1. The first point source B is underlining is that, according to, Giampiero Carocci an Italian
historian, Mussolini did not take seriously the threat of British opposition to his invasion
of Abyssinia. In fact, despite the opposition from Britain in the League of Nations,
Mussolini was able to secure Ethiopia and the Empire.
Furthermore, a second point that the source states is that; due to the weakness of the
British navy after years of disarmament, the British government wished to avoid war at
all costs. A source states, "The British government wished to avoid war at all costs
because of the weakness of their navy after years of disarmament,". By underlining how
Mussolini, through his secret services, fully exploited his knowledge of the weakness of
the British navy, according to Carocci.
As a result, Mussolini didn't need to take British opposition seriously, knowing that the
British were too weak to confront Italy militarily and were more concerned with other
threats such as Japan and Germany. Apart from not imposing significant sanctions, such
as against gasoline or closing the Suez Canal to Italian ships, Britain did not take
Mussolini's resistance seriously.
(b) One message that source C conveys is that, as shown in the cartoon published in the
newspaper Daily Dispatch, showing us two figures on the front page. In the back we
see an old woman, looking kind and exhausted, that is representing the League of
nations, he is holding in his hands a tiny man, representing Mussolini. In fact, by
analyzing the source we can state, that Mussolini is represented as a Child for his
poor behavior he needs to be controlled, by a superior force. Moreover, we can see
how the league of nations is having difficulties taking care of Mussolini, probably due
to his failure by stopping him to invade Abyssinia. Finally, in the background of the
carton, we can see a bottle of castor oil, and soothing syrup, techniques used by
fascists during ww2.
2. Source A is a document written by Anthony Eden, who was British foreign minister
during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 this is considered a first-hand resource. It is
most likely that the document is a speech or diplomatic message regarding British policy
toward the crisis.
The ability to understand the British government's views on the Abyssinian crisis is one
of the main strengths of Source A. Since Eden was the foreign minister and one of the
main decision-makers in the British government at the time, his document probably
reflects the attitudes and positions of the ruling class at the time. Because it provides a
first-hand report on British strategy toward the issue, it may be useful for historians
researching the diplomatic history of the time.
Source A may also bring to light the internal conversations and arguments about the
situation that occurred within the British administration. For example, Eden may have
discussed the other choices being considered, including economic sanctions, military
involvement, or diplomatic talks. When trying to understand the complexity of the
judgment process, historians may find this paper helpful.
On the other hand, also has some disadvantages. To begin with, it may not be entirely
clear or objective in its analysis because it is a personal autobiography, where he justified
himself for his failure, as a politician he might have just expressed what was convenient
for him. Eden may have offered a specific viewpoint on the issue for political reasons,
which may have led to a one-sided view or the use of only some evidence. While Source
A focuses on British strategy and may not consider the views of other important figures,
just as the League of Nations, Italy, or Ethiopia, who may also think differently and
provide a complete and different picture of the issue.
In conclusion, Source A can be a useful tool for historians studying the Abyssinian crisis,
it is crucial to be aware of its limitations and combine it with other sources and
perspectives to develop a more complete and accurate picture of events.