Addressing nuclear new build construction risks:
some pointers on risk management in plant
construction from former Finnish chief regulator
Author: Jukka Laaksonen
Date: Ju ne 2016
From: Nuclear Engineering I nternational(Vol. 61, Issue 743)
Publisher: NS Media Grou p Limited
Docu ment Type: Article
Length: 3,379 words
Ful l Text:
Looking at past nuclear construction projects, eg, in Finland, what are the factors that contributed to
success?
* Developer/owner/operator's strong ownership of the project
From the outset, the utility/developer/owner/operator has a strong management organisation that closely
monitors and assesses design, manufactu ring and construction works, even in the case of tu rnkey
projects. This inspires good performance from the vendor.
I n addition there are direct and open lines of commu nication between developer/owner/operator and the
regulatory body. Formal commu nication is su pported by informal contacts to ensu re correct mutual
u nderstanding.
Participants share the common goal of finding acceptable technical solutions to problems encou ntered
du ring construction.
* Vendor takes ful l responsibility for its work
The vendor and developer/owner/operator cooperate constructively, emphasising their joint interest in
building a safe and reliable plant to the planned schedule and meeting quality targets.
The vendor has a strong management system for assu ring quality of its own work and of the work of al l
subcontractors.
The vendor demonstrates its sense of responsibility by correcting swiftly and without hesitation identified
non-conformances.
Systematic information transfer is established within and between organisations involved in the project
implementation.
Adequacy of information transfer is monitored and confirmed by regular audits.
* Experience and professional competence of al l parties
Many of those responsible for design and manufactu ring have a solid backgrou nd in research and
development work, and have contributed to production of technical codes and standards and are familiar
with the backgrou nd to the requirements.
Experience of project managers often extends to construction of more than one nuclear plant.
Projects are managed by teams with adequate knowledge of nuclear technologies and good internal
commu nication, permitting information exchange between different technical discipline.
* Positive business environment
Looking back to the 1970s, when most of the cu rrently operating fleet was constructed, the nuclear
industry was relatively strong. The power plant vendors had plenty of orders, the futu re looked bright.
Each vendor cou ntry had domestic manufactu ring capacity that was able to su pply most of the
components. The vendors themselves had extensive and experienced engineering departments and
comprehensive in-house capabilities in design and manufactu ring.
Examples of success
Loviisa 1 and 2
Loviisa was the first nuclear power plant in Finland, and prior to this project a national nuclear
infrastructu re was almost non-existent.
At start of the project the utility had only a handful of experts with nuclear experience, acquired via a
Triga Mark I I reactor and/or the carrying out of reactor and thermal physics calculations.
On the other hand the utility had a strong engineering department with previous experience from design
and construction of hydro and fossil-fired power plants.
The nuclear regulatory body was established inside the existing radiation protection institute, STUK,
starting from one person in 1968 and achieving a level of about 50 professionals in 1975.
The Finnish technical research centre, VTT, had, from the late 1960s onwards, know-how in materials
research and testing, safety analysis, reactor physics, reliability calculations, and nuclear plant systems
simulation. VTT developed sufficient competence to verify independently the safety relevant information
received from the vendor. This was a necessary condition set by STUK for an operating licence.
The utility (licensee) was responsible for project management and took ownership of safety and quality
assu rance.
I n addition to general project management, the utility was also responsible for parts of the design,
equipment pu rchase, and site works.
Utility staff designed electrical systems and civil structu res, notably the ice condenser containment,
u nder the licence and guidance of Westinghouse.
Electrical, I&C, and ventilation equipment, plus certain auxiliaries, eg, the seawater cooling system,
were pu rchased from separate contractors.
I nspections of nuclear fuel and mechanical equipment were conducted at manufactu rers before shipping
to site.
Civil construction and the instal lation of electrical, I&C, and ventilation systems were conducted u nder
direct su pervision of utility experts.
Prior to start-u p, the utility developed the skil ls needed to operate and maintain the plant (independent of
vendor su pport), including reactor core calculations, in-service inspections, and water chemistry.
Atomenergoexport (AEE) of Russia, as main su pplier, listened to requests from the customer and was
committed to meeting Finnish nuclear regulatory and quality requirements.
AEE provided most process systems and mechanical equipment: reactor and fuel; primary circuit;
tu rbine plant; and most auxiliary systems.
The plant was designed to be very different from the original reference plant, with the objective of
meeting US requirements set out in ten CFR 50, Appendixes A and B.
Significantly, departu res from the reference plant were implemented in lay-out and al l safety, electrical
and I&C systems.
The reference design was reproduced in reactor and fuel, reactor vessel and its internals, steam
generators, tu rbine plant (although with modified lay-out), and some auxiliary systems.
The successful outcome of the project and rapid implementation of design changes was much facilitated
by the experience, competence, and cooperative attitude of the Soviet experts.
Loviisa 1 started power production about five and a half years after the first concrete casting.
Since start-u p, the plant has operated almost without any forced outages for more than 38 years, with an
annual load factor of arou nd 90%.
The construction time and the high levels of safety and reliability in operation demonstrate that the
project has been able to cope with potential sou rces of trouble, such as: a major redesign of the layout
and safety systems du ring the early stages of construction; very limited experience and knowledge of
nuclear technology initial ly on the Finnish side; strict regulatory oversight, which was a new experience
for the su ppliers; and different native languages of key people (Russian, Finnish, German),
necessitating interpreters for commu nication.
Barakah
A more recent example of nuclear construction success is provided by the Barakah project, the first
nuclear power plant in an Arabic cou ntry and the first export project of the South Korean nuclear
industry, u nder a contract signed in 2009.
Fou r u nits are u nder construction in paral lel and are planned to start u p at one year intervals, starting in
2017.
The reference plant is Shin Kori 3, which was su pposed to start u p in 2013 but was delayed by two years,
principal ly by cable quality issues (see below). It was connected to the grid and su pplied first electricity
in January 2016, with commercial operation expected in May 2016.
The Barakah plant has been built to the planned schedule and it seems that targeted start-u p dates wil l be
achieved although several significant changes to enhance safety are being implemented, including
u pgrades based on lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi and 911.
Among the factors contributing to success to date are:
* strong political su pport from government and determined building of the national nuclear and
technology infrastructu re;
* experience col lected from the South Korean nuclear new build programme, which has been u nderway
since 1972;
* continuous development of the nuclear plant design, building on the Combustion Engineering 80+
model;
* very strong and experienced international project management team working for the utility and
cooperating wel l with the vendor team;
* experienced international management team and foreign experts working for the regulatory body;
* successful recruitment of talented local people, cou pled with an extensive training programme in the
UAE and abroad.
Delays and cost increases
At the other end of the spectru m are nuclear new build projects beset by delays and cost increases. What
are the factors contributing to these problems?
* First of a kind plant--absence of a detailed design
Example: The contract for Ol kiluoto 3 in Finland was signed and a promise of first power in 2009 was
given although the design was only at a conceptual stage, and the su pplier had never real ly faced a
rigorous regulatory process.
The main contract was signed in December 2003 and the construction licence, accompanied by a large
nu mber of conditions, was issued in February 2005. The licensing decision was made in good faith, with
the u nderstanding that open issues would be resolved in the early stage of construction.
First concrete for the reactor building bottom plate was pou red in late su mmer 2005 but after that the
vendor had no more work drawings.
Readiness to start erection of reactor building wal ls was not achieved u ntil late spring 2007, when the
detailed design had been completed--at that time the construction was already delayed by two years and
also after that each concrete casting took more time than scheduled.
* First of a kind plant--increase in component sizes
Example: AREVA's EPR, at 1600MWe net, is larger than any other previous PWR.
Manufactu ring of the primary circuit components, main primary coolant pipes, the tu rbine and the
generator has been a chal lenge.
Manufactu ring of some of the large components and large subassemblies failed at the first attempt and
re-manufactu ring was required.
On a positive note, AREVA demonstrated its safety responsibilities by rejecting failed pieces on its own
initiative.
Due to delays for other reasons, failu res in manufactu ring have not impacted on the main schedule in the
case of Ol kiluoto 3.
* First of a kind plant--new I&C technology
Example: Ol kiluoto 3 civil construction works and instal lation of mechanical components and pipes were
completed a cou ple of years ago but I&C system re-design, testing and instal lation are delaying the plant
start-u p, which is cu rrently scheduled for 2018.
Adequate reliability of programmable I&C systems has been difficult to prove in this and many other new
build and refu rbishment projects.
It seems that I&C system design and qualification are more advanced in some other fields of technology
where high levels of safety and reliability are required, eg, car and aviation industries.
Standards have been developed by I EC and I EEE for new nuclear equipment that require design and
qualification of new I&C platforms to be conducted in a traceable manner from the very first stages of
design because qualification by comprehensive testing is not feasible.
* First of a kind plant--new manufactu ring technology
Application of new manufactu ring technology can enhance the reliability of mechanical components but
demonstration of safety general ly needs testing and experience.
Example 1: Nozzles for connecting main coolant lines to the EPR reactor vessel are fitted and welded in a
new way that improves inspectability of welds, but the first welds required time consu ming repairs.
However, after the new techniques had been practiced and some experience gained, the quality was
much improved.
Example 2: The cylindrical part of 1200MW WER pressu re vessel, ie the section arou nd the reactor core,
can now be manufactu red in one piece without welds. However, there is a need to demonstrate that
material properties over the whole height of the cylinder are at least as good as in the proven former
design, in which two shorter cylindrical pieces are joined with a weld at the reactor core height.
* First of a kind plant--new types of components
New types of component have been designed especial ly for passive safety systems. Such components
require thorough testing that prove their intended fu nction in al l design conditions.
Example: The main coolant pu mps of the Westinghouse AP-1000 PWR enhance safety because, u nlike
cu rrently operating Westinghouse plants, they have no seals that could cause loss of reactor coolant in
the event of a total loss of AC power. Demonstration of adequate pu mp reliability has required extensive
testing, resulting in construction delays for the first AP-1000 plants in China (although the problems are
now resolved).
* New business models in the industry
The nuclear business environment for vendors has changed significantly since the 1970s, especial ly in
Western Eu rope and North America: some vendors have very smal l or non-existent domestic markets;
export markets are reduced and highly competitive; design and manufactu ring are subcontracted
global ly in long su pply chains; management and oversight fu nctions are subcontracted; customer
cou ntries request localisation of manufactu ring and construction, often to companies that have no
nuclear experience and have limited capabilities for achieving quality.
It is not u nusual for lower level subcontractors to make bids without previous nuclear business
experience, and without knowledge of inspection practices and nuclear safety cultu re.
* Vendor failing to take onboard customer and regulator expectations
To better manage regulatory risks is necessary that vendors become wel l acquainted with the relevant
national nuclear regulations and safety requirements.
It is also important that the power company planning new construction has itself a clear u nderstanding of
the regulators' expectations and can provide a comprehensive set of national requirements to the vendor.
Fu rthermore, to avoid regulatory risks the vendors need an opportu nity to get direct explanations from
the regulator as to the intent of requirements that may not be expressed clearly enough.
It is also important that the vendor takes seriously the regulatory requirements.
Example: It seems that in the Ol kiluoto 3 case the vendor did not believe that the regulations were
seriously enforced. This caused problems especial ly in the area of I&C design.
* I nexperienced nuclear plant customer or regulator
I n some projects an inexperienced nuclear plant customer or regulator has enforced strict formal
requirements that actual ly do not influence the safety or reliability of the plant but only cause much work
and delay.
Especial ly in cou ntries that are planning to build their first nuclear power plant it is not u nusual for the
developer/power company and the regulatory body to have limited knowledge, with no capability for
proper safety assessment.
I n such situations it is necessary to al low time for training.
Example: I n Vietnam the start of nuclear power plant construction has been postponed by several years
to establish first a proper legislative and regulatory framework and to train the national experts in nuclear
technology and safety.
* False economy of cheap components
There are examples of misjudgments where an initial ly cheaper component has tu rned out to be very
expensive due to failu re to meet requirements and consequent negative impact to the project schedule.
Accu rate assessment of real capabilities of low cost manufactu rers is necessary before making a decision
on pu rchase.
* Deterioration of manufactu ring know-how
Starting new nuclear build after what amou nts to a moratoriu m of about ten years has tu rned out to be
difficult because many of the manufactu rers of nuclear components have moved out of the business and
those who remain have lost their most experienced staff to retirement.
Maintaining the quality certificates, quality management systems and manufactu ring specifications on
paper has been fou nd not to guarantee maintaining of the skil ls. Examples of elementary manufactu ring
errors have also been observed at the long established manufactu rers.
I n considering the capabilities of manufactu rers it is necessary to assess the situation at the shop floor
level: staffing; shop organisation; available equipment; and recently su pplied products.
* Cou nterfeit components
Fraud by some su ppliers and manufactu ring of cou nterfeit components is a new concern that requires
new approaches to quality assu rance.
Example: It was noticed in the autu mn of 2013 du ring construction of the Shin Kori 3 plant that cou nterfeit
cables had been instal led in key control systems. The fraudulent su pply by a South Korean manufactu rer
was revealed when the instal led control cabling failed to pass flame tests, as wel l as tests to confirm the
cable's performance in the event of a loss of coolant accident. Al l cables had to be replaced and the
incident (including al l necessary investigations) delayed the planned fuel loading by almost two years.
Fu rthermore, investigations conducted at operating plants prompted by the Shin Kori 3 incident showed
that safety related control cabling with falsified docu mentation had been instal led at fou r of KH N P's
reactors: Shin Kori u nits 1 and 2; and Shin Wolsu ng u nits 1 and 2. The regulator ordered KH N P to shut
down al l fou r reactors and not to operate them u ntil the cabling had been replaced.
Strategies and solutions
So, based on the foregoing, how can nuclear new build construction risks be minimised? Priorities
should include the fol lowing:
* National safety requirements
National safety requirements or proper references to recognised international or other cou ntries'
requirements need to be clearly specified as part of the licensing and regulatory framework.
* Understanding of regulatory practices
Understanding of regulatory practices is essential for successful project implementation.
Al l parties (vendor, developer, regulator) should be familiar with licensing, regulatory oversight, and
inspection practices both in the vendor cou ntry and in the customer cou ntry. The vendor should take
regulatory approach into accou nt in the project planning.
* Early contacts between vendor, customer and regulator
Early contacts between vendor, customer and regulator after signing the contract help to avoid licensing
u ncertainties.
Safety issues that could create u ncertainties in the licensing process need to be identified and thoroughly
discussed before applying for a construction licence.
Regular project management meetings and other direct contacts among the three parties at management
level are most useful.
Moving the vendor's project management to the site, and maintaining a continuous presence there,
significantly improves shared u nderstanding of cu rrent issues.
* Adequate decision making power
Adequate decision making power needs to be vested in the vendor's project management team, and
there needs to be clear separation of contractual issues from project management.
Decisions coming from the vendor's head office that go against a consensus on technical issues reached
in project meetings between al l parties are detrimental to smooth progress.
* Developer/owner/operator's responsibility for safety
The nuclear licensee (developer/owner/operator) is responsible for the safety of the plant, and needs to
verify du ring design and construction that it is getting a plant that is reliable and safe to operate.
This requires detailed oversight of the construction and manufactu ring, even in for a tu rnkey project.
The licensee management needs to build and implement a strong quality management system du ring the
construction phase, with the competence and resou rces to verify that safety and quality requirements
are being met, the ability to resolve non-conformances, the authority to require use of proven state-ofthe-art technology in manufactu ring and construction (not just to accept final products that meet minimu m
agreed quality requirements) and to ensu re the vendor uses only suitably qualified sub-contractors.
* Adequacy of resou rces for construction stage
Resou rces needed in the vendor and developer/owner/operator/licensee organisations for the
construction phase, and the recruitment schedule, must be planned du ring the licensing preparation and
licensing stage.
The developer/owner/operator/licensee and the vendor must have: adequate project management and
quality management skil ls; experience from management of a large construction project; knowledge and
experience in al l technical areas relevant for nuclear power plant construction and operation, including:
civil, mechanical, electrical, I&C, and nuclear technologies (water chemistry, nuclear fuel, reactor
physics, thermo-hydraulics, safety analysis).
I n addition, the vendor needs to have at its disposal experienced generalists who have broad technical
knowledge across the areas relevant to nuclear power plant design and safety ("chief engineers") and
experienced designers who have a realistic view of the actual chal lenges involved in implementation and
can set out the requirements clearly to constructors and manufactu rers.
* Timely completion of design
The importance of timely completion of design and engineering work cannot be overemphasised.
It may not be realistic to require that al l details of design, such as choice of al l components, shop
drawings for manufactu ring, and specifications for each construction step are completed before
construction start.
However before starting construction it is necessary to have approved design docu mentation and a
construction plan and schedule for at least six months ahead at al l times.
* Selecting sub-contractors
I n selecting sub-contractors for construction, one should not u nderestimate the importance of proven
experience in management of large projects.
For contracting su ppliers and sub-su ppliers with no previous experience in the nuclear field, the vendor
needs to ensu re that al l relevant nuclear-specific work practices are clearly brought out in each cal l for
tender. These may include: requirements for design docu mentation to be provided for approval before
manufactu ring; oversight (audits, inspections, etc) to be conducted by several different organisations
du ring manufactu ring; and expectations regarding safety cultu re.
If the nuclear specific work practices are not recognised and u nderstood by the sub-contractors at the
time of signing the contract, difficulties are to be expected later.
* Promotion of safety cultu re
From the outset and throughout the project strong messages and transparent actions and decisions are
needed from the vendor and developer/licensee management to promote safety cultu re. Safety cultu re
cannot be tu rned on overnight at the plant start-u p.
Managers need to demonstrate their attitude towards safety and quality through: choice of qualified subcontractors; use of state-of-the-art tools and methods; u ncompromising compliance with the agreed
requirements; carrying ou r regular wal k downs; and taking into accou nt safety concerns expressed by
workers and answering their questions.
Above al l it must be emphasised that safety and quality have higher priority than costs and schedule.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 NS Media Grou p Limited
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Sou rce Citation (MLA 9th Edition)
Laaksonen, Jukka. "Addressing nuclear new build construction risks: some pointers on risk management
in plant construction from former Finnish chief regulator." Nuclear Engineering I nternational, vol.
61, no. 743, Ju ne 2016, pp. 36+. Gale OneFile: Engineering Col lection,
link.gale.com/apps/doc/A454487830/SPJ.SP02?u=phcep&sid=bookmark-SPJ.SP02&xid=24eb5100.
Accessed 6 Mar. 2023.
Gale Docu ment Nu mber: GALE|A454487830