World-Scale Patterns of Labor-Capital Conflict: Labor Unrest, Long Waves, and Cycles
of World Hegemony
Author(s): Beverly J. Silver
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center) , Winter, 1995, Vol. 18, No. 1, Labor Unrest in
the World-Economy, 1870–1990 (Winter, 1995), pp. 155-192
Published by: Research Foundation of State University of New York for and on behalf
of the Fernand Braudel Center
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WorldScale Patterns of
Labor-Capital Conflict
Labor Unrest, Long Waves, and
Cycles of World Hegemony
Beverly J. Silver
central conclusion to be drawn from the country studies in
this special issue of Review is that the World Labor Research
Working Group (WLG) Database can be used as a reliable tool for
identifying waves of labor unrest- and in particular waves that represent turning-points in labor-capital relations. These waves of labor
unrest are, in turn, a central process underlying world-scale social
change, setting into motion phases of intensive global political,
economic, and social restructuring.1
This essay explores the world-scale patterning of labor unrest
which emerges from the WLG Database. In addition, the database
is used to assess the plausibility of theories that link labor-capital
conflict to three processes of world-scale social change: (1) long
waves (Kondratieff cycles), (2) cycles of world hegemony (world war
and peace), and (3) the core-periphery relocation of production
processes.
1 The WLG Database on Labor Unrest was constructed from reports of labor
unrest culled from the indexes of the New York Times and the Times (London) from
1870 through 1990. For a detailed discussion of the construction of the WLG Database
see Silver, this issue. For the country reliability studies referred to above see Part II of
this special issue.
REVIEW, XVIII, 1, WINTER 1995, 155-92 155
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156
Beverly
J.
Silver
I. LONG WAVES AND LABOR UNREST2
The wave of labor unrest that spread throughout western
Europe in the late 1960's, and the more or less simultaneous end of
the long postwar boom, led to a revival of interest in both Kondratieff cycles and labor-capital conflict, as well as the emergence of
theories which postulated a causal link between these two process-
es. Screpanti (1984; 1987), for example, argues that periods of
economic expansion ("A-phases") increase workers' power and
dissatisfaction culminating in an explosion of militancy toward the
end of the "A-phase." These "major proletarian insurgencies," in
turn, dampen capitalists' willingness to invest, provoking an economic downturn (or "B-phase"). The downturn undermines workers' power and militancy, thus recreating the conditions for another
expansionary A-phase.
While their theoretical reasoning about the causal mechanisms
are different, Mandel (1980), Gronin (1980), and Screpanti (1984)
have all hypothesized a pro-cyclical relationship between long waves
and labor unrest. Starting from relatively low levels, they expect
class struggle to rise during the economic expansion (A-phase), and
escalate sharply at the end of the A-phase. Cronin and Screpanti
are most explicit in their prediction that major explosions of labor
militancy occur at the transition from the A to the B phase. During
the economic contraction (B-phase), levels of class struggle may
remain quite high, and repeated outbursts of unrest may occur. For
Mandel, in particular, "intensified class struggle . . . generally characterizes most of the depressive long wave" (1980: 48). Nevertheless, they all expect the overall trend in the B-phase to be downward, and the transition to the new A-phase to be characterized by
an atmosphere of relatively low levels of unrest.
In order to assess the plausibility of the hypothesis of an overlapping cycle of long waves and labor militancy, an index of labor
unrest "intensity" was constructed from the WLG Database in such
a way as to be analogous to Screpanti's (1987) strike intensity
index.3 The patterns of labor unrest intensity were then studied:
2 This section summarizes results published in an earlier article (Silver, 1992a).
More extensive arguments and evidence are contained therein.
3 The number of mentions of labor unrest worldwide was multiplied by the number
of countries in which labor unrest is reported per year. The product is a single index
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 157
(1) growth rates of each A- and B-phase were compare
of major world-scale explosions of worker militancy w
Table 1 reproduces the results of the calculation
rates. Given the pro-cyclical hypothesis, we would
positive growth rates in A-phases and negative gro
phases (Cronin, Mandel, Screpanti). Furthermore, w
not to find any major explosions of labor militancy in
of the B-phases or early years of the A-phases; ra
expect to find these explosions clustered around t
from A- to B-phases.
The evidence (as summarized in Table 1) does
support for the proposition that there is a close c
tween labor unrest and long waves. While some ca
is still plausible, the number of anomalies is simply
Table 1
Long Waves and World-Scale Class Struggle
Index of Intensity
Growth Rates (%)
Non-
World Core Core
1872-1893 B 8 7 12
1893-1917 A 9 8 9
a
1917-1940 B -5 -6 -4
1940-1968 A 2 0 4
1968-1985 B 0-5 4
Source: WLG Database.
(a) above dotted line, index based on the New York Times only; below line,
based on both newspaper sources.
that simultaneously reflects the level and geographical extent of worker militancy. For
a detailed discussion of the methods used and their appropriateness for the task at
hand, see Silver (1992a).
4 To qualify as a "great explosion" year, class-struggle intensity had to be at least
double the average of the preceding five years for two or more consecutive years. This
criterion had to be met for the world-scale index and for the indices of core and non-
core countries taken separately for at least one year in each set. The intention was to
identify "great explosions" that are truly general in geographic terms and not corespecific or regionally-specific phenomena.
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158
Beverly
J.
Silver
With regards to grow
strong positive annua
century B-phase (1872-
core
for
the
postwar
positive annual growth
current B-phase. With
explosions" of world-sc
20, 1946-48): (1) one set
period from an A- to a
latter part of that A-p
beginning of an A-phas
of the late-nineteenth
We
could
dating
try
other
scheme5
in
stat
orde
labor militancy and lo
However, one look at
graphed
attempt
series
are
over time (see
would be misg
the
two
world
after each of the two w
waves and labor unrest
ship between world lab
II. LABOR UNREST AND WORLD WARS
Figure 1 charts a time series which gives the total number
mentions of labor unrest per year in the WLG Database as reco
ed from the Indexes of the New York Times and the Times (Londo
Figure 2 charts a series which gives the percentage of countries
the world experiencing waves of labor unrest in any given ye
(Waves of labor unrest are defined as years in which the number o
mentions of labor unrest in a given country are (1) more than
higher than the average of the previous five years and (2) high
than the overall average of the series for that country.) Both F
5 The dating for A- and B-phases used in Table 1 are taken from Goldstein (19
67) who argues that they reflect the "strong consensus" among long-wave scholars.
T-phase dating is taken from Screpanti (1984: 521).
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 159
ures 1 and 2 show the series with a three-year mov
The two post-world war waves of labor militancy
in both series. The years 1919-20 are the peak yea
for the number of mentions of labor unrest with a total of 2,085
and 1,827 mentions, respectively. The next highest peak is 1946-47
with 1,469 and 1,555 mentions, respectively.
Likewise, the two post-world war waves of labor militancy are
also the peak years in the series for the percentage of countries
experiencing waves of labor unrest. However, the order of magnitude is reversed. The year 1946 is the overall peak of the series with
58% of the countries in the series experiencing waves of labor
unrest. The year 1919 is second with 42% of the countries experiencing waves of labor unrest. The next two highest years are 1947
(with 38%) and 1920 (with 36%). Thus, although the number of
mentions of labor unrest was higher for 1919-20, the geographical
extent of the 1946-47 explosion (the number of countries affected)
was greater.
The world war effect is double-edged. Not only do the peak
years of both series correspond to the immediate aftermaths of the
wars, but the troughs of the series occur during the wars themselves. Thus (focusing only on 1906-90, the years for which the
series is based on both newspaper sources) the trough in the number of mentions of labor unrest is 1915 with 169 mentions, followed by 1940 with 209 mentions, and 1942 with 215 mentions.
Likewise, the overall trough in the series for the percentage of
countries experiencing waves of labor unrest is 1942 (1%), followed
by 1915 (3%), and 1939 (4%).
Labor unrest waves by no means disappeared for the entire
span of the world wars. For example, our data shows labor unrest
waves in the middle of the First World War (particularly in Germa-
ny and Russia in 1917-18 as well as elsewhere in Europe) and in
the middle of the Second World War in the United States (1941,
1943), in Canada (1943), the United Kingdom (1943), as well as in
some African and Asian colonies such as Zambia (1940-41) and
Singapore (1940). Nevertheless, the overall effect of world wars
6 Appendix 1 at the end of this essay details the procedures used to construct these
series as well as the tables and figures.
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160
Beverly
J.
l-H
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Silver
WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 161
CM
s
D
O
E
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162
Beverly
J.
Silver
(while they are being fo
militancy in the worldThe WLG data thus se
ferred
science
to
as
"one
literature
national
.
conflict"
be read as support
this hypothesis:
of
.
.
t
th
(198
for
a
1) that involvement
national level and th
2) that involvement i
national
3)
that
level
social
ernments
1980:
The
An
to
and
incr
conflict
involve
t
297-98).
rest
of
this
assessment
section
of
hyp
horizon of the analysis
diate aftermath. This will be undertaken in Section III, below.
Hypothesis #i: War and Social Cohesion
Our finding that overt conflict declined significantly during the
early years of both world wars is in line with hypothesis #1. It also
parallels the findings of other studies such as Hibbs (1978) and
Tilly (1989). In a long-run analysis of strike activity in eleven west-
ern European and North American countries, Hibbs found that
industrial conflict "declined markedly" during the First and Second
7 This decline cannot be construed as an artifact of newspaper bias; that is, of labor
unrest reports getting squeezed out of the newspapers by war news. In the first place,
where we know from other sources that labor unrest wa"s widespread during the war
years, we have found that our newspaper sources have also reported it (e.g., in the
United States in the early years of the Second World War or the widespread militancy
in Germany and Russia in the middle of the First World War.) Moreover, there is no
reason to think that waves of labor militancy would be seen as less important news
than battlefield and diplomatic reports as industrial workers had become critical cogs
in the war machine (supplying the soldiers at the front) by the late-nineteenth century
(cf. McNeill, 1982: Ch. 7 &: 8).
8 However, Stohl lamented (1980) that this nexus has been neither theoretically
elaborated nor empirically grounded.
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 163
World Wars. Hibbs attributes this decline, in part, t
tions against wartime strikes." But he places even
sis on a combination of consent and cooptation:
. . . more important was the voluntary commitme
in virtually all combatant countries to give maxim
to the war effort. (Such pledges were usually ac
government protection against attacks by capi
lished labour organizations.) War-time strikes in
tries were sporadic, usually unauthorized by u
and very short-lived (Hibbs, 1978: 157).
Tilly also attributes the decline in strike activity
of wars to government compacts with manageme
labor in support of the war effort. But he places
on the coercive roots of the decline in militanc
general tendency for the repressive capacities of
increase during wartime. Tilly explains downturns
as the combined result of (1) the increased repre
governments, (2) the transfer of workers to govern
war industries and (3) the transfer of organized w
tary service and their replacement by less organiz
441-42).
Attempts to ensure the cooperation of work
effort through combinations of repression and co
recognition by governments of the important r
industrial armies had come to play in determining
an age of industrialized warfare (cf. McNeill,
These efforts appear to have extended well beyon
batant countries. Thus, while Hibbs' and Tilly's st
to western European and North American coun
Database indicates that the decline in militancy d
wars was far more general. The roots of this dec
same for both metropolitan and colonial countrie
time of the Second World War, colonial and semi
had become tightly integrated into the resource sup
imperial powers. Coercion played the main role in
But coercion was proving to be insufficient give
power of certain strategically-located colonial lab
Britain's decision to introduce trade unions and
arbitration mechanisms throughout its Empire du
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164
Beverly
J.
Silver
World War as labor unr
tive of both the disrup
move toward supplemen
Great Britain's effort
have had a serious restr
Indeed, the cause(s) of t
open
to
debate:
through calls
the generally
their citizens
are
th
to unity ag
increased c
during war
who were promised rec
and file militancy; or b
tors?
Whatever
wars drew to a close.
forces
were
a
Hypothesis #2: War and Social Conflict
The second hypothesis- that is, of a causal link between war and
explosions of social conflict (especially revolutions)- is widespread
in the social science literature (e.g., Laquer, 1968; Hibbs, 1978;
Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1978). Skocpol, for example, argues that "defeats in war or threats of invasion and struggles over colonial con-
trols . . . have directly contributed to virtually all outbreaks of revolutionary crises" (1979: 23). In some ways, contemporary studies in
political sociology echo Lenin's contention that imperialist wars
intensify all the contradictions of capitalism, and thus are "the eve
of the social revolution of the proletariat" (1916: 175).
Our finding that major world-scale explosions of labor unrest
occurred after the world wars is in line with hypothesis #2, and
parallels the findings of various country and regional studies.
Hibbs, for example, found that "most [western European and
North American] countries experienced strike explosions towards
the ends or just after the end of the World Wars" (1978: 157). He
attributes these strike waves to efforts by labor "to defend its war-
9 For studies emphasizing the strategic position of export workers in Latin America
and Africa and their resulting disruptive potential, see Bergquist (1986) and Brown
(1988), respectively. See Brown (1988) and Burawoy (1982) on Great Britain's policy of
extending trade unionization to the colonies.
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 165
time organizational gains, to resolve the shop-floo
had accumulated over the long period of 'discipli
serve real wages in the face of war generated upwar
prices" (1978: 157).
Tilly argues that a "war shaken state often faces m
cized industrial conflict" (1989: 442); and moreov
tionary situations are often brought on by war.
great revolutions, and many of its lesser ones,
strains imposed by war" (1990: 186). This, he clai
"the essential relationship between war and the re
of the government" (1978: 211).
As we saw above, Tilly attributes the decline in
during the early years of the war, in part, to the
sive capacity of states during wartime. However,
repressive capacity is highly unstable:
Although war temporarily places large coerci
under the control of a government, it does not gu
they will be used efficiently, or that they will
under the government's firm control. Defeat an
lization provide especially favorable circumstanc
tion because they combine the presence of substan
resources with uncertain control over their use
Moreover, the aftermath of wars are characterized
in which the demands made by workers and othe
state increase, at the same time as the states' ability
or repress those demands decreases. Demands
pressed or suspended for the duration of the
surface as the war ends. But at the same moment, T
is "a very general pattern in which the end of w
not) produces a crisis of governmental incapacity
size of the problems increase (e.g., millions of dem
are thrown on soft labor markets), as the capacity t
through cooptation or repression decreases (e.g., d
cial costs of the war and the exhaustion of militar
defeated, and even sometimes, the victorious coun
bination of increased demands from below and d
mental capacities to either meet and/or repres
mands fosters politicized (and often revolutionar
labor militancy towards the ends of wars (Tilly, 1
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166
Beverly
J.
Silver
Most of those who draw the link between war and social conflict
focus on the main metropolitan rivals, and certainly on those
directly involved in the fighting. The WLG time series, however,
show that waves of labor militancy extended well beyond the main
metropolitan rivals, and well beyond those directly involved in the
fighting. The widespread nature of the unrest in the immediate
postwar years can be seen clearly in the world maps that highlight
the countries experiencing labor unrest waves after each of the
world wars (Figures 3 and 4).
This is consistent with Goldfrank's hypothesis that major waves
of social conflict are likely to occur in the periphery and semiperiphery during periods in which core countries are preoccupied
with war and/or social unrest at home- and thus when core capacities for foreign intervention are hobbled. For Goldfrank, it is not
merely the direct impact of the war mobilization and demobilization that explains the clustering of waves of social unrest during
and immediately following major imperialist wars. Rather, "the
preoccupation of major powers with war or serious internal difficulty" provides a permissive context for challenges from subordinate
groups, which would have otherwise been nipped in the bud by
direct or indirect foreign intervention. Intense competition among
the core powers also increases the likelihood that labor and nation-
alist movements will get outside help from one rival power or
another, as part of strategies designed to undermine the colonial
allies of the enemy. Thus, "as one moves toward the present temporally and toward the periphery of the world-system spatially, [the
world-systemic context] becomes increasingly critical" in explaining
rebellions and revolutions (1979: 148-49). Similarly, Skocpol argues
that "international military balances and conflicts have . . . provided
the 'space' necessary for the completion and consolidation of social
revolutions" by dividing the efforts or diverting the attention of
foreign enemies interested in preventing revolutionary successes
(1979: 23; cf. Kowalewski, 1991).
A strong correlation between world wars and waves of labor
unrest is clearly evident from the WLG Database. Goldstone's claim
that "the broad relationship between war and revolution is virtually
nil" is not supported by the evidence (1991: 15-16). Nevertheless,
Stohl rightly cautions us to distinguish among different types of
wars when hypothesizing about the relationship between war and
social conflict:
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 167
CO
D
O
•a
o
I
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168
Beverly
J.
Silver
i
v
I
U
o
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 169
As Durkheim noted eighty years ago, "while gr
wars have had a strong influence on the amount
both France and Germany, purely dynastic wars
Crimean or Italian which have not violently mov
es, have had no appreciable effect" (Durkheim
07). This suggests that we would do well, when stud
impact, to consider such properties as its len
casualties, domestic popularity, and social dist
adversary (Stohl, 1980: 327-28).
Indeed, the type of war with which we found a
ship is "world war." From a world-systems perspect
are just the most morbid symptom of a general crisis
In the next section the hypothesis that the centra
not between social conflict and "war," but rather b
conflict and the alternating cycles of world hegem
that have characterized the modern world-system is e
process a theoretical approach that encompasses al
hypotheses outlined above is elaborated.
III. LABOR UNREST AND HEGEMONY/RIVALRY IN
THE WORLD-SYSTEM
Two contrasting patterns emerge when we divide the 80
series10 into two equal periods- roughly corresponding to th
od of transition from British to U.S. hegemony (1911-50) a
the period of U.S. hegemony (1951-90).11 Table 2 summariz
differences.
10 The mentions of labor unrest series is based on both newspaper sources for 85
years, that is, from 1906-90. However, the wave series begins in 1911 and is only 80
years long. This is because wave-years are singled out on the basis of their size relative
to the average of the previous five years.
11 The start date for U.S. hegemony used in this essay corresponds to the beginning
of the Cold War. This is consistent with the Gramscian concept of hegemony used in
this study (Arrighi, 1990a; Silver & Slater, 1993) whereby hegemony implies more than
economic and military dominance (cf. Wallerstein, 1984; Chase-Dunn, 1989: 166-98).
While the U.S. was the dominant world power in 1945, hegemony was achieved
through the Cold War. It is important to note, however, that while some of the details
change, the main findings remain the same whether a 1945 or 1950 start date is usedthat is, there is a downward trend in labor unrest for the core and for the world as a
whole during the period of hegemony.
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170
Beverly
J.
Silver
Table 2
Patterns of World Labor Unrest
(World-Level Series)
Rivalry Hegemony
1911-50 1951-90
Average Annual % of Countries
with Waves of Labor Unrest 16 18
Average Annual "Mentions" of
Labor
Unrest
775
772
"Explosiveness":
Standard
Deviation of Wave Series 11 6
"Explosiveness": Standard
Deviation of Mentions Series 425 194
Explosion Years in Either Wave 1919-20 NONE
Series or Mention Series 1946-47
High Deviations from the Mean 1919-20 1955
in
Either
Series
1937
1956
1946-50 1959
Source: WLG Database.
Labor unrest in the rivalry period is far more "explosive" tha
labor unrest in the hegemony period, as indicated by the far great-
er variance in both the wave and mention series for 1911-50
(standard deviation equals 11 and 425, respectively) than for
90 (standard deviation equals 6 and 194, respectively.) Al
"explosions" of labor unrest (defined as years in which the se
equal to twice its mean) occur during the rivalry period. Mor
eight out of the eleven "high deviations from the mean" (ye
which the series is greater than the mean plus the standard
tion) are concentrated in the rivalry period.
The less explosive nature of world-scale labor unrest in
hegemony period does not mean that there was less labor u
As can be seen from Table 2, the average annual number of
tions of labor unrest in the two periods were virtually identica
versus 772), while the average annual percentage of coun
experiencing waves of labor unrest was slightly higher in the h
mony period (18%) than the rivalry period (16%). The differe
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 171
that during the rivalry period labor unrest tended
particular years, giving rise to simultaneous, worldwi
to the capitalist world-system. This tendency for nat
labor unrest to cluster in time disappears in the hege
Rivalry and Explosive Labor Unrest
In large part this divergent pattern is due to the r
wars in first dampening, and then provoking simult
scale outbreaks of social conflict (in line with hypoth
discussed above). The absence of world wars in th
period has made labor unrest less explosive.
The world wars, however, do not explain fully the
between the rivalry and hegemony periods. We also n
hypothesis 3 into the picture: that is, that social co
national level encourages governments to involve th
interstate wars. Escalating social conflict increases th
wars and wars promote escalating social conflict.
Indeed, the time series of labor unrest charted in F
2 clearly illustrate the tendency for labor unrest (1
prior to the outbreak of world wars, (2) to be tem
pressed during the wars, and (3) to explode as the wa
tendencies can also be seen from Table 3, which disag
world-level indicators of labor unrest into three gr
semiperiphery, and periphery.12 Focusing on the ri
only: the only labor unrest "explosions" for the wor
are the post-world war peaks (1919-20 and 1946-4
1919-20 and 1946-50 are "high deviations from the m
world labor unrest time series. But so is 1937. Moreov
several additional "explosions" or "high deviations" in
semiperiphery during the immediate prewar years. Fo
addition to the post-world war peaks, these are 191
and 1937. And for the semiperiphery, these are 1
1936, and 1938.13
12 Arrighi and Drangel's (1986) classification of countries as organ
semiperiphery, and organic periphery is used. See Appendix B for th
and their classification.
13 A different pattern, however, is visible for the periphery: there is no explosion
following the First World War (although 1920-21 qualify as high deviations from the
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172
Beverly
J.
Silver
Table 3
Table 3(a)- Average Annual % of Countries Experiencing
Waves of Labor Unrest
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry. 16 23 18 14
1911-50
Hegemony:
1951-90
18
15
20
20
Table 3(b)- Average Annual "Mentions" of Labor Unrest
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry: 775 467 153 60
1911-50
Hegemony:
772
1951-90
340
165
82
Table 3(c)- "Explosiveness": Standard Deviation of Wave Series
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry: 11 19 14 13
1911-50
Hegemony:
1951-90
6
11
11
10
Table 3(d)- "Explosiveness": Standard Deviation of Mentions Series
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry 425 289 102 58
1911-50
Hegemony.
1951-90
194
130
58
40
Table 3(e)- "Explosion" Years in Either Wave Series or Mention Series
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry: 1919-20 1912 1913 1925
1911-50 1946-47 1918-20 1919-20 1927-29
1932,1937 1936,1946 1946,1949
1946-47 1950
Hegemony None None 1951,1959 1953-56
1951-90
1965
1959,1962
1981
Table
3(f)-
High
Deviations
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Rivalry 1919-20 1912,1918-20 1913-14,1919-20 1920-21
1911-50 1937 1932,1936-37 1922,1932,1936 ' 1925,1927-29
1946-50 1946-49 1938,1946-47,1950 1946,1949
Hegemony 1955-56 1955 1951,1959,1965-66 1953-56,1958-59
1951-90 1959 1973,1976,1986 1962,1974,1980-81,
1988-89 1985-86,1989
Source: WLG Database.
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 173
Since the world wars originated in the core and se
the explosions of labor unrest in the immediate pre-vto
in the core and semiperiphery- 1912-14 and 1936-38to hypothesis 3. In other words, the patterning of l
the core and semiperiphery simultaneously supports all
hypotheses outlined by Stohl. First, when multiple coun
ence explosions of social conflict at the national level
and capitalists seek solutions to internal tensions th
that increase the likelihood of world war. Secondly, the
world war leads to an initial decline in labor militanc
increased repression or increased social cohesion). Thi
the end of world wars, labor militancy is re-ignite
widespread, simultaneous explosions of conflict that,
er, constitute a challenge to the capitalist world-system
Hegemony and Conflict Containment
If a vicious circle of social and interstate conflict characterizes
the rivalry period, the hegemony period can be characterized as a
virtuous circle- at least for the core. But how is the vicious circle
broken? Historically, a partial pre-condition for the emergence of a
new hegemony has been the concentration of economic and military power in a single state (Wallerstein, 1984; Chase-Dunn, 1989:
166-98). However, this has not been sufficient. The new hegemon
must also be in a position to bring social conflict under control
(Arrighi, 1990a). Historically, this has been achieved through a
combination of (1) repression, (2) "consent" through reforms and
cooptation, and (3) the weakening of the challenging groups' bargaining power "behind their backs"- that is, through transformations in the labor process and the geographical relocation of capital
(Silver, 1992b; Silver 8c Slater, 1993).
During the rivalry period, all three of these mechanisms tended
to be weak and ineffective. States swung sharply between harsh
repression and total collapse (cf. Tilly, 1978 and "Hypothesis #2:
War and Conflict" above). Corporatist solutions at the national
level tended to crumble under the fiscal pressure of acute interstate
mean). Explosion years for the periphery are concentrated in the middle and late
1920's (1925, 1927-29) and in the aftermath of the Second World War (1946, 1949).
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174
Beverly
J.
Silver
competition and- along
trous involvements in
the rivalry period, th
strained
national
by the risks an
business, and b
and multilateral trade
closed off, the only ch
malfunctioning of thes
(repression,
cooptatio
produced major explos
By the end of the Se
might
was
mobilized
concentra
at
the
global
l
create effective mecha
communist parties and
classes were coopted vi
norms.
At
the
firm
leve
al level it meant expan
safety nets (Aglietta,
at
the
global
level
it
me
and finance to the Key
employment (Schurma
policy sponsored by th
1970's implied a recogn
commodities,"
and
trol
protectin
required
destructiveness
Ruggie,
This,
these
is
protective
but
capital
Plan
of
and
a
only
measu
steadily
and
self
Mjoset,
however,
slowly
of
1982;
more
unde
transfor
military
Keyne
wave of U.S. corporate
and 1960's (Hymer, 197
with the European co
lenge," fostered the
techniques
backbone
of
the
of
in
western
the
militan
twentieth
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cent
WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 175
production (Hobsbawm, 1984:169; Arrighi & Silver
same time, this geographical relocation of investme
undermined the bargaining power of those worke
the backbone of the U.S. labor movement in the 1930's and
1940's- the semiskilled mass production workers (Edwards
Goldfield, 1987; Moody, 1988; Arrighi 8c Silver, 1984).
The result of these processes of repression, cooptation,
tion, and restructuring was a transition from a period of inten
conflict to a period of relative social peace in the core. The in
sociology literature of the 1950's and 1960's referred to thi
tion as "the withering away of the strike" (Ross & Hartman
This "withering" can be seen in the steep decline in labor unre
the WLG time series registers for the core from the 1950's on
(see Figure 5). The average annual number of labor unrest m
in the core declines from 467 in the rivalry period to 340
hegemony period; and the average annual percentage of c
experiencing waves of labor unrest declines from 23% to 15 p
Moreover, while seven years qualified as labor unrest explo
the core during the rivalry period, no explosions of labor unr
place during the hegemony phase (see Table 3).
Finally, it is striking to note that the last high deviation fr
mean in labor unrest for the core takes place in 1955- th
before the reestablishment of currency convertibility in w
Europe and the consequent inauguration of a major wave o
sion of foreign direct investment by U.S. multinational c
tions. Although the timing may be a coincidence, it is co
with our claim that the relocation of production from the
States and the expansion of mass production/mass consum
industries in western Europe are central processes underlying
cline of labor militancy in the core in the period of U.S. hege
With the generalization of mass production techniques th
out western Europe, and the drying-up of rural industrial
armies, a "resurgence of class conflict" took place in the la
and early 1970's (Grouch & Pizzorno, 1978). This "resurgen
visible in Figure 5 as a slight upturn on a strong downward
The power and vitality of these movements were quickly c
(and their victories largely overturned) as a result of intense
rate and state restructuring efforts. The automation of pr
(aggressively pursued in Italy), the relocation of capital t
peripheral locations (aggressively pursued in Germany
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176
Beverly
reversal
of
J.
Silver
Keynesian
econ
United Kingdom) rapid
mass production worke
Baglioni, 1989; Hyman,
1987). And in the United
had begun decades earlier
Organizations
(CIO)
str
collapse of the mass pro
under the combined imp
(Goldfield, 1987; Moody,
labor unrest in the core
had virtually disappeared
The clear contrast between labor unrest in the core for the
hegemony and rivalry periods cannot be seen in the periphery
semiperiphery. To be sure, there is a decline in explosiveness
both the semiperiphery and the periphery (see Table 3). But th
is an increase in the average annual percentage of countries exp
encing waves of labor unrest in both the semiperiphery (from
to 20%) and the periphery (from 14% to 20%). Likewise, there i
increase in the average annual mentions of labor unrest, from
to 165 in the semiperiphery and from 60 to 82 in the periph
Moreover, while the number of years that qualified as high de
tions from the mean for the core dropped from eleven to one fro
the rivalry period to the hegemony period, it increased in
periphery (from eight years to thirteen years) and decreased o
slightly in the semiperiphery (eleven years versus nine years
sum, while all indicators show a decline in labor unrest in the core
with the transition to hegemony, the indicators for the semip
phery and periphery all show increases or no significant chang
The underlying nature of these divergent zonal patterns b
comes clearer if we break up the hegemony period into four t
year segments (see Table 4). The mean intensity of labor unres
the core declines each decade in relation to the previous decad
But in both the semiperiphery and periphery labor unrest intensi
shows an initial decline, followed by an increase. For the se
periphery, the decline in labor unrest intensity occurs in the 1960
the rise takes place in the 1970's and 1980's. In the periphery
decline lasts for two decades, the 1960's and 1970's, before ris
again in the 1980's.
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 177
i
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178
Beverly
J.
to
D
O
E
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Silver
WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 179
W
04
P
O
fa
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180
Beverly
J.
Silver
Table 4
Patterns of Labor Unrest During the Period of U.S. Hegemony
Table 4(a)-Mean Labor Unrest Intensity (1911-90=100)
(Intensity Index=Mentions Index Multiplied by Waves Index)
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
1951-60 143 76 123 192
1961-70
87
68
80
91
1971-80
87
65
94
79
1981-90
58
19
Table
103
120
4(b)-
(Number
of
High
Devia
Years
Qua
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
1951-60
3
1
2
6
1961-70
1971-80
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
1
1981-90
0
0
3
5
Source: WLG Database.
An examination of the number of high deviations from the
mean for the mentions and waves series reinforces the general
picture of an initial decline followed by a resurgence of labo
unrest for the periphery and semiperiphery (see Table 4b). In the
core, one year (1955) qualifies as a high deviation from the mean
for the entire hegemony period. In the semiperiphery, two years
qualify in each of the first three decades of the hegemony period
while three years qualify in the 1980's. The pattern of decline an
rise is clearest for the periphery: six years qualify as high deviations
from the mean in the 1950's, while only one year qualifies for eac
of the following two decades. In the 1980's, a strong resurgence
takes place, with five years qualifying as high deviations from th
mean.
The initial declines in the periphery and sem
partly be attributed to the successes of nationa
ments and communist revolutions, and the subse
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 181
tion of both. In the semiperiphery, and especially
labor unrest rose in the late 1940's and 1950's, as
escalated together with national liberation strug
Asia and Africa (see Figure 7). But the U.S./UN-s
nization process succeeded in channeling the nation
into paths that could be absorbed by a reformed
system. The new states were incorporated into the w
project as subordinate members through the promise
mination" and "development." Once nationalist m
trolled state power, workers' struggles inevitably los
former support from other classes in society and we
repressed. Likewise, the extension of communist rul
European semiperiphery and China initially dampe
through a combination of cooptation, repression,
ing-poorer (peripheral and semiperipheral) version
es at work on the core side of the Cold War.14
Whereas the downward trend of labor unrest accelerated in the
core in the 1970's and 1980's, a reversal of that trend occurred in
the periphery and semiperiphery. The upturn in labor unrest in the
semiperiphery and periphery can be interpreted as "the other side
of the coin" of the continuing downward trend in the core. The
geographical relocation of capital- as a mechanism for evading and
undermining the bargaining power of labor- has played an important role in containing overt militancy in the core. The (threatened
and actual) elimination of jobs in mass production industry has
become an increasingly potent weapon on the side of capital since
the early 1970's. Relocation, however, has proved to be a doubleedged sword: labor movements in areas from which capital emigrates are undermined, but new working classes are created (and
over time strengthened) in the sites to which capital migrates
(Arrighi 8c Silver, 1984; Silver, 1992b; 1993).
To be sure, many workers in the periphery and semiperiphery
are incorporated into the world-scale division of labor in ways that
leave them little effective bargaining power vis-à-vis either their
employers or the state- e.g., young women drawn into labor-inten-
14 On the deradicalization of workers' movements in post-revolutionary states
through repression and cooptation see, among others, Post (1988) on Vietnam; Beinin
and Lockman (1987: 14-18) on Egypt and more generally. See also Selden (this issue)
on China.
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182
Beverly
sive
J.
export
turnover
Silver
productio
rates
"Primitive
and
high
Taylorizat
labor-intensive industr
basic electronics. In the
core (through foreign d
and reproduces a wage
power (Nash & Fernand
However, significant g
periphery, have been dr
sive mass production tec
ed to particular semiper
cheap and docile worke
Korea).
The
subsequen
investment contribute
miracles" in the 1970's
intensive
mass
produ
"economic miracles" als
with significant disrup
waves of struggle that
cles of the 1970's and 1
Keck, 1989; Moreira Al
Southall, 1985; Obrery,
in the 1970's to South K
berg,
1993).
These
wa
upturn registered by t
since the 1970's (see Ta
One
of
the
responses
movements has been a
production (from Brazi
more
peripheral
sites
(Silver, 1993). If past exp
geographical relocation
sites
of
disinvestment
movements
too
soon
to
in
the
new
expect
f
maj
15 For an analogous interpret
notably the Polish "economic
(1992b:
Ch.
2).
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 183
upturn in the WLG's labor unrest indicator for t
the 1980's is consistent with our hypothesis that s
the epicenters of labor unrest follow successive sh
of production. Moreover, recent reports of mount
in China (Tyler, 1994)- a new favorite site of in
further evidence in support of this hypothesis.
The Crisis of U.S. Hegemony and the Future of Wor
The upturn in labor unrest outside the core
coincides with an incipient crisis of U.S. hegem
the conceptual framework developed here, th
tween the time-space patterning of world-labor un
world-hegemony may not be accidental. Duri
1960's- the decades of solid U.S. hegemony- lab
worldwide. Cooptation through rising wages an
central mechanism of conflict containment in the core; while less
expensive forms of cooptation via developmentalism, nationalism,
and populism obtained in the semiperiphery and periphery.
But, with the sharp intensification of inter-capitalist competition
in the 1970's, as western Europe and Japan caught up with the U.S.
economic lead, old conflict-containment strategies have ceased to
function. Cooptation has become too expensive and has been
replaced, in the core, by geographical relocation, restructuring, and
union-busting. Likewise, in the periphery and semiperiphery (in-
cluding eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R.), International
Monetary Fund-imposed structural adjustment plans have overturned many populist social contracts. To date, the new conflict-
containment strategies have succeeded in virtually eliminating overt
expressions of labor unrest in the core. But, in the periphery and
semiperiphery, the result has been escalating conflict. The map of
labor unrest waves for 1986-90 (see Figure 8) shows widespread
conflict in the East and South. The core (with the exception of
Scandinavia) remains untouched.
As we have argued above, these divergent trends in core and
semiperiphery/periphery can be interpreted as two sides of the
same coin. Indeed, it could be argued that the "success" of the
conflict-containment mechanisms in the core is premised on the
ability of the core to "externalize" or "export" contradictions to the
periphery and semiperiphery. Whether there are limits to this
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184
Beverly
J.
oo
D
O
S
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Silver
WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 185
"externalization" process, and how/when they w
complex questions that lie beyond the bounds o
wise, the related question of whether we can exp
experience of the past cycle in which waves of lab
deepening crisis of hegemony were intertwined
open.
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188
Beverly
J.
Silver
Appendix 1
Construction of Labor Unrest Indicators
Most of the figures and tables in this essay are based on time
series derived from the World Labor Research Working Group
(WLG) Database, which itself was created by recording all mentions
of labor unrest from the indexes of the New York Times (from 18701990) and the Times (London) (from 1906-90). For a detailed discussion of the construction of this database see Silver, this issue.
Figure 1 charts the "maximum mentions" series for the world.
This world-level time series includes all countries for which there
were at least 85 mentions of labor unrest from 1906-90 in either of
the two newspaper sources (i.e., a minimum average of one mention per year). Seventy-five countries met this minimum threshold
(see Appendix B, this issue). For each of these countries a "maxi-
mum" time series of labor unrest mentions was created for the
years 1906-90. This was done by comparing the number of me
tions for each year from the two newspaper sources and takin
whichever number was larger for each year. The 75 country-lev
maximum mentions series were then aggregated into a single world
level "maximum mentions" series. (The time series of labor unr
mentions from 1870-1905 is composed of the mentions collect
from the New York Times Index only and is therefore not stric
comparable with the series after 1906.)
Figures 5, 6, and 7 chart the "maximum mentions" series fo
the organic core, organic semiperiphery, and organic peripher
respectively. Each of these aggregate series was created by summin
the maximum mentions series for the applicable countries. Arri
and DrangeFs (1986) classification was used to group countries
zone. Only countries that qualified as "organic" members of ea
zone were included in the zonal aggregates (i.e., only countries t
remained in one zone throughout the 50-year period covered i
Arrighi and Drangel's study [1986]). Non-organic members that m
the 85-mention threshold (e.g., countries such as Japan or Italy tha
moved from the semiperiphery to the core over the period of o
study) are included in the world-level series but not the zonal serie
Appendix B of this special issue shows the categorization of cou
tries by world-economic zone.
Figure 2 charts a "wave" series derived from the "maximum
mentions" series. Wave-years were calculated for each of the 7
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WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 189
countries that met the minimum mentions threshold. Two criteria
had to be met to qualify as a wave-year: the number of mentions in
the maximum mentions series had to be (1) at least 50% higher
than the average of the previous five years and (2) higher than the
overall average of the series for that country. For each year the
number of countries experiencing waves of labor unrest was
summed. A series which gives the percentage of countries experiencing waves of labor unrest in any given year was created from the
resulting series by dividing the latter by the total number of coun-
tries in the series. Up until 1950 the denominator was 72; from
1950-71 it was 74 (with the addition of Pakistan and East Germany); from 1972-90 it was 75 (reflecting the addition of Bangladesh). Appendix B of this special issue specifies the 75 countries
included in the series.
The country wave series discussed above were used to create the
world maps indicating countries experiencing labor unrest waves in
various key periods (Figures 3, 4, and 8).
Wave-years were also calculated for the organic core, organic
semiperiphery, and organic periphery. The procedure was analogous to that used for the world-level calculation. The Arrighi and
Drangel (1986) classification scheme was used. These series were
then used in Table 3 (see below).
For Table 2, the "maximum mentions" and the "waves" worldlevel time series each were divided into two equal time periods:
1911-50 and 1951-90. Table 2 shows the mean level of mentions
and waves for each period. For both series the standard deviation
was calculated for each period (as an indicator of relative explosiveness). Finally, two criteria were used to single out exceptional years
of world-level labor unrest. Explosion years were defined as years in
which the number of mentions/ waves was equal to twice the mean
of the mentions/waves series. High deviations from the mean were
years in which the number of mentions/ waves was greater than the
mean number of mentions/waves plus the standard deviation for
the mentions/waves series.
Table 3 uses the same indicators as Table 2. The difference is
that the results are presented for the organic core, organic semiperiphery, and the organic periphery aggregates, as well as the
world-level aggregate.
Table 1 is based on an earlier elaboration of the WLG data. The
procedures used are discussed briefly in the text of this essay, and
more fully in Silver (1992a).
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190
Beverly
J.
Silver
Appendix 2
Labor Unrest "Maximum Mentions Series," 1906-90
Index: 1906-90=100
Year
World Core Semiperiphery Periphery
Index
Index
Index
Index
1906
43
47
69
1907
69
70
94
44
1908
47
59
35
41
1909
61
1910
82
1911
99
1912
103
120
137
108
1913
104
1914
1916
42
1917
1918
98
12
48
38
132
3
30
181
54
34
10
96
243
31
1
25
111
36
22
27
61
159
93
63
1915
21
0
0
10
58
122
0
12
1919
276
376
213
158
1920
242
262
254
201
1921
126
123
144
195
1922
128
118
203
170
1923
89
1924
1925
118
77
103
76
95
43
74
122
49
43
285
1926
74
99
23
149
1927
67
67
32
250
1928
86
84
51
303
1929
81
83
57
251
1930
89
89
118
105
1931
81
76
129
1932
86
83
157
1933
1934
76
70
127
1935
1936
145
166
1938
105
95
1940
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
I
28
64
83
86
195
206
I
50
159
77
56
75
20
38
53
33
77
124
181
249
16
25
128
58
37
96
34
100
28
62
233
248
1941
87
67
171
40
13
143
65
1937
1939
38
94
96
68
47
36
44
31
21
31
32
140
|
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9
27
222
WORLD-SCALE PATTERNS OF LABOR-CAPITAL CONFLICT 191
Appendix 2
Labor Unrest "Maximum Mentions Series," 1906-90
Index: 1906-90=100
Year
World Core Semipcriphery Periphery
Index
1948
155
1949
1950
Index
166
133
1951
189
202
135
138
1952
Index
86
48
62
66
137
122
117
97
Index
112
201
61
62
145
1953
120
98
42
213
1954
108
99
87
198
1955
151
171
244
1956
158
132
210
1957
1958
122
104
115
119
97
118
158
201
1959
133
1960
112
76
101
114
1961
95
156
109
95
95
105
189
81
69
1962
139
113
127
228
1963
128
125
77
176
1964
104
80
85
164
1965
105
87
111
149
1966
124
126
120
148
1967
75
71
88
100
1968
107
145
54
83
1969
94
82
67
96
1970
90
88
74
53
1971
88
91
59
61
1972
86
83
81
65
1973
100
100
162
33
1974
120
113
120
155
1975
92
76
137
64
1976
93
68
204
38
1977
102
90
105
127
1978
107
96
90
111
1979
75
79
63
90
1980
127
78
123
90
1981
143
74
80
124
1982
74
50
78
75
1983
62
35
104
49
1984
92
90
87
95
1985
69
41
118
112
1986
I
79
I
48
I
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192
Beverly
J.
Silver
Appendix 2
Labor Unrest "Maximum Mentions Series," 1906-90
Index: 1906-90=100
Year
World Core Scmipcriphcry Periphery
Index
Index
Index
Index
1987
69
29
148
81
1988
68
23
126
78
1989
1990
I
81
46
I
25
19
Note:
165
202
I
(1)
The
m
based on "mentions'* of labor unrest found in the indexes of the New York Times and the
Times (London). For an explanation of the procedures used to construct the maximum
mentions series, see Appendix 1 of this article. (2) Seventy-five countries met the minimum
threshold of 85 mentions of labor unrest during the years 1906-90, and were thus included
in the world index. The world index is the sum of the maximum mentions series for those
countries. (Sec Appendix B of this special issue for the listing of countries included.) (3)
Only those countries which were classified by Arrighi and Drangel (1986) as organic core,
organic semiperiphery, or organic periphery were included in the zonal indexes. (See
Appendix B of this special issue for the classification of countries.)
Source: WLG Database.
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