Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
www.elsevier.com/locate/aos
The construction of a social account:
a case study in an overseas aid agency
Brendan OÕDwyer
*
Department of Accountancy, Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business, University College Dublin, Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
This paper presents a case study examining the evolution of a social accounting process in an Irish overseas aid
agency, the Agency for Personal Service Overseas. Much of the corporate rhetoric surrounding social accounting
processes simplifies their complex nature and tends to downplay many concerns as to how they can effect ÔrealÕ organisational change and empower stakeholders. The case exposes this complexity by illuminating the contradictions,
tensions and obstacles that permeated one such process. The paper contributes to the recent increase in field work in the
social accounting literature, called for by Gray [Account. Orga. Soc. 27 (2002) 687], which seeks a richer, more in-depth
understanding of how and why social accounting evolves within organisations.
Ó 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
This paper presents a case study examining a
social accounting process in an Irish overseas aid
agency, the Agency for Personal Service Overseas
(APSO). The case examines how and why the social accounting process evolved within APSO
focusing in particular on the extent of stakeholder
empowerment within the process. This exposes the
complexities and obstacles encountered during the
stakeholder engagement and social account construction phases of the process.
Several social accounting scholars contend that
formal social accounting processes should enhance
corporate transparency and accountability by creating ‘‘a new internal visibility of the workings
of. . . organisation[s]’’ (Owen, Gray, & Bebbington,
1997, pp. 191–192) in order to empower stake*
Tel.: +353-1-7168038; fax: +353-1-7168814.
E-mail address: brendan.odwyer@ucd.ie (B. OÕDwyer).
holders ‘‘to seek more benign organisational
activity’’ (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, & Zadek,
1997, p. 329, see also, Adams & Harte, 2000;
Bebbington, 1997; Gray, 2000, 2002; Hill, Fraser,
& Cotton, 1998, 2001; Larrinaga-Gonzalez &
Bebbington, 2001; OÕDwyer, 2001, 2003; Owen
et al., 1997; Owen, Swift, Humphrey, & Bowerman,
2000; Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001; Thomson &
Bebbington, 2004; Unerman & Bennett, 2004).
Recent social accounting practice also purports to
concern itself with accountability, transparency
and stakeholder empowerment (Adams, 1999, 2002,
forthcoming; Cotton, Fraser, & Hill, 2000; Dawson, 1998; Elkington, 2001; Gray, 2001, 2002; Gray
et al., 1997; Kent, 2002; Owen et al., 2001; Raynard, 1998; Zadek, 2002). Despite widespread
calls in the literature for richer, more in-depth
and sustained examinations of the emergence of
social accounting processes (Gray, 2002; Thomson
& Bebbington, 2004), in particular the role and
involvement of stakeholders therein, few studies of
0361-3682/$ - see front matter Ó 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.aos.2004.01.001
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B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
this nature have been conducted. Notwithstanding
this lack of in-depth empirical insight, widespread
suspicion has been expressed in the social
accounting literature about the extent of the role
played by stakeholders in these processes (Gray,
2000, 2001; Owen et al., 2001; Thomson & Bebbington, 2004). There have been suggestions that
stakeholder engagement exercises often constitute
little more than management control devices used
by organisational managers to manage external
pressures threatening key organisational objectives
(Adams, 2002; Belal, 2002; Dey, 2002a; Gray, 2000,
2001; OÕDwyer, 2002; Owen et al., 2000, 2001).
It has also been maintained that stakeholder empowerment can only evolve if institutional reforms
enabling stakeholders to participate more directly
in organisational decision making accompany these
ÔnewÕ accounting processes (Adams, forthcoming;
Owen et al., 1997, 2000, 2001; Owen et al., 2000;
Owen et al., 2001).
This paper responds to the aforementioned calls
for richer, more in depth understandings of how
and why social accounting processes emerge within
organisations (Gray, 2002; Thomson & Bebbington, 2004). By presenting an in-depth examination
of one social accounting process in action it also
represents a rare attempt to empirically inform the
suspicions surrounding the nature and extent of
stakeholder involvement and empowerment within
these processes. This examination was conducted
using in-depth interviews with a broad range of
participants in the process (including board
members and internal and external stakeholders),
internal memoranda and other documents, press
releases, and observations recorded by the author
while acting as a member of the audit review panel
for the social account published from the process
(see Appendix for further details surrounding the
data collection and analysis). 1
1
Fifteen interviews were held over a fourteen month period
with board members, operational managers, representatives
from four of the seven stakeholder groups identified in the
social accounting process, social accounting process facilitators
and researchers, and members of the social accounts audit
review panel. Within the case interviewees are identified as
follows: B ¼ board member; M ¼ operational manager;
IS ¼ internal stakeholder; ES ¼ external stakeholder.
The case proceeds in a chronological fashion.
Firstly, a brief outline of the nature of APSOÕs
organisation is presented. The process through
which social accounting was initially considered by
APSO is then outlined. External pressures for
greater accountability fuelling this choice are
examined and conflicting/confused motivations
regarding the key process objectives are exposed.
An analysis of the dynamics within the stakeholder
engagement process then ensues. This exposes
tensions and flaws in the process involving issues
such as stakeholder identification, stakeholder
power, and stakeholder/management antagonism,
all of which coalesce to deflate much of the initial
optimism among key drivers of the process. The
APSO boardÕs belated entry into the process at the
account construction stage is subsequently scrutinised. Here, we observe the boardÕs assertion of
authority over the social account presentation
which acts to undermine the core ‘‘accountability’’
motives driving some of the internal promoters of
the process. The case proceeds to examine the
perceived absence of post account reflection and
action by the APSO board and management in
response to stakeholder concerns raised in the account. The change-resistant nature of the board,
in contrast to their published commitment to
accountability and change, is thereby uncovered.
The case concludes with a discussion of the key
findings before making some brief policy recommendations.
The case setting
The Agency for Personal Service Overseas
(APSO) is an independent agency operating under
the aegis of the Irish GovernmentÕs Department
of Foreign Affairs. It is a non-profit organisation
focused on human development, operating as part
of IrelandÕs international co-operation programme
with so-called developing countries and is funded
by an annual grant-aid from IrelandÕs bilateral aid
allocation. 2 The Agency was incorporated in 1974
2
Grant aid in 2001 totaled approximately €14 million.
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
and until recently its mandate remained unchanged as outlined in its mission statement:
The mission of APSO is to contribute to sustainable improvement in the living conditions
of poor communities in developing countries
by enhancing human resources, skills, and local capacities in the interests of development,
peace and justice (APSO, 2000, p. 4).
The Agency pursues this mission by enabling
skilled people from Ireland and developing countries to transfer and share skills and knowledge
and by supporting organisations and communities
in developing countries to work towards self-reliance and sustainability. It provides funding
and training services to Irish and international
non-governmental development agencies for their
personnel. APSO responds to skills needs in:
education; health; administration; technical areas;
and social science and agriculture. As part of its
support of development outside Ireland it has become actively involved with local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community
development initiatives.
The Agency has a separate chairperson, chief
executive and company secretary. An eleven
member board of directors is appointed by the
Irish Government Minister for Foreign Affairs.
They meet approximately six times a year and
serve in a voluntary capacity. The AgencyÕs head
office in Dublin employs 32 individuals.
The initial elevation of social accounting in APSO
Perceived pressure to learn about APSO’s
‘performance’
With the instigation of a new board in 1995,
there was pressure to engage in some soul
searching regarding APSOÕs role and performance. It appears that the organisation (through
the board) needed some reassurance as to its
‘‘performance’’ to satisfy both external (governmental) and internal (board) constituents, particularly with increased governmental funding
coming on stream for IrelandÕs foreign aid pro-
281
gramme. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also
wanted APSO to contribute to the development
of criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the
foreign aid programme. 3 One board member
discerned a general ‘‘rise in requirements for
accountability and transparency’’ (B1) which
meant that in future APSO would have to ‘‘justify itself’’ (B1) given ‘‘question marks [which
were being raised] about the viability of [APSO]
placing personnel overseas to work on development projects’’ (B1). In effect, APSO was now
going to have to ÔaccountÕ for its ÔperformanceÕ in
some explicit manner.
Given the specific nature of APSOÕs work and
the difficulties inherent in measuring what it did
objectively, the need for some form of qualitative,
subjective ‘‘participatory’’ (ES1), and accountable
assessment was widely perceived:
[The Board] were looking for a way of assessing APSO on a qualitative basis because what
APSO does is hard to measure. . . you can say
Ôwe sent ten aid workers out to GambiaÕ but
you canÕt actually measure [their impact]. . .
itÕs tough to do. (IS2)
The Board was finding it quite difficult to get
a handle on how do we represent what the
agency does, the overall quality of the agency
and its work. . . Given the rise in requirements
for accountability and transparency, we envisaged someone asking: is APSO any good anyway? (B2)
External consultants were commissioned by the
board to examine the quality assessment models
available. The board publicly stated that they required a model enabling ‘‘self assessment, organisational learning and improvement’’ (APSO, 1998,
p. 6). They eventually decided that the production
of some form of social account would help achieve
these objectives. After a tendering process, an
external consultant with experience developing a
3
This information is gleaned from internal board meeting
memorandums and communications between board members
as well as interviews with board members and internal
stakeholders.
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seminal social accounting process was appointed
to oversee the account production.
The social accounting process adopted (as outlined in Table 1) closely followed the relatively
sophisticated model adopted by Traidcraft Exchange (see Gray et al., 1997, pp. 344–347), a sister
organisation of Traidcraft plc, the UK Third
World Fair Trade organisation. Traidcraft plc
published the first independently audited set of
social accounts in 1993 and has consistently represented the ‘‘cutting-edge’’ of social accounting
practice in the UK (Dey, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). This
practice is built around the notion of polyvocal
citizenship introduced by Gray et al. (1997). A
polyvocal citizenship perspective (PCP) focuses
on stakeholder dialogue ‘‘providing each of the
stakeholders with a ÔvoiceÕ in the organisation’’
(Gray et al., 1997, p. 335). Stakeholder groups
identify their key issues of concern and the
emerging social account primarily reports their
voices.
A seven step process was adopted by APSO
and focused on identifying key stakeholders and
ascertaining their assessment as to how the
organisation fulfilled its objectives 4 (see Table 1).
As with Traidcraft Exchange, the process was
subject to an external audit by a financial auditor. One manager and another external consultant (the Ôinternal championsÕ) were appointed to
promote the process within APSO and to provide
ongoing support to the social accounting consultant. The external consultant acting as an internal
champion had been heavily involved in the initial
search for a process to evaluate APSO and was
the individual who first presented the possibility
of adopting social accounting to the board. The
board publicly stated that the process would enable APSO to ‘‘measure and account to its
stakeholders the extent to which it ha[d] achieved
its own objectives and realised its values’’ (APSO,
1998, p. 42).
4
As part of the process, the identified stakeholders were also
asked to identify the criteria by which they believed APSO
should be evaluated.
Confused board expectations of the social
accounting process
While there was a definite desire among certain
board members, especially the chairman, to instigate some form of evaluation process within
APSO, there seems to have been little clarity of
purpose internally regarding exactly what form the
social account would take and how it would impact on APSOÕs ongoing operations. The internal
champions sensed that some board members
‘‘didnÕt have a clear vision of what they wanted’’
(M2) and that ‘‘APSOÕs CEO was edgy about the
process’’ (M1). One board member admitted that
the full implications of implementing the process
were not fully thought through. Indeed, in correspondence prepared by the board in response to
the eventual publication of the social accounts the
board complained about the process not being
easily understood.
I suppose, naively, at the back of my mind I
had an idea that perhaps the social accounting
process would be at least a step in the right
direction towards some form of change, in
terms of some consistency to what we were
doing, also giving us an overall picture rather
than a few sort of hit and miss looks at various things in different countries. (B3)
Some form of evaluation or ÔaccountingÕ
mechanism was deemed necessary but board control of the process was an implicit assumption
among many members.
It was an example of people putting forward
proposals as to how to do things and somebody else not being able to think of any good
reason to object. (B3)
This uncertainty led to divergent expectations
of social accounting among board members, many
of whom already had a fractious relationship with
one another due to business and development
world philosophies clashing regularly at meetings.
Several stakeholders (both internal and external)
contended that while ‘‘one or two’’ (IS3) board
members seemed committed to a process of open
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
283
Table 1
Key elements of the APSO social accounting method adopted
1.
Establish the value base
What are the social objectives and ethical values against which APSO will measure its performance?
2.
Define the stakeholders
Who are the key groups of people who can influence or are influenced by APSOÕs activities?
3.
Establish social performance indicators
Stakeholder participation in determining the appropriate indicators for measuring APSOÕs performance is required
4.
Collect the data
Use of interviews, externally facilitated discussions, postal questionnaires, monitoring media responses, and
independent opinion surveys
5.
Write/construct the accounts
The social accounts will be prepared and written by APSO. This is analogous to the practice in financial accounting
6.
Submit the accounts to independent external audit
A financial auditor is appointed to head the process. Will apply general auditing standards to determine if the
accounts are relevant, understandable, reliable, complete, objective, timely, and consistent, and whether in his
opinion, they give a true and fair view of APSOÕs ethical performance and impact on its stakeholders in the period
reviewed by the accounts
7.
Publication
The social accounts report, including the auditorsÕ report is published and distributed to all key stakeholders
Source: APSO (1998, p. 42).
dialogue with stakeholders centred on contributing
to some form of organisational change, most
members perceived the process as a legitimation
exercise focused on maintaining the status quo:
I think maybe it was a core objective that we
would be going through a process which
would represent APSO as being a viable,
healthy organisation at the end of the day. I
donÕt think it was envisaged that any of the
Ôwarts and allÕ would really come up. I donÕt
think that was really addressed initially. . . I
donÕt think it was thought about. (M1)
For example, one head office staff member
commented that the underlying tension surrounding the process motives meant that initially
‘‘there was not any great leadership in the process
[at board level]’’ (IS4). He contended that for some
board members the process was perceived as enabling the board to publicly present APSO as
being committed to evolving and learning from its
ÔstakeholdersÕ while in reality there was ‘‘no genuine desire to learn’’ (IS4). The maintenance of
the legitimacy of APSOÕs operations in the eyes of
the Department of Foreign Affairs was deemed the
primary objective.
I think it was seen as a positive exercise by
some members, as a way of presenting APSO
as. . . being a learning organisation. (B3)
Discussions around the process at board level
aggravated tensions between board members with
business and development backgrounds. One of
the internal champions felt that business members
were overly focused on pushing their own experiences in commercial organisations, which she felt
was highly inappropriate as they viewed the process as a crude control mechanism. For her, they
were concerned with ‘‘evaluation’’ while social
accounting was concerned with ‘‘accountability’’:
I remember thinking, Ôthis is all very vagueÕ
and nobody had any vision and they were
all talking about their own organisations,
going on like Ôthis is how we do evaluations,
and this is how we do everything elseÕ. . . and
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I remember thinking, this [social accounting]
is very different, it isnÕt quite evaluation. . .
they had never heard of social accounting.
(M2)
Internal championing of social accounting as
an accountable organisational change mechanism
The internal champions were much clearer
about the role of social accounting. They were
excited and optimistic due to their perception of its
potential to bring about some ‘‘badly needed
change’’ (M2) within APSO. The internal champion who had initially suggested the process to the
board felt it was ‘‘philosophically’’ right for the
organisation:
I felt that the process could. . . [help]. . . APSO
reinvent itself and stimulate thought about
where we [we]re going, and what we [we]re
about. . . I thought this would be a good
way of seeing what needed to be done [using]
a strong voice from [our] stakeholders. . . in a
qualitative way. . . and it was very much that
it was a qualitative methodology. . . as I come
from that way of thinking. (M2)
Well, I would have been quite excited and idealistic. . . I was optimistic, if you like, that this
was an opportunity to present a Ôwarts and allÕ
picture. (M1)
a clear idea of what the stakeholders wanted.
And that it was a very fair way of introducing
change into the organisation. Now I would
have to be honest and say that I also felt that
APSO needed change. (M2)
I had this vision. . . that everybody would be
involved, it would be a very dynamic thing
. . . that all the people in APSO with different baggage would come together in this
process. . . I actually had a vision of them all
working together. . . And this would be a
way of involving the staff in the process
of change within APSO. . . I have to be
straight about that, I do see social accounting as a means of bringing about change.
(M3)
Whatever the tensions surrounding the motives
driving the process, the subsequent publication
of the reasons for selecting social accounting
were unambiguous. A commitment to creating an
open and accountable dialogue with all key stakeholders regarding the organisationÕs performance against its stated mission and objectives (as
well as objectives to be specified by the stakeholders consulted) and the facilitation of change based
on this dialogue was explicitly promoted (see
Table 2).
The evolution of stakeholder ‘‘dialogue’’
Several operational managers and other internal stakeholders spoke of the initial infectious
energy behind the process and the impression that
it was innovative given APSO was apparently
expressing a commitment to learning from ‘‘people
on the ground’’. Some praised the boardÕs ‘‘bravery’’ as there was an underlying sense that latent
frustration among stakeholders would be allowed
to leap forth into an account committed to
bringing about change. This initial positive view
was aided by the internal championsÕ commitment
to making the process work for APSOÕs stakeholders:
I felt social accounting was really going to
consult with stakeholders. And then you had
Stakeholder selection––denying key external
‘‘voices’’
The initial stages of the process focused on
identifying APSOs key stakeholders (see Table 1).
However, early in the process widespread concern
emerged due to a failure to identify local communities in developing countries (or their representatives) as key stakeholders. While the
engagement process involved consultation with
service providers who were directly provided with
assistance by APSO it deliberately excluded the
‘‘the key people in the village[s] or in the hospital[s]
in developing countries’’ (M2). Hence, key stakeholders, if not the key stakeholders without a voice
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
285
Table 2
The APSO boardÕs publicly expressed motives for instigating the social accounting process
It focuses on the qualitative aspects of the work of the organisation
It identifies and consults all the stakeholders
Stakeholders define the performance indicators
It is transparent
It will be published
All staff members will be involved––it is not for management only, every staff member is actively involved in the process
It facilitates change––all are involved in learning
It relates to all aspects of the organisation
Source: APSO (1998, p. 6), emphasis added.
prior to the instigation of the process remained
unheard and were therefore denied any possibility of participating in or influencing any form
of transformation in their relationship with
APSO.
The stakeholders identified were ÔconvenientÕ,
there was no attempt to address the concerns
of the people on the ground in Africa, those
being taught in various areas, the Africans
themselves. (ES1)
They [the local communities in Central Africa] are who we are trying to empower to build
their organisations and build their capacities
and make them sustainable so. . . they should
be the main stakeholder. (IS4)
One operational manager was incensed with
what she perceived as a ‘‘quality brainwash’’ (IS2)
which overtook the process focusing on the
voices of various agencies and NGOs while
appearing to have little concern for the voices of
the local people she felt APSO was supposed to
serve.
I remember saying to a lot of quality people
initially, Ôhow do you get the voice of the person on the north bank in the river Gambia. . .
where do the people in the village come into
the scene. . . the people who actually benefit
from the work of APSO? (IS2)
When the board became aware of this, some
members were alarmed and expressed their reservations to the social accounting consultant.
The board were. . . concerned that we must get
to the key stakeholders at the end of the day
and the key stakeholder is the person in the
developing country. (B2)
This issue caused severe tension between the
board and the consultant with the latter writing to
the board seeking to reassure them by indicating
that as APSO did not have a ‘‘direct’’ accountability relationship with local people on the
ground in developing nations they did not need to
consult them. Effectively, he argued against identifying the final recipients of APSOs services as
stakeholders. The board remained unconvinced
but resisted interfering in the consultantÕs work for
fear, according to one board member, of being
perceived as attempting to dictate the ongoing
consultative process.
A flawed ‘dialogue’––power relations, mistrust
and cursory ‘consultation’
The ensuing dialogue with identified stakeholders was severely criticised by those involved.
For many, APSOÕs ‘‘unremitting power’’ over its
stakeholders operating in developing countries
rendered the pursuit of an open, critically focused
dialogue impossible. It was repeatedly highlighted
by interviewees that as most of APSOÕs key
stakeholders were totally dependent on APSO for
assistance and resources they were unlikely to engage in a process where they might criticise and
potentially alienate ‘‘the only hand that feeds
them’’ (IS1). Hence, the process was accused of
failing to ‘‘deal adequately with the power asymmetries involved’’ (ES1):
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A number of sending agencies are absolutely
dependent on APSO for funding, they are
not going to say something thatÕs going to
cut off their nose to spite their face. . . Also,
the beneficiaries, including the local organisations,. . . even if they had question marks
about the usefulness of the skills of the development workers being recruited they will not
complain as they depend on them. (ES3)
There is that power relationship between the
funder and the funded and the extent to which
people feel that they can criticise is severely
compromised. . . overseas partners will [therefore] tell you what you want to hear. (ES2)
Furthermore, there was widespread resistance
to engagement by internal stakeholders. An
antagonistic relationship pervaded between certain
head office staff and APSO management and there
was ‘‘a lot of distrust [of management]’’ (IS5).
Many head office staff complained of an embedded
management myopia prior to the inception of the
social accounting process and they openly questioned the publicised motives surrounding it.
Hence, they had little faith in the process as a
means of instigating change and felt that there was
little to be gained from their participation. This
severely restricted the potential for open dialogue
with these stakeholders with just ‘‘over 50 per cent
of the head office staff respond[ing]’’ (M2) to
questionnaires issued:
There was a cynicism among staff regarding
the actions of management in APSO and their
motivation for the process. . . the response
rate was very low. (M2)
One senior staff member was particularly animated. He castigated in rather intemperate language what he saw as the dubious motives for the
process. For him, it was merely aimed at political
constituencies in the Irish government who had the
power to change APSOÕs remit and smacked of a
cynical legitimation exercise concerned with preventing as opposed to facilitating change. This
absence of trust destroyed any possibility of a
‘‘constructive’’ interchange between the consultant
and internal champions, who were perceived as
representing the board, and head office staff.
The capacity of the consultative process to
encourage meaningful dialogue between the organisation and its stakeholders was continually criticised by the stakeholders interviewed. Many felt
the dialogue was restricted by primarily exploring
perceptions as to how APSO fulfilled its mission
and objectives, however defined. One external
stakeholder felt this ‘‘tend[ed] to limit the potential
for exploring new ideas’’ (ES2) as problems
stakeholders may have been interested in discussing could not be considered. There was a perception among some stakeholders that the consultant
‘‘rushed’’ the consultations and produced ‘‘homogenised’’ questions which were often totally
inappropriate for different stakeholder groups,
particularly given the cultural differences encountered. Many stakeholders did not feel ‘‘involved’’
enough in the process:
If the process was a vibrant dynamic process
it would have involved the stakeholders on a
more long term basis. . . not just one consultation and one questionnaire that you filled out
in twenty minutes. . . they [stakeholders]
should be involved and have a right to poke
their noses in as to where the results were
going and what was being done. . . I saw it
as a dynamic process that didnÕt just happen
and then end. (M2)
Several stakeholders complained they had little
opportunity to engage in dialogue with each other.
It was widely claimed that stakeholders needed to
learn from each other across the organisation as
opposed to merely enabling the board to learn
from them and then isolate them. The information
flows were only going one way, from the stakeholders to the board, with little apparent prospect
of a two-way dialogue emerging:
Ideally social audit 5 should be about the
organisation learning and organisational
learning means throughout. . . For that to
5
Note that many interviewees referred to the social accounting process as ‘‘social audit’’.
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
happen I think you would need to have some
of the relevant people at different levels meeting with their relevant stakeholders for their
level. . . staff people not only management
level. (IS2)
The production and management of the social
account
The production of the initial social account was
undertaken in a hurried manner under pressure
from the board. They began to feel alienated from
the process especially when they realised that the
consultant had not identified them as stakeholders.
Immediately, they changed from a passive observer
of the stakeholder engagement process, evidenced
in their earlier reluctance to interfere when concerned about stakeholder identification, to an active participant in the social account production.
Asserting board authority over the social account
The board began to take a more active critical
role in the process prior to the preparation of the
first account draft. While one board member felt
that ‘‘the symbolism of the board not getting involved initially was important for the process in
general’’ (B1), this hesitancy gave way to concerns
that they were left without a voice in the ongoing
dialogue. Many board members could ‘‘not get
[their] head[s] around why they werenÕt considered
a stakeholder. . . they wrestled with this over and
over again and could not figure out what role they
had within [the process]’’ (B2). Some felt their
involvement was crucial in order to provide a
balance to the perspectives being considered.
There was a general view that they had ceded too
much control to the consultant and the internal
champions:
We were not getting enough information. . .
[and] as we got information there was a sense
Ôsurely all of this is about balance and where is
the balance?Õ The board can be an element in
the balance. . . it might have been given a
voice as just another stakeholder and that
might have had a balancing element. (B3)
287
The consultant was summoned to formally address the board to reassure them of the progress of
the process and in particular to explain to them
why they had a non-participatory role in the initial
stakeholder dialogue. He reminded them of the
model they had formally approved and claimed
they could not interfere with its implementation
without threatening its credibility:
I think they [the board] were more or less beaten into submission in the end. . . it added to
the confusion the board had regarding the
process and what to do about it. (M1)
Eventually, in order to alleviate the festering
concern, a board subcommittee was formed to
receive and comment on the initial account draft:
It was a bit late in the staged process that was
being worked through that the board decided
to set up a committee to receive the output of
the exercise. . . there was some concern about
the apparent sidelining of the board in the
process. . . you were being told there was a
model and an approach and you couldnÕt
start affecting the methodology. (B2)
Seeking to influence the social account
The board subcommittee put ‘‘pressure. . . on to
deliver an early draft of the accounts’’ (M1) and
this created further tensions between the board
and the consultant and internal champions. A
draft was ‘‘poorly prepared. . . under duress’’ (M2)
and submitted but ‘‘most [board members] found
[the content] totally confusing’’ (B2).
The nature of the initial draft surprised and
shocked many board members. There was significant unease with the subjective nature of the reported perspectives despite this being a key
reason for initially selecting the process. It was
widely perceived that ‘‘. . . the agenda appeared to
have been too big’’ (B2). Some board members
had met other international aid body leaders at
conferences and these individuals had expressed
concern that APSO risked ‘‘being torn to shreds’’
(B1).
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B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
The board had expected to get more feedback
on the impact of what we [APSO] are doing
and the objective impact of what we are doing
rather than peopleÕs impressions on what was
happening. (B2)
The overly negative nature of the perspectives
caused particular unease. APSO came in for heavy
criticism from some stakeholder groups. Many
board members were not prepared for the sheer
extent of this exposure of stakeholder concern.
Their published desire for a ‘‘warts and all’’ report
did not anticipate such open hostility:
The Board had not fully considered the possibility of what the process might throw up. . .
There was quite a bit of shock [among the
board] in the social audit process in that there
was a lot of negativity coming back at them. . .
[For example,] there was a fair amount of
frustration among development workers. (B3)
The board subcommittee felt compelled to force
their way into the process in order to influence the
nature of the reporting of stakeholder voices. They
met the consultant and internal champions and
demanded that the social account be re-written:
They threw it [the draft] back at us and said
Ôthis is a load of garbageÕ. . . They were perfectly right. . . it was a complete mish mash
of statistics and figures. (M1)
Underpinning their anxiety was the consultantÕs
reminder that by committing to the complete
process, they had consented to the account being
published externally. Some members were extremely reluctant about ‘‘sign[ing] off’’ on the account and a heated debate ensued. Many were
worried that ‘‘somebody whose interests l[ay]
elsewhere c[ould] manipulate th[e] information and
use it for whatever reason’’ (B2). The internal
champions felt betrayed by this turn of events:
A few things popped up regarding whether
the document should be published or not,
whether it should be internalised which defeated the whole process in my view. (M1)
Perceived manipulation and control of the social
account
The boardÕs interference became common
knowledge among certain internal and external
stakeholders and they felt aggrieved. One stakeholder claimed that ‘‘management put their own
spin on the results [of the dialogue]’’ (IS5) and
accused them of suppressing some of the more
critical perspectives. 6 This perception alienated
many stakeholders and further highlighted the
mistrust of management that persisted among
some stakeholder groups:
A first draft of the social accounts came out
and then a second draft. . . there was quite a
strong degree of dissatisfaction that it
had been sanitised from draft 1 to draft 2.
(ES2)
Management probably controlled the wording. . . looked for negative stuff and then
downplayed it to an extent. . . major critics
were only cursorily addressed. (ES1)
The boardÕs attempt to wrest control of the
account escalated during the audit review process
instigated prior to account publication. One
external stakeholder claimed that the audit review
panel was carefully selected so that the process of
approving the final account could proceed without
any major challenges. Another claimed she was
deliberately dropped from the audit review panel.
She was extremely angry and insisted that this was
a deliberate way of excluding a critical voice from
the process as she might raise serious questions
about its integrity and refuse to ‘‘rubber stamp [the
report]’’.
Much to my surprise and to many othersÕ surprise. . . I was removed from the process. I was
6
Correspondence examined indicates that one chapter of the
initial draft of the social accounts was excluded from the final
draft on the advice of the board as they deemed it to be more
akin to advisory data to the board on APSOÕs information
systems.
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
one of two trained social auditors in the country. . . it was extraordinary. (ES5)
Other audit review panel members were also
unhappy with the boardÕs evident control over the
process at this final stage. The focus on process
detail as opposed to more substantive issues surrounding the findings at the audit review panel
meeting troubled some members. Furthermore,
others expressed surprise and suspicion at being
called into the process at such a late stage. Indeed,
the external auditor referred to this in his subsequent management letter to the board.
It was fairly obvious there was some board
agenda surrounding the [audit review] process. (ES3)
It was initially suggested at the review panel
meeting that the external auditorÕs report be addressed to the board (i.e. not the identified stakeholders). Some members of the review panel
(including the author of this paper) strongly objected to this given the purported objective of the
process was for the board to account to the
stakeholders and not vice versa:
At the external review panel meeting. . . as far
as I can remember, initially our report was
going to be addressed to the board. I said Ôlisten you might as well forget the whole process
if you are going to do this because it is a report. . . to the stakeholdersÕ. (ES6)
It was evident at this stage that the external
consultant was now almost exclusively acting on
the instructions of the board subcommittee and
the board had taken effective control of the account presentation.
The black hole––substantive feedback deficiency
Feedback to stakeholders post account publication was crucial if any change in how APSO dealt
with its identified stakeholders, which management
publicly claimed the process was about, was to
ensue. While they did wrest control of the account,
289
the board still allowed many negative perspectives
to be reported. The role of the external auditor
in ensuring this occurred was crucial. However,
there was a widely perceived absence of board
commitment to embedding a two-way dialogue
with stakeholders regarding potential changes that
could arise from acting on the account content.
Repeated reference was made by both internal
and external stakeholders to the stakeholder perspectives disappearing into a ‘‘black hole’’ never to
emerge for substantive consideration or further
consultation which might facilitate some challenges to the status quo in APSO. One staff
member claimed the ‘‘board were very defensive
and did not take the accounts very seriously at
all’’ while ‘‘they were taken more seriously by
staff’’ (IS2) and other stakeholders who had
contributed as they were keen for some form
of change. Several stakeholders claimed they
learned little about how APSO proposed to instigate change on their behalf and felt this reflected
an ‘‘accountability deficiency’’ (IS4) in the process.
The results could have brought about change
through [continuing] dialogue but they werenÕt really taken on board, they were taken
on board superficially. It didnÕt challenge
enough. (ES2)
While the idea is good, while it is adventurous, while it is representative of a forward
thinking organisation concerned with stakeholders, without ongoing dialogue it doesnÕt
actually change anything. People can say they
have done something but actually nothing
happens. (IS2)
Certainly from how I thought about it [social
accounting] from when I set out. . . it failed.
And that would be one of my big questions
about social accounting, is that you can actually go through the process, because I have
now gone through it, and it hasnÕt challenged.
(M2)
The aforementioned mutual mistrust between
many staff members and management was seen to
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B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
have influenced this poverty of managerial feedback. Several interviewees felt the ‘‘embedded’’
communication difficulties within APSO were
reflected in the lack of substantive feedback.
For the board, publishing the account seemed
to have constituted the key ÔeventÕ as opposed
to responding to its contents on an ongoing
basis.
[There was] very poor communication in
APSO anyway and the accounts came out
and there was a lack of feedback and a lack
of reaction which made staff even more angry
and more cynical. (M1)
It hasnÕt made this organisation a better
organisation. . . and issues, for example,
around internal communication, around
staff appraisal have not changed, so I would
be quite disillusioned [with the process].
(IS4)
When challenged in their interviews, some
board members conceded that feedback could
have been better given ‘‘it was unsystematic [and] a
little bit haphazard’’ (B2). However, one member
insisted that ‘‘feedback was not ignored’’ (B1) and
that efforts were made to address some concerns
addressed in the accounts. Given a commitment
had been made to undertaking the process a second time he claimed there was a sense that ‘‘weÕd
better make sure that something [i]s done in the
meantime’’ (B1). 7
A whole range of changes did take place. . . we
looked at all the systems, how people are handled from the time we recruit them to the time
we finish up with them, all those systems were
reviewed and we went back on them again to
see to what extent the change was implemented. (B1)
7
APSO undertook a much more focused and ‘‘cost-effective’’ process three years later. A social account was produced
in draft form but this has never been published. External
strategic reviews by consultants and a new strategic plan
superseded its contents.
Another board member commented that while
the process ‘‘alert[ed] the board to the need for
responding to feedback’’ (B3), acting on this was
problematic given the nature of the method chosen.
This was a constant refrain among board
members when discussing the perceived absence of
feedback. There was a sense that while they wanted to measure the qualitative nature of APSOÕs
performance the data produced was perceived
as too ‘‘soft’’ to act upon:
The [social accounting] methodology hasnÕt
moved on as far as I can see, so we found it
difficult to get a handle on what we should
be doing as a result of this [process] that will
improve the system. . . Nobody [wa]s ever
asked Ôokay you donÕt like that but what do
you want to be different or what are you prepared to do differently? (B1)
ItÕs easier for business with its more narrow
focus to instigate a process such as this. . .
the process doesnÕt suit APSOÕs objectives.
(B2)
The demolition of the initial internal championsÕ optimism was now apparently complete:
At the end of the day, social accounting is only
as good as the organisation thatÕs using it. Because in fact APSO didnÕt change because of
social accounting. All APSOÕs bad ways and
bad habits, and lack of systems and structures
and organisation and all of that are all the
same as they were in the beginning. And it
didnÕt do any of the things that I wanted it
to. To be blunt it didnÕt challenge, it didnÕt
bring about change and it didnÕt rattle. Now
that is partly to do with the methodology,
partly the board, and the consultant. (M2)
Discussion and conclusions
This paper presents a case study of the evolution of a social accounting process in an Irish
overseas aid agency, the Agency for Personal
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
Service Overseas (APSO). The case examines how
and why a social accounting process evolved
within APSO. It specifically responds to calls for
richer, more in-depth understandings of how and
why social accounting processes evolve within organisations (Gray, 2002; Thomson & Bebbington,
2004). Much of the corporate rhetoric surrounding
social accounting processes simplifies their complex nature and tends to downplay many concerns
as to how they can achieve ÔrealÕ organisational
change on behalf of stakeholders (see Owen et al.,
2001). The case exposes this complexity by illuminating the contradictions, tensions and obstacles
that permeated one such process. In doing so, it
provides rare empirical support for the suspicions
expressed in the social accounting literature regarding the nature and extent of stakeholder involvement and empowerment within these processes
(Belal, 2002; Dey, 2000, 2002a; Owen et al., 2001;
Owen et al., 2001; Thomson & Bebbington, 2004;
Unerman & Bennett, 2004).
The core of the case illuminates a systematic
process of stakeholder silencing by a powerful
APSO board whose agenda for the process differed
significantly from those of its promoters. This
prevented the process empowering key stakeholders to institute substantive organisational change.
A coalition of factors emerged in the case to support this conclusion. For example, conflicting and
confused perceptions of the process objectives
among board members prevailed with most
exhibiting little concern to empower stakeholders.
The nature of the stakeholder identification and
consultation process was fundamentally flawed
and deliberately excluded key stakeholder voices.
There was an absence of firm board commitment
to acting on stakeholder concerns evidenced in
their resistant response to the emergence of critical
stakeholder voices in the initial social account
draft. More fundamentally, the extent of APSOs
power, through the board, over its key stakeholders denied the possibility of any comprehensive discussion of APSOÕs impact on these
stakeholders. Finally, the absence of any governance mechanisms designed to empower key
stakeholders post account publication indicated
scant regard for acting on those voices that were
represented in the account.
291
Extreme power relations between key stakeholders and the APSO organisation negated the
potential for stakeholder empowerment. The
boardÕs attempt to control the account presentation contradicted their initial concern, expressed to
the consultant, to hear the voices of key developing world stakeholders. This expression of unease
did not, however, imply a commitment to acting in
response to these voices. Given the extent of the
power APSO held over these stakeholders the
board could easily have ignored their concerns.
Furthermore, given this power relationship, it is
debatable whether the stakeholder voices would
have provided any substantial evidence of stakeholder desire for change. For example, stakeholders in developing countries who were
consulted were totally reliant on APSO for assistance and, moreover, had no formal avenues
through which they could attempt to influence
APSOÕs governance and executive decision making. Hence, even if critical viewpoints were expressed there was no formal mechanism through
which these voices could be empowered. Owen
et al. (1997) and Owen et al. (2001) have alluded to
this absence of supporting institutional mechanisms to empower stakeholder voices more generally in social accounting practice and the
evidence here supports their perception of the need
for institutional supports for stakeholders in these
processes. In this instance, the board was able to
downplay critical stakeholder voices in the account
and rationalise this internally by blaming flaws
in the social accounting methodology they had
approved. Once the board assumed control of
the account, key stakeholders (and the internal
champions and consultant) were powerless to
resist.
These findings provide some support for the
suspicions of Owen et al. (2001) regarding the oft
promoted ease with which stakeholder engagement
mechanisms can provide mutual stakeholder/organisational benefits (see also, Belal, 2002; Dey,
2000, 2002a; Gray, 2000, 2001; Thomson &
Bebbington, 2004). Owen et al. (2001) suggested
that the power organisational interests are able to
bring to stakeholder engagement exercises often
implies they inevitably come to control the dialogue agenda (see also, Thomson & Bebbington,
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B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
2004). They bemoan the absence of any consideration of this dimension in the promotion of social
accounting practice. In this case, the absence of
any two-way exchange between APSO and its
stakeholders and the power relationships involved
ensured that the dialogue (as well as the reporting
of the dialogue) was controlled by management. If
stakeholder empowerment is to be a key feature of
these processes, then this case indicates how vital
consideration of this power dimension is to the
design and implementation of ÔtrulyÕ accountable
processes.
Stakeholder/management mistrust and, in some
cases, antagonism also emerged to disrupt the
process. Stakeholder resistance to engagement was
fuelled by embedded mistrust of the board and
management among head office staff and many
development workers. For them, the process was
always vulnerable to board/managerial influence.
Its publicised ÔaccountabilityÕ motives contrasted
with their experience of persistent communication
difficulties with APSO management. This suspicion was heightened when word of the board
subcommitteeÕs influence on the final account became common knowledge. The contrast between
the published objectives and the boardÕs eventual
active resistance to substantive change instigated
by the process further fuelled these concerns and
illuminates a resistance to empowering stakeholder
voices. Owen et al. (2001) and Gray (2001) have
consistently questioned whether organisations are
willing to accept the degree of ÔhurtÕ necessary to
produce ÔtrulyÕ accountable social accounts. In this
process, there was little openness to ÔhurtÕ and an
account was produced that appears to have had
little significance for the lives of many stakeholders
despite its publicly stated commitment to transparency, accountability and stakeholder engendered change.
This case demonstrates that unless some formal
empowerment of stakeholder groups is permitted,
organisational managers can easily emasculate
social accounting processes and displace a purported commitment to accountability with effective control of stakeholder voices. In order to
compel management to commit to acting on key
stakeholder voices mechanisms by which these
voices can be incorporated into corporate decision
making need to evolve (see, Owen et al., 1997;
Owen et al., 2001). Many of the key stakeholders
in APSOÕs process had no formal mechanism
through which they could be ensured their voice
would influence decisions impacting directly on
their lives. The ÔaccountÕ of their voices, where this
was obtained, was also open to manipulation if it
disturbed the status quo. The power the board
possessed to undermine the delegated authority of
the consultant, the internal champions and the
internal audit review panel members was subject to
no countervailing force. Not only were the stakeholders unable to ensure their voices were heard,
the perceived absence of feedback indicates a lack
of willingness on the part of APSO management to
embed the stakeholder engagement process on an
ongoing basis.
This case, albeit related to one specific setting,
provides critical evidence of how a conception of
social accounting can be emasculated by management and designed to serve organisational as opposed to broad stakeholder interests. It indicates
that there is an urgent need for further sustained
critical examinations of the operation of these
processes, especially in the corporate world, in
order to assess the degree to which they actually
facilitate stakeholder empowerment. These studies
should shed more light on widespread claims to
accountability and indicate how practice should
evolve in order to challenge rather than conceal
organisational impacts on stakeholder groups.
Research of this nature can contribute to the
development of social accounting processes which
begin to reflect democratic dialogues between organisations and stakeholders focused on empowering stakeholders to bring about some form
of stakeholder induced organisational change.
Acknowledgements
The assistance of Mike Greally, Programme
Manager, APSO was invaluable throughout the
data collection phase of this study. I would like to
express my extreme gratitude to him for this. I
would also like to acknowledge the invaluable
comments of Amanda Ball, Jan Bebbington, Rebecca Boden, Colin Dey, Linda English, Rob Gray,
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
Richard Laughlin, Hugh McBride, Dave Owen,
Ian Thomson, Carol Tilt, Jeffrey Unerman and the
anonymous reviewers for Accounting, Organizations and Society. Comments from participants at a
research seminar in The Management Centre,
KingÕs College, University of London, the 2002
Critical Perspectives on Accounting conference,
New York, the 2002 Irish Accounting and Finance
Association conference, Galway, the 2002 Financial Reporting and Business Communication conference, Cardiff, and the 2002 International
Congress on Social and Environmental Accounting, Dundee are also greatly appreciated. The
financial assistance of the Irish Accountancy Educational Trust is warmly acknowledged.
Appendix
Research method
The case was constructed using a number of
evidential sources. These included: in-depth interviews; internal memoranda and other documents;
press releases; publicly available information and
documents on APSOÕs mission and strategic
objectives; media reporting on the social accounting process in APSO and on APSO generally; and
observations recorded by the author while acting
as a member of the audit review panel for the social account published from the process.
In-depth interviews
Fifteen interviews, primarily of an in-depth
nature, were held over a fourteen month period
commencing in September 2000. Chiefly for
logistical reasons, five of these interviews were held
by telephone. This was mainly as some of the interviewees worked on overseas assignments for
APSO in Central America and Africa and this was
the only available means of directly communicating with them. Time constraints for certain other
interviewees also made phone interviews most
efficient from their perspective. Interviewees were
selected from a broad range of constituencies
associated with the social accounting process in
APSO. These encompassed board members,
293
operational managers, representatives from four
of the seven stakeholder groups identified in the
social accounting process, social accounting process facilitators and researchers, and members of
the social account audit review panel. 8 I had
hoped to interview members of all stakeholder
groups but this did not prove possible, hence, there
was an element of expediency in the selection of
stakeholder groups. However, I was very conscious that I needed to interview external stakeholders and different stakeholders within specific
stakeholder groups, which I successfully achieved.
A semi-structured interview approach was
taken using broad open-ended questions in order
to encourage the interviewees to participate in a
loosely guided conversation (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). This approach empowers interviewees, enabling them to speak in their own ‘‘voices’’
therefore increasing their propensity to ‘‘tell stories’’ and provide narrative accounts (Llewellyn,
2001). The interview guide focused in particular on
obtaining perspectives on how and why social
accounting had evolved in APSO (Lillis, 1999) in
order to discover what was in and on the intervieweesÕ minds regarding the evolution of the
process (Patton, 1990). While this imposed some
structure on each interview, I was conscious to
ensure that it was the intervieweesÕ perspectives I
was gaining and therefore the interview guide was
not used in an overly constraining manner (Patton,
1990). Interviews lasted from between one and two
and a half hours. 9 A number of interviewees also
provided follow up feedback subsequent to their
interviews and this enabled clarification of some of
the issues discussed. 10 Elements of this follow up
included detailed written reflections on the social
8
The author was also a member of this panel.
On some occasions I had to reassure interviewees that I was
not working for anyone on a consultancy basis and that this
was merely an independently minded academic enquiry.
10
During each face to face interview detailed notes were
taken, and immediately after these interviews reflections on
each interview were recorded on tape and subsequently written
up. These reflections dealt in particular with the intervieweeÕs
demeanour throughout the interview, covering issues such as
rapport established, reaction to probing, apparent conviction in
responses, inconsistencies in responses and general attitude to
the research issue under study.
9
294
B. O’Dwyer / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 279–296
accounting process submitted to the author by
participants in the process.
Other sources of evidence
The interview data was supplemented with
additional evidential sources. Internal documentation reflecting the boardÕs response to the process as it evolved was also examined. This
included, inter alia, correspondence reflecting the
initial board consultations with the social
accounting consultant; the boardÕs responses to
various drafts of the social accounts; and the
external auditorÕs management letter. Strategic
planning documents, annual reports, the organisationÕs web site, submissions to the Irish GovernmentÕs Department of Foreign Affairs and draft
social accounts subsequent to those emanating
from the process examined here were also studied.
Newspaper articles relating to APSO throughout
the process were also collected and content analysed (see, for example, Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff,
1980; Weber, 1985) to obtain some sense of how
the organisation was perceived externally.
Evidence analysis
Nine of the ten face to face interviews were recorded by tape and subsequently transcribed 11
(Jones, 1985). During all the unrecorded interviews
detailed notes were taken throughout and were
written up immediately after these interviews.
Furthermore, immediate reflections and key issues
from these interviews were also recorded on tape.
The analysis of the evidence collected was primarily qualitative and iterative and constituted a
continuous process throughout the study (see
OÕDwyer, 2004). For example, during the interview collection phase ongoing analysis was aided
by: extensive notes taken during and immediately
after interviews; tape-recorded reflections on
interviews; listening to interview tapes while travelling; and the recording of an inner dialogue
reflecting on the interviews in a separate journal
11
One interviewee was very reluctant to be tape-recorded.
(often termed a ‘‘theoretical memo’’) 12 (Baxter &
Chua, 1998; Parker & Roffey, 1997). This, in effect,
provided a provisional running record of analysis
and interpretation prior to any formal evidence
processing and interpretation (see, for example,
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Tesch, 1990).
After ten interviews had been conducted, the
interview transcripts, notes and documentation
collected were examined and re-examined in-depth
over a two month period. As a result of this iterative process, they were coded into broad substantive themes encompassing a ÔstoryÕ or ‘‘thick
description’’ (Denzin, 1994, p. 505; see also, King,
1998, 1999) of the evolution of the social
accounting process. 13 Contrasting perspectives
were highlighted and where necessary confirmation of perspectives was requested from participants in order to ensure that it was the
perspectives of those being studied which were
being presented (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998). Subsequently, five more interviews were undertaken
and extra documentation was collected over an
extended period. After the passage of approximately three months, these interviews were formally analysed in conjunction with a second
analysis of the initial ten interviews. This time gap
allowed for some further reflection on the nature
of the interpretation of the evidence collected.
New themes and ‘‘competing interpretations’’
emerged within the overall ‘‘story’’ (Ahrens &
Dent, 1998; Silverman, 2000). The case constructed from this analysis tells the ÔstoryÕ of the
evolution of the process.
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