple Released," The Philippine Star December 30, 2007, http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/35787/npacouple-released. 329 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez." 330 Jerome Aning, "Militants Welcome Release of Couple But.." Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 30, 2007; "Karapatan Press Release," December 29, 2007, http://www.samarnews.com/news2007/dec/f1429.htm. 89 in Leyte, Western and Eastern Samar.331 The NPA mirrored the military’s use of violence for deterrence, likewise targeting local officials and paramilitary fighters for collaborating with the army. 332 For instance, in Tacloban City, Leyte in July 2007, Charlie Solayao, vice president of a market vendors’ association linked to Bayan Muna was allegedly killed by suspected military or police agents. 333 Days later, suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed Rogelio Picoy, who was believed to be an 331 In Mahaplag, Leyte on July 5, 2007, two gunmen suspected to be from the military killed Guillermo Robin; Robin may have been considered a NPA sympathizer who, with his partner, had been caring for NPA commander Fermin Gozon’s child. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0002 Re: Guilermo Robin," (Commission on Human Rights, January 23, 2009). On July 22 in Villaba, Leyte, Feliciano Labrador and his wife and 12-year-old son as well as Labrador’s visitor named Jessry were killed. The military claimed it was an armed encounter and that Labrador was a former NPA insurgent, but the military officers had reportedly been at the house for three hours before the family was killed, suggesting otherwise. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-32 Re: Feliciano Labrador et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, August 10, 2007). An unknown gunman killed Roberto Cabaljao in Hinabangan, Samar on August 7, 2007; Cabaljao, son of a Bayan Muna member, may have been mistaken for his father, and killed for the latter's affiliation with Bayan Muna. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0126 Re: Roberto A. Cabaljo," (Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2010). In September 2007 in Leyte, witnesses to the lethal shooting of four men by gunmen on motorcycle claim that the shooters said three of the dead were known NPA insurgents; in a separate incident, soldiers killed a man in an alleged armed encounter but he may have already been in their custody before dying. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0087 Re: Celestino P. Almerino," (Commission on Human Rights, May 14, 2008). "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-44 Re: Bonifacio Dunghit," (Commission on Human Rights, February 22, 2008). Soldiers arrested a young man, Sonny Boy Dacles, in Motiong town, Samar in November 2007. He was not seen again afterwards. Four years later, his family filed a complaint but withdrew it shortly after the implicated commanding officer was notified. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0318 Re: Sonny Boy Dacles," (Commission on Human Rights, December 28, 2011). 332 In July 2007 in Eastern Samar, suspected NPA insurgents killed Jaime Nebril, a CAFGU paramilitary member and former NPA, reportedly due to the NPA’s decision to “liquidate” Nebril as a traitor for joining the CAFGU. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 2008-0102 Re: Jaime A. Nebril," (Commission on Human Rights, June 24, 2008). On August 17, 2007, suspected NPA insurgents killed Alipio Tagle of the paramilitary Western Samar CAFGU company, CAA, at his home in Santa Rita town. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-47 Re: Alipio Tagle," (Commission on Human Rights, November 5, 2007). Former barangay chairman in Llorente, Eastern Samar Alberto Calzado was shot while gathering coconuts by alleged NPA insurgents in December 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0079 Re: Alberto Calzado, Sr.," (Commission on Human Rights, February 14, 2008). 333 "Tagalog News: PNP Iniimbestigahan Na Ang Pagpatay Kay Solayao," Philippine Information Agency Press Release July 19, 2007, http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&sec=reader&rp=8&fi=p070719.htm&no=71&date=. 90 informer to government authorities.334 Picoy was the former chairman of labor group Anakpawis in Tacloban City from 2000. He separated from the group after the 2004 presidential election and joined the Philippine Guardian Brotherhood as an alleged police asset; Solayao had succeeded him as Anakpawis chair.335 During this period however, insurgents were no longer able to inflict heavy casualties as they had before Palparan’s assignment to the region. The Fight Ends in Northern Samar The military continued to pour additional fighters into the region: by early 2008, there were five thousand soldiers in Eastern Visayas in nine battalions.336 As the military made headway quelling the communist insurgency in the area, the overall level of violence decreased.337 Most of the incidents in 2008 were concentrated in 334 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-27 Re: Charlie Solayao," (Commission on Human Rights, October 16, 2007). 335 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-28 Re: Rogelio B. Picoy," (Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2007). In another incident, on September 26, unidentified gunmen ambushed a group of villagers from barangay Caranas, Motiong town as they left the 46th Infantry Battalion Philippine Army detachment in the town. The villagers had been directed to report to the military. Suspected insurgents killed four barangay officials including Jonathan Dacutanan, a Samar College student and sangguniang kabataan (youth council) chair, and wounding three others. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0122 Re: Jonathan T. Dacutanan," (Commission on Human Rights, December 24, 2008). On the same day, the military claimed that NPA gunmen killed Ernesto General in Motiong town. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0140 Re: Ernesto General," (Commission on Human Rights, April 28, 2009). 336 Joey Gabieta, "Army to Recruit 100 Men for East Visayas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 6, 2008. 337 Few incidents occurred in Leyte and Eastern Samar. For instance, in January 2008 in Abuyog, United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Pastor Feliciano Catambis was killed by two suspected military agents. He may have been targeted because the UCCP was considered to be a NPA front organization and he was moreover the second pastor of the Northeastern Leyte Conference killed in this manner in a two year period. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-81 Re: Felomino G. Catambis," (Commission on Human Rights, April 29, 2008). Also "In the Know," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 17, 2011, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/15557/in-the-know-5. Farmers Jimmy Anday, Chito and Ronald Catubay were killed in September 2008 in Boronga, Eastern Samar by suspected soldiers, allegedly in response to a recent directive from President Arroyo to finish off the communist insurgency before 2010. Their bodies bore marks of torture, their hands were tied and their stomachs sliced. "Rights Group Says Soldiers Tortured, Killed 3 Farmers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 7, 2008. In a strange case, soldiers allegedly killed farmer Leopoldo Fernando, claiming that he was a member of the NPA. Afterwards, however, Fernando’s 91 Western Samar. For instance, a series of attacks took place in Paranas town, next to Motiong town where much of the violence had occurred in previous years. Suspected NPA insurgents killed four unidentified soldiers in March, 2008; three days later, suspected soldiers allegedly retaliated by forcibly taking farmer Rodrigo Babatio whom they accused of being with the NPA.338 In June, suspected NPA insurgents killed former barangay official Noe Pagarao.339 Nevertheless, the army was relentless in its anti-insurgency campaign, conducting air raids in San Jose de Buan town and making arrests of villagers on the ground.340 By the end of 2008, the army claimed common law wife Gina Irigon witnessed the soldiers going to Fernando’s house and, with two barangay councilors, distributed Fernando’s food and valuables throughout the group. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0111 Re: Leopoldo Fernando," (Commission on Human Rights, July 18, 2011). A year later in August 2009 in Calbayog city, relatives of Barangay Chairwoman of Barangy Higasaan, barangay kagawad Lolito Valentino and a 13member squad from the 46th Infantry Battalion allegedly killed Irigon’s new common-law husband, Michael Oñate. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0446 Re: Michael Oñate," (Commission on Human Rights, August 19, 2011). 338 "4 Troops Slain in Samar Encounter," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2008.According to the CHR investigation, this may have been a reaction to the prior ambush that left four soldiers killed and others wounded. The CHR report stated that the NPA ambush occurred in Motiong but the March 6 news report in the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported the encounter to have occurred in neighboring Paranas town. "Final Report Re: CHR VIII-2008-0089," (Commission on Human Rights, March 17, 2008). Shortly afterwards, in April 2008, soldiers allegedly killed two NPA insurgents from the Samar South Front in a chance encounter in Basey town. "NPA Rebs Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 12, 2008. 339 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0139 Re: Noe Pagarao," (Commission on Human Rights, November 7, 2008). Suspected insurgents ambushed members of a local group called the Philippine Christians Maintaining Peace Organization, whom the NPA suspected of helping the military, killing Rafael Papiona and Arnuldo Mabesa and wounding others in Villareal town in August 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0115 Re: Rafael Papiona, Arnuldo Mabesa and Romeo Vencio," (Commission on Human Rights, March 3, 2009). 340 "Rights Group Hit Military Use of Air Raids in Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2008. The military denied this claimed to have only bombed a deserted village thus reasoning there were no people to arrest or detain. However, it was unclear why the military would bother bombing an abandoned area. After weeks of intense counter-insurgency activity, three alleged military fighter planes dropped 33 bombs in four separate blasts over two days in September 2008 and caused civilians to flee the area—not for the first time. Villagers fled alleged military harassment in August 2005 as well, at the tail end of Palparan’s command in the region. Ericson Acosta, "An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in Eastern Visayas," Bulatlat August 12, 2011, http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/08/12/anoverview-of-the-human-rights-situation-in-eastern-visayas/. 92 that they had dismantled three guerrilla fronts in Eastern Samar.341 The locus of the conflict shifted to Northern Samar, where the number of violent incidents soon tripled. The NPA waged a retaliatory campaign, picking off military targets and civilian collaborators.342 The army initially seemed to maintain the upper hand, keeping the pressure on local activists and civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents. For instance, suspected soldiers killed Bartolome Resuelo, a physician at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital and human rights advocate in Pambujan town.343 In August 2009 in Lope de Vega town, barangay kagawad Jojo Basiloy and farmer Jerwin Marino were questioned over the location of NPA insurgents before being killed by alleged soldiers and members of Dosé Parés, an armed paramilitary group.344 In Catubig town, a week after the Lope de Vega killings, armed men suspected to be from the military ambushed and killed a parish priest.345 A brother of Northern Samar’s vice governor Antonio Lucero, the priest Cecilio Lucero may have been suspected to be a NPA sympathizer and was reportedly mentioned in a local military order of battle. Moreover, Lucero took charge of the witnesses in the 341 Carla Gomez, "Half on NPA Fronts Dismantled, Says Army Exec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2009. 342 In February 2009 in Catubig town, alleged NPA insurgents killed Caesar Vicencio, husband of town mayor Maria Cristina L. Vicencio; she received letters from the Rodante Ortal Command that her husband was “sentenced” to death for the murder of two NPA members. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII- 2010-0144 Re: Caesar Y. Vicencio," (Commission on Human Rights, May 12, 2010). In May 2009, suspected NPA insurgents killed soldier Douglas Jumagdao and a civilian woman with a grenade attack on a military camp in a Catarman village. Joey Gabieta, Johana Gasga, and Julius Embile, "2 Soldiers, Woman Slain in NPA Attack in Northern Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 1, 2009. 343 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0011 Re: Dr. Bartolome M. Resuello," (Commission on Human Rights, April 22, 2010). Even if incidents were concentrated mostly in Northern Samar, military-led violence also continued in other parts of the region. In July 2009 in Samar, soldiers allegedly killed Romulo Mendova, accused of participating in raid and wounding CAFGU; Mendova had earlier been made to report to the detachment commander of 52nd Infantry Batallion and was said to have been in the military’s Order of Battle. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0489 Re: Romulo Mendova," (Commission on Human Rights, November 4, 2009). 344 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0027 Re: The Alleged Killing of Jojo Basiloy and Jerwin Marino," (Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010). 345 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0324 Re: The Killing of Rev. Fr. Cecilio P. Lucero," (Commission on Human Rights, October 19, 2009). 93 Lope de Vega case.346 A soldier charged for the crime went into hiding and was finally found and arrested in 2012.347 Two months afterwards, an another case involved a relative of a prominent political family. In October 2009 in Rosario town, the younger brother of Raul Daza, provincial governor of Northern Samar, was ambushed by alleged NPA. 348 The COMELEC expressed alarm at the murders, hinting that they could have been linked to the elections the next May.349 In late 2009, the CHR launched an investigation into the high number of documented extra-judicial killings in the region—second only to Davao—and there was particular concern over the murder of the Lucero case as a possible intersection between the insurgency-related attacks on activists and electoral politics. 350 Having defended former president Estrada in his impeachment case, Governor Raul Daza was at the time the only high-ranking politician in the region to have been elected without the backing of the incumbent Arroyo administration. 351 Although the level of violence in Western Samar had declined considerably compared to previous years, most of the violence that did occur consisted of NPA attacks—including on local politicians.352 In Leyte, for instance, the NPA also took 346 "National Fact-Finding Mission Report on the Killing of Father Cecilio Lucero," 2009, http://www.karapatan.org/files/Lucero%20fact-finding%20mission%20report%20Oct09.pdf. 347 Orlando Dinoy, "Ex-Soldier Wanted for Priest's Slay Arrested," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 19, 2012. 348 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0448 Re: The Killing of Manuel A. Daza," (Commission on Human Rights, August 12, 2010). 349 Joey Gabieta, "Comelec Exec Alarmed over Samar Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 6, 2009. 350 "CHR: E. Visayas Next to Davao in Murders," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 21, 2009. Nikko Dizon, "CHR to Probe Spate of Unsolved Samar Murders," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 16, 2009. 351 Vicente Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 3, 2007. 352 In March 2010 in Matuginao, the family home of Domingo dela Cruz was strafed by armed men, killing two; there was family history of attacks by NPA as they were suspected to be military intelligence assets and guides in military operations. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0135 Re: Domingo De La Cruz, Junie De La Cruz and Mylene De La Cruz," (Commission on Human Rights, May 4, 2010). Catarman municipal police intelligence officer Teronimo Tan was killed in September 2010 by alleged NPA sparrow assassins. Tan 94 responsibility for the killing of former mayor of Giporlos town Mateo Biong in July 2010, who had run and lost in the May election.353 The NPA claimed that they executed him for crimes against the people, but the CHR investigation indicated that he might have been punished for refusing to pay off the NPA.354 The military had paused in its counterinsurgency campaign as soldiers were either redeployed to secure polling precincts and assist the police or sent to Maguindanao province in the south.355 As a consequence, shortly after the elections, the NPA managed to inflict severe casualties again on the military in Northern Samar, at levels comparable to the early 2000s. In August, suspected insurgents of the Efren Martires Command ambushed and killed police official Nicasio San Antonio and seven other policemen in Catarman.356 In a December ambush in Catubig, 10 soldiers and a civilian were killed in an ambushed by an alleged group of 40 armed NPA insurgents. 357 Still, the cumulative effect of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign bore fruit. By the end of this period, the military estimated the NPA’s fighter numbers to have dropped to about 300 active insurgents in the region. 358 Under the government of Benigno Aquino, who assumed office on June 1, was known to have gathered intelligence against University of Eastern Philippines personalities, Bayan Muna, and the campus organization League of Filipino Students. He was also an affiant in a legal case against NPA leader Salvador Nordan. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0307 Re: Geronimo E. Tan," (Commission on Human Rights, September 17, 2011). 353 Joey Gabieta, "CHR Tags Former Mayor's Slay as Extra-Judicial," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 20, 2010. See also "Philippines: Rebel Executions Violate International Law," October 27, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/27/philippines-rebel-executionsviolate-international-law. 354 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0277 Re: Mateo Biong, Jr," (Commission on Human Rights, August 17, 2010). 355 "Army Exec Vows to End Anti-Insurgency Campaign in Eastern Visayas This Year," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 14, 2010. Troops were sent to Maguindanao on account of the Ampatuan massacre of 59 people on November 23, 2009, which led to the imposition of a state of emergency and brief martial law in the province. 356 Rachel Arnaiz and Joey Gabieta, "N. Samar Cops Slain by NPA Buried as Heroes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2010. 357 "Memorandum Re: CHR VIII-2011-0234," (May 3, 2011). 358 Gabieta, "Army Exec Vows to End Anti-Insurgency Campaign in Eastern Visayas This Year." 95 2010, the AFP shifted its tactics in Eastern Visayas. Even in areas that had been declared “cleared”, such as Leyte, the military maintained a presence. Local human rights NGO Katungod alleged that soldiers were stoking fear among villagers by paying frequent visits.359 Yet there was a pronounced decline in the military’s use of lethal violence, even after serious provocations and multiple deaths among government forces. Nonetheless, allegations of military torture, harassment, and forced disappearance persisted.360 The military continued to direct its attention toward deterring civilians from supporting insurgents, but began to place a greater emphasis on intelligence gathering. 361 Activists and others suspected of being NPA sympathizers were often the subject of arrest on trumped up charges.362 For instance, the military arrested Ericson Acosta, a researcher working for human rights NGO Karapatan, in February 2011 in San Jorge, Samar. Acosta was accused of being a NPA member and arrested for possessing a grenade without authority or license.363 He was detained for almost two years until the Department of Justice reviewed his case and dropped the charges.364 In 2011, the NPA launched several attacks but these resulted in far fewer 359 "Group Slams "Militarization" of Villages," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 17, 2011. 360 In November 2012, 10 soldiers stationed in San Jose de Buan town allegedly tortured Yono Cabadongga, a farmer and member of the Mamanua indigenous peoples group, as he was interrogated on NPA movements in the locale. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-VIII2012-0436 Re: Yono C. Cabadongga," (Commission on Human Rights, May 21, 2013). In another case, the military allegedly coerced barangay councilor Artemio Labong and his family to publicly pose as rebel returnees. Ina Silverio, "Family Abducted, Presented as Rebel Returnees in Samar," Bulatlat.com March 23, 2012, http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/03/23/family-abducted-presented-as-rebel-returnees-in-samar/. 361 Joey Gabieta, "Reservists Tapped in Anti-Red Drive," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2011. 362 Ronalyn Olea, "Military Turns Wrath on Farmers, Activists in Eastern Visayas," Bulatlat.com December 10, 2011, http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/12/10/military-turns-wrathon-farmers-activists-in-eastern-visayas/. 363 "Memorandum Re: Case of Erickson Acosta," (Commission on Human Rights, December 15, 2011). 364 "DOJ Drops Charges against Political Prisoner Ericson Acosta," Bulatlat.com February 1, 2013, http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/06/14/6-years-under-aquino-media-killings-unabatedpress-freedom-under-siege/. 96 casualties than the year before. Moreover, typhoons and other natural catastrophes forced insurgents to surface for humanitarian assistance. In 2009 for instance, NPA members sought help due to heavy floods.365 Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest tropical cyclones on record, devastated the Visayas regions in 2013. Tensions rose as military presence was increased to assist with the calamity, but also in response to rioting and protests over the failures in the government’s relief efforts.366 The army claimed that NPA rebels were left disorganized and unable to contact their leaders, but were attempting to regroup by recruiting members in calamity-stricken areas.367 The military allegedly targeted aid workers as a consequence. Violence was aimed at the Municipal Farmers’ Association (MUFAC), an NGO assisting typhoon victims in Leyte. In the following months, soldiers established outposts and allegedly prohibited residents from joining protest actions over delays in relief and rehabilitation. 368 In August 2014, in Carigara, Leyte, two gunmen on motorcycle killed MUFAC member 365 James Mananghaya, "Flood Flushes out Communist Rebels," The Philippine Star October 13, 2009, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/358226/esperon-tells-melo-commission-npabehind-political-killings. Human rights group Karapatan claimed that government relief failures in the 2012 Typhoon Pablo led to protests, military repression and the killing of Cristina Jose, leader of the Pablo victims. Bulatlat Contributors, "Stranded Pablo Mission Rescued, Military Blamed," The Philippine Star April 22, 2013, http://bulatlat.com/main/2013/04/22/stranded-pablo-mission-rescued-military-blamed/. 366 Marya Salamat, "Urgent Relief and Rehab Needed in Yolanda-Stricken Areas, Not Militarization," Bulatlat November 12, 2013, http://bulatlat.com/main/2013/11/12/urgentrelief-and-rehab-needed-in-yolanda-stricken-areas-not-militarization/. 367 Rommel Fuertes, "NPA Operation in Eastern Visayas Devasted by Yolanda," DZRH News December 18, 2013, http://dzrhnews.com.ph/npa-operation-eastern-visayas-devastatedyolanda/. The Communist Party of the Philippines had declared a ceasefire and ordered the NPA to desist from launching attacks in areas affected by the typhoon and later denied the army’s assertion that they were devastated by the typhoon. Edwin Espejo, "Communist Rebels Declare Ceasefire in Disaster Areas," Rappler November 14, 2013, https://www.rappler.com/nation/43717-communist-rebels-declare-ceasefire-haiyan. CPP Information Bureau, "CPP Laughs Off AFP Claim That Yolanda Disorganized NPA in the Visayas," National Democratic Front of the Philippines International Information Office December 18, 2013, https://www.ndfp.org/cpp-laughs-off-afp-claim-yolanda-disorganizednpa-in-the-visayas/. 368 Janess Ann Ellao, "'Ruthless Legacy': 7 Activists Killed in August," Bulatlat.com September 3, 2014, http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/09/03/ruthless-legacy-seven-activistskilled-in-august/. 97 Jefferson Custodio.369 Skirmishes increased after the NPA ambushed and wounded two soldiers who had delivered relief goods to Northern Samar due to typhoon Nona in 2015.370 Counter-insurgency is a strategic aim of the state. The period from 2001 to 2004 was marked by NPA insurgency attacks that dealt multiple casualties to military and paramilitary forces. However, the military was stymied by the difficulty in identifying rebels and their supporters. Democratic constraints were weak and failed to prevent the targeting of activists and civilians. During the assignment of General Palparan to Eastern Visayas for six months in 2005, the military’s tactic shifted in scale and lethalness. Claims that soldiers killed leftist activists and other local community organizers are credible. The military bombed villages and restricted people’s movements. The NPA likewise targeted civilians, albeit in smaller numbers and more selectively. However, Palparan’s tactics alienated some local politicians and he was consequently reassigned to Central Luzon. After a slowdown of the military-led violence with Palparan’s departure, conflict intensified in 2007 as the army weakened the NPA’s hold on Leyte and Samar islands. Although the NPA made a number of strikes against military targets, they no longer exacted the kind of casualty numbers as they had in the past. The NPA was driven into the northern interior of Samar island. However, a series of natural disasters battered Eastern Visayas. The 2013 “super” typhoon Haiyan fragmented an already greatly diminished insurgent force. Violence on both sides subsided significantly and dwindled. 369 Ibid. See also "Initial Investigation Report Re: Jefferson A. Custodio Case," (Commission on Human Rights, September 24, 2014). 370 Insurgents also raided a police station in March 2016 in Eastern Samar, and ambushed soldiers with a land mine in Samar weeks before the May 2016 elections. CDN Research, "Attacks Staged by Suspecteed NPA Rebels in the Visayas since 2015," Philippine Daily Inquirer July 22, 2017, http://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/140558/attacks-staged-suspectednpa-rebels-visayas-since-2015. 98 Electoral Violence Electoral violence regularly peaked around election seasons. Mandated term limits, in effect from 1988, restrict local officials and congressional representatives from running after three consecutive terms in office. In practice, affected politicians barred from running in 1998 often bided their time by fielding family members or close allies as “seat warmers” until they could run again. So in 2001, many such politicians throughout Eastern Visayas were attempting to make a comeback while others were entrenched politicians seeking higher office or re-election. 371 Moreover, at least two private armies were known to operate in Samar: one under Calbayog City mayor Reynaldo Uy and the other under Congressman Rodolfo Tuazon. 372 Western Samar was the site of the most electoral violence and 2001 was particularly bloody. 373 In the 2004 elections, almost all of the violence was concentrated over the Catbalogan contests in Samar.374 Samar congressman Reynaldo Uy allegedly orchestrated the murder of Tarangan town mayor Aniceto Olaje in 371 PDI Visayas Bureau, "Old Faces in 'New Politics'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2001. 372 Contreras., “100 Private Armies of Candidates Listed”. 373 On March 26, Robert Gulla, former bodyguard of Congressman Tuazon, was killed; on April 19, Liberal Party leader Marcelo Niangga in Calbayog (shot and killed) and his companion Gerry Calderon (wounded) were ambushed; and on May 2, Rose Tamidles, wife of incumbent city councilor and Tuazon’s trusted leader Nestor Tamidles, who was also critically wounded in the attack along with eight other wounded and four other fatalities. Vicente Labro, "Bet's Wife, 4 Others Killed in Ambush in Calbayog City," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 3, 2001. 374 In Northern Samar however, suspected gunmen from a private armed group wounded a supporter of mayoral candidate Nicolas Turog (Liberal party) in an ambush by gunmen belonging to a rival camp. Inquirer Bureaus, "15 More Killed in Poll-Related Incidents," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 11, 2004. Politically-motivated killings occurred in Samar during the July 2002 barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council) elections nationwide, alleged supporters of barangay chair candidate Florencio Apacible shot dead Eutemio Patente, the incumbent candidate for re-election; Patente's brother, in apparent retaliation, shot dead Erenio Medalla, a known Apacible supporter. Joey Gabieta, "2 Murders Open Campaign Period," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 5, 2002. 99 February 2004.375 A third term mayor, Olaje had fielded his wife Emily in the town’s mayoral race and was also a known supporter of former Samar Rep Rodolfo Tuazon. Tuazon and Uy ran against each other in the congressional race.376 Uy accused Tuazon of retaliating by shooting and wounding one of Uy’s bodyguards.377 Barely a month after filling the vacancy left by Olaje’s death, Tarangan mayor Francisco Montero was assassinated.378 As a result, the Commission on Elections monitored Eastern Visayas. The police estimated that as many as ten politicians’ private armies operated in Eastern Visayas.379 The situation was rendered more complicated with the NPA being active during the elections, raking in at least PhP 13 million (US$ 260,000) in permit-tocampaign fees.380 For instance, weeks prior to the elections, suspected NPA members held captive incumbent mayor Chinita Gabieta and her entire slate in Samar and released them after they paid PhP200,000 in permit-to-campaign fees.381 In the 2007 elections, violence was again mostly concentrated in Samar as soon as the election season opened the year before. In October 2006, unidentified gunmen on motorcycles, allegedly under the orders of San Jorge town mayor Joseph Grey, killed Rolando Diocton. Grey went on the run after a regional trial court issued 375 "Solon's Supporter Tagged Gunman in Mayor's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 3, 2004. 376 "Samar Town Mayor Shot Dead in Cockfight Arena, Politics Eyed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2004. 377 "Samar Solon's Guard Shot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 2, 2004. 378 Vicente Labro, Mei Magsino, and Marlon Ramos, "Mayor Who Took over Slain Predecessor Himself Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 4, 2004. 379 Joey Gabieta, "110 East Visayas Areas on Watch List," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2004. 380 Gil Cabacungan, Alcuin Papa, and Martin Marfil, "Gov't Cracks Down on Private Armies," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19, 2004. 381 NPA group believed to belong to the Arnulfo Ortiz Command of the CPP-NPA, which operates on Samar island. Joey Gabieta, "Rebs Hold Mayor Hostage, Get P200,000," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2004. 100 a warrant of arrest against him, his son and three others.382 Grey’s supporters had themselves been targeted in the past.383 In January, Samar Rep. Catalino Figueroa, Daram town vice mayor Bartolome Figueroa, Edgar Figueroa and four unidentified men, allegedly killed Daram mayor Benito Astorga.384 Other election-related violence occurred throughout the following weeks. Vice mayor Francisco Langi of Motiong town survived an attempted assassination on February 6.385 There were also quite a number of incidents that involved NPA insurgents. On February 20, suspected NPA insurgents killed municipal councilor and member of the municipal peace and order council Vivencio Ellantos in San Jose de Buan town, Western Samar. He was reportedly suspected by the NPA of gathering all barangay captains to join in intelligence and monitoring against the NPA.386 Around the same time in Eastern Samar, alleged NPA assailants killed village councilor Ruino Silla and his daughter Rufa Silla. There were escalating threats to Silla’s life for offenses “against the masses”. 387 From 2007 to 2013, much of the election-related violence in the region was related to the struggle between the Uy and Tan dynasties in Calbayog City and their 382 "Samar Mayor, Son Face Arrest for Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2007. During the 2002 Barangay elections, security personnel of Calbayog City mayor Oliceria Catalan allegedly fired upon Wilfredo Sale, chair of barangay Mancol, San Jorge municipality and reportedly a supporter of Catalan’s opponent Joseph Gray, killing Sale’s sister Rosalita and wounding several others. Gray later defeated Catalan in the mayoral elections and the latter and his bodyguards were charged with murder and frustrated murder. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-003 Re: Rosalita Sale," (Commission on Human Rights, September 26, 2002). 384 Vicente Labro, "Remote Samar Town Mayor Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 26, 2007. See also Joey Gabieta, "Congressman Sued for Mayor's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2007. 385 "Police Tag Samar Election Hot Spot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 23, 2007. 386 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-41 Re: Vivincio L. Ellantos," (Commission on Human Rights, October 8, 2008). 387 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0080 Re: Rufino G. Silla and Rufa Joy S. Silla," (Commission on Human Rights, March 13, 2008). 383 101 political supporters.388 One incident involved Jovito Palparan, who had retired from military service in 2006 and founded an anti-communist political party “Bantay – The True Marcos Loyalist for God Country and People”. Bantay means “watch”, likely referring to his role in the violence counter-insurgency campaign Oplan Bantay Laya (Operation Freedom Watch) under President Arroyo. Running in the party-list elections, Palparan accused Uy of benefiting from the pattern of killings in Calbayog City, including a June 2009 attempt on Arturo Pasacas, a former soldier himself who had run in 2007 under Uy’s party. It was unclear why Paplaran thought Uy would kill his own party mate.389 In April 2011, Calbayog City Mayor Uy was assassinated.390 Prior to his death, Uy had endorsed a recall petition against Samar governor Sharee Ann Tan and her younger brother vice governor James Tan. The COMELEC had been about to schedule a recall election.391 Violence continued a pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation between the Uy and Tan dynasties, targeted at political operatives at the village level.392 In one case, however, former barangay chief Felomino Cabarriban was killed 388 There were some exceptions. In the 2007 barangay elections, re-elected barangay chair Marcos Anquillo and tanod Roger Reyes were killed by unknown assailants in Catarman, Northern Samar. Inquirer Bureaus, "29 Dead but Polls Peaceful, Says PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 31, 2007. Unidentified killers assassinated Matuginao municipal mayor Carlos de la Cruz in July, 2009. Joey Gabieta, "Mayor of Poor Samar Town Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2009. 389 As explained earlier in this chapter, there was an animosity between Western Samar politician Reynaldo Uy and former general Jovito Palparan. Palparan’s command in Eastern Visayas had been cut short partly due to congressional inquiries led by Uy and other allies of the heightened violence in 2005. Palparan was consequently reassigned to Central Luzon, where he remained until his retirement in 2006. The CHR also noted that Pasacas’s involvement in land disputes was the probable motive for the attempted assassination. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0447 Re: Arturo Pasacas," (Commission on Human Rights, September 13, 2011). 390 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0233 Re: Reynaldo S. Uy," (Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010). 391 Joey Gabieta and Christine Avenado, "Noy Orders Hunt for Mayor's Killer," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2011. 392 In January 2013 for instance, unidentified assailants killed Lito Buracan and William Someno in Catbalogan City; Buracan was reportedly a political organizer of Samar provincial 102 in Calbayog City to silence him over an alleged corruption relevation. A week before he was killed, Carriban told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that a road worth PhP 11 million (US$ 220,000), funded through Congresswoman Milagros Tan’s discretionary funds, was never built.393 Election-related violence dwindled after 2013 although a few cases involved prominent local politicians.394 What about seeming oases of calm? Biliran and Southern Leyte provinces did not experience any serious cases of insurgency-related violence and saw very little electoral violence. The only incident of lethal electoral violence in Biliran documented in this study occurred in Caibiran town, Biliran, several weeks after the May 2001 election.395 On the face of it, the enduring primacy of the Espina political dynasty in Biliran has obviated the use of violence. Family patriarch Gerry Espina first occupied the Biliran congressional seat in 1998 and a second generation of Espinas began to seek office when he reached his seventies.396 By 2007, Espina was unable to run for re-election in Congress due to term limits but he ran and won as mayor of the capital town Naval instead. His sons occupied Biliran’s lone congressional seat, governor Sharee Ann Tan. Joey Gabieta, "Killings Mar Poll Peace Pact Signing," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 15, 2013. 393 Jennifer Allegado and Joey Gabieta, "Gunman in Ghost Project Witness' Killing Charged," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 4, 2013. 394 In Samar, prior to the May 2016 local and national elections, Joseph Grey was implicated in electoral violence, this time in the killing of barangay chair Romulo Barcoma. Grey’s two sons and a former soldier who had been working in the Grey family’s private security were charged as suspects but the court case was dismissed for lack of evidence. "Evaluation Report Case ID CHR-III-2016-0114," (Commission on Human Rights, 2016). Rommel Rutor, "According to Cops, Eyewitness: Vice Mayor, 3 Others Linked to Killing of Village Chairman," The Philippine Star July 1, 2016, http://www.philstar.com/region/2016/02/18/1554263/according-cops-eyewitness-vice-mayor3-others-linked-killing-village. 395 Caesar Almen, who had just won the vice mayoral election, was allegedly killed by suspects Antonio and Noel Azur, supporters of the town mayor Melchor Maderazo. Vicente Labro, "Biliran Vice Mayoral Race Winner Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 16, 2001. 396 Eileen Ballesteros, "Biliran Governor Insists: "No Dynasty, but Destiny"," The Philippine Star November 1, 2015, http://www.philstar.com/region/2015/11/01/1517195/bilirangovernor-insists-no-dynasty-destiny. 103 gubernatorial seat, and mayorship of Kawayan town.397 Moreover, the Espina political clan had no serious opponents. 398 While the Espinas requested security details like many politicians in the region during the 2013 election, neither was there serious violence nor was the Espina clan dislodged despite the death of the Espina patriarch that year.399 In Southern Leyte, there was active electoral jostling between the Lerias and Mercado political families yet electoral violence was rare. 400 Southern Leyte politicians eschew additional security details from the army and police during election seasons.401 The electoral contests between the Leriases and the Mercados have had their bitter moments, but they also cooperated to divide political spoils between them. Rosette Lerias, from a political clan that dominated politics in the 1980s, first ran against Roger Mercado for the lone congressional district in 1987. Mercado won by a few hundred votes then, but defeated Lerias by a wider margin in the next election. Avoiding confrontation, Lerias ran for governor instead in 1995 and won.402 In 2004, although they were aligned with opposing political parties, Lerias (for governor) and Mercado (for Congress) ran as allies and successfully defeated their rivals.403 In 397 Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics." In the 2010 elections, there were some challenges to Espina dominance but to no avail. "Political Families Revive Poll Rivalries," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 19, 2009. 399 PDI Visayas Bureau, "Polls Solidify LP Hold in Most of Visayas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2013. Also Joey Gabieta, "Only 1 Province Not a 'Hot Spot' in East Visayas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 15, 2016. 400 In Macrohon municipality, Southern Leyte, unknown assailants killed Dennis Yulo. Prior to the incident, he was seen tearing down posters for congressional candidate Roberto Castañares. Inquirer Southern Luzon et al. Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics." 401 Joey Gabieta, "22 Visayas Bets Want Bodyguards," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 24, 2013. Although journalists had been harassed and even killed elsewhere, when gunmen fired at the house of Southern Leyte Times publisher Tony Reyes in 2008, local journalists noted that any assault on a media worker in the province was unprecedented. Jani Arnaiz, "Gunmen Attack Leyte Publisher's House, Send Chilling Mesage," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 12, 2008. 402 Eileen Ballesteros, "It Must Be Fate, Says Ex-Solon of Facing Rival for the Fourth Time," The Philippine Star April 16, 2001, http://www.philstar.com/nation/104010/it-must-be-fatesays-ex-solon-facing-rival-fourth-time. 403 In 1998, Mercado had been so incensed that he shot at Saludo and missed, instead hitting a helicopter that burst into flames; Mercado was charged with frustrated murder and arson. Saludo had the charges dropped in 2001 when he allied with Mercado against Lerias. Jani 398 104 subsequent elections, the prowess of Lerias waned while Mercado began to successfully field his family members in local elections.404 Violence was averted by this ecosystem of political families that contest but also cooperate, trading political offices like they swap horses. Similar to the Lerias and Mercado families in Southern Leyte, political dynasties have divided the governorship and control of the capital city of Tacloban between themselves. The Petilla and Romualdez families have been among Leyte’s dominant political clans since the 1960s. Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, Imelda Marcos’s younger brother, was Leyte governor from 1967 until Marcos fell in 1986. 405 Since 1989, the Petillas maintained their stature. Leopoldo Petilla was governor until 1995, succeeded by his wife Remedios (1995 to 2004), his son Jericho (2004 to 2013), and another son Dominico (2013 to the present).406 As for the Romualdez family, only after Corazon Aquino’s presidency did they slowly return to dominance in Leyte’s capital Tacloban City. Imelda Marcos held office as congressional representative of the First District in the city from 1995 to 1998, succeeded by her nephew Alfred Romualdez from 1998 to 2001. Another of her brothers, Alfredo Romualdez was Tacloban City mayor from 1998 to 2007 and his son Alfred took over, also for three consecutive terms until 2016.407 Unlike Southern Arnaiz, "Southern Leyte's Tangled Web of Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 20, 2010. 404 Derek Alviola, "East Versus West: Southern Leyte Divided in 2016 Elections," Rappler April 30, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/131297-east-west-southern-leyte-2016elections. Election results and party affiliations in 2013 and 2016 as published online on rappler.com. 405 Joey Gabieta, "Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez Dies; 81," Philippine Daily Inquirer February 22, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/149717/benjamin-kokoy-romualdez-dies-81. 406 Adelina Larrazabal took office briefly in 1986 before the Petilla clan began its sustained dominance. Lalaine Jimenea, "Cari, Petilla Families in Leyte Retain Political Reign," The Philippine Star May 17, 2016, http://www.philstar.com:8080/region/2016/05/17/1584077/cari-petilla-families-leyte-retainpolitical-reign. 407 Alfred’s wife, Cristina Romualdez, was elected in 2016 to succeed him. Joey Gabieta, "Cristina Gonzales-Romualdez Is New Tacloban City Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer May 10, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/784830/cristina-gonzales-romualdez-is-newtacloban-city-mayor. Although the Romualdez hold was broken for two terms from 2001 to 2004 by TV news personality Ted Failon and from 2004 to 2007 by Remedios Petilla, 105 Leyte and Biliran, however, Leyte province was the site of considerable insurgencyrelated violence. The insurgency had little impact on politics in urban areas and electoral violence was rare.408 Draining the Sea to Catch the Fish In Eastern Visayas, the dynamics of counter-insurgency explain violence against activists and other civilians. At the start of the period in this study, in the early 2000s, the NPA insurgency was at a post-Marcos peak in terms of arms and fighters nationwide—and Eastern Visayas was a communist stronghold with roots in Western Samar. The NPA waged an effective armed campaign against military, paramilitary and police targets, as well as against civilians and those they claimed were civilian collaborators. The military took many losses. Unable to strike the guerrilla forces effectively, the army’s strategy was oriented toward eroding the civilian base from which insurgents sought support or sympathy. By 2008, Leyte was almost clear of insurgency-related violence. Western Samar was clear by 2009 except for a small spike in 2012. The NPA was pushed to Northern Samar where they made a stand and stepped up attacks in 2009 and 2010. Violence dropped drastically afterwards—partly due to natural disasters that fragmented an already exhausted insurgent force. The Eastern Visayas case thus follows a pattern of political violence resulting from statist, strategic interests in containing an armed insurgency—by all means available to the military, including the illegal targeting of civilians and using mass Imelda’s nephew and Kokoy Romualdez’s son, Ferdinand Martin, kept the post of First District congressman from 2007 to 2016. 408 In one case, two assailants killed Villaba municipal vice mayor Claudio Larrazabal, cousin of former Commission on Elections commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal, in November 2014. Larrazabal may have been killed to prevent him from running in the 2016 elections. "Leyte Vice Mayor Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 18, 2014. Lalaine Jimenea, "Vice Mayor Slay Suspect Nabbed," The Philippine Star December 23, 2014, http://www.philstar.com/region/2014/12/23/1405735/vice-mayor-slay-suspect-nabbed. 106 violence against them. Military violence was centrally directed and coordinated across the region. The military escalated violence in response to insurgents’ attacks, and the level of violence dropped mainly as a result of the NPA’s defeat. All in all, the pattern best exemplifies a centrally led crackdown on opponents. Similar examples are discussed in Northern Luzon (counter-insurgency from 2001 until 2011) and, to a certain extent, in Central Luzon (from 2005 to 2006), where General Palparan was assigned after his command in Eastern Visayas. This is the subject of the next chapter. At a smaller scale than counter-insurgency, elections produced violence each election “season”, every three years from 2001. There were exceptions, of course: potential candidates were sometimes eliminated as early as a year or two before an election. Sometimes, shortly after the polls, a winning candidate was killed to prevent them from assuming office. However, elections did not produce violence “automatically”. As demonstrated in provinces where violence was comparatively low, violence was averted when one group had a virtual monopoly over politics or when competing groups managed to share power by carving up electoral offices among themselves. In the region, electoral violence lessened considerably in scale after 2010. The NPA also actively intervened during elections, particularly in Western Samar. In the early 2000s, they levied “permit-to-campaign” fees, abducted and harassed candidates and, in some cases, eliminated them permanently from the running. The NPA’s ability to do so diminished over time, under the pressure of the government’s military counter-insurgency campaign. 107 Chapter 4. Patronage and Punishment in Central Luzon Central Luzon was the site of a high level of insurgency-related violence. Unlike in Eastern Visayas, where state violence was in clearer response to the local insurgency threat, particularistic politics had a stronger influence on the use of violence. (See Figure 8, below) The violence against unionists, leftist politicians and activists in Hacienda Luisita, a sugar plantation in Tarlac province that had enjoyed a controversial exemption from land reform, exemplifies this variation. In neighboring Nueva Ecija, a group of former communist insurgents engaged in anti-crime vigilantism. Demonstrating a capacity for regulating social violence, the police dismantled the group. Finally, electoral violence followed a similar pattern as in Northern Luzon and Eastern Visayas—President Arroyo’s successful dislodgement of Nueva Ecija strongman Governor Thomas Joson offers another example of the center prevailing when faced with an antagonistic local leader. Figure 8. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Central Luzon 120 100 80 60 Other patterns of violence 40 Insurgencyrelated violence 20 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table 108 Central Luzon has a long history of peasant organization and unrest. Close to Manila, the region has the third highest voting population nationwide. The densely populated region is made up of the provincial bailiwicks of the Cojuangco-Aquinos in Tarlac and the Macapagals in Pampanga, as well as Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Bataan and Zambales. (See Map 3 below) Map 3. Central Luzon Provinces The presence of these dynastic families that have prominent roles in the capital has served to lessen electoral violence in Central Luzon. Underlying their deep and long sustained participation in national politics, the consolidation of these dynasties. This chapter will explore the reasons why dynastic consolidation resulted in a relatively low scale of electoral violence. Nonetheless, violence tended to heighten prior to, or during, elections—although the scale diminished over time (See Figure 9). 109 Figure 9. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Central Luzon 120 100 80 Other patterns of violence 60 Electionrelated violence Election Year 40 20 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped, see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section explains the dynamics that produced a pattern of political violence related to wealth control, particularly the case of Hacienda Luisita in Tarlac. The second section covers the general contours of insurgency-related violence throughout the region, with a focus on General Jovito Palparan’s assignment to the regional military command in Central Luzon in 2005 and the brutality of counter-insurgency violence during this period. The third section deals with anti-crime vigilantism in Gapan City, a distinct category of political violence concerned with social control. Finally, the fourth section explains the central-local dynamics affecting electoral violence in the region, focusing on the fall of the Joson political dynasty in Nueva Ecija. 110 A Strong but Brittle Alliance: Hacienda Luisita Central Luzon has a long past of class conflict, having been the site of the first major peasant insurgency in the country’s modern history. The Huk rebellion lasted from 1946 to 1954, and at its height numbered between 11 and 15 thousand fighters.409 The Huks had grown out of a guerrilla force that resisted both the Japanese occupation during World War II and its landlord collaborators. After the war, the independent Philippine government grew violently repressive against the Huks and the leftwing political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Matters came to a head when six DA candidates elected to Congress to represent Central Luzon were prevented from taking their seats on unsubstantiated allegations that they had used terror and other illegal means to win.410 The Huks engaged in full-scale rebellion, peaking between 1949 and 1951. The Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, made headway in the government’s counter-insurgency efforts by using violence more selectively. Elected president in 1953, Magsaysay instituted limited land reform and frontier resettlement in Mindanao to alleviate agrarian discontent.411 In 1957, the Spanish corporation Tabacalera sold the 6,400-hectare sugar plantation Hacienda Luisita and sugar mill Central Azucarera de Tarlac after prolonged labor unrest. Magsaysay asked an ally, Benigno Aquino, to facilitate the sale to Aquino’s in-laws, the Cojuangcos—a powerful clan in Tarlac.412 In line with its social justice programs, the government guaranteed loans for the Cojuangcos to make the purchase on the proviso that the parcel of land would be distributed after ten years to the tenants and small-holders 409 Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Philippine Edition) (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), 243.“Huk” refers to the Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan (HMB). 410 Ibid.158-72. 411 Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 270-71. 412 James Putzel, Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992), 93-95. 111 who worked on the sugar plantation. This section explains the central-local dynamics of political violence for control of Hacienda Luisita. Figure 10. Pattern of Wealth Control Violence in Central Luzon 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 0 2001 2 Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped, see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table This pattern of using political violence to control the wealth of resources like farmlands, forests and mines is distinct from counterinsurgency and electoral violence, although they overlap. The strategic interests of the state converge with particularistic interests of national and local political actors to crush threats to their dominance as well as to exploit and extract highly valuable resources. The violence is sustained and can scale up quickly, especially if the military is involved. Yet in contrast to counter-insurgency violence, which spreads nationally or regionally, incidents are localized because violence concentrates in resource rich areas. From 2001 to 2016, political violence related to wealth control in Central Luzon intensified 112 in 2004 and 2005 (See Figure 10).413 From November 2004 to around June of the following year, more than half of the killings were due to labor conflict on the Hacienda Luisita sugar plantation in Tarlac City. On November 16, 2004, police shot into a crowd of Hacienda Luisita workers who were on the fourth day of a strike, killing seven and wounding over a hundred protesters. The violence resulted from the intersection of national and local elite interests as well as state and private aims. The struggle between the Cojuangco family and Hacienda Luisita workers spanned four decades since Magsaysay brokered the sale of the estate to the Cojuangcos. However, the family refused to honor the terms of the agreement to redistribute the land, thanks to weak agrarian reform policies in the country. During the presidency of Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, sister of Cojuangco patriarch Jose “Peping” Cojuanco, Congress passed a comprehensive land reform law in 1987. Under the law, Hacienda Luisita applied a Stocks Distribution Option (SDO) to farm workers in lieu of land distribution. Peasants continued to clamor for outright ownership. Labor protests by workers in the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugarprocessing factory, were rooted in grievances over wages and other aspects of the SDO implementation. The retrenchment of more than 300 workers in October, 2004, 413 A small spike in violence throughout different Central Luzon provinces in 2010 were from incidents that were mostly unrelated to one another. However, there was one thorny dispute over the establishment of a special economic zone in Aurora province on land claimed by the Agta indigenous people as their ancestral domain. For instance, in November 2010, an attempt was made on the life of Bernie Rada, a commentator on Radyo Natin and vocal critic of the project. Half a year later, Agta tribal chieftain Armando Maximino was killed amid protests against Apeco; two days later, the homes of Agta tribal members were burned down and Maximino was denied burial on Agta ancestral land. Tonette Orejas, "Radioman Links Threat to Views on Apeco Aired on His Program," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 19, 2010. "CHR Probes Burning of Aurora Tribe Homes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3, 2011. 113 including union leaders, was the immediate spark of the protest.414 The following month, negotiations broke down between the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and the United Luisita Workers Union (ULWU), as well as between the Central Azucarera de Tarlac and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union. This prompted a demonstration by 5,000 workers and supporters in the demonstrations at the gates of the hacienda. At first, the police were unable to disperse the protesters. The Department of Labor and Employment, recognizing that the sugar industry was “imbued with public interest”, issued orders for compulsory arbitration and assumed jurisdiction, paving the way for military presence at the picket lines.415 On November 16, riot police fired into the crowds, killing seven demonstrators and injuring 121 others. After a yearlong investigation into the case, the CHR upheld the legality of the government’s actions and deplored the aggressiveness of the protesters. However, the CHR questioned the basis of military involvement—raising the possibility that it was a “strategic ploy to intimidate the strikers.”416 Troops from the military’s Northern Luzon Command had been stationed in Tarlac earlier that year—ostensibly for special operations training in the villages, community dialogue and the protection of local facilities. After the 2004 strike and its violent dispersal, the military claimed that the Hacienda Luisita situation presented a threat to national security due to NPA infiltration and instigation of workers to take up arms.417 Over the months that followed, leaders and prominent supporters of the 414 Stephanie Dychiu, "How a Worker's Strike Became the Luisita Massacre," GMA News Online January 26, 2010, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/182515/news/specialreports/how-a-workers-strikebecame-the-luisita-massacre. 415 "Fact Sheet in Re: Alleged Violent Dispersal of Strikers in Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City," (Commission on Human Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date). 416 "CHR Resolution Case No. R III-Pi-2004 Re: Alleged Violent Dispersal of Strikers in Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City ", (CHR, November 16, 2005). 417 Jo Martinez-Clemente, "Luisita Workers Defy DOLE," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 16, 2005. 114 strike were assassinated one by one. Peasant leader Marcelino Beltran was killed in Tarlac City on December 8, 2004. Beltran, who had been scheduled to testify in a congressional inquiry into the Hacienda Luisita strike dispersal, made a dying declaration that his killer was a soldier.418 Shortly after, in early March 2005, Tarlac City councilor Abelardo Ladera, who had filed several resolutions in support of the hacienda workers, was shot dead.419 Ladera was a member of the left-wing political party Bayan Muna, which accused the military of Ladera’s assassination. 420 On the same day, Danilo Macapagal, another prominent leader of the protest and Bayan Muna provincial leader, was forcibly abducted from Cabanatuan City and has not been seen since.421 A parish priest of the Philippine Independent Church, Reverend William Tadena, was killed by two unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle days later.422 In June in Mayantoc, Bulacan, unidentified gunmen on motorcycles killed barangay chair Artemio Carmen and Pedro Quinez, who was a member of the peasant group Alyansa ng mga Magbubukid (Peasants’ Alliance) and a known supporter of the Hacienda Luisita strike.423 The military blamed the NPA for the violence, and charges were filed against alleged insurgents in some cases.424 Family members and fellow 418 Philip Tubeza and Leila Salaverria, "NBI Ordered to Probe Killing of Peasant Leader," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 11, 2004. 419 "Abelardo Ladera: The Hero of Luisita," Bulatlat.com March 12, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/03/12/abel-ladera-the-hero-of-luisita/. 420 Ronaldo Dizon, "Tarlac Councilor Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 4, 2005. 421 "Initial Report Case No CHR III-C-05-2635 Re: Danilo A. Macapagal," (Commission on Human Rights, April 14, 2005). Dee Ayroso, "Aparición Danilo Macapagal," Bulatlat March 3, 2015, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/aparicion-danilo-macapagal/. 422 "Initial Report Re: Killing of Fr. William Tadena and Wounding of Two Others," (March 18, 2005).. Russell Arador and Tonette Orejas, "Pro-Worker Priest Killed in Tarlac," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 14, 2005. 423 Russell Arador, "Barangay Chair Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 9, 2005. 424 Dona Pazzibugan and Blanche Rivera, "Military Blames NPA for Killings at Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 15, 2005. 115 hacienda community organizers nevertheless remained convinced that the military was behind the violence, which was meant to dissuade further protest.425 As scandal engulfed President Arroyo in June 2005 following accusations of massive voter fraud in the 2004 elections, former president Corazon Aquino called for Arroyo’s resignation in early July.426 Arroyo set in motion the process to wrest Hacienda Luisita away from the Cojuango-Aquino family. It appears that this was done in retaliation for Corazon Aquino breaking ranks with Arroyo. In October, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), the highest decision making body on agrarian reform issues on which the president and other cabinet members vote, began a review of the SDO that exempted the land from being redistributed.427 Before the year’s end, PARC revoked the SDO and ordered that the land be parceled out to the workers.428 This abrogated the 1989 PARC decision that allowed the exemption in the first place. Undeterred, in April 2006, Aquino joined opposition politicians and civil society groups in a campaign to block Arroyo’s attempts at amending the constitution to prolong her term in office. The following month, PARC ruled against a Hacienda Luisita appeal to reconsider the SDO revocation.429 425 Interview with Tarlac City Councilor Emily Ladera-Facunla on June 7, 2016 in Tarlac City. 426 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "Make Way for Your Successor, Cory Aquino Asks Arroyo," The PCIJ Blog July 8, 2005, http://pcij.org/blog/2005/07/08/makeway-for-your-successor-cory-aquino-asks-arroyo. This was a reversal from the support she and her family had given Arroyo in the 2004 elections. Moreover, her son Benigno Cojuangco Aquino—a Tarlac representative at the time and future president—voted against examining alleged evidence of Arroyo’s electoral fraud in Congress just days prior to the public break with Arroyo. Stephanie Dychiu, "Win or Lose, Noynoy Has to Face Luisita Deadlock," GMA News Online May 4, 2010, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/190035/news/specialreports/win-or-lose-noynoyhas-to-face-luisita-deadlock. 427 Blanche Rivera, "Cory Family on the Verge of Losing Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 8, 2005. 428 "It's Final: Cory, Kin Lose Hacienda Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21, 2005. 429 "Gov't Parceling out 1,000 Ha. To Luisita Farmers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 5, 2006. 116 During this period, a shift also occurred in the violence related to the Hacienda Luisita disputes. First of all, there was a lull in the violence for a number of months, broken when Major General Palparan was assigned to Central Luzon in September 2005 (discussed in the next section). Three assassinations are likely to have been aimed at forestalling organized action in the hacienda as a continuation of strong arm tactics following the 2004 strike dispersal: those of Ladera, Macapagal and Tadena.430 However, the subsequent killing of Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union president Ricardo Ramos and others with links to the Hacienda Luisita protests were more likely to have been part of the broader counterinsurgency campaign throughout Central Luzon.431 Although the military had already established an outpost inside the hacienda at the height of 2004 strikes, the army’s presence assumed a new significance as an enforcer of land distribution. 432 Militarization in the hacienda shifted in purpose and meaning. The military’s presence no longer meant protection of Cojuangco-Aquino landowners from peasant and labor protests. Instead, it implied President Arroyo’s particularistic punishment of the family. While subsequent violence in Tarlac City can be attributed to the larger counterinsurgency campaign in Central Luzon, developments in national politics affecting the land dispute itself and the use of political violence to influence the outcome. Benigno Cojuangco Aquino, son of the former president and whose father was the Marcos dictatorship’s most prominent martyr, ran for the presidency and won in 2010. Nevertheless, the following year, the Supreme Court upheld the previous 430 "Karapatan 2005 Human Rights Report," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2005). See also Tonette Orejas, "500 Luisita Farm Families Told to Leave," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 30, 2009. 431 Tonette Orejas and Vincent Cabreza, "Political Killings, Meningo, a Rape Case," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 4, 2006. Tonette Orejas, "Legacy Left by Palparan: 35 'Archived' Abuse Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2016. Carmela Reyes, "AntiRed Drive Pushed in Bulacan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 6, 2006. 432 Tonette Orejas, "Army Won't Remove Troops in Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 21, 2006. 117 government’s decision to parcel out the land. 433 Moreover, the court set the land price at which to compensate the Cojuangco family at 1989 rates—far lower than what prevailing rates in 2011 could fetch.434 In 2012, the military reinstalled a troop presence in Hacienda Luisita, bolstered by a request lodged by some village officials inside the sugar estate.435 On the pretext of deterring the return of communist insurgents, the army was once again an instrument of intimidation against peasant and labor unrest.436 Lethal violence abated in the hacienda during this period nonetheless, reflecting the shift in the struggle from the estate itself to the higher courts at the national level. The Supreme Court rejected a final bid by the Cojuangco family to secure PhP 5 billion in compensation for Hacienda Luisita, setting the number at PhP 196 million instead.437 The Supreme Court rulings may have set off Aquino’s retaliation against the Supreme Court chief justice Renato Corona, an Arroyo appointee. Corona was soon impeached by a Congress dominated by Aquino’s Liberal Party and he was removed from office in May, 2012. 438 The Department of Agrarian reform began awarding land titles to over 6,000 farmer beneficiaries in 2013, finally distributing the largest contiguous estate remaining in the country at the time. 439 During President Aquino’s term, 433 Philip Tubeza, "Noy May Give up Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 13, 2009. 434 Daxim Lucas and Kristine Alave, "The Hacienda Is No More," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 25, 2011. "Highlights of the Hacienda Luisita Decision," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 25, 2011. 435 Tonette Orejas, "Military Presence in Luisita Confirmed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2012. 436 Jerome Aning and Tonette Orejas, "P-Noy Kin: Luisita No Garrison State," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 22, 2012. 437 Inquirer Bureaus, "SC: P196m for Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2012. 438 Vincent Cabreza, "Luisita Farmers Hail Corona 'Agrarian Reform Champion'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2012. 439 Jo Martinez-Clemente, "Tough Journey Ends for Luisita Farmers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 2, 2013. 118 moreover, Arroyo was convicted of corruption and spent nearly four years under arrest.440 The Butcher Arrives, Violence Shifts in Meaning The state’s strategic aim of containing the communist insurgency coincided with alarm over the electoral success of left-wing parties, a concern that many local political actors shared. Bayan Muna was particularly successful in Central Luzon in 2001, making it a priority target for both counter-insurgency and anti-activist violence as early as 2003—even prior to Operation Bantay Laya that used dirty tactics throughout the country. The military also established a strong presence in urban centers—a measure that had been unprecedented in the post-Marcos period. However, the military’s use of violence elicited a backlash from some local politicians. The violence abated to a large extent after 2007 although the military increased its involvement in disputes over resources, mining in particular. Counter-insurgency efforts in Central Luzon were centrally directed. In August 2001, top military and police officials launched a joint counter-insurgency agenda aimed at crippling the CPP in Central Luzon, which was one of the insurgency’s biggest sources of funds. 441 The military contended that communist forces were expanding rapidly among the region’s villages. The army estimated that the combined forces of the communist factions in parts of Northern and Central Luzon numbered some 1,500 to 1,600 insurgents, of which around 700 were in 440 As an informal concession, Arroyo was detained in a hospital for most of the period. When she was president, she allowed a similar arrangement for her predecessor, Joseph Estrada. 441 At the time, only the highly industrialized Southern Tagalog generated more funds than Central Luzon. Tonette Orejas, "PNP, AFP Sign Pact vs Reds," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 17, 2002. 119 Central Luzon.442 In comparison to the other regions however, the NPA was the least violent in Central Luzon so the actual security threat may have been overplayed.443 Moreover, the NPA escalated its attacks in 2004 and 2005, but from 2006 onwards, rebel-led violence dropped to virtually zero with only a handful of deadly attacks made.444 After the May 2001 national and local elections, clashes and assassinations heightened in scale. Most of the violence was concentrated in Pampanga, the bailiwick of then president Arroyo.445 After a lull in the conflict between the NPA and NPA breakaway, Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (RHB), during the May elections, violence flared up again with the assassination of Reynaldo Lagman, RHB leader for Central Luzon, Santa Ana town in August.446 In December, Angeles City police killed three men whom they accused of being insurgents from a new communist armed group called the Maralitang Hukbong Bayan (MHB). The CHR investigation indicated that forensics show that the victims were shot at close range, execution style.447 In Tarlac, there were a number of cases in which the military 442 "Army Says C. Luzon Has Most Rebels," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2003. See also "Communist Threat in C. Luzon Serious, Says PNP Director," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 22, 2002. 443 Drawing from the data in this study, insurgent-led attacks in Central Luzon resulted in only 61 victims (comprised of military, police, local government, other insurgent and civilian targets) compared to 64 in Northern Luzon, 120 in Eastern Visayas and 202 in Southern Mindanao. 444 In Central Luzon, the NPA claimed about half a dozen victims a year from 2001 to 2003. In 2004, the number went up to 12 and in 2005, to 25. However, it dropped to four in 2006 and after that virtually zero except for 2 recorded casualties from NPA attacks in 2009 and one in 2010. These figures come from the data collected in this study. 445 One case prior to the election involved the RHB taking responsibility for killing a man whom they claimed was a military intelligence agent. Jun Malig, "NPA Condemns Rival Group over Killing," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 2001. 446 Tonette Orejas, "Suspected NPA Hit Men Kill Leader of Rival Communist Group," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 2001. 447 "CHR Resolution Case No. III-01-2227 Re: Killing of Henry Marin and Arnold Mendoza," (Commission on Human Rights, March 5, 2008 ). Also Ding Cervantes, "Raps Poised vs. Angeles Fiscal, 8 Policemen over Salvaging," The Philippine Star February 8, 2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/149878/raps-poised-vs-angeles-fiscal-8-policemen- 120 allegedly inflicted casualties among insurgents and civilians alike.448 Clashes between army soldiers and NPA insurgents continued to cause casualties on both sides. Violence began to intensify in Bulacan, where insurgents began to target local government officials and rebel “returnees”. 449 The military responded with counteroffensives, resulting in the deaths of several alleged insurgents in armed encounters in various towns. Lethal force was particularly intense in 2003, with as many as twenty suspected rebels killed over two days in March.450 The pattern of counter-insurgency violence against political activists on the Left emerged earlier in Central Luzon than in other regions in this study. The military began to target activists particularly from political parties that had made unprecedented electoral successes in the 2001 party-list elections. In September 2001 in Bulacan, military scout rangers were suspected of killing local councilor and activist Wilfredo Mananghaya.451 In February 2003, suspected military and police forcibly abducted Rowena Bayani and Edwin Villaluz in Maria Aurora town in Aurora province; and five days later soldiers took Juan Orcino and Honorio Ayroso in over-%C2%91salvaging%C2%92. See also Tonette Orejas, "Cops Kill 3 Members of New Red Group," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 7, 2001. 448 Ronaldo Dizon, "Ex-Rebel, Dad, Brod Slain in Tarlac," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 20, 2001. 449 Rebel returnee Luis Reyes, alias Ka Allan, was killed in Calumpit in January 2003 seemingly as part of a pattern of NPA killings of former members in Cenral Luzon and in Negros Occidental.Carmela Reyes, "Another Former NPA Leader Slain in Bulacan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2003. See also TJ Burgonio, Carlito Pablo, and Alcuin Papa, "Hit Squads on the Loose," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2003. 450 On March 28, 2003, the military reported killing an unidentified NPA fighter in Angat. The following day, the military claimed to have killed 18 unnamed NPA fighters in Pandi town. Carmela Reyes, Russell Arador, and Tonette Orejas, "2 Rebs Slain in Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2003. Tonette Orejas and Carmela Reyes, "18 NPA Rebs Killed in Bulacan Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2003. 451 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2294 Re: Wilfredo Mananghaya for Homicide," (Commission on Human Rights, May 2, 2006). 121 San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; all of whom were affiliated with leftwing party Bayan Muna.452 Apart from the assassinations following the violent dispersal of a workers’ protest at the Hacienda Luisita, the lethal targeting of activists escalated with the assignment of Major-General Jovito Palparan to the region. Palparan was assigned to Northern and Central Luzon amid allegations of his personal responsibility for extrajudicial attacks against leftist activists and local organizers in Oriental Mindoro and Eastern Visayas (as discussed in the previous chapter). 453 With a flair for showmanship, upon his installation as chief of the army’s 7th Infantry Division in the region, Palparan “declared war” on Central Luzon’s communist insurgents.454 He also claimed that the killing of military sergeant Juanito Sobredo in San Ildefonso, Bulacan and 2nd Lt. Rolly Aganon in Guimba, Nueva Ecija were meant as a personal challenge to him.455 The general explicitly vowed to employ a strategy of state terror against the rebels, declaring this to be part of the “essence of the coercive power” of the state against “bad elements of society”.456 Meanwhile, civilians began to bear the brunt of heightened military bombing, movement restriction and the establishment of food blockades. 457 The military tightened its grip and fostered a climate of repressiveness. For instance, soldiers interrogated and tortured the president and three 452 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2268 Re: Cristina R. Orcino and Zacarias A. Ayroso for Forcible Abuction," (Commission on Human Rights, November 17, 2003). Also "Report CHR Case No. III-02-2252 Re: Edwin C. Villaluz et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, May 25, 2004). See also "Army, Police Nix Abduction of Bayan Muna Members," The Philippine Star, April 6, 2016, 2002. 453 Norman Bordadora, "Assault on Activists Alarms CHR," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2005. See also Gabieta, "Transfer of Army General Draws Mixed Reactions." 454 Tonette Orejas, "Palparan Declares War on C. Luzon Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2005. 455 Palparan claimed that the NPA’s Sparrow Unit of assassins was responsible for Sobredo’s murder. The insurgent group did not claim credit for the attack. 456 Anselmo Roque, "Palparan to Use Terror vs Guerrillas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 29, 2005. 457 Palparan: Rebs suffer 'major setback', "Suspected Reb Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8, 2005. 122 members of a farmers’ union in San Miguel town over graffiti slurring President Arroyo. The farmers were warned that the military was in the area to purge “enemies of the state” and had the power to kill them in their homes if their association had links to the NPA.458 In addition to Palparan’s assignment, a deployment of 1,500 troops from Mindanao to Central and Southern Luzon, a move made possible by reduced fighting with the Moro Islamic Liberation while peace negotiations took place. 459 He positioned his troops in key cities and towns in Pampanga and Bulacan, a counterinsurgency strategy that was highly unusual in the post-martial law years. Their stated aim was to deny NPA insurgents staging grounds for specialized assassinations in the urban centers of the region. 460 The military developed this strategy of urban militarization in cities like San Fernando and Angeles in Pampanga, San Jose City in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac City and Malolos City in Bulacan, adapting the use of “special operations teams” (SOT) that had been confined since the mid-1990s to only “red areas”, or guerrilla bases in remote areas.461 These SOTs sustained a military presence in villages aimed at shrinking the areas in which insurgents could operate, pushing them into the less populous hinterlands.462 In other regions, the military was mainly responding to the armed challenge of a resurgent Communist insurgency. In contrast, in Central Luzon, the political threat was more pronounced than the security risk posed by the NPA. In the military’s view, areas that gave electoral support to the “above ground” political parties of the 458 "Investigation Report Re: Threats on the Life & Mental Torture," (Commission on Human Rights, March 13, 2006), 333. 459 Delfin Mallari, Marlon Ramos, and Dona Pazzibugan, "3 Army Battalions Join Anti-NPA Drive," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 20, 2006. 460 Tonette Orejas, "Troops Sent to C. Luzon Urban Areas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 14, 2006. 461 "Palparan Formula Seen in New Anti-Red Plan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 1, 2007. 462 "Only 40 Villages Left in Army 'Clearing'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2007. 123 left were one and the same with those that aided the “under-ground” armed movement. 463 As a result, the military targeted what it considered “front” organizations, including local chapters of political party Bayan Muna, peasants’ group Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, labor group Anakpawis and other groups like the Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT). Shortly before the 2004 elections, for instance, Bayan Muna complained that soldiers in Tarlac were using such tactics as posing as census-takers or looking for houses to rent, asking who among the residents were members of the party-list group—even distributing propaganda materials against Bayan Muna in Hacienda Luisita.464 Arroyo thus reversed the trend towards legalizing the Communist Party and drawing its members into democratic politics. This policy was ultimately incompatible with growing fears sparked by their party-list success. The targets of violence in Central Luzon in previous years were insurgents, and insurgents responded by targeting local officials, the military and the police. 465 During the Palparan period however, lethal force against leftist activists escalated in Central Luzon as it did in the rest of the country. Some of the killings occurred merely hours apart in different provinces throughout the region, as in the murders of Bayan Muna and urban poor group Kadamay members in Pampanga and the provincial chairperson of Anakpawis in Bulacan. 466 Around the same time in Nueva Ecija, 463 "The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas," 80. "Left Assails Campaign against Bayan Muna," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 3, 2004. In Bataan province, soldiers were caught conducting surveillance on a Bayan Muna assembly. 465 Dabet Castañeda, "New Killings, Abductions Blamed on Palparan," Bulatlat December 24, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/aparicion-danilo-macapagal/. The military often blamed the NPA for these attacks, as in the case of Bayan member Victorina Gomez. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-05-2675 Re: Victorina M. Gomez," (Commission on Human Rights, July 30, 2009). See also Carmela Reyes and Tonette Orejas, "Bayan Muna Member, 2 Others Killed in Attacks," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 18, 2005. 466 Part of a spate of leftist political party assassinations within hours of each other, Bayan Muna members Francisco Rivera, Nemensio Maniti and Angel David in Magalang, Pampanga on October 26. "Initial Report Re: Killings of Francisco Rivera, et. al.," 464 124 former president of the leftist League of Filipino Students at the Central Luzon State University, Maribel Supera, was abducted with her husband from San Jose City. Their bodies were found hogtied and mouths taped up almost a month later. 467 Supera had been pregnant. Murdered activists were allegedly given prior warning from the military itself that they were in the army’s Order of Battle.468 Leaders of Bayan Muna and unionists associated with the labor unrest in Hacienda Luisita were targeted. However, there was a distinction between the assassinations that were directly aimed at repressing dissent in the hacienda and azucarera disputes from those that occurred under Palparan’s watch. Activists associated with the Hacienda Luisita protests such as Bayan Muna Tarlac chapter (Commission on Human Rights, October 27, 2005). See also Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "Karapatan 2005 Human Rights Report," 2. On the same day, provincial chairperson of Anakpawis and president of a local tricycle operators and drivers association Federico de Leon was killed in Malolos; de Leon was an employee and unionist in the municipal government until he was accused of being a member of the NPA. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-05-2680 Re: Killing of Federico De Leon for Violation of Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 9 ICCPR," (Commission on Human Rights, July 17, 2007). Similarly, suspected military agents killed leftwing Bayan Muna and urban poor group Kadamay member Errol Sending in Angeles City on November 19. Two days later, Bayan member Rommel Arcilla was killed in Floridablanca by unknown gunmen. Marlon Ramos, Tonette Orejas, and Anselmo Roque, "Political Killings Escalate," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2005. Tonette Orejas, "Militant Leader in Angeles Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 16, 2002. Also "Investigation Report Re: CHRP-III-C-06-2705 Errol Sending," (Commission on Human Rights, October 16, 2008). 467 Ibid.,Marlon Ramos, Tonette Orejas, and Anselmo Roque., “Political Killings Escalate”. 468 In Guimba, Nueva Ecija, alleged military elements abducted and killed Cecilia Esteban, an active member of Bayan Muna on October 2, 2005.Prior to her murder, soldiers of the 71st Infantry Brigade had warned her four times that she was in their Order of Battle. TJ Burgonio, "'One of the Worst Cases Submitted to the Melo Commission," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2006. On the same day, labor group Anakpawis-Central Luzon leader Armando Javier, Jr. was killed by suspected soldiers in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Tonette Orejas, "Kin of Slain Activists Seek Justice," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 11, 2006. Less than two weeks later in Bataan, soldiers under the command of General Palparan forcibly abducted Tomas Paras, a rebel returnee, who refused army pressure on him to join the land mines team despite threats that his name was on the army’s Order of Battle. "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dorina Paras Petitioner Versus Staff Sergeant Elizaldo Betty and Major General Jovito Palparan," (2006). Anakpawis and Bayan Muna member Leodegario Punzal was killed by two unidentified men wearing civilian clothes in Norzagaray. "CHR Resolution Case No.: IIIC-05-2679 Re: Leodegario M. Punzal for Violation of Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 6 ICCPR," (Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006). 125 secretary general Florante Collantes,469 Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union president Ricardo Ramos, 470 labor organizer Jesse Alcantara, 471 United Luisita Workers Union leader Tirso Cruz and Hacienda Luisita youth leader Ronald Intal, were killed between October 2005 to April 2006 while an attempt was made on the life of Father Mario Quince, pastor of the Philippine Independent Church. 472 Their association with the hacienda protests made them targets but the pattern of attacks 469 In October in Camiling town, suspected military agents under the command of MajorGeneral Jovito Palparan gunned down Bayan Muna Tarlac chapter secretary-general Florante Collantes, who was also a close supporter of Central Azucarera picketers. Russell Arador, "Bayan Muna Tarlac Leader Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 16, 2005. See also "Re-Investigation Report CHRP-III-05-2693 Re: Florante Collantes," (Commission on Human Rights, May 30, 2008). However, despite a warrant issued for the arrest of Pfc. Roderick de la Cruz, relatives of Collantes claimed that he roamed free within Hacienda Luisita. Tonette Orejas, "Suspect Roams Freely, Victim's Kin Say," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 30, 2005. 470 A few days later after Collantes’s murder, however, two army sergeants allegedly assassinated the president of the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union Ricardo Ramos; on the afternoon of the killing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-Lo-05-2676 Re: Ricardo S. Ramos," (Commission on Human Rights, June 21, 2009). See also "2 Army Sergeants Tagged in Luisita Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29, 2005. 471 In December 2005, unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle fatally shot Jessie Alcantara, former president of the Tricycle Drivers’ Association in Bulacan, following a pattern of intimidation prior to the murder. The CHR investigated a labor dispute related to Hacienda Luisita as a possible motive and that soldiers from the 24th Infantry Battalion were responsible. "Investigation Report Re: Killing of Jessie V. A.," (Commission on Human Rights, August 14, 2006). Reyes and Orejas. 472 Tirso Cruz, an Ulwu union leader, was murdered on March 17, 2006; Cruz had received death threats since he joined the Hacienda Luisita strike and prior to his death, soldiers allegedly attempted to force Cruz to admitting to being a surrendered NPA rebel but Cruz refused. Tonette Orejas, Russell Arador, and Blanche Rivera, "Another Luisita Union Leader Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2006. Despite Cruz’s involvement with Ulwu, the CHR noted in its resolution on the matter that the police had filed murder charges against an alleged member of an armed group based on the theory that Cruz was a collector of “revolutionary tax” for the NPA and the NPA killed Cruz as punishment for failing to remit collection money. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2780 Re: Tirso M. Cruz (Extra-Legal Killing)," (Commission on Human Rights, January 19, 2009). See also "Follow-up Investigation Report Re: Tirso M. Cruz," (Commission on Human Rights, May 15, 2006). In April 2006, Ronald Intal, reportedly leader of the Samahan ng mga Kabataang Democratico sa Asyenda Luisita, a youth organization in Hacienda Luisita, was forcibly disappeared by a group of armed men believed to be government soldiers. The police suspected that rebels designed the abduction to put blame on the military. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2760 Re: Ronald C. Intal for Abduction and Enforced Disappearance," (Commission on Human Rights, August 1, 2006). In January 2006, unidentified gunmen attempted to kill Aglipayan parish priest and active supporter of Hacienda Luisita strikers, Father Mario Quince, in early January 2006. "Initial Report Re: Attempted Killing of Fr. Mario Quince," (Commission on Human Rights, January 6, 2005). 126 and the military’s “red tagging” them as communists suggests that the violence was directly related to their alleged links to the armed underground. This was consistent with anti-activist violence occurring at a higher scale throughout the rest of the region at the time. In Pampanga and Bulacan for instance, soldiers increasingly threatened unionists and activists, and attempted to coerce them into confessing to having links with armed insurgents. 473 Some local organizations were targeted in particular, such as the farmers’ group Aguman da reng Maglalautang Talapagobra keng Gabun (Association of Farmers and Land Workers or AMTG) in Mexico town, Pampanga. Barely two weeks after the killing of AMTG leader Antonio Adriales, Perla Rodriguez—a member of the group—was also killed. Soldiers had allegedly threatened Rodriguez, coercing her to admit to being a NPA member. She filed a complaint with the CHR and the Deputy Ombudsman for Military but unidentified gunmen shot her dead in her home just as the investigation was concluding.474 In Bulacan, the violence directed against activists created a climate of terror in towns but General Palparan placed the blame on the NPA.475 473 In January 2006, gunmen killed peasant leader Antonio Adriales in Mexico town; while police claimed Adriales was part of the RHB, the farmers’ group AMTG that Adriales had led rejected this allegation. Police accused the NPA of the crime. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2926 Re: Antonio D. Adriales," (Commission on Human Rights, July 31, 2008). See also Tonette Orejas, "Farmer Leader Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 21, 2006. In January 2006, Bayan Muna leader Armando Leabres was killed in Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija by suspected military elements a week after he expressed fear for his life at a meeting, having been threatened by a soldier. "Another Militant Leader Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2006. 474 "Memorandum Re: Killing of Perla T. Rodriguez," (Commission on Human Rights, January 20, 2006). Also "Fact Sheet in Re: CHR Case No. III-06-2707 Re: Threats on the Person of Perla Rodriguez and CHR Case No. III-06-2726 Re: Killing of Perla Rodriguez," (Commission on Human Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date). See also Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "Karapatan Report on the Human Rights Situation 2006," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2006), 13-14. 475 Arlyn dela Cruz, "Fear Now Grips 3 Bulacan Barangays," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 15, 2006. 127 Violent excesses began to increase throughout the region as a consequence of the heightened military presence. 476 In some cases, civilians got caught in the crossfire.477 In others, civilians may have been punished in retaliation for NPA attacks made on the army. For instance, in February 2006, twelve suspected members of the military entered a farm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, shooting and killing Ricardo Valmocina, his sons and farm workers and abducting two. 478 An incident involving the shooting of an army detachment a few days earlier might have precipitated the killings.479 The same group may have been involved in the abduction and killing of a barangay tanod in the same town days later. 480 A spate of forced disappearances of environmental, labor and leftist activists in Aurora and Bulacan provinces occurred in March.481 On March 6, 2006, for instance, unidentified men forcibly abducted Rogelio Concepcion, local Anakpawis chapter coordinator and workers’ representative at his workplace, the Solid Development Corporation.482 He has not resurfaced since. The CHR investigated a number of disappearances around this time in places like Doña Remedios Trinidad town, Bulacan. Alleged victims resurfaced even months later but were unwilling to 476 The only exception was in Nueva Ecija, which demonstrated a distinct pattern of violence for social control (to be discussed in a subsequent section). 477 In January 2006, soldiers reported 10 NPA casualties resulting from an armed encounter in Santa Ignacia town, Tarlac but human rights NGO Karapatan claimed that among the dead were two civilians caught in the crossfire, Allan Ibasan and Dante Salgado. Tonette Orejas, "Tarlac Clashes Death Toll Rises to 11," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 2, 2006. 478 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2751 Re: Killings of Ricardo Valmocina, Roel Joseph Valmocina, Melchor Cardinal, Michael Milanay, Manuel Avila Jr. And Enforced Disappearances of Reyante Valmocina and Robin Solano," (Commission on Human Rights, April 11, 2012). 479 Cruz., “Fear Now Grips 3 Bulacan Barangays”. 480 Barangay tanod Danilo Fajardo was tied to a motorcycle, dragged and shot. Carmela Reyes, "2 Slain in Bulacan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 24, 2006. 481 In March 2006, suspected military elements, believed to be under the orders of then general Jovito Palparan, forcibly abducted environmental activist and social worker Joey Estriber in Baler. Tonette Orejas, "Legacy Left by Palparan: 35 'Archived' Abuse Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2008. See also Tonette Orejas and Ansbert Joaquin, "Anakpawis Leader Tags Army Man in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 22, 2006. 482 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2774 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Rogelio Concepcion," (Commission on Human Rights, March 28, 2007). 128 file complaints against the military.483 Most of the targets during this period were “above ground” activists who were well known in their communities for their advocacy. This suggests that the purpose of the violence was to sow terror and deter community support for leftist advocacy and the insurgency. Meanwhile, the killings continued. Shortly after Concepcion’s disappearance, military agents were suspected of killing Bayan Muna’s Malolos chapter chairperson in Bulacan and attempting to ambush the Anakpawis coordinator and peasant association Alyansa ng Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon (Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers, or AMGL) vice chairperson in Zambales.484 Members and leaders of Bayan Muna and Anakpawis in Tarlac and Pampanga were forcibly abducted and killed in the months that followed.485 In Nueva Ecija, members and leaders of the AMGL 483 For instance, "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2807 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Eddie Pornellos and Junior Pornellos," (Commission on Human Rights, April 17, 2012). Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2770 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Manuel Sioson, Jr.," (Commission on Human Rights, January 14, 2013). In the Sioson case, soldiers under General Palparan’s command were suspected of being responsible. Janess Ann Ellao, "'Lolo' Is Palparan - Witness," Bulatlat April 27, 2015, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/04/27/lolo-is-palparan-witness/. 484 In March 2006 in Castillejos town, suspected military elements ambushed Amante Abelon; Abelon survived but his wife and son were killed in the attack. Edgar Alejo, Tonette Orejas, and Gill Francis Arevalo, "Attacks on Leftists Mount," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2006; Norman Bordadora and Luige del Puerto, "Bayan Exec Killed; 'Amnesty' Alarmed over Leftist Deaths," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2006. 485 Rolando Mariano, Bayan Muna coordinator in Gerona town, Tarlac, was killed after receiving death threats due to his association with the party. "Updated Report Re: Killing of Rolando Mariano," (Commission on Human Rights, April 28, 2006). See also Russell Arador and Anselmo Roque, "2 More Party-List Group Members Slain in Tarlac, Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8, 2005. Benedicto Magdaong, alleged Anakpawis chairman and member of an Abacan river residents’ association, was forcibly abducted by suspected military intelligence agents in Angeles City. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2750 Re: Benedicto B. Magdaong," (Commission on Human Rights, February 1, 2010). On May 13, local Bayan Muna leader Manuel Nardo was killed in San Fernando City, Pampanga. "Initial Report Re: Killing of Bayan Muna Leader Manuel Nardo," (Commission on Human Rights, May 17, 2006). See also Tonette Orejas, "93rd Leftist Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2006. In July in San Felipe town, unknown assailants killed Charlie Daylo, Aeta chieftain, vice-chairperson of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and former provincial coordinator of Anakpawis. Ansbert Joaquin and Tonette Orejas, "Aeta Leader Latest Fatality in Attacks on Leftists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 24, 2006. 129 were targeted in particular.486 By May 2006, eight months after Palparan had been posted to Central Luzon, the military expanded their sights to target teachers’ organizations and church leaders.487 The police and military also began to flout legal restraints more openly. For instance, Emerito Lipio, leader of the drivers’ association Pinagkaisang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (United Drivers and Operators Nationwide, also known as PISTON) disappeared after his arrest by Angeles City police and military. He was never formally charged and has not resurfaced since. 488 Another case bordered on the absurd: a woman and her son were accused of rebellion and arrested by the military at their homes in Nueva Ecija. Nine months later, the woman’s husband told CHR investigators that they were “alive and well”, his wife had moved to a different village and their son was in an army camp but so were no longer interested in pursuing a case against the military. 489 Activists and community 486 In mid-May, a group of alleged military agents forcibly abducted Domingo Guinto and two other civilians in Jaen, Nueva Ecija; the military claims there was an armed encounter with insurgents in Pias village but the CHR investigation noted that villagers attest to no such encounter. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2816 Re: Abduction and Enforced Disappearance of Domingo Guinto, Avelino Interior and Virgilio Tranquilino," (Commission on Human Rights, August 7, 2007). On June 11, Rodolfo de los Santos, a member of the provincial council of the AMGL was murdered in Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. Tonette Orejas, Anselmo Roque, and Desiree Caluza, "Farmer-Leader Slain in C. Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2006. A month later, suspected soldiers killed another member of the peasant group AMGL and Bayan, John Gado, in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. "Memorandum Re: Verification of Killing Cases Reported in Daily Newspapers," (Commission on Human Rights, July 21, 2006). 487 Military agents were suspected of killing Kilusan ng Pambansang Demokrasya or National Democracy Movement (KPD) member Audie Lucero and Analiza Abandor, provincial coordinator of the Bataan Alliance of Teachers Association-Alliance of Concerned Teachers; the army alleged Abandor was a collection officer of the RHB. Greg Refraccion, "Woman Is 10th Leftist Activist Slain in 2 Weeks," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2006. A few days later, soldiers claim that they killed a United Church of Christ pastor, in the course of an armed encounter in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; however, the CHR indicated the likelihood that the man was summarily executed. "Initial Investigation Report Re: CHR Case No. III-Cl06-2831," (Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2008). 488 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2779 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Emerito Lipio," (Commission on Human Rights, March 16, 2011). 489 "Initial Investigation Report Re: CHR Case No. III-Cl-06-2802," (Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2007). Also Update Report on the case (no date). 130 organizers continued to receive death threats and warnings of being on state security forces’ Order of Battle.490 In cases where specific soldiers or paramilitary “assets” were charged or investigated, the police or military would claim that those killed were suspected of being NPA members or sympathizers.491 Moreover, the military met NPA attacks with brutal reprisals against civilians.492 In mid-2006, as Palparan’s mandatory retirement loomed on the horizon, Arroyo announced the launch of Opan Bantay Laya II as a signal that the military would redouble efforts against the communist insurgency. Just before the president’s renewed “all out war” to defeat communist rebellion, new forms of militarization had already begun in areas just outside Metro Manila, such as in the Central Luzon provinces of Tarlac, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan.493 Despite Palparan’s claim that the military campaign was coordinated with local officials and the police, local officials began to balk at the army’s unrelenting encroachment. For instance, the governor of Bulacan, Josefina de la Cruz, openly criticized Palparan, linking him to 490 In August 2006, fisherfolk association Samahan ng Pamalakaya of Obando member Orlando Rivera was killed in Obando by suspected military soldiers; he was believed to be in the military’s Order of Battle, moreover death threats had been made. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2789 Re: Orlando M. Rivera," (Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007). In October, Aglipayan Church Bishop Alberto Ramento and chairperson of Karapatan Central Luzon was killed in Tarlac City. prior to his death he said at a forum with the military that he feared for his life and had been warned that he was in the army’s Order of Battle. "Initial Report CHR Case No. III-Cl-06-2819 Re: Bishop Alberto Ramento," (Commission on Human Rights, October 5, 2006). 491 An alleged military “asset” and former rebel was suspected of killing a man accused of being a runner for the NPA "Investigation Report," (Commission on Human Rights, July 28, 2006). On August 15, 2006, a barangay councilman and tanod was killed at a wake in the village by suspected government soldiers. The military alleged he was NPA sympathizer. "Report Re: Killing," (Commission on Human Rights, October 11, 2006). 492 In September 2006, for instance, alleged NPA fighters killed two soldiers in Orani town, Bataan. On the same day, suspected soliders killed Elmer Rufino and Mario Tubera of Barangay Tala in Orani. The following day, Barangay Tala village secretary Romualdo Flores was also killed in Orani."Memorandum Re: Killing of Elmer Rufino of Brgy. Tala, Orani on October 1, 2004 and Abduction and Killing of Mario Tubera on September 27, 2005," (Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2005). Visaya, "Village Chief Killed." 493 Tonette Orejas, "AFP Widens War Theater in C. Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2006. "War on Reds Focuses on 4 Provinces," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2006. 131 complaints of abuse and killings in the province.494 Ultimately, with almost 200 cases of extrajudicial killing or forced disappearance linked to Palparan in Mindoro, Eastern Visayas and Central Luzon, it was in Bulacan where a local court indicted him in 2011.495 Although political violence in Central Luzon linked to the state’s counterinsurgency program had been lethal and repressive before General Jovito Palparan’s involvement in the region, his year there was marked by the concerted use of state terror against political opponents. Among the scores of murders, forced disappearances, rapes and torture during this period, one particular case planted the seeds of Palparan’s downfall: the disappearance of University of the Philippines (UP) students Sherilyn Cadapan and Karen Empeño. Palparan was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in Malolos, Bulacan on September 2018 along with two former soldiers.496 The case had been well covered in the media for years, providing insight into atrocities of Oplan Bantay Laya. At the end of June 2006 in Hagonoy, Bulacan, soldiers of the 56th Infantry Battalion, operating under General Palparan, abducted Cadapan and Empeño.497 They also took Manuel Merino, who had rushed to the women’s aid. The two women have 494 Fe Zamora, Tonette Orejas, and Christine Avendaño, "Bulacan Governor Slams Palparan's One-Man Army," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 22, 2006. 495 Purple Romero, "Poor Track Record in Curbing Human Rights Violations," ABS-CBN News July 27, 2009, http://news.abs-cbn.com/special-report/07/20/09/poor-track-recordcurbing-human-rights-violations. 496 "Palparan Guilty of Kidnapping up Students Empeño, Cadapan," The Philippine Star September 17, 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/09/17/1852264/palparanguilty-kidnapping-students-empeo-cadapan. Palparan had evaded arrest and had been in hiding from 2011 until his capture in 2014. 497 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-W-06-2778 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Sherilyn Cadapan, et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, March 6, 2007). See also "Decision CaG.R. Sp No. 00002 (Supreme Court G R No. 179994 - for Write of Amparo and Resolution Ca-G.R. Sp No. 95303 (Supreme Court G R No. 173288 for Writ of Habeas Corpus ", (2007). Cadapan was also a community organizer for Alyansang Magbubukid ng Bulacan. Kathleen de Villa, "The Kidnap Case of 2 up Students vs Palparan Et Al.," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 26, 2015. 132 not resurfaced although various witnesses have testified to having seen them in the military’s custody soon after they vanished. Among these witnesses include Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo, who had been abducted from their home in San Ildefonso earlier that year, but managed to escape after 19 months of captivity.498 According to these and other witnesses, detainees were interrogated, heavily tortured, and in the cases of Cadapan and Empeño, repeatedly raped.499 Similar to other cases, detainees were coerced to admit that they were NPA supporters—in some cases, they were released afterwards.500 In other cases, they were killed and their remains were burned. The abductions and treatment of the prisoners were carried out under Palparan’s command, with his direct involvement.501 A month after the women had disappeared, Arroyo singled the general out for praise in her 6th State of the Nation Address on July 24, 2006:502 “… Jovito Palparan continues to battle our enemies. He will not back down until the communities he serves are released from the darkness of fear, able to rebuild their lives in the dawn of justice and freedom.” 498 "Disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo CHRP-III-06-2725 Fact Sheet," (Commission on Human Rights, no date). 499 Carmela Reyes-Estrope, "Farmer Recounts Abuse Suffered by Missing Students," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2015. "Witness Says He Saw Palparan with Missing up Students," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 14, 2015. "Ex-Security Guard Tells Court He Saw Missing University of the Philippines Students," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 2015. 500 Ernesto Santiago was taken by soldiers on July 24, 2006 in Pulilan Bulacan; he was interrogated and forced to admit that he was an NPA supporter before he was released after more than three months. He claims to have spotted Cadapan and Empeño, as well as a 15year-old boy among the detainees. "Final Investigation Report Re: CHRP-III-C-06-2783," (Commission on Human Rights, June 28, 2007). "Farmer Recounts Abuse Suffered by Missing Students." Allison Lopez, "Torture Victim Recalls Ordeal in AFP Hands," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 12, 2007. 501 Leila Salaverria, "Court Says Palparan Knew of Abductions," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 28, 2007. 502 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, "Sixth State of the Nation Address of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, Delivered at the Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City, on July 24, 2006," (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2006). 133 Violence De-escalates The posting to Central Luzon was Palparan’s final assignment on active duty; he retired from the military in September 2006. However, Arroyo immediately appointed him as the deputy for anti-insurgency operations at the National Security Council.503 Palparan may have not been ready to leave the region, however. In April 2008, he seized a mine in Doña Remedios Trinidad town and a seaport in Masinloc that had been embroiled in a land dispute, using soldiers and police without authorization from their commanders. 504 Palparan was reportedly working as a consultant at the security agency contracted by the owners of the facilities under contention. The seizures prompted local officials in Bulacan and Zambales to protest Palparan’s actions and a Department of National Defense investigation.505 The former general may have also been involved in another land grab and the murder of a peasant leader, Pascual Guevarra. 506 Palparan denied any wrongdoing. He claimed that 503 Christine Avendaño, "Palparan Gets New Job," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2006. 504 Tonette Orejas, "Palparan under Fire for Takeover of Mine, Port," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2008. 505 Carmela Reyes, "Local Execs Want Palparan out of Their Villages," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 4, 2008. Tonette Orejas, "DND Chief Orders Probe of Palparan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2008. The military took over after ousting Palparan’s illegal occupation of the areas. Months later in Zambales, the provincial government backed mine workers and residents in an effort that ultimately resulted in the military’s withdrawal from the mine. "Workers, Residents Drive Away Soldiers from Zambales Mine," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 19, 2008. 506 In Laur, in July 2010, unknown assailants attacked and killed peasant leader Pascual Guevarra, leader of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association and the Alyansa ng Magsasakang Nagkakaisa (ALMANA). Guevarra had mediated talks on compensation payments over the right of way and damages disputes caused in the construction of the Sagan Fort Magsaysay-Santa Rosa Road. ALMANA was formed to stop the Philippine Army from removing farmers from 3,100 hectares of land inside what used to be an Army reservation. The land may have been titled to retired military officials, including Palparan. Police surmised this dispute led to his killing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-2010-0187 Re:Unlawful Killing of Pascual Guevarra," (Commission on Human Rights, June 7, 2012). Armand Galang and Tonette Orejas, "78-Yr-Old Farmer Leader Gunned Down near Army Camp in N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 11, 2010. 134 regardless of his retirement, he continued a personal crusade against communist insurgents through his work for private security firms in Central Luzon.507 Palparan also briefly occupied a party-list seat in Congress by founding an anti-communist party, Bantay, a name that evoked the bloody military campaign he had championed. Running in 2007, Bantay failed to meet the threshold to send a representative to Congress until a Supreme Court ruling more than doubled the number of party list seats in Congress, paving the way for Palparan and others to enter Congress in 2009.508 By some estimates, the greatest number of extrajudicial killings during Arroyo's term occurred in Central Luzon. 509 The CHR reckons that around 52 extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances while Karapatan counts around 136 such cases linked to Palparan in Central Luzon. 510 After Palparan retired, the military sought to build on the presence that he had established in the region’s rural and urban centers. Part of this counter-insurgency strategy, as had been pursued in other regions, was to bypass provincial officials and mobilize barangay officials into a paramilitary force. In Central Luzon, contrary to the provincial governor’s criticism of Palparan’s record of abuse, some mayors enthusiastically supported the continuation of a military presence in the region even after his departure. 511 Levels of violence went down sharply after Palparan left but abductions and the targeting of activists continued despite the military’s claims that Palparan was 507 Tonette Orejas, "Palparan Says Mining Job Part of War on Reds," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 3, 2008. 508 Vincent Cabreza, "SC Increases House Party-List Reps to 55," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2009. 509 Tonette Orejas, "40 Rights Violations Cases in C. Luzon Unsolved," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 12, 2011. 510 "Legacy Left by Palparan: 35 'Archived' Abuse Cases." Reyes, "Anti-Red Drive Pushed in Bulacan." 511 "Bulacan Mayors Back Continued Army Presence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 29, 2006. 135 “the last of his kind”. 512 For instance, in April 2007, farmer and activist Jonas Burgos was forcibly abducted in Quezon City. Burgos was targeted for his links to the communist underground and alleged intelligence work to “infiltrate” the military in Bulacan and obtain a copy of their Order of Battle.513 Ultimately, Arroyo was indebted to the military for backing her ascension to the presidency in 2001, making her vulnerable to the prevailing hardliners in the army. In the final analysis, however, there was an overriding strategic purpose to this dirty war beyond the caprice of the national elites. The army’s main strategy targeted NPA strongholds and, coupled with the illegal use of state terror against civilians, the violence met the immediate objective of quelling the NPA surge in the early 2000s. Undercutting the electoral success of the “above ground” left was both a goal of counter-insurgency as well as of local, oligarchic politics. As a result of the violence as well as other measures that favored mainstream parties and political dynasties, Bayan Muna never again attained the level of electoral success as it had in the 2001 and 2004 party-list polls.514 Presidential elections in 2010 ended Arroyo’s unusually long tenure and ushered in the government of Benigno Cojuangco Aquino. Under the Aquino presidency, the military became more involved in the protection of private interests, particularly in the extractive industries. For instance, suspected members of the military killed Wilhelmus Geertman, a Dutch missionary in the Philippines since 1979. He had been tagged as a communist and harassed by the military since the 512 Marlon Ramos, "Palparan Last of His Kind in AFP," Philippine Daily Inquirer 2012. Glenda Gloria, "Why Would the Army Abduct Jonas Burgos?," Rappler April 28, 2012, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/4466-why-would-the-army-abduct-jonas-burgos. See also "Legal Analysis and Recommendations on Jonas Burgos Case," (Commission on Human Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date). 514 Alcuin Papa and Norman Bordadora, "Militant Groups List 54 Cases of Fraud, Violence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2007. See also Nikko Dizon, "Bayan Muna Blames AFP for Fall from Top Slot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2007. 513 136 1980s.515 In 2012, he was ostensibly killed in the course of a robbery but his death was suspected to be politically motivated.516 His family alleged that he was killed due to his advocacy against mining and illegal logging.517 The Red Vigilante Group In Central Luzon, a distinct pattern of violence emerged involving a local militia group that claimed to be acting on behalf of the state, the Red Vigilante Group or RVG. The RVG targeted neither insurgents nor political opponents but alleged criminals like drug pushers and petty thieves. At a much smaller scale and for a briefer period of time, the anti-crime vigilantism in Gapan City in Nueva Ecija province bore a few similarities to violence related to “social control” in Southern Mindanao and the national “war on drugs” that began in 2016 (discussed in the following chapters). Figure 11. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Central Luzon 25 20 15 10 5 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table 515 "Report: Case Conference of the Extra-Judicial Killing of Wilhelmus Geertman and Romualdo 'Waldo' Palispis," (Commission on Human Rights, August 14, 2012). 516 Tonette Orejas, "Military 'Asset,' 5 Other Suspects Charged with Geertman's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 17, 2012. 517 "Another Video Shows Killers of Dutch Dev't Worker," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 1, 2012. 137 Social control violence in Central Luzon peaked in 2001, with the RVG violence accounting for 86 percent of the incidents until 2003. In 2011, there was another spike of violence, consisting of isolated incidents across three provinces that included police shootings of suspected criminals as well as a death and torture of detainees in police custody.518 In 2016, weeks after President Rodrigo Duterte won the May 9 election but prior to his assumption of office, fatal police shootings and alleged vigilante attacks rose, likely to be in anticipation of Duterte’s national “war on drugs”. (See Figure 11 above) The focus in this section, however, is the vigilante violence against alleged criminals and corrupt officials that emerged in Gapan City. Central government and local officials’ tolerance enabled locally led vigilantism in Gapan, a consequence of an unstable peace process between the state and a faction of the communist insurgency. From 2001 to 2003, the RVG was responsible for a campaign of “total cleansing” of alleged drug criminals throughout the province of Nueva Ecija, dumping the bodies in Bulacan.519 The RVG killed around 30 to 40 people in the twoyear period, often dumping bodies outside Gapan. For instance, half a dozen corpses were left with a message saying “pusher kami” (we are drug pushers), “all out war sa pusher-drug lord para sa bayan” (we are pushers, all-out war against pusher-drug lords for the country), signed off simply as “Vigilante”.520 With an estimated 60 fighters to its name, the group claimed to be the Nueva Ecija unit of the 518 For instance, in January 2011, in Angeles City, Pampanga, police allegedly tortured and maltreated William Cortez, who was in custody for criminal activities. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-2011-0032 Re: William C. Cortez for Torture," (Commission on Human Rights, May 16, 2011). 519 Carmela Reyes, "'Salvage' Survivors Key to Police Probe," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2001. 520 Carmela Reyes and Tonette Orejas, "Anti-Drug 'Vigilante' Massacres 6 Men," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2001. 138 Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Bongcayao Brigade (RPA-ABB), a breakaway from the NPA based in Negros, Western Visayas. The RPA-ABB’s national commander maintained that the RVG campaign against crime was part of the peace agreement signed with the government in December 2000.521 Estrada’s ouster disrupted the peace process in 2001. Moreover, an internal split left the Nueva Ecija’s RPA-ABB cut off from its links to civil society and sources of funding while inheriting most of the fighters and arms.522 Armed but in need of finance, the red vigilantes claimed that they waged a patriotic “all-out war” against drug pushers and drug lords. 523 However, they were also likely to have profited from crime themselves.524 Politicians and the police initially tolerated the RVG’s operations, which targeted people on the police’s watchlists of criminals.525 In 2002, for example, the RVG claimed responsibility for the abduction and killing of Romy Ferrer and Willy Chavez, suspected drug dealers, and Eric Francisco, an alleged car thief, in Llanera town.526 The group claimed that Ferrer was a local drug lord who had long been on the regional police’s Order of Battle and Chavez was his henchman.527 Perente Tolentino and Joel Joaquin from Gapan City, whom the RVG also allegedly executed in a spate of multiple killings in 2003, had also been in local 521 Anselmo Roque and Tonette Orejas, "Ecija Vigilantes Kill Suspected Drug Offender," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 3, 2003. 522 ICG, "The Philippines: Dismantling Rebel Groups," in Asia Report No. 248 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), 22-23. 523 Reyes and Orejas, "Anti-Drug 'Vigilante' Massacres 6 Men." 524 Anselmo Roque, "Ecija 'Salvagings' on the Rise," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2001. 525 Tonette Orejas, "Vigilante Group Turning into Kuratong," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 15, 2002. 526 Ding Cervantes, "Ecija Vigilantes Claim Having Killed Alleged Drug Lord, Pusher," The Philippine Star September 7, 2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/174999/ecija-vigilantesclaim-having-killed-alleged-drug-lord-pusher. See also "Ecija Vigilantes Kill Car Thief," The Philippine Star August 22, 2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/172977/ecija-vigilantes-killcar-thief. 527 The Nueva Ecija Police intelligence chief admitted only that Ferrer and Chavez were known to be involved in petty drug pushing. Tonette Orejas, "Rebs-Turned-Assassins Execute 2 Drug Suspects in Nueva Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2002. 139 police records as drug crime suspects. 528 The group operated with relative ease throughout Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, leaving corpses—hands and feet bound and their mouths taped shut—one day after another, in different towns outside their base in Gapan.529 If authorities had indeed turned a blind eye to the group’s activities, toleration wore thin over time. Soldiers killed Miguel de la Cruz a.k.a. Ka Eagle and captured three other alleged members of the RVG in Zaragoza town in April, 2003.530 The conflict occurred five months after Arroyo ordered the implementation of the 2000 peace agreement with the RPA-ABB. Evidently, the government’s pact with the larger RPA-ABB group in the Western Visayas region no longer extended to the RVG rump in Central Luzon. The following year, police arrested the RVG’s leader Ricardo Peralta in Pampanga.531 The RVG ceased its operations and was considered defunct by 2003.532 “Seasonal” Electoral Violence There was little electoral violence in Central Luzon during the Arroyo and Benigno Aquino presidencies respectively due to the relatively stable consolidation of dynastic rule by the early 2000s. By some measure, the Cojuangco-Aquinos in Tarlac, the Magsaysays in Zambales, the Josons of Nueva Ecija, the Romans of Bataan and 528 Perente Tolentino, on the police’s watchlist of drug suspects, and three men were killed in March were from Gapan in Nueva Ecija, although their bodies were dumped in San Miguel town. Anselmo Roque, "Vigilantes Resurface, Kill 4 in Nueva Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2003. 529 For instance, six unidentified men were suspected killed by the Red Vigilante Group; the bodies were found—some bound and their mouths taped—over four days in late January 2002 in the towns of Sta. Rosa, Carranglan, Cuyabo and Bongabon. "6 Men Found Dead in Ecija Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 20, 2002. 530 Tonette Orejas and Anselmo Roque, "RPA-ABB Rebel Killed, 3 Captured in N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2003. 531 Tonette Orejas, "Suspected Assassin Guards 'Hanging Judge'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 23, 2005. 532 "Rebolusyonaryong Partido Ng Manggagawa Ng Pilipinas (Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines) and Its Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP/RPA-ABB)," 281. 140 the Oples of Bulacan had developed alternatives to violence in settling differences or securing their position, such as alliance building with national centers of power or making tactical compromises.533 “Mature” dynasties also had a tendency to split into factions, maintaining fractious clan dominance to the exclusion of other entrants into local politics. In 2007, for instance, except for Benigno Cojuangco Aquino, most local candidates ran under the banner of the incumbent, President Arroyo, and Aquino’s was the only opposition ticket in the province.534 The 2010 presidential elections similarly split Tarlac between Aquino and his cousin Gilbert Teodoro, Arroyo’s anointed successor. 535 While intra-dynastic violence does occur elsewhere in the Philippines, there was little evidence of it in Central Luzon.536 Disruptions of dynastic dominance did not lead to high levels of violence. Some dislodgement from power was temporary, like jueteng power brokers in Pampanga. 537 In Doña Remedios Trinidad and San Ildefonso, Bulacan, violence resulted in sympathy votes for the perceived victims, in this case the widows of assassinated politicians.538 533 "Beyond the Picture of Calm," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2001. See also PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Political Clans Back in Power," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2001. Sidel describes a similar path to dynastic provincial bossism in his case study of the Osmeñas of Cebu province. Sidel, 138-39. 534 The Cojuangcos nevertheless suffered from an internal split. Jo Martinez-Clemente, "No Opposition, Unified Slate, Free Zone," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 28, 2007. 535 "Noynoy vs Gibo: Tough Call for Tarlac," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 23, 2009. 536 The Gordons of Olongapo City in Zambales were also divided internally and the 2013 ellections effectively ended more than 25 years of unbroken dominance. Robert Gonzaga, "Deep Division Seen Cause of Gordons' Debacle in Olongapo," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 26, 2013. 537 Former priest Ed Panlilio defeated “Jueteng Lord” Bong Pineda’s wife Lilia for the governorship only to later be stripped of the office by the Commission on Elections. He served for most of one term but was unable to mount a successful electoral challenge subsequently. See Tonette Orejas, "Pampanga Poll Fraud Tied to Gambling, Graft," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 18, 2007. "Miracle in Pampanga," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 19, 2007. Charlene Cayabyab, "Panlilio Resurrects Good Governance Crusade," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2010. "Jueteng in Pampanga, Floods in Laguna," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 10, 2010. 538 Doña Remedios Trinidad municipal mayor Esteban Paulino and two aides in as well as San Ildefonso mayor Honorato Galvez and his bodyguard were assassinated prior to the 2001 elections. Their widows successfully ran against the prime suspects in the killings of their 141 Nonetheless, some electoral contests did result in violence. In Bulacan, violence was localized to San Miguel town from 2006 to 2008.539 The 2012 election season was particularly violent in several provinces, with killings related to disputes over local legislation.540 The one location in Cental Luzon, where elections were unusually violent elections, was in Nueva Ecija. There was regular intensification of violence around the campaign season every three years. The Josons had dominated Nueva Ecija since 1960, resorting to brutal and lethal methods without compunction. Eduardo Joson was provincial governor from 1959 who ruled Nueva Ecija with an iron fist until his death of a heart attack in 1990. The power vacuum triggered a bloody crisis of succession. 541 In 1995, his sons Tomas and Mariano were implicated in killing husbands. Arzadon, "Ilocos Norte Arms Buildup Revealed." Carmela Reyes, "Widows of Slain Bulacan Mayors Press Poll Bids," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 11, 2001. 539 Three local candidates were murdered in March 2006, including barangay chair Jessie Velayo, who had run for vice mayor in San Miguel town in the 2004 elections. "Bulacan Village Head Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 7, 2006. In June, armed men entered the residence of Ronaldo Valdez, brother of the village’s former barangay captain also murdered years before; they killed Valdez and his two young daughters. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2881 Re: Myra Joson Valdez, Complainant, Versus Rudy Mendoza et. al. Respondent," (Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007). In May 2008, former Calumpit mayor Ramon Pagdanganan was gunned down; the assassination was suspected to have been retaliation for his alleged role in the killing of a political rival’s financier. "Investigation Report: The Killing of Two Men in Barangay Batia, Bocaue, Bulacan," (Commission on Human Rights, July 28, 2008). ABS-CBN News, "Brother: Slain Ex-Bulacan Mayor Knew Kill Plot against Him," ABS-CBN News May 5, 2008, http://k2.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/05/05/08/brother-slain-ex-bulacan-mayor-knewkill-plot-against-him. 540 On November 8, Cabanatuan City dwJJ radio commentator Julius Cauzo was killed after having received death threats from local politicians amid a local plebescite over whether the city should be reclassified as a highly urbanized city. The family of pro-reclassification Mayor Julius Ceasar Vergara owns dwJJ. Anselmo Roque and Armand Galang, "Ecija Radioman Slain Amid Gun Ban," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 9, 2012. See also "Politics Eyed in Nueva Ecija Broadcaster's Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 10, 2012. In Aurora province, local opposition to a Congressional bill to create a new town “Dr. Juan C. Angara” out of the existing municipality of Maria Aurora was believed to be the motive for the killing of Romualdo Palispis, who chaired a community group opposing the bill. Tonette Orejas, "Poll Official in Aurora Shot Dead in His Own House," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 2, 2012. 541 William Branigin, "A Deadly Brand of Politics," The Washington Post December 25, 1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/12/25/a-deadly-brand-ofpolitics/d30fb505-a3f4-4fcc-aecb-5149d748859e/?utm_term=.7be7ee756fb7. 142 Eduardo’s former rival, Cabanatuan City Mayor Honorato Perez, who ran against Tomas for the governorship.542 In the 1998 elections, the Josons delivered support crucial to President Estrada’s bid for the presidency. When Estrada won, he pardoned the Joson brothers and appointed another sibling to his cabinet.543 However, Aurelio Umali of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (defeated Tomas Joson’s son in the 2001 congressional race—the first sign that the Josons were losing their grip.544 The disturbance of Joson dominance in Nueva Ecija and the spread of electoral violence in the province had its roots in a break with national elites. With President Estrada’s fall in January 2001, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had not yet been able to consolidate her local reach before the May 2001 elections. With the exception of Tarlac and Arroyo’s bailiwick Pampanga, the rest of Central Luzon voted for deposed president Estrada’s party in local and congressional races. 545 Meanwhile, tensions had begun to rise between the Nueva Ecija governor and the president’s office, with Malacañang thwarting Tomas Joson’s attempts to sanction municipal mayors in the province in 2003.546 In the 2004 national and local elections, again only Pampanga and Tarlac gave Arroyo more votes than contender Fernando Poe, Jr.547 542 Anselmo Roque, "Josons Aim for Political Resurrection," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 9, 2013. 543 Carlos Marquez and Vera Files, "All Quiet in 'Wild, Wild Nueva Ecija?'," GMA News Online May 6, 2010, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/190230/all-quiet-inwild-wild-nueva-ecija/story/. 544 Tina Arceo-Dumlao, Yolanda Fuertes, and Anselmo Roque, "New Faces Enter Northern Luzon Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2001. 545 Tonette Orejas, "'Political Immaturity' Seen in Opposition Win in Central Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2001. Nueva Ecija has the second highest number of registered voters in the region, after Bulacan. Commission on Elections, "Philippine 2016 Voters Profile Consolidated Voter Statistics by Province and City/Municipality," 2016, http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=2016NLE/Statistics/Philippine2016VotersProfile/ByProvCity. 546 Joson claimed that the president meddled with preventive suspension orders he issued against Nueva Ecija mayors facing administrative charges. Anselmo Roque, "Ecija Gov Slams Palace Hand in Mayors' Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 2003. 547 Tonette Orejas, "2004 a Bad Year for Central Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 29, 2004. 143 The 2007 election was critical. Joson was constrained by term limits from running for re-election and fielded his brother Mariano to run for governor.548 Umali ran against Mariano and requested that the national government to take steps to forestall electoral violence. Nueva Ecija was declared a hotspot for violence and the Commission on Elections deployed 350 soldiers to Nueva Ecija, to “maintain peace and order”.549 Umali prevailed in this race and for the first time in almost half a century, Nueva Ecija did not have a Joson in the provincial capitolio.550 Umali went on to successfully remain governor over three terms, fending off various challenges from the Josons and their allies. 551 Ultimately, the 2007 elections were the most violent since 2001, marked by assassinations of candidates as well as violence against media workers. 552 The weakening of the Josons’ supremacy resulted in greater violence among new political actors seeking electoral success and aspiring to establish their own dynasties. 553 Shortly before the polls, a firefight between security forces of Congressman Rodolfo 548 Anselmo Roque, "Josons Continue to Dominate N. Ecija Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2007. 549 "Comelec to Send New Teams to Keep Ecija Peace," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2007. 550 Manny Galvez, "Political Dynasties Rise, Fall in Ne," The Philippine Star May 19, 2013, http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/05/19/943615/political-dynasties-rise-fall-ne. 551 Anselmo Roque, "Umali, Joson Battle for Ecija Supremacy," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 22, 2009. 552 In January 2007 in Cabanatuan City, unknown gunmen killed Romulo Valisno, former political leader of Nueva Ecija representative Pacifico Fajardo. Anselmo Roque and Carmela Reyes, "Motorcycle Assassins Gun Down Ecija Trader," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 6, 2007. The day after the attack on Rueda, an attempt was likewise made on local radio station dwNE reporter Rufino “Butch” Gamboa; a man on a motorcycle had shot and wounded Gamboa. Anselmo Roque, "Radioman in Ecija Survives Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 23, 2006. In April, Carmelo Palacios, a reporter for Radyo ng Bayan was killed in Santa Rosa town. Dennis Santos, "Broadcaster Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 25, 2007. 553 On April 26, a firefight between security forces of Congressman Rodolfo Antonino and Jaen mayoral candidate Antonio Esquivel resulted in the deaths of two unnamed men. Days before the May 2007 elections, in San Isidro town, gunmen on a motorcycle killed Alex Mempin, a barangay council member and political coordinator of Congressman Antonino; an hour later Nestor Macabio, the driver of mayoral candidate Dennis Alejandro, was shot dead in Quezon town. Anselmo Roque et al., "Death Toll in Poll Violence Hits 100," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2007. 144 Antonino and Jaen mayoral candidate Antonio Esquivel resulted in the deaths of two unnamed men. Days afterwards, gunmen on a motorcycle killed Alex Mempin, a barangay council member and political coordinator of Congressman Antonino. An hour later Nestor Macabio, the driver of mayoral candidate Dennis Alejandro, was shot dead in Quezon town.554 Equivel and Antonino were new entrants onto Nueva Ecija’s political stage at the time; others like them sprang up throughout the province during that period of relative uncertainty.555 Subsequent city and municipal elections were considerably less violent.556 Village level elections continued to be bloody, however.557 Moreover, while the Josons were hemmed in by the Umalis and won fewer public offices than before, the Umalis in turn were unable to increase the number of their relatives in office.558 Umali ostensibly shirked from using violence, at 554 In March 2006, former Gapan City mayor Ernesto Natividad arranged an attack on his political rival Rodrigo Pascual, killing five people including two sons of Pascual. Leila Salaverria, "Ombudsman Orders Murder Case Filed vs Ex-Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 19, 2012. While later that year in December, an attempt was made on Gapan City Councilor Elpidio Rueda; Rueda survived but his aide Henry Managgit was killed. Anselmo Roque, "Councilor Escapes Ambush, but Aide Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21, 2006. 555 Marquez and Vera Files. 556 Anselmo Roque et al., "N. Ecija 'Unusually' Calm, but Cops Keep Watch " Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2010. While the 2013 local elections were somewhat calm overall, assassins gunned down Carranglan Mayor Restituto Abad in Guimba the prior year. Mayor Dies 5 Days after Gun Attack in N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 10, 2012. "Election 2016: Agenda of the Nueva Ecija Gov," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 27, 2016. 557 The October village elections, however, were marked by some violence. In August, former Jaen town barangay chair Noel Acosta, who had intended to run again for the position in the October barangay elections, was killed in Cabanatuan City. Armand Galang, "Ex-Village Chair Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10, 2010. In October, municipal councilor Alexander Ventura and a group of his followers killed Vice Mayor Luisito Caraang in Licab Town. "Councilor Hunted," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 24, 2011. In June 2015, motorbike-riding gunmen attempted to kill Jaen town barangay captain Arsenio Santos and, within a week, lethally shot Camp Tinio barangay captain Roger Pascual. "Village Chief Shot Dead in Cabanatuan City," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 7, 2015. Another Cabanatuan City barangay captain Cesar Baltazar was killed in September and village chief Geral Fermin in April 2016, prompting the national police to examine the link between the killings and the May 9, 2016 elections. Armand Galang and Delfin Mallari, "Ecija Cops Grilled on Political Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 14, 2016. And Visaya and Galang. 558 In contrast, Arroyo’s former chief of the Philippine National Police and close adviser Hermogenes Ebdane effectively began dominating Zambales politics as governor, dislodging well established political families—but not before his struggle with the Deloso clan for 145 least overtly.559 The fall of Joson and the rise of Umali demonstrate how national elites have the capacity to act against powerful local actors. A Weak State’s Show of Strength Central-local dynamics are critical in explaining patterns of political violence in Central Luzon in four ways. First, the state violence for wealth control characterizes the pattern of violence in Hacienda Luisita—until the political alliance between Arroyo and the Cojuangco-Aquino dynasty fell apart. Initially, the particularistic interests of Arroyo and the Cojuangco-Aquinos aligned. Arroyo mobilized the military and police to intimidate the Hacienda Luisita strikers and possibly even assassinate union organizers, designating the sugar plantation and factory a matter of national interest. The violence was episodic, escalating and deescalating according to the political needs of President Arroyo. Second, the state initially pursued a strategic interest in addressing insurgency movements in the region. The NPA had regained its strength nationally and military strategists within the government perceived leftist influence in populous, urban areas as integral to the insurgency. This analysis resonated with the concerns of President Arroyo, who was eager to strike two birds with one stone: one, reciprocate the military’s backing of her ascension into office in 2001; and, two, arrest the electoral rise of the leftist parties that would not be silenced over the exposure of electoral fraud in 2004. Strategic and particularistic interests converged in the mobilization of the military’s capacity for violence. The brutal campaign against activists coupled political control turned bloody. Anselmo Roque, "In Nueva Ecija, the Winner Is..." Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2013. 559 The rivalry may have resulted in the murder of Cezar Madoh, a bodyguard of former governor Amor Deloso, in Iba town. Robert Gonzaga, "An Emerging Force in Zambales Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2013.. See also "Killing Increases Tension as Zambales Polls Proceed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2012. 146 with the intensified counter-insurgency were effective in greatly weakening the NPA in Central Luzon yet the anti-activist violence intensified in 2006 even after the armed insurgents were virtually defeated. A third dynamic involved the central government tolerating RVG vigilantes in Nueva Ecija, obliging local governments and the police to turn a blind eye to the violence in Gapan City. The RVG claimed that their attacks on alleged criminals was part of the larger peace agreement between the government and the RPA-ABB in Western Visayas, which included the RVG in Central Luzon. They were allowed to retain their arms to help the government maintain peace and order. With the government’s tolerance, the RVG’s vigilantism was sustained for two years. This changed when President Arroyo affirmed the peace pact with the RPA-ABB negotiated by deposed President Estrada before her. The police arrested the RVG’s leader and dismantled the group, demonstrating the central state’s capacity to regulate violence and crack down on armed groups. Fourth, electoral violence in Central Luzon remained at a low level in comparison to the other regions in this study. Intra-elite moderation among political dynasties may account for part of this. Moreover, the central government—via the military’s presence in the region—exerted an impact on local politics. Over time, candidates were dissuaded from paying off NPA extortion. Moreover, military deployment amplified the influence of the president during elections. This was demonstrated in vote rich Nueva Ecija, when it became necessary for Arroyo to dislodge the powerful Joson dynasty. In Central Luzon, the state showed its strength—pursuing its strategic interests, often converged with the particularistic interests of the president and allies—and mobilizing capacity to achieve them. 147 Chapter 5. Safe City, Murder Capital in Southern Mindanao To understand the current “war on drugs” in the Philippines, it is necessary to study the Davao City Death Squad (DDS). State-sponsored vigilantism may have claimed as many as 1,200 lives—mostly young men or boys, almost all of whom were part of the city’s urban poor. When President Rodrigo Duterte was the mayor of Davao City, he avoided overt political repression that would have courted backfire. “Social cleansing” virtually gained social acceptability as an effective solution to urban crime because it made the city otherwise safe. Figure 12. Patterns of Political Violence in Southern Mindanao 100 Insurgency-related violence 90 80 Moro Insurgency* violence 70 60 50 Social control-related violence 40 Election-related violence 30 Wealth control-related violence 20 10 Unknown 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table * Refers to 2003 bombings of Sasa wharf and Davao airport Southern Mindanao was the most violent of the regions in this study, with insurgency-related violence accounting for the greatest proportion of victims (See Figure 12).560 But in other respects Southern Mindanao diverged significantly. While it would be reasonable to expect a substantial level of electoral violence, as was the case in Northern and Central Luzon, in Southern Mindanao there was very little (4.1 560 See Appendix 2 for cross-regional comparision. 148 percent). Conversely, violence related to social control (i.e. crime, vice, etc.), which was minimal in the other cases, made up almost a third (32.5 percent) of overall political violence of Southern Mindanao between 2001 to 2016, and of this 73.57 percent was concentrated in Davao City and 12.33 percent in Tagum City.561 Southern Mindanao Region is composed of five provinces: Davao del Sur, where Davao City is located; Davao del Norte, where Tagum City is located; Davao Oriental; Davao Occidental; and, Compostela Valley.562 (See Map 4 below) Map 4. Southern Mindanao Provinces Between 1988 and 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was re-elected every three years as Davao City mayor, pausing only to serve in Congress (1998-2001) and as the vice mayor (2010 to 2013) while his daughter, Sara, had the top job. These pauses were 561 All computations are based on data in Appendix 9. The provinces referred to in this chapter belong to the administrative Region XI designated as the “Davao Region”. With the inclusion of the provinces South Cotabato and Sarangani, the region was called “Southern Mindanao” until 2001. In order to avoid confusion when referring to the three different Davao provinces and Davao City, the old name Southern Mindanao is used here when referring to the region. 562 149 due to legal limits on consecutive terms. Throughout the latter half of his tenure as a city executive, Duterte effectively cordoned Davao City off from the anti-Communist campaign that the military waged around the city. Duterte was a powerful third force in the conflict between the army and the NPA. He exerted a strong influence over military units in the city and the Southern Mindanao region more generally. Moreover, he essentially permitted guerrillas to operate in certain areas of this city. Duterte ensured that leftist activists were safe from state-sponsored killings, and in turn, they were expected to remain silent over vigilante killings in the city.563 Figure 13. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Southern Mindanao 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table This chapter focuses on the central-local dynamics that sustained the high level of state sponsored vigilante killings in the region (See Figure 13). An earlier and prominent example of this pattern of violence occurred in Manila during the tenure of Mayor Alfredo Lim from 1992 to 1998. He was reputed to have tolerated summary executions of criminals by the police, particularly in the slums of the country’s 563 ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 11. 150 capital.564 Violence for social control in Southern Mindanao involved the convergence of the state’s strategic aim of eradicating crime and the particularistic interest of local political actors in using this tactic to gain power and influence. Moreover, using lethal violence against the urban poor allows authorities to rule them using fear. Violence thus becomes a lever with which to influence, if not control, a segment of society that would otherwise be impenetrable. The first section of the chapter explores how and why central-local dynamics enabled the rise of state-sponsored vigilante violence for social control in Davao City, and the second examines why the withdrawal of central support did not bring an end to the violence in Davao City. The third section draws a comparison between the central-local dynamics explaining the Davao Death Squad and the shorter-lived Tagum City death squad. The fourth and final section of this chapter turns to the dynamics of violence related to control over mining in Talaingod, Davao del Norte province, Mount Diwalwal in Compostela Valley and in Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Petty Despotism and Central Support As mayor, Duterte cultivated a reputation for being tough on crime, not the least due to his association with vigilante killings by a group that became known as the Davao Death Squad (DDS).565 By one estimate, the DDS committed 1,424 killings in Davao City from 1998 to 2015 (See Figure 14).566 564 Gavin Shatkin, "Are Communities Organised? A Quantitative Investigation of Two Cities in Metro Manila," International Development Planning Review 25, no. 3 (2003): 227. His tough-on-crime platform made him an early favorite in the popularity polls when he ran (but lost) for president in 1998. He was nonetheless catapulted into national politics. Lim was elected senator from 2004 to 2007 and had a second stint as mayor of Manila from 2007 to 2013. 565 See, for instance, Phil Zabriskie, "The Punisher," Time Asia, June 24 2002. 566 The Coalition Against Summary Execution (CASE) is a Davao City-based group that began monitoring the Davao Death Squad violence in 1998. CASE obtains its data from regional and city newspapers and its constituent NGOs (e.g. church groups, street children 151 Figure 14. Davao Death Squad Killings 200 180 160 Coalition Against Summary Execution s estimate, 1998 to 2015 140 120 100 Author's estimate, 2001 to 2016* 80 60 40 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 0 1998 20 Source: Coalition Against Summary Executions (CASE), unpublished; Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table * As proportion of annual CASE estimate The formation of the DDS dates back to Duterte’s narrow victory in the 1988 election, when Duterte ran against radio broadcaster Jun Pala, a popular spokesperson for the anti-communist vigilante group Alsa Masa (Masses, Arise) set up by the Davao City police commander. Having won the election, one of Duterte’s first priorities was to establish his dominance in the city, which was beset by military, paramilitary, vigilante and insurgent factions.567 Duterte exploited a fracture in the shelters, etc.). Coalition Against Summary Execution, "Data on Summary Executions in Davao City Based on News Clippings from Davao Sunstar, Sunstar Super Balita, Mindanao Times and Brigada Editors from 19 August 1998 to December 2015," (Davao City2015). Unpublished. 567 F.A. Mediansky, "The New People's Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines," Contemporary Southeast Asia 8, no. 1 (1986). Oude Breuil, Brenda Carina, and Ralph Rozema, "Fatal Imaginations: Death Squads in Davao City and Medellin Compared," Crime, Law and Social Change 52, no. 4 (2009): 415. See also Sheila Coronel, "I Will Kill All the 152 communist insurgency and forged an alliance with the NPA. Yet Duterte also supported and funded the Alsa Masa. By co-opting the Alsa Masa, Duterte may have assisted the CPP leadership to purge urban insurgents who deviated from the party’s Maoist line.568 Duterte disbanded the Alsa Masa, yet the Paquibato district in Davao City long remained a stronghold of Duterte’s NPA ally Leonicio “Ka Parago” Pitao until Parago’s death in 2015.569 Duterte deftly balanced his alliance with the left through appeasing the locally stationed military, apparently by making regular financial transfers from the city coffers and ensuring that communist insurgents remained only at the city’s fringes.570 The DDS grew as Duterte consolidated his influence over the military and paramilitary groups. DDS expanded from a handful of assassins in 1988 to a shadow structure parallel to an official Anti-Crime Task Force, initially meant to address organized crime. The DDS targeted gang members, thieves and drug addicts.571 Through a patchwork of deals with the military and insurgents, and using financial incentives, Duterte had hegemonic control over the use of violence in Davao City by Drug Lords: The Making of Rodrigo Duterte," The Atlantic September 20, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/rodrigo-duterte-philippinesmanila-drugs-davao/500756/. 568 John McBeth, "Duterte Always Loved Communists--except When He Was Killing Them," South China Morning Post October 19, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/weekasia/geopolitics/article/2038320/duterte-always-loved-communists-except-when-he-waskilling. 569 Military forces gunned down Pitao in 2015 and Duterte allowed a funeral march for Pitao in the city streets. Allan Nawal, "Rebs Say Slain Leader, Medic Unarmed When Gunned Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 2, 2015. Dennis Santos, "Duterte Defends Allowing Hero's Burial for Slain NPA Leader," Philippine Daily Inquirer July 11, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/704460/duterte-defends-allowing-heros-burial-for-slain-npaleader. 570 The threat of withdrawing city financing from the military in 2010, for instance, and Duterte’s role in regional security arrangements are discussed later in this section. 571 Leila de Lima, "Dissenting Report of Senator Leila M. De Lima to Joint Committee Report No. 18 of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights Jointly with the Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs," (Manila: Senate of the Philippines, December 9, 2016), 22. Arturo Bariquit Lascañas, "Affidavit," (February 19, 2017); ibid. de Lima, 26. 153 the late 1990s. 572 In this environment, Duterte began operating the DDS, unencumbered by rival groups. From two suspected DDS killings in 1998, there were an estimated 16 killings in 1999 and 11 in 2000.573 The state-sponsored vigilante killings in Davao City evolved over time but some key characteristics remained consistent. DDS violence tended to occur in spates of killings that fostered a dangerous atmosphere, with multiple killings in one day, over the course of a few days or spread out over a month.574 At the start of a new mayoral term in 2001, Duterte declared a “war on drugs” and vowed to eradicate drug crime from the city by the end of that year. A few months after the election, a spate of killings attributed to the DDS began with as many as eight alleged drug criminals killed within a week.575 Duterte read lists of alleged criminals on the radio, and within a certain period of time, sometimes as brief as a day or two, some of those on the list would be killed by unidentified gunmen on motorcycles.576 The lists came from the police anti-narcotics crime bureau and intelligence gathered by village officials. The DDS also began targeting newly released convicts from prison, individuals with cases pending against them or people with a criminal record.577 Typically, the targets or 572 TJ Burgonio and Dona Pazzibugan, "Move over Dirty Harry, Duterte's Here," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10, 2002. 573 See Appendix 9. 574 Seven periods of heightened killings were documented in this study, including: September to November, 2001; May to July, 2003; February 2004; June to August 2004; December 2004 to January 2005; Mar to April 2006; August 2009. 575 Anthony Allada, "Making Davao a Better Place to Live In," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 11, 2001; "More Suspects Slain as New Drug War Vowed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8, 2001. 576 For instance, unidentified gunmen killed Jomad Suma and Kiram Nakilan, suspected drug pushers on a list of 500 names that Mayor Duterte had earlier read out over the radio. Both had prior arrests on drug charges."2 More on Duterte Drug List Slain in Shootout," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 12, 2001. 577 "Death Squad Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2003. An example is the 2005 killing of Roberto Gonzales, whom police identified as a member of the Akyat Bahay house burglary gang with a criminal record for illegal drugs and robbery. The CHR also noted the similarity of his case to prior DDS killings. Moreover, Gonzales’s death may have been one of six such killings that day. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong 154 their families would learn directly from village officials or through word of mouth that they were “on the list,” prior to the attacks.578 The violence was selective and not indiscriminate.579 This personalized the threat and strengthened the ability of the local state agents to control dense sections of the urban poor. A crucial part of Duterte’s success stemmed from his ability to form alliances with national politicians. In July 2002, President Arroyo threw her political weight behind Duterte and appointed him to head a national consultative taskforce on kidnapping and illegal drugs. In doing so, she endorsed his methods in no uncertain terms. 580 Duterte also chaired the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC), spanning the Davao provinces and Compostela Valley province.581 The purpose of the RPOC and other sub-national councils were, inter alia, to coordinate the local offices of national security, police and civilian agencies for “peace and order” concerns. The RPOC oversaw counter-insurgency specifically, as well as monitored the activities of paramilitary militias.582 As the RPOC chair, Duterte was involved in the management of several security issues that went beyond the borders of Davao city. For instance, a dispute between the local mayor and small-scale miners in Mount Diwalwal, in Gonzales Alias "Pasmo" Tn: Roberto Gonzales," (Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006). 578 References to being “on the list” featured in almost half of the Davao City cases that Human Rights Watch had investigated. See "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 29-46. 579 On the theory of selective violence, see Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. 580 Burgonio and Pazzibugan. Dona Pazzibugan, R. Nazareno, and R. Ponte, "Duterte's Tough Stance Rubs Off on GMA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 13, 2002. 581 Duterte was the regional chair for most of the post-Marcos period, having first been appointed into the position by President Corazon Aquino. "The Rodrigo Duterte Interview," Esquire Magazine, August 25 2016. 582 "Executive Order No. 309 Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council," (Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). "Executive Order No. 320 Amending Executive Order No. 309, S. 1987, Entitled "Reorganizing the Peace and Order Councnil," as Amended by Executive Order No. 317, S. 1988," (Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, 1988). 155 Compostela Valley province, turned bloody, with a series of assassinations in 2002.583 Arroyo appointed Duterte to resolve the conflict. 584 (The Diwalwal conflict is discussed in detail at the final section of this chapter.) In March and April 2003, the bombing of Sasa wharf and the Davao City airport killed almost 40 people. The government held the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) responsible for the attacks.585 President Arroyo declared a state of “lawless violence”—an executive measure that Arroyo used to skirt Congressional review, unlike declaring martial law—in Davao City on April 2. Through this measure, Arroyo created a military-led Task Force Davao to address the terrorist attacks.586 The task force, with the support of Duterte as city mayor, immediately established headquarters in the city center, operated checkpoints in strategic areas and conducted street patrols in full battle gear. 587 While a specialized military unit operating in the city might ordinarily signal the tightening of central control over the locale, there were strong indications that Duterte maintained influence if not outright operational control. Moreover, the Davao Task Force was likely to have indirectly supported the DDS vigilantism in the city.588 It eventually expanded its activities beyond the 2003 bombings in Davao City. The military-led security force was 583 Ayan Mellejor and Anthony Allada, "Duterte Vows to Disarm Miners on Mt. Diwalwal," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 6, 2002. 584 Anthony Allada, "Killings Continue in Mt. Diwalwal, Despite Agreement to End Rivalry," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10, 2002. 585 Dennis Santos and Charlie Señase, "Duterte to MILF: Give up Bombers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2003. PDI Mindanao Bureau, "Davao Bombed; 15 Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2003. 586 Edith Regalado, "Task Force Formed to Beef up Davao Security," The Philippine Star April 6, 2003, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/201678/task-force-formed-beef-davaosecurity. 587 Andres Rebana, "Task Force Davao: A Behemoth Gone Wild," Bulatlat October 10-16, 2004, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-36/4-36-davao.html. 588 "Bayan Slams Mayor for Continued Killings in Davao City," Bulatlat January 18-24, http://bulatlat.com/news/3-49/3-49-davao.html. 156 accused of political repression of left-wing political parties like Bayan Muna and NGOs like Karapatan, as well as harassment of Muslims residing in the city.589 Meanwhile, as Duterte re-asserted control following the terrorism incidents, anti-crime vigilante killings intensified. A few weeks after the bombings, four men were killed as soon as they stepped out of prison.590 Ten days later, suspected DDS vigilantes gunned down Romeo Jaca, reportedly the leader of a youth gang.591 These and other killings created such fear in Davao City that when President Arroyo announced a national anti-drug campaign on June 16, 2003, dozens of people surrendered to the local police.592 As a result, suspected vigilante violence intensified to an unprecedented degree as the DDS began killing confessed criminals—bolstering the claim that the vigilantes were cleansing society of its undersired elements. On the same day as Arroyo’s announcement, suspected vigilantes killed Noel Valdueza and Wilfredo Gabia, charged with theft, shortly after police released them from custody.593 Four days later, Johnny Olarte, a former intelligence operative of Davao City police was shot dead by vigilantes. Within a week, eight more suspected thieves and drug pushers were killed.594 Duterte confirmed the existence of a vigilante group in the city but denied any involvement. 589 "Task Force Davao: A Behemoth Gone Wild". Allada, "Death Squad Killings." 591 Months prior, his mother heard rumors that barangay officials were collecting the names of gang members and suspected that this explained why he had been killed. "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 41. 592 "Pushers Fear Davao Death Squad, Surrender," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 4, 2003. 593 "CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-03-1969dc Re: Death of Noel Valdueza, Case No.: XI-03-1969dc Re: Death of Wildredo Gabia," (Commission on Human Rights, November 30, 2004). 594 Olarte was killed five days after Mayor Duterte announced in his weekly TV program that he had a “special project” for officers in uniform and that Olarte was one of six policemen whom he named as drug traffickers. Anthony Allada and Joselle Badilla, "Executions in Davao: Duterte 'Special Project' Eyed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 22, 2003. See also Anthony Allada, "Woman Killed by Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2003. 590 157 On September 6, 2003, however, gunmen shot Pala dead in the street near his house.595 Pala had survived an attempt the past April and had made broad hints on air that Duterte was responsible. 596 The brazen assassination of Duterte’s long-time political opponent alarmed the local legislature, which had already been castigating the local police for its inability to stop the DDS vigilante murders.597 The city council decried the violence, saying that Davao City was turning into the country’s “murder capital” and one councilor just stopped short of accusing Duterte of masterminding the violence.598 The CHR noted that the assassination was likely a result of Pala’s “hard line comments against prominent personalities”.599 The likelihood that Duterte was responsible for Jun Pala’s death is high. 600 Ultimately, the murder accusations did not slow Duterte’s political ascent and the DDS violence in Davao City increased in its intensity. In 2004, Duterte ran for re-election unopposed and campaigned on a platform of vigilante justice. On the eve of the vote in May, Duterte told a crowd gathered for a 595 Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "Davao Broadcaster Jun Pala Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2003. 596 Ayan Mellejor and Anthony Allada, "Anti-Red Leader Wounded in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 1, 2001. Also Ayan Mellejor, "Duterte Dares Pala to Confront Him on Slay Try," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2003. As with the previous assassination attempts on Pala, Duterte had denied any involvement and moreover claimed that Pala’s former running mate ex-mayor Benjamin de Guzman may have had something to do with the assassination. Anthony Allada, "Duterte Links Poll Foe to Pala Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 30, 2003. 597 Anthony Allada, Ellen Red, and Franklin Caliguid, "85 Dead in Vigilante-Related Killings in Davao since January," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 17, 2003. 598 Anthony Allada, "2 Slain as Davao Vigilantes Strike," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 19, 2003. 599 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3019 DO Re: Death of Elvis Española," (Commission on Human Rights, July 10, 2008). 600 Arthur Lascañas, Davao City senior police officer at the time, admitted in 2017 to having been the DDS member behind the attempts on Pala’s life and that after Pala was killed, Duterte paid him and his crew PhP 3 million. Audrey Morallo, "Lascañas: Duterte Behind Killing of Jun Pala," The Philippine Star February 20, 2017, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/02/20/1674120/lascanas-duterte-behind-killing-junpala. Lascanñas’s testimony corroborated statements of confessed DDS hitman Edgar Matobato at a Senate hearing in September 2016. Dharel Placido, "NUJP Wants Probe into Death of Duterte Critic," ABS-CBN News February 22, 2017, http://news.abscbn.com/news/02/22/17/nujp-wants-probe-into-death-of-duterte-critic. 158 press conference that if he won, more criminals would be killed. 601 Vigilantes delivered on this promise over the two months following Duterte’s re-election. In June, five were killed in three days, including Allen Tecson, who was tortured, suffocated and then shot in the head. Police linked Tecson’s murder to two robberies and speculated this was the motive for the killing.602 Days after the Tecson killing, vigilantes on motorcycle killed a suspected member of a criminal gang and, within the same week, an ex-convict linked to illegal drug activities.603 A few days later, three alleged criminals were shot dead within 12 hours in separate incidents.604 Four more people were killed soon afterwards, including Rolando Custodio, who had been on a list of alleged drug personalities that Duterte had disclosed two years prior. 605 The CHR observed that chains of summary executions began happening at a high frequency.606 Over time, however, motives for some killings became less clear. Police claimed that victims were known criminals, but CHR investigators would be unable to find any evidence to substantiate the claim.607 The myth of the DDS eventually 601 "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 72. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2290dc, Case No.: XI-04-2297dc Re: Death of Allen Tecson," (Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006). 603 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2298dc Re: Death of George Albores," (Commission on Human Rights, October 11, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2308dc Re: Death of Abraham Aquino," (Commission on Human Rights, February 9, 2006). 604 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2322dc Re: Death of Zandro Bajala," (Commission on Human Rights, August 11, 2006). See also Anthony Allada, "Death Squad Kills 4," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 4, 2004. 605 Ibid. "3 More Persons, Including Trader, Killed by Vigilantes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 6, 2004. 606 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2321dc Re: Death of Johnny "Jack-Jack" Moñeza," (Commission on Human Rights, October 17, 2006). In a 2009 confidential cable published by Wikileaks in 2016, the American ambassador to the Philippines at the time reported that the Duterte had admitted complicity in the Davao Death Squad killings to CHR regional commissioner Alberto Sipaco. Sipaco allegedly expressed helplessness and fear for his own safety to the ambassador. Paterno Esmaquel, "Duterte 'Admitted Complicity' in Davao Killings - Wikileaks," Rappler September 25, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/147244duterte-complicity-davao-killings-wikileaks-kenney. 607 For example, the case of Jorie Pacana, allegedly a member of the Simpleng Grupo gang in Bankerohan and involved in snatching, extortion and robbery; however, the CHR found no 602 159 became self-referential. Throughout January 2005, killings that conformed to the pattern of the DDS modus operandi occurred at a steady pace almost daily.608 During this period, there could be as many as five or six killings a day, according to CHR investigations.609 By July, the CHR estimated that motorcycle-riding gunmen had killed 127 people in 2005 alone.610 In August, the bodies of three suspected victims of extrajudicial killing were found dumped with their mouths covered in tape and their hands, ankles and feet bound by barbed wire.611 corroborating evidence to substantiate the allegations. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-20083017dc Re: Case of Pacana, Jorie," (Commission on Human Rights, July 7, 2008). 608 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2388dc Re: Case of Risalito Abellana," (Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2390dc Re: Case of Jason Dela Cerna," (Commission on Human Rights, September 8, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2389dc Re: Death of Alacel Jumat A.K.A. "Robot"," (Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2396dc Re: Case of Glen Mulle," (Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2394dc Re: Death of Leo Baogbog," (Commission on Human Rights, January 27, 2007). 609 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong Gonzales Alias "Pasmo" Tn: Roberto Gonzales." "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2401dc Re: Case of Dante Galarce," (Commission on Human Rights, September 20, 2006). Anthony Allada, "Vigilantes Continue Killings of Davao Crime Suspects," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 12, 2005. See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2398dc Re: Death of Reynaldo Adolfo," (Commission on Human Rights, November 20, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2403dc Re: Death of Ruel Andia," (Commission on Human Rights, August 28, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2404dc Re: Death of Cesarlito A. Tagod," (Commission on Human Rights, September 22, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2405dc Re: Case of Tata "Hudas" Toco/Charwin Tuco (Tn)," (Commission on Human Rights, August 3, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2413dc Re: Death of Joel Castro," (Commission on Human Rights, August 29, 2006). "Vigilantes Kill 5 in One Day in Davao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 24, 2005. 610 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2641dc Re: Death of Romeo Hingcuy," (Commission on Human Rights, February 28, 2006); "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2458dc Re: Death of Richard Padua," (Commission on Human Rights, August 31, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2491dc Re: Death of Julius Antido," (Commission on Human Rights, November 28, 2006); "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2613dc Re: Abduction of Lowell Labajo," (Commission on Human Rights, September 2, 2005). 611 The CHR examination of police records showed that Alex Alagao and Dean Alagao while Perdo Chaves might have also been involved in crime and were thus targeted by the killers. "CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2623dc Re: Case of Alex Alagao, Dean Mark Alagao and Pedro Chavez," (Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2006). 160 In 2006, curiously, the pace of killings abated to a large extent. Only one spate of summary executions may have occurred from around March 21 to April 25.612 However, the DDS formula for violence became so familiar that the police began to use its logic openly. For instance, in 2006, Coca-Cola bottling plant worker Hilario Ortega was shot dead. According to the CHR, police authorities believed that the motive was a personal grudge, noting that Ortega was a “good person” and had no criminal record, “and could not be a victim of ‘summary execution’ that frequently transpires in this city.” 613 By the end of 2006, the DDS-linked killings were estimated to have dropped by two-thirds from 2005. 614 The year 2007 marked the start of a turning point in protections against summary executions in the country, with Davao City receiving special attention due to the notoriety of the DDS. When the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston, visited the Philippines to investigate summary killings of leftist activists, he made it a point to visit Davao City.615 A side issue in his report on military-led summary executions, Alston highlighted the obvious inconsistency in the mayor’s reasoning that he knew nothing of the DDS yet at the same time claimed to be in complete control of the city. Alston noted that the assailants killed in broad daylight and did not even bother to wear masks, yet the 612 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2764dc Re: Case of Boyet Abella," (Commission on Human Rights, November 26, 2007). Dennis Santos, "3 More Vigilante Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 24, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2781dc Re:Death of Maturan, Ramil," (Commission on Human Rights, June 5, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2715dc Re: Case of Andrew Mendez and Rexol Cabras," (Commission on Human Rights, April 12, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2787dc Re: Death of Sasam Manuel," (Commission on Human Rights, June 29, 2006). 613 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2397dc Re: Death of Hilario C. Ortega," (Commission on Human Rights, November 8, 2006). 614 Calculations based on data from the Coalition Against Summary Execution. 615 DJ Yap, Nikko Dizon, and Miko Morelos, "I'll Make Noise, UN Prober Vows," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 12, 2007. 161 mayor and police failed to bring the murderers to justice.616 Police records showed that only two suspects had ever been arrested, and they were eventually released because of a lack of evidence. 617 Furthermore, 2007 was an election year. However, the cooperation between Arroyo and Duterte began to unravel. The alliance between Arroyo’s Team Unity ticket, led locally by the incumbent representative of Davao City’s First District, and Duterte’s own party fell apart. 618 Congresman Prospero Nograles and Duterte, longtime rivals, had set their enmity aside to support President Arroyo but quarreled over the allocation of positions between their camps. It is possible that Duterte timed the break to the day before the election for full effect. Duterte had promised he would deliver her the votes for her 12 senatorial candidates; instead, eight opposition candidates and two independents topped the Davao City polls while two Team Unity candidates barely squeezed into the city’s top rankings. In contrast, Duterte’s allies in the local races left their opponents trailing far behind.619 Duterte, running unopposed, won another term as mayor and his daughter Sara was elected as his deputy.620 A number of cases of suspected DDS murders targeting city slum residents with criminal records, particularly for illegal drug use or trafficking, occurred that year but the violence resumed and scaled up anew in the months after the elections. 621 616 Sales, 329. Rizalene Acac, "Davao Cops Told to Solve Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2007. 618 Germelina Lacorte, "Tu Hangs in Balance as Davao Alliance Snaps," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2007. 619 "Davao City Is Still Duterte Country," Mindanews May 18, 2007, http://www.mindanews.com/c102-governormayorsanggunian/2007/05/davao-city-is-stillduterte-country/. 620 Rizalene Acac et al., "Duterte, Daughter Dominate Davao City Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 21, 2007. 621 For instance, in April, Fernando Alia, was stabbed to death after having survived an earlier attempt the previous November. Human Rights Watch documented Fernando’s murder as the 617 162 Amid the violence ostensibly aimed at petty criminals, a few cases indicated that the DDS might have targeted individuals who posed threats to local police officers. On July 4, unidentified assailants gunned down police officer Godofredo Guritan, who had instituted an administrative case against a high ranking police official before the Regional Internal Affairs Service. 622 Fifteen-year-old Adon Mandangit had been arrested in the past for sniffing glue and theft, and his mother filed a complaint against a Calinan police precinct officer for mistreating her son. The officer was removed from the station and the police paid damages to the family, but the boy was killed by suspected DDS assailants in July.623 The DDS continued to kill alleged criminals in Davao City’s slums. Suspected DDS killers shot the anchorman of DXGO radio station, Ferdinand Lintuan, twice in the head, in the middle of a snarl of Christmas eve traffic on December 24, 2007. Once the shooter ascertained Lintuan was dead, he sped away on a motorcycle driven by another man.624 Lintuan had bought block time from the radio station for his program in which he criticized Mayor Duterte, particularly over Duterte’s “pet project People’s Park”, resulting in a graft investigation.625 The police arrested one man as a fourth in a series of lethal targeting of the Alia brothers from Bankerohan that started in 2001 with suspected gang member Richard and continued with the slaying of Christopher and, in 2003, of Bobby. However in May, August and October, suspected DDS vigilantes stabbed, shot and killed targets who had been previously warned by barangay officials that they were “on the list”. "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 34-38. Julius Gumba, who had a criminal record with the police, was killed by unknown assassins. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2983dc Re: Death of Julius Gumba," (Commission on Human Rights, June 10, 2008). 622 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2984dc Re: Death of Godofredo Guritan," (Commission on Human Rights, December 22, 2007). 623 "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 30. 624 "Final Report CHR Case No. XI-07-3009dc (Re: Death of Lintuan, Ferdinand @ "Batman")," (Commission on Human Rights, 2008). 625 Rizalene Acac, "Duterte Takes Leave as Graft Probe Starts," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 2008. 163 suspect but Lintuan’s family and former colleagues believed that the “real culprit” and mastermind was someone else.626 Duterte Outlasts Rift with Center After the 2007 election, Arroyo was bent on ending Duterte’s political career as she had done to local strongmen during her tenure—even well entrenched ones like Vicente Valera in Abra and Tomas Joson in Nueva Ecija. In a highly centralized authoritarian regime, such as the Marcos dictatorship, this would have been a matter of course. However, despite the repressiveness of the Arroyo government, Duterte was able to fend off moves against him long enough to remain in elected office and outlast Arroyo’s presidency. His trajectory ultimately led him to the highest office in the country. The first major sign of Duterte’s disfavor with Malacañang was his dismissal from the regional security council in 2008. President Arroyo appointed Davao del Sur governor Douglas Cagas as the new chair of the RPOC for Southern Mindanao to replace Duterte.627 Cagas, was a relative of the wife of Congressman and Speaker of the House, Prospero Nograles. Cagas, and his appointment added insult to Duterte’s political injury, given the long and public animosity between him and Nograles.628 Just a year earlier, as the RPOC chair, Duterte had threatened to disarm opposing 626 The police held suspected shooter Oliver Antoc but then dropped the case for insufficient evidence. The police then pursued Lintuan’s fellow broadcaster/commentator Leonilo Larosa, whom Lintuan had attacked on air and who, according to a colleague, threatened Lintuan’s life. Dennis Santos, Rizalene Acac, and Joselle Badilla, "Slain Davao City Broadcaster Buried," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 31, 2007. 627 Duterte resigned, citing health reasons—likely in an attempt to save face. 628 Eldie Aguirre, "Duterte out, New GMA Ally in in Davao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 25, 2008. 164 factions—Cagas included, of course—embroiled in electoral violence over the Davao del Sur elections. 629 The rift between Duterte and national elites was ever more apparent in a shift in the military’s behavior in the city. A new military officer was assigned to Task Force Davao, Lt. Col. Oscar Lactao, under whose command the military’s lethal, antileftist campaign affected Davao City in a significant manner for the first time since the 1990s. 630 For instance, the secretary-general of the peasant union Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) Celso Pojas was gunned down due to his advocacy of farmers’ rights in 2008.631 Pojas was the first leftist leader killed in Davao City despite the pattern of lethal military attacks against activists that began nationwide in 2001.632 A sign of his waning clout, Duterte was no longer able to guarantee the safety of leftist groups. Under Lactao, Task Force Davao also rolled out an extensive Barangay Defense System for counter-insurgency that claimed to have mobilized 4,000 militias in the outskirts of Davao City by the end of 2008.633 Earlier in the year, Duterte had asked the military to stop recruiting barangay chairpersons into paramilitary forces after the NPA targeted and killed village chiefs in Compostela Valley and Davao del Sur provinces.634 Duterte’s warnings were ignored. During this period of political realignment, DDS violence reached a historic 629 "Gov Bet Suspect in Killing of Davao Sur Bet, Son," Mindanews May 18, 2007, http://www.mindanews.com/c102-governormayorsanggunian/2007/05/gov-bet-suspect-inkilling-of-davao-sur-bet-son/. 630 "Palparan Is Suspect Too, in Bloody Legacy in Mindanao," Davao Today August 14, 2014, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/palparan-suspect-bloody-legacy-mindanao/. 631 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3041dc Re: Death of Celso Pojas," (Commission on Human Rights, November 10, 2008). 632 Jeffrey Tupas and Dennis Santos, "Davao Farmer Leader Gunned Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2008. 633 Marilou Aguirre-Tuburan, "4,000-Strong Barangay Defense Force to Fight NPA," Davao Today November 6, 2008, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/crime-public-safety/4000strong-barangay-defense-force-to-fight-npa/. 634 Germelina Lacorte, Joselle Badilla, and Jani Arnaiz, "Stop Arming Village Execs, Army Asked," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2008. 165 peak with an estimated 180 killed by the end of 2008, punctuated by a spate of 20 people killed by the following January.635 Duterte was nearing the end of a third and final consecutive term in office and had lost President Arroyo’s support to Congressman Nograles. Nograles was poised to wrest the Davao City mayoralty and keep his congressional seat in Davao City’s First District within the Nograles clan. Duterte’s strategy bore the marks of outward appeasement, offering little overt opposition to the manuevers against him. Meanwhile he redoubled the use of violence as a reminder that he remained firmly in control of covert force. Soon enough, it seemed that Duterte’s impunity from accountability had come to an end. In March 2009, the Commission on Human Rights chairperson Leila de Lima opened a public inquiry into the unexplained killings of more than 800 people in Davao City since 1998.636 In a reversal of her prior endorsement of Duterte’s anticrime methods, then President Arroyo vowed full support for the CHR’s investigation.637 Coinciding with the CHR probe, Duterte relinquished control of the local National Police Commission (Napolcom) personnel as well as all general and operational supervision and control of the city’s police forces to the city police chief. He also severed links between the mayor’s office and the military’s Task Force Davao.638 Duterte’s rival Congressman Nograles crowed that the DDS’s existence demonstrated Duterte’s failure as city mayor. 639 Nograles directed the House 635 Data from Coalition Against Summary Execution. Dennis Santos, "Davao City Vigilantes' Toll: 20 Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 1, 2009. 636 Included in the inquiry was a special investigation into the abduction and killing of NPA Commander Parago’s daughter Rebelyn Pitao. Nikko Dizon, "CHR Probes 800 Kills by Davao Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2009. 637 Christian Esguerra and Leila Salaverria, "Palace Backs CHR Probe," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2009. 638 Jeffrey Tupas and Leila Salaverria, "43 on PDEA Target List among Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 1, 2009. 639 Esguerra and Salaverria. 166 committee on human rights to conduct a parallel inquiry into the killings in Davao City, suggesting that the committee investigate how Davao City’s PhP476 million annual peace and order fund had been spent.640 To mock Duterte, Nograles arranged for a crowd of a hundred students to attend the launch of the NGO Human Rights Watch report on the Davao Death Squad.641 Meanwhile, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston asserted that vigilante-style executions in Davao City worsened since his visit to the Philippines. Alston noted that Duterte had done nothing to stop the killings and supported the slayings in his public statements. Alston claimed that the death squad members operate with complete impunity and had even begun selling their services for about PhP5,000 per hit (US$100).642 Duterte continued to deny the charges and sparred lengthily with de Lima during a public hearing that the CHR had organized in 2009.643 Furthermore, Davao del Sur officials such as Digos City mayor Arsenio Latasa and the city’s police chief Anthony Padua, continued to deny the existence of the vigilante group.644 From an all-time peak in the previous year, the killings fell precipitously during the CHR investigation. The police cited a drop to only four killings in May compared to 10 in April that year and the lull continued for another three months.645 The CHR attempted 640 Tupas and Salaverria. Jeffrey Tupas, "Politics Soils Probe of Death Squads," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 19, 2009. 642 Nikko Dizon, "Vigilante Killings in Davao Alarm UN," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 11, 2009. 643 Moreover, the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao Isaac Robillo noted that only one case of summary execution has ever been filed in court since 1998 despite the hundreds of possible cases reviewed , Jeffrey Tupas and Nikko Dizon, "Duterte Tells CHR: Prove Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2009. The probe also resulted in the disclosure that at least 43 people on the target list of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) have been killed since 1998. Tupas and Salaverria. 644 Orlando Dinoy, "We'll Face CHR, Say Davao Del Sur Execs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2009. 645 The regional police for Southern Mindanao claimed credit for curbing the crime rate in the region during the period, especially in Davao City. Rizalene Acac, "PNP Claims Credit for Fall in Summary Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2009. According to the Coalition Against Summary Execution chairperson Father Amado Picardal, the CHR probe 641 167 to investigate claims that a quarry owned by a former police officer was used as a dumpsite for DDS victims. By August, however, the CHR investigations hit a wall when the inspection of the quarry was plagued with legal and procedural impediments.646 However, the pause in the violence ended. From August until early September, violence attributed to the DDS resumed with an estimated 22 more killings in Davao City and at least one killing in nearby Digos City.647 Still, compared to the height of an estimated 166 killed in 2008, DDS casualties may have dropped by half to 78 by the end of 2009.648 Nevertheless, despite some difficulty, Duterte was able to survive the investigations and maneuver through the 2010 national and local elections. The challenge seemed insurmountable. The slew of investigations occurred toward the end of Duterte’s third consecutive term. By this point, he was constrained by legal limits from seeking re-election. Blood was in the water and political rivals circled closer. Nograles, similarly, was on his third and final term as Congressman and decided to run for Davao City mayor against Duterte’s daughter Sara in the 2010 elections.649 Scant weeks before the election, in a play for a new broker at the top, Duterte endorsed the candidacy of Aquino over Arroyo’s favored candidate. 650 While speculation had initially been rife that Duterte himself would run against Nograles’s appeared to have been effective because the number of killings dropped over the past three months. Jeffrey Tupas, "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 9, 2009. 646 "Legal Woes Stump Davao Killings Probe," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 16, 2009. Confessed DDS member and former policeman Lascañas testified in 2016 to the Senate that an estimated 100 bodies had been buried there, but the remains were moved a week prior to the CHR visit in 2009. ABS-CBN News, "Davao Death Squad Probe Revives Interest in Laud Quarry," ABS-CBN News March 6, 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/03/06/17/davaodeath-squad-probe-revives-interest-in-laud-quarry. 647 Judy Quiros and Orlando Dinoy, "Davao Death Squad: 22 More Victims," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2009. 648 Coalition Against Summary Execution. 649 Tupas, "Politics Soils Probe of Death Squads." 650 Grace Uddin, "Why Duterte Endorses Aquino," Davao Today April 18, 2010, http://davaotoday.com/main/davao-city/why-duterte-endorses-aquino/. 168 son Karlo in the race to represent the city’s First District in Congress, Duterte ran and won the easier contest as his daughter’s vice mayor instead.651 Sara’s victory over Nograles senior put the Dutertes on secure footing once again in the city. In the end, Arroyo failed to dislodge the strongman of Davao City; moreover, her coalition was roundly defeated in the 2010 polls and oppositionist candidate Benigno Aquino took her place in Malacañang. Unlike when she moved against Valera and Joson at the height of her power in the mid-2000s, Arroyo was in a much weaker position by 2010. As a lameduck president preoccupied by a fight for her own political survival, she could not muster the resources for a coup de grâce and Rodrigo Duterte survived the rift with the center. In a signal that political life would remain “normal” despite Duterte’s official post as vice mayor, the scale of violence resumed at the same level it had been since 2004. Suspected DDS killings picked up again toward the end of 2009, months prior to elections, with a total estimated dead of 100 people that year alone. By the end of 2010, around 101 were believed to have been killed by the DDS. 652 Meanwhile, potential rivals like Douglas Cagas began to face political troubles of their own.653 651 Once more, Duterte prevailed over his former vice mayor-turned-rival Benjamin de Guzman. Cheryll Fiel, "2010 Elections: Dutertes Proclaimed as Winners in Davao Polls," Bulatlat.com May 13, 2010, http://bulatlat.com/main/2010/05/13/2010-elections-dutertesproclaimed-as-winners-in-davao-polls/2/. 652 Tupas, "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces." Also, see Figure 14 for annual data from Coalition Against Summary Execution. 653 Former Davao del Sur governor Douglas Cagas was eventually charged for conspiring to murder Nestor Bedolido, former editor of a weekly magazine the Digos Times. In 2014, Cagas surrendered himself to the provincial police after charges were filed against him and three others, including Matanao mayor Vicente Fernandez, Eldie Aguirre, "Ex-Gov Tied to Newsman's Slay Yields," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 21, 2014. See also Karlos Manlupig et al., "Ex-Gov Jailed for Media Killing to Seek Bail," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 23, 2014. However, before the trial could even begin, one judge after another inhibited herself from handling the case. Allan Nawal, "Yet Another Judge Begs Off from Case vs Cagas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 6, 2014. 169 Next Stop, Malacañang Confident in their bailiwick of Davao City, the Dutertes reasserted themselves in matters of local politics and remained overtly at odds with the central government on various issues. For example, Davao City withdrew financial support of at least PhP 130,000 (US$2,600) in monthly assistance, reportedly to purchase food supplies, to the 1003rd Infantry Brigade and two commands, 69th and 84th Infantry Battalions. Sara Duterte asserted her disapproval of the military’s "combat heavy" approach; moreover, the two battalions were linked to former general Jovito Palparan.654 There had been no love lost between her father, the left-leaning mayor, and the military hardliner. The animosity between Duterte, who had cultivated friendly ties with the NPA, and Palparan, infamous for lethal anti-Communist military campaign, had been a matter of public knowledge. Shortly before elections in the previous year, two campaigners for Bantay, the anti-communist party-list group that Palparan founded, were abducted from a supermarket at gunpoint in Davao City. Their bodies were found days later. Another anti-communist group associated with Palparan, the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), asserted that Mayor Duterte was behind the violence. Duterte scoffed at the allegation saying “What will I gain? People will only sympathize with the party-list group.” 655 Confessed DDS killer Edgar Matobato later claimed that he had been one of the killers, acing on Duterte’s orders.656 654 Jeffrey Tupas, "Duterte, AFP Part Ways in Handling Insurgency," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 2010. 655 Jeffrey Tupas and Dennis Santos, "2 Palparan Campaigners Found Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2010. 656 de Lima, 41-43. To be precise, Matobato claimed that he had killed bodyguards of Prospero Nograles and men of Jovito Palparan, including a female ex-barangay captain. Journalists linked this testimony to the cases of Noquera and Miranda; noting that “Miranda was one of the men Palparan sent to provide support to Nograles during the 2010 elections.” 170 Duterte also was out of step with the central government with respect to the NPA. In December 2011, Davao City mayor Sara Duterte invited NPA rebels to leave the countryside and enjoy the Christmas holiday in the city. However, the CIDG and the Special Action Battalion arrested NPA rebel Edwin Brigano during a holiday truce between the government and guerrillas. 657 Incensed, the younger Duterte demanded the ouster of the chief of the police’s regional office for Southern Mindanao, threatening to withdraw the city’s financial support to the regional command for fuel and provisions.658 Furthermore, Duterte became a resource person in the National Democratic Front of the Philippines moreover, which negotiates on behalf of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA in peace talks with the state, over objections from the central government. 659 In another discordant note between Duterte and the central government, the mayor’s office vehemently opposed any mining activities in Davao City. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau in Southern Mindanao of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources was forced to exclude Davao City from participation in a national regulatory regime that would have allowed small-scale mining to take place.660 In contrast, elsewhere in Southern Mindanao, the military expanded its reach into the protection of private mining interests (discussed in the final section of this chapter). Jodesz Gavilan, "Matobato's Hits and Misses," Rappler October 3, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/147815-edgar-matobato-davao-death-squad-hitsmisses. 657 Jeffrey Tupas and Carla Gomez, "Arrest of NPA Rebel Angers Dutertes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 5, 2011. 658 Jeffrey Tupas, "Duterte to Demand Ouster of Regional Cop Chief," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 2011. 659 The Secretary for the Department of the Interior and Local Government at the time, Jesse Robredo, consequently reprimanded Duterte for failing to remain on the government’s side of the negotiations. Duterte then publicly withdrew himself from the process. Germelina Lacorte, "Duterte Heeds DILG, Quits NDF Post," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 11, 2011. 660 Potential mining areas in the city were reportedly the largest in the world, in terms of land size. Judy Quiros, "MGB Erases Davao City from Mining List," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2012. 171 In 2013, once again eligible to run for mayor, Duterte ran against four inexperienced and largely unknown opponents while his son Paolo ran unopposed for vice mayor.661 The estimated deaths attributed to the DDS began to decrease to 53 in 2014 and 2015 at 60. 662 It is likely that this de-escalation was calibrated in preparation for Duterte’s presidential bid. During this period, for instance, overt police participation in Duterte’s anti-crime strategies became more visible. For example, a series of lethal police shootings of alleged drug and robbery criminals in 2015 were punctuated by Duterte’s public pronouncements against drug criminals. In April, police killed three illegal drug suspects and seven in July in police raids and alleged shootouts; Mayor Duterte quipped that the seven dead would have also “los(t) their heads” if it were up to him.663 In August, police shot dead Rey Caroro, a suspect in a robbery-murder of a taxi driver, just hours after Mayor Duterte promised to deliver swift justice to the taxi driver’s family. 664 Duterte announced a 48-hour ultimatum for drug pushers to leave the city after a police officer was killed in a drug buy-bust operation. The next day, police operatives shot dead Armanuel Atienza after he allegedly resisted arrest during a similar sting operation.665 Police fatally shot a second crime suspect four days later.666 Duterte’s announcement that he would run for the presidency was made on 661 Sara Duterte was meant to run against Karlo Nograles for the First District; despite the congressional seat being a key to complete the Dutertes’ political dominance of the city, Sara refused to run and forced her father’s party to field a former vice mayor and party lightweight, Luis Bonguyan instead. Germelina Lacorte, "Sara Duterte Defies Dad, Drops Out " Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 7, 2012. 662 Data from Coalition Against Summary Execution. See Appendix 9. 663 Germelina Lacorte and Allan Nawal, "'They Would Have Lost Their Heads'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2015. 664 Karlos Manlupig, "Duterte Justice: Robbery, Slay Suspect Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 21, 2015. 665 Allan Nawal, "Davao Drug Suspect Dead after Duterte Ultimatum," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 30, 2015. 666 Dennis Santos, "2nd Crime Suspect Dead on Heels of Duterte Ultimatum " Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2015. 172 November 21, 2015, more than a month past the candidacy filing deadline. This tactic let the two front runners, Vice President Jejomar Binay and Senator Grace Poe, as well as the incumbent administration’s candidate Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas, undermine each other’s campaigns for months.667 It was likely that Duterte has been preparing for a bid for the presidency as early as 2014, when he launched an ostensible nationwide consultation on federalism.668 He pulled a typical trick in local politics of using a loophole in COMELEC rules that allowed candidates to be substituted even after all candidacies had been filed. Misleading his adversaries, Duterte had earlier filed to run for re-election in Davao City. When Duterte switched lanes into the presidential race, his daughter Sara ran for Davao City mayor in his stead. 669 He then took the place of a nuisance candidate who had filed for the candidacy of national party Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-Power of the Nation or PDP-LABAN).670 After the May 9 presidential election and within days of his official proclamation as the winner, the outgoing Justice Secretary Emmanuel Caparas announced that the government was at a dead end in its investigation in to the DDS, 667 For instance, in 2014, a senate inquiry on corruption bogged down the Binay campaign. In 2015, the Poe campaign momentum stalled over a supreme court challenge over her nationality. 668 Franklin Caliguid, "Duterte on 2016 Presidential Bid: I'm Waiting for 'Divine Signal'," Philippine Daily Inquirer January 23, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/667533/duterte-on2016-presidential-bid-im-waiting-for-divine-signal. Gabriel Cardinoza, Germelina Lacorte, and Yolanda Sotelo, "Duterte 'Eyes' Presidency in 2016 to Save Ph from 'Disaster'," Philippine Daily Inquirer February 19, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/673999/duterteeyes-presidency-in-2016-to-save-ph-from-disaster. 669 Pia Ranada, "Duterte Not Running for President, Aide Files COC for Davao Mayor," Rappler October 15, 2015, https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/109373rodrigo-duterte-run-davao-mayor. Yuji Gonzales, "Why Duterte Is Hesitant to Run for President," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 24, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/700504/why-duterte-is-hesitant-to-run-for-president. 670 Paterno Esmaquel, "Duterte 'Placeholder' Diño Withdraws Presidential Bid," Rappler October 29, 2015, https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/111051-duterteplaceholder-dino-withdraws-presidential-bid. Yuji Gonzales, "It's Official, Duterte Now a Candidate for President--Comelec," Philippine Daily Inquirer December 17, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/748425/duterte-now-officially-a-candidate-for-president-comelec. 173 citing the lack of evidence after a key witness disappeared.671 Prior to taking office, Duterte announced that he would put up unspent campaign funds as a bounty for law enforcement personnel who neutralize drug suspects “dead or alive”, offering: PhP 3 million (US$60,000) for a drug lord, PhP2 million (US$40,000) for a “second echelon” syndicate members, and PhP50,000 (US$1,000) for an “ordinary” pusher. Suspects who put up resistance during their arrest would be killed.672 Even before he was sworn into office on July 1, 2016, DDS-style vigilante killings sprang up throughout the country. Tagum City Death Squad, A Pale Imitation The death squad vigilantism under Duterte was not unique to Davao City. Similar anti-crime vigilantism spread to Cebu City in Central Visayas, for instance.673 Although the death toll was higher in Davao City, police vigilantism was not uncommon in Manila.674 Killings of alleged criminals raised suspicions of either the existence of a Digos City Death Squad or of spillover from vigilante violence from Davao City. The earliest documented report was a spate of killings that allegedly targeted drug criminals from around October 2001, intensifying in March and April in 671 Niña Calleja, "Halt to Davao Death Squad Probe Hit," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2016. 672 Duterte had raised over PhP375 million and had PhP3.5 million left over, based on his statement of contributions and expenditures to the Commission on Elections. Christine Avendaño, "Ping Backs Duterte in War vs Drugs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3, 2016. Jocelyn Uy, "Duterte Spent over P371m for Successful Campaign; Binay Poured P463m," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 8, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/789763/duterte-spentover-p371m-for-successful-campaign-binay-poured-p463m. See also Karol Ilagan and Malou Mangahas, "13 Donors Raised P334m for Duterte Campaign Fund - PCIJ," Philippine Daily Inquirer December 6, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/851212/13-donors-raised-p334m-forduterte-campaign-fund-pcij. 673 "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 10. 674 Peter Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines," (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2016). 174 2002. 675 While denying the existence of a vigilante death squad, local police attributed the death of twenty suspected drug dealers to gang boss Polo Aznar’s attempt to monopolize the drug trade.676 Aznar was found dead and mutilated in the Digos City public market in 2002. Nonetheless, suspected vigilantes killed around 20 alleged drug criminals in 2006 and 14 others in 2007.677 Then governor of Davao del Sur, Douglas Cagas, accused local police of direct involvement in a series of summary executions in Digos City. He linked them to the Davao death squad, despite denials from both the police and Duterte. However, another spate of killings in May 2011 throughout Davao del Sur raised alarm that Davao City vigilantism had spread out its operations beyond its city limits.678 The Tagum City death squad under city mayor Reynaldo Uy was a separate group from the Davao City Death Squad. Tagum had been elevated to city status in 1998, resulting in a 200 percent increase of central government budgetary transfers to the local government coffers.679 Facing higher stakes, Uy was first elected to office in 675 See Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "Vigilante Killings Resume in Digos," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2002. Also Anthony Allada, "Death Squad Ends Brief Vacation, Kills 3," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2002. "Drug Killings Won't Stop as 3 More Slain in Digos," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 8, 2002. 676 "Cops Say Death Squad Men Known, on the Run," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 25, 2002. 677 For instance, in October 2006, suspected drug criminal Ronel Racasa was shot dead in Digos City by two gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle; the Digos City Prosecutor charged Jessie Silva and two others for the crime. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2882 Ds Re: Death of Racasa, Ronel," (Commission on Human Rights, June 30, 2008); Eldie Aguirre, "Alleged Drug Pusher Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2007. See also "Gov Tags Cops in Vigilante Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 12, 2007. Eldie Aguirre and Orlando Dinoy, "3 Killings Revive Fears of Return of Death Squads," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 2009. Another spate of killings occurred around May to July of 2009. Aguirre, "Gov Tags Cops in Vigilante Killings." 678 According to Davao del Sur police chief at the time, Ronald dela Rosa, police were however checking the link to illegal drugs and the involvement of guns for hire. Orlando Dinoy, "Vigilante-Style Slays Are Back," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2011. See also "Torture, Slay of Teener Revives Talk of Death Squads," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 26, 2011. Dela Rosa was appointed chief of the Philippine National Police upon Duterte’s assumption of the presidency. 679 Hope Gerochi, "Tagum City: Development at the Crossroads," in Discussion Paper Series (Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2004). 175 1998 but lost a re-election bid in 2001, returning to the mayor’s office only in 2004.680 Uy swiftly asserted control by emulating Duterte in Davao City: 40 alleged criminals were summarily executed within the first four months of his 2004 term in office.681 Known locally as the Underground Death Squad in Tagum City (UDS), the group was an “outgrowth” of Tagum City’s Civil Security Unit, which was officially tasked with overseeing safety in the local markets and other areas and part of a campaign to rid the city of indigents and street people.682 Uy had been emboldened by the success of Duterte’s model of political domination and social control in Davao City. Uy began to castigate criminals as “weeds” that had to be rooted out of the city. In 2006, a spate of killings raised public speculation about the UDS with dozens dead in April and May.683 Like the DDS, the UDS targeted alleged gang members, thieves and drug traffickers.684 However, Uy also used the UDS to silence corruption allegations and forestall opposition to unpopular policies, such as raising taxes to finance the construction of 680 Frinston Lim, "Tagum: From Rural Area to Boom City," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 20, 2011. 681 Grace Uddin, "Vigilantes Descend on Tagum," Bulatlat.com, no. September 26-October 2, 2004, http://bulatlat.com/news/4-34/4-34-tagum.html. 682 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan," (Commission on Human Rights, August 28, 2006). Also, see "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 12. 683 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro Palin Gumela," (Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006). See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan." 684 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2718dn Re: Death of Rey Lumiguid," (Commission on Human Rights, September 4, 2006). See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2735dn Re: Case of Jomar Escobar," (Commission on Human Rights, August 8, 2006). Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2744dn Re: Death of Noel Omos," (Commission on Human Rights, August 23, 2006). Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2779dn Re: Death of Enrique Catito," (Commission on Human Rights, September 7, 2006). Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2805dn Re: Death of Armando Pawakil," (Commission on Human Rights, October 31, 2006). Suspected UDS vigilantes killed Alejandro Gumela and laborer Ronnie Aquino, neither had any criminal records. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-062807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro Palin Gumela." See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2808dn Re: Case of Ronnie Aquino," (Commission on Human Rights, August 31, 2006). 176 “a sprawling and modern city hall.”685 The UDS also killed people to cover up the vigilantes’ own crimes. 686 During the April 2006 wave of suspected UDS killings for instance, unidentified gunmen on motorbike killed Jessie Opalla. The CHR investigation indicates that he may have been killed in connection with his testimony against police officer Alexis Manigo, who had been served summons by the PNP Provincial Internal Affairs office on a murder charge the day before Opalia was killed.687 This convergence of statist, anti-crime aims and particularistic interests in Tagum City was characteristic of violence for social control.688 In 2012 however, former UDS hitmen confessed responsibility for a number of assassinations.689 These included the murder of Roberto Onlos, in order to pave the way for a replacement at the Ancestral Domain Council, a body involved in mining projects, in neighboring Compostela Valley province. The self-professed assassins also admitted to the slayings of Dennis Angeles, chair of an agrarian reform beneficiaries cooperative and his bodyguard. They admitted killing Wilfredo Derecho, a traffic aide with Tagum City’s Civil Security Unit, who may have learned too much incriminating information about the UDS. Nonetheless, Uy and his vice mayor Allan Rellon won two successive reelections by large margins in 2007 and 2010. Uy attempted to consolidate power and supported his brother Arthur’s successful bid for the governorship of Compostela 685 "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 13. Edu Punay, "Ex-Mayor, 29 Others Face Murder Raps over Tagum Death Squad," The Philippine Star March 6, 2015, http://www.philstar.com:8080/nation/2015/03/06/1430374/exmayor-29-others-face-murder-raps-over-tagum-death-squad. 687 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2778dn Re: Case of Jessie Opalla," (Commission on Human Rights, June 16, 2008). 688 The UDS was suspected of killing a succession of alleged gang members and criminals, although local police attributed the bloodletting to rivalries among criminal gangs. Frinston Lim, "Vigilante Killings?," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 30, 2011. 689 "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 25-36. 686 177 Valley, where the Uy family had made their fortune in small-scale gold mining.690 When Duterte vacated his chairmanship of the Regional Peace and Order Council in 2008, Uy joined the governors of Davao del Norte and Davao del Sur in jockeying for the position, recognizing how influential the position could be.691 But Uy remained limited in his reach. He was unsuccessful in prolonging his hold on political power once he reached his term limit in 2013. The lame duck became a target when Uy’s erstwhile vice mayor Rellon handily defeated Uy’s son, De Carlo, in the 2013 election. Uy had previously been able to control the Tagum City police force through the city’s purse strings, allowing him to influence key appointments in particular. He proved vulnerable from above without patronage of Davao del Norte’s provincial governor, Rodolfo del Rosario. The Davao del Norte provincial police, “on orders of their superiors”, began building a case against Uy with testimony and evidence on the death squad. 692 The National Bureau of Investigation task force concluded that Uy had created the death squad, recommending charges against him and 28 death squad participants, including police officers, ex-convicts, gangsters and former NPA fighters.693 Remaining free from any conviction for the killings, Uy ran against Rellon for Tagum City mayor in 2016 but lost. Even without Uy at the helm, the UDS is believed to continue to operate as guns 690 Ibid., 14. CJ Kuizon, "Del Rosario, Cagas Welcome Possible RPOC Post," Davao Today March 8, 2017, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/crime-public-safety/del-rosario-cagas-welcomepossible-rpoc-post/. 692 In fact, when Human Rights Watch published the findings of their two-year investigation into the Tagum City Death Squad, their claim that the UDS was responsible for almost 300 killings from 2007 to 2013 was based on Davao del Norte’s provincial police investigations. "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 12-14; footnote 22. 693 "Tagum Killings: NBI Files Murder Raps vs Ex-Mayor, 28 Others," Rappler March 4, 2015, http://www.rappler.com/nation/85782-tagum-killings-nbi-murder-raps-former-mayor. See also Tarra Quismundo, "Ex-Mayor Charged in Death-Squad Slays," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2015. 691 178 for hire.694 While the tactics were similar to the Davao City death squad, Uy failed to overcome the disadvantage of his bad relations with the provincial governor. Lacking central support, Uy was vulnerable to Governor del Rosario’s machinations. The Military and Investment Defense In the early 2000s, the government warned that the NPA was “on the rebound” in the Davao provinces and Compostela Valley, in part because the military had been preoccupied with Moro separatism elsewhere in Mindanao.695 The military estimated the NPA’s strength at nearly 12,000 in 2001 nationally, up from 11,255 the previous year and the MILF at about 12,500, while the Abu Sayyaf strength had dropped from about 1,000 to only 60. 696 By 2008 however, army officials said that these armed insurgents had lost fighters in battles and surrenders, bringing them to their weakest level in 20 years.697 In 2010, there were an estimated 800 NPA fighters in Southern Mindanao, 60 to 70 percent of whom were allegedly lumad or indigenous peoples.698 694 Two unidentified gunmen on a motorcycle shot dead radio commentator and barangay councilor Rogelio Butalid in December, outside his workplace in Tagum City. Human Rights Watch accused former UDS members of killing radio commentator and barangay councilor Rogelio Butalid. Government investigators found that Butalid’s radio program was sponsored by the National Electrification faction of the Davao del Norte Electric Cooperative, which was embroiled in a violent dispute with a pro-cooperative faction; they implied that Butalid’s may have invited a violent response by training his hard-hitting commentary against the rivals of his donors. "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 15; 39-41. Nancy Carvajal, "Some Journalists Had It Coming, Probers Say," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 14, 2013. Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2014-0004dn Re: Death of Butalid, Rogelio E. "Tata"," (Commission on Human Rights, February 11, 2014). 695 Edith Regalado, "18 Soldiers, 10 NPAs Die in Davao Ambush," The Philippine Star November 19, 2001, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/140615/18-soldiers-10-npas-diedavao-ambush. 696 Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "10 NPAs, 5 Soldiers Die in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2002. 697 Frinston Lim, Nikko Dizon, and Delfin Mallari, "5 Soldiers Dead in Clash with Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 31, 2008. 698 ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 10. Lumad is also used as a term to politically distinguish indigenous people in Mindanao from the predominantly muslim, moro indigenous people. Arnold Alamon, "Wars of Extinction: The 179 Violence was concentrated in indigenous communities or lumad ancestral lands, where the military protected resource extraction from insurgency attacks. This section explains the central-local dynamics that produced insurgencyrelated violence in a larger pattern of militarization relating to mining interests that intensified due to national directives in 2008 and 2012. Moreover, the political dynamics of Davao City had a ripple effect elsewhere in the region as Mayor Duterte played a leading role in regional security as part of his strategy to keep the insurgency conflict outside his city gates. This section explains the dynamics of military involvement in wealth control using three examples in Southern Mindanao. First, violence over mining in Mount Diwalwal in Compostela Valley was locally initiated, before the central government and military took over. Second, in Kiblawan in Davao del Sur, military and local leaders directed violence against mining opponents among the indigenous B’laan lumad community. Rather than insurgency or attacks against the state, the conflict was over a highly contentious mining project. Third, in Talaingod, Davao del Norte, the forcible displacement of indigenous lumad communities was tantamount to a land grab by the military. The dynamics of political violence in Southern Mindanao centered upon the military’s strategy toward indigenous communities. This involved the recruitment of lumad fighters for counter-insurgency and clearing lumad communities out of sites for resource extraction. In Davao del Norte, the town of Talaingod was a key hive for the mobilization of lumad fighters. The military had encouraged some indigenous groups to wage a pangayao (tribal war) against the NPA in the early 2000s. 699 In Davao Lumad Killings in Mindanao, Philippines," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, no. 21 March 2017, https://kyotoreview.org/issue-21/lumad-killings-philippines/. 699 Ferdinand Zuasola, "Tribal Folk Demand Firearms to Fight Rebels," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 10, 2001. The regional office of the National Indigenous People’s Commission even proposed the creation of an armed “Ancestral Domain Forces” as a defense 180 Oriental, a military-sponsored pangayao against the NPA also exploited a division between lumad communities over the entry of mining firms into their territory. 700 In 2008, President Arroyo directed the military to deploy an Investment Defense Force in Southern Mindanao to “protect vital infrastructures and projects from terrorists, including the New People’s Army and other rebel groups who stand in the way of development in the rural areas”.701 The military then capitalized on earlier collaboration with lumad groups to mobilize indigenous communities against the NPA with an Alsa Lumad (Lumad, Arise) campaign based out of Davao City.702 The displacement of thousands of civilians, mostly lumad families from hinterland villages in Davao Oriental, Davao del Norte and Compostela Valley, began to intensify around this time.703 Displacement, violence and harassment were part of a wider campaign to control the area’s resources.704 Mount Diwalwal, Compostela Valley. The conflict over mining in Mount Diwalwal pitted local political actors against one another, with the national against land-grabbing, armed conflict and destruction of the environment. "Gov't Exec Pushes for Formation of Tribal Armed Force," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 18, 2002. 700 The military mainly armed the Mandaya lumad groups, while Higaonon and anti-mining Mandaya lumad opposed the entry of mining firms into their territory. The groups had been united in protecting their ancestral domains from logging in the past. Mining divided them. "'Lumad' Armed to Fight NPA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 21, 2002. See also NCIP and military encouragement of lumad participation in the government’s counter-insurgency campaign. Ferdinand Zuasola and Ayan Mellejor, "'Lumad' Urged to Make a Strong Stand against Violence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 21, 2002. Ferdinand Zuasola, "Entry of Mining Firms Divides Davao 'Lumads'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 2, 2002. 701 "PGMA Orders AFP to Create Investment Defense Force," Philippine Information Agency Press Release February 9, 2008, http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&sec=reader&rp=2&fi=p080209.htm&no=18&date=02/09/2 008. 702 ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 12. 703 An estimated 2,500 people from several towns in Davao Oriental fled their homes due to intensified military-NPA fighting; most were lumad families from the hinterland villages of Baganga, Boston and Cateel towns. Jeffrey Tupas, "Anti-NPA Drive: 400 'Lumad' Families Flee," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 11, 2008. In May, residents of at least two villages, in Talaingod, Davao del Norte and Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, about 400 lumad families or an estimated 2,000 members of the Ata-Manobo fled flighting between the military and NPA. "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces." 704 Carlos Conde, "Arroyo Troops Continue Reign of Terror in Southern Mindanao," Bulatlat.com, no. 21, http://www.bulatlat.com/archive1/021Arroyo%20troops%20SMR.html. 181 government initially remaining on the periphery. With the elimination of a key local interlocutor, the national government became directly engaged in the conflict. A joint venture between a large-scale mining company Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation and local mining firm JB Management and Mining Corporation (JBMMC) owned by Monkayo town mayor Joel Brillantes escalated the violence in Diwalwal from 1999 to 2002, resulting in the murder of about 100 miners and residents.705 Until this point, legal challenges had prevented large mining companies from proceeding with exploration and artisanal miners from all over the Philippines descended on Diwalwal. Brillantes, a former military intelligence operative, sought to control the informal mining sector through the imposition of a temporary restraining order on their mining activities. Mount Diwalwal barangay captain Franco Tito emerged as the small scale miners’ voice in opposition to Brillantes and JBMMC.706 In April 2002, the local judge Eugenio Valles that issued the order and denied the small scale miners’ petition against it was shot dead by unidentified gunmen.707 In July, unidentified gunmen shot dead Arnold Tabigue, an employee of JB Management and Mining, a firm identified with Brillantes; the next day, gunmen killed Jesus Milay, an employee of Blucor Minerals Group, one of the mining groups involved in the long-standing dispute.708 Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte, who also chaired the Regional Development Council at the time, vowed to disarm the miners forcibly. President 705 Tito warned of a bloodbath in Diwalwal. Daisy Gonzales and Carlos Conde, "Entry of Huge Mining Firm Turns Diwalwal into Powder Keg," Bulatlat 2, no. 30 September 1-7, 2002, http://bulatlat.com/news/2-30/2-30-caloy2.html. 706 Ayan Mellejor and Ferdinand Zuasola, "Cops Eye Guns-for-Hire in Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 27, 2002. 707 "Judge in Mt. Diwalwal Mining Case Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2002. 708 Allada, "Killings Continue in Mt. Diwalwal, Despite Agreement to End Rivalry." 182 Arroyo appointed Duterte to oversee the resolution of the conflict.709 Duterte thus convened the various stakeholders in the gold rush area to end their disputes by entering a joint mining venture.710 The military also claimed that mining activities in Diwalwal has been the largest source of funds for NPA rebels operating in the area.711 In the course of 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) took over Diwalwal, declaring 8,100 hectares a mineral reservation area enforced by the police and military.712 In June 2003, Brillantes was killed in Monkayo while his bodyguards shot and killed the gunman, Aniceto Dejito, a former NPA rebel.713 Police started a manhunt for a former police officer, Reynaldo Cajes, and four others who were with Dejito during the assassination. Cajes was a bodyguard of Nelson “Tata” Sala, president of the Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association.714 Sala was the principal suspect in the Brillantes assassination. In the following year’s elections, Manuel Brillantes, the brother of the slain mayor, successfully ran for office. Throughout late April and May 2004, a spate of violence accompanied elections in Monkayo, primarily between the Brillantes and Sala camps. Among the incidents included the murder of Barangay chair and Brillantes supporters Arthur Baltazar and Felix Petero.715 For instance, police attributed the murder of 709 Ibid. Mellejor and Allada, "Duterte Vows to Disarm Miners on Mt. Diwalwal." 711 Santos and Allada. 712 Daisy Gonzales and Carlos Conde, "Gov't Takeover to Bring in More Mining Giants to Diwalwal," Bulatlat 2, no. 31 September 8-14, 2002, http://bulatlat.com/news/2-31/2-31diwalwal.html. 713 Anthony Allada, "Monkayo Mayor Killed for P1m, Suspect's Wife Claims," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 2, 2003. 714 Other incidents included the lethal shooting of Henry Buduan, a supporter of Monkayo mayoral candidate Franco Tito and the killing of Virgilio Baquiano, a fruit and vegetable trader. Anthony Allada and Ferdinand Zuasola, "Ex-Cop Hunted for Slay of Compostela Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 5, 2003. 715 Gentugaya had been vice mayor but took over as mayor as a result of Joel Brillantes’s assassination the year before while Estrada, who had been the highest ranked town councilor, was appointed vice mayor. "CHR Joint Resolution Cases No.: XI-2014-2159 to 66 DO Re: Case of Hentry Buduan, Domingo Estrada, Franklin Estrada, Jessielyn Bybay, Arthur 710 183 barangay councilor Rodolfo Gogo to his switching sides from Manuel Brillantes to Rizal Gentugaya.716 Violence flared up again in the locale after the national government unveiled a renewed plan for the mineral reservation. In February 2008, the NPA attacked a gold processing plant in Monkayo allegedly owned by Monkayo mayor Manuel Brillantes, killing two unnamed security guards. The NPA reportedly declared Brillantes to be a counterrevolutionary enemy, and the prior year they had burned two of his company’s dump trucks, as well as chopped down palm trees in his plantation. Meanwhile, the national government intensified its military presence, purportedly to protect local communities from “extortionist” communist insurgents.717 Ultimately, although issues over electoral dominance and access to resource wealth were never fully resolved by the use of force, the deployment of the military was a trump card whenever local conflict over the mine pit the mayor against the small scale miners and communist insurgents.718 The involvement of national actors was essentially mediated by Joel Brillantes, who acted as the interlocutor in Diwalwal for both the central government and the mining companies until his assassination in 2003. Afterwards, the military tightened its control and took charge of the mine. Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Unlike in Diwalwal, the military was directly involved in the protection of mining interests from the outset, fueling political violence in Davao del Sur, particularly in Kiblawan town. The military had been Baltazar, Rodolfo Gogo, Felix Pequero, Virgilio Baquiano," (Commission on Human Rights, October 28, 2004). 716 Anthony Allada, "NPAs Kill Head of Monkayo Village Chiefs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 4, 2004. 717 The small-scale miners rallied around a figure like Franco Tito but the NPA also maintained an interest in profiting from the artisanal miners in the form of “revolutionary” taxes, thus adding a plausible counter-insurgency dimension to justify the military’s involvement. Boris Verbrugge, "Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines," World Development 67 (2015): 456. 718 ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks." See also Verbrugge, 456. 184 active in the area and was embroiled in cases of violent excess in 2005 and 2007, intensifying greatly in 2012 and 2013. The conflict between the military and the local indigenous community did not stem from insurgency or attacks against the state. Instead, the root of the conflict was a highly contentious large-scale mining project located mainly in Tampakan town in neighboring South Cotabato province. In 2003, the foreign-financed company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (SMI) launched the Tampakan project, which also encompasses Kiblawan town in Davao del Sur. The mineral deposits are on an ancestral domain claimed by the B’laan tribe.719 Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Battalion fired on B’laan tribe members killing Francisco, Promencio and Padilla Bulane and wounding two other relatives in Kiblawan town on February 8, 2005. The military claimed that the three were killed in a legitimate military encounter but human rights groups claimed that the Bulane massacre was a human rights violation.720 The provincial prosecutor filed criminal charges of murder against army lieutenants Roberto Betita and Josue Erie. On March 2, 2007, provincial coordinator of labor group Anakpawis and peasant group Nagkakaisang Magsasaka ng Davao del Sur (United Farmers of Davao del Sur) Renato Pacaide was shot by gunmen on a motorcycle in Digos City.721 Human rights activists suspected that he was assassinated due to his sustained advocacy for an investigation of the Bulane killings.722 719 Bong Sarmiento, "Special Report: The Tampakan Project: Battle over Southeast Asia's Largest Copper-Gold Reserves," Mindanews November 11, 2012, http://www.mindanews.com/environment/2012/11/special-report-the-tampakan-projectbattle-over-southeast-asias-largest-copper-gold-reserve-1/. 720 "CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2470 to 5 Ds, Re: Massacre of Indigenous Group at Barangay Abnate, Kiblawan, Davao Del Sur by the 25th I.B., 6 I.D., Pa," (Commission on Human Rights, September 1, 2005). 721 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2946 Ds Re: Death of Renato "Atong" Torrecampo Pacaide," (Commission on Human Rights, August 13, 2008). 722 Pacaide was also organizing a union in the Nakayama corporation, which had been expected to lay off about 80 laborers that may have been a motive for his murder. Eldie 185 The bitter dispute delayed the development of the project and in 2012, both mining opponents and pro-mining local officials appealed to the national government to intervene decisively. Farmers and irrigators’ associations in Davao del Sur and Davao City asked the government to stop the multi-billion dollar SMI open-pit mine for copper and gold, saying that it would destroy the watershed that irrigates 13,000 hectares of rice farmland.723 However, Marivic Diamante, the mayor of Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, as well as mayors of two affected towns in South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, sought the intercession of President Aquino for the project to commence. At least seven military detachments were deployed to the area to enforce a curfew and restrict people’s movements. The anti-mining B’laan Tampakan Forum accused the companies of using the military to stifle opposition. 724 Diamante, the military and the SMI later revealed that the company was paying the town PhP180,000 (US$3,600) to PhP 850,000 (US$17,000) per month for the deployment of soldiers and paramilitary forces to the site, as part of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign.725 In response to the sustained protests and a 2010 ban on open pit mining imposed by the provincial government of South Cotabato, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) rejected the project’s environmental compliance certificate application in 2012.726 The violence escalated afterwards on the Davao del Sur side of the project. Members of the 27th Infantry Batallion killed Aguirre and Cecilia Rodriguez, "DOJ to Reinvestigate 15-Month-Old Killing of Militant Leader in Davao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 24, 2008. 723 The mining site straddles 10,000 hectares of agricultural land located between the towns of Tampakan, South Cotabato and Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Kristine Alave, "Farmers Decry Loss of Water to Mine," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 28, 2012. 724 Judy Quiros, Aquiles Zonio, and Orlando Dinoy, "3 Mayors Ask Palace Help for Mine Project," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 2, 2012. 725 The information came to light in the course of a congressional hearing to investigate the killing of Juvy Capion and her children. Lorie Ann Cascaro, "SMI Should Stop Funding Gov't Forces in Tampakan Mining Site--Bayan Muna," Mindanews February 24, 2013, http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2013/02/smi-should-stop-funding-govt-forces-intampakan-mining-site-bayan-muna/. 726 Sarmiento.”Special Report: The Tampakan Project”. 186 Juvy Campion, wife of anti-mining activist and B’laan leader Dagil Campion, in an alleged “legitimate encounter” with a “bandit group”; two of their children were also killed in the attack with a third child wounded.727 Campion had been waging an armed campaign against SMI. The military stated that his wife and children were caught in the cross fire but human rights groups cited reports that there was no gunfight.728 By mid-January 2013, military personnel were posted to protect the mine site.729 Within two weeks, suspected members of a special military taskforce created to secure the mining area killed Campion’s younger brother Kitari and two others in Kiblawan.730 Shortly after, civilians began to flee the area, particularly from B’laan territories. 731 Meanwhile, the DENR issued environmental clearance for the project, giving the government a green light to proceed with the project.732 A few months later, taskforce militias allegedly killed anti-mining leader Datu Anti Freay and his son Victor in Kiblawan. 733 With the procedural victory of the government over mining opponents, the violence slowed down but did not cease entirely. Talaingod, Davao del Norte. In 2011, shortly after simultaneous raids on three mining firms in northeastern Mindanao, President Aquino initiated a government plan to use paramilitary groups to protect mining companies.734 The 727 Nikko Dizon et al., "Army Probes Soldiers in Davao Sur Massacre," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 20, 2013. 728 Germelina Lacorte, "Independent Probe of B'laan Slays Sought," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 4, 2012. 729 Bong Sarmiento, "Tribal Members Flee Tampakan Mine Site Due to Heavy Military Presence," Mindanews February 3, 2013, http://www.mindanews.com/topstories/2013/02/tribal-members-flee-tampakan-mine-site-due-to-heavy-military-presence/. 730 Aquiles Zonio, "B’laan Leader Capion Confirms Brother Killed in Clash with Soldiers," Philippine Daily Inquirer January 31, 2013, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/350539/blaan-leadercapion-confirms-brother-killed-in-clash-with-soldiers. 731 Sarmiento, "Tribal Members Flee Tampakan Mine Site Due to Heavy Military Presence". 732 "Stakeholders Note Pros and Cons of $5.9 Tampakan Mine Project," GMA News Online February 21, 2013, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/content/296041/stakeholdersnote-pros-and-cons-of-5-9-b-tampakan-mine-project/story/. 733 Aquiles Zonio, "Antimining Head, Son Slain in Davao Del Sur," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 26, 2013. 734 The mobilization of the military to protect mining sites is discussed in earlier chapters. 187 following year, Aquino issued Executive Order 79 on mining reform, signaling increased central support for military and paramilitary defense of resource extraction from insurgents and other opponents.735 In 2014, at least 300 Manobo lumad families fled Talaingod for fear of getting caught in armed conflicts between the military and the NPA after two helicopters and four military planes dropped bombs near their villages.736 The villagers sought refuge in Davao City while the military occupied their lands. The military justified their presence in response to NPA presence in the locale but anti-mining groups claimed that their opposition to logging and mining in the Pandtaron Range must have prompted the military to intensify their operations in the area.737 After a few weeks, the military pulled out after a meeting among the evacuees, officials of the military’s Eastern Mindanao Command, and Davao del Norte governor Rodolfo del Rosario, facilitated by Davao City Mayor Duterte.738 Incidents of military excesses continued to perturb communities in Davao del Norte. Later that year, three soldiers were accused of raping a teenaged lumad girl in Talaingod, Davao del Norte.739 Lumad community leaders accused the military of violence and displacement aimed at eroding their resistance to extractive economic activities like mining and 735 "2012 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 9. Dee Ayroso, "Mining Act: '20 Years of Plunder, Destruction and Pollution Must End'," Bulatlat March 3, 2015, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/mining-act-20-destruction-andpollution-must-years-of-plunder-end/. 736 Karlos Manlupig, "Manobo Families Flee from Davao Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 1, 2014. 737 "Dreams Die Young in Talaingod," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 4, 2014. 738 A similar humanitarian problem faced Davao City’s Paquibato District but Duterte opposed a military withdrawal. Nonetheless, Duterte asked the soldiers to stop conducting a community “census” about their affiliations and activities, sowing fear of red-tagging among local leaders. Germelina Lacorte, "Army Agrees to Pullout in Davao Norte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2014. 739 Julie Aurelio, "Militants Rally at Camp Agui over Rape of 'Lumad' Girl," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 12, 2015. 188 logging. 740 In late 2015, more than 700 lumad were displaced from Talaingod. When refugees began to return to Talaingod two months later, harassment and violence resumed within days of their return—including the killing of a 15 year old boy.741 The villagers were forced to evacuate the area once more, following a pattern of recurrent violence aimed at dispossession.742 The Violent South In this study, political violence at the highest scale occurred in Southern Mindanao. The main pattern of violence in the region presented a puzzle at the outset: why was so much political violence unrelated to either insurgency or elections? The relationship was indirect. The state-sponsored vigilantism in Davao City and Tagum City was aimed at particularistic political control. The violence followed a distinct pattern aimed at social control. Primarily, the violence was effective at controlling the city’s urban poor. While the victims may have seemed anonymous to the general public, the violence was acutely personal. Individuals were selected based on lists generated from local knowledge of community leaders, manifesting the city government’s capacity for surveillance and punitive action. Duterte’s also contributed towards perpetuating his hold on political office. Duterte expanded the traditional use of a politician’s private army. A vigilante group, the DDS was rendered virtually invisible to monitors of electoral violence. Unlike elsewhere in the country, violence decreased prior to elections and typically scaled upwards in the months after the vote. This strategy forestalled the risk of COMELEC interference during elections. Furthermore, except in very rare cases, the DDS was not 740 Karlos Manlupig, "'Lumad' in Gold-Rich Mindanao Targeted," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 7, 2015. 741 Frinston Lim, "'Lumad' Seek Help Amid New Abuses," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 1, 2016. 742 See also Alamon. 189 used against political opponents. In other regions, political assassinations sometimes resulted in a backlash at the polls or criminal prosecutions pursued by highly motivated political families. Duterte’s political tenacity went beyond the control of violence within the city; his strategy also entailed influencing the contours of violence within the wider region. Facilitated by his initial alliance with President Arroyo, Duterte built upon a careful balancing act between the NPA and the military to effectively minimize the encroachment of insurgency violence into Davao City. In the rest of Southern Mindanao, other dynamics were at play. The Arroyo government enabled the military to pursue the communist insurgency with little restraint. In the final years of Arroyo’s tenure, the government was able to exploit a weakened insurgency and penetrate new areas for resource control and extraction, particularly in Southern Mindanao. The Aquino government continued in this direction and expanded the military’s role in mining. 190 Chapter 6. The Extra-Judicial Killing of Philippine Democracy? To what extent do central-local dynamics help to explain the violence of Duterte’s first eighteen months in office? The sheer scale of the violence – as well as its demographic, geographic and temporal features – signifies that a new set of dynamics is at play. Nonetheless, this concluding chapter will endeavor to answer the question. The first section synthesizes the key contributions this dissertation has made to understanding political violence in post-authoritarian democracies such as the Philippines. The second section attempts an initial sketch of the central-local dynamics of the national “war on drugs” that has made so much violence possible throughout the country in such a short period of time. Central-Local Dynamics of Political Violence While much of the scholarship on Philippine politics has concerned itself with how violence has been used to win elections, this dissertation instead situates violence and local politics in its broader relationships within the state. Unlike security studies or the social movements literature, moreover, insurgency and counterinsurgency are placed in their political context. For more than a century, elections have linked Manila to the provinces, leaders to vote banks, and patrons to their clients. However, the use of force also activates relationships that are not oriented for elections, or bypass them altogether. Local bosses and petty strongmen may rely on political thuggery to make their way to the top. However, the heights they reach and the scale of violence usually remain limited. In areas with active insurgency groups and military encampments, moreover, parochial powers and agents of the central state need to either gain mutual advantage, augment their resources and exploit the other, or unilaterally pursue their aims. 191 Patterns of political violence. Central-local dynamics shape the contours of political violence. Political violence is constituted of distinct but overlapping forms of violence associated with different processes. In the Philippine case, state weakness and precarious democratic consolidation blur the distinction between strategic and particularistic interests. Moreover, interactions between actors in the national capital and provincial peripheries result in inter-related forms of violence. Political partisans may use the state’s coercive apparatus during elections, for instance. “Insurgent” may be a label for recalcitrant labor unionists or peasant organizers. Political violence is best understood in its broadest, rather than most parsimonious, sense. It includes traversing categories of direct state violence, electoral violence, protection of economic plunder and racketeering, as well as the illicit state-sponsored violence for social cleansing. Here, violence is politics by other means.743 While stark episodes like high profile assassinations or mass killings may receive public attention, this study demonstrates that assassinations and massacres have occurred frequently throughout the country. Political violence is everyday and commonplace. The largest single category of targets in this study is unaffiliated civilians (see Appendix 4). The Philippine case affirms the argument that counter-insurgency has been waged not only against insurgents but also against civilians.744 Furthermore, the “social cleansing” of the urban poor in Davao City resulted in death tolls at a comparable scale. Both kinds of violence point to a key insight from this research: violence against a large number of unarmed, non-combatant and unaligned civilians is a common strategy for political gain. even in the absence of conflict 743 Tambiah borrows the famous (some argue misunderstood) turn of phrase about war, but applies it to collective violence. Stanley Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 223. 744 See Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, 401-02. 192 Examining each incident for its specific narrative – who committed violence against whom, and why – made it possible to discern how single occurrences were part of broader patterns: larger, sustained interests attributable to identifiable groups of national and local elites, who targeted what specific groups of people, in certain areas, and at certain periods of time. In recognizing these patterns of political violence, the specific nature of how violence escalated, de-escalated or ended often revealed actors and actions of considerable political power. 745 Analyzing the modulation of violence to lower or higher scales is a crucial innovation. This study accounted for observations of discernible and relative shifts in the use of violence, rather than absolute increases or decreases in the levels of violence. The four previous chapters trace central-local dynamics that explain political violence in the regions studied. Each case demonstrated the inter-relatedness of violence, the salience of local context, the importance of endings and significance of shifts in scale. Central actors were often involved in cases in which a significant change in the scale of violence occurred, whether escalation or de-escalation. Most episodes of violence were terminated by some form of decisive action from above, typically through the military. Violence was also de-escalated or curtailed by the withdrawal of support from the center or transference of central support. Finally, violence also ended at the initiative of local actors due to the consolidation of their primacy in their bailiwicks or because of intra-elite moderation. Inter-related types of violence. The inter-connectedness between different forms of violence is best conceptualized as a system in which changes occur to the system as a whole. A counter-insurgency campaign pits the military against armed 745 I adapt ideas on the dynamics of “endings” of mass atrocities; although these are at a much higher scale, the notion of analyzing how violence ends was a crucial insight. See ConleyZilkic, 5-6. 193 insurgents in a classic model of state violence. However, military encampment near or inside communities has often resulted in violent excesses. A poorly paid standing army has also supplied mercenaries and assassins for a thriving market for murder.746 Local political actors will also exploit opportunities to amplify their power from the military and gain an advantage over their opponents.747 In the crackdown on Hacienda Luisita labor protests, the central government involved the military under the pretext that the sugar plantation fell within the realm of a national security interest. Suspected military involvement in the assassination of union leaders and sympathizers were precipitated by “red baiting” and militarization under the guise of counterinsurgency. When the Cojuangco-Aquino dynasty fell out with President Arroyo, the continued military presence in the plantation under the famed “butcher” General Jovito Palparan was an ominous warning to the family. Lethal violence against activists took on a different meaning and shifted to a larger scale in terms of magnitude and location. Attacks against activists in the locale were part of a broader pattern of violence against leftist activists and community organizers across the country. Locality. Insurgency and elections motivated patterns of political violence across all the cases in this study. However, the central-local dynamics were distinct in each region because local politics, particularly structures of domination, change at a slower pace than national politics. Political dynasties could endure for decades, as exemplified by the old “Solid North” families in the Ilocos and Cagayan regions. Compared to the other regional groups in this study, the scale of the violence was low in Northern Luzon. In Southern Mindanao, the violent dispute over mining in 746 See for instance Cabreza, "This Business of Fixing Abra." See also Herman Kraft, "The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxilliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010). 747 Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence," 486. 194 Diwalwal is another example of a distinct regional context. Natural resource endowment is part of the geographic context of political violence. Under a weak state in which elites are predisposed to predatory behavior, the exploitation of resources is a strong motivation for violence. Violence escalated with the entry of the military as an enforcer of private control of wealth in the extractive industries elsewhere in the region. Indigenous lumad communities became targets for violence aimed at dispossessing them of their ancestral domain. Endings. Why does violence end? Generally, these cases of political violence lead to three main categories of termination: (1) the consolidation of a local actor’s dominance obviates the need for violence; (2) central support for violence is withdrawn or shifted to a rival; and, (3) a resolute, centrally directed effort at ending the violence or “crackdown”. In most cases in this study, violence ended when the central state took decisive, even forcible, action. For instance, the central government launched a crackdown on private armies in Abra province from 2004 to 2007, most notably the forces under the command of the Valera clan. The governor, Vicente Valera, had also fallen out with President Arroyo. In the case of the final crumbling of the Joson dynasty in Nueva Ecija province, President Arroyo may have tipped the balance in their opponent’s favor in the 2007 elections by deploying military personnel to the province. In contrast, the retirement of Chavit Singson from active political contests and his successful bargaining among other political families forestalled further bloodshed, which already had been scaling down during his final years in office. This is an example of how the consolidation of local dominance can transform dynamics and lead to non-violence—albeit effectively constraining democratic outcomes by gaming elections so that politicians run unopposed. Moreover, this dissertation offers evidence that the Philippine state is not simply 195 weak. When particularistic interests converge with the government’s statist aims, the state is able to act with strength and regulate political violence “in society”. However, there was one example in which the central government sought to break the local strongman’s hold and failed. When the alliance between Arroyo and Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte collapsed in 2007, she mustered a considerable amount of central power in an attempt to dislodge him. Arroyo encouraged the Commission on Human Rights to launch an investigation into the Davao Death Squad. Constrained by term limits in 2010, Duterte was vulnerable and ran as his daughter Sara’s vice mayor rather than seeking a more powerful congressional seat. Prior to the elections, Arroyo had eased Duterte out of national and regional appointments, appointed new military officials into Davao City and encouraged CHR investigations into the vigilante crimes linked to him. Arroyo endorsed the Dutertes’ rivals—giving them the support of the incumbent national party—yet she still failed to topple him from power. The vigilante violence in the city continued unabated, only diminishing in scale just prior to Duterte’s presidential campaign in 2016. Thus, the Davao City case also shows that while national level actors and resources usually tip the scales in favor of the center, other factors such as the uncertainty of elections mitigate and constrain central power. Under authoritarian rule, in comparison, Marcos possessed greater capacity to achieve his desired outcome vis-à-vis recalcitrant local bosses. Similar to any lame duck incumbent, Arroyo was furthermore hamstrung at the end of her final term. Scale. In understanding the temporal and geographic dimensions of political violence in these cases, it is necessary to use meaningful descriptors. In the database developed for this research, information on individual victims is captured as well as the specific details of the violence. Counts are thereby possible, giving an idea of how 196 the magnitude of violence changes over time and place. However, understanding patterns of violence required local context. The scale of violence is best understood within its specific milieu. For instance, while elections and insurgency produced violence in all the regions studied, the magnitude was lowest in Northern Luzon but highest in Southern Mindanao. Yet in all places, the scale of electoral violence was dwarfed by violence related to insurgency. This observation bears emphasis, considering that the scholarship on political violence in the Philippines concentrates on elections while insurgency normally falls under security studies. An important empirical problem that demanded explanation was the high scale of violence that was related neither to elections nor insurgency: anti-crime, vigilante violence in Southern Mindanao. Why did this type of violence emerge? Why was the scale so high and sustained over so many years? In the preceding chapter, I offer evidence to substantiate the argument that violence perpetrated in the name of eradicating crime in Davao City resulted from a specific political objective: Rodrigo Duterte’s aim to exert a monopoly of control over violence in the city. The Tagum City Death Squad was a pale imitation. Sidel and Hedman argue that vigilantism must be seen in the context of the longer history of “sub-contracted” state violence in the country.748 In other words, heavily armed groups have fought dirty fights against insurgents and other opponents at the government’s behest in the past. In the immediate post-Marcos period, these paramilitary vigilantes were aimed at the armed communist insurgency. From 2001 to 2003 in Gapan City, Central Luzon, the Red Vigilante Group (RVG) targeted criminals, ostensibly to amplify state force and assist with the peace and order 748 The authors make this observation in relation to anti-communist vigilantism that sprang to fore in the immediate post-Marcos period. Eva-Lotta Hedman and John Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2000), 57. 197 challenges of the government. An erstwhile rebel breakaway faction from the New People’s Army, the group claimed that this was part of their return to the fold, under the peace agreement with the state. The anti-drug vigilantism of the Davao Death Squad and Tagum City Death Squad likewise seemed to pursue a “public service” of ridding the cities of drug criminals. The city mayors in Southern Mindanao publicly endorsed the vigilantism (though stopped short of taking official responsibility). Unlike the RVG however, the Davao and Tagum city vigilante groups were operated by active duty police officers. A key feature in Davao City has been the identification of targets and the plausibility that they were criminal elements. Victims who confessed to drug use or crime and had surrendered to the police were often victimized. In addition, however, there were victims whose names had been on lists of drug peddlers, addicts and other alleged criminals. Village heads, police authorities, informants, neighbors and family members compiled these lists. As Kalyvas argues, if private information is used in determining who is punished and who is rewarded, political actors are able to use violence more effectively to control the population in a contested area.749 For a state determined to exert control over society, regulating urban slums requires personal knowledge generated through confession and from informants in the community. In this way, these ordinarily opaque sections of the population can be, as Scott puts it, legible.750 The most remarkable characteristic of violence for social control is the sheer scale of killing—offering clues to how tens of thousands could be killed in the first 18 months of the national “war on drugs”. On one hand, the scale of the violence in 749 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 12, 144-45. James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Scheme to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven Yale University Press, 1998), 77-80. 750 198 Gapan City was extraordinary enough to generate public alarm in Nueva Ecija and the neighboring province of Bulacan, where the bodies were often dumped. Yet the scale of the violence in Tagum City and Davao City were out of proportion compared to any violence at the hand of primarily local officials in this research. I argue that the violence at this scale was made possible by two factors. First, overt and covert instrumentalization of the police was key to making the strategy work. Police violence against civilians – criminals, suspects and otherwise – is not unique to Southern Mindanao nor the Philippines.751 Similar cases were documented in Northern Luzon, including the story of Mountain Province State Polytechnic student Stefen Galidan, who was killed in police custody.752 So the death squad killings appeared to be no more than casual violence experienced elsewhere and the numbers could rise without attracting immediate censure. Second, central support allowed the violence to escalate and continue unrelentingly especially in the Davao City case. In 2001, after about a dozen deaths in each of the two prior years, Davao City groups staged a public protest and the local lawyers’ association and the Commission on Human Rights decried the violence in the national media.753 It was only after Arroyo publicly endorsed Duterte and his methods that the upward shift in scale occurred. By 2004, an average of 100 people were killed by the Davao City Death Squad each year, with as many as 180 killed in 2008. For locally led campaigns of political violence to escalate, central actor participation was required. 751 Jyoti Belur, Permission to Shoot? Police Use of Deadly Force in Democracies (New York: Springer, 2010), 10; 26-27. 752 Vincent Cabreza and Kimberlie Quitasol, "Bontoc Outraged by Student's Killing," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 10, 2014. 753 Anthony Allada, "Davao Killings Alarm Lawyers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29, 2001. "Davao Becoming 'Salvage' Capital-CHR," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 26, 2001. 199 Synthesis. Why does political violence occur in a post-authoritarian democracy in the Philippines? This question has taken on a greater significance in light of the unprecedented state-sponsored violence of the Duterte government since July 2016. The central-local dynamics have changed, exhibiting greater centralization and authoritarianism, enabling a shift in scale of political violence. The period preceding the Duterte presidency, the focus of the empirical work in this research, adds to our understanding of why such a shift was possible. This study argues that central-local dynamics explain patterns of political violence. Statist aims and political actors’ personal ambitions motivate violence, and these machinations are enabled through the mobilization of central and local capacities for violence. In a weak state like the Philippines, the state’s predatory capability exceeds its developmental orientation. Capabilities include state security forces such as the military and police at various levels. These are comprised of locally stationed forces and those deployed ad hoc (e.g. during elections or specific security campaigns) as well as private armies, mercenaries, militias, and paid assassins. Two main patterns of political violence are discernable: electoral violence and insurgencyrelated violence. Two other categories are closely related: violence for wealth control and economic extraction, often masked as counter-insurgency; and violence for social control, for which the anti-crime rhetoric itself is often the mask. The main central-local dynamic is of accommodation between the central and local actors. This study illuminates how a weak state governs without a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence nor the illegitimate use of force. First, when particularistic interests are enabled by local capacity for violence, this is likely to result in political violence, typically cyclical around election seasons, locally contained and accommodated by central authorities. Rarely does the violence 200 escalate. When it does, and if local political actors antagonize powerful national actors, this will likely result in a centrally-led dislodgement or takedown of entrenched, local strongmen. A variant of this dynamic is that the state’s strategic interests diverge from the particularistic aims of local actors, making a takedown also a likely outcome. If statist, strategic aims are pursued by central authorities through security forces such as the military and police, as well as deputized militias, then political violence can be sustained over a long period and spread across political boundaries, escalating over time and across space in response to security threats. This is likely to result in a crackdown on state opponents, often by legitimate security forces but through illegitimate means. When particularistic and statist aims converge, however, this usually necessitates a central-local joint production of violence. When centrally led, it is typically for the purpose of resource extraction or exploitation. It can result in violence that is sustained and escalated against opponents of the exploitation, but localized at the site of economic extraction. When the violence is at the behest of local political allies, the center provides the “muscle” but the violence is episodic. Escalation and de-escalation turn on the longevity and exigencies of the alliance. When the violence is locally led, depending on the capacities of a private army or other form of locally organized force, violence can be sustained and escalated in the locale for as long as the central-local alliance holds and the relationship can be characterized as delegative in nature. However, when there is divergence between the state’s strategic interests and local actors’ particularistic motives, they may mobilize their respective capacities in an antagonistic manner. In a contest between a national leader and a local strongman, 201 the center will usually prevail. However, if the center is particularly weak under certain conditions—such as the final election of what amounts to a lame duck incumbency—the attempt may fail. President Arroyo was not in a good position to dislodge Duterte in 2010 for instance. Still, Duterte was forced to feint and dodge by running for a lower position in Davao City rather than a congressional seat, which was controlled by a rival political family. Arroyo’s relative weakness is more apparent when compared to her actions against entrenched strongmen at high points of her political strength: against Vicente Valera after ostensibly winning the 2004, for instance, and against Thomas Joson, in 2007. The Philippine state’s power was not absolute. Democratic institutions, even if flawed, imposed constraints. The next section compares the Davao City experience with the national “war on drugs”. I will show why the scale of the new violence can be explained by centrallocal dynamics, but only to a certain extent. The Philippines is currently undergoing a process of political transition. The dynamics specified in this dissertation operate within the context of democracy and a weak state plagued by centrifugal forces. Within a scant 18 months however, Duterte’s presidency has rapidly moved in the direction of centralized authoritarianism. Shock Therapy: Duterte’s War on Drugs On August 16, 2017, teenager Kian delos Santos was killed in Caloocan City, Metro Manila. According to the police, delos Santos was another drug crime suspect who was allegedly armed and put up a fight with arresting police officers.754 The boy would have been no different from the thousands killed at the hands of police officers 754 Officers before a Senate inquiry on August 24, 2017 admitted that they had only determined that delos Santos may have been a drug courier after he was killed. Camille Elemia, "Cops 'Confirmed' Kian 'Drug Ties' after Operation, through Social Media," Rappler August 24, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/179883-caloocan-police-confirm-kiandelos-santos-drug-ties-social-media. 202 and unidentified assailants had the moments prior to his death not been captured in CCTV footage. The video was made public, witnesses came forward to discredit the police version of the story, and the first major street protests against the president’s “war on drugs” took place in Manila. During this period, human rights groups made the highest claim of the death toll published so far: 13,000 killed by August, 2017.755 At the time, the official Philippine National Police claim of the number of “drug personalities who died in anti-drug operations” under the Duterte government was 3,811.756 Including an official count of deaths under investigation of possible vigilante killings, a credible low estimate on the lower end is 7,080 fatalities.757 With around 7,000 to 13,000 killed during the Duterte government’s first 13 months in office, it appears that Rodrigo Duterte’s tactic of extrajudicial killing in Davao City as mayor has been scaled up to the national level. Some features of the national “war on drugs” are familiar. There is Duterte himself, who had publicly said that the government would employ lethal force against suspected drug criminals on several occasions as candidate as well as president.758 The president’s threats resemble the radio and TV broadcasts that Duterte had aired as mayor, forewarning spates of vigilante violence in Davao City. In 2003, as the Davao 755 "Thousands Demand End to Killings in Duterte's Drug War," Al Jazeera August 22, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/thousands-demand-killings-duterte-drug-war170821124440845.html. The reference to 13,000 from August 2017 remained unchanged until the end of that year. However, unlike media monitoring sites that either reported specific information on victim names (when available), time and location, the supporting basis for the claim has not been made publicly available. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1003944/intl-localprofessors-verify-5000-deaths-in-ph-due-to-drug-war#Echobox=1529914664 756 From the period July 1, 2016 to August 29, 2017. Vera Files, "Vera Files Fact Check: PNP Chief Dela Rosa Understates War on Drugs Figures," Vera Files September 5, 2017, http://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-check-pnp-chief-dela-rosa-understates-war-dr. 757 Estimate for the period July 1, 2016 until January 31, 2017, based on official police statistics. Michael Bueza, "In Numbers: The Philippines' "War on Drugs"," Rappler December 12, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statisticsphilippines-war-drugs. 758 Martin Petty and Karen Lema, "Expecting Policy Speech, Filipino Businessmen Hear Duterte's Wartalk," Reuters, April 27, 2016. Phelim Kine, "The Philippines' Duterte Incites Vigilante Violence," Human Rights Watch Dispatches April 19, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/19/philippines-duterte-incites-vigilante-violence. 203 City Death Squad began scaling up its operations, a few dozen self-professed drug users and small time pushers gave themselves up to the city police out of fear for their lives. Under the Duterte presidency, the national police reported over a million people had “surrendered” or reported to police authorities in response to the anti-drug crime campaign by the end of 2016.759 As in Davao City, the profile of victims is mainly poor, young and male.760 Moreover, to bolster claims that the national “war on drugs” is waged against only the guilty, violence has been targeted at those who had earlier surrendered and confessed to crimes committed.761 As noted in the previous chapter, victims in Davao City included newly released convicts from prison, individuals with pending cases or those with a criminal record. However, despite superficial similarities in appearance and scheme, the sheer magnitude of the violence—not to mention the coerced surrender of over a million people to police authorities—reveals that the violence under the Duterte presidency is something new and unprecedented. From relatively low levels of violence during the preceding Aquino government, the scale of the violence under President Duterte has shifted upwards. Even if the comparison were narrowed to anti-drug crime campaigns, an average of three people were killed a month under the previous government.762 In the first six 759 Leila Salaverria, "More Than 1 Million Drug Users, Pushers Have Surrendered, Says PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer December 30, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/858077/more-than-1-million-drug-users-pushers-havesurrendered-says-palace. 760 "Philippines: Abusive 'Drug War' Targets Children," Human Rights Watch September 9, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/09/philippines-abusive-drug-war-targets-children. Al Jazeera, "Children and Duterte's Drug War: Lessons from the Past," Rappler February 19, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/161904-children-duterte-drug-war-lessons-past? 761 Jodesz Gavilan, "PNP Says Most Murder Victims Are Drug Personalities, Not Innocents," Rappler December 27, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/156770-pnp-murder-victimswar-drugs. Amnesty International, "If You Are Poor, You Are Killed: Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines' War on Drugs," (London: Amnesty International, 2017), 20-25; 34-5. 762 Citing police records from the last six months of the Arroyo government to the entire period of the second Aquino administration (January 2010 to June 2016), 256 were “killed in action” over 78 months. Vino Lucero and Malou Mangahas, "Big Kill of Small Fry, Puny 204 months of President Duterte’s term in office, an estimated 1,000 people were killed each month.763 Moreover, a Reuters investigative report of the national anti-drugs campaign observed that lethal force was used in 97 percent of drug crime related, shooting incidents involving the police in Metro Manila. 764 Most of the killings occurred between midnight and 3 am, in raids and drive-by shootings.765 Many bodies were simply found with hands or feet bound, heads wrapped in tape, and with a sign reading “drug pusher ako, addict ako—huwag tularan” (I am a drug pusher, I am an addict—do not end up like me). The massive shift in the scale of these killings is only half the story: in a remarkable contrast of political violence concentrations in the past, most of the killings have occurred in urban rather than in rural areas. An estimated 39 percent of those killed were in Metro Manila (National Capital Region) and 20 percent in nearby Central Luzon (20%), 10 percent in the industrial zones of Southern Tagalog or Calabarzon (10%) and 8 percent in the metropolitan area of Central Visayas (8%).766 Drugs Haul, Defies PNP Rules," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism July 25, 2016, http://pcij.org/uncategorized/big-kill-of-small-fry-puny-drugs-haul-defies-pnp-rules/. 763 Author’s calculation using data from July 2016 to January 2017. See graph “Killed during Police Operations vs Deaths under Investigation” in Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "PCIJ Findings: What's Flawed, Fuzzy with Drug War Numbers?," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism June 8, 2017, http://pcij.org/stories/pcij-findings-whatsflawed-fuzzy-with-drug-war-numbers/. 764 Clare Baldwin, Andrew Marshall, and Damir Sagolj, "Police Rack up an Almost Perfectly Deadly Record in Philippine Drug War," Reuters December 5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-police/. 765 Yvonne Chua, "War on Drugs: What the Numbers Show," Vera Files October 8, 2016, http://verafiles.org/articles/war-drugs-what-numbers-show. 766 ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group, "Map, Charts: The Death Toll of the War on Drugs," 2018, http://news.abs-cbn.com/specials/map-charts-the-death-toll-of-the-war-ondrugs.The count starts shortly before Duterte assumed office on July 1, 2016 likely due to pronounced violence in several areas as soon as his victory in the presidential elections became evident and continued until January 2018, without any indication of discontinuation. The other two main media monitors of the government’s “war on drugs” statistics ceased updating their counts: Philippine Daily Inquirer’s “The Kill List” on February 14, 2017; and, Rappler’s “In Numbers, The Philippines’ War on Drugs” on January 31, 2017, with one update for the period March 1 to April 23, 2017. Rappler Research Team, "Timeline: The PNP's Use of the Term 'Deaths under Investigation'," Rappler March 31, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/165534-timeline-philippines-pnp-deaths-under- 205 Almost 80 percent of the violence occurred in these locations (See Appendix 10). Specifically, fatalities were highest in the cities of Metro Manila and Cebu.767 The rural-to-urban, periphery-to-center inversion of political violence based on the data in this study surfaces when expressed as a ratio to the voting population. In Northern Luzon, an estimated six victims per 100,000 from the 2001 to 2016 data across all categories of political violence while under the Duterte presidency, the “drug war” related fatalities is slightly higher at a ratio of seven to the population. In Central Luzon, the violence was nine victims per 100,000 and is now 14. On the other hand, in less densely populated, less urbanized areas, the violence is much lower now than before. In Eastern Visayas, the ratio was 12 per 100,000 population and now is only two to 100,000; in Southern Mindanao, the ratio was 26 per 100,000 and now is only three per 100,000.768 At a meeting in Manila on August 12, 2017, President Duterte was reportedly overheard telling Indonesian President Joko Widodo that he learned from the “Petrus” killings during the authoritarian regime of former president Suharto.769 In 1983 and 1984, an estimated 2,000 or 3,000, perhaps as many as 10,000 killings, occurred in Jakarta and other major cities in a clandestine anti-crime operation later known as Petrus (a portmanteau from Penembak Misterius, or mysterious shootings).770 Over these two years, state-sponsored death squads roamed the cities at night, targeting investigation; "The Kill List," Inquirer.net July 7, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/794598/kill-list-drugs-duterte. 767 Ronald Mendoza and Miann Banaag, "Epicenters of Fatalities in Drug War: Metro Manila, Cebu Top List," Rappler December 19, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/thoughtleaders/155983-epicenters-fatalities-drug-campaign-december-2016. 768 Author’s calculations. 769 The story was related by Political, Legal and Security Affairs minister Wiranto, himself a Suharto era general and army commander. Jakarta Post, "Duterte Inspired by 'Petrus'Wiranto," Philippine Daily Inquirer August 16, 2017, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/159756/rodrigo-duterte-wiranto-petrus-mysterious-shootingspenembakan-soeharto-joko-widodo-extrajudicial-killings-war-on-drugs. 770 "Shooters in the Dark," Tempo Magazine 23, no. VIII, https://papindo.wordpress.com/2008/02/08/soeharto-killings/. 206 criminals, gang members or ex-prisoners. The targets were removed from the scene to maintain an image of order, usually taken to a quiet place and shot at close range, and later staged in public areas as a spectacle for all to see that the targets had been truly eliminated. 771 Reported crime, particularly cases of violent crime, dropped significantly following the Petrus operation.772 President Suharto subsequently stated in his 1989 biography that this campaign of mysterious shootings was meant as “shock therapy” for the general public to appreciate the power of the state.773 Another comparison is with the “war on drugs” in 2003 in Thailand. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra pursued a bloody anti-drug crime campaign that resulted in an estimated 2,800 fatalities in the first three months.774 The police drew up blacklists of suspected drug traffickers using information obtained from village heads. Each province set targets for the number of arrests within the three-month deadline. Police were incentivized with bonuses for arrests and threatened with removal if targets were unmet. The cumulative death toll was publicly announced daily, at an average of 30 deaths a day. A pattern emerged in the killings of a lone gunman shooting the victims from a motorcycle—“the classic style of professional hits.”775 At the height of the slayings, polls showed 60 to 90 percent public approval and the extra-judicial killings might have continued regardless of investigations by the National Human Rights Commission until the king intervened and put an end to it.776 771 Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," Indonesia 66, no. October 1998 (1998): 18. 772 "Shooters in the Dark". 773 Translated into English and quoted in "Suharto Authorized the Death Squads," TAPOL Bulletin February 1989, 1. 774 "Thailand's 'War on Drugs'," Human Rights Watch March 12, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs. 775 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, Thaksin (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2009), 160-62. 776 Ibid.166-67. 207 Like the Indonesian and Thai cases, President Duterte’s “war on drugs” exemplifies the political use of a ‘social problem’ to justify violence. Unlike the Philippine case however, neither Suharto nor Thaksin required these drastic anticrime campaigns as a foundation for their political dominance. The Petrus killings may have been aimed at eliminating or subordinating organized crime.777 The Thai crackdown on drugs was only one part of Thaksin’s populist politics of reform, which was mainly oriented toward the economy.778 It is unlikely that an acute public emergency is the primary motivation for the Philippine anti-drugs operation. The claims that Duterte has made about the magnitude of drug crime incidence are spurious and omit the considerable decline in illegal drug use since 2004. 779 Moreover, as this study shows, Duterte wielded violence for political control in Davao City, for influence within Southern Mindanao and for leverage against the center, or what he called “Imperial Manila”. As a new president, the promise to use violence to curb crime was a principal element of his approach to government. Davao City is the template. Duterte’s aim is to consolidate a stronghold in national politics, with a strategic interest in subordinating other centers of coercive force, including in illicit trade, and a particularistic interest in quickly enlarging the projection of his power from his bailiwick in the south. A thousand murders a month was the shock therapy needed to condition the populace to a new kind of politics. Yet the logistics of killing thousands of young men and boys would be a complex endeavor. Sheila Coronel argues that this was possible only because the 777 Barker, 28-29. Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 226-38. 779 Lucero and Mangahas. See also Manuel Quezon, "Opinion: Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug Statistics," ABS-CBN News October 5, 2016, http://news.abscbn.com/blogs/opinions/10/04/16/opinion-lies-damned-lies-and-drug-statistics. 778 208 national police was a “ready, willing and able killing machine”. She argues that Duterte’s drug war was enabled by existing forms of routine police corruption780 A Human Rights Watch investigation documented many cases in which the police killed alleged drug criminals, and then later staged the crime scene with planted weapons, spent ammunition and small quantities of prohibited substances to falsely claim selfdefense.781 In the three decades since the overthrow of Marcos, politicians have been reliant on illegal gambling syndicates for campaign finances. The national police fused legitimate force with corrupt control over the illicit economy and routinized brutality as an extension of presidential power.782 The “war on drugs” also reverses the reliance of regional and provincial police directors on local elected officials for resources and appointments. The president is appointing “trusted” representatives to key positions throughout the country and is strengthening their incentives to follow the chain of command, beginning with the top police officials at the national headquarters.783 The subordination of local officials to central power is exemplified by highly public attacks against municipal mayors accused of being petty drug lords. Barely over a month into his presidency Duterte began brandishing a list of local officials, judges and police officers, who he claimed to be drug lords or protectors of crime lords.784 The process of determining the list has been opaque and the contents of the lists are not fully public. Some high-profile 780 Sheila Coronel, "Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in Duterte's War on Drugs," in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency, ed. Nicole Curato (Quezon City: Atenedo de Manila University Press, 2017), 169. 781 "License to Kill: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte's War on Drugs," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2017), 38-41. 782 McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, 533-34. 783 Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines," 20. 784 "The Duterte List: Judges, Mayors, Police Officials Linked to Drugs," Rappler August 8, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/142210-duterte-list-lgu-police-officials-linked-drugs. Pia Ranada, "Duterte to Mayors on 'Final' Drug List: Resign or Die," Rappler January 10, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/157815-duterte-threat-mayors-final-drug-list. 209 violence of targets on this list include a Maguindanao mayor killed in a shootout at a police checkpoint in October 2016, a Leyte province municipal mayor shot dead while in police detention a week later, and a Mizamis Oriental mayor massacred with 14 members of his family in a police raid of his home in July 2017.785 Another scheme of centralization is manifested in police intelligence bypassing provincial and municipal officials to generate lists of purported drug offenders directly from barangay or village leaders.786 An Amnesty International investigation and anonymous police sources have claimed that the police national headquarters provides cash incentives for drug war murders under the table. Around PhP 8,000 (US$160) to PhP 15,000 (US$300) for drug pushers, rapists, pickpockets, gang members, alcoholics, “and other troublemakers” is paid per head, and distributed throughout the local police unit.787 The payment per individual killed may have been a key mechanism driving the high number of murders. When the police involvement in the kidnapping and murder of a South Korean businessman in January 2017 was publicly exposed, the president temporarily suspended the “war on drugs”—and the violence turned off like water from a tap—indicating central control and direction.788 The scale of the killing and evidence of police involvement have sparked fears that the Philippine National Police 785 "Albuera Mayor Espinosa Killed in Jail Operation," Rappler November 5, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/151353-albuera-mayor-rolando-espinosa-killed-jail. Katerina Francisco and Jodesz Gavilan, "Timeline: Parojinog, from Duterte's Narco List to a Bloody Raid," Rappler August 1, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/177238-timelineparojinog-ozamiz-duterte-drug-list-ozamiz-raid. 786 Jayson Lamcheck, "A Mandate for Mass Killings? Public Support for Duterte's War on Drugs," in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency, ed. Nicole Curato (Quezon City: Atenedo de Manila University Press, 2017), 210-13. 787 See also Amnesty International, 29-30. Manuel Mogato and Clare Baldwin, "Special Report: Police Describe Kill Rewards, Staged Crime Scene in Duterte's Drug War," Reuters April 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-policespecialrep/special-report-police-describe-kill-rewards-staged-crime-scenes-in-dutertes-drugwar-idUSKBN17K1F4. 788 Avendano and Cabreza., “Aquino on New Mining EO”. 210 has become the president’s personal killers and that extrajudicial killing has been institutionalized. However, paying attention to the central-local dynamics of the violence reveals that while the government may be projecting a strong, centralized state, authoritarian consolidation is not a fait accompli. First of all, while the police as an institution has been mobilized and the violence is widespread, it should be recalled that the great concentration of violence is in a few densely populated, urban areas. Kreuzer also observes that there is significant variation between regions with regard to the share of the violence committed in on-duty police shootings and those attributed to unidentified vigilantes. He argues that in areas where the level of police violence is high, like Central Luzon, the violence is likely to be under police control. On the other hand, where violence is mostly attributed to vigilantes like the Ilocos and Cagayan regions in Northern Luzon, local elites may be tolerating or even supporting vigilante violence. 789 He notes that the provincial police chief and the elected governor of Bulacan province are Duterte allies, possibly explaining the heightened scale of police killings there. In contrast, the Tarlac provincial governor and congressional representative are aligned with a rival national party, allowing the police director to “drag his feet with respect to the new policy”.790 Even in areas where the police are suspected of being responsible for lethal violence during police operations as well as masked vigilantism, much of the violence can be attributed to only specific police precincts.791 During the height of the lethal violence from July 2016 to January 2017, the officers who formed the core of the 789 Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines," 11. Ibid.18-19. 791 Investigative journalists reported this finding after examining police records from July 1, 2016 to January 1, 2017 in Quezon City. Patricia Evangelista, "This Is Where They Do Not Die," Rappler November 25, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/188904-impunity-series-police-killingsquezon-city-ejk. 790 211 anti-drug unit in one such precinct, Batasan Station 6 in Quezon City, were from or near Davao City. According to a Reuters investigative report, six officers were transferred to Quezon City from Southern Mindanao when Duterte assumed the presidency. 792 They called themselves the “Davao Boys”, spoke Visayan and remained aloof from rest of the precinct and local community. According to the report, police precinct records show that the group was involved in a majority of the lethal drug crime-related shootings. After 13 months, the unit leader was promoted to the elite Criminal Investigation and Detection Group reporting directly to National Police chief Ronald dela Rosa – the highest-ranking “Davao Boy”.793 The national deployment of police officers with experience in Davao City and nearby underscores how the Philippine “war on drugs” might actually rely upon a small group of people. The police may have also “outsourced” the violence to paid assassins, a practice allegedly employed in the past by the Davao City Death Squad.794 Rather than a total instrumentalization of the national police as an entire institution, top to bottom, these methods also indicate an intention to exaggerate the breadth and scope of this “war”, as part of Duterte’s shock tactics. 792 Clare Baldwin and Andrew Marshall, "Special Report: How a Secretive Police Squad Racked up Kills in Duterte's Drug War," Reuters December 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-squad/special-report-how-a-secretivepolice-squad-racked-up-kills-in-dutertes-drug-war-idUSKBN1ED1KZ. 793 National police chief dela Rosa was Davao City police chief from 2012 to 2013, and held several senior postings in Southern Mindanao provinces of Compostela Valley and Davao del Sur. Bea Cupin, "Duterte's 'Bato': Who Is Ronald Dela Rosa?," Rappler May 19, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/133519-ronald-dela-rosa-duterte-pnp-chief. 794 Coronel, "Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in Duterte's War on Drugs," 175. Also Jonathan Head, "Philippines Drugs War: The Woman Who Kills Dealers for a Living," BBC August 26, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37172002. 212 War on Drugs, War on Democracy The Duterte government deploys violence for political control, not against illegal drugs. The rhetoric on eradicating drug crime is but a fig leaf. The government’s narrative goes like this: its campaign against illegal drugs is anti-crime and targets people who are most probably criminals. Therefore, they argue that this “war” is legitimate, it is a top national priority, it makes society safer, and it is progress from previous governments’ ineptitude. The president has mobilized the country’s security apparatus to make state power immediate to the population. Because suspicion is based on lists of offenders that provided by neighborhood and village officials, the threat of violence is personal. With the nightly killings, people are habituated to an excessive use of state force and supposed vigilantism. At the top, the efficacy of a purported anti-drugs campaign has been effective in neutralizing opposition. Most notably, Duterte and his allies tarred his most vocal critic in the senate, Leila de Lima, with the same brush of suspected drug-related crime.795 This purported anti-crime campaign must thus be understood alongside Duterte’s attempts to consolidate political control. In the first 18 months of government, the president has imposed a state of national emergency since September 2016 and placed a third of the country under martial law. Duterte has even tried to sweeten the memory of dictatorship via the rehabilitation of the legacy of Ferdinand Marcos. Yet the most instructive comparison is with former president Gloria Arroyo, who was in office from 2001 to 2010. Fending off impeachment proceedings for electoral fraud, Arroyo employed repression, including the use of violence, against 795 "Senator Leila De Lima Arrested," Rappler February 24, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/161278-leila-de-lima-surrender-drug-charges. 213 dissidents and activists. When Arroyo attempted to suspend civil liberties, opposition coalesced quickly such that she could only declare a state of national emergency over a 10-day period in 2006, and in a restricted area, Maguindanao, in 2009. In contrast, Duterte has victimized thousands of mainly young, urban poor, imposed martial law in Mindanao and has kept the entire country under a state of national emergency since his second month in office. Duterte's repertoire of political violence is unprecedented. Yet his use of a violent anti-crime campaign as a pretext for total control is an unmistakable refrain from his time as mayor of Davao City. The national “war on drugs” is a campaign of state terror. Its strategic purpose is not to combat the drug trade but rather to control the population and contain dissent. Compared to the Marcos dictatorship, the Duterte regime needs to maintain the façade of democracy—for now. Building directly on his long experience in Davao City, he has learnt from Arroyo’s example not to launch a frontal assault but instead attack Philippine democracy’s vulnerable flank: crime and corruption. 214 BIBLIOGRAPHY "Abelardo Ladera: The Hero of Luisita." Bulatlat.com (2005). Published electronically March 12, 2005. http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/03/12/abel-ladera-the-hero-of-luisita/. Abinales, Patricio. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000. 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Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2006. 221 "CHR Joint Resolution Cases No.: XI-2014-2159 to 66 DO Re: Case of Hentry Buduan, Domingo Estrada, Franklin Estrada, Jessielyn Bybay, Arthur Baltazar, Rodolfo Gogo, Felix Pequero, Virgilio Baquiano." Commission on Human Rights, October 28, 2004. "CHR Memorandum Re: Study/Analysis of Reported Political Killings." 2006. "CHR Memorandum Report Re: More Killings in Kalinga." 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No. III-01-2227 Re: Killing of Henry Marin and Arnold Mendoza." Commission on Human Rights, March 5, 2008 "CHR Resolution Case No. R III-Pi-2004 Re: Alleged Violent Dispersal of Strikers in Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City ". CHR, November 16, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.:08-02-09 Re: Alberto Ocenar and Roberto Cabueños." Commission on Human Rights, September 9, 2002. "CHR Resolution Case No.:08-2002-08 Re: Bernardino G. Guiuan." Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2002. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-01-36 Re: Ssgt. Luceno P. De Guzman et. al.". Commission on Human Rights, September 14, 2001. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-02-59 Re: Mahayahay Mahaplag Ambush Re: Killing of Msg Alex Ajenga et. al.". Commission on Human Rights, February 18, 2003. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-19 Re: Celso Tabucao, Jr.". Commission on Human Rights, May 22, 2003. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-30 Re: Killing of Nine (9) Persons at Sitio Mahayahay, Brgy. San Isidro, Kanaga, Leyte." Commission on Human Rights, December 11, 2003. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-19 Re: Murder of Atty. Feledito C. Dacut." Commission on Human Rights, June 3, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-20 Re: Alfredo Davis." Commission on Human Rights, June 28, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-27 Re: Murder of Rev. Edison Lapuz." Commission on Human Rights, July 19, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-37 Re: Ryan Cabrigas, Dalmacio S. Cepeda, Jr., Benedicto Gabon." Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-38 Re: Marlo Ocasla." Commission on Human Rights, October 6, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-003 Re: Rosalita Sale." Commission on Human Rights, September 26, 2002. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-006 Re: Rosa Guadiana." Commission on Human Rights, June 15, 2003. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-VIII-2012-0436 Re: Yono C. Cabadongga." Commission on Human Rights, May 21, 2013. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 2008-0102 Re: Jaime A. Nebril." Commission on Human Rights, June 24, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0277 Re: Mateo Biong, Jr." Commission on Human Rights, August 17, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: CHRP VIII-05-48 Re: Alrico Barbas et. al." Commission on Human Rights, December 14, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2268 Re: Cristina R. Orcino and Zacarias A. Ayroso for Forcible Abuction." Commission on Human Rights, November 17, 2003. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2294 Re: Wilfredo Mananghaya for Homicide." Commission on Human Rights, May 2, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-05-2675 Re: Victorina M. Gomez." Commission on Human Rights, July 30, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-2010-0187 Re:Unlawful Killing of Pascual Guevarra." Commission on Human Rights, June 7, 2012. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-2011-0032 Re: William C. Cortez for Torture." Commission on Human Rights, May 16, 2011. 222 "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-05-2679 Re: Leodegario M. Punzal for Violation of Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 6 ICCPR." Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-05-2680 Re: Killing of Federico De Leon for Violation of Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 9 ICCPR." Commission on Human Rights, July 17, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2750 Re: Benedicto B. Magdaong." Commission on Human Rights, February 1, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2751 Re: Killings of Ricardo Valmocina, Roel Joseph Valmocina, Melchor Cardinal, Michael Milanay, Manuel Avila Jr. And Enforced Disappearances of Reyante Valmocina and Robin Solano." Commission on Human Rights, April 11, 2012. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2760 Re: Ronald C. Intal for Abduction and Enforced Disappearance." Commission on Human Rights, August 1, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2770 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Manuel Sioson, Jr.". Commission on Human Rights, January 14, 2013. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2774 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Rogelio Concepcion." Commission on Human Rights, March 28, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2779 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Emerito Lipio." Commission on Human Rights, March 16, 2011. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2780 Re: Tirso M. Cruz (Extra-Legal Killing)." Commission on Human Rights, January 19, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2789 Re: Orlando M. Rivera." Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2807 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Eddie Pornellos and Junior Pornellos." Commission on Human Rights, April 17, 2012. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2816 Re: Abduction and Enforced Disappearance of Domingo Guinto, Avelino Interior and Virgilio Tranquilino." Commission on Human Rights, August 7, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2881 Re: Myra Joson Valdez, Complainant, Versus Rudy Mendoza et. al. Respondent." Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2926 Re: Antonio D. Adriales." Commission on Human Rights, July 31, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-Lo-05-2676 Re: Ricardo S. Ramos." Commission on Human Rights, June 21, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-W-06-2778 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Sherilyn Cadapan, et. al.". Commission on Human Rights, March 6, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-02 Re: Jose A. Ducalang." Commission on Human Rights, January 4, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-36 Re: Constancio Calubid, Ismael Solayao." Commission on Human Rights, September 1, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-04 Re: Renato Dizon et. al." Commission on Human Rights, March 20, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-12 Re: Noel Labong, Levi Labong." Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-48 Re: Norman Bocar." Commission on Human Rights, March 26, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-53 Re: Eddie R. Albay." Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-24 Re: Dominador De Luna." Commission on Human Rights, November 7, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-25 Re: Augusto Daclitan." Commission on Human Rights, August 16, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-27 Re: Charlie Solayao." Commission on Human Rights, October 16, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-28 Re: Rogelio B. Picoy." Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2007. 223 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-32 Re: Feliciano Labrador et. al.". Commission on Human Rights, August 10, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-41 Re: Vivincio L. Ellantos." Commission on Human Rights, October 8, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-44 Re: Bonifacio Dunghit." Commission on Human Rights, February 22, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-47 Re: Alipio Tagle." Commission on Human Rights, November 5, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-54 Re: Elizabeth M. Gutierrez." Commission on Human Rights, January 2, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0074 Re: The Killing of Sgt. Reynaldo Bantayan." Commission on Human Rights, April 29, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0075 Re: Pepe Legria." Commission on Human Rights, April 9, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0079 Re: Alberto Calzado, Sr.". Commission on Human Rights, February 14, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0080 Re: Rufino G. Silla and Rufa Joy S. Silla." Commission on Human Rights, March 13, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-81 Re: Felomino G. Catambis." Commission on Human Rights, April 29, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0087 Re: Celestino P. Almerino." Commission on Human Rights, May 14, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0111 Re: Leopoldo Fernando." Commission on Human Rights, July 18, 2011. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0115 Re: Rafael Papiona, Arnuldo Mabesa and Romeo Vencio." Commission on Human Rights, March 3, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0119 Re: Oscar Laboc." Commission on Human Rights, January 23, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0121 Re: Rogelio Dacutanan." Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0122 Re: Jonathan T. Dacutanan." Commission on Human Rights, December 24, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0123 and Final Report Re: Noel Versoza Alias Twin and Boranting." Commission on Human Rights, March 23, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0124 Re: Lindon Pacon "A.K.A. Boranting"." Commission on Human Rights, May 20, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0126 Re: Roberto A. Cabaljo." Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0139 Re: Noe Pagarao." Commission on Human Rights, November 7, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0140 Re: Ernesto General." Commission on Human Rights, April 28, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0168 Re: Arturo Gabiana." Commission on Human Rights, October 7, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0170 Re: Pedro Dacles." Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0174 Re: Generoso Labong." Commission on Human Rights, October 12, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0002 Re: Guilermo Robin." Commission on Human Rights, January 23, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0324 Re: The Killing of Rev. Fr. Cecilio P. Lucero." Commission on Human Rights, October 19, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0446 Re: Michael Oñate." Commission on Human Rights, August 19, 2011. 224 "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0447 Re: Arturo Pasacas." Commission on Human Rights, September 13, 2011. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0448 Re: The Killing of Manuel A. Daza." Commission on Human Rights, August 12, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0489 Re: Romulo Mendova." Commission on Human Rights, November 4, 2009. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0011 Re: Dr. Bartolome M. Resuello." Commission on Human Rights, April 22, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0027 Re: The Alleged Killing of Jojo Basiloy and Jerwin Marino." Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0135 Re: Domingo De La Cruz, Junie De La Cruz and Mylene De La Cruz." Commission on Human Rights, May 4, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0307 Re: Geronimo E. Tan." Commission on Human Rights, September 17, 2011. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0233 Re: Reynaldo S. Uy." Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0318 Re: Sonny Boy Dacles." Commission on Human Rights, December 28, 2011. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII- 2010-0144 Re: Caesar Y. Vicencio." Commission on Human Rights, May 12, 2010. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-001 Re: Extra-Judicial Killing of Jose Maria Cui." Commission on Human Rights, March 19, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez." Commission on Human Rights, February 19, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-59 Re: Sgt. Jose Baccol." Commission on Human Rights, December 28, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2290dc, Case No.: XI-04-2297dc Re: Death of Allen Tecson." Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2298dc Re: Death of George Albores." Commission on Human Rights, October 11, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2308dc Re: Death of Abraham Aquino." Commission on Human Rights, February 9, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2321dc Re: Death of Johnny "Jack-Jack" Moñeza." Commission on Human Rights, October 17, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2322dc Re: Death of Zandro Bajala." Commission on Human Rights, August 11, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2388dc Re: Case of Risalito Abellana." Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2389dc Re: Death of Alacel Jumat A.K.A. "Robot"." Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2390dc Re: Case of Jason Dela Cerna." Commission on Human Rights, September 8, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2394dc Re: Death of Leo Baogbog." Commission on Human Rights, January 27, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2396dc Re: Case of Glen Mulle." Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2397dc Re: Death of Hilario C. Ortega." Commission on Human Rights, November 8, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2398dc Re: Death of Reynaldo Adolfo." Commission on Human Rights, November 20, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong Gonzales Alias "Pasmo" Tn: Roberto Gonzales." Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2401dc Re: Case of Dante Galarce." Commission on Human Rights, September 20, 2006. 225 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2403dc Re: Death of Ruel Andia." Commission on Human Rights, August 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2404dc Re: Death of Cesarlito A. Tagod." Commission on Human Rights, September 22, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2405dc Re: Case of Tata "Hudas" Toco/Charwin Tuco (Tn)." Commission on Human Rights, August 3, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2413dc Re: Death of Joel Castro." Commission on Human Rights, August 29, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2458dc Re: Death of Richard Padua." Commission on Human Rights, August 31, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2491dc Re: Death of Julius Antido." Commission on Human Rights, November 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2613dc Re: Abduction of Lowell Labajo." Commission on Human Rights, September 2, 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2641dc Re: Death of Romeo Hingcuy." Commission on Human Rights, February 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2715dc Re: Case of Andrew Mendez and Rexol Cabras." Commission on Human Rights, April 12, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2718dn Re: Death of Rey Lumiguid." Commission on Human Rights, September 4, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2735dn Re: Case of Jomar Escobar." Commission on Human Rights, August 8, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2744dn Re: Death of Noel Omos." Commission on Human Rights, August 23, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2764dc Re: Case of Boyet Abella." Commission on Human Rights, November 26, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan." Commission on Human Rights, August 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2778dn Re: Case of Jessie Opalla." Commission on Human Rights, June 16, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2779dn Re: Death of Enrique Catito." Commission on Human Rights, September 7, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2781dc Re:Death of Maturan, Ramil." Commission on Human Rights, June 5, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2787dc Re: Death of Sasam Manuel." Commission on Human Rights, June 29, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2805dn Re: Death of Armando Pawakil." Commission on Human Rights, October 31, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro Palin Gumela." Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2808dn Re: Case of Ronnie Aquino." Commission on Human Rights, August 31, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2882 Ds Re: Death of Racasa, Ronel." Commission on Human Rights, June 30, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2946 Ds Re: Death of Renato "Atong" Torrecampo Pacaide." Commission on Human Rights, August 13, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2983dc Re: Death of Julius Gumba." Commission on Human Rights, June 10, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2984dc Re: Death of Godofredo Guritan." Commission on Human Rights, December 22, 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3017dc Re: Case of Pacana, Jorie." Commission on Human Rights, July 7, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3019 DO Re: Death of Elvis Española." Commission on Human Rights, July 10, 2008. 226 "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3041dc Re: Death of Celso Pojas." Commission on Human Rights, November 10, 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2014-0004dn Re: Death of Butalid, Rogelio E. "Tata"." Commission on Human Rights, February 11, 2014. 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Private Armies and Guerrilla Fronts Region Number of Local Private Armed Groups 0 Number of Insurgent Guerrilla Fronts 0 5 4 4 0 - Cagayan Valley Central Luzon Calabarzon Southern Tagalog/Mimaropa Bicol Western Visayas Central Visayas Eastern Visayas Western Mindanao 4 3 7 4 2 11 8 6 8 1 2 2 0 11 13 6 7 2, no data on MNLF/MILF high insurgency intensity* Northern Mindanao 0 3, no data on MNLF/MILF medium insurgency intensity* Southern Mindanao Sockskargen 0 4 11 3, no data on MNLF/MILF high insurgency intensity* Caraga Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 0 41 5 No data; high insurgency intensity* National Capital Region Northern Luzon - Cordillera Autonomous Region - Ilocos Sources: Local private armies: Mendoza, Gemma. "85 Armed Groups Maintained by Politicians-PNP." Rappler (2012). (accessed November 27, 2014). Number of Insurgent Guerrilla Fronts: "The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Knowledge Management Division, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns, 2003. *Alternate source based on number of armed encounters between government and insurgents: Bautista, Cynthia. Ideologically-motivated Conflicts in the Philippines: A Background Paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005. Diliman, Quezon City: Human Development Network, 2005. 253 Appendix 2. Political Violence by Region and Pattern 2001 to 2016 Regional Group Total Victims Insurgencyrelated Electionsrelated Wealth controlrelated Social controlrelated Unknown Northern Luzon Eastern Visayas Central Luzon Southern Mindanao Totals 327 149 137 11 18 12 323 224 48 9 40 2 541 325 67 58 76 15 699 386 29 43 227 14 1890 1084 281 121 361 43 254 Appendix 3. Political Violence by Type of Incident 2001 to 2016 Type of Incident Total 1651 Northern Luzon 299 Eastern Visayas 274 Central Luzon 440 Southern Mindanao 638 Killing Forced Disappearance 108 4 30 54 20 Attempted Killing 80 20 12 21 27 Rape/Torture 51 4 7 26 14 Total 1890 327 323 541 699 255 Appendix 4. Political Violence by Target 2001 to 2016 Target Total 561 Northern Luzon 34 Eastern Visayas 86 Central Luzon 133 Southern Mindanao 308 Civilians w/ no known political affiliation Military/Police 373 81 97 36 159 Insurgents 354 48 29 172 105 Local Officials 336 128 59 96 53 Activists 216 30 48 85 53 Journalists 27 6 2 8 11 Others/Unknown 23 0 2 11 10 Total 1890 327 323 541 699 256 Appendix 5. Political Violence by Known or Suspected Aggressor Percentage share (%), 2001 to 2016 Aggressor All Regions 32% 25% 14% 9% 9% 7% Military Insurgent Unknown Vigilante Local official Police Private armed group/assassin Civilian Totals Aggressor Military Insurgent Unknown Vigilante Local official Police Private armed group/assassin Civilian Totals Aggressor Military Insurgent Unknown Vigilante Local official Police Private armed group/assassin Civilian Totals 4% 1% 100% Northern Luzon 23% 25% 15% 0% 21% 6% Aggressor Military Insurgent Unknown Vigilante Local official Police Private armed group/assassin Civilian Totals 10% 0% 100% Eastern Visayas 35% 39% 7% 1% 7% 7% Aggressor Military Insurgent Unknown Vigilante Local official Police Private armed group/assassin Civilian Totals 5% 0% 100% 257 Central Luzon 45% 12% 15% 6% 9% 9% 2% 2% 100% Southern Mindanao 24% 29% 15% 20% 4% 5% 2% 0% 100% Appendix 6. Political Violence in Northern Luzon 2001 to 2016 Year Insurgency related 10 17 14 1 28 17 5 2 1 2 12 13 3 11 7 6 Election related 15 4 8 17 9 9 20 9 1 15 0 7 8 8 1 6 Other patterns 2 0 2 3 3 4 0 2 2 1 1 5 1 3 0 0 Unknown 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Annual Total 27 21 25 22 42 30 28 13 4 18 13 26 13 25 8 12 Total 327 149 137 29 12 0 0 1 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 Insurgency-related Violence Only, in Northern Luzon, by Administrative Region Annual Total Year Cordilleras Ilocos Cagayan 2001 10 0 5 5 2002 17 0 7 10 2003 14 10 4 0 2004 1 0 0 1 2005 28 9 11 8 2006 17 3 5 9 2007 5 1 1 3 2008 2 2 0 0 2009 1 0 0 1 2010 2 0 0 2 2011 12 11 0 1 2012 13 11 0 2 2013 3 2 0 1 2014 11 11 0 0 2015 7 2 5 0 2016 6 0 0 6 Total 149 62 38 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped 258 49 Appendix 7. Political Violence in Eastern Visayas 2001 to 2016 Year Insurgency related 11 14 28 2 45 20 36 15 12 29 3 8 0 1 0 0 Election related 14 3 0 6 0 1 10 0 7 0 1 0 4 1 0 1 Other patterns 2 6 3 9 5 1 6 3 2 5 3 3 0 0 1 0 Unknown 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Annual Total 27 23 31 17 50 22 52 18 21 34 7 11 5 3 1 1 Total 323 224 48 49 2 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped 259 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Appendix 8. Political Violence in Central Luzon 2001 to 2016 Year Annual Total Election related Wealth Control Social Control Unknown 42 45 86 29 88 96 20 20 20 29 30 12 3 4 8 9 Insurgency related 16 30 73 17 64 70 6 7 13 10 17 2 0 0 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 3 4 8 3 1 15 10 4 1 3 0 7 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 9 18 2 1 6 1 10 1 1 0 1 5 0 22 10 3 0 4 3 3 2 4 5 11 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 1 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 Total 541 325 67 58 76 15 Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped 260 Appendix 9. Political Violence in Southern Mindanao 2001 to 2016 Year Annual Total Insurgency related Election related Davao City DDS (Author’s data) Davao City DDS (CASE data**) 1998 -- -- -- --- -- 2 1999 -- -- -- -- -- -- 16 2000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11 2001 70 53 0 1 16 0 16 29 2002 45 29 1 3 12 0 1 59 2003 96 72 1 1 22 0 19 98 2004 65 33 5 1 25 1 23 107 2005 70 28 1 5 33 3 33 154 2006 49 15 1 6 25 2 14 65 2007 30 11 4 2 11 2 7 116 2008 45 28 2 14 1 14 180 2009 49 17 2 3 26 1 22 100 2010 40 26 9 0 5 0 3 101 2011 34 12 4 16 2 2 111 2012 16 7 1 3 4 1 0 61 2013 13 4 1 4 4 0 1 101 2014 39 34 2 3 0 0 0 53 2015 30 16 0 2 11 1 10 60 2016 8 1 1 3 3 0 2 -- Total 699 386 29 43 227* 14 167 1,424 Wealth Control -- Social Control Unknown -- Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped * Includes 167 in Davao City and 28 in Tagum City ** Coalition Against Summary Executions (CASE). 261 Appendix 10. Fatalities in “War on Drugs” May 10, 2016 to 31 December 2017 REGION National Capital Region (Metro Manila) Northern Luzon • Cordillera Autonomous Region • Ilocos Region (R1) • Cagayan Valley (R2) Central Luzon (R3) Calabarzon (R4 A) MIMAROPA (R4 B) Bicol Region (R 5) Western Visayas (R6) Central Visayas (R7) Eastern Visayas (R8) Zamboanga Region (R9) Northern Mindanao (R10) Southern Mindanao/ Davao Region (R11) Socccsksargen (R12) Caraga (R13) ARMM Negros Island Region TOTAL Source: ABS-CBN 262 Number Killed 1665 Percentage 39% 43 204 129 861 432 7 112 41 364 49 51 54 1% 5% 3% 20% 10% 0% 3% 1% 8% 1% 1% 1% 85 89 67 19 52 4324 2% 2% 2% 0% 1%