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27 October 2022
Just Missing the Mark
In the wake of the recent Afghanistan pullout, the US military has made great
efforts to modernize and expand its capabilities. The United States Army demonstrates
this the clearest perhaps with the NGSW program, a significant overhaul to the standard
infantryman’s issued kit that seems bent on incorporating the knowledge gained from
the protracted conflict in Afghanistan. This program seeks to replace the standard issue
M4A1 service rifle and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon with two new and distinctive
fire control systems. The NGSW program also seeks to introduce a new smart optic, but
what is perhaps the most interesting requirement for the bids was that this new rifle and
light machine gun needed to be chambered in a 6.8 caliber round. This controversial
requirement represents a massive shift from the M4A1 and M249, which are both
chambered in the 5.56x45 NATO round, and there are many critics of this new program
for this reason alone. The United States Army’s adoption of the 6.8x51 or 277 Fury
cartridge as a replacement for the traditional 5.56x45 cartridge in standard infantry
rifles is overall a beneficial decision due to its superior ballistic profile and increased
soldier lethality. However, the Army would be better served by instead supplementing
with the 6.8x51 round while incorporating the bimetallic case design into the existing
5.56x45 weapons platforms.
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In order to better understand the consequences that changing caliber has, an
understanding of the capabilities of the current round is necessary. The critical question
is why switch calibers from an existing round that already has an established logistics
and supply chain? It is important to note that 5.56x45 (specifically the M855 variant)
was adopted in 1970 with the intent to standardize NATO countries’ ammunition, but
with regards to the basic dimensions, it is essentially the same round as the .223
Remington (Hornady). The .223 Remington was first developed in 1962 specifically for a
new service rifle intended for troops in Vietnam, a similar origin to the 6.8x51 (Orkand
and Duryea 52). This means that the .223 Remington and subsequent 5.56x56 cartridges
have remained in service for around 60 years, and as time has gone on, some significant
limitations have arisen. Major Thomas P. Ehrhart of the U.S. Army highlighted a few of
these limitations that were encountered in Afghanistan, specifically by combining his
preface that soldiers need to be able to engage targets out to 500 meters and parroting
numerous military studies and ballistic tests, saying that “the M855 cartridge is most
effective to a distance of 200 meters after which its effectiveness is limited unless hitting
a vital area of the target” (26). He continues, elaborating that the M855 is not a
particularly effective round at distance due to its construction. With the decreased
velocity out of the shorter M4 barrel, increased stability at distance due to the relatively
monolithic bullet construction, and the ability to penetrate light barriers because of the
steel penetrator, the M855 variant of 5.56x45 is simply not a very lethal round (Ehrhart
26). These factors all result in decreased yawing and fragmentation on impact, the very
factors that made the original .223 Remington design effective out of the original
XM16E1 in Vietnam. The Iraq War provided more examples of M855’s inadequacies
according to a paper from the Naval Postgraduate School, which stated that “Not long
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into the war, soldiers began to give reports of the 5.56x45 mm ammunition, henceforth
designated as the M855, failing to adequately incapacitate enemy combatants”
(Wesolowski 24). While the M855 was eventually replaced in 2010 by the M855A1
variant, the subsequent round still suffered from similar flaws. Though the M855A1
boasts increased barrier penetration capabilities, enhanced accuracy, and improved soft
target terminal effects, the effective range of the 5.56x45 cartridge is not extended
(Wesolowski 35). Clearly then, there is a limitation in the capabilities of the average
infantryman that has not been addressed. In an effort to address this problem, the Army
has opted for adopting a new cartridge.
The NGSW contract had three primary bidders that all put forward a different 6.8
round for adoption. The winner of this contract, Sig Sauer, had a unique bid in that their
proposed 6.8x51 or 277 Fury round consisted of a bimetallic cartridge case that ‘is a
three-piece cartridge where the brass part of the case encompasses the body, shoulder,
and neck, the base of the case is stainless steel, and the third piece mechanically bonds
the stainless base and brass body together inside the case’ (Sim). This unorthodox
design allows the 6.8x51 round to excel in many places where the 5.56x45 fell short. The
primary advantage stems from the cartridge’s ability to handle pressures exceeding that
of traditional rounds, which according to SAAMI (Sporting Arms and Ammunition
Manufacturers' Institute) specifications are up to 80,000 PSI compared to M855A1’s
reported 61,830 PSI (Small Arms Solutions LLC). What this means is that in
conjunction with modern bullet design, the 6.8x51 round is able to vastly outperform
the M855A1 or any 5.56x45 round. Looking back to the specifications, SAAMI states that
the test round that was evaluated was a 135 grain bullet that was going 3,000 feet per
second at muzzle velocity out of a 16” barrel, an impressive display of performance for a
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round that is over twice as heavy as the current M855A1 round. Considering that the
6.8x51 round is ballistically superior in terms of aerodynamics and that this specific
loading is intended for civilian use, it can be anticipated that the actual performance of
6.8x51 military rounds is going to be even better both at the muzzle and at distance. In
sum, the 6.8x51 round clearly dominates the currently issued 5.56x45 ammo on a
technical level.
On a non-technical level, all of this data essentially means that the new NGSW
round greatly enhances soldier capability and lethality. Army Magazine puts it simply by
quoting ‘St. John’ from Sig Sauer, “you are going to be able to go shoot farther, stay in
that supersonic range a lot longer, have more predictability in your ballistic curves while
shooting flatter in windy conditions” (Gourley). This new round performs better in
nearly every aspect of ballistics, having the soldier do less guesswork while firing fewer
rounds down range to achieve these better results. Interestingly, this reflects a similar
outcome that was experienced when the Marine Corps began to adopt the M27 Infantry
Automatic Rifle (IAR) as their replacement for the M249. Small Arms Defense Journal
published an article that quoted Jeffrey Eby, a Senior Gunner for the Marine Corps who
stated that “Experiments by Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity
(MCOTEA) proved that the M27 significantly outperformed the M249 in suppression,
used significantly less ammunition and had less downtime during reloads when total
down time was measured through a full combat load of ammunition. This was especially
true at night [...]” (Bruce 1). Essentially, while the M27 IAR is fed ammunition by
smaller box magazines compared to the M249’s belt-fed mechanism, the Marines found
that they did not lose suppressive fire capabilities. In fact, they found that their
suppressive fire capabilities were enhanced by the increased accuracy of the system.
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This provides an excellent parallel to the 6.8x51 round, which is intended to be fired at a
lower rate of fire than the current doctrine dictates in exchange for greater accuracy.
Overall, the new 6.8x51 round is more accurate, shoots farther, and hits harder.
However, despite all of the increased capability that the 6.8x51 round offers, it does have
some downsides.
There are a few main arguments that are made against the adoption of the 6.8x51
or 277 Fury, all of which have their own merits. One of the primary disadvantages is the
weight of the ammo. Staff Sergeant Michael Reinsch of the Army News Service said in
regards to the new combat load that “Currently the [NGSW rifle] basic combat load is
seven, 20-round magazines, which weighs 9.8 pounds. For the [NGSW light machine
gun] the basic combat load is four 100-round pouches, at 27.1 pounds. For comparison:
the M4 carbine combat load, which is seven 30-round magazines, weighs 7.4 pounds,
and the M249 light machine gun combat load, which is three 200-round pouches,
weighs 20.8 pounds.” The new ammo represents a decrease in 70 rounds of ammunition
for the standard infantryman and a decrease in 200 rounds for the auto rifleman. Not
only are these soldiers getting less ammunition, but they are trading it for increased
weight, as the new loads are 2.4 lbs and 6.3 lbs respectively. While the increased soldier
lethality and accuracy supposedly make up for this loss in ammo and increase in weight,
it is still a sacrifice that some in the Army see as too great, especially when this is paired
with the argument of money. The adoption of a new caliber as the standard issue is
expensive. It means that new ammunition plants need to be built, new weapons need to
be provided, and tooling has to be manufactured. The adoption of 6.8x51 represents a
monumental logistical change in the Army’s current supply chain, and a successful
transition requires a large amount of money to achieve. This is best evidenced by the
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cost of the NGSW program, which the US Army stated had ‘a contract ceiling value of
$4.7 billion’ (U.S. Army Public Affairs). This money has to come from somewhere, and
many argue that the alternative programs and allocations for that money are “better”
than the adoption of a whole new caliber and weapon system. Furthermore, this leads to
the argument that full-size rifle calibers already exist and are in production and that the
conversion to a new caliber does not offer suitable improvements over these existing
calibers. The most common example of this is 7.62x51 NATO, which already is produced
in great quantities and boasts increased performance to the 5.56x45 caliber at a
comparatively reduced cost. The counterargument is that 7.62x51 is not enough of a
performance increase over 5.56x45 to warrant a full replacement, whereas 6.8x51 at the
least is a substantial increase in performance. Ultimately, the military considered these
increased performance metrics as “enough” to invest the money and time that they did
into the NGSW program.
So while 6.8x51 is certainly a massive improvement over the 5.56x45 cartridge,
there is arguably a better alternative than simply replacing 5.56x45 entirely. It is entirely
possible that the technology utilized in the new 6.8x51 round could be adapted for usage
in the 5.56x45 round if all that is needed is a new metal base and locking washer. This
design would conceivably have the same effects on the 5.56x45 round as it does on the
6.8x51; it would allow for the round to be loaded to higher pressures. According to the
Sig Sauer website, the commercially available 277 Fury ammunition that does not
include the steel base has a muzzle velocity of 2,750 feet per second compared to the 277
Fury with the base, which has a muzzle velocity of 3,000 feet per second according to
SAAMI specifications. Science shows that a heavier object is harder to accelerate faster,
so with a lighter round like M855A1, the velocity gains of such a design would be
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significant. If a new M855A1 round could be adapted in such a way that it could be
propelled to 3,500 feet per second or more, the round would theoretically have a flatter
trajectory, maintain more terminal energy, and pierce through barriers more effectively.
This would require a partial redesign of some of the M4 carbine’s components, but this
would not be as costly as fully replacing the rifle. To properly account for this increased
pressure, a new barrel with a reinforced chamber would have to be used in conjunction
with a stronger bolt, both of which would be pocket change compared to a new rifle. If
the increased recoil presents itself as a problem, all that is necessary to replace is the
spring or buffer system, which once again is a relatively cheap component to replace
comparatively speaking. In addition to the reduced costs that this solution offers, it also
disturbs squad dynamics and military doctrine less than a full replacement of the
5.56x45. The US Department of Defense says that the standard infantry squad in the
United States Army consists of nine men split into a squad leader and two fire teams.
The loadout of each soldier within this squad is highly situational and varies greatly,
however, so it is easier to go off an understanding of roles. For instance, riflemen,
grenadiers, squad leaders, and similar carry M4s whereas auto riflemen and machine
gunners carry M249s and M240s. In the instance where a squad has a designated
marksman or similar, they could be using M110s or SR-25s. However, if a 40-40-20 split
were adopted, the squad loadout could be relatively standardized. 40% of men in a
squad that would traditionally carry an M4 would adopt the higher power 5.56x45
ammunition while the other 40% would simply use the newer NGSW rifle that fires the
6.8x51. The remaining 20% is allocated to the auto riflemen and machine gunners who
would adopt the new NGSW light machine gun in 6.8x51. This split obviously would
change based on the composition of the squad and mission objectives, but in general,
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this split is flexible enough to save money while also preserving current squad
configurations.
In conclusion, the new 6.8x51 round for the NGSW program shows a great deal of
promise. It has both increased ballistic and terminal performance over the current issue
5.56x45 round, which greatly increases soldier lethality. However, the very same
technology that allows for the 6.8x51 to perform as well as it does could be applied to the
5.56x45 round. This would increase the capability of the 5.56x45 round while only
requiring relatively cheap upgrades to the M4A1 carbine. This would overall decrease
the costs of the NGSW program while reducing the amount of change that must be made
to current military doctrine or squad dynamics. Therefore, while the 6.8x51 is an
excellent round, the military would be better served by partially implementing this
cartridge while upgrading existing 5.56x45 ammunition and weapon systems.
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Works Cited
“277 SIG FURY.” SAAMI New Cartridge & Chamber, 23 Sept. 2020,
https://saami.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/277-Sig-Public-Introduction-Or
ig-2020-11-11.pdf. Accessed 27 Oct. 2022.
“Army Officials Brief the Media on the Next Generation Squad Weapon.” Army.Mil, U.S.
Army Public Affairs, 21 Apr. 2022,
https://www.army.mil/article/255909/army_officials_brief_the_media_on_the
_next_generation_squad_weapon.
Bartocci, Christopher. “The M855A1.” Small Arms Solutions LLC, Small Arms
Solutions, 12 Nov. 2017, https://smallarmssolutions.com/home/the-m855a1.
Ehrhart, Thomas P. School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
2009, Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the
Infantry Half-Kilometer.
“Elite Ball FMJ 277 Sig Fury.” SIG SAUER, Sig Sauer,
https://www.sigsauer.com/elite-ball-fmj-277-sig-fury.html.
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Gourley, Scott. “New Weapons for Squads.” Army Magazine, vol. 72, no. 8, Aug. 2022,
pp. 62–64. EBSCOhost,
https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=
aph&AN=158132887&site=ehost-live.
“Military Units: Army.” U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Military-Units/Army/#army.
Orkand, Bob, and Lyman Duryea. Misfire: The Tragic Failure of the M16 in Vietnam.
Stackpole Books, 2019.
Plaster, John L. “Testing the Army's M855A1 Standard Ball Cartridge.” NRA American
Rifleman, National Rifle Association, 21 May 2014,
https://www.americanrifleman.org/content/testing-the-army-s-m855a1-standar
d-ball-cartridge/.
Plaster, John L. “Testing the Army's M855A1 Standard Ball Cartridge.” NRA American
Rifleman, National Rifle Association, 21 May 2014,
https://www.americanrifleman.org/content/testing-the-army-s-m855a1-standar
d-ball-cartridge/.
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Reinsch, Michael. “NGSW Signifies an Evolution in Soldier Lethality.” Army.Mil, Army
News Service, 13 May 2022,
https://www.army.mil/article/256697/ngsw_signifies_an_evolution_in_soldier
_lethality.
Sim, Levi. “.277 Sig Fury Demystified.” GunsAmerica Digest, GunsAmerica Digest, 22
Dec. 2019, https://www.gunsamerica.com/digest/277-sig-fury-demystified/.
Wesolowski, Adam. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2016, HUNTING
THE GHOST GUN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY RIFLE.
“What Is the Difference between 5.56 NATO and 223 REM Ammunition?” Hornady
Law Enforcement & Military, Hornady,
https://www.hornadyle.com/resources/le-faq/what-is-the-difference-between-5
56-nato-and-223-rem-ammunition.