Succession cases
1. Perez v Tolete
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, USA.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to
his wife “all the remainder” of his real and personal property at the time of his
death “wheresoever situated.” In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael Jr. as substitute executor. In his will, Dr. Jose provided
that should he and his wife die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of their deaths, the presumption is that he died
first.
Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament, containing the
same provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she provided that should she and
her husband died under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of their deaths, it should be presumed that he died first.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as trustee and
substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate
thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. The wills
were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to
the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed as
special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a
farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. She was granted letters of special administration
and posted bond in the amount of PHP 10,000.00. As special administratrix, Salud
consolidated the assets of the Cunanan spouses, including the bank deposits of Dr.
Jose.
The RTC Judge ruled that the probate of two wills in a single proceeding is not
procedural.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two wills probated outside the Philippines may be reprobated in
the Philippines.
RULING:
In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two
wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation. Respondent Judge's view that the Rules on allowance of
wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses
is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be
"liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice.
2. Avena v Garcia, 42 Phil 145
FACTS:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the
will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez,
the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia.
Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one
of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full
possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was
corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of
sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed.
He accordingly admitted the will to probate.
On appeal, the probate was questioned because of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each
page of the will instead of the left margin.
ISSUE:
Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the
signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the
right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
RULING:
Yes. The will is valid.
A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing
law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator
and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left.
Some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial that it
would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive
importance to them. The provision to the effect that the signatures of the testator
and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page — rather than on the
right margin — seems to be of this character. So far as concerns the authentication
of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether
the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or
the other.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page,
and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these
signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the mode of signing
here adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded
from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been
protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could
be exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the
consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.
3. Estate of Tampoy v Alberastine, L-14322, Feb. 25, 1960
FACTS:
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and
testament of one Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in accordance
with law and petitioner had presented oral and documentary evidence, the trial
court denied the petition on the ground that the left-hand margin of the first page
of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix.
Petitioner prays that this ruling be set aside for the reason that, although the first
page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however
expresses her true intention to give the property to her whose claims remains
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any opposition to the
probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed by
the three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for
probate is unopposed, the three testimonial witnesses
testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and
voluntary will of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will can be admitted probate despite the absence of testatrix’s
signature on the 1st page of the will.
RULING:
No. It cannot be probated. Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the
testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the
witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed
in the attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with
it is fatal to the validity of the will Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing
the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A
will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power or
discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with
those enumerated in the statutes".
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the
three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails
to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.
4. Re Andrada, 42 Phil 180
FACTS:
Lucina Andrada died on June 5, 1919, in the Municipality of Capiz, Province of
Capiz; and soon thereafter a petition was presented to the Court of First Instance of
Capiz by Lucila Arce to establish a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased. The trial court declared that the document in question
had not been executed in conformity with the requirements of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature,
thus, denying probate.
The attesting clause of the will in question is incorporated in the will itself,
constituting the last paragraph thereof; and its defect consists in the fact that it
does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which. The will is written,
though it does state that the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses signed on
every page, as is in fact obvious from an inspection of the instrument. Each of the
pages moreover bears successively the Visayan words, "isa," "duha," "tatlo,"
"apat," "lima," which mean respectively "one," "two," "three," "four," "five,"
Visayan being the dialect in which the instrument is written.
By section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is
required that each and every page of the will shall be numbered correlatively in
letters and that the attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will be denied probate for failure to comply with the
requirement that each and every page of the will shall be numbered correlatively in
letters and that the attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used.
RULING:
Yes. Such failure is fatal to the will’s validity.
The law plainly says that the attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages
used, the evident purpose being to safeguard the document from the possibility of
the interpolation of additional pages or the omission of some of the pages actually
used. It is true that this point is also safeguarded by the other two requirements
that the pages shall be consecutively lettered and that each page shall be signed on
the left margin by the testator and the witnesses. In the light of these requirements
it is really difficult to see any practical necessity for the additional requirement that
the attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used. Nevertheless,
it cannot be denied that the last mentioned requirement affords additional security
against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has
seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material.
5. Singson v Florentino, L-4603, Oct. 25, 1952
FACTS:
On January 13, 1948, Leona Singson died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, leaving a will. In
said will the deceased instituted as heirs her brothers Evaristo, Dionisio and Manuel,
her nieces Rosario F. de Donato, Emilia Florentino and Trinidad Florentino de Paz,
her grandniece Consolacion Florentino, and some servants. She named her brothers
Evaristo and Manuel as executors of the will. On February 2, 1948, Manuel Singson
filed a petition for the probate of said will.
On March 6, 1948, Emilia Florentino, Trinidad Florentino de Paz and Josefina
Florentino Vda. de Lim, daughters of a sister of the deceased, opposed the petition
alleging among other grounds that the signatures appearing in the will are not the
genuine signatures of the deceased, and that the will has not been executed in
accordance with the formalities of the law.
The lower court, however, admitted the will’s probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
the sheets or pages in which the will is written which, it is claimed, is fatal because
it is contrary to the express requirement of the law.
RULING:
No. There is substantial compliance with the law.
Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, requires
that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which
the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an
effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of
the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended
to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; xxx). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will
itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part
of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages,
which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of
construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more
liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations.
Considering the form in which the will in question is written in the light of the liberal
ruling above adverted to, the conclusion is inescapable that the will has been
drafted in substantial compliance with the law. This opinion is bolstered up when we
examine the will itself which shows on its face that it is really and actually
composed of eight pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses.
The remaining question to be determined is: does the attestation clause state that
the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the three
instrumental witnesses as required by law?
A perusal of the attestation clause would at first glance give the impression that the
testatrix merely signed or stamped her thumbmark on the will in the presence of
the witnesses, without stating the place where her signature or thumbmark had
been affixed, which impression is caused by the fact that right after the sentence
firmo e imprimio su marca digital en presencia de todos nosotros, there appears a
semicolon; but if this semicolon is disregarded, we would at once see that the
testatrix signed or affixed her thumbmark not only at the bottom of the will but also
on the left margin of each and every page thereon, considering the concluding part
of the sentence concerning the signing of the will. That semicolon undoubtedly has
been placed there by mistake or through inadvertence, as may be deduced from
the use of the word tambien made by the witnesses in the sentence immediately
following, which conveys the idea of oneness in action both on the part of the
testatrix and the witnesses. Thus considered and interpreted, the attestation clause
complies substantially with the law.
6. Diaz v De Leon, 43 Phil 413
FACTS:
The case involves an allege revocation of the will executed by Jesus de Leon. The
petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging
that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will
expressly revoking the former.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by
him. RULING:
No. There was no valid revocation.
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after
the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him.
The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the
document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this
effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the
will, said that it had been destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the
testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first
will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statement to the witnesses Canto
and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.
The Original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo
revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
7. Payad v Tolentino, 62 Phil 846
FACTS:
Upon her death, the will of Leoncia Tolentino was submitted to the court for
probate. The court found that the will in question was executed by the deceased on
the date appearing thereon, September 7, 1933, one day before the death of the
testatrix, contrary to the contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her
death. The court, however, denied
probate on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the
requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused
Attorney Almario to write her name at her express direction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will be denied probate for failure of the attestation clause to
state that testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction.
RULING:
No. The will should be probated.
The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by
Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the
questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place
where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign
for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page
thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made
by the testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney
Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in
accordance with law.
8. Garcia v Lacuesta, 90 Phil 489
FACTS:
The case involves the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will
appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of
Antero Mercado, followed below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of
Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately
after his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that
the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the
will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence
of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the
signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said
testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the
three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the
three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause failed to comply with the formal requirements
provided by law.
RULING:
Yes. It is failed to comply with the formal requisites of law.
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein
petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross
written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of
Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as
much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this
Court in the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs.
Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil.,
296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature
of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After
mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a
thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether there is a
sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator
in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator
and of each other.
9. Cruz v Villasor, 54 SCRA 31
FACTS:
The case involves the the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valente
Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said
deceased, opposed the allowance of the will, alleging that the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said
instrument was executed without the testator having been fully informed of the
contents thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing; and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will
and testament. Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.
ISSUE:
Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the
first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will,
and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will
before a notary public.
RULING:
No. The will was not executed in accordance with Articles 805 and 806 of the new
Civil Code.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely, Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr.,
Dr. Francisco Pañares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named,
is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have
been acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was attested and
subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of each other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before
the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public
himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before
the notary public to acknowledge the will.
The Court ruled that the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before
means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in
front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed
the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary
public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the
validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very
purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of the Code
Commission p. 106-107), would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article
805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been
said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for that purpose. In
the circumstances, the law would not be duly observed.
10. Gan v Yap, 104 Phil 509
FACTS:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in
the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of
first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed
by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San
Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for
reconsideration failed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will of the decedent can be probated. RULING:
No. The alleged will cannot be probated.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes,
Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814.
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be
subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;
such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirement to be fulfilled when
such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of
one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient, if there is no opposition (Sec.
5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony of
such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion
as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances of
its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they
are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The
law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated
to be — or not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one
witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses
shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's
handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted
to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the
holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they
may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor
may present other witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some
expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the
deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the
hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such
contradictory testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity
— the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940, allow proof (and probate) of a lost
or destroyed will by secondary evidence — the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the
original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
which could not then be validly made here.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of
either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think
it spurious. 5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for
their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway
the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if
genuine, a right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof
from them.