ADIL
CASE NO. 01
Article 3, Section 1: Police Power
Lozano v. Martinez, GR No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted and charged for the violation of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Check Law). She moved to
quash the information on the ground that the act charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. She contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Nonetheless, the motion was denied by the
respondent trial court hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N B.P. 22 is unconstitutional on the ground that it inhibits the constitutional safeguard against
imprisonment for non-payment of debts and poll tax.
RULING/MP: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for
non-payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law
can punish. A mala prohibitum act may also be punished because of the harm that it inflicts on the community. The
state can do this in the exercise of its police power. Hence, The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The police power of the state has been described as
"the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but
inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man
in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
ADIL
CASE NO. 02
Article 3, Sec. 1: Police Power
DOH v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc. (PMPMI)
FACTS: Respondent applied for a sales promotion permit before the BFAD (petitioner), now the FDA. The BFAD
have not acted on the request and when consulted by the respondent, PMPMI was only verbally informed of the
existence of a Memorandum issued by the DOH purportedly prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any
tobacco promotional activities in the country. PMPMI, nevertheless, filed another application and for the same
reason but was outrightly refused by the BFAD. Eventually, in a letter, the BFAD denied PMPMI’s Gear Up Promo
application based on the provisions of RA 9211 or the "Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003." PMPMI then filed an
administrative appeal before the DOH. The DOH denied PMPMI’s appeal but the CA granted respondent’s petition
on the ground that the DOH does not have the authority to enforce the provisions of RA 9211. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the DOH has the regulatory power on the use, sale, distribution, and advertisements of tobacco
products, as well as all forms of “promotion” which essentially includes “sales promotion.”
RULING/MP: No. The Court finds that the RA 9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of the RA 7394 with
respect to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotions. Hence, if the IAC-Tobacco was created
and expressly given the exclusive authority to implement the provisions of RA 9211 in accordance with the foregoing
State policy, it signifies that it shall also take charge of the regulation of the use, sale, distribution, and
advertisements of tobacco products, as well as all forms of “promotion” which essentially includes “sales promotion.”
Therefore, with this regulatory power conferred upon the IAC-Tobacco by RA 9211, the DOH and the BFAD have
been effectively and impliedly divested of any authority to act upon applications for tobacco sales promotional
permit, including PMPMI’s. The State’s police power to regulate the use, sale, and advertisements of tobacco
products, to promote a healthful environment and protect the citizens from the hazards of tobacco smoke,
is vested with the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH.
ADIL
CASE NO. 03
Article 3, Sec. 1: Police Power
Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections
FACTS: On February 15, 2013, RA 10367 (An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration) was
signed into law which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology. It likewise provides voters who failed to submit themselves for validation shall be deactivated for
purposes of May 2016 Elections. Thereafter, the COMELEC passed resolutions 9721, 9863, and 10013 as IRRs of
the mentioned act. Hence, herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to question
the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the COMELEC resolutions as non-compliance of these has risen to the level of
an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage under the last paragraph of
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the State may impose biometrics validation as a prerequisite to the right to vote.
RULING/MP: Yes. The Court has recognized that the right to vote is not a natural right but is a privilege and a right
created by law. One of the requirements of the right of suffrage is that a voter must not be disqualified by law and
the only limitation to this statutory power of the State is that “No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.” However, registration is only a procedural limitation on the right to
vote and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen
to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it. This biometrics validation requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. Hence, proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to
vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election.
ADIL
CASE NO. 04
Article 3, Sec. 1: Police Power
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan
FACTS: Petitioner is the president and CEO of Boracay West Cove. The company applied for a building permit with
the municipal government for the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan. However,
the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site
was within the "no build zone." Despite the lack of the necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business
and mayor’s permit, the petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Consequently, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued and implemented EO 10, for the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s illegally constructed hotel. Hence, the petitioner contended that the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance per accidens must be determined by the ordinary courts of law
and not by a mere resolution of the Sangguinang Bayan. On the other hand, respondents claim that the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent mayor has the authority to demolish the illegally constructed hotel.
RULING/MP: Yes. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se. In this case, despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens (because of its
location), the Court found that the LGU may properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise
of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. Nonetheless, for failure to secure the necessary permits, the Local Government Code authorizes
city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.
ADIL
CASE NO. 05
Article 3, Sec. 1: Police Power
Ferrer Jr. v. Bautista
FACTS: Respondent Quezon City Council enacted the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT = 0.5% of assessed value of
land in excess of 100K), or Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, of Quezon City. Under this ordinance, a special
assessment from all real property owners will be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized
Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. In addition, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted in
which garbage fees on domestic households will be collected by the City Government of Quezon City. Herein
petitioner is a registered co-owner of a residential property in the said city hence he insists that the SHT is a penalty
imposed on real property owners in favor of informal settlers. He further avers that the collection of garbage fee
results to double taxation. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice
principle and that the collection of garbage fee is in the exercise of police power and not of power of taxation.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinances in question are valid exercises of police power.
RULING/MP: Yes. Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens to fulfill the
objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. Additionally, the Congress enacted the LGC to
delegate to various LGUs the three great powers (which includes police power) of the government. In this
jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power. On the
SHT, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is
greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. Though broad and
far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to the requirement that
its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. The police power granted to local government units
must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. As with the State,
LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a
lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. On the
Garbage Fee, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police
power to protect public health, safety, and welfare. A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and
control the collection of garbage within its corporate limits. The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of
regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature determined that
such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient waste management programs. Certainly, as opposed to
petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee violates
the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
ADIL
CASE NO. 06
Article 3, Sec. 1: Police Power
South Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD (including Dissent of Carpio and Separate Opinion of Leonen)
Note: Long digest. Sorry, I think this is landmark/important case kaya madami akong nilagay na details kasi need din
isama dissenting opinion ni J. Carpio and separate opinion ni J. Leonen.
Ang ruling ng Court constitutional ang batas and valid exercise siya ng police power. Ang opinion ni J. Carpio hindi
siya exercise ng police power kundi Eminent Domain kasi there was taking of private property and for him when you
say private property it does not only pertains to land but also to proprietary property like yung mandatory discounts
sa senior and PWDs kasi the amount of discount belong to the private establishments. For J. Leonen naman,
Eminent domain pertains to physical property, and hindi considered na yung profit since intangible right sya and not
a property contemplated by Eminent Domain, and cannot be appropriated for public use.
FACTS: In 2004, R.A 9257 amending R.A 7432 or An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purpose was signed into law. The new law
retained the 20% discount on purchase of medicines but removed the annual income ceiling and it further modified
the tax treatment of the discount, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income. Likewise, R.A 7277 or the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was enacted and thereafter R.A 9442 was enacted amending the said law.
Similar to R.A 9257, Section 32 of R.A 9257 also provided for 20% discount to PWD and covered establishments
shall claim the discount given to PWDs as tax deductions.
The change in the tax treatment of the discount did not sit well with some drug store owners, claiming it affected the
profitability of their business, and on the ground that it amounts to taking private property without just compensation.
Hence, they filed a petition for Prohibition, with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 4(a) of R.A 9257 and Section 32 of R.A 9442.
ISSUE: W/N Section 4(a) of R.A 9257 and Section 32 of R.A 9442, granting 20% discounts to senior citizens and to
PWD are constitutional and a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING/MP: Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. It is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in
their lives when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. In the same way,
providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to give
full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons. The duty emanates from its role as
parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially
those who cannot tend to themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent
powers. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) Nos. 9257 and 9442,
the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and persons with disabilities
(PWDs). Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms
to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs." It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Also, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already been made clear in
Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its
police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding
police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
J. Carpio (Dissenting Opinion)
I assert that that Carlos Drug Corporation v. DSWD, barely distinguished between police power and eminent
domain. While it is true that police power is similar to the power of eminent domain because both have the general
welfare of the people for their object, we need to clarify the concept of taking in eminent domain as against taking in
police power to prevent any claim of police power when the power actually exercised is eminent domain. When
police power is exercised, there is no just compensation to the citizen who loses his private property. When
eminent domain is exercised, there must be just compensation. Thus, the Court must distinguish and clarify
taking in police power and taking in eminent domain. Government officials cannot just invoke police power
when the act constitutes eminent domain.
Both Section 4(a) of R.A 9257 and Section 32 of R.A 9442 undeniably contemplate taking of property for public use.
Private property is anything that is subject to private ownership. The property taken for public use applies
not only to land but also to other proprietary property, including the mandatory discounts given to senior
citizens and persons with disability which form part of the gross sales of the private establishments that are
forced to give them. The amount of mandatory discount is money that belongs to the private establishment.
For sure, money or cash is private property because it is something of value that is subject to private
ownership. The taking of property under Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. 9442 is an exercise of
the power of eminent domain and not an exercise of the police power of the State. A clear and sharp distinction
should be made because private property owners will be left at the mercy of government officials if these
officials are allowed to invoke police power when what is actually exercised is the power of eminent
domain.
J. Leonen (Separate Opinion)
The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that there is property that is taken from the owner. In
this case, there is no private property that may be the subject of a constitutional taking. The subject of the
alleged “taking” is the establishments’ possible profits. Possible profits cannot be acquired by the State
through the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Possible profits are yet to be earned; hence, they are
yet to be owned. They are intangible property for which establishments do not have a vested right. A vested right is
a fixed or established interest in a property that can no longer be doubted or questioned. It is an “immediate fixed
right of present or future enjoyment.” It is the opposite of an expectant or contingent right.
Establishments do not have a vested right on possible profits. Their right is not yet absolute, complete, and
unconditional. Profits are earned only after the sale of their products, and after deducting costs. These sales may or
may not occur. The existence of the profit or the loss is not certain. It cannot be assumed that the profits will
be earned or that losses will be incurred. Assuming there are profits or losses, its amount is undeterminable.
Thus, for purposes of eminent domain, there is still no property that can be taken. There is no property
owned. There is nothing to compensate. The ponencia shares the same view. However, I maintain that to be
consistent with this view, the proof of losses (or the lack of profits) must be irrelevant. No matter the evidence,
petitioners cannot be entitled to just compensation. Assuming there was a “taking,” what was taken is not
property contemplated by the exercise of eminent domain. Eminent domain pertains to physical property.
The right to profit is an intangible right, which cannot be appropriated for public use. In fact, it is a right and
not property in itself. Moreover, the right was merely restricted, not taken. The establishment still is given a wide
discretion on how to address the changes caused by the subject provisions, and how to ensure their profits. As
shown in the above example, they may adjust their pricing, and improve on the costs of goods or their efficiency to
manage potential outcomes. Profits may thus still be earned.
ADIL
CASE NO. 07
Article 3: Seat of Police Power
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association
FACTS: Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent, received a letter of request from MMDA (petitioner) to open
Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe
and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. Respondent prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and
prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The court denied the issuance of the of a preliminary injunction
which the respondent questioned. The appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls.
ISSUE: W/N MMDA possess police power.
RULING/MP: No. Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority it has no police power. Police
Powers in Metro Manila is exercised by cities and Municipalities. Police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature which may delegate the power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
ADIL
CASE NO. 08
Article 2: Primacy of Human Rights
Republic v. Sandiganbayan - LANDMARK CASE
FACTS: After the EDSA Revolution Pres. Cory Aquino created the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. The AFP Board investigated
various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. Aside from the
military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate in the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano the mistress of the respondent. Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Petitioner
claims that the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at that time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
ISSUE: W/N the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
interregnum ,that is, after the actual and effective takeover of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution)
RULING/MP: No. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government up
to 24 March 1986 —a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.
ADIL
CASE NO. 09
Article 3: Primacy of Human Rights
Mijares v. Ranada
Note: Sorry, not sure sa case na ito. Complicated ng case hindi specific sa topic. Nag ask na ako help sa higher
years, hindi rin sila sure sa digest. May note din sila na hindi related sa topic. Parang ang closest sa topic is
recognizable ang foreign judgement especially if accepted by public policy and primacy of human rights. Then by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, principles of international law are generally accepted.
FACTS: A complaint of 10 Filipinos, representing 10,000 alleged victims who suffered from human right violations
during the Marcos Regime, was filed against the Marcos estate in Hawaii. The US district courts ruled in favor of the
Filipinos. Petitioners filed a case for the enforcement of judgment in the Philippines. The Marcos estate filed a
motion to dismiss contending the non-payment of correct filing fees, paying only P410 compared to the RTC’s
estimation of P472M.
ISSUE: W/N foreign judgment may be recognized and enforced in the Philippines.
RULING/MP: Yes. Relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a
general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment merely due to
an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law.
There are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the
property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum. The vagaries of inflation, as well as
the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable
in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the
amount of the award sought to be enforced.
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this
jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially
when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person.
The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public
policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law
rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can safeguard
against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original
claim is noxious to our constitutional values. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part
of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations
ADIL
CASE NO. 10
Article 3: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, Property
Philippine Blooming Mills Employee Organization (PBMEO) v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc
FACTS: When the management of Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc knew that their employees wanted to conduct a
mass demonstration, for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police, the management decided to conduct a meeting.
The 1st meeting was to clarify that the meeting was not against the company and that the company asked them to
cancel the strike since it would interrupt its business operations. The company also gave them a threat if they
participate they might lose their jobs. A second meeting was conducted wherein the company reiterated their appeal
that while the workers may be allowed to participate however those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
ISSUE: W/N life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution.
RULING/MP: No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation
and vitality of our civil and political institutions. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law
and its object or purpose - that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive - would suffice
to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
ADIL
CASE NO. 11
Article 3: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, Property
Salonga v. Pano
FACTS: Sen. Jovito Salonga along with 39 others was charged for violation of the Revised Anti- Subversion Act due
to the series of bombings that had occurred in Metro Manila. This was due to the statement of Mr. Lovely who
named him as the mastermind of the attacks because of the following reasons (1)the petitioner’s as a contact point
and that (2) his remarks against the political struggle in the PH during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. The
petitioner was imprison but was under hospital arrest however it took months before the charges against him was
finally revealed.
ISSUE: W/N the Salonga’s alledged remarks is protected by the freedom of speech.
RULING/MP: Yes. We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a “preferred” right and,
therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate
accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. This must be so because
the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political
discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.
ADIL
CASE NO. 12
Article 3: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, and Property
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Benjamin Victoriano, is a member of a religious group named “Iglesia ni Cristo”, a
religious sect which prohibits its members to join any labor organization, and has been employed in Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. Incidental to his employment, he was also made member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, through
a collective bargaining agreement. A law was passed which prohibits union agreements from retaining members
that are members of a religious sects that prohibits being part of any labor organization. With the promulgation of
said law, RA 3350, Victoriano resigned from the union. However, the union sent a letter to the company’s
management of the petitioner’s violation of the bargaining agreement, where later on challenged the petitioner with
a dismissal if he does not come in to terms with the union. In the CFI, the Union raised the collective bargaining
agreement and assailed the constitutionality of the RA 3350, to which the same court decided in favor of the
respondent. Thus, this petition for the reversal of the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: W/N the “right” to join associations includes the right to resign from a labor organization, thus RA 3350, is
not unconstitutional.
RULING/MP: Yes. The power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.
It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should
he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined,
he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is
clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
ADIL
CASE NO. 13
Article 3: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, and Property
Social Justice Society, et. Al v. Atienza, Jr. - LANDMARK CASE
FACTS: The petitioners herein complained before the Mayor of Manila, Atienza Jr., to enforce the law as accorded
in the Local Government Code. The law in question was Ordinance No. 8027, made by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, that reclassified the Pandacan area in Manila from industrial to commercial. From its reclassification,
the petitioners argued that the oil companies operating thereto should be stopped and closed because of the
ordinance. Thus, this petition before the court for the enforcement of such law.
ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid exercise of police power of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
RULING/MP: Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its
police power. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subject to restraints and
burdens to fulfill the objective of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses, and occupations to promote the
general welfare.
ADIL
CASE NO. 14
Article 3: Hierarchy of Rights: Primacy of the Bill of Rights over the right of the state to prosecute
Allado v. Diokno (Landmark Case)
FACTS: Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, in the practice of their profession, and on the
basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, have been accused of the heinous crime of
kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested by the respondent
judge. Respondents relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his
participation in alleged crime. Petitioners, content that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in “whimsically holding that there is probable cause against the petitioners without determining
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings.
ISSUE: W/N the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the arrest.
RULING/MP: Yes. The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use
of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include personal
liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities. Certainly, in the
hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when
weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop
the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes
and rules that probable cause exists, therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued. However, the Court ruled in
favor of the petitioner as they were unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. The Court examined
the records and cannot find any support for respondent judge conclusion. On the contrary, the court discern a
number of reasons to declare the insufficiency for finding a probable cause against the petitioners.
ADIL
CASE NO. 15
Article 3: Due Process in General
Tupas v. CA
FACTS: A decision was promulgated by the RTC in relation to the case of the petitioner on April 3, 1989 and an
appeal was made on May 9, 1988, which is more than the 15-day reglementary period in perfecting an appeal, to
which due to the tardiness of the appeal, the CA dismissed such. Now, the petitioner argues that he should not be
made liable of the mistake of his counsel for failure to comply with the reglementary period of producing the appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the reglementary period on perfecting an appeal is against the due process clause embedded in the
constitution.
RULING/MP: No. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and
adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules
should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law,
as complementing each other, in the just and resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
ADIL
CASE NO. 16
Article 3: Due Process in General
Asilo v. People
FACTS: Private respondents executed a contract with the Municipality of Nagcarlan to lease lot and a store in 1978,
that would end in 1998. Then in 1993, the accused Mayor Comendador and Asilo, were civilly and criminally
charged by the private respondents for the demolition order, without obtaining a special order from the court, on the
lot and store leased by the private respondents. The case was heard before the Sandiganbayan where the same
ruled against the accused for violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act. A petition for certiorari
before the supreme court was then filed by the counsels of the accused on the ground that there can be no liability
when a public officer commits in good faith an error of judgment.
ISSUE: W/N the defendants followed due process in ordering the demolition.
RULING/MP: No. If demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the
parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition(from the court). As provided by Section 10(d), Rule 39 of
the rules of court “Before a removal must take place (in this case the demolition), there must be a special
order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. In this case, the accused failed to follow such.
ADIL
CASE NO. 17
Article 3: Due Process in General
Phil. Amusement Gaming Corp (PAGCOR) v. De Guzman
FACTS: Respondent, De Guzman, an employee of PAGCOR is required to accomplish a Personal History
Statement (PHS), herein she states that she has no relatives working in the same company. However, Atty. Sordan
of the Corporate investigation unit found out that De Guzman’s nephew is working in PAGCOR. In view that the
respondent falsely declared that she has no relatives working in PAGCOR, Bailey, the OIC of PAGCOR’s Human
resource and development, found her administratively liable which resulted to her dismissal, done by the issuance of
a memorandum. De Guzman then brought the case to the CSC where it ruled in favor of her. An appeal was made
before the CA by PAGCOR where it ruled in favor of the respondent stating that due process was not availed by the
respondent because it was not PAGCOR who issued the memorandum but it was issued by its employees without
authorization. Thus, this petition by PAGCOR before the SC.
ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in ruling that respondent was deprive of due process.
RULING/MP: Yes. Since PAGCOR was the one who appointed De Guzman to her position then the power to
discipline or remove her is vested in PAGCOR. Accordingly, it should be done through its Board of Directors.
However, in the case at bar, it was Atty. Sordan and OIC HR Bailey who produced the said memorandum. Section
16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in administrative
disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority (PAGCOR in this case) furnish the employee
concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or omissions complained of and directing him to
answer the charges stated therein.
ADIL
CASE NO. 18
Article 3: Due Process in General
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
FACTS: Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA and was supposed to
graduate with honors. One of his professors, however, issued a delinquency report against him because he was late
for 2 minutes, together with other cadets who were 5 minutes late. He reasoned for a couple of times that the
circumstances of his previous class was beyond his control which caused him to be late and that others could vouch
for this. He was later reported to the Honor Committee (HC) for violation of the Honor Code for lying based on the
conversation that the military official had with the professor of the previous class who alleged that she did not
dismiss the class late. Cudia made a written appeal but the same was dismissed by the Cadet Review and Appeals
Board (CRAB).
ISSUE: W/N the PMA, the HC, and the CRAB committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia
from the Academy in utter disregard of his right to due process.
RULING/MP: No. The Court held that the minimum standards of due process under Guzman v. National University
has been applied in this case. These standards are that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. The Court has been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice; that the proceedings may be summary; and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action is only substantial evidence. What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards
of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected
private interests; hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process
is a must.
ADIL
CASE NO. 19
Article 3: Due Process in General
Jardeleza v. Sereno
FACTS: Before the retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announced
the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position. The JBC then received a letter from the
Dean of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General, for
the said petition. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included as a candidate and subsequently
interviewed by the JBC. Weeks later, however, Jardeleza received phone calls from Justice Lagman (former CA
Assoc. Justice and incumbent JBC member) informing him that then CJ Sereno manifested that she would be
invoking Sec. 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. He was the directed to make himself available before the JBC on
a certain date during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. Petitioner, however, alleged that
integrity accusations were made against him without informing him of the nature and cause thereof and without
affording him an opportunity to be heard. JBC countered by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the
right to a hearing in the fulfilment of its duty to recommend.
ISSUE: W/N the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or
opposition to an application is raised
RULING/MP: Yes. While the facets of criminal and administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable. The
Supreme Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfilment of the duty of the
JBC to recommend.
ADIL
CASE NO. 20
Article 3: Due Process in General
Ray Shu v. Dee, et.al
FACTS: Petitioner, as President of 3A Apparel Corporation, filed a complaint before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to
Metrobank. Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A Apparel Corporation’s
loan. After the investigation, NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati City charging the respondents
of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. Respondents argued that they were denied of their right
to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the
standard sample signatures of the petitioners for comparison. Respondents further alleged that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the resolution
which ruled in favor of the petitioners and of denying the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents were denied their right to due process.
RULING/MP: No. They were not denied of their right to due process when they were not informed by the Secretary
of Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s appeal. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity
to be heard. Since the respondents filed with the Sec. of Justice a motion for reconsideration, any initial defect in
due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, the Court ruled that
the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory; thus, no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have
taken place. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a
chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0021
Article III Sec. 1 Due Process: In General
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335, 2014
FACTS: This case concerns certain provisions of RA 10125 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Sec. 6 of the
said Act was questioned for imposing penalties that are one degree higher when the crimes defined in the RPC and
certain special laws are committed with the use of information and communication technologies (ICT), including the
fact that the prescriptive periods for the equivalent cybercrimes have become longer. Some of the petitioners insist
that Sec. 6 is invalid since it produces an unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would hinder free
expression.
ISSUE: W/N prescription is a matter of procedure over which the Court has something to say.
RULING & MP: No. Prescription is substantive law since it assumes the existence of an authority to punish
a wrong, which authority the Constitution vests in Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that Congress
may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit. What it cannot do is pass a law that
extends the periods of prescription to impact crimes committed before its passage.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0022
Article III Sec. 1 Due Process: In General
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
MAIN POINT: As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules
that are intended to to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect.
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of a Municipal Trial Court of
Compostela Valley, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in certain Regional Trial Courts. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)’s Office of Recruitment,
however, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations due to the
JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more
than a year, he was excluded from the list. Petitioner argued that JBC’s five-year requirement violates the due
process clause of the Constitution for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Registrar (ONAR). JBC averred that there is no violation of due process as the policy is
merely internal in nature.
ISSUE: W/N there should have been publication by the JBC of the five-year rule to qualify for Judge of second-level
courts.
RULING: Yes. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. However, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees
for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0023
Article III Sec. 1 Due Process: In General
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
FACTS: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 or the RH Law. The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Allegedly, Section 23 (a)(l) thereof
mentions a "private health care service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who
is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution." It also unclear if hospitals operated by religious groups are likewise
exempt from giving “reproductive health information” under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering “reproductive health
procedures” under Section 23(a)(2). Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of “incorrect information”, but does not define "incorrect information."
ISSUE: W/N the RH Law violates the due process clause.
RULING & MP: NO. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. The use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion since they are used
synonymously. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical “procedures”. Further, from their plain meaning, “incorrect information”, when used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Hence, RH Law does not suffer from vagueness
and does not violate the due process clause.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0024
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; in general
Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca 37 P 921 - LANDMARK CASE
FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. Due to
the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property.
Engracio however left for China and he never returned until he died. Since Engracio is a non-resident, El Banco
must notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court
further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it would be sent to Amoy, China. The court
eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf
of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no
due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: W/N the conducted proceedings constitute due process of law.
RULING & MP: YES. The Court ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the
proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0025
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; in general
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 21, 2016
FACTS: The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged the petitioners in the Sandiganbayan for conspiracy to commit plunder
by raiding the public treasury, unlawfully acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of PHP365,997,915.00.
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. After the Prosecution rested its
case, respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan,
so they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.
RULING & MP: Yes.The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. The denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then
appeal the conviction and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Certiorari is proper since the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0026
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685
FACTS: Petitioners Galvez, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide
and two counts of frustrated homicide. Prosecutor Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent
Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper crimes
chargeable against the accused," which was granted by Judge Villajuan. Before petitioners could be arraigned in
Criminal Cases, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. This motion
was granted by Judge Villajuan. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE: W/N the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the
charge.
RULING & MP: Yes. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the
prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its reconsideration and approval. The
only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0027
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
State Prosecutor v. Muros 236 SRCA 505
FACTS: Respondent Judge Muro of the RTC Manila, was charged by State Prosecutors with ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by dismissing 11
cases against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions on the basis of newspaper reports concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President
of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision
by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor.
The petitioners further averred that the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may
be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial
dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence) thereby depriving the
Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality.
ISSUE: W/N there is blatant denial of due process committed by the Judge.
RULING & MP: Yes. The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge
resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution
inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. He gave the prosecution no
chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused.
The act of the judge is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably
indicative of bad faith and partiality. The dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and any notice to the
prosecution violate due process.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0028
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 395
FACTS: Private respondents De la Paz and his sister , entered into an oral contract with petitioner Martinez. The
latter completed his payment but was not given the Deed of Sale by De la Paz. In the meantime, 3 lots were sold to
Spouses Veneracion, including the lot sold to the petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition with the MTC who ruled in
favor of him. Upon petition by the respondents, the RTC reversed the decision of the lower court which was affirmed
by the CA. Now, the petitioner avers that the CA erred in its decision and raised the issue among others that the
respondents failed to pay the docket fee within the reglementary period of perfecting an appeal and that the
resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the
Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration is contrary to
the constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is
based.
(2) W/N payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal is not necessary for the perfection of
the appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed within such period.
RULING & MP:
(1) No. The requirement that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor was fully complied with when the Court of
Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling
because petitioner had not raised anything new.
(2) No. It was held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the
municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under 20 and 23
of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981.
Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing of a notice
of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Even in the
procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts, nothing is mentioned about the payment of appellate docket fees.
The SC ruled that in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. Thus, private
respondents Venerations failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not fatal to their appeal.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0029
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Espeleta v. Avelino 62 SCRA 395
FACTS: It is the sad plaint of petitioner in this certiorari proceeding that he was denied procedural due process
when respondent Judge in a spirit of unwanted generosity towards private respondent corporation, Shell Philippines,
Inc., acceded to its plea that the testimony of a witness deemed by him as vital to his case be ignored and
disregarded in its entirety for failure to be present in court on the day set for her cross-examination. In view of the
decidedly liberal interpretation of the cardinal precept of due process that justice be done to the parties both
procedurally and substantively, consistently adhered to from United States v. Ling Su Fan decision.
ISSUE: W/N the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be
heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?
RULING & MP: No. Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is
understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just
a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. It cannot be truly asserted
then that the proceedings satisfied the constitutional standard for a judicious inquiry. To that extent, it would make a
mockery of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a trial where the litigants are given full and
unimpeded opportunity to sustain their respective claims and to have their evidence duly considered and weighed.
Unless, the challenged order then were set aside,petitioner can assert a grievance grounded on the due process
guarantee.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0030
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Rabino v. Cruz 222 SCRA 493
FACTS: Private respondents, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, filed complaints docketed
as Civil Cases No. 630 and No. 631 of the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, for the recovery of portions of a
parcel of land located at Sitio Sampalucan, Barangay San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal against occupants in which the
petitioners herein, although occupants of a portion of the subject parcel of land, were not impleaded as defendants
in said cases. Occupants of the said parcels of land were asked to vacate including petitioners herein.
ISSUE: W/N a decision of the Court is binding upon persons who are not parties to an action.
RULING & MP: No. The rule is anchored on the constitutional right of a person to due process of law. No person
shall be condemned, or judgment rendered against him without due process of law. The Court ruled in Lopez v.
Director of Lands, that "contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting
one's person or property." As applied to judicial proceedings, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirements of due process are satisfied if the following conditions are present namely: (1) There must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0031
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Ysmael v. CA 273 SCRA 165
FACTS: Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 29, and obtained judgment in their favor on October 2, 1980. The decision remained unexecuted for a
long time so, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the judgment in the RTC Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990,
rendered a decision reviving such judgment. Properties were sold in favor of the petitioners, but respondents
exercised their right of redemption to which the latter contended to have already prescribed. However, CA ruled in
favor of the private respondents and denied their MR, hence this petition
ISSUE: W/N respondents can still redeem their property.
RULING & MP: Yes. Although it is required that full payment of the redemption price must be made within the
redemption period, the rule on redemption is actually liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property.
The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption. At least the
defendants have shown their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price within the period provided by law
which was simply ignored by the plaintiffs who appeared to profit more if the properties are not redeemed by reason
of the higher value of said properties. The issue raised by the petitioner as to the validity of the tender of the two
checks given to the petitioner’s counsel contending he has no authority to do was found baseless by the Court. It
was later found out that question was never really raised in the courts below and, therefore, petitioners cannot now
be allowed to raise it for the first time without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A question
not raised in the lower courts cannot be entertained by the higher courts upon appeal as it would go against basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0032
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Carvajal v CA 280 SCRA 351
FACTS: Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who
came to possess the unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an
owner up to the time of his death. The latter court upheld the trial court filed before RTC. In dismissing petitioner's
application for registration of title of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent Solid Homes,
Inc. as the registered owner of the said parcel of land, situated in Antipolo City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the application for registration, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition wherein petitioner maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an applicant in a land registration
case, was not able to take the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated in the
proceeding except to propound clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the Land
Registration Authority.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has been denied due process when he was unable to take the witness stand
RULING & MP: No. While petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take
the witness stand. The court ruled that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of
this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and
he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court
ordered the submission of the parties’ memoranda which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he
acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness stand. The essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0033
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
People v. Castillio 289 SCRA 213
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of Antonio Dometita in Cola pub
house Q.C. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense of denial and alibi claiming that he was then asleep in
his house at the time of the incident. Prosecution witness Velasco testified that he was sitting outside the pub house
when appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest causing his death. Another
prosecution witness, Mercad, testified that although she did not see the actual stabbing, she saw appellant wrapping
a bladed weapon in his shirt. However, defense witness Marcelino, a tricycle driver, testified that he was about 25
meters away from the crime scene when he saw a 2 persons ganging up on a person who was later identified as the
victim, and that appellant was not one of them. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the two
prosecution witnesses and rendered judgment of conviction with penalty of RP. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner is
questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the partiality of the trial judge in favor of the prosecution
as shown by his participation in the examination of witnesses.
ISSUE: W/N the allegation that the trial judge was biased against the accused for propounding questions that were
well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask is correct
RULING & MP: No. It is a judge’s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. The
Supreme Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions
which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative.It is a
judge’s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. Questions which merely clear up
dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0034
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Cosep v. PEO 290 SCRA 378
FACTS: Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer of Olutanga,
Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian well for one of its localities. Hence,
it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E. Alegre to undertake the said project, under a “pakyaw”
arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00 payable after completion of the project. After the project was
finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal Treasurer. However, only P4,500 was given
to the private complainant, the balance being allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in
processing the papers in the Municipal Treasurer’s Office. Private complainant filed a complaint. Petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the
charge. Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that: (a) he was not accorded an impartial trial by the
Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to justify his conviction. Petitioner bewails
the fact that during his testimony the Justices of the Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by
propounding no less that 68 questions.
ISSUE: W/N the active participation of the Justices of the Sandiganbayan, by propounding no less than 68
questions, were indications of partiality or prejudgment of guilt.
RULING & MP: No. Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an
“impartial and neutral judge” as an indispensable imperative of due process. Judges must not only be impartial, but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that the decision will be just. However, this is
not to say that judges must remain passive or silent during the proceedings. Since they are in a better position to
observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask
questions to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points and to
elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0035
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan GR 125498 Feb. 18, 1999
FACTS: Petitioners entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction (Larry Lu) for the electrification of
Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas. Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power
Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and
confirmed by Larry Lu. Subsequently, payment was effected by the Municipal Treasurer to Philwood Construction.
Petitioners then received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan who found that as per
COA evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished. The
powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
Petitioners requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to re-inspect the project, which was
denied. Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their
opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due process. They submit that “the issuance of a notice
of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or adjudicate and decide
on the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond
the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance.”
ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ right to due process was violated by the filing of the complaint against them by the
Provincial Auditor
RULING & MP: No. The right to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of
the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront
the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same
defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation.
The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection
pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same.
CASE NO. 0036
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
People v. Huli 338 SCRA 2000
FACTS: A police informant code-named Stardust arrived at the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo
Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag of two Chinese nationals who were
supposedly big time drug pushers. She claimed to have regular contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a
certain Carlos Tan Ty. Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the NARCOM agents organized a buy-bust
operation to apprehend the reputed drug pushers (herein appellants). Appellants were charged. The accused, in
their defense, countered that no buy-bust operation took place. They denied selling any shabu and accused the
police of extortion. The defense (People) offered the testimonies of Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag, who was
presented as a hostile witness. He testified to certain aspects of the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of the
accused. RTC ruled against the accused. The case is now before this Court for automatic review wherein
respondent contends the trial court committed a grave error when it knowingly deprived the accused of the “cold
neutrality” of an impartial judge as a part of their right to procedural process.
ISSUE: W/N appellants were denied their right to an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
RULING & MP: No. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him
to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine
or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. A severe
examination by a trial judge of some of the witnesses for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at
the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to
secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounded happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
CASE NO. 0037
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
People v. Cabiles 341 SCRA 2000
FACTS: Cabiles, by means of force and violence, robbed, from Marites Nas Atienza. Marites was asleep with her 1
-year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza and with their housemaid Luzviminda. Cabiles was then unidentified. He
suddenly barged into the house of Marites by destroying the kitchen door and poked a 6-inch knife on the right side
of Marites neck. She was told not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of
Marites’ baby. When she was about to shout, he poked the knife on her left side, causing her an injury. Then, he
raped Luzviminda. Marites went to her neighbor, Arnel Cericos, sought help but Cericos was stabbed by Cabiles,
thereby inflicting upon him serious phyical injuries. After 3 days, Cabiles was arrested. According to him, he did not
know why he was arrested. He denied the allegations. As regards to his sworn statement admitting the commission
of the crime, he said he was forced by the policemen to execute and sign the same. He was not assisted by a
counsel at that time. The policemen did not have a warrant when they made the arrest. However, such irregularity
was only raised during trial.
ISSUE: W/N warrantless arrest, raised during trial, is deemed waived because of the delay.
RULING & MP: Yes. The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In regard to this delay, Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error;
such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused
CASE NO. 0038
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Gozum v. Liangco 339 SCRA 253
FACTS:
This case involves an administrative complaint for dismissal filed against Judge Daniel Liangco—a Municipal Trial
Judge at the MTC of San Fernando Pampanga. Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in possession of subject
land for more than 30 years. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the lot and issued a
Resolution stating its ownership and the squatting of Gozun. Respondent Judge issued a resolution siding with the
municipality and stated the validity of the resolution, the use of reasonable force through the PNP in removing
complainant from their home and declaring the squatting of complainant as nuisance per se. Pursuant to the
resolution, the municipal mayor issued E.O. 1 ordering the PNP to implement the Resolution. Throughout all of
these, Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. The agents of the
LGU, then, demolished the house. Gozun averred that respondent judge issuance of the resolution amounted to
gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence. The Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition
to this court. After the OCA investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo submitted a memorandum
recommending respondent judge’s dismissal.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's resolution was a mere expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment, hence,
complainant Gozun was not entitled to notice and hearing.
RULING & MP: No.The purpose of notice is to afford the parties a chance to be heard—which was not given to
Gozun that led to the demolition of his home. Respondent Judge argues that the resolution he issued was a mere
expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment. Such argument betrays either gross ignorance or contempt of
law. A member of the bench must keep himself constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments. It is the
function of the court to adjudicate actual controversies. Legal advice is the job of a lawyer. When the law violated is
so elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
CASE NO. 0039
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Soriano v. Angeles 339 SCRA 253
FACTS: According to petitioner Soriano , Ruel Garcia and Pedro Garcia (his uncle), both members of the Caloocan
police, barged into the barangay hall in Caloocan City, looking for Soriano. Ruel gave Soriano fist blows on the face
while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him. Although there were 4 barangay
tanods in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of Soriano because they were held at bay by Pedro. The
Garcias then left. Soriano was treated for his injuries in the hospital. Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He
alleged that he went to the barangay hall because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and beaten up
by Soriano. When Garcia insisted on going inside the barangay hall, Soriano blocked him and then pushed him on
the chest. Garcia also pushed Soriano. Garcia was charged with the RTC Caloocan City for direct Judge Angeles
called the parties and their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, to which Soriano
refused. The trial court acquitted Garcia. Judge Angeles found it incredible that Soriano did not resist or even say
anything when Garcia allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came
to his aid. The judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of Soriano and barangay tanod. Soriano filed
a petition for certiorari, alleging that the decision is void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
ISSUE: W/N the judge was biased and that there was lack of the objectivity that due process requires.
RULING & MP: No.It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough
evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed. There must be a showing of bias and
prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what
the judge learned from his participation in the case. There was no proof showing that the judge decided the criminal
case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision acquitting Garcia shows that the same was made
on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense.
CASE NO. 0040
Article III Sec. 1 Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Villanueva v. Malaya 330 SCRA 278
Facts: In civil case R-570 (Irene Villanueva v Raul Santos) , a writ of execution on the subject property was made.
Erlinda Villanueva, legally adopted daughter of Irene, together w/brother Jose sought to cancel the Deed of Sale
(DOS) on the property w/Raul Santos. A TRO was issued, directing sheriff to desist from proceeding with the public
auction in R-570, but it was not enforced. The land was successfully bought by Ruben Sia. Erlinda tendered
cashier’s check to Sia who refused to accept the same bc he wanted to consult w/lawyer first. Meanwhile, Erlinda
executed two DOS in favour of the lessees on the subject land, on the condition that she redeems the property from
Sia. Sia asked for a Definite DOS and ex parte Writ of Possession, contending that the period for exercising the right
of redemption has already expired. It was granted to him by Judge Angel S. Malaya.
Issue: W/N the right to due process of the petitioner-lessees was violated
RULING & MP: Yes, the writ of possession may only be issued after the occupants (lessees) are afforded an
opportunity to be heard without need of a separate action. The RTC violated petitioner-lessees right to due process
by granting the Writ of Possession. A writ of possession may issue againts occupants of property subject of
execution who derive their right of possession from the judgement debtor upon motion in the execution proceedings
and without need of a separate ejectment action, provided that the occupants are afforded an opportunity to explain
the nature of their possesion on which basis of the writ of possession will be denied or granted.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 41
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Almendras v. Asis 330 SCRA 69
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Almendra filed 3 administrative complaints against Judge Enrique Asis of RTC Leyte for
partiality, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Gaudencio Almendra, sibling of the petitioner, filed with the RTC an action for quieting of title
over several parcels of land located in Abuyog, Leyte. The trial court declared plaintiff Gaudencio Almendra and
defendants Francisco, Vicente, and Antonio Almendra co-owners of the parcels of land in question. The case was
appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thelma and Arthur Almendra, legitimate
children of Gaudencio, filed an action for quieting of title, with Antonio as one of the defendants. Judge Enrique Asis
declared Thelma and Arthur Almendra the rightful owners. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Asis for failing to observe the doctrine of res judicata.
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge failed to observe the doctrine of res judicata
RULING/MAIN POINT: YES. When material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and
were admitted or judicially determined there are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such
facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be relitigated in a subsequent action between the
same parties of their privies regardless of the form of the latter.
In the case at bar, the decision rendered by respondent judge in Civil Case No. 214 and the decision of the Court of
Appeals upholding the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 3773 clearly show that the issues, parties and
subject matter are identical. Both cases are actions for quieting of title involving the same parcels of land. Plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 3773 merely sold to his children, or his successors-in-interest, two portions of the subject property
and the latter filed another case for quieting of title ruled upon in a previous final decision. Thus, respondent judge,
in rendering decision in Civil Case No. 214, acted contrary to the doctrine of res judicata. Since the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 3773 had reached finality, respondent should have refrained from hearing the merits of
Civil Case No. 214, considering that the issues in the latter case had been settled in a previous judgment involving
the same parties. A judge cannot amend a final decision, more so where the decision was promulgated by an
appellate court. Judges should respect the orders, resolutions and decisions of higher courts, especially the highest
court.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 42
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Dayot v. Garcia 353 SCRA 280
FACTS: Sofronio Dayot was accused of the crime of grave slander. He was eventually convicted by respondent
Judge Rodolfo Garcia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calavatra, Negros Occidental and sentenced to
imprisonment. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the conviction. Dayot filed a petition for review but the Court of
Appeals dismissed it. The motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Dayot, then, elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, which denied due course to the petition. He availed of a motion for reconsideration and while it was
still pending, Judge Garcia issued a warrant of arrest against him and ordered his detention. Dayot filed this case
and accused Judge Garcia of misconduct of office, abuse of authority, and oppression when he issued a warrant of
arrest despite the fact that his motion for reconsideration was still pending. He also said that the Judge did not
observe due process when he issued another Order discrediting his sentence of the service from May 6, 1998 to
November 6, 1998 because he served it outside of the prison cell.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Garcia observed due process when he issued the order discrediting Dayot’s service of his
sentence from May 6, 1998 to November 6, 1998.
RULING: NO. Dayot was denied due process. The Order discrediting Dayot’s sentence was issued after Judge
Garcia heard the complaint of the mother of the offended party that Dayot was not serving his sentence inside a
prison cell. The Order was issued without prior hearing or notice. Although the judge probably issued the order in
order to address the issue of corruption and special treatment of Dayot in prison, he still should not have abused his
judicial discretion by depriving the petitioner of his right to be heard. Assuming that Dayot did have special sleeping
arrangements in the special sleeping quarters in the third floor of the municipal building, this matter should have
been left to the Jail Warden and the Order given by the judge given after hearing. Although a judge is not always
subjected to disciplinary action for all his erroneous decisions, this immunity is not a license for him to be
abusive or arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. The issuance of the Order of November 6,
1998 without the benefit of a hearing is a clear evidence of the judges failure to understand the limitations
of his power and betrays his ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process. By unilaterally discrediting
the period served outside the jail without giving complainant a chance to be heard, respondent Judge failed
to observe the requirements of due process.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 43
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
People v. Hapa GR 125698 July 19, 2001
FACTS: Accused Francisco Hapa y Ebasco, Claro Feratero y Encinares, Amador Españo y Ofalsa and Conrado
Entereso y Hapa appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the death of Leoniso Hermo, and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided therefor, and to indemnify jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased Leoniso Hermo in the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Accused Hapa, Feratero, Españo and Entereso filed a joint notice of appeal. They claimed that the trial court
erroneously condemned them for murder without giving accused Francisco Hapa the opportunity to testify on his
behalf.
ISSUE: W/N Francisco Hapa was deprived of his right to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. There is nothing that would support this contention. It is well settled that the right to
be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights guaranteed to an accused. Not only this
but he likewise has the right to present evidence in his defense. Due process of law in judicial proceedings
requires that he must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend in
person at every stage of the proceedings. A decision would only be void for lack of due process if, as a
result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.
In the case at bar, the last witness for the defense was accused-appellant Claro Feratero, who took the witness
stand on February 18, 1985. From that time until the defense rested its case on October 13, 1987, the defense had
sufficient time and opportunity to present further evidence. Yet, every time that the case was set for trial, despite due
notice to him, accused-appellant Francisco Hapa never showed up. Hence, the trial would be reset to another date.
Because accused Francisco jumped bail, his counsel had to rest the case and submit it for decision. Obviously,
accused-appellants were given ample opportunity to present evidence to prove their innocence.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 44
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Aguirre v. people GR 144142 August 23, 2001
FACTS: Accused Yolanda Aguirre was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. At her arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty to all the charges. Since they involved substantially similar facts, the cases were consolidated. Trial
ensued. When it was her turn to adduce evidence, petitioner continuously moved for the postponement of the
hearings. Thereafter, the trial court declared petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense.
On July 15, 1996, the trial court then rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed her conviction to the CA. Accused claims that she was deprived of due process when the trial court
declared that her right to present evidence as deemed waived, forfeited and abandoned
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was deprived of due process because she was given ample opportunity to present her
evidence.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the records show that she was given ample
opportunity by the trial court to present her evidence. The trial court in view of the absence of either
appellant or her counsel granted the motions of her counsel for continuance to enable the defense to
present its evidence. Accused-appellant continuously requested postponement of hearing. The trial court
was constrained to declare the right of the accused to present evidence as deemed waived, forfeited or
abandoned due to the non-appearance of appellant or her counsel. Accused-appellant did not file any motion or
pleading to have said order reconsidered. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if it were true that appellant
wanted to present her evidence, she should have taken advantage of the ample opportunity to present, to be heard
and to testify in open court with the assistance of her counsel. She cannot now claim that she was denied her right
to be present and present her evidence. Court finds that petitioner in this case cannot feign denial of due process
because she had, indeed, been given the opportunity to present her side.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 45
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
PUYAT V. ZABARTE, 352 SCRA 738
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the foreign judgment, which was in the form of a Compromise Agreement, cannot
be executed without the parties being assisted by their chosen lawyers. The reason for this, he points out, is to
eliminate collusion, undue influence and/or improper exertion of ascendancy by one party over the other. He alleges
that he discharged his counsel during the proceedings, because he felt that the latter was not properly attending to
the case. The judge, however, did not allow him to secure the services of another counsel. Insisting that petitioner
settle the case with respondent, the judge practically imposed the settlement agreement on him.
ISSUE: W/N the Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991
was obtained without the assistance of counsel for petitioner and without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was
rendered in clear violation of petitioner's constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The manifestation of petitioner that the judge and the counsel for the opposing party
had pressured him would gain credibility only if he had not been given sufficient time to engage the services of a
new lawyer. Respondent's Affidavit dated May 23, 1994, clarified, however, that petitioner had sufficient time, but he
failed to retain a counsel. Having dismissed his lawyer as early as June 19, 1991, petitioner directly handled
his own defense and negotiated a settlement with respondent and his counsel in December 1991.
Respondent also stated that petitioner, ignoring the judge's reminder of the importance of having a lawyer,
argued that "he would be the one to settle the case and pay" anyway. Eventually, the Compromise
Agreement was presented in court and signed before Judge Ellen James on January 3, 1992. Hence,
petitioner's rights to counsel and to due process were not violated.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 46
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
BARITUA V. MERCADER 350 SCRA 86
FACTS: Respondents filed in RTC of Northern Samar a complaint against damages petitioner alleging among
others, that the latter’s driver negligently and recklessly operated the bus at fast speed causing it to fell from the
bridge on March 17,1883 leading the death of Dominador Mercader. In their answers, petitioners denied specifically
all complaint’s material allegation. In one of their affirmative defenses, they argued that the respondents have not
yet paid the correct docket fees on the reason that the value or amount of Mercader’s properties losted during the
accident was not specifically alleged in the complaint. The RTC, after due trial , decided in respondents favor
ordering petitioners to pay the former damages. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision
On April 17,1998. When their motion for reconsideration was denied on October 19,1998, petitioners filed the
present petition for review under Rule 45assailing CA’s decision and resolution.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were denied procedural rights.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: NO. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In
ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the
evidence before them. In other words, the mere fact that Judge Noynay based his decision on the
testimonies of respondents' witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of
petitioners.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 47
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS)
BARBERS V LAGUIO, 351 SCRA 606
FACTS: Private respondent, Lawrence Wang, was charged with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal
Possession of Firearms, and COMELC Gun Ban after 32 transparent bags containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and two unlicensed firearms were found in his possession by police officers. Respondent
Judge Laguio dismissed the cases for lack of evidence upon filing of the accused of Demurrer to Evidence. Judge
Laguio found that the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without
probable cause and could not be licit hence, evidence gathered from the invalid warrantless search was
inadmissible. Petitioner directly came to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari to nullify and set aside the
resolution of said judge.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and
acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case,
the petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by
appeal without violating private respondent’s right against double jeopardy. What petitioner filed with the Court in the
present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law,
which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (grave abuse of discretion). The right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be
exercised only in the manner provided for by law. Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal. An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is
a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 48
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS)
PEOPLE V. HERIDA, 353 SCRA 650
FACTS: Respondent Julio Herida was convicted of murder for the death of Herlito Delara and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the RTC of Quezon City. On appeal before the Supreme Court, he
averred that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him, pointing out that over 70% of the
testimonies of the prosecution’s material witnesses were elicited by the judge while the cross-examination of the
defense witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the judge himself. Hence, his right to a fair and impartial trial
was violated.
ISSUE: W/N the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial was violated by the intensive questioning of the
witnesses by the judge.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Transcripts of the proceedings showed that the judge intensively questioned witnesses
from both the prosecution and the defense. Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a boxing bout, whose only
task is to watch and decide the results. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify
ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel. Intensive questioning
by the judge in a trial does not violate the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 49
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS)
PEOPLE V. MEDENILLA, GR 1311638
FACTS: Respondent Loreto Medenilla was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC of Pasig for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (possession of 4 transparent bags containing shabu and being a drug pusher).
In his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, he averred that he was denied of due process on the grounds
that the trial court denied his motion to have the questioned shabu examined (quantitatively and qualitatively) and
the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.
ISSUE: W/N the accused was denied due process with the denial of his motion to have the questioned shabu
examined and with the bias attitude of the presiding judge.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. As held in the previous case of People vs. Barita, there is no need to examine the
entirety of the submitted specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole specimen. On the
second ground, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the
purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though, that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 50
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS)
PEOPLE V. RIVERA, GR 139180
FACTS: Respondent Rolando Rivera was found by the RTC of Pampanga guilty of rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death and to pay damages to the offended party (13 year-old daughter). In his appeal before
the Supreme Court, he averred that the lower court failed to observe his constitutional right to due process and right
to counsel due to the following reasons: 1) his lawyer was disallowed from questioning the victim concerning her
sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; 2) his motion to postpone the cross-examination of
the examining physician was denied resulting to his counsel’s waiver of such cross-examination; 3) the judge
propounded numerous questions to him during cross-examination by the prosecutor; and 4) the trial court’s decision
was promulgated a day after his submission of his memorandum.
ISSUE: W/N the accused right to due process and right to counsel have been violated in the case at bar.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights, not a mere formality that may
be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. Considering both the evidence and the law applicable to this case,
the Supreme Court held that accused-appellant has been accorded his right to due process.
While the Constitution recognizes the accused’s right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his
option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the States and the offended
party’s right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a private counsel if
the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the
attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason. In this case, his regular counsel was absent without
any explanation hence, another counsel was given to him.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 51
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS)
PEOPLE V. BASQUEZ, GR 144035
FACTS: Respondent Vicente Basquez was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt by RTC of Davao City of the
crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages to the victim. On
his appeal before the Supreme Court, he averred that the trial court judge showed manifest bias and partiality
against him by virtually acting as prosecutor and using the authority of his position in making up for the
shortcomings of the prosecutor. That trial judge went to unjustifiable lengths in examining some of the witnesses
called for the defense.
ISSUE: W/N there was bias and partiality of the trial judge in the case at bar.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Judges are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary.
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions
to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. Questions designed to
clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter,
may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time The trial
judge’s inquisitiveness did not unduly harm respondent’s substantial rights. Rather, the questions he propounded to
the witnesses showed his intention to elicit the truth. This conduct is expected of judges who, conscious of their
responsibilities as magistrates, propound questions to witnesses who give incomplete and obscure answers.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 52
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Cooperative Development (CDA) vs DOLEFIL G.R. No. 137489.
May 29, 2002
FACTS: A petition for certiorari was filed by DOLEFIL Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (DARBCI)
questioning the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve the complaints against some of the officers and BOD, specifically
with respect to the authority of the CDA to issue the freeze order and to create a management committee that would
run the affairs of DARBCI which replaces such officers. CA denied the petition of CDA and ordered the
reinstatement of said officers.
ISSUE: W/N the action taken by the Court of Appeals, nullifying election of the officers and members of the Board of
Directors of DARBCI, violated the constitutional right of the petitione rs-in-intervention to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: YES. It was precipitate for the appellate court to render judgment against the
petitioners-in-intervention in its Resolution dated February 9, 1999 without due notice and opportunity to be
heard. The requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: (1) there
must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment
must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 53
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Garcia vs Pajaro G.R. No. 141149. July 5, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Sebastian Garcia was suspended because of his unsatisfactory performance. However, he had
been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the
complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. He
did not believe the Order; he did not submit himself for investigation. Thus his salary was withheld. Further he
argues that his right to due process was violated, because he was not heard during the administrative proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N he was denied due process of law.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO, the City Treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against
subordinate officers or employees. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the
opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a
petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 54
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Brioso vs. Mariano G.R. No. 132765. January 31, 2003
FACTS: On May 27, 1977, the Spouses Mariano filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property
against Glicerio, Ernesto, Concepcion, Eusebio and Salvador Brioso. The trial court awarded damages against
Brioso and the return of the land. Petitioners averred that the decision is not valid and binding upon all of the
petitioners as there was no valid substation upon the death of Glicerio.
ISSUE: W/N the substitution of the heirs on the liability of Glicerio due to his death violates the right to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: Void as to Felicidad, Glicerio, Jr., Bener and Julito since they were not duly notified of the
substitution. Valid and binding on: Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, shared in the case and presented evidence in
defense of deceased defendant.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 55
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Macias vs Macias G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003
FACTS: Judge Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Margie Corpus Macias (herein respondent). Summons and complaint were published in the
newspaper. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. RTC denies the motion and issued an Order setting the hearing
on May 2 and 3, 2001. Respondent received a copy of this Order only on May 8, 2001. Thus, when the case was
called for hearing as scheduled, respondent and counsel, not being duly notified, did not appear and allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court violated the right of the respondent to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: YES. The trial court, without even waiting for respondent’s motion for reconsideration
denying her motion to dismiss, hurriedly set the case for hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent to
file her answer the trial court hastily authorized petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte. The summary
proceeding is a patent nullity.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 56
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Alboir vs Auguis A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner charged respondent (Cleck of Court II) of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the
performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his son, Edilberto Albior. The Office of the Court
Administrator found respondents defense unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said
detention order prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant of arrest was issued
against the accused.
ISSUE: W/N respondent violated the right to due process of Albior.
RULING/MAIN POINT: YES. Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused
and his relatives. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior
was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful
detention. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 57
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 Nov 18, 2003
FACTS: Motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits of the Marcoses. The
Marcoses asserts that the proceedings under RA 1379 are criminal in nature and all the rights must be in favor of
the accused under the constitution and the prosecution has the burden of proving the respondent's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The respondents also argue that the letter and intent of RA 1379 forbid and preclude summary
judgment as the process to decide forfeiture cases under the law.
ISSUE: W/N the Summary Judgement in the forfeiture proceeding is a violation of due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The Marcoses are not being deprived of the right to due process. Summary
judgment in the forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of
respondent Marcoses as the proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is
penal in character. Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, their
defenses and their pleadings. Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the
absence of previous notice but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 58
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank 422 SCRA 649
GR 149797-98
FACTS: Respondents Banco Filipino filed with RTC of Batangas an action for reconveyance of real property against
petitioner Nancy Ty, et al. Petitioner filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition or disqualification of respondent Judge
Tac-an on the grounds of manifest prejudgment and partiality.
Respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the orders of the court were based on facts and
applicable law and jurisprudence. Separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed with the Court of
Appeals. Appellate Court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed orders by respondent judge
ISSUE: W/N CA gravely erred in accepting the course of judicial proceeding exercised by RTC Judge Tac-an.
RULING/MAIN POINT: YES. CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower court. The role of the trial judge
in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution of
controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however,
undue interference where the judge’s participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case
for one of the parties. There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the presentation of
specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and who to
present as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 59
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
People vs Larranaga, 412 SCRA 530
FACTS: The case at bar are motions for reconsiderations separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and
James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes of (a) special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Here petitioners alleged SC erred in finding that the trial court did not violate the rights of the accused to due
process of law in excluding the testimony of other defense witnesses.
ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial court did not violate the rights of the accused to due
process of law in excluding the testimony of other defense witnesses
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The trial court made the correct decision in excluding some of the witnesses of the
defense. For an archeologist cannot be a credible witness in ascertaining validity of fingerprints and the affidavit of
the NBI Regional Director has nothing on it that would acquit the accused-appellants of the crimes they have been
convicted. In resolving the instant motions, every piece of evidence presented before the trial court is
evaluated in response to appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. The element of reasonable
doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of
their submissions.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 60
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF PROCEEDINGS)
R. Transport vs Philhino 494 SCRA 630 GR 148150
FACTS: R Transport purchased from respondent Sales Corporation 10 brand new units of buses in which the
agreed settlement of payments was not met by R. Transport. Here Philhino seeks to recover the payment from the
petitioners. Which during proceedings, main witness of R. Transport has to leave for US to represent an off-shore
company where she is the managing director which the petitioners filed for a motion to transfer dates of hearing.This
petition is for certiorari which is to nullify CA resolutions in affirming the decision of the RTC to deny motion of
petitioner to transfer the dates of trial and an order striking off the records of direct testimony of the petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement and
in striking off the records the testimony of a witness
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Parties asking for postponement have no right to assume that their motions
would be granted nor to expect that their motion for reconsideration of their denied motion for
postponement would be reconsidered. They must be prepared on the day of the hearing. The Court cannot
make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a
case rather than postpone the hearing to another day because of the absence of a party or a party's
witness. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court
to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness which is totally absent in the case
under consideration. It is duty of the witness to complete his testimony and make himself available for cross
examination in accordance with fair play and due process. As his oral testimony remained incomplete, the same
could not be the subject of cross-examination.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 61
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Trans Middle East vs Sandiganbayan
Main Point: Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party
can present its side or defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Facts: EO No. 2 was issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino to go after illegally acquired properties by the Marcoses and their
relatives, Atty Narciso declared in a letter that the Philippine Commercial Int Bank shares are owned by former Gov.
Romualdez under TMEPEI and thus falls under the jurisdiction of PCGG. PCGG then sequestered the shares for
reconveyance of ill-gotten wealth and placed all the PCIB bank shares under sequestration. Petitioner TMEPEI filed a
Motion to Intervene alleging that PCGG sequestered its shares without due process and exercised all rights of ownership
thereof which was granted by respondent Court.
However, on a later, decision respondent court ruled that disclosures of assets or properties constituting ill-gotten wealth
allegedly amassed during the Marcos regime placed in the names of nominees, agents or trustees be governed by EO
No. 2.
Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction depriving petitioner of
due process in ascertaining the application of EO no. 2
Ruling: NO. The Sandiganbayan did not deny petitioners due process. The petitioner was given an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings when Sandiganbayan directed the petitioner to file its comment on the manifestation and
motions but failed to do so. Therefore, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Further, the petitioner was
afforded the opportunity to be heard. To be heard does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one
may also be heard through pleadings, and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, as in this case,
there is no denial of due process.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 62
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC)
MAIN POINT: Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against.
FACTS: Respondent FMISC filed for a complaint for a sum of money when the check issued by the petitioner Elpidio Uy
and a certain Robert Uy for the payment for the ordered deformed steel bars was dishonored upon presentment and the
petitioner refused to pay. Various counsels appeared for the petitioner on various dates due to the rescheduling of the
hearings. During the hearing on Feb. 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares, counsel for the petitioner, arrived late. Upon motion of
FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to present evidence is deemed waived and the parties were directed to
file their respective memorandum. The case was deemed submitted for decision. Petitioner, through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio,
Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearing for
the reception of evidence, thus impairing his rights to due process.
ISSUE: W/N Motion for New Trial can be given to the petitioner.
RULING: No. The records show that the hearings were postponed or cancelled without any justification. However, the trial
court accommodated the requests for postponement or resetting to accord petitioner due process. Under the
circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings without justifiable reason
tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such, it cannot be a ground for new trial.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 63
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Deutsche bank v. Chua
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents who incurred a total loss in their deals of USD-to-PHP foreign
exchange with the Bank and failed to pay their obligations. RTC denied to the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners. In a MR, RTC ordered all the documentary exhibits be admitted as part of the testimonies of the witness who
testified thereon. Petitioner contends of a denial of due process when there was failure to inhibit respondent Judge with
his erroneous pronouncements and in the admission of the evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process upon the denial of admission of the documentary
exhibits/evidence.
RULING/MP: NO. Despite the trial court’s initial failure to state its reasons for admitting the documentary
evidence of petitioner, said court has subsequently admitted all of the same although merely as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses. The trial court, in so ruling, did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in
proceeding, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is abuse of discretion. A ruling on the admission of evidence,
even if wrong, is not an abuse of discretion but simply an erroneous ruling. As long as the trial court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgments, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy of petitioner was to appeal in
due course from the judgment or decision of the trial court on the merits of the case to the CA.
Where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the
court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 64
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
People v. Santos
FACTS: RTC found Santos GBRD of the crime of Rape of then 5-y.o. AAA and was sentenced with the death penalty. The
case was elevated to the Court for automatic review. Pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo, the case was referred to
the CA for evaluation. CA affirmed the RTC decision. The trial court and the CA gave credence to the testimony of AAA.
Appellant herein faults the trial court with "acting as the prosecutor and the judge at the same time" for allegedly initiating
and propounding "the questions, short of supplying the desired answer from the witness."
ISSUE: Whether or not the there was a violation of due process in the trial court’s form of questioning the child witness.
RULING/MP: NO. The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may
be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness.
The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a
child witness. Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, child witnesses may testify in a
narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will
further the interest of justice. The record discloses that the questions propounded by the judge were intended to elicit the
truth from the child witness. This perceived undue inquisitiveness of the judge did not unduly harm the substantial
rights of the appellant. In fact, it is only to be expected from the judge who, with full consciousness of his
responsibilities could not, and should not, easily be satisfied with incompleteness and obscurities in the
testimonies of the witness.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 65
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Victoriano v. People
FACTS: Petitioner Marianito Victoriano and a certain Raymond Illustre were charged of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents supported by various witnesses with their testimonies. The Sandiganbayan
acquitted petitioner of the charge of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. However,
he was found liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner then argued that he was denied of his right to
due process and that he did not waive his right to participate in the trial or to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied of his right to due process.
RULING: No. In the instant case, petitioner’s counsel did not cross-examine the opposing party’s witnesses due to his
failure to cooperate in preparing his defense. In fact, records show that it was petitioner’s counsel who suggested to the
court to cite him in contempt and to cancel his bail bond for failure to attend the hearings. Thus, he could not complain at
this stage of the proceedings that he was denied the right to confront the witnesses against him.
MAIN POINT: The right to confront and cross-examine the opposing party’s witnesses is indeed a fundamental right
which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 66
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Santos v. DOJ
FACTS: Hours before the show “Wowowee”, an unruly mob caused a stampede claiming 71 lives and left hundreds
wounded. Respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez constituted an Evaluating Panel to evaluate the report made by the
DILG inter-agency fact finding team and determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted. The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a
Report concurring with the DILG Report but concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. NBI-NCR recommended DOJ to designate a panel of state prosecutors (Investigating Panel) to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. The Investigating Panel found probable cause to indict the
respondents-herein petitioners for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries, and
recommended the conduct of a separate preliminary investigation against certain public officials. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the said October 9, 2006 Resolution, filed on October 30, 2006 with abundance of caution, is pending
resolution, and in the present petition they additionally pray for its annulment. In asserting their right to due process,
specifically to a fair and impartial preliminary investigation, petitioners impute reversible errors in the assailed issuances,
arguing that:
·
Respondents have already prejudged the case, as shown by the public declarations of Respondent
Secretary and the Chief Executive, and have, therefore, lost their impartiality to conduct preliminary investigation.
·
Respondents have already prejudged the case as shown by the indecent haste by which the proceedings
were conducted.
·
The alleged complaint-affidavits filed against Petitioners were not under oath.
·
The supposed complaint-affidavits filed against Petitioners failed to state the acts or omissions
constituting the crime
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is denied of his right to due process specifically to a fair and impartial preliminary investigation.
RULING/MP: No. There was no proof that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their decision
with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. Therefore, there was no violation of the petitioners’
right to due process, specifically to a fair and impartial investigation. The Court also found that there was no indecent
haste of proceedings.
BENITEZ
Case No. 67
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DBP vs. Teston
MAIN POINT: The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
FACTS: Teston purchased, on installment basis from petitioner two parcels of land. Respondent was unable to pay
amortizations which had amounted to P3,727,435.57. DBP thus rescinded their contract by letter. It turned out that
respondent had voluntarily offered the two parcels of land for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Respondent alleged that under Republic Act No. 6657, his obligation to DBP was assumed by the government
through the Land Bank after the two parcels of land became covered by the CARP, and that the operation of said law
extinguished DBP's right to rescind the sale. DBP alleged that since respondent had not acquired title to the two parcels of
land, he had no right to voluntarily offer them to the CARP. The CA ordered DBP to return to respondent P1M alleged
down payment
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering DBP to return theP1M down payment
RULING: Yes. Rescission of a sale creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract,
together with their fruits, and the price with its interests is undisputed. However, to require DBP to return the alleged
P1,000,000 without first giving it an opportunity to present evidence would violate the Constitutional provision
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” In the case at bar, DBP
had no opportunity to present evidence on its behalf.
BENITEZ
Case No. 68
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Ruivivar vs. OMB
MAIN POINT: The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine
its findings and conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the
tribunals ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of due process, on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or
tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based
on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating
party against whom a ruling was made.
FACTS: Private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the petitioner of serious misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner, shouted at
her in a very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from entering the office
of the LTO Commissioner. To prove her allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits of three witnesses.
The Ombudsman then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of
the private respondent’s witnesses. The Ombudsman responded to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration by ordering
that the petitioner be furnished with copies of the affidavits of the private respondent’s witnesses. Records show that the
petitioner received copies of the private respondent’s witness’s affidavits but she did not choose to controvert these
affidavits or to file a supplement to her motion for reconsideration. She simply maintained in her Manifestation that her
receipt of the affidavits did not alter the fact the she was deprived of due process nor cure the irregularity in the November
4, 2002 Decision.
ISSUE/S: whether or not petitioner was denied of the constitutional guarantee to due process when she was deprived of
her right to confront the evidence submitted against her before the decision of the office of the ombudsman was rendered.
RULING: No. The ruling made by CA is legally correct as exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing
of a petition for certiorari. Other than this legal significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries the direct and
immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail of this
opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due process.
BENITEZ
Case No. 69
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Borromeo vs. Garcia
MAIN POINT: The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence in
support of one’s defense—what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. What the law proscribes is the
lack of opportunity to be heard. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would
have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.
FACTS: On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De Andrada (Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a
document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple) over Lot No.
6-H-2. Patricia sold the property to petitioner. On April 17, 1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Cebu and moved for the annotation of the August 17, 1938 document executed by Patricia. Petitioner contended
that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due process.
`
ISSUE: Whether or not there was error in the nullity of the Order for the denial of petitioner’s substantive and procedural
right to due process
RULING: No. The records reveal that the court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its previous
order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the court heard petitioners motion for
reconsideration in open court wherein both parties presented their respective arguments to defend their rights and the
court likewise allowed the parties to file their respective memoranda prior to ruling on the motion for reconsideration.
BENITEZ
Case No. 70
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Cesar vs OMB
MAIN POINT: There is no denial of due process if records show that hearings were held with prior notice to adverse
parties. Even without notice, there is no denial of procedural due process if the parties were given the opportunity to be
heard. Due process in administrative proceedings simply means an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the order
complained of and it cannot be fully equated with that in strict jurisprudential sense. A respondent is not entitled to be
informed of the preliminary findings and recommendations of the investigating agency; he is entitled only to a fair
opportunity to be heard and to a decision based on substantial evidence
FACTS: In 1995, government auditors conducted a surprise audit at the Cash Division of Cebu City Hall. Paymaster
Badana had cash advances of more than P216 million fraudulently incurred by presenting cash items such as payrolls
and vouchers already previously credited to her account to cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. The OMB
found Cesar (city treasurer) and the other city officials guilty of neglect of duty and meted to them the penalty of six
months suspension without pay. Cesar argued that there was lack of due process because the complaint filed against him
was not verified. He also argued in his petition for review that the Ombudsman had no power to directly suspend him and
that there was no legal and factual basis to suspend him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cesar’s right to due process violated when he was suspended for six months as city treasurer
RULING: No. The appellate court correctly ruled that procedural lapses, if any, were cured when Cesar participated in the
preliminary conference, submitted his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, actively participated in the
proceedings by cross-examining witnesses, and filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Cesar was given every opportunity to explain his side and to present evidence in his defense during the administrative
investigation. True, the case mutated when the graft investigators discovered evidence against and impleaded the city
officials, but Cesar filed a supplemental affidavit to controvert the charges and later participated in the hearings
BENITEZ
Case No. 71
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DAR vs. Samson
MAIN POINT: In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process.
FACTS: Samson applied for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) over
nine (9) parcels of land. In an undated Order issued sometime in 1995, the subject lots were declared exempt from CARP
coverage by DAR Regional Director. Petitioners-farmers filed an Opposition/Petition alleging that they received the
undated Order of DAR only on January 1997. On August 9, 1999, Samson assailed the Order before the Office of the
President arguing that he was not notified of the appeal; that had he been properly apprised, he could have presented
evidence to prove that the properties have a slope of 18% or over and are not developed; and that petitioner-farmers are
not qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. He denied that he was represented during the alleged ocular inspection conducted
by DAR on February 1998. The Office of the President ruled that any alleged procedural lapses committed in the
proceedings before the DAR were cured when Samson interposed the appeal before it which gave him an opportunity to
present evidence and to substantiate the claim that the subject land is exempt from CARP coverage. Likewise, the DAR
Secretary considered all available records including Samson’s application for exemption thus, there is no denial of due
process.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent Samson was deprived due process.
RULING: No. It was not shown that farmers-petitioners sent notices or copies of their Opposition/Petition to respondents.
However, as correctly ruled by the Office of the President, there is no denial of due process because the DAR Secretary,
in issuing the assailed Order, considered all available records of the case at the DAR Regional Office, including
respondents’ application for exemption and its supporting documents. Neither can the DAR be faulted for sending its
notices to respondents’ predecessor’s previous address in Quezon City as it was the same address appearing in the
undated
BENITEZ
Case No. 72
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Hilario vs. People
MAIN POINT: In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory,
it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
FACTS: Petitioner, after being meted a total of 16 years of imprisonment for the crime of homicide, insists that the failure
of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his judgment of conviction despite his explicit instruction to do so
constitutes excusable negligence and so his petition for relief should have been granted. RTC dismissed the petition.
Without the benefit of a counsel, petitioner filed for certiorari but CA dismissed it and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed because it was not made within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law
rendered the resolution final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner’s counsel de oficio to
seasonably file a Notice of Appeal constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention
prisoner/petitioner to pursue his appeal.
RULING: YES. Failure to file within the reglementary period which renders decisions final and executory can be relaxed
on matters of life, liberty, honor and property. Furthermore, the petition for certiorari before the CA by the petitioner without
the benefit of a counsel should have alerted the CA and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance
of his counsel.
BENITEZ
Case No. 73
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Pastona, Jr. vs. CA
MAIN POINT: So long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
FACTS: After due investigation, the management of San Miguel Corp. found petitioner guilty of gross negligence,
withholding of funds due the company, and insubordination. Petitioner, after notice, was subsequently terminated.
Petitioner in turn filed for a complaint of illegal dismissal. Labor arbiter granted the petition. NLRC however reversed it.
CA, on certiorari, assailed NLRC’s decision holding that petitioner knowingly violated company’s rules which constitutes
just cause for his termination. No motion for reconsideration was filed and CA’s decision became final and executory. Five
months later, however, petitioner filed for certiorari maintaining that despite inquiries with his former counsel, he was not
informed by the latter of the CA’s decision and the non-filing of motion for reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE: W/N CA’s decision can be nullified for constituting a denial of due process of law by reason of counsel’s failure to
file a motion for reconsideration.
RULING: NO. He was not denied of due process of law because he had the opportunity to be heard at some point of the
proceedings even if they had not been able to fully exhaust all the remedies available by reason of their counsel’s
negligence or mistake. He had been able to present all his evidence and fully ventilate his arguments before the Labor
Arbiter, then on appeal before the NLRC, and even in his petition for certiorari before the CA.
BENITEZ
Case No. 74
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Bibas vs. OMB (Visayas) and COA
MAIN POINT: In order to secure relaxation of rules due to negligence of the counsel, the defendant must satisfy the court
with a good and meritorious defense sufficient to warrant such relaxation.
FACTS: OMB charged LOURDESITA M. BIBAS, Disbursing Officer II in the City Treasurer’s Office, Silay City, with
Dishonesty and meted the penalty of dismissal from service for failure to account the shortage, amounting to
P990,341.10, from her cash accountability as evidenced by the cash examination conducted by COA. She answered that
she misplaced two bundles of paid payrolls because COA personnel would borrow them every now and then. CA, on
certiorari by the petitioner, dismissed it holding that appeal is the correct remedy and not certiorari. She filed motion for
reconsideration after 22 days but CA again dismissed for not complying with the reglementary period of 15 days. She
however maintains that procedural errors were attributable to her former counsel’s negligence.
ISSUE: W/N her former counsel’s negligence warrants the relaxation of procedural rules in the case at bar.
RULING: NO. Petitioner has failed to present a strong case through the pleadings she has submitted to warrant relaxation
of rules. She cannot even finger point any particular COA personnel and she eventually admitted that it was all due to her
carelessness and negligence.
BENITEZ
Case No. 75
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Espiña vs. Cerujano
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesus Clarito Espiña, a Prosecutor of the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Lao-ang, Northern Samar,
signed a Motion to Dismiss for Criminal Case No. 1276 upon Trial Judge’s request. The same trial judge granted the
motion thereafter. Respondents, as a result, filed an admin case for Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the service
against Jesus Clarito Espiña. The Secretary of Justice later formally charged petitioner with conduct grossly prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and subsequently found him guilty of grave misconduct which the President affirmed
and later meted a dismissal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. CA also denied his appeal. Petitioner on
Certiorari, argued that he was not afforded due process because he was found guilty and penalized for grave
misconduct, even though the charge filed against him was for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
ISSUE: Whether or not a conviction of “Grave Misconduct” may be meted for the charge of “Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best interest of the Service”.
RULING/MP: NO. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service does not necessarily include the elements
of grave misconduct. : A basic requirement of due process is that a person must be (a) duly informed of the charges
against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime which he was not charged. Administrative
proceedings are not exempt from this rule. The word “gross” connotes “something beyond measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful” while “prejudicial” means “detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally,
probably or actually bringing about a wrong result.” The Petitioner however is not absolved from liability for acting as a
puppet for unscrupulous judges.
BENITEZ
Case No. 76
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Geronga vs. Varela
MAIN POINT: Two fundamental requirements of due process in administrative cases are that:
1.
a person must be duly informed of the charges against him;
2.
and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with which he was not charged.
A deviation from these requirements renders the proceeding invalid and the judgment issued therein a lawless thing that
can be struck down anytime.
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Geronga works as Engineer IV at the General Services Department of the local government
of Cadiz City. In 1996, he was involved in two administrative cases: 1) Administrative Case (AC) No. 96-04 for Unjust
Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination, Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Alarm and Scandal; and 2)
Administrative Case (AC) No. 96-05 for Grave Misconduct and engaging in Partisan Political Activity. Both complaints
resulted to the dismissal of the petitioner as recommended by the City Legal Officer. CSC, on appeal, sustained the
dismissal. CA also upheld the dismissal and dismissed the petition for review thereafter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process under the Resolution/Recommendation of the City Legal
Officer.
RULING: YES. In the present case, the records of AC No. 96-04 reveal that petitioner was dismissed for an act which
was not alleged in the administrative charge filed against him. Nowhere in the records of AC No. 96-04 does it appear that
petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to answer for his alleged defamatory statements. AC
No. 96-05 Resolution should likewise be rendered void ab initio for being in utter contempt of petitioner’s due process.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 77
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OMB vs. Magno
FACTS: Magno was administratively charged with Misconduct and Oppression for his supposed violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act but was held guilty of Grave Misconduct by the Ombudsman, and dismissed him from service
and also dismissed his Motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed the decision on the ground that Magno could not be
found guilty of Grave Misconduct without violating his right to due process.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman violated Magno’s right to Due Process of Law
RULING/MP: Yes. As found by the CA, Magno was clearly deprived of his right to due process when he was convicted of
a much serious offense, carrying a more severe penalty, without him being properly informed thereof or being provided
with the opportunity to be heard thereon.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 78
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Avenido vs. CSC
FACTS: Avenido prepared the Order of Payment and delivered the same to the Cashier, and made it appear that Animus
International complied with an application for Permit to Import its mobile telephone units. NTC issued him a Show Cause
Order and later on charged him with Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents and Usurpation of Authority. NTC then
found him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service which was not included in the Show Cause
Order. CSC affirmed, which merits the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner claims that he was deprived of due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was afforded sufficient Due Process of Law
RULING/MP: Yes. Petitioner was furnished a copy of the charges against him and he was able to file an answer and
present evidence in his defense. Consequently, a decision was rendered by the NTC finding him guilty of an offense which
was not specifically designated in the Show Cause Order, but was still based on acts that were alleged therein, which
compromised the image and integrity of his public office. Clearly, therefore, due process was observed in this case.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 79
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Romualdez vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and section 12 of
RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act, for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new voters
in Burauen, Leyte, wherein petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss. The Complaint-Affidavit
contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of
the same. But COMELEC filed with the RTC separate information against petitioners for violation of Section 10 (g) and
(j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the RA 8189. So petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of
law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered
to be filed against them.
ISSUE: WON Due Process of Law was violated
RULING/MP: No. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is understood in a language
which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charges filed by the COMELEC. The charges are based on the
same set of facts and their nature are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due
process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit.
BENITEZ
CASE NO. 80
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Multi-Trans Agency vs. Oriental Assurance Corp
MAINPOINT: In cases where one of the exceptions is present, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who
suffered by reason of the counsel’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
FACTS: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ordering petitioner to pay respondent a sum of money for its breach of
contract in the delivery of goods when his counsel failed to file an answer and to act after receipt of the declaration of
default issued by the CA which constituted simple negligence, and as a rule binding to the petitioner, not entitling him to a
new trial. Petitioner claims that it has been unduly deprived of its rights to be heard and to present its defense, through no
fault of its own, thus violating his right to due process of law.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was deprived of its right to Due Process of Law
RULING: Yes. The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel is so gross that he was deprived of his day in court, thus
denying him due process. While it is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not without
exception.
Exceptions are:
1.
In cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law,
2.
When the application would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property,
3.
Where the interest of justice so requires.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 81
Due Process: Section 1. Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Siochi v. BPI
G.R. No. 193872, October 19, 2011
MAINPOINT: While it is true that the Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed, this does not mean that the
courts may disregard the rules, especially when it deprives a person’s right to Due Process of Law.
FACTS: Petitioners borrowed money from the BPI. When petitioner filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation, the
BPI filed their comment saying the rehabilitation plan was unfeasible and prejudicial to them, but the RTC hastily
ruled in favor of petitioners violating the Rules of Procedure in Rehabilitation Cases that “if the court is satisfied that
there is merit in the petition, it shall give due course to the petition and immediately refer the same and its annexes
to the rehabilitation receiver.” So, the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling stating that the proceeding was rife with prime
procedural infirmities. Petitioners claimed that it is within the RTC’s discretion to disregard the procedural formalities.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the RTC’s decision.
RULING: No. RTC hastily approved the plan in the same order giving due course to the petition. The RTC also
failed to refer for evaluation the rehabilitation plan to the receiver. Hence, depriving the respondent’s right to Due
Process of Law, petition is dismissed and CA’s decision is affirmed.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 82
Due Process: Section 1. Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Catacutan v. People
G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011
MAIN POINT: In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the credence to be accorded to
the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that usually, the participants are the only eyewitnesses to the
occurrences.
FACTS: The appellant raped AAA, an 11-year-old girl at around 3:00 a.m. of 20 January 2000, AAA, who was
sleeping beside her 10-year old brother and 2-year old nephew inside the store when she was awakened by a
mosquito bite and saw appellant lying on top of her. AAA asked permission to urinate first before appellant brought
her to a vacant lot at the back of the store. Appellant raped her while pointing a knife at her chest, and threatening to
kill her family if she reports the incident. On the same day AAA undergo medical examination which further proved
that she lost her virginity. Appellant was guilty of rape. In his brief appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He questions the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Appellant alleges that
the victim’s testimony is highly incredible and not in consonance with reason and common experience.”
ISSUE: WON the testimony is credible enough to convict the appellant.
RULING: YES. No young woman especially of tender age would create a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts, and pervert herself by being subjected to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 83
Due Process: Section 1. Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Mortel v. Kerr
G.R. No. 156296, November 12, 2012
MAIN POINT: The negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that
they denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They prevented him from presenting
his side, which was unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly meritorious.
FACTS: Mortel seeks the reversal of the resolution for his petition for review on certiorari on his property which was
sold on a public auction because Mortal was in default due to the incompetence ignorance or inexperience of his
counsel, he was prejudiced and denied his day in court when Atty Mas did not appear in court. Atty Tumulak filed a
notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel but the RTC did not act on such notice because of the lack of submission
on the part of Atty Mas’ withdrawal as counsel. With Atty. Tumulak left out and unaware of the developments in the
case, Mortel, upon receipt of the decision and feeling abandoned again by Atty. Tumulak, his new counsel, engaged
Atty. Lacambra to collaborate as his counsel.
ISSUE: WON Mortel was deprived of his property without due process of law.
RULING: YES. Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was unable to submit his evidence to controvert the
claim of Kerr about the RTC declared Mortel as in default due to his counsel’s failure to appear at the fifth setting of
the pre-trial. Moreover, he did not offer any explanation for his non-appearance at the pre-trial despite notice nor did
he take the necessary move to protect the interest of Mortel upon learning that Mortel had been declared as in
default by the RTC. The negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable
that they denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 84
Due Process: Section 1. Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
Gravides v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 199433, November 13, 2012
MAIN POINT: While procedural rules are intended for the speedy disposition of election cases, this should not delay
this Commission from compliance with the established principles of fairness and justice.
FACTS: Borjal and Gravides both ran for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay U.P. during the 2010
Barangay Elections. Where Gravides won by 2 votes. Borja filed an election protest for revision, re appreciation and
recounting of ballots. Gravides filed her answer and move for the dismissal of the protest for non-compliance with
Sec 4 rule 9 of A.M no. 07-4-15-SC as to the contents of the preliminary conference brief. Borja Appelead arguing
that the METC misinformed him of the contents of the preliminary conference brief in its Notice of Pre Trial
Conference.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it blamed the court for the failure of the counsel
for Gravides to be cognizant of the required contents of his preliminary conference brief
RULING: No. no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC who only warrants a more reasonable and liberal
application of the rules. The mistake committed by Borjal’s counsel in complying with the court’s directive should not
prejudice his cause, as nointent to unduly prolong the resolution of the election protest can be gleaned from
his actions
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 85
Due Process: Section 1. Procedural due process; aspects of the proceedings
People v. Pagal
G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020
MAIN POINT: Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending
circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution prove the exact
liability of the accused. As it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be based principally on the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the accused becomes secondary. Accordingly,
convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings when the conviction is
predicated solely on the basis of the improvident plea of guilt.”
FACTS: Brendo P. Pagal was indicted under an information for the crime of murder. During his arraignment, he
pleaded guilty to the crime charged. The RTC found the plea to be voluntary and will full understanding of its
consequences. Hence, the RTC found Brendo guilty beyond reasonable doubt based solely on his plea of guilty.
The CA remanded the case to the RTC for failure to comply the procedure in the conduct of searching inquiry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Brendo on the sole basis of his plea of guilty.
RULING: Yes. It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition
of death as a punishment. Thus, when Brendo pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital
offense.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 86
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
Publicity and T.V. Coverage
Webb v. De leon
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
MAIN POINT: Under other circumstances publicity may deprive someone his rights to due process; there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
FACTS: The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter of complaint charging petitioners Webb et al with the crime of Rape and
Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in
their home BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Immediately, the DOJ formed a panel of
prosecutors headed by Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel
for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon
and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination. Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE: WON DOJ Panel lost its fairness due to the prejudicial publicity conducted in the press and broadcast media
by the NBI.
RULING: No. media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, few cases can match
the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Even the
principal actors in the case; the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers, have participated in this
media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
completely closed to the press and the public.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 87
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
Publicity and TV coverage
People v Teehankee
MAIN POINT: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of
members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. There is nothing
wrong in Leino identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons.
FACTS: Claudio teehankee was identified as the gunman who shot Chapman and Maureen Hultman while leino
was walking Maureen Hultman home. Leino being the sole survivor and 3 other witness who saw the incident. In
addition, the NBI conducted line ups where The NBI agents forced teehankee to join the lineup and placed him in
the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon as
he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. A second identification was made on the same
day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who
allegedly identified him as the gunman in a lineup. A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was
then seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted
on the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said
investigation.
ISSUE: WON his out-of-court identification is prejudicial to his right.
RULING: No. We cannot sustain appellant claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high-stake criminal trials.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 88
SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
People v. Sanchez (January 25, 1999)
MAIN POINT: The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
FACTS: This case was known as the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew strong condemnation from
an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
seven (7) counts of rape with homicide. The prosecution’s version of the events was based mainly on the
recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan— who were originally co-conspirators
but later on turned into state witnesses; both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired the accused-appellants right to a fair trial.
RULING: No. The Court revisited its pronouncements in People v. Teehankee, Jr., viz, the Court cannot sustain
appellants’ claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 89
SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
People v. Sanchez (October 18, 2001)
MAIN POINT: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
FACTS: This case is a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s January 25, 1999 decision, affirming in
toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape with homicide in the infamous Allan Gomez-Aileen Sarmenta rape-slay. In his motion for
reconsideration, one of the accused-appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Antonio Sanchez, one of the accused-appellants, is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity.
RULING: No. The court cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high-stake criminal trials. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To
be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press
has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 90
SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
MAIN POINT: Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public attention and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
FACTS: Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) filed a petition asking the Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full transparency. In effect, the petition seeks a
re-examination of the resolution of the Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino, wherein
the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of allowing live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan should be granted.
RULING: No. Petition denied. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us
that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 91
SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
MAIN POINT: First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule
that the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law. Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic
training of the people.
FACTS: MR of the June 29, 2001 decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and
broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan filed by the Secretary of Justice, as
one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information
and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there
is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the
people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard
against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. On the other hand,
former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the
ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring
the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
RULING: Yes. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial. There are several reasons for such televised recording.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 92
SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
People v. Roxas
G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010
MAIN POINT: The fact that the trial judge opted to believe the prosecution’s evidence rather than that of the defense
is not a sign of bias. Before the Court could conclude that appellant was prejudiced by the presence of the media
and Secretary Perez, he must first show substantial proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a showing that
adverse publicity indeed influenced the court’s decision. The Court found none in this case.
FACTS: This is an appeal by way of automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appellant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles for the crimes of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6539, or the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. Respondent Roxas challenged the RTC judge’s neutrality as he invoked
that he was deprived of his right to due process because of the unexplained presence of the former Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Hernando Perez, in court. He contended that the RTC was already predisposed to convict
him even before trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering the decision.
RULING: No. The Court is unconvinced. The Court finds no basis for appellants allegation that he was deprived of
due process of law and that the trial conducted was far from impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and partiality is
not supported by the record. Even if the RTC had allowed the presence of then Secretary Hernando Perez and the
media, there is no sufficient basis to show that their presence or pervasive publicity unduly influenced the courts
judgment. Before the Court could conclude that appellant was prejudiced by the presence of the media and
Secretary Perez, he must first show substantial proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a showing that
adverse publicity indeed influenced the court decision. The Court found none in this case.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 93
Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 94
RE: AMENDMENT TO THE RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE OF CRIMINAL CASES
[A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. March 25, 2003]
Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Resolution of the Court en Banc dated October 15, 1991), is
amended as follows:
"Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within
their jurisdiction:
4. Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom:Provided, however, that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine
does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff's
cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor
to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary
procedure."
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 95
Rules on Summary Procedure
Section 1(b)
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with
another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is
necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 96
Sections 20, 22, 23 of BP 129 as amended
Regional Trial Court
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of
by the latter.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases,
urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 97
Section 90 of R.A. No. 9165
Section 90. Jurisdiction. – The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional
Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of
courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their
respective jurisdiction.
The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from
the date of their filing.
When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is established, the
corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the
investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the
corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of
receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the
filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of
submission of the case for resolution.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 98
Section 5 of R.A. No. 8369
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the following cases: a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18)
years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or
more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have
incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Ptesidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"; b) Petitions for guardianship,
custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; c) Petitions for adoption of children and the
revocation thereof; d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those
relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different
status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; e) Petitions for support
and/or acknowledgment; f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines"; g) Petitions for declaration of status of
children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of
children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws; h) Petitions
for the constitution of the family home; i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act,
as amended; j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and k)
Cases of domestic violence against: 1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are
likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical
abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom
movement; and 2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development. If an act
constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the
corresponding penalties. If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 99
RE: CONSOLIDATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS WITH COMMERCIAL COURTS
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, to implement the provisions of Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code),
and in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice, the Supreme Court en bane, in the (a)
Resolution dated 21 November 2000 (Annex 1), 4 July 2001 (Annex 1-a), 12 November 2002 (Annex 1-b), and 9
July 2002 (Annex 1-c), all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No.
01-5-298 RTC (Annex 2); and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC (Annex 3), resolved to
designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the same Resolution, sixty-five (65) Regional Trial Courts, distributed in all regions (NCJR
and Regions 1-12), were designated as SEC courts ("SEC Courts"), which courts have presently a total of 812
pending SEC cases (see Annex 6, Table); chan robles virtual law library
WHEREAS, in A.O No. 113-95, dated 2 October 1995, as amended by A.O. No. 104-96, dated 21 October 1996, the
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Region and Regions 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11, with twenty-seven (27)
judges, were specially designated to try and decide cases for violations of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 4),
and to ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property rights under the Intellectual
Property Code (Rep. Act No. 8293), the Supreme Court en bane, in A.M. No. 02-1-11- SC, dated February 19, 2002,
designated the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1, 2, 5, 8 and 12, with a total of seven (7) judges, and Branch 24 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila with one (1) judge, as Special Intellectual Property Courts ("Special IP Courts")
(Annex 5)
WHEREAS, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-1-11 SC and A.O. No. 113-95, these Special IP Courts have a total caseload of
503 cases. Of this number 434 IP cases are pending in the NCJR (Annex 6, Table); chan robles virtual law library
WHEREAS, since the establishment of Special IP Courts (except for the Special IP Courts in Manila), 15 designated
courts, in Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 have zero (0) IP cases, and do not warrant their continued
designations as Intellectual Property Courts (Annex 7, Table); chan robles virtual law library
WHEREAS, intellectual property cases are commercial in nature;
WHEREAS, to streamline the court structure and to promote expediency and efficiency in handling such special
cases, the jurisdiction to hear and decide IPC and SEC cases are best consolidated in one court;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court Resolves:
1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated 21
November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b)
Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No.
01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and decide
cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission; chan robles virtual law library
2. The designation of Intellectual Property Courts under Administrative Order No. 113-95 dated 2 October 1995, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated 21 October 1996 and Resolution dated 19 February 2002 in
A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC, is hereby revoked. However, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby designated
as an additional Special Commercial Court in the City of Manila;
3. Upon the effectivity of this Resolution, all IP cases shall be transferred to the designated Special Commercial
Courts except those which have undergone the pretrial stage in civil cases or those where any of the accused has
been arraigned in criminal cases which shall be retained by the court previously assigned to try them;
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with respect to
the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court; chan robles virtual law library
5. In the event of inhibition of the judge of a designated Special Commercial Court, the following guidelines shall be
observed: (a) where there is only one (1) Special Commercial Court, the case shall be raffled among the other
judges in the station; (b) where there are two (2) Special Commercial Courts in the station, the Executive Judge
shall immediately assign the case to the other Special Commercial Court; and (c) in case of inhibition of both judges
of the Special Commercial Courts, the Executive Judge shall raffle the case among the judges in the station; and
6. In order to ensure a just and equitable distribution of cases, the designated Special Commercial Courts shall
continue to participate in the raffles of other cases. Provided, however, that the Executive Judge concerned shall
adopt a procedure whereby every IP and SEC case assigned to a Special Commercial Court should be considered
a case raffled to it and duly credited to such court
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 100
Section 4 Sandiganbayan Law as amended by R.A. No. 10660
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads:
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not
allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising
from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00).
"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of
the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise
in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined
in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 98
Court of Tax Appeals
Through the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the jurisdiction of the CTA has been expanded to include not only
civil tax cases but also cases that are criminal in nature, as well as local tax cases, property taxes and final
collection of taxes. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1125 and other laws prior to R.A. 9282, the Court
of Tax Appeals retains exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, the following:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other
penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs [Rep. Act. No. 1125, (1954), Sec. 7];
3. In automatic review cases where such decisions of the Commission of Customs favorable to the
taxpayer is elevated to the Secretary of Finance (Sec. 2315, TCC); and
4. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity
or article, or the Secretary of Agriculture, in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, in
connection with the imposition of the Anti-Dumping Duty, Countervailing and Safeguard Duty
[Republic Act Nos. 8751 and 8752, (1999) Sec. 301 (a) and (p), and Republic Act 8800].
Under Republic Act Number 9282, the CTA's original appellate jurisdiction was expanded to include the following:
1. Criminal cases involving violations of the National Internal Revenue Code and the Tariff and
Customs Code;
2. Decisions of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) in local tax cases;
3. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in cases involving the assessment
and taxation of real property; and
4. Collection of internal revenue taxes and customs duties the assessment of which have already
become final.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 99
Supreme Court
REPUBLIC ACT No. 5440
An Act Amending Sections Nine and Seventeen of the Judiciary Act of 1948
Section 2. Section seventeen of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:"Sec.
17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance
of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals."In the following cases, the Supreme
Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance:
"1. In petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; and
"2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade.
"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the
law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
"(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment;
and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same
occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving
rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals,
accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;
"(2) All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization; and
"(3) All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private person or entity.
"The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari
as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
"(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order
or regulation is in question;
"(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toil, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto;
"(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
"(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, However, That if,
in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next
preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari;
and
"(5) Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax
Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission and the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission."
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 100
SEC 1: Due Process in administrative proceedings;in general
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
MAIN POINT: Administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make
sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. Due process can be complied with by observing the
following: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one cause and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support
itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather soles, Toribio caused the lay-off of a number of his employees belonging to the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU). NLU questioned the validity of said lay-off because no members of the rival labor
union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that Toribio was discriminating NLU. The case
reached the CIR where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the SC invoking its right for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence (books of business/inventory accounts).
ISSUE: WON the Union was denied due process by CIR.
HELD: Yes. SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant
evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of the case is remanded to the CIR.
CIR is required to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms, and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence. The newly discovered
documents were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 101
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Due process in administrative
proceedings; in general
Dazon v. Yap - 610 SCRA 19
FACTS: The case is a petition for Certiorari assailing several orders of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City who granted the
motion to withdraw information filed by the prosecutor and likewise denied by the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent Yap is the president of Primetown Property Group Inc. Petitioner Dazon entered into a
contract with Primetown for the purchase of Unit C-108 of the condominium project. Dazon made a downpayment
and several installment payments totaling 1M+. Unfortunately, Primetown failed to finish the condominium project.
Petitioner demanded for the refund of her payments pursuant to PD957, the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree. Primetime failed to refund petitioner’s payments. Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the
Office of the Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City. An information was filed with the RTC. Respondent filed a petition for
Review with DOJ in connection with the resolution finding probable cause, which eventually led to the withdrawal of
information.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation of PD957.
RULING: Yes. The petition has merit. The basis of the DOJ resolution was, not that there was lack of probable
cause but, the finding that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case. It directed the withdrawal of the
information on the erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the case. The primordial
function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade and business and not the conviction and
punishment of criminals. Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are
criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, SC finds that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 102
Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Due process in administrative
proceedings; in general
Estrada v. Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, 748 SCRA 1, Jan. 21, 2015
FACTS: Sometime in Nov and Dec 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Jinggoy Estrada 2 criminal complaints
for plunder, among others. 18 of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the 2 complaints filed their counter-affidavits. On
March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings. Sen. Estrada’s request was made pursuant to the right
of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished, and
to have access to the evidence on record. The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s request.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law.
HELD: No. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. (1) there is no law or rule
which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit
the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. What it refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. (2) A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” (3) the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases
do not apply to preliminary investigations in criminal cases. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in
conducting a preliminary investigation, after conducting its own factfinding investigation, is to determine probable
cause for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under
the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay.
The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the
witnesses against him.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 103
Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Due process in administrative
proceedings; in general
In re: Allegations made under oath at the senate blue ribbon committee against Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, September 26, 2013
FACTS: This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that
surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong. Respondent stands accused of gross misconduct,
partiality, and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his
dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. He also failed to disclose in his letter to CJ
Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012. The Investigating Justice recommended that
respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and impropriety, and be meted with the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
ISSUE: WON Justice Gregory Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, thus violating the New
Code of the Judicial Conduct.
HELD: Yes. The Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice. Respondent’s
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal, constitutes GROSS MISCONDUCT notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant. The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent
("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 104
Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Judges and the disciplinary process
OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 125
FACTS: This is an Administrative Case against JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL. One CEFERINO TIGAS, a fictitious
name, wrote a letter addressed to Office of the Court Administrator of SC, charging that irregularities and corruption
were being committed by the RESPONDENT Presiding Judge of MTC-Angat Bulacan. Letter was referred to NBI for
“discreet investigation.” They proceeded to the residence of CANDIDO CRUZ, an accused in respondent’s sala. In
his affidavit, Cruz declared that he was the accused in a criminal case for Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge
decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries in exchange for P2,000. NBI entrapped Respondent
judge with the help of Cruz, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto.
Executive Judge NATIVIDAD G. DIZON submitted report and recommendation that Respondent judge be penalized
for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct (A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence).
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge was denied due process since he was not able to confront the witnesses against
him and present evidence in his defense.
HELD: Yes. The SC noted that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge
Natividad G. Dizon consist of: (1) The Complaint, (2) the Answer, (3) the Memorandum of the respondent, and (4)
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the
Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein he can confront
the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense. This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The
Rules, even in administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be
faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the
charge is penal in character. The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen
short of the requirements of due process. Hence, the case is dismissed.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 105
Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Judges and the disciplinary process
Valenzuela v. Bellosillo 322 SCRA 536
FACTS: Petitioner, counsel of Colapo in case involving violation of BP 22 charged respondent with gross violation of
the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice claiming that respondent,
talked to Colapo before granting bail for her provisional liberty inside his chambers in the absence of the petitioner
and allegedly respondent was mad and remove him as counsel for Colapo suggesting a counsel of PAO/PALAO to
represent her, thereby acting with arrogance, oppressiveness and gross misconduct. Respondent denied the claim
stating that when he inquired from Colapo where her lawyer was, she answered in a very disappointed manner that
she was going to change her counsel because she did not like the idea of paying somebody who could not
represent her at the time she needed him most and due to excessive charge made by petitioner
Respondent likewise denied that he ever referred complainants client to the PALAO since it cannot not represent an
accused in a BP 22 case. Besides, according to respondent, it was none of his business whether Colapo would
want to change her counsel. He (respondent) stated that he is not aware whether Atty. Gusapos, the lawyer who
replaced the complainant, is a PALAO lawyer since he used his private or residential address when he entered his
appearance."
ISSUE: WON the respondent can be adjudge guilty of gross ignorance of the constitution and gross violation of the
constitutional right of accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice?
RULING: No. The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without
affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo; otherwise, his right to due process would be
infringed.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 106
Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
FACTS: Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the
Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was
falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints.
The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992,
but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992,
to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to
due process was violated as well as his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: W/N the due process clause entails the right to be assisted by counsel in an administrative inquiry?
RULING: No. In administrative investigations, the right to counsel is not imperative because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 107
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers
who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The
mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in
Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on
December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation
and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their
innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their
immediate dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
Held: Yes. Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent
and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the
absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal. In the present case, the various committees formed
by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the
local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA
4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning
to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 108
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Joson v.Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279
FACTS: A complaint was filed against Petitioner Governor Joson before the Office of the President for barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. Private respondents
claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner
that the province of Nueva Ecija obtains a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's
acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file
an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension.
Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of
position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural dueprocess in administrative
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for
six (6) months without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of petitioner’s motion to conduct formal investigation tantamount to denial of his
due process?
Held: Yes. Rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. An erring
elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of
procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by
counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory
attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 109
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999
Facts: The 16th regular examination of the books and records of the PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. ("PESALA") was conducted from March to April, 1988 by a team of CB examiners. Later, several
anomalies and irregularities were discovered.
(CB-SES) Central Bank Supervision and Examination Section’s director invited BoD of PESALA to a conference to
discuss findings on said examination, but petitioners did not respond. Later, the Monetary Board adopted
a resolution including the names of petitioners, officers of PESALA in the watch list to prevent them from holding
responsible positions in any institution under CB supervision. Petitioners filed a petition for injunction against the MB
in order to prevent their names from being added in the watch-list. RTC issued the TRO. The MB appealed to the
CA which reversed RTV’s decision. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC where petitioners claim that
Monetary Board’s resolution is null and void for being violative of petitioners' right to due process.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ claim that MB’s resolution is null and void for being violative of their right to due process.
RULING: No. Petitioners cannot complain of deprivation of their right to due process, as they were given ample
opportunity by the Monetary Board to air their submission and defenses as to the findings of irregularity during the
said 16th regular examination. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defence. What is offensive to due process
is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners having availed of their opportunity to present their
position to the Monetary Board by their letters-explanation, they were not denied due process.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 110
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
CSC v. Lucas GR 127838 Jan. 21, 1999
FACTS: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer of an agency of Department of Agriculture (DA), filed a
complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency for misconduct. The complainant
alleges that respondent maliciously touched the former’s legs and had verbal exchanges with her while in the
premises of the office. Nonetheless, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA issued a resolution finding respondent guilty
of simple misconduct (suspension). In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the CSC however the latter
found him guilty of grave misconduct (dismissal). Thus, he further appealed the case to the CA. The CA set aside
CSC’s decision and ruled that a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the
charges against him. In the instant case, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge against him only
when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the service. Nevertheless, petitioner assails the
decision of CA and contends that an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in
a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct,
the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct.
RULING: Yes. The Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is
that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a
crime with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable
in administrative proceedings.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 111
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
NPC v. Bernabe 332 SCRA 74
FACTS: As per a newspaper article, respondent allegedly headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of Police
Commission personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. This led to a
series of investigations, where he was ordered to explain through affidavit on the charges against him.
Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within five days from receipt of the
complaint after his suspension. Eventually, a recommendation for his dismissal was raised and resulted to a
decision by the National Appellate Board sustaining the summary dismissal, made by PNP Chief, of respondent
from the PNP for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a police officer. Respondent then appealed with the
CA challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process (the case was decided by
the Chief, PNP without the benefit of a hearing, and therefore he was not given the opportunity to fully present his
evidence and was denied the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers). The CA ruled in favor of respondent as to
the lack of due process allegation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed
against him.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. Due process does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to
answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the
decision of the Chief, PNP to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Respondent was given
more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and
substantive due process.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 112
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
FACTS: Twelve administrative complaints were filed against respondent before the Summary Dismissal Board of
the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the several cases shall be
consolidated into one for the "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" because at one incident he allegedly
approached and entered the compound of the complainant, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed
policemen, and shouted invectives and remarks in a very, very loud voice while in the performance of duty involving
a near vehicular accident. The Board nonetheless, dismissed the Complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police
officer and instead charged respondent with simple irregularity in the performance of duty. Thus, Torcita filed a
petition for certiorari in the RTC questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not
charged, “which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law.” Both the RTC and CA
ruled in favor of the respondent hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction by petitioner is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law.
RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard. The SC ruled that a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is
not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due
process. Also, although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed
against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a
proper observance of due process. Further, it is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed
of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the Court. The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita “committed breach of internal
discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same” should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 113
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713
FACTS: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for mayor
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent sought the exclusion of Election Return of
petitioner on the ground that it is incomplete and contains material defects. Nonetheless, the Comelec issued a
resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor. Velayo claimed that he was denied due process because
he was not furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that
petitioner received from the Comelec was its en banc resolution annulling his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not notice of pre-proclamation proceeding is necessary for administrative due process in
COMELEC cases.
RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. In this case, the records will show that petitioner was not furnished any notice of the
pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. Velayo is a real party-in-interest since he was the
proclaimed mayor. His non-inclusionas respondent and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the Comelec
which resulted to the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due process. Further, It is
true that RA No. 7166 provides for summary proceedings in pre-proclamation cases and does not require a trial type
hearing. Nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot be stretched to mean ex parte proceedings. Summary
proceedings cannot be stretched to mean ex parte proceedings—summary simply means with dispatch, with the
least possible delay, signifying that the power may be exercised without a trial in the ordinary manner prescribed by
law for regular judicial proceedings.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 114
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Ramoran v. Jardine 326 SCRA 208
FACTS: Petitioner was an accounting employee of Jardine. The Human Resource Development (HRD) of
respondent received from petitioner overtime (OT) authorization slips for alleged OT work on some days on
November and December 1993. The HRD post-auditing officers noticed some irregularities and tampering in the OT
slips submitted by petitioner. Hence, respondent conducted an administrative investigation concerning petitioner for
which the latter’s immediate supervisor denied having signed and approved petitioner’s irregular OT authorization
slips. Subsequently, petitioner’s employment was terminated for violation of company rules. Notwithstanding said
decision, respondent and Jardine Union (representing petitioner) entered into an agreement that a Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall decide on the matter of the legality of the termination of petitioner’s employment. Both
parties also agreed on the composition of said panel. Nevertheless, the panel upheld the termination and when the
decision was appealed to the CA, the same was denied. Now, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
process of law because of the composition and actuations of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. In the instant case, petitioner was
apprised of the charges against her. During the administrative investigation, petitioner attended and was given an
opportunity to give her side. She consented to resorting to voluntary arbitration and participated in the selection of
arbitrators. Petitioner submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, by presenting her
evidence and sought affirmative relief therein; hence, she cannot now validly question the latter’s jurisdiction. Due
process does not necessarily require conducting an actual hearing but simply giving the party concerned
due notice and affording an opportunity or right to be heard.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 115
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Immam v. Comelec 322 SCRA 866
FACTS: Petitioner Nasser Immam and private respondent Hadji Yusoph Lidasan were both candidates for Mayor of
Matanog, Maguindanao in 1998 elections. COMELEC (Office of the Election Officer, Matanog, Maguindanao) issued
a certification that only the votes cast in 41 out of the 55 precincts were counted. Private respondent filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Count the Ballots and for Holding of Special Elections, alleging that election inspectors of
14 precincts left the polling places due to "violence, terrorism, and armed threats perpetrated by armed men, hence
the continuation of voting did not take place." Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor and took his oath of
office, despite the pendency of the aforesaid petitions. Private respondent prayed to COMELEC that the
proclamation of petitioner be declared void. COMELEC issued its assailed order which suspended petitioner's
proclamation. Petitioner prayed before COMELEC En Banc for the TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and
desist from enforcing and implementing the questioned order.
En Banc issued a Resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and ordering the COMELEC in the
meantime to desist until the validity of the Commission on Elections' Order is resolved by this Court."
Petitioner assails the order issued by the COMELEC en banc since the consolidated cases were originally heard by
the COMELEC's First Division.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the case was transferred to the COMELEC en
banc without notice to him
RULING: NO. Petitioner himself prayed that the petition be heard by the Commission en banc which is correct as
the law provides that petitions for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC sitting en banc. The fact
that petitioner was not given notice specifically stating that the case was transferred to the en banc did not affect the
legality of the order. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 116
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Villarosa v. Comelec GR 133927 Nov. 29, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro in the 1998
elections and was proclaimed duly elected thereto. She filed her COC in which she stated that her nickname is JTV.
Private respondent Restor, a candidate of the same position, filed a letter-petition addressed to COMELEC asking
for the invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official nickname of petitioner, and the nullification of all votes cast
in the said nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not publicly known by that name but instead as Girlie and that
JTV actually pertains to the initials of her husband and former Congressman. On election day, COMELEC en banc,
issued a Resolution granting private respondent’s petition. Petitioner received a fax copy of this Resolution at which
time voting has ceased and canvassing of votes in some precincts has already gone underway. Petitioner filed with
the COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation and a MR the aforesaid Resolution. COMELEC En banc denied the motion.
OSG observed that even if the letter-petition was treated as an election matter which may be properly heard
firsthand by the COMELEC en banc, COMELEC should have given notice to petitioner before resolving the issue
therein. On the issue of the validity of the use of nickname, it opined that petitioner may validly use the same as she
is in fact Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and hence, there is no misrepresentation.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling on private respondent Restors letter-petition without
according notice and hearing to petitioner.
RULING: YES. Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin
requirements of notice and hearing must be observed. Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in the
assailed Resolution dated May 11, 1998, that “JTV” is not a nickname by which petitioner is generally or popularly
known, was drawn purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the COMELEC acted in
excess of its jurisdiction. We have declared that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. However, we find the foregoing rule
inapplicable to the circumstances of the case at bench. Petitioner filed an “Urgent Manifestation and Motion”, which
was promptly denied the following day. Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said resolution by invoking due
process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and arguments for reconsideration.
Additional info: this is not administrative but quasi-judicial matter and may thus be dealt with firsthand by the
Commission en banc since the petition is not only for the invalidation of “JTV” as petitioner’s authorized nickname,
but also the nullification of all votes cast in that name.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 117
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Go v. Comelec GR 147741 May 10, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Go filed candidacy for Governor and Mayor of Leyte, but she withdrew her candidacy 28 minutes
late after the deadline thru fax machine. The case was then referred to the Law Department of COMELEC which
gave due course to the private respondent’s petitions without giving Go the opportunity to be heard or submit
responsive pleadings. Based on its report, Go was disqualified to run for both positions.
ISSUE: W/N Go was denied procedural due process of law.
RULING: YES. COMELEC Law Department conducted an ex-parte study of the case without giving Go an
opportunity to be heard, or requiring her to submit comment or opposition or setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the petitioner of
procedural due process of law. The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving cases before it.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 118
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Mollaneda v. Umacob R 140128 June 6, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Umacob was a public school teacher, she requested to be transferred to different district but
when she went to the office of superintendent she was molested by the petitioner. Respondent reported it to the
Police and filed a complaint with the MTC, she also filed a complaint with the CSC and gave copy of the affidavit to
DECS. The case was heard before the CSC, both parties attended together with their counsel and CSC found him
guilty and was dismissed from service. Petitioner Mollaneda was claiming that he was denied due process.
ISSUE: WON Mollaneda was denied due process.
RULING: NO. he was not denied due process because he even attended the hearing with CSC. A person who was
given the opportunity to be heard has been given due process. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency
may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing
and make reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical
necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings, one of which is that “the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate.”
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 119
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Cruz v. CSC GR 144469 Nov 27, 2001
FACTS: Gilda Cruz took the CSC exam for Zenaida Patim. A fact finding investigation was conducted by CSC, they
took the seat plan with pictures and compared it with prior years. They found that a prima facie case exist for
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Cruz filed for answer denying all the allegations. Eventually, she raised that she
was deprived of due process because CSC was the complainant as well as the judge.
Issue: W/N Cruz’s right to due process was violated because CSC was the judge as well as the complainant.
Ruling: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative
bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that
the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. No rights were violated because CSC is vested with
appellate jurisdiction and CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 120
Art III Sec. 1. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration – Aspects of the proceedings
Condilla v. De Venecia GR 150605 Dec 10, 2002
FACTS: Locsin and Codilla are candidates for the 4th district of Leyte. Codilla won despite having a disqualification
case against him and Locsin came in 2nd. At the time of the elections the court has to rule over the disqualification
case against Codilla. However a most urgent motion to suspend proclamation was filed against Codilla. Petitioner
now contends that he was deprived of due process since he did not receive the motion filed against and he only
knew about the complaint due to telegraph, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the
suspension of petitioner’s proclamation.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied of due process during the entire proceeding which led to the proclamation of
respondent Locsin
RULING: Yes. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed.
The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he
was served a copy thereof by registered mail
The COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together
with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in
the petition and hear his side.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO: 121
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Associated Communication v. Dumlao GR 136762 Nov. 21, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. ("ACWS" for brevity) is a registered
partnership organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, doing business under the trade name United
Broadcasting Network, Inc. Initially, ACWS operated several radio and television stations nationwide by virtue of a
legislative franchise acquired in 1969 under R.A. No. 4551 through Concurrent Resolution No. 58 of the Sixth
Congress of the Philippines. Presidential Decree No. 576- ("PD 576-A" for brevity) took effect providing for the
regulation of radio and television broadcast services in the country. Effective December 31, 1981, PD 576-A
terminated all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or
television broadcasting systems. With the termination of its legislative franchise, ACWS continued to operate its
radio and television stations through permits issued by the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications pursuant to PD 576-A. The NTC, however, refused to release to ACWS the approved
and paid for temporary permit. Instead, the NTC issued an Order [13] dated February 26, 1998 directing ACWS to
show cause why its temporary permit to operate should not be recalled for failure to secure a legislative franchise.
The NTC also ordered ACWS to cease and desist from operating Channel 25.
ISSUE:
ACWS was utterly deprived of his fundamental right of due process
RULING: No Denial of Due Process. Neither could ACWS plead denial of due process as justification for its immediate
resort to the court. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution,
thus: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x." To fall within the
protection of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method
or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely
the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.
DINALAGAN
CASE 122
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Velllarosa v. Pomperada, AdminCase No. 5310, Jan. 28, 2003
FACTS:
On 02 August 2000, complainants Lina Villarosa and her son Jose Villarosa filed before this Court a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Osmondo Pomperada, charging him with deceit and gross misconduct. In her affidavit-complaint,
Mrs. Villarosa alleged that sometime in 1994 her late husband, Isidro Villarosa, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of their son, Jose Villarosa, over their property in Barangay Dulao, Bago City, covered by TCT No. T-18480, specifically
described to be. According to complainants, the deed was neither dated nor notarized. Subsequently, Jose Villarosa sold
the property to Loreto Cauntoy and a deed of agreement, dated 08 April 1997, was executed by the parties. The Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A;' and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent has trifled with the importance or
significance of his notarial commission, and had consequently prejudiced the integrity of the instruments/documents
presented to him in his capacity as Notary Public which dishonest action amounts to gross misconduct, Respondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and Revocation of his Notarial Commission and
Perpetual Disqualification from being appointed as Notary Public."
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Pomperada was utterly deprived of his fundamental right of due process
RULING: The Court underscored the necessity for such an investigation before any disciplinary sanction can be
imposed. The Court elucidated: "Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If,
at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however,
the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by
merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during
which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard.
DINALAGAN
CASE 123
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Alauya v. Comelec, GR 152151-52, Jan. 22, 2003
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order to nullify the Orders of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for
brevity) en banc dated January 2, 2002 and February 19, 2002 in SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 (ARMM). The
January 2, 2002 Order directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers not to proclaim the winning candidates for
regional assemblyman in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur, while the February 19, 2002 Order denied the motion to
dismiss SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 (ARMM).
ISSUE:WON the Order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in violation of due process of law.
HELD: No.Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify him of any hearing conducted prior to the issuance of the order
dated January 7, 2002 in violation of Section 242[1] which requires notice and hearing prior to the suspension of
proclamation.A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a
hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party is given an
opportunity through his pleadings.
DINALAGAN
CASE 124
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Spouses Casimiro v. CA 135911, Feb. 11, 2003
FACTS: Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in Pamplona,
Las Piñas City, during a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the instance of
respondents, it was discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners, encroached by 3,110
square meters into respondents' land. Respondents notified... petitioners and demanded that they desist from
making further development in the area. Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises,
respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Pasay City an action for recovery of possession with damages
against petitioners and the latter's lot buyers. The Court of Appeals found that the final relocation survey report
yielded the "indisputable and inevitable conclusion" that petitioner encroached on a portion of the respondents'
property comprising an area of 3,235 square meters. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized
representative.
RULING: Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is
an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed
under the CARL. Poring over the records of the Court of Appeals regarding the resurvey of the subject properties, it
appears that the actual field work was performed by engineers from LRA, without the representatives of petitioners
and respondents being present. There was no clear showing that... notices of the field work were sent to petitioners
and respondents. Worse, the actual field work was undertaken by only four engineers, all of whom were designated
from the LRA. This is in violation of the agreement of the parties that the actual field work should be done by... five
technical personnel, three of whom shall come from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be
Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or their respective representatives.
DINALAGAN
CASE 125
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Sy v. CA, GR 147572, Feb. 27, 2003
FACTS: Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners’
family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same family
business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later 6B’s Trucking Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known as SBT
Trucking Corporation since 1994. Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent
continuously served the trucking business of petitioners. When Sahot was 59 years old, he incurred several absences due
to various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a
driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but
discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer. Sahot filed a week-long leave to get
medical attention. When Sahot applied for an extended leave, he was threatened of termination of employment should he
refuse to go back to work. Eventually, Sahot was dismissed from employment which prompted the latter to file an illegal
dismissal case with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid dismissal
RULING:In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination
was for lawful cause and validly made. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal
of an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction whether the employer
admits or does not admit the dismissal. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.
DINALAGAN
CASE 126
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Namil v. Comelec, GR 15040, Oct. 28, 2003
FACTS: This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
to set aside the November 6, 2001 Resolution No. 4615, 1 promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc 2 installing the private respondents as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang,
Sultan Kudarat, although the petitioners had already taken their respective oaths and assumed offices in the same
elective positions. Thereafter, private respondent Joenime B. Kapina wrote the COMELEC requesting that she and
the others who were proclaimed as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the winning candidates and the new
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Appended to said letter was a certification
issued by Regional Election Director Clarita N. Callar, Region XII, Cotabato City, that the private respondents named
in the COCVP No. 8031109, issued on May 21, 2001, were duly proclaimed as the winning candidates for the said
municipality. Thus, the petitioners contended that the public respondent’s Resolution No. 4615 is null and void since
it was issued without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined principle of due process.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 4615 is null and void.
RULING: YES. While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws,the
same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. In this case, the petitioners had beenproclaimed as the
winning candidates and had assumed their office. Since then, they had been exercising their rights and performing
their duties as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, SultanKudarat. Their proclamation on May 20,
2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same.
The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law.Due process in the proceedings before
the public respondent exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus,
although the COMELEC possesses, inappropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any
candidate, the Court also ruled that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
DINALAGAN
CASE 127
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Bautista v.COMELEC GR.1547796-97
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to nullify
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") en banc. Resolution No. 5404 1
dated 23 July 2002 ordered the deletion of Raymundo A. Bautista’s ("Bautista") name from the official list of
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas ("Lumbangan") in the
15 July 2002 elections. Resolution No. 5584 2 dated 10 August 2002 provided for the policy of the COMELEC
regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they ran for
office.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
Nos. 5404 and 5584
RULING: Yes. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal
hearing. 25 There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings. 26 However, the
COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.
DINALAGAN
CASE 128
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Office of OMB v.Coronel
FACTS:
October 14, 1998, respondent called for a meeting the officers of diff water districts in Lanao DelNorte and Sur, as
well as advisers from Local Water Utilities Admin. Lunch time, they opted tocontinue the meeting at Marvilla store in
Iligan City. 10 people came. As the host of the meeting,the respondent paid for the lunch. Respondent claimed
reimbursement of her expenses chargeable against representation and entertainment account of her office. The
voucher was approved and the respondent got her reimbursement of 1,213.Nov 17 1998. Pedro Sausal was
appointed General Manager of Linamon water district. 1999, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
letter complaint against respondent for dishonesty. He alleges that the respondent falsified the invoice she submitted
for reimbursement, making it appear as a luncheon bill when in fact, it was only 213 as reflected in the photocopy of
the original duplicate of the cash invoice. An unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute
substantial evidence to show that the respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the
photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was not guilty of falsifying the amount
written in the receipt.
RULING:
Respondent maintains that Ombudsman Desierto's marginal notation - - which reads, "The original decision stands"
- - was violative of her right to due process for failing to state the basis for the action.On the other hand, petitioner
counters that the marginal notation met constitutional standards. Citing Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, the OMB
maintains that by referring to the original Decision, the notation adopts the findings of fact and law already
discussed. "It may be true that, on the face thereof, the marginal notes seem to lack any factual or evidentiary basis
for failure to specifically spell out the same. However, that is not all there is to it. What is actually involved here is a
situation wherein, on the bases of the same findings of fact of the investigating prosecutors, respondent special
prosecutors were of the opinion that, contrary to the former's recommendation, petitioner is probably guilty of the
offense charged. Obviously, therefore, since it is merely a review of the conclusions arrived at by the investigating
prosecutor, another or a new preliminary investigation is no longer necessary."28
DINALAGAN
CASE 129
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Erece v. Macalingay
FACTS:
Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Erece’s subordinates. Macalingay et al
were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them from using the company vehicle. That Erece had been
receiving his Representation and Transportation Allowance yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the vehicle. The
issue reached the CSC proper which found Erece guilty as charged. Erece contends that he was denied due
process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his
instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support
the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but
moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his
objection. Macalingay et al then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that
although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to
cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the
procedure, still Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Erece had been denied due process.
RULING: No. The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his
evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
DINALAGAN
CASE 130
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
MARCELO V. BUNGUBUNG
FACTS:The Ombudsman found respondent Leopoldo F. Bungubung (Bungubung) administratively liable for grave
misconduct, dismissing him from the service and imposing the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bungubung was denied due process
RULING NO. the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving,
by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.Substantial evidence,Being guided accordingly by the
aforementioned evidentiary rules and jurisprudence, this Court finds that the evidence on record in the present case
does not constitute substantial evidence of Bungubung's administrative culpability for grave misconduct.Within the
field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not
evidence cannot be disregarded.
DINALAGAN
CASE 131
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
SEC V.INTERPORT
FACTS:
In 1994, an investigative proceeding was conducted by the SEC against respondent Interport Resources
Corporation for failure to make timely disclosures of their negotiations with Ganda Energy Holdings, a violation
against the Revised Securities Act. However, the proceeding was interrupted by a writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent in 1998.During the pendency of this case, the Securities
Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act, which give SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating
the case, or the Regional Trial Court to hear any case which may later be filed against herein respondent. As a
defense, respondents averred that the case is already deemed moot and academic, since any criminal complaint
that may be filed against them resulting from the SEC investigation has already been prescribed. They point out the
prescriptive period of 12 years from the time of the commission of the crime,under Sec. 1 of Act No. 3326 (An Act to
Establish Period of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts). Since the offense was committed in
1994,prescription has already set in as early as 2006.
ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of complaint by SEC against respondent has already prescribed, in pursuant to Sec.
1 Act 3326.
RULING:No. It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription.As
defined, a preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and
whether there is probable cause for the accused to have committed the offense.Under Sec. 45 of the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC has the authority to make such investigations as may deem necessary to determine whether
a person has violated any provisions of this Act. Thereafter, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution.Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate
investigation.
DINALAGAN
CASE 132
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
CALINISAN V ROAQUIN
FACTS: This case is about the right of a discharged police officer to reinstatement, back salaries, allowances, and
other benefits after being absolved of a serious crime filed against him before a regular court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
RULING: An issue of fact exists when what is in question is the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, whereas an issue
of law exists when what is in question is what the law is on a certain state of facts. The test, therefore, for
determining whether an issue is one of law or of fact, is whether the CA could adjudicate it without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is an issue of law; otherwise, it is an issue of fact.
Here the CA needed only to review the records, more particularly, the pleadings of the parties and their annexes to
determine what law applied to Roaquin, Section 45 or Section 48 of R.A. 6975. Such a question does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties since the essential facts of the case are not in
dispute. As Roaquin’s superior officers’ appeal involves only questions of law, they erred in taking recourse to the
CA by notice of appeal. Hence, the CA correctly dismissed their appeal.
DINALAGAN
CASE 133
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
IBP V.ATIENZA
FACTS: In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through its National President Jose Anselmo
Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge.
Mayor Atienza granted the permit but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge.
Aggrieved, Cadiz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the permit for being violative of their right to
freedom of expression.
Meanwhile, the IBP pushed through with the rally at the Mendiola Bridge. Thus, the Manila Police District (MPD)
filed a criminal case against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in
the permit. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Cadiz prayed for the
suspension of the criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
ISSUE:Whether or not can the court motu proprio suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial
question?
RULING:Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in
a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and
not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of
prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the
criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in
the criminal action, and not before this Court in an appeal from the civil action. (IBP vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241,
February 24, 2010)
DINALAGAN
CASE 134
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceeding
DOMINGO V.OMB
FACTS:
A complaint for malversation, falsication of public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct was led against
Barangay Chairman Domingo by Sangguniang Kabataan offcials alleged that Domingo gave a false statement in his
justifcation supporting the Barangay Budget and expenditure.Respondent alleged that petitioner gave a false
statement in his justification that his barangay had no incumbent SK Officials. Where the OMB ruled petitioner guilty
and had been suspended for a period of six months.
ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner's fundamental point is that one can not be indicted for the submission of a
document which he himself has repudiated.
RULING:The sole evidence relied upon by the OMB in holding petitioner liable is the undated Justification.The
handwritten entry "Copy Budget 2004"... as certified by the Chief of the MBB appears to be a clerical error because
the Justification was ostensibly made in connection with the 2003 budget. The OMB stated that "the fact of whether
or not the same (Justification) was intended for 2003 or 2004 budget is immaterial as the irregularity of its entry in
the records of the barangay bureau was the issue."However, its entry into the barangay records was in itself
questionable. In both cases, the submission of the Justification cannot be logically pinpointed to petitioner. The
Justification, if indeed it was officially submitted, was denominated as such and so submitted to justify the
non-inclusion of the SK in the barangay budget. But the 2003 budget contained an appropriation item for the SK.
Thus, if at all, the Justification is a stray and aberrant document which could not have emanated from petitioner.
DINALAGAN
CASE 135
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Zambales v. Castellejos
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of the ZAMECO II. Respondent, an organization of
electric consumers, filed a letter-complaint with National Electrification Administration (NEA) seeking the removal of
the petitioners from the Board based on the NEA’s June 25, 1998 Financial Audit Report. NEA later issued a
resolution removing the petitioners from office relying on the NEA-ADCOM’s Report and Recommendations and the
July 24, 2003 Audit Report that was not part of the letter-complaint. Hence, petitioners insist that they were denied
due process as they were never heard on the charges as stated in the July 25, 2003 Audit Report cited as the bases
for 3 of the 5 offenses in the Resolution of the NEA which directed their removal from office. Allegedly, petitioners
had been asked to respond only to the charges under the June 25, 1998 Audit Report.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process.
RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process. The right is
guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The right to notice and hearing is
essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. The
records disclose that NEA failed to inform the petitioners that the audit disallowances contained in the 2003 Audit
Report would constitute additional charges in the administrative proceedings which served as the basis for the
petitioners’ removal. Hence, petitioners were never heard on the charges as stated in the 2003 Audit Report.
DINALAGAN
CASE 136
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
OMB V.EVANGELISTA
FACTS: Priscila Villanueva, co-chair of the Local School Board (LSB) of Aguirre, Pangasinan,filed an administrative
case with the Ombudsman against Mayor Evangelista, municipal treasurer Melican,and municipal accountant
Limos. She alleged that the three made use of the Special Education Fund (SEF) to purchase speech kits and
textbooks without the authorization of the LSB and that the said speech kits and textbooks were not even received
by the recipient schools.
ISSUE: Whether or not a preventive suspension order may issue even without notifying the respondent in an
administrative case of the charge/s against him?
RULING:YES. A preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman may issue even without notifying the
respondent of the charge as per the Ombudsman Act and the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter. Under Sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act, a preventive suspension order may issue when two requisites
concur: (1) evidence of guilt is strong; AND (2) the charge involves dishonesty,oppression, grave misconduct,
neglect in the performance of duty; OR the charge warrants the removal of the officer from service; OR the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case against him.
DINALAGAN
CASE 137
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Phil Export v. Pearl City
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation is a PEZA-registered Ecozone Export Enterprise engaged in the business of
recycling and processing, for export, of used clothing into wool, fiber, cotton fiber, polyester fiber, useable clothing
and industrial rags. Individual petitioners are the employees of the petitioner Corporation.Sometime in March 2004,
petitioner Corporation, along with two (2) other PEZA-registered companies importing used clothing, was informed
of a physical inventory to be conducted by the PEZA officers in their respective zones on their businesses.After the
completion of the physical inventory on the petitioner Corporation, PEZA officers discovered that it had an
unaccounted importation of 8,259,645 kilograms of used clothing for the period of fifteen (15) months covering
January 2003 up to March 2004.Petitioner Corporation was then instructed to submit its explanation regarding the
said unaccounted shortage in its import-export liquidation. After submitting the required explanation, petitioner
Corporation was Subjected to a special audit conducted by PEZA to determine the amount of wastage generated by
the company.On the basis of the results of the physical inventory and the special audit conducted on the petitioner
Corporation, respondent PEZA Board passed a resolution canceling the PEZA Registration of petitioner
Corporation as an Ecozone Export Enterprise at MEZ I.ς
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent PCMC was afforded due process
RULING:The Court agrees with petitioners' contention in the first issue raised that respondent PCMC was afforded
due process.It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side
suffices to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
DINALAGAN
CASE 138
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report
and recommendations to the President. respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and
Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three
Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
ISSUE:Whether or not E.O 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process
RULING:Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the
Laws.Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of
limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the
government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government.29 It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law,
"all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
DINALAGAN
CASE 139
Article III-Section 1: Aspects of the proceedings
Arroyo v. DOJ
FACTS: The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 (to be composed of DOJ and COMELEC officials) which shall conduct preliminary
investigations on the alleged election anomalies during the 2004 and 2007 elections involving herein petitioners.
The Joint Committee later promulgated its Rules of Procedure. Petitioners now claim that the Joint Panel (refers to
the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team) does not possess the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge
because it is all at once the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge, and that the DOJ-COMELEC Joint Order No.
001-2011 and the Joint Committee Rules have not been published, all of which violate their right to due process.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not creation of the Joint Panel and proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto violated the
right to due process.
RULING:
(1) NO. It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation are subject to the requirements of both substantive
and procedural due process. Petitioners failed to prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and partiality
against them. There was no proof that the Joint Panel made biased statements that would convey to the public that
the members were favoring a particular party.
DINALAGAN
CASE 140
Article III-Section 1: Extradition proceedings
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Department of Justice later received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. On the same day, petitioner designate and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Mark Jimenez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
ISSUE: Whether or not an extraditee have a right of access to the evidence against him.
RULING: No. During the executive phase of an extradition proceeding, an extradite does not have the right of
access to evidence in the hands of government. But during the judicial phase, he has.
FARGAS
Case No. 141
Extradition proceedings
Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
FACTS: Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent for 7 counts of accepting an
advantage as an agent contrary to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong, and 7 counts of conspiracy to
defraud. The Philippine DOJ forwarded the request for provisional arrest to the Anti-Graft Division of NBI. The NBI
filed an application for the provisional arrest of respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC of Manila
issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA has jurisdiction to decide whether the rule of double criminality applies.
RULING: NO. The issue of whether or not the rule of double criminality applies was not for the Court of
Appeals to decide in the first place. The trial court in which the petition for extradition is filed is vested with
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the offenses mentioned in the petition are extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in the applicable treaty. In this case, the
presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC of Manila has yet to rule on the extraditability of the offenses for which the
respondent is wanted in Hong Kong. Therefore, respondent has prematurely raised this issue before the Court of
Appeals and now, before this Court.
FARGAS
Case No. 142
Extradition proceedings
Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. The Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an
order for his “immediate arrest” in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition,
Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.
ISSUE: W/N the detention of a potential extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceeding
amount to a violation of due process.
RULING:
NO. The Court iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. Where the circumstances—such as those present in an extradition case—call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity
to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation
of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. Extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest.
FARGAS
Case No. 143
Extradition proceedings
Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290
FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo and Imelda Rodriguez, they applied for bail which the trial court.
They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government filed a petition where the court
directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon.
Purganan. The lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the
cancellation of their bail which was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the cancellation of petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and hearing is a violation of copetitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
YES. The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to the Court’s ruling
in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein. In this case, the cancellation had been
issued after the determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The Court believe that the benefits of
continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without
the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be
discontinued.
FARGAS
Case No. 144
Extradition proceedings
Gov’t. of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative
Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”.
ISSUE:
W/N a potential extraditee can post bail.
RULING:
YES. The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail. While the Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
FARGAS
Case No. 145
Arbitration
RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583
FACTS:
The dispute between the parties arose sometime in May 2003 when RCBC informed respondent and the
other selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of
valuation of accounts and that the sellers violated their warranty under Share Purchase Agreement. As no
settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the International Chamber of CommerceInternational Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA) Respondents refuses to pay the cost of advance proceedings and so,
the petitioners now pray that the former be defaulted from participating in the proceedings and that the hearings be
not suspended for the reason of refusal of payment of costs by the respondents. The tribunal granted a partial
award to the petitioner and is about to grant a second partial award to RCBC. BDO then filed with the CA a motion
for preliminary injunction but it was denied. hence, this case for urgent application for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the tribunal committed an error in granting a partial award to RCBC resulting to acting out
of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes. The case at bar does not present a non-disclosure issue but conduct allegedly showing an arbitrator’s
partiality to one of the parties. Even before the issuance of the Second Partial Award for the reimbursement of
advance costs paid by RCBC, Chairman Barker (of the tribunal) exhibited strong inclination to grant such relief to
RCBC, notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the Arbitration Tribunal "has no power under the ICC Rules
to
order the Respondents to pay the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against the
Respondents’ refusal to pay. Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs – like arbitration, mediation,
negotiation and conciliation – are encouraged by this Court. By enabling parties to resolve their disputes
amicably, they provide solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and more
productive of goodwill and lasting relationship .But the most important feature of arbitration, is the public’s
confidence and trust in the integrity of the process. For this reason, the law authorizes vacating an arbitral
award when there is evident partiality in the arbitrators.
FARGAS
Case No. 146
Academic Discipline In General
Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jose Angeles, initiated an administrative case before the Office of the Dean, Gilberto G. Mercado,
of the Institute of Technology, FEU, by filing a complaint against the private respondents Edgardo Picar and
Wilfredo Patawaran for alleged breach of the university’s rules and regulations.
The same incident became also the subject of a criminal complaint for assault against a person in authority
instituted by the petitioner Jose Angeles in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against the private respondents.
The case was dismissed against Patawaran and later on the petitioner filed an affidavit of desistance for the case
against Picar and so that case too was dismissed. However, the administrative case was continued by the petitioner
Dean Gilberto G. Mercado. Respondents now question the authority of the of the Dean and his committee to
conduct the administrative investigation as the incident happened outside the premises of the school and that the
Petitioner Angeles already desisted from pursuing a criminal case.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the criminal case has the effect of rendering this instant petition moot and
academic.
RULING:
No. The administrative action before the school authorities can proceed independently of the criminal
action because these two actions are based on different considerations. In the former, the private respondent’s
suitability or propriety as a student which is the paramount concern and interest of the school is involved, while in
the latter, what is at stake is his being a citizen who is subject to the penal statutes and is the primary concern of
the State. There being no withdrawal of the complaint filed by petitioner Jose Angeles before the petitioner Dean
Gilberto Mercado, the administrative investigation should proceed.The pendency or the dismissal of the criminal
action does not abate the administrative proceeding which involves the same cause of action.
FARGAS
Case No. 147
Academic Discipline In General
Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University who conducted a rally
inside the school premises. The petitioners were found to be guilty for their holding of an illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for 1 academic year. The validity of such is hereby assailed by the
petitioners contending that the University failed to accord respect to their constitutional rights of freedom of
peaceable assembly and free speech is the grievance.
ISSUE:
W/N the decision of the university is violative of the constitutional rights of the students.
RULING:
Yes. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not
to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present
danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be
totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit but even
then, a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. If the assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
FARGAS
Case No. 148
Academic Discipline In General
Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699
FACTS:
Petitioners are students of respondent National University, have come to the Court to seek relief from their
School’s continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll. Petitioners contends that the respondent
university subjecting them to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without being
informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend themselves is a violation of their
constitutional right to due process and education.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a violation of the constitutional right to due process committed by the respondent
university.
RULING:
Yes. It is apparent that the respondent university had never conducted proceedings of any sort to
determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed committed any violation or defiance against the school.
Petitioners were being denied the right "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations; without due process. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to
petitioners’; view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
FARGAS
Case No. 149
Academic Discipline In General
Alcuaz v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
FACTS:
Respondent school and the petitioners who are students therein entered into an that will govern their
activities within the school on the exercise of their democratic rights. In spite of the above-stated agreement they
demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which was turned down by the school, resulting in commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts by the petitioners within the school. The petitioners were then blacklisted and
denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed
by the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Faculty Union on the ground of commonality of
issues and cause of action with that of the petitioners who, later on were sanctioned by the investigating committee
of the respondent school.
ISSUE: W/N there has been a violation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and of due process of
law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
RULING: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due
process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be
compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. Under similar circumstances where
students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of contracts as in the instant
case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case (Guzman vs. National University,
142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]).
FARGAS
Case No. 150
Academic Discipline In General
Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by
the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school
in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet seeking their readmission
to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied
by the trial court on the ground that they waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In
addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges & to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations
laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled; Hence, the
affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N process was accorded to petitioners.
RULING:
NO. It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in
Guzman v. National University, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings
that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied
that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and
which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when
the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial
of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Imposition of sanctions on students
requires observance of procedural due process. The following are minimum standards which must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
FARGAS
Case No. 151
Academic Discipline In General
ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644
FACTS:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of ADMU, died of serious physical injuries after the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report on the circumstances surrounding
the death of Lennie Villa. Respondent students, through a notice, where required to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt, which they failed to do so. The Investigating Committee
found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
“Discipline”. Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner
Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students, which found them guilty of
violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack
of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of
the penalty to the University Administration.
ISSUE:
W/N there was denial of due process against the respondent students.
RULING:
NO. It cannot seriously be asserted that the requirements to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process (refer to prev case) were not met. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners’ notices. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract
from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include
the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted investigate students’ participation
in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
FARGAS
Case No. 152
Academic Discipline In General
U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
FACTS:
Petitoner Ramon Nadal, was among those who applied for the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
Program (STFAP), popularly known as the “Iskolar ng Bayan” program of the University of the Philippines (U.P.).
During a random sampling scheme of verification of data on 1991, a team from UP staff conducted a home
investigation at the residence of Nadal wherein Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found
discrepancies between the report and Nadal’s application form. Nadal was informed of the result of the
investigation which showed that (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in
support of the studies of his brothers; and he was required to pay back the benefits he received from the STFAP.
The UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP
benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has
settled his financial obligations with the university.
ISSUE:
W/N Nadal was denied due process.
RULING:
No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29,
1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary
cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of
lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when
he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable
doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion.
FARGAS
Case No. 153
Academic Discipline In General
Go v. Colegio De San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Kim Go was named among several high school students involved and present at a hazing rite of Tau
Gamma in the house of one Dulce, in Tondo Manila. Kim’s mother, Angelita Go, was then informed of her son’s
participation as a fraternity member The fourth year students involved were to be allowed to graduate from
Letran, whereas those who were not graduating were allowed to finish their current school year but were to be
barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran. Mrs. Go later on submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s
suspension so that he could take a previously scheduled exam. Several conferences addressing the students
involved in the fraternity were gone unattended by the spouses Go despite consistent notification. The
respondents proposed that students and their parents sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with
their suspension to which Spouses Go did not sign, refusing to accept the findings that Kim was a fraternity
member, and that there was a lack of due process in the findings.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners were denied due process in the opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case.
RULING:
NO. Reiterating the ruling in Guzman v. National University case, due process in student disciplinary
cases does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
Justice. They may be summary proceedings, and cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. The viewing
and examining of written statements is admissible in due process. The written notice rule is to inform the student
of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. Kim had enough time to
prepare his response. The essence of due process, the opportunity to be heard, had been given. Due process in
student disciplinary cases does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in courts of Justice. They maybe summary proceedings, and cross-examination is not an
essential part thereof.
FARGAS
Case No. 154
Deportation Proceeding In General
Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756
FACTS:
In 1958, Filomeno Chia Jr. was declared a Filipino citizen when the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion
no. 191 as it appears that his father, Filomeno Chia Sr. (Lao Gi) is a Filipino citizen. In 1980, Minister of Justice
rendered Opinion no. 147, cancelling and setting aside the citizenship of Lao Gi on the ground that his citizenship
was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Lao Gi filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. Charges of
deportation were filed against the Chia’s which also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they
committed acts of undesirability. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that CID has no authority to
reopen a matter long decided by Opinion no. 191, which was opposed by private prosecutor and CID’s special
prosecutor on the ground that citizenship may be threshed out as occasion may demand and that due process was
accorded to respondents. CID denied both motions.
ISSUE:
W/N due process was accorded to petitioners.
RULING: NO. Section 37 of the Immigration Act provides that arrest and deportation of aliens may be done after a
determination of the Board of Commissioners that a ground for deportation exists. After the charges are filed,
respondents should be notified of the grounds and a hearing should be conducted and it is only after a hearing has
been conducted may the alien be deported and the Opinions rendered will bear weight in the determination of
their citizenship. Nituda can only direct or order respondents to register as aliens once there is a positive finding
that the respondents are aliens. " This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens
injurious to the public good. Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same
law, it is provided that: No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
FARGAS
Case No. 155
Deportation Proceeding In General
Domingo v Scheer, 421 SCRA 468
FACTS:
Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status to reside in the Philippines. He married
a Filipina and had 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa. One day, the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) received information that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Police that a warrant of
arrest had been issued against him. The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer, relied on
the correspondence from the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that a warrant of arrest was issued by the
District Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the
respondent in Palawan. Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the respondent’s motion. The
respondent was neither arrested nor deported. Meanwhile, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision
dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. He informed the respondent in a Letter.
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent’s motion. Commissioner did not respond to the respondent’s Letter.
The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan.
ISSUE:
W/N the BOC Commissioner committed GADLEJ in issuing its Summary Deportation, and the
arrest and detention of the respondent.
RULING:
YES. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of
grace; such privilege is not absolute nor permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or
deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
FARGAS
Case No. 156
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
FACTS:
By virtue of RA 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the
authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT
provides satellite services to companies like Globe and PLDT. PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission. (RA 5514, Sec. 5)
ISSUE:
W/N a hearing was required before NTC ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates.
RULING:
YES. Temporary rate fixing order is not exempt from the procedural requirements of notice and
hearing. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate- fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does
not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to
any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
FARGAS
Case No. 157
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Randiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517
FACTS:
Respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent NTC for the Approval of Rates for Digital
Transmission
Service Facilities. The respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the
prescribed 30-day period allowed by law. The respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing for PLDT’s
application. Petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of
affected parties. According to petitioners, NTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in
issuing provisional authority to private respondent without prior notice and hearing when its application is not for rate
approval but for authority to engage in services outside its franchises, that PLDT is limited by its legislative franchise
to render only radiotelephonic services, exclusive of radiotelegraphic or record services.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion without prior notice to the petitioners.
RULING:
NO. Public Service Commission, empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without prior
hearing. Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is empowered to approve provisionally
rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, as amended, the Board of
Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber’s investment to be effective
immediately, without hearing. Further, the Public Service Act makes no distinction between initial or revised rates.
These rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them (Republic v. Medina, supra).
Moreover, the Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The reason is
easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in
conformity with the definitive rates approved after final and it was so stated in the case at bar, in the National
Telecommunications Commission’s order.
FARGAS
Case No. 158
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454
FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondents, the oil companies filed
with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional
increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify said increase. The
petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due process for having
been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE:
W/N ERB orders granting the provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.
RULING:
YES. Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board
from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce
or increase it further or to deny the application. The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that:
“Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in matters of
rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative,not quasi-judicial, function. As such
administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings.”
FARGAS
Case No. 159
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Globe Telecom v. NTC, 435 SCRA 110
FACTS:
SMART filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection
of SMART’s and Globe’s GSM networks. SMART alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to
grant SMART’s request for the interconnection of SMS. NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the
documentation required for interconnection. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of
value-added service or enhanced- service given in NTC Memorandum Circular, their implementation of
SMS interconnection is mandatory. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS
without authority from it.
ISSUE:
W/N Globe was correct that it need not to secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS as a
deregulated special feature, therefore, exempted from rate or tariff regulations of NTC.
RULING:
YES According to NTC’s Memorandum Circular No. 14-11-97, the Commission deregulates the provision of
special features inherent to the Telephone Network, provided, that in the provision of the feature, no law, rule,
regulation or international convention on telecommunications is circumvented or violated. The Commission shall
periodically update the list of special features in the Telephone Network which, including the charging of
rates therefor, shall be deregulated.
FARGAS
Case No. 160
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
FACTS:
In Issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No.04-92), Limiting The Term of Appointment Of Harbor
Pilots To One Year Subject To Yearly Renewal Or Cancellation. Respondents United Harbour Pilots Association And
The Manila Pilots Association, Through Capt.Alberto C. Compas, Questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92. The Office Of The
President Issued An Order Directing The PPA To Hold In Abeyance The Implementation Of PPA-AO No. 04-92. The
Op, Through Then Assistant Executive secretary For Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, Dismissed The
Appeal/Petition And Lifted The Restraining Order Issued Earlier. Respondents Filed A Petition For Certiorari,
Prohibition And Injunction With Prayer For The Issuance Of A Temporary Restraining Order And Damages, Before
Branch 6 Of The Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
W/N PPA-AO-04-92 is Constitutional.
RULING:
YES. THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF
RESPONDENS’ RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONOF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. AS A
GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN ANADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS,SUCH AS ISSUING
RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVEBODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF NOTICE AND HEARING. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON
THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY
RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR
COMPULSORY RETIREMENT.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 161
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
ABALOS V. CSC, 196 SCRA 81
FACTS: The Civil Service Commission affirmed the order of Civil Service Regional Office No. 12 directing the
reinstatement in the Provincial Engineer's Office, Lanao del Sur, of Sergio Villabona and Eduardo Yap, Jr. on the
ground that they had been illegally dismissed. For there was no formal investigation made Petitioner Francisco A.
Abalos is now before us and prays that the resolution be reversed because it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE: W/N there is violation on due process
RULING: YES. Although moot and academic, the right to be heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free
society. We should be proud that in this jurisdiction every person who may be involved in controversy is entitled to
present his side, no less than his adversary, at a hearing duly called for that purpose. This right is available to
citizen and alien alike, from the humblest to the most exalted, and covers with its protection the offer of arguments
and evidence, from the profound to the absurd, in defense of one's life, liberty and property. That is a right we must
all cherish.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 162
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
GSIS V. CSC (should be CA), 201 SCRA 661
FACTS: Respondent Evelyn T. Kintanar, a second-grade civil service eligible, was employed by petitioner
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") at its Cebu Branch, initially as a casual employee on 3 September
1976, and later as records clerk, and then as control clerk. As a control clerk, she was assigned to the Records and
Communication (mailing) Section, Information and Services Division. Sometime in 1979, two (2) members of the
GSIS, in separate affidavits, complained that they had not received their policy loan checks. Petitioner maintains in
this Petition for Review that respondent's summary dismissal from the service was justified, the charge being
serious and the evidence of guilt being strong; and that whatever lack of procedural due process may have attended
the summary dismissal had been cured by respondent's subsequent appeal not only to the Civil Service
Commission but also to the regular courts. Petitioner, however, because it never accorded Evelyn Kintanar an
investigation of the charges made against her, never disclosed to her either the charges or the evidence on the
basis of which it had dismissed her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is valid.
RULING: NO. In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondents liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial pronouncements.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 163
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
MACAYAYONG V. OPLE, 204 SCRA 372
FACTS: The records show that before petitioner was dropped from the roster of the Department of Labor, he was
notified twice by his home office to report back to work, on January 5 and on January 19, 1976. In the aforesaid
notices, the petitioner was urged to come back to his home office because his services were badly needed, with a
warning that in case he (petitioner) fails to report, he would be dropped from the roster of the Department of Labor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is valid.
RULING: YES. Even assuming that petitioner’s contentions as to his date of receipt of notices were true, it is well
settled that due process contemplates freedom from arbitrariness and what is required is fairness or justice, the
substance rather than the form being paramount. An allegation based solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard
without notice does vent per se merit unconditional approval. It is said that, “No violation of due process is
committed even where no hearing was conducted but the parties were given the chance to explain their side.”
Likewise, there is no denial of due process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present his case.
MAIN POINT: What the principle of process seeks to safeguard is not lack of previous notice but the denial of
opportunity to be heard. But even if a party had not been given prior notice of a motion, he cannot claim denial of
due process if he was given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the order which was issued
pursuant to a motion without prior notice to him.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 164
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
GONZALES V. CSC, 226 SCRA 66
FACTS: The herein Petitioner is an Administrative Officer of the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) for 36 years.
Early in 1990, certain problems beset his two (2) children in the United States. He had to fly to the United States to
attend to his children. He applied for and was granted leaves with pay from February 2, to July 16, 1990. On June
25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay starting from the second
week of July to December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason his desire to take advantage of. The letter was
personally delivered by the petitioner's wife. For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not act on the
letter-request. It was neither approved nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI started acting adversely on
petitioner's request. The letter was addressed at 30 Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City, petitioner's house. The
letter, however, was returned to sender (ATI) on September 27, 1990. What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar
import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general
ISSUE: WON there is violation/denial of due process.
RULING: Yes, there was. There was no receipt of notice by the Petitioner. When petitioner filed his leave of
absence without pay, ATI knew that petitioner was staying at 149 Declaration Way, San Jose, California in 1992.
The letter of June 25, 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly carried his address in the United States.
The records do not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioner's correct address. Despite this
knowledge, however, the letter of September 5, 1990 written by Atty. Ildefonso del Rosario, ATI's Asst. Director and
OIC, directing petitioner to return to work within five (5) days, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls was
inexplicably mailed to his house at 30 Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City. The letter was not received by
petitioner.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 165
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
Go. v. NPC, 271 SCRA 447
FACTS: Petitioner, a member of the Olongapo City Police Department, was dismissed by the Summary Dismissal
Board of the PC/INP Regional Command for his alleged involvement in illegal gambling (operation of jai-alai
bookies). In his petition before the SC, he maintained that he was not served written charges and informed of the
nature of such charges; that no hearing was held by the summary dismissal board; and that he was not heard. He
claimed that he appeared before the summary dismissal board but no hearing was ever held either because the
complainant and his witnesses did not appear or the members of the board were absent or all three were absent. He
was informed of his dismissal through a memo from the INP District Superintendent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when no copy of the complaint was
furnished to him
RULING: Yes. In summary dismissal proceedings, unless other fully effective means for implementing the
constitutional requirement of notice and hearing are devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified in writing and
that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which
evidence against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge. They take the place of direct examination of
witnesses. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with in summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the
presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to the requirement that the respondent in the
administrative case be notified of the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
MAIN POINT: Underlined
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 166
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
CHR v. CSC, 227 SCRA 42
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Elias Pacete, CHR Region IX Division Chief, filed an application for optional
retirement due to his failing eyesight. His application was accepted and approved by the Chairman of CHR despite
his subsequent withdrawal of said application and a new successor was appointed in his stead. GSIS informed
Pacete that his application for optional retirement cannot be granted due to his failure to meet the required 3-year
continuous service preceding retirement. Pacete requested to be reinstated but CHR denied and instead formally
charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of official duty and failure to account for
public funds. On appeal, Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of CSC ordered his immediate reinstatement with
payment of back wages and other benefits allowed by law without prejudice to the outcome of the formal charges
against him. Petitioner contended that private respondent cannot be reinstated because it has the right to summarily
remove and replace incompetent employees under the Civil Service Decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR failed to observed administrative due process when it denied the reinstatement of
private respondent
RULING: Yes. Government Service Insurance Act allows an employer to request retirement of an employee who is
unable to perform satisfactorily and efficiently his duties, but such request must first be submitted to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals and only after said employee shall have been notified in writing of the proposed retirement. There
was no request for optional retirement of private respondent from the CHR to the Civil Service Board of Appeals
based on incompetence and inefficiency. Although he was furnished a copy of the resolution denying his application
for reinstatement with the attendant charges against him, he was not afforded the opportunity to refute them prior to
the promulgation of the said resolution. The attempt to observe due process was made only after he had been
separated from the service.
MAIN POINT: Employer must first notify employee in writing before requesting Civil Service Board of Appeals to
retire him for inefficiency.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 167
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
Uy v. COA, 328 SCRA 607
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after being
dismissed from service by former Agusan del Sur Governor Paredes who was allegedly motivated by political
vengeance when he dismissed petitioners and hired new employees to replace them. MSPB ordered the
reinstatement of petitioners and the payment of back wages. On inquiry by Provincial Administrator (on behalf of
new Governor Plaza), COA rendered a decision holding former Governor Paredes personally liable for the payment
of back salaries and other benefits of reinstated employees and disallowed the payment by the Provincial
Government of Agusan del Sur of such.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA violated due process when it held former Governor Paredes personally liable for the
payment of back wages and benefits of reinstated employees without due notice
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the
proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hidebound by
technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to
enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former
Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an
opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. SC rulings holding that public officials are personally
liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in
their official and personal capacities
MAIN POINT: Underlined
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 168
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
Lameyra v. Pangilinan, 322 SCRA 117
FACTS: Petitioner, Pedro Lameyra, was dismissed from the government service as janitor/messenger of Famy,
Laguna. He was informed by respondent Mayor Pangilinan via letter that he was dropped from the roll of employees
due to insubordination and AWOL. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that
he was a permanent employee and that he was terminated without prior written notice of the charges and without
investigation and hearing, in violation of his security of tenure and due process. He alleged that the act of Mayor
Pangilinan was an act of political vengeance as he was publicly known to have voted for his political rival during the
May 8, 1995 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process observed in the dismissal of the petitioner
RULING: No. Although, pursuant to Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12 Series of 1994, no prior notice is
required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL) for
at least thirty (30) calendar days, the SC, however, is not convinced that petitioner did not report for work from July
6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 to constitute such substantial evidence in light of the petitioner’s contention that the
Personnel Officer/Human Resources Management Assistant Benito Vicencio, who provided the certification for his
absences, was the same person who prevented him from signing the logbook. That he has been replaced by one
Leynes in July, 1995, and that he has been asked to submit his resignation which he refused to do. Under these
circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the requirements of due process,
petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his service was illegal.
The case was remanded to the CSC for further proceeding.
MAIN POINT: Findings of fact of an administrative agency is respected by the Supreme Court provided that such
findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 169
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
NPC v. Zozobrado, 487 SCRA 16
FACTS: Respondent (permanent employee of National Power Corporation assigned as pilot) was dropped from the
rolls of employee due to two consecutive unsatisfactory performance rating given by Gen Lagera. On appeal, the
CA found respondent’s separation to be made with utter lack of due process and ordered his reinstatement.
Petitioner contended that actual and constructive notice had been served upon respondent. That the ratings given to
respondent resulting to his dropping from the rolls were official and regular acts by NPC based on his performance
and by no means a premeditated design to drop respondent from the rolls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dropping of respondent from the rolls is a violation of the procedural due process
RULING: Yes. Dropping from the rolls means separation from the service. Such separation is made summarily,
without any case, investigation or due process. For this reason, the rule should be strictly construed in order that it
may not be used as a tool for harassment, vindictiveness or removal of any employee who happens to fall out of
grace of his supervisor or superior officers. In the case at bar, the notice required by law was not given to
respondent. Respondent was never notified in writing of his “Unsatisfactory” rating within 30 days from the end of
the semester when the “Unsatisfactory” rating was given. He was never warned in writing that a succeeding
“Unsatisfactory” performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Even the allegation of the oral notice
itself is clearly an afterthought. Furthermore, his unsatisfactory ratings were found to be made arbitrary.
MAIN POINT: Procedural due process requires notice to be given to the employee before he can be dropped from
the rolls of employees.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 170
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN GOVT
PAGCOR vs CA G.R. No. 185668 December 13, 2011
FACTS: Mia Manahan, treasurer officer of CF-Pavilion caused the transfer of P4.2M to a certain David Funtabella.
However CF-Laog denied that such fund transfer had been transmitted by CF Pavilion. Thus, Manahan was
called by for investigation. She avers that she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process of law
when the PAGCOR BOD outrightly dismissed her from service without informing her of the formal charges
and apprising her of the documentary evidence against her. CSC and CA dismiss the petition of PAGCOR.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not PAGCOR violated the right of due to process on the dismissal of Manahan from
government service.
RULING: Yes, a cursory reading of the purported formal charge issued to Manahan shows that the same is
defective as it does not contain the required statements, and it was not issued by the proper disciplining
authority. Hence, Manahan is not deemed to have been formally charged.
*Required Statements
While its form may vary, it generally embodies a brief statement of the material and relevant facts
constituting the basis of the charge(s); a directive for the employee to answer the charge(s) in writing and
under oath, accompanied by his/her evidence; and advice for the employee to indicate in his/her answer
whether he/she elects a formal investigation; and a notice that he/she may secure the assistance of a
counsel of his/her own choice.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 171
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
Hellenic vs Siete G.R. No. 84082 March 13, 1991
FACTS: Siete was employed on May 22, 1985, as Capt of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd. On July 8,
1985, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to
take over its command and he was dismissed from service. It contends that the respondent had been
instructed to erase the timber load line on the vessel; that he had indeed been negligent in supervising the
unloading of the cargo at Tripoli, resulting in the replacement of certain damaged equipment; and that he
had not been denied due process
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Siete was denied the right to due process.
RULING: Yes. respondent was illegally dismissed because, first, he was not accorded a fair investigation as
required by law, and second, because the grounds invoked for his separation have not been proved by the
petitioner. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. The employer shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 172
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
Salaw vs NLRC G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991
FACTS: Espero Santos Salaw was employed by respondents as a credit investigator-appraiser. On November 27,
1984, the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary, extracted from the petitioner
without the assistance of counsel a Sworn Statement which made it appear that the petitioner, in cahoots
with a co-employee. Petitioner was terminated from his employment effective March 27, 1985, for alleged
serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the
private respondents.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Salaw was denied the right to due process.
RULING: Yes, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was characterized by undue haste. He was not
given the opportunity to present his own defense and confront the witnesses and examine the evidence
against him nor was he granted counsel or representative during the hearing. The rudimentary requirements
of due process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an employee may be dismissed.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 173
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
Conti vs NLRC G.R. No. 119253. April 10, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Amor Conti was employed by respondent Corfarm as cashier. On 13 January 1993, petitioners
received a memorandum, from private respondents terminating their services, allegedly for two reasons: 1)
the expiration of their employment contracts, these being coterminous with the management contract
between Corfarm and MERALCO, and; 2) the on-going evaluation of their past performances, and
investigation of the internal auditor of Corfarm of certain anomalous transactions involving them (petitioners).
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to due process.
RULING: Yes, neither notice nor hearing was afforded to the petitioners. They were not given an opportunity to
refute the findings stated in the audit. In order that the willful disobedience by the employee may constitute a
just cause for terminating his employment, the orders, regulations, or instructions of the employer or his
representative must be: 1) reasonable and lawful; 2) sufficiently known to the employee; and 3) in
connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 174
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
Aparente vs NLRC G.R. No. 117652. April 27, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Aparante, Sr., an advertising foreman of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CCBPI).
Petitioner met an accident in which he sideswiped Marilyn Tejero and was driving without a valid driver’s
license. The Insurance Company refused to reimburse upon finding that petitioner was driving without a
valid drivers license. And was dismissed for violating Company Rules and Regulations resulting to damages
of P19,534.45.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Petitioner was denied the right to due process.
RULING: No, due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a
right to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side. In labor
cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfill the requirements of due process.
Further, petitioner has misrepresented himself and led the private respondent to believe that he had
procured another driver’s license. Thus, he was permitted to drive again.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 175
Art III Section 1: Dismissal in Private Sector
Lopez vs Alturas 647 SCRA 568 GR 191008
Facts: Petitioner was dismissed after being caught by respondent’s security guard in the act of attempting to
smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap iron. Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory,
respondent company terminated his employment on the grounds of loss of trust and confidence, and of violation of
company rules and regulations. The labor arbiter dismissed the petitioner’s complaint saying that the latter’s
dismissal was justified given that he held a position of trust and confidence. It was also held that the respondent
paid the correct wages contrary to the claims of the petitioner.
NLRC ruled that the evidence is not sufficient to terminate the employee. MR was denied but CA reversed the ruling
and upheld the dismissal on the ground that the act f smuggling had been sufficiently established.
However, it was also held that that due process was not observed when respondent company failed to give him a
chance to defend his side in a proper hearing. The company then was ordered to pay nominal damages of P30,000.
ISSUES: W/N Lopez was illegally dismissed
Ruling: NO. Lopez was not illegally dismissed since respondent company’s loss of trust and confidence arising from
petitioner’s smuggling out of the scrap iron constituted just cause for terminating his services. The case of Cruz v.
Court of Appeals has laid down the basis of loss of trust and confidence namely (1) willful breach of the
trust reposed in the employee by the employer (2) based on substantial evidence (3) act is work related (4)
employee holds a position of responsibility (5) employee is concerned with delicate matters like handling or
care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. Respondent company’s charge against
petitioner was amply proven by substantial evidence consisting of the affidavits of various employees of
respondent.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 176
Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension
Alonzo vs Capulong 244 SCRA 80
Facts: Fajardo was preventively suspended from her post at the Pag-ibig Fund Foundation. The decision for her
preventive suspension was based on a recommendation by Pag-ibig’s legal department, which found a prima facie
case after investigating the circumstances surrounding a letter sent to the CEO of Pag-ibig by a contractor
complaining of improper conduct on Fajardo’s part. Fajardo claims she was deprived of due process for being
suspended on the basis of an unverified letter and not being allowed to give her side.
Issue: W/N preventive suspension of a public officer needs to undergo due process
Ruling: NO. The Court rule that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered
even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose is to prevent the accused from using his position or office to influence prospective
witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
Main Point: Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 177
Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension
Castillo-Co vs Barbers 290 SCRA 717 GR 129952
Facts: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co
and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against the public treasury and malversation. (Sections 3(e)
and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.) for anomalous purchases of construction equipment.
A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under
preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months which was approved by the Deputy Ombudman for Luzon
Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration but were denied by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. Which now leads to he special civil action for certiorari seeking to nullify the suspension order due to the fact
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon has no authority to issue such order.
Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process because she was not afforded the opportunity to controvert the
evidence against her before the order of preventive suspension was issued.
Ruling: NO. A preventive suspension, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are
brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty but merely a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. A suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation
Main Point: BOLD
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 178
Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension
Bacsasar vs CSC 576 SCRA 787
Facts: Bcasasar was charged with dishonesty by the CSC-ARMM due falsifying the entry of the Personal Data
Sheet indicating a passing score of 87.54% rating, in support of the issuance of the appointment as Municipal
Assessor under permanent status. She denied the allegation and claimed that a man approached her and
convinced her to obtain eligibility from him without examination.
She waived her right to a formal investigation. The CSC-ARMM imposed a penalty of dismissal from service
including all the accessory penalties. She appealed from CSC and was further denied and the decision was by
CSC-ARMM. She requested a 30-day extension of time to file for a petition for review, however, still failed to file the
petition within the extended period. Again, she filed for a motion to admit but the CA dismissed the petition for
having been tardily filed and for lack of merit due to her failure to file the intended petition for review within the
30-day period which rendered the CSC decision final and executory.
Issue: W/N petitioner Bacsasar was denied due process
Ruling: NO. Petitioner was not denied due process. Her failure to file her appeal on time allowed the CSC
resolutions to lapse into finality which goes beyond the power of the Court’s review. Also, she was the one who
waived her right to a formal investigation which denied herself the opportunity to present evidence, to confront the
witnesses against her, and to object to the evidence adduced against her.
She was also given ample time and opportunity to defend herself. The essence of due process is simply to be
given an opportunity to be heard or to explain one’s side; and this she was accorded but denied herself
when she waived her right to a formal investigation.
Main Point: NB Preventive suspension not required as violation is falsification of public document
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 179
Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension
Carabeo vs CA 607 SCRA 390
Facts: Liberato Carabeo, City Treasurer of Paranaque was alleged to have acquired properties from the time he
started working in said city up to present. However, these properties were not declared in his SALN particularly the
cars registered under his name. Thus, he was charged with violation of RA 6713, RA 3019 and other pertinent laws.
Carabeo denied the liability but during the pendency of investigation, he was preventively suspended.
Issue: W/N the suspension rendered by the Ombudsman is valid.
Ruling: YES. Preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. There is nothing in the law, specifically Section 24 of RA 6770, or The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which requires that notice and hearing precede the preventive suspension of an erring public official.
Main Point: BOLD
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 180
ART III SEC 1
DISMISSALS, SUSPENSION, REINSTATEMENT ETC.: PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Villasenor v. OMB
FACTS: Petitioner Villaseñor, an electrical inspector from the electrical division, and Mesa, inspector from the
Electrical Engineering Office, both from Quezon City, were administratively charged in connection with the Manor
Hotel fire tragedy killing 74 people and causing injury to others. In its Joint Decision, the Investigating Panel of the
Office of the Ombudsman ruled that both were guilty of the appropriate charges of their negligent acts. The
Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision. Petitioners, then filed their separate MR of the Joint
Decision. The Ombudsman denied the MR filed by Mesa. Mesa appealed to the CA, Villaseñor made no appeal
because the MR before the Ombudsman was not yet resolved. Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA assailing immediate implementation of the Joint Decision despite the pendency of
Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s appeal. They prayed that the said order be annulled, and an
injunction be issued to restrain its implementation. On the other hand, Mesa argues that the order of suspension
against him should not have been implemented pending his appeal with the CA.
ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year can be implemented
pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner
Mesa’s appeal before the CA?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñor was
ordered dismissed from the service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory
pending appeal.
MAIN POINT: Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved
of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month;
and (4) a fine equivalent to one month’s salary. Appealable decisions are those which fall outside said enumeration
and may be appealed to the CA within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 181
Ordinance/status/memorandum circulars/rules
People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136
FACTS: Nazario is an operator of a fishpond in Quezon. Alvarez, the Municipal Treasurer, wrote Nazario a letter
asking him to pay his taxes and fee for the fishpond operation. Nazario refused and failed to pay the municipal taxes
required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance, as amended, in spite of repeated demands
made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer. Petitioner contends that the ordinance is vague insofar as they reckon
the date of payment. The ordinances are ex post facto measures since it penalizes acts or events occurring before
its passage.
ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Ordinance is unconstitutional for being vague.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. It is a well-settled rule that the statute may be vague if it lacks comprehensible
standards as men of common intelligence would necessarily guess its meaning and differ to its application. In the
present case, the Court held that assailed ordinances are not vague and ambiguous. As an operator of a fish pond,
the appellant falls within the term manager. In fact, he never denied the fact that he financed the construction of the
fishponds, introduced fish fries and had employed laborers to maintain them.
LAUGHTON
CASE 182
Ordinance/status/memorandum circulars/rules
Franscisco v. CA 199 SCRA 595
FACTS: Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of an antiquated and
dilapidated Quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, outside the zone for
warehouses. The legal possessor of the Quonset sought the prohibition of the Order but was denied by the RTC.
The CA originally overturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in this case is the validity of such
order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatement of nuisance, without prior judicial authority.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra−judicially order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset
building.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted as
authorizing the summary removal of a non−conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must
be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the Court of
Appeals. Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings, which applies only to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
LAUGHTON
CASE 183
Ordinance/status/memorandum circulars/rules
Misamis Or. V. DOF 238 SCRA 63
FACTS: Petitioner, is engaged in the buying and selling of copra in, he alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular 47-91 which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food
product and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. Respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food product. The
reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was
classified as an agricultural food product. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47- 91.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied his right to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in
not considering copra as an "agricultural food product". As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food,
that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous
Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The CIR is not
bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation
of laws.
LAUGHTON
CASE 184
Ordinance/status/memorandum circulars/rules
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
FACTS: Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause that petitioner Estrada, then President of the
Philippines, has committed the offense of plunder and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law).
Petitioner, then, moved to quash the information claiming the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and the amended information for
plunder charged more than one offense.
ISSUE: W/N the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute a crime. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only several acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove every other act alleged in the information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.
LAUGHTON
CASE 185
Motion for reconsideration
Medenilla v. CSC 194 SCRA 278
FACTS: Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124, a reorganization ensued within the DPWH and all the positions
therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of
personnel was issued. The petitioner was appointed to the disputed position. The protestants alleged that since they
are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have been appointed to the said position. Thus, the Commission
promulgated the assailed resolution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. On May
30,1990 a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration was also filed. However, prior thereto, the Commission
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner also contends that she was not notified by the Civil
Service Commission of the existence of the appeal before it.
ISSUE: W/N the resolution violated the petitioner’s due process of law?
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is
not always the cornerstone of due process. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 186
Motion for reconsideration
Mendiola v. CSC 221 SCRA 295
FACTS: Petitioner is an employee of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau. Petitioner received a
notice of termination from service effective at the close of office hours of April 30, 1988. Alleging that he was not
informed of the cause of his dismissal, petitioner appealed his case to the chairman of the Appeals Board. His
appeal was denied. Subsequently, he appealed to the Commission and averred that he was denied due process
when he was dismissed from the service.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent Commission erred in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. With respect to petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the
Commission heard the Bureau's motion for reconsideration without notice to him, SC agreed with private respondent
Bureau's argument that the defect was cured by the filing by petitioner of his Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1990.
Lack of notice regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 187
Motion for reconsideration
Rodriguez v. Proj. 6 247 SCRA 528
FACTS: Rodriguez is a vendor occupying and leasing one of the stalls at the Project 6 Market. The Cooperative
sought to eject the petitioner from his market stall and recover from his arrears in his monthly rent over the property.
Petitioner contends that he was deprived of procedural due process when the trial court issued the order of August
31, 1987 without any hearing and without him having been furnished a copy of the Cooperative's opposition to his
motion to quash. However, petitioner admits that when he moved for reconsideration of said order, he received his
copy of the opposition and the respondent judge conducted a hearing on his motion.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was denied due process in the issuance of the order
RULING/MAINPOINT: NO. The court found that long before petitioner entered into the said contract, he already
knew that the land was owned by the NHA and that the Cooperative was to lease this land with the option to
purchase after 25 years, construct the market, building thereon and operate the market. In short, the petitioner was
aware of the kind of agreement he had with the Cooperative over his market stall. Deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 188
Motion for reconsideration
Lazo v. CSC 236 SCRA 469
FACTS: Civil Service Commission received a letter reporting that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that
he had bought his career service (subprofessional) eligibility from the Civil Service Commission of which had been
paid to the examiner. The CSC ordered the examination answer sheets of petitioners to be retrieved and
hand-checked by the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement. The rechecking disclosed that petitioner's
actual score was 34.48%, not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of eligibility. The CSC filed, but later dismissed
the administrative charges against petitioner for lack of evidence linking petitioner to the irregularity. However, it
revoked his eligibility for being null and void. When the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration, he filed a petition
for certiorari alleging that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner's right to due process
by unilaterally revoking petitioner's eligibility without a formal investigation or an opportunity given to him to examine
and go over his answer sheet in the Civil Service Examination
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated when his certificate of eligibility was revoked without
notice or hearing
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. While it is true as a general proposition that the CSC cannot motu propio revoke a
certificate of eligibility without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned, in the context of this case, which
simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than a reevaluation of documents already in
the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice and hearing was not
required. Instead, what applied was the rule of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself)
LAUGHTON
CASE 189
Motion for reconsideration
Salonga v. CA 269 SCRA 534
FACTS: Private Respondent Izon, as President of Paul Geneve Corporation, agreed into a joint venture enterprise
with Petitioner Salonga, as owner of Solid Intertain; Documents were prepared for the joint venture. Private
respondent signed the document, and it was then delivered to the petitioner for his signature. However, the said
documents were not signed by the petitioner. A month after, RTC rendered a decision, holding the petitioner in
default, in favor of the private respondent. A few more months after, Petitioner Salonga was adjudged guilty of civil
contempt. Petitioner alleged that his counsel Atty. Garlitos acted fraudulently in handling the Civil Case based on the
following observations of the petitioner on his counsel. Petitioner contend that he was deprived of his basic rights to
due process.
ISSUE: W/N The judgment of the lower court should be annulled on grounds of denial of due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The court held that due process was never denied for petitioners Salonga and Solid
Intertain Corporation because the trial court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present their
side in all the proceedings before it. The records reveal that the judgment by default was rendered by the trial court
in faithful compliance with Rule 18 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional guarantee of due process.
LAUGHTON
CASE 190
Motion for reconsideration
Bernardo v. CA 275 SCRA 413
FACTS: Private Respondent Tomas filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
damages against Petitioner Bernardo, the National Housing Authority (NHA). During the proceedings, the court
interpreter informed the judge that an associate of Atty. Puerto allegedly called to say that Atty. Puerto had died.
Pending official and verified notification of such death, the court decided to proceed with reception of evidence from
the plaintiff. It was only on June 7, 1991, after Plaintiff Tomas and the NHA concluded the presentation of their
respective evidence, that Atty. Marcelo J. Abibas, Jr. filed a notice of appearance as new counsel for Bernardo,
mentioning the death of Atty. Puerto. Bernardo, through his new counsel, filed a motion seeking a new trial on the
grounds that he had been denied his substantive right to due process, particularly the right to be heard, and that
said decision was contrary to law. The trial judge denied the motion.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The negligence of the law firm engaged by the petitioner to defend his cause, and the
error of his new counsel in giving a defective substitution and notice of the death of his former counsel, did not result
in deprivation of due process to said party. Hence, a nullification of the Respondent Courts Amended Decision
grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. Clearly, the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements. His new counsel's notice of appearance merely mentioned that Atty. Jose B. Puerto recently died. A
verified certificate of death was not attached thereto.
LAUGHTON
CASE 191
Motion for reconsideration
Casuela v. Ombudsman 276 SCRA 635
FACTS: Petitioner, Casuela, was found liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the official duties and was meted
out a penalty of 3 months suspension by the Ombudsman. Casuela, as a member of POEA Administrative
Complaints Committee, conducted a hearing before the defendant could file an answer which is a total disregard of
Section 38 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. Casuela sought for reconsideration but
the OMB still dismissed it holding that the acts of Casuela shows excessive use of authority, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties. Casuela, upon petition for review, raises that he was not duly
informed of the true charges against him and was not accorded the opportunity to refute the same.
ISSUE: W/N Casuela was denied due process of law.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Petitioner’s claim that ‘the Ombudsman virtually deprived him of his right to due process
by failing to inform him of the charges against him is bereft of merit since the petitioner himself, in a motion for
consideration, was able to allege the lack of sufficient opportunity to be informed of the charges against him. This
Honorable Court has repeatedly stressed that the requirements of due process are complied with when a party is
heard on a motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 192
Motion for reconsideration
Cordenillio v. Executive Secretary 276 SCRA 652
FACTS: The office of the President favorably endorsed a 20-hectare fishpond lease to Jose Bolivar. As a result, the
Secretary and the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture enforced a 20-hectare fishpond lease to Jose
Bolivar situated at Barrio Malag-it, Pontevedra, Capiz. The said area happens to cover a 10-hectare fully developed
fishpond of Roberto Cordenilla. Petitioner Cordenilla filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the
President but was denied, holding that Bolivar has the legitimate and preferential right over the said area. Petitioner
Cordenillo now filed an injunction case arguing that he was deprived of the land and its improvements without due
process and would therefore unjustly enrich Jose Bolivar at his expense. The Trial Court denied the petition. CA
also dismissed the case upon petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N the contention of Cordenillo that he was denied due process is meritorious.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. The petitioner was in fact heard, for purposes of administrative due process, when he
filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the President. Any contention of denial of due process must
fail as the same is cured by the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 193
Motion for reconsideration
Chua v. CA 287 SCRA 33
FACTS: Florita Vallejo, after her common law husband Roberto Lim Chua died intestate, subsequently filed for
guardianship over the persons and property of their 2 illegitimate children and for letters of administration of the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of
Roberto Chua, moved to recall the petitions of Florita Vallejo on grounds of improper venue. The Trial Court
dismissed the motion ruling that Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua had no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss
as she is not related to the deceased. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Chua was not able to prove
her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The Trial Court, on the other hand, granted the petition for
guardianship and letters of administration of Florita Vallejo. As a result, Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua raised that
she was not given due notice to the grant of guardianship and letters of administration which is a violation of due
process.
ISSUE: W/N Chua was denied due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Petitioner, not able to prove her marriage, was not entitled to notice of the proceedings.
Even granting that she was not notified of the proceedings, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motion to recall
letters of administration. Also, a motion of reconsideration of the order of denial of her motion for recall was duly
heard by the trial court but was however subsequently denied. Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 194
Motion for reconsideration
De la Cruz v. Abelle 352 SCRA 691
FACTS: The Regional Director of Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance issued an order granting right of retention
over an agricultural land to the deceased Herminio Abille which included an area covered by Certificate of Land Title
issued to Balbino dela Cruz. Hence, said land title of Balbino dela Cruz was automatically canceled. The heirs of
Balbino dela Cruz moved to dismiss such order contending that Balbino dela Cruz is deemed the owner of subject
property after paying annual rent for 19 years which thereby entitled them to emancipation patent pursuant to P.D.
No. 27. But the same was denied by the Regional Director. Motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed before
the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform but was also dismissed for lack of merit and held that the land title
in favor of Balbino dela Cruz is only an inchoate right and can be canceled administratively for justifiable reason.
Petition for review and motion for reconsideration were both dismissed by the Court of Appeals. They are now
contending that they were denied due process of law considering that Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner
of the subject property and they were not given a day in court to question the order of the Regional Director of DAR.
Emancipation Patent – legal instrument to secure the ownership and tenure of the farmers to the land.
ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Balbino dela Cruz were denied due process.
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of
the cancellation of the said CLT which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated
October 21, 1992 and also in their (petitioners’) motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
LAUGHTON
CASE 195
Motion for reconsideration
Rodreguez v. CA GR 134275 August 7, 2002
FACTS: PNP launched OPLAN AJAX to minimize the extortion activities of traffic policemen. Petitioner was found in
possession of the entrapment money so an administrative case was filed with NAPOLCOM against him for his
summary dismissal. The case was elevated to the CA but was denied for lack of merit, so petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was also denied.
ISSUE: W/N there was a denial of petitioner’s right to due process
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Lack of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. The resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration clearly shows
that petitioner was given every opportunity to air his side. Lack of due process cannot be invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 196
Motion for reconsideration
Gonzales v. CSC 490 SCRA 741
FACTS: Petitioner was the casino operations manager of PAGCOR, He was administratively charged for
dishonesty, misconduct and violation of company rules and regulations when he committed a scheme which cost a
loss of 7 million pesos. PAGCOR dismissed him from service and denied his motion for reconsideration. The case
was elevated to the CA, but it denied the case and his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the CA denied petitioner of his constitutional right to due process
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Petitioner was able to respond to the charges against him, testify and participate in the
administrative proceedings. Therefore, he was given the opportunity to explain his side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of and any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration. Lack of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
LAUGHTON
CASE 197
Motion for reconsideration
Berboso v. CA 494 SCRA 583
FACTS: The Conversion Order issued by former DAR Secretary Estrella declaring private respondent’s parcel of
land suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes was declared as null and void, for lack
of due process, because petitioner were not notified thereof. The Office of the President, reversed the decision
when a private respondent brought it for appeal, and reinstated the Conversion Order. Petitioner brought the case to
the CA but it denied the case and his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that Petitioner’s right to due process was observed
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. It was proved that Petitioner was notified about the Conversion. And even assuming for
the sake of argument that petitioner were not notified, this lack of notice had been cured when he actively intervened
and participated in the proceedings, by making appeals and repeatedly moved for the reconsideration of each
decision that was adverse to them. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
LAUGHTON
CASE 198
Motion for reconsideration
Pontejos v. Desierto
FACTS: Private respondent filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against petitioner for allegedly
demanding and receiving monetary consideration in exchange for offers of assistance in securing a favorable
decision in a pending case. Respondent then convicted petitioner of estafa and direct bribery. Petitioner moved to
reconsider with the Respondent which was denied. It was then forwarded to the CA which the appellate court also
denied. He contended that he was not able to challenge the allegations filed to him and was not able to confront
Private Respondent who failed to appear in two hearings which constitute a violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in not declaring that the petitioner was denied of his right to due process by the
Ombudsman
RULING/MAIN POINT: NO. Petitioner was given ample time to prepare his defense. He was even able to seek
reconsideration through his appeals. He had the opportunity to be heard, present his case and to submit his
evidence. Even the absence of private respondent in some hearings does not affect the fact that he was accorded
due process. Respecting the findings of the Ombudsman, there is substantial evidence to warrant herein petitioner’s
dismissal. In an administrative context, a formal type of hearing is not always necessary as long as the petitioner
was given the opportunity to explain his side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
LAUGHTON
CASE 199
Suretyship
Stronghold Insurance v. CA 205 SCRA 605
FACTS: Petitioner and Urtesula, a seaman, executed a surety bond for the protection of a Filipino seaman. Urtesula
filed a complaint against Petitioner, when his employer Pan Asian Logistic breached their contract and cannot
indemnify the damages caused to him. The petitioner invokes due process on the ground that it was not notified
thereof nor did it participate in the hearing, therefore deprived of the opportunity to defend itself. It further contend
that the stipulation of “notice to the Principal is a notice to surety” cannot be applied for it is unconstitutional and
contrary to public policy, because it is "a virtual waiver" of the right to be heard and "opens wide the door for fraud
and collusion between the principal and the bond obligee" to the prejudice of the surety.
ISSUE: W/N due process was denied to the Petitioner.
RULING: NO. The argument that the right to a hearing is absolute and may not be waived in any case under the
due process clause is not correct. As a matter of fact, the right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and
validly as long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. The circumstance that the chance to be
heard is not availed of does not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the right to due process.
Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be
heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to
complain that he was unduly silenced.
LAUGHTON
CASE 200
Tariff and Customs Code
Feeder v. CA 197 SCRA 842
FACTS: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of
Singapore, bound to Zamboanga carrying on 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil was found
in at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities thus, liable under Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law and the right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized
RULING: NO. A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature. The petitioner, which is a
corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure
proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose
of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their
deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be
imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
CASE NO. 201
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Alba v Deputy Ombudsman
FACTS: Dr. Ramon Y. Alba in his capacity as Director III of DECS was charged with violating certain provisions of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713). For such gross
misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension of thirty (30) days without pay, after he was given all opportunity to
be heard, albeit through pleadings. When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was
denied by the Ombudsman, he filed an "Appeal Petition for Certiorari ..." with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the 30 day no pay and unappelable imposed by the Deputy Omb is in accordance with the
constitutional right of due process
RULING/MP: YES. The thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay and "unappealable", is valid
or constitutional law/legislation. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989")
states that: Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a
part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege. Due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the
denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence in support of one's case.
CASE NO. 202
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Telan v CA
FACTS: Petitioner’s land was foreclosed by DBP which prompted petitioner to file for suit before the RTC. However,
the petition was dismissed and further dismissed by CA. Petitioner wanted to appeal but CA issued a resolution
which considered the appeal as abandoned and dismissed for “failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary
period” pursuant to Sec 1 (f), Rule 50 of the rules of court.
The petitioner was not aware of the non-compliance until it was found out that the counsel named Atty. Palma who
presented them is not a member of the Bar.
ISSUE: WON the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amount to a deprivation of his right to counsel
and hence a lack of due process.
RULING/MP: YES. They had not been accorded due process because they lost their right to appeal when deprived
of the right to counsel. Telan had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their counsel “Atty Palma”
and the client is bound by the actions of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the attorney’s mistake
or negligence in procedural technique. But in the case at bar, the addressed lawyer is fake thus, no person shall be
deprived of his right to counsel unless he expressly waives his right through writing.
CASE NO. 203
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Rivera v CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines and was charged with various offenses under
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner brought the case before the CSC but was found guilty resulting in his
dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that he was denied due process.
ISSUE: WON CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of
unsubstantiated finding and conclusions
RULING: Yes. It should have befitted Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in
resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of
due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990
is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred
CASE NO. 204
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Singson v NLRC
FACTS:Singson was employed by PAL as traffic representative passenger which consists of checking in
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. Among the passengers, Ms Kondo lodged a complaint that the
petitioner required her to pay $200 for excess baggage without issuing a receipt.
The investigation committee found the petitioner guilty and recommended his dismissal. Petitioner lodged a
complaint against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Aquino declared the petitioner's dismissal invalid and
ordered his reinstatement. PAL appealed, NLRC commissioners where Aquino is also part, promulgated its
resolution.
ISSUE: WON NLRC acted with GAD when the Hon. Aquino, in his capacity as Presiding Commissioner and
promulgated the decision and in the consultation of the members in reaching the conclusion before it was assigned
to the ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
RULING: YES. Petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing
his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was
the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case
MP: The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is
not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is
not an innocent error. It negated his right to due process.
CASE NO. 205
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; APPEAL
Building Care v. Macarag
FACTS: Petitioners are in the business of providing security services to their clients. However, the respondent was
relieved of her post and then reassigned but no longer given any assignment.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit. Respondent filed a notice of appeal but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. CA
however reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declared respondent to have been illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
RULING: Yes. While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never
intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly
filed, should never be taken lightly. The judgment attains finality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal
without such appeal or motion for reconsideration being filed. In Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated
the basic rule that when a party to an original action fails to question an adverse judgment or decision by not filing
the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law, he loses the right to do so, and the judgment or decision, as
to him, becomes final and binding. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, therefore, became final and executory as to
respondent when she failed to file a timely appeal therefrom.
CASE NO. 206
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE PROCEEDING
CB V. CA
FACTS: The Monetary Board issued a RESOLUTION ordering the closure of Triumph Savings Bank and placing it
under receivership. TSB filed a complaint challenging the Central Bank’s act as unconstitutional.
RTC granted a TRO against CB resolution to which CB filed a motion to dismiss the TRO but was denied. CA also
upheld the decision of RTC in granting the TRO. Hence, this petition was raised by the Central Bank.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Monetary Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership may be annulled on
the ground of lack of prior notice and hearing.
RULING: No. Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing
before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. A previous hearing is nowhere
required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of
the Monetary Board's resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before
making the resolution effective. It is enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided. Sec. 29 of R.A.
265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of police power
of the state.
CASE NO. 207
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE PROCEEDING
Rural Bank v. CA
FACTS: A general examination of the Rural Bank of Buhi’s affairs and operations was conducted and there were
found by DRBSLA, among others, massive irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to unknown and
fictitious borrowers.
Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report recommending to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank the
placing of Buhi under receivership. As a result, the Monetary Board placed Bhi under receivership pursuant to
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not under Sec. 29, R.A. 265, as amended, the monetary board (MB) of the Central Bank may
place a rural bank under receivership without prior notice to said rural bank.
RULING: Yes. There is no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a
banking institution may be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions
prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to
appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made
by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c)
prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
CASE NO. 208
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE PROCEEDING
Phil Merchants v. CA
FACTS: For several times prior to 1985, Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved
petitioner’s requests for renewal of permit/recognition because of recurrent violations. Despite these violations,
petitioners still continued to enrol students and offered courses.
Petitioner assailed the resolutions of the OP before the CA and averred they were due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: No. The narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure
orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply
with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a
reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its
side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies. As long as the parties were given opportunity to be
heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met. It should also be
noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of respondent DECS and its
motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and granting its request for
re-inspection of its premises. The opportunity to be heard is the essence of procedural due process and that
any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
CASE NO. 209
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; BIDDINGS
Concerned Officials of the MWSS v. Hon. Vasquez
FACTS: On October 1992, Ombudsman directed to set aside MWSS recommendation of pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE for short) , and instead award
it to a complying and responsive bidder for fiberglass pipes.
Petitioners filed for reconsideration to which after the Court required parties to submit their memoranda.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rudiments of due process have been properly observed in the issuance of the assailed
19th October 1992 and 01st March 1993 orders of the Ombudsman.
RULING: Yes. The petitioners have been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. The essence of due
process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.
A.
The Urban Development and Housing Act – Republic Act No. 7279
CASE NO. 210
ART III SEC 1: UDHA – RA7279
Perez vs. Madrona
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Madrona are owners of a residential property in Marikina City where they built their
house enclosed with concrete fence and steel gate. Petitioner James Perez, Chief Demolition Officer, sent a letter to
the spouses ordering them to remove the fence encroaching the public drainage.
Respondents sought the issuance of TRO to enjoin petitioner. The RTC held that petitioner’s threat to demolish the
concrete fence is tantamount to a violation of their constitutional rights as property owners. There is also no showing
that respondents’ fence presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare.
ISSUE: WON the respondents are denied due process when their property is ordered to be summarily demolished
without judicial intervention.
HELD: Yes. If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to
demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to
court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing
is nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention. Respondents’ fence is not a
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to
secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the
sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, its summary
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
CASE NO. 211
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
American Inter-Fashion vs. OP
FACTS: Private respondent Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty of dollar salting and misdeclaration of
importations which closed their exports. Glorious filed a petition contending its right to due process was violated but
later on withdrew such petition. After 2 years, Glorious filed for the restitution of its export quota allocation and
requested reconsideration of such decision.
An appeal was then taken to the Office of the President. AIFC, herein petitioner, filed its opposition to Glorious’
appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long been final. The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious
and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Glorious Sun Fashion was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision.
RULING: No. Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a
resolution against Glorious. Contrary to the petitioner’s posture, in cancelling the export quotas of the private
respondent GTEB violated the private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the cancellation,
Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota
allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from
it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another. In the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills
Corporation v. Ongpin, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota
allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the
Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been
accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since
not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner but also the livelihood of
some 700 workers and their families.
CASE NO. 212
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma
FACTS: The Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization (ADFLO) filed an application for registration as a
national federation alleging among others that it has 12 affiliates and was granted by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
The Confederation of Labor and Allied Social Services (CLASS) filed a petition for the cancellation of the registration
on the ground that the documents submitted by ADFLO were simulated to which the petition was granted. ADFLO
appealed to Secretary of Labor Torres which was granted but BLR Director Pura rendered an order affirming its
previous decision. ADFLO appealed to the Secretary of Labor but failed to act on its appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the decision of cancelling the registration of petitioner is a violation of the due process clause.
RULING: Yes. While, in general, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the DOLE, are free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are nonetheless bound by law and practice to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. The most basic
tenet of due process is the right to be heard, and as applied in administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side. Such opportunity was denied petitioner in this case. The cancellation of a
certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization. For without such
registration, it loses its rights under the Labor Code. Under the circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled to
be heard before a judgment could be rendered cancelling its certificate of registration.
CASE NO. 213
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
ABAKADA vs. Ermita
FACTS: This is a consolidated case. Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List and Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers Inc. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 for authorizing the President to raise the VAT to 12%
after meeting certain conditions.
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes. Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING: No. The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of
validity must prevail. Petitioners claim that the limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed would
result to a portion of the input tax which cannot now be credited against the output tax. Petitioners argument
assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains
uncredited. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete. It ends at the net effect that there will be
unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such
unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision. The
input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A
VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. The state may change or
take away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was
vested by virtue of such rights.
CASE NO. 214
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
British American Tobacco vs. Camacho
FACTS: Petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold 3 kinds Lucky Strike cigarettes w/ SRP
P9.90/pack. They were initially assessed with excise tax of 8.96php. RMO 6-2003 provides for the guidelines and
procedures in establishing current net retail prices. RR 22-2003 was issued to implement the revised tax
classification which increased the excise tax to P13.44.
This cause petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition sought to enjoin the implementation on the ground
that they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution. RTC dismissed the petition. While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 took
effect which increased petitioners excise tax to P25/pack. Petitioner prayed for a downward classification of Lucky
Strike products at the bracket taxable at P 8.96/pack.
ISSUE: WON RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the Constitution.
RULING: No. It suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances, the conditions not being different. Thus, classification if rational in character is allowable.
SC previously held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation.” Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. Since every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, the burden of proof is on the one attacking the constitutionality of the law to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the legislative classification is without rational basis. The presumption of
constitutionality can only be overcome if classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular
classes, and that there is no conceivable basis which might support it. The classification is considered valid and
reasonable if:
(1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.
CASE NO. 215
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-Ombudsman
Roxas vs. Vasquez
Facts: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five
units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer
of Nikko-Hino.
The COA later discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and
the purchase order. Thus, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against officers of PC-INP and
the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused impaired their constitutional rights and as such SC
may interfere?
Held: Yes. Ordinarily, SC will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, SC find that the case at bar
falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused
are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause exists, the Supreme Court may interfere with the findings
and conclusions.
CASE NO. 216
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-Ombudsman
Ocampo v Omb
Facts: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation
Administration. NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to
March 1989. ADBN paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00.
NIACONSULT demanded the total training fee paid by ADBN which the petitioner personally received but failed to
remit. This prompted NIACONSULT to file an admin case against Ocampo .
The Ombudsman then dismissed the petitioner from service. Petitioner filed his MR raising the denial of his due
process but was denied. Hence, the petition.
Issue: W/N the petitioner was deprived of due process in the case at bar?
Held: No. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. A party who
chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due
process.—Petitioner’s failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own
remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator.
CASE NO. 217
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-Ombudsman
Serapio vs SB
Facts:
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation providing educational opportunities. In 2000 Petitioner, received a
donation of (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Singson. Later Gov. Singson publicly accused President
Estrada and his cohorts of anomalies and filed with the Omb several criminal charges against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons.
The Ombudsman conducted a PI and later on charged Estrada, petitioner and other co-accused with plunder.
Petitioner filed MR with Sandiganbayan but was denied.
Issue: WON SB committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s MR?
Held: No. the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred
by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground
for quashing the Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be
said that the petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation.
CASE NO. 218
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
Substantive Due Process
US v Toribio
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was
denied because his carabao is found not to be fit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the
necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise
of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Toribio’s counsel that “said law mandating one to acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is invalid exercise of police power” is proper?
Held: No. the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution,
but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interest of the community.
MP: The State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
CASE NO. 219
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
Substantive Due Process
Churchill v. Raferty
Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon
complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection
(b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to
the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant
“decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”
Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?
Held: Yes. From whatever direction the social, economic, or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is
legal justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use of private property may be regulated or restricted
to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate these declared essentials to the well being of the public.
CASE NO. 220
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
People v. Fajardo, et al.
FACTS: Due to a typhoon, respondents’ residential house got destroyed. As they were only leasing a residential
house due to the aforementioned fact, they sought permit from the incumbent mayor of Baao, CamSur to construct
a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek.
The request was nonetheless denied for the reason that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of
the public plaza. The basis of the denial was the ordinance. Even in the absence of the permit, herein respondents
proceeded with the construction of the building hence a complaint was filed against them. Both the justice of the
peace court and Court of First Instance ruled (convicted, ordered to pay and demolish the constructed building) in
favor of the municipality while the CA forwarded the case to the SC because of the attack on the constitutionality of
the said ordinance. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance may stand to restrict respondents’ lawful use of their property.
RULING: No. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. To legally achieve the preservation of the aesthetic appearance of
the community by prohibiting structures offensive to the sight, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
MAIN POINT: Aesthetics may be used as reason for “taking,” but then there must be due process and just
compensation. (Bernas Commentary)
NICANOR
CASE NO. 221
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Operator v. City of Manila
FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 (approved by Astorga, then acting
mayor) for being violative of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions: (1) Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; (2) prohibiting admission of less than 18
years old.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is a violation of the due process clause
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. The due process contention is untenable. Due process furnishes though a standard to
which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an
abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 222
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals (IAC)
FACTS: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the EO as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao
being transported across provincial boundaries. EO No. 626-A was enacted prohibiting the inter-provincial
movement of carabaos. Herein petitioner, however, had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo and for this reason, the carabaos were outrightly confiscated by the police for the violation of the above
measure. Hence, the petitioner sued for recovery (carabaos were returned), but when the RTC sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos, the bond was ordered confiscated upon failure to return the carabaos.
ISSUE: W/N Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional because it violates the due process of law
RULING/ MAIN POINT: Yes. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. Due process, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. To justify the
State’s exercise of police power, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals
NICANOR
CASE NO. 223
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
Agustin v. Edu (Land Transportation Commissioner)
MAIN POINT: The exercise of police power, such as the regulation requiring cars to be equipped with “early warning
devises” (EWD), does not require notice and hearing in the promulgation of general regulations for the benefit of
general welfare.
FACTS: Former President Marcos issued a letter of instruction (LOI) directing all owners, users or drivers of motor
vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one pair of early warning device. The issuance of the
LOI was by virtue of the exercise of the State’s police power in order to prevent fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation for the interest of safety on allstreets and highways. Now, herein petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen
Beetle car assails the constitutionality of the LOI for it being an oppressive, unreasonable exercise of police power
because it violates the guarantee of due process.
ISSUE: W/N LOI providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is a violation of due process.
RULING: No. The Letter of Instruction is a valid police power measure. Police power has a broad and expansive
scope to meet the exigencies of the times. The exercise of police power, such as the regulation requiring cars to be
equipped with “early warning devises” (EWD), does not require notice and hearing in the promulgation of general
regulations for the benefit of general welfare
NICANOR
CASE NO. 224
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
Balacuit v. CFI
MAIN POINT: There can be no valid exercise of police power if there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance (or law) and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.
FACTS: The City of Butuan passed an ordinance penalizing the selling of admission tickets to any movie or other
public performances that require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Herein petitioners filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance praying that the said ordinance be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
is an invalid exercise of police power and violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent court
ruled in favor of respondent city whose contention is that the questioned ordinance is for the welfare of the public.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance violates the due process clause of the Constitution
RULING: Yes. The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The ordinance is clearly
unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
NICANOR
Case No. 225
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
National Development Co. (NDC) & New Agrix v. Phil Veterans Bank (PVB)
MAIN POINT: Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just
compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under this Constitution.
FACTS: Agrix Marketing Inc. executed a real estate mortgage for over three parcels of land in favor of Philippine
Veterans Bank. During the subsistence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. Presidential Decree No. 1717 was
issued by President Marcos to salvage the Agrix companies. PVB filed a claim for the payment of their loan credit
against petitioner, where petitioner invoked Sec. 4(1) of P.D. No. 1717 which provides that “all mortgages and other
liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without prejudice to
PD 1717
Main Point/RULING: YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights
once they accrue.
NICANOR
Case No. 226
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC
FACTS: Eddie Damalerio, a room attendant of Maranaw Hotel was alleged to have committed qualified theft and
was terminated from employment. Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner. After the parties had sent in their position papers, Labor Arbiter Diosana decided the case in favor of the
respondent.
ISSUE: W/N not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding
that petitioner failed to adduce conclusive evidence in support of its version of the incident
RULING/MAINPOINT: NO. Records disclose petitioner’s failure to substantiate such imputation against him. During
the investigation presided over by the Labor Arbiter, unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless conclusions by
employers are not legal justification for dismissing employees. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
employee, in keeping with the principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution. Damalerio was illegally
dismissed thus he is entitled to be paid full back wages and be reinstated.
NICANOR
Case No. 227
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
MAIN POINT: For an ordinance to be valid, it must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not
contravene the constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) It must not be partial or
discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable
FACTS:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City and leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening as violative of Ordinance No. 3375-93,
prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to
the LGC, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is valid
RULING: NO. LGC expressly vested local governments with police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause. However, ordinances should not contravene a statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869.
This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
NICANOR
Case No. 228
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Bennis v. Michigan
FACTS: Bennis’ husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the
couple’s jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance
subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car).
ISSUE: W/N the abatement order entered against petitioner’s car constitute a taking of private property for public
use.
RULING/MAINPOINT: NO. The abatement order against petitioner’s car did not violate the takings clause.
Michigan's abatement scheme has not taken petitioner's property for public use without compensation. Because the
forfeiture proceeding did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, her property in the automobile was transferred by
virtue of that proceeding to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property
which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent
domain.
Case No. 229
NICANOR
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri
FACTS:
Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a vegetative state. She was sustained for several
weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. Cruzan’s parents attempted to terminate the
life-support system. State hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. Missouri Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the state’s policy over Cruzan’s right to refuse treatment.
ISSUE: W/N the Due Process Clause permits Cruzan’s parents to refuse life-sustaining treatment on their
daughte’s behalf.
RULING/MAINPOINT: NO. While individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process
Clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. Absent a clear and convincing evidence that
Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri’s actions designed to preserve
human life to be constitutional. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best
interests of incompetent patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible, the
Court upheld the State’s heightened evidentiary requirements.
NICANOR
Case No. 230
Article III Section 1, Substantive Due Process
JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA
MAINPOINT: No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always
been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public
health and welfare and public morals
FACTS: Following the death of Maricris Sioson, President Cory Aquino ordered a total ban against deployment of
performing artist abroad, However after some protest the ban was removed provided that the performing artist shall
have an artist record book (ARB) before the processing of their papers. Now promoters are now questioning the
validity of the ARB requirement contending that it is discriminatory, illegal and
ISSUE: W/N requiring ARB deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law
RULING/MAINPOINT: No. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of
these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a
measure of control.
NICANOR
Case No. 231
Article III Section1 Substantive Due Process
Corona v. United Harbor
MAIN POINT: An administrative order that provides for pre-evaluation cancellation of a license is unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
FACTS: PPA issued an administrative order PPA-AO No. 04-92 limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to
one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. Respondents now contend that they are deprived due process
since there was no hearing or consultation done before the passing of the administrative order. Especially since
there is no doubt that pilotage is a property right.
ISSUE: W/N the yearly “renewal “apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 constitutes to deprivation of property without due
process of law
RULING: Yes. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after
passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could
use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
NICANOR
Case No. 232
Article III Section1 Substantive Due Process
Kelly v. Johnson
MAIN POINT: A county regulation limiting the length of county policepmen’s hair held not to violate any right
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
FACTS: Johnson, the president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, sued to challenge
regulations established by Kelley (defendant), the former commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department.
The regulations dictated the style and length of hair worn by male members of the police force.
ISSUE: W/N a deprivation of respondent’s ‘liberty’ interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle
RULING: No. State and federal employers could impose considerable restrictions on their employees that could not
be imposed on citizens outside that employment context. The Court concluded that the respondent failed to show
the regulation was so irrational that it was arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Case No. 233
Article III Section1
Substantive Due Process
Chavez v. Romulo
FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend
the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR) to avert the rising crime incidents.
Petitioner Chavez, a licensed gun owner requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines.
ISSUE: W/N revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property hence denial of substantive due process
RULING/MAINPOINT: No. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the
common good and general welfare. In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police
measure, 1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and (2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the
essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of
property rights.
NICANOR
Case No. 234
Article III Section 1 Substantive Due Process
Cruz v. Flavier
FACTS: Petitioners filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). Petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the IPRA violate the due process clause of the Constitution since it only includes the indigenous people
RULING/MAINPOINT: No. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not
mean that it is incapable of delivering justice to the non-indigenous people. A person’s possession of the trait of
impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples
are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous people for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the
concept of justice.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 235
ART III SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Smith Kline v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner herein was granted a patent for the manufacture, use, and sell of Cimetidine, which is useful as
an antihistamine and in the treatment of ulcers, by the Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer.
Years after the grant of such patent, private respondents applied for compulsory patent for the use and manufacture
of medicines using Cimetidine. That under Sec 43 (1) (e) of RA 165 or the Patent Law, that application for
compulsory patent may be issued upon the lapse of 2 year from the date of grant of such patent, provided that its
use and manufacture is necessary for public health or public safety. Petitioner oppose the issuance of this
compulsory patent to private respondent.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of a compulsory license to private respondent results in the deprivation of petitioner’s
property without just compensation.
RULING/MAINPOINT: No. It must be pointed out that as owner of Letters Patent, petitioner had already enjoyed
exclusive rights to manufacture, use and sell Cimetidine for at least two years from its grant. Even if other entities
like private respondent are subsequently allowed to manufacture, use and sell the patented invention by virtue of a
compulsory license, petitioner as owner of the patent would still receive remuneration for the use of such product in
the form of royalties.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 236
ART III SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Pareno v. COA
MAIN POINT: Since petitioner abandoned his Filipino citizenship, it is unequivocal that such vested right to receive
monthly pension has been terminated in accordance with PD 1638. Thus, due process guarantee may not be
invoked when no vested right is present.
FACTS: After retiring from the AFP and receiving pension benefits, herein petitioner, Salvador Pareno, migrated to
Hawaii and became a naturalized American Citizen. The AFP, invoking Section 27 of PD 1638 (which provides the
guidelines for AFP’s retirement and separation benefits), stopped releasing petitioner’s monthly pension. In the said
PD, those retirees who losses their Filipino citizenship will have their benefits terminated. The petitioner went to
COA and filed a claim for the continuance of his monthly pension. However, COA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1638 deprives petitioner’s right to property (receiving monthly pension) and due process
RULING: No. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. There was no denial
of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his
monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 237
ART III SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag
MAIN POINT: The due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested right has been acquired.
FACTS: Upon failure of the petitioners, who has been occupying in the disputed lots since 1978, to comply with the
requirements of the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) for the grant of loan to be paid out the land owners of the land where they have been occupying, the
Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’ Association Inc. (BATAHAI), herein respondents, delisted said petitioners and
reassigned the lots to others. Petitioners brought the case before the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC) contending that they have been deprived of due process, which sustained the action of BATAHAI to delist
them. The CA also sustained the ruling of HIGC.
ISSUE: W/N the reassignment of lots is without observance of due process of law.
RULING: No. The petitioners have been given sufficient information of the action that may result if they failed to
comply with the requirements of obtaining the loan and the period during which petitioners occupied the lots. Their
mere occupancy of the land in dispute, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to claim ownership
since it is a fundamental principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance
of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of acquisitive prescription.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 238
ART III SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
BF Homeowners’ Association v. The City Mayor, Paranaque
MAIN POINT: While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute. The
exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.
FACTS: Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 was passed converting El Grande and Aguirre Avenue inside of BF Homes
Paranaque to commercial zones. The petitioners, United BF Homeowners’ Association Inc, (UBFHAI), challenged
the said ordinance before the CA, contending that such ordinance would amount to impairment of contract between
the lot buyers and the developer which states that such lot are residential lots and will tantamount to invalid exercise
of police power
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power
RULING: Yes. Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative
body of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants.
NICANOR
CASE NO. 239
ARTICLE III SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
St. Luke’s v. NLRC
MAIN POINT: No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon an employer where the separation of an employee is
undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. Justice, fairness and due process demand that an employer
should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control.
FACTS: Private petitioner, Maribel Santos, was hired at St. Lukes in the Radiology department. After the passage or
RA 7431 which requires Radio Technicians to acquire certification before they could practice, the HR department of
St. Lukes notified Santos to comply with the requirement of the said law. For her failure to comply, Santos was
dismissed from the said hospital. Before the NLRC, a decision was ruled in favor of Santos subjecting the hospital to
pay her separation pay.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of Santos amounts to the deprivation of due process as required by law.
RULING: No. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification exposed the
hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private respondent could
not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business. Justice,
fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no
participation or control.
NICANOR
Case No. 240
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD
MAIN POINT: Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise of police power using the
due process clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may interfere wherever the public
interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
FACTS: This case challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 (R.A.
No.9257) which provides the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase
of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property,
alleging that the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstoreswill be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE: W/N the assailed section is unconstitutional for undue taking of property
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object; when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 241
Article 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Perez v. LPG 531 SCRA 431
FACTS: BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and
underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of
underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders which sets P20,000 and P50,000 as the minimum and maximum
penalties, respectively. The Department of Energy issued a circular to implement the law. Respondent filed a
petition to nullify the circular on the ground that it introduced offenses not included in the law and by providing
penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation which might exceed the maximum penalty under the law.
ISSUE: W/N the amount of imposable fine prescribed under the assailed Circular is excessive to the extent of being
confiscatory and thus offends the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING/MP: No. The Circular is not confiscatory in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis. Those penalties do
not exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which penalizes “any person who
commits any act [t]herein prohibited.” Thus, violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase “any act” as
mandated in Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate, oppressive and
impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons
subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 242
Art, 3, Section. 1: Substantive Due Process
MMDA v. Viron 530 SCRA 34
FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila, the President issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 179―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. Hence, petitioner
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing
the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass
transport terminal facilities to provide a more convenient access to the commuting public. MMDA was designated as
the implementing agency. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation assailed the constitutionality of said E.O. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted
the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process because provincial
bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use
the common bus terminals.
ISSUE: W/N the said EO is unconstitutional on the ground that it constituted deprivation of property without due
process.
RULING/MP: No. As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents’
certificates of public convenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. As such, these must
yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people. Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA
cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has been
granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does
not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure. A bus company’s certificate of public convenience
confers no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges which must yield to legislation safeguarding
the interests of the people. Note that as to deprivation of property, such act is invalid. However, the same EO was
still declared unconstitutional because it should have been the DOTC who should implement the law. MMDA has no
police power.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 243
Art. 3, Section. 1: Substantive Due Process
Sec. of DND v. Manalo
FACTS: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being
members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured
by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, respondents recognized their abductors as members of
the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their
brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture
and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
ISSUE: W/N the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.
RULING/MP: Yes. “The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence.” While the right to life
under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution guarantees essentially the right to be alive, the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life; In a broad sense, the right to security of
person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation, including the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it
is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of
life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.”
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 244
Art. 3, Section. 1: Substantive Due Process
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
FACTS: R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses. In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit DDB
and PDEA from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm on the ground that the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can
be used to harass people.
ISSUE: W/N the assailed sections of R.A. 9165 should be struck down as unconstitutional for violating the due
process clause.
RULING: No as to paragraphs (c) and (d) covering students of secondary and tertiary schools and those
covering officers and employees of public and private offices. The Court deduced that schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students and that they have the right to impose conditions
on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. As to employees and officers, the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional. Yes as to paragraphs (f) and (g) covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses and candidates for election. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. Drug testing
in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy. As applied to electoral candidates, the requirement is
unconstitutional because it adds to the exclusive qualifications for such offices as prescribed by the Constitution. In
the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless; To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 245
Art 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92
FACTS: The SJS sought to compel respondent former Manila City Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
which reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial, and directed the owners and operators
of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses, which
included the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron. The oil companies sought for the
nullification of the ordinance, contending that it is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of
pesos in the depot; it has discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals; and that it contravenes RA
7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998) which
vests upon the Department of Energy the jurisdiction over the administration of the oil companies.
ISSUE: W/N the Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional.
RULING/MP: YES. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only comply with the procedural requirements of
law but also with the ff. substantive requirements: it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Such are satisfied in the case at bar. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in
the exercise of its police power. It is not unfair nor oppressive as the properties of the oil companies remain theirs
and only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial
zone. It was not partial nor discriminatory as there was reasonable classification because unlike the depot, the
surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in
those areas would be nothing compared to the damage in the depot itself. Further, the ordinance does not violate
RA 7638 and RA 8749 as nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the
exercise of its police power.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 246
Art. 3, Section 1. Substantive Due Process
SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
FACTS: The SEC received reports that Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) failed to make timely public
disclosures of its negotiations with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). SEC later issued an Omnibus Order where it
created a special investigating panel to hear and decide the case in accordance with the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED) Rues of Practice and Procedure. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure did not comply with the statutory requirements contained in the Administrative Code of
1997, as it affords a party the right to be present but without the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against
him, in violation of Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: W/N the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V thereof failed to provide
for the parties’ right to cross-examination.
RULING/MP: NO. Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that subject to the
requirements of due process, proceedings before the PED of the SEC shall be summary in nature not necessarily
adhering to or following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in the courts of law. Further, PED exercises powers
which are investigative in nature and Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code affects only the
adjudicatory functions of administrative bodies. In proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence. Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be
cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. In order to comply with the requirements of due
process, what is required, among other things, is that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity to
appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 247
Art 3 Section 1. Substantive Due Process
People v. Siton 600 SCRA 476
FACTS: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano, charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202
(2) of the RPC, question the constitutionality of the said provision, claiming that the definition of the crime of
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the
definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts, thereby
violating their constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process .The lower court declared Art 202 (2) as
unconstitutional. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC committed a reversible error in declaring unconstitutional Article 202 (2) of the RPC.
RULING/MP: YES. In exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule
of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as
the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application, violates the first essential requisite of due process of law. The said underlying principle
that Article 202 (2) fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here
because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. This
principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 248
Art 3, Section 1. Substantive Due Process
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila 576 SCRA 416
FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. Petitioners argue that the
ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. They contend
that it is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement, is an invalid
exercise of police power, and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. RTC declared it
unconstitutional but upon appeal to the CA, the ruling was reversed. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the City Ordinance No. 7774 is constitutional.
RULING/MP: NO. The primary constitutional question in the instant case is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. Specifically,
substantive due process inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person
of life, liberty, or property. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out more than twice a
day. A person in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex
or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 249
Art 3, Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) v. Romulo 614 SCRA 605
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 which imposes minimum corporate
income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as
ordinary assets. Petitioner claims that the MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if
there is no realized gain, because said provision is pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross
income, which is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized
gain. Petitioner also avers that the imposition of CWT on real estates deprives its members of their property without
due process of law because, in their line of business, gain is never assured by mere receipt of the selling price. As a
result, the government is collecting tax from net income not yet gained or earned.
ISSUES: (1) W/N the imposition of the MCIT on domestic corporations is unconstitutional and; (2) W/N the
imposition of CWT on income from sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets is unconstitutional.
RULING/MP:
(1) NO. The due process clause may properly be invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a revenue
measure when it amounts to a confiscation of property. Certainly, an income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory
if it taxes capital because capital is not income. However, the MCIT is not a tax on capital but is imposed on
gross income which is arrived at by deducting the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the
cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.
(2) NO. The CWT is creditable against the tax due from the seller of the property at the end of the taxable year. The
seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is less than the taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that is
not due so there is no confiscation of property repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due
process. More importantly, the due process requirement applies to the power to tax. The CWT does not
impose new taxes nor does it increase taxes. It relates entirely to the method and time of payment.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 250
ART 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Southern Hemisphere v. ATC 632 SCRA 146
FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007).
Petitioners assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with
no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrine vagueness
find no application in the present case.
ISSUE: W/N a penal statue may be assailed for being vague.
RULING/MP: YES, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. In this jurisdiction, penal statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only “as applied” to a defendant. This means that
in determining the constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. Absent of an actual
or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally
impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with violation of the assailed
law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 251
ART 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo 630 SCRA 211
FACTS: Melissa Roxas is enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines. After doing survey work in Tarlac,
Roxas and her companions rested. While they were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly
entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is
being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. She was
interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. Eventually, Roxas
was released. After her release, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before
the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the
belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in a Writ of Amparo petition.
RULING: NO. The doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of
the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo
petition, is legally inaccurate. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect agreement. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 252
ART 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Meralco v. Lim 632 SCRA 195
FACTS: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She
was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the premise that
the transfer was a denial of her due process. She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond,
she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to Meralco’s omission of providing her with details about
the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the
data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of Lim’s right to privacy.
RULING: NO. There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent said that the letters were mere
jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to real intent of management.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment
to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does
not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Respondent was concerned with her
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 253
ART 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Pollo v. Karina Constantino GR 181881, October 8, 2011
FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received a document from an anonymous source, making her
aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all
the files of the computers found therein. Respondent found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents
that are related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. He asserted
that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the
complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials).
ISSUE: W/N the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to privacy.
RULING: NO. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work
computer. He did not have a separate office space, nor did he use a password for his computer. The CSC
also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything
on their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use. The validity of the seizure of the files should
be limited to the need for determining whether or not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of the
Commission for personal purposes and should not extend to the reading of the files’ contents, which would be
violative of his right to privacy.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 254
ART 3, Section 1: Substantive Due Process
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245
FACTS: These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8042 otherwise known
as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995. RA 8042’s purpose, among others, is to set
government’s policies on overseas employment. It also establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of
the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
Assailed provisions: Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
ISSUE: W/N RA 8042 is constitutional.
RULING/MP: YES. R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work
abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of
a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 255
ART 3, Section 1: Equal Protection of The Law
People v Cayat 68 PHIL. 12, 18
FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian
tribes, was found guilty of violating Act No. 1639 which prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of a
non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the constitutional right to the equal protection of the law in specifically classifying
non-Christian tribes in the prohibition provided for under the said law.
RULING/MP: No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing and
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 256
Art. 3, Section 1: Equal Protection of The Law
Ichong V Hernandez 101 PHIL 1155
FACTS: Petitioner and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected assails
the constitutionality of the RA 1180 or An Act to Regulate the Retail Business contending among others that
contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law for prohibiting non-filipino citizens to engage directly or indirectly in retail trade.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the right of the petitioner to equal protection of the law.
RULING/MP: No. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 257
Art. 3, Section 1: Equal Protection of The Law
Villegas v Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
FACTS: Respondent herein assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibits aliens from being
employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00 on the ground among others that t is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being
applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution which had been ruled in favor of the former by the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 6537 is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in
a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The guarantee of equal protection of laws includes the means of livelihood. The shelter
of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 258
Art. 3, Section 1: Equal Protection of The Law
Dumlao v COMELEC 96 SCRA 392
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution by prohibiting any retired
elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
ISSUE: W/N Section 4 of BP 52 is unconstitutional for violating equal protection of laws.
RULING/MP: No. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies". In fine, it bears reiteration that the
equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribed is a classification which
is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification
based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all Chose belonging to the same class.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 259
Art. 3 Section 1: Equal Protection of the Law
Goesart v Cleary 335 US 464
FACTS: Valentine Goesaert owned a bar inside the city of Michigan which had a law prohibiting females unless
she be "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor establishment from getting a bartender's
license. Goesaert challenged the law, and the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. She argued that the
law violated her 14th Amendment rights under the equal protection clause, which required that the state government
treat everyone equal under the law.
ISSUE: W/N the subject law violated the equal protection of the law clause.
RULING/MP: No. The Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the
legislature to protect female bartenders, the court cannot second-guess the legislature and decide that the
real purpose here was for male bartenders to monopolize the industry.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 260
Art 3, Sec 1: Equal Protection of the Law
Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City Feb. 7, 1968
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an ordinance imposing “on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under
protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.. Said company filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint
against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court
rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of
uniformity of taxation, were infringed
RULING/MP: YES. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance
does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. At the time the ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar
central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot
be subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. As the entity to
be levied upon. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is
based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present;
and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
REYES
CASE NO. 261
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review
BASCO VS PAGCOR
MAIN POINT: A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1
of the Constitution.
The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same
FACTS: In 1977, PAGCOR was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the
power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s
power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Atty. Humberto
Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. Basco et al argued that PD 1869
violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
ISSUE: W/N PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
RULING: No. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended
by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions,
while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional. Basco ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.”.
REYES
CASE NO. 262
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
MAIN POINT: To give a more favoured treatment to one, de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to
indulge in invidious discrimination.
FACTS: Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign
loans by various banks. The banks required that their loans be fully covered by absolute and unconditional guarantee
from PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was composed of private respondents Bondoc, et.al. He misused the
proceeds of the loans to other uses and/or appropriation, then for his own personal benefit.
Congressman de Venecia’s group of companies was unable to service these foreign loans and this compelled
PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor. A case was filed against the De Venecia, Bondoc and et al.
However, Bondoc’s complaint or case was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause in the dismissal of the complaint to Bondoc.
RULING: Yes. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. De Venecia Jr, and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated. To give a more
favoured treatment to one, de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in invidious
discrimination.
REYES
CASE NO. 263
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review
HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
RA 6975 provides that upon filing of a complaint against a PNP member for grave felonies, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.
FACTS: Petitioner Himagan, a policeman, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and attempted murder
of Bernabe Machitar. After the information were filed, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until termination
of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, or DILG Act of 1990, Petitioner contended that his suspension should
be limited to ninety (90) days, which was denied by the judge, pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the
accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. Petitioner claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.
ISSUE: W/N the imposition of the preventive suspension of over 90 days against the petitioner violates his constitutional
right to equal protection of laws.
RULING: No. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The special law for police officers is justified by their
status.
REYES
CASE NO. 264
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can
quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the activities that circulate around
the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the
Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.
RULING: NO. There can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. Also, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took
into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings.
REYES
CASE NO. 265
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
TELEBAP, GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.Petitioner contended that: While Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC
free of charge. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC TIME denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws, and that it constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
RULING: NO. The said provision expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should be considered as part of the
public service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public
information and education under their respective franchises or permits. As radio and television broadcast stations
do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
REYES
CASE NO. 266
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
Tiu v. CA
FACTS: RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other productive uses. Section
12 granted special privileges to the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which includes the City of
Olongapo, Municipality of Subic, and the Lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base. EO 97 was issued to clarify the
application of the incentives.
Sec. 1 - tax and duty-free importations shall only be applied to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by
business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods are subject to the taxes and
duties under Philippine laws.
Section 1.1 - enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the business and enterprises and residents within the
presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the first two component cities as provided for by RA 7227.
ISSUE: Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?
RULING: NO. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class. The real concern of Republic Act 7227 is to convert the lands
formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas.
REYES
CASE NO. 267
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881) contending that it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its classification of
persons running for office is not a valid classification. Petitioners also argue that Section 67 effectively shortens
the terms of office of elected officials, in violation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The COMELEC asserts that the classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on
substantial distinction. It points out that incumbents running for the same position are not considered resigned
because the intention of the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in
the delivery of essential services.
REYES
CASE NO. 268
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
De Guzman, et. al v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act of 1996. Which states No Election
Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who has served
for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new
station outside the original congressional district.
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from
holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING: NO. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.
The singling out of election officers in order to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
REYES
CASE NO. 269
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
People v. Mercado, et. al. November 29, 200
FACTS: The accused, members of the PNP, kidnapped one Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and subjected him to
extreme/brutal physical violence, and thereafter hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed Buama who thereby sustained mortal
wounds which directly caused his death. The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping
with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty
and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting
the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty impugns the constitutional right to equality before the law.
RULING: No. Anyone, regardless of his economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be
perceived imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law,
and procedural rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law.
REYES
CASE NO. 270
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689
MAIN POINT: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offence.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of equal protection of the law.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for
valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
REYES
CASE NO. 271
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
PEOPLE V. PIEDRA, 350 SCRA 163
FACTS: Accused-appellant Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the
constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. Appellant invokes the equal protection clause in her
defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application
forms and even received payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained
scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional
origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguena, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga
City.
ISSUE: WON equal protection of the law was denied to the appellant.
RULING: No. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not,
by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Furthermore, the
presumption is that the prosecuting officer’s regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only
by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.
REYES
CASE NO. 272
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING
MAIN POINT: The Court finds the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires that persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries.
FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and temporary residents. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local- hires. Petitioner claims
that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: WON the practice is constitutional.
RULING: No. The court held that there was no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by “foreign hires and
“local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers. While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform
the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
REYES
CASE NO. 273
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS’N V. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
MAIN POINT: The concept of relative constitutionality. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance,
be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one
time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions
FACTS: Petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The provision in R.A. 7693 (The Central
Bank Act) creates two classes of employees in the BSP. Petitioner posits that the classification violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its
continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law?
RULING: YES. It cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the BSP rank-and-file employees and those of
other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) . These rank-and file employees are similarly situated; thus, the
classification made in the Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular
circumstances of each GFI.
REYES
CASE NO. 274
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
YCASUEGI V. PAL, 569 SCRA 467
MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
FACTS: This case talks about an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company. He argues that he was discriminated against because other overweight
employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a
convenient excuse to discriminate against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was duly discriminated against when he was dismissed while other overweight cabin
attendants were either given flying duties or promoted.
RULING: No. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and
the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal
protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.
REYES
CASE NO. 275
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
SJS v. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92
FACTS: Respondent Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified certain areas from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operation within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. The oil companies take the position that the
ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is
congested with buildings and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code, and Health and
Sanitation Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is partial and discriminatory
RULING: No. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. Here, there is a reasonable classification. We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to
prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is
not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing
compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself.
REYES
CASE NO. 276
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with Falsification of Public Documents and
Misconduct relative to the anomalous purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer. Office of the Ombudsman ordered his
preventive suspension. Gobenciong parlayed the theory that the application of RA 6770 which authorized the
Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative
Code (which limits the disciplining authority to imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days)
violates the equal protection guarantee.
ISSUE: Whether or not application of RA 6770 violates the equal protection guarantee
RULING: No. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that there is a
substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
REYES
CASE NO. 277
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
MIAA v. Olongapo, 543 SCRA 269
MAIN POINT: Although the law be fair on its face and impartial on its appearance, yet if applied and administered by the
public authorities charged with their administration with an evil eye and unequal hand so as to practically make unjust and
illegal determination, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
FACTS: MIAA did not renew the janitorial and maintenance service contract of respondents Olongapo Maintenance
Services Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services Inc. (TCI) but instead awarded such contract to a new service contractor
through a negotiated contract and without the benefit of public bidding. Respondents contended that such was a
violation of their right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the service contracts to new service contractor by MIAA without public bidding
violates the respondents’ right to equal protection of law.
RULING: Yes. The constitutional right of respondents to equal protection was violated by petitioner when no public
bidding was called precisely because the latter was going to award the subject service contracts through negotiation.
REYES
CASE NO. 278
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for a different treatment
of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused
FACTS: Private respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith of the US Armed Forces was convicted of the crime of rape
committed against petitioner. Pursuant to the VFA agreement, Smith’s custody was transferred to the US government and
he was transferred to the US Embassy Compound for detention. Petitioner contended that to allow the transfer of
custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different procedure for that accused which violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of custody of the accused violated the equal protection clause
RULING: No. The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule on
international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to
the extent agreed upon.
REYES
CASE NO. 279
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
League of Cities v. COMELEC, 608 SCRA 636
MAIN POINT: A law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art.
III of the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws converting the municipality covered thereby into a city
(cityhood laws) and sought to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. To the
petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption
from the standard P100 million minimum income requirement, violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not such exemption granted to respondent municipalities violated the equal protection clause
RULING: No. No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit. The fundamental right of equal protection does not
require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights and privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. It does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual difference between individuals and classes. Equality granted is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification.
REYES
CASE NO. 280
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Quinto vs COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
FACTS: A petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code as it violates the Equal Protection Clause that it unduly discriminates against
appointive officials because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective
positions. It provides that appointive officials and employees shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, which the same does not apply to elective officials.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The restriction is justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 281
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CREBA vs Romulo, G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 27(E) of RA 8424 and the revenue regulations issued by the
BIR to implement said provision and those involving creditable withholding taxes and MCIT or the imposition of 2% tax on
gross income. Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT
is being levied only on real estate enterprises and were not similarly imposed to manufacturing enterprises.
ISSUE: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD: No, MCIT applies to all corporations and the taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for
purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption,
infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently
from other business enterprises.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 282
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
NPC vs Pinatubo G.R. No. 176006 March 26, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner questions the decision of the trial court declaring NPC Circular No. 99-75 which sets the guidelines in
the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced and provides that qualified bidders are only limited to
partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely
or partly out of aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or overseas.
ISSUE: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD: No, Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of
government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Limiting qualified bidders in this case to
partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products made purely or
partly of aluminum was an exercise of discretion by the NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or used as a
subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 283
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Biraogo vs PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity and constitutionality of EO 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Petitioners contended that it violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration (ARROYO) and does not equally apply to all
members of the same class. The OSG maintains that it does not violate the equal protection clause as it was created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes, EO 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the graft and corruption of the previous
administration. The EO 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike other
investigation commissions created in the past.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 284
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
League vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008
FACTS:Congress enacted into law RA 9009, increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 was passed. Petitioners filed the present
petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes, the exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to
a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to
all similarly situated.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 285
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
PAGCOR vs BIR, 645 SCRA 338, GR 172087
FACTS: PAGCOR, for the longest time is excluded from paying taxes except from the franchise tax of 5% of the gross
revenue. Based on RA 9337 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code, 10% Value-added tax was imposed to
PAGCOR which is specifically included in BIR regulations order as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT. PAGCOR
now raises the issue of constitutionality in imposing such taxes.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9337 is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the equal protection clause embodied in the constitution
HELD: NO. Section 1 of RA 9337 excluding petitioner PAGCOR from the enumeration of government-owned and
controlled corporations exempted from corporate income tax is valid and constitutional. While BIR Revenue
Regulations insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act No. 9337.
Main Point: Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal
protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 286
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Gancayco vs Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853, GR 172087
FACTS: The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco in violation of the National Building Code of the
Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. Due to non-compliance, the demolition proceeded. The City Government of
Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. Petitioner filed a petition for TRO and RTC
ruled that ordinance was unconstitutional. CA reversed the ruling and declared that ordinance was a valid exercise of the
right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.
ISSUE: W/N MMDA illegally demolished the property and violated the owner’s right to equal protection of laws
HELD: YES. The structures were illegally demolished. Power to enforce building code is vested in DPWH, and no
showing that MMDA was delegated by the agency to enforce such power on their behalf. Instead, it merely
prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The ordinance itself clearly
states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance
Main Point: The government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 287
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Mendoza vs People, GR 183891, Oct 19, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner seeks for the reversal of the court's decision convicting him in violation of RA 8282 or the Social
Security Act. The court finds that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable doubt. However,
during the pendency of the appeal, petitioner voluntarily paid the due amount to settle his delinquency. He now then
claims that in view of RA 9903 and its IRR, the settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him to an acquittal.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner can benefit from the terms of RA 9903 and invokes equal protection clause.
HELD: NO. The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending
cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere
payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month availment period
that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903. By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner effectively
placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 288
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Bureau of Customs vs Tevez, GR 181704, Dec 6, 2011
FACTS: R.A. No. 9335 was enacted to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. BOCEA filed a petition against the respondents
contending that R.A. 9335 and its IRR violates the rights of BOCEA’s members to equal protection of laws because R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other
revenue generating government agencies which are not subject to attrition.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9335 violates BOCEA members’ rights to equal protection of laws
HELD: NO. RA 9335 does not violate equal protection of laws. Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Both the
BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 289
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Pichay vs Office of Deputy Executive Secretary
FACTS: Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members
of the LWUA Board of Trustees, due to the purchase by the LWUA of 445k shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc. The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13 (Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Investigatory and Adjudicatory
Division, Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, IAD-ODESLA).
ISSUE: W/N EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process and equal protection clause
HELD: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Presidential appointees come under
the direct disciplining authority of the President. Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the
President has the authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 290
ART III SEC 1 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Alvarez v. People
FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the Decision affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of
Section 3(e) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner contends that bad faith, manifest partiality and gross
negligence were not proven by the respondent. He stresses that there was substantial compliance with the requirements
of R.A. No. 7718, and while it is true that petitioner may have deviated from some of the procedures outlined in the said
law, the essential purpose of the law – that a project proposal be properly evaluated and that parties other than the
opponent be given opportunity to present their proposal – was accomplished. Petitioner maintains such actions are
presumed to be regular and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondent. Because all the transactions were
done by him with the authority of the Sangguniang Bayan, petitioner argues that there can be no dispute that he
endeavored in good faith to comply with the requirements of R.A No. 7718. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the
non-inclusion of all the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan denied him the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE: W/N the court failed to consider that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the right of Mayor Alvarez to the equal
protection of the laws
RULING: No. It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if
bad faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under the
circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the
pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a
crime.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 291
ART III SEC 1 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Garcia v. People
FACTS: Garcia was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for
failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as
required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713. Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by
the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive
confinement subject to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in
Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
ISSUE: W/N the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal
Protection Clause.
RULING: Yes. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 292
ART III SEC 1 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Arroyo v. DOJ
FACTS: Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. Petitioners claim that
the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist
that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the joint committee via the joint order is contrary to the due process and equal protection
clause of the constitution.
RULING: No. The Joint Committee was created for conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses during the
2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee. The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated
alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 293
ART III SEC 1 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda
FACTS: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the Section 6 of RA 8042
which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish
between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he
declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 6 of RA 8042 violates the right to equal protection of those that operate with government license or
authorities.
RULING: No. "Illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding,
makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that
section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the
appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
SAKIR
CASE NO. 294
ART III SEC 1 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Republic v. Daisy Yahon
FACTS: A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the respondent, his wife, from further abuses. In the TPO,
Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal support to the respondent. In his failure to appear before
the court with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the court has granted PPO for the respondent
against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from
his retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the
retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. The petitioner
contended that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors of the said employees in the process of
garnishment.
ISSUE: W/N the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the financial spousal
support of respondent in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
RULING: Yes. Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of the respondent. As a rule
in statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. As Section 8(g) of RA No.
9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt
Yahon. R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. The court ruled that R.A. No. 9262
rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and
prejudice against women.
SAKIR
Case No. 295
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Scope of Protection
Moncada vs People’s Court
FACTS: The petitioner was accused of the crime of treason. He alleges that he was arrested by the members of the CIC
of the United States Army at his residence. Petitioner contended that the evidence that was illegally acquired in his
domicile cannot be used against him and was not admissible in court as it violated his constitutional rights.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the seizure of documents was unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The SC concurred with the appellant's claim that he had the right to have his house respected, his
documents should not be confiscated by any authority or agent of authority, without a writ of registration duly issued.
These constitutional limitations, however, do not go so far as to exclude as evidence the documents obtained illegally or
unduly. The Rules of the Courts, Rule 123, determines which are the evidence that should be excluded, which are the
admissible and competent, and does not classify as incompetent evidence those obtained illegally. The means used in
the acquisition of the document does not alter its probative value. There is no constitutional or legal provision that
frees the accused of all criminal liability because there was no search warrant. The public vindicta demands that offenders
of the penal law be punished. Releasing the blame for the simple fact that the evidence against him has not been
obtained legally is sanctioning the crime judicially.
SAKIR
Case No. 296
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Scope of Protection
Stonehill vs Diokno
FACTS: Several judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners directed to the any peace officer, to
search certain persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of properties as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argued that items not under the
seize list were seized. An injunction was partially granted. Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized are those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the corporate officers may object to the search and seizure.
RULING: No. Petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. It is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection
from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
SAKIR
Case No. 297
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
People vs. Marti
193 SCRA 57; GR 81561, January 18, 1991
FACTS: Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes. Before being sent out for delivery, as part of standard
operating procedures, Job Reyes, husband of Anita, proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he
found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI
agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against
Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court
claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained run against Marti's constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
RULING: NO. It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes, Anita’s husband, proprietor of the courier and a private
individual, was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.
SAKIR
Case No. 298
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
Waterous Drug Corp. vs. NLRC
280 SCRA 735; GR 113271, Oct. 16, 1997
FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. She allegedly received a check
amounting to P640 representing as payment for the overpriced purchase order she made to YSP, Inc., a supplier of
medicine. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp.
ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. Catolico insist that she only received a token gift from YSP, Inc.
and argued that Saldana invaded her privacy when she opened an envelope addressed to herself. NLRC declared that
the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the check is inadmissible as evidence violating constitutional rights if privacy of communication
and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING: NO. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It clearly appears however that Catolico’s dismissal was based on hearsay information which carried
no probative value. Catolico’s dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee’s dismissal. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against
the government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.
SAKIR
Case No. 299
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
People vs. Mendoza
301 SCRA 66; GR 109279-80, Jan. 18, 1999
FACTS: Accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza allegedly shot his wife Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza which resulted in the
latter’s death. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide. Cecilia’s father,
Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s death, decided to remove pieces of property in the victim’s house
including the accused’s personal effects which included a Mission Order No. 86-580-893 that authorized the accused to
carry a Colt Revolver, .38 caliber. As a result, accused-appellant claims that these documents, which were relied as
evidence, were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers,
and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s constitutional right to privacy of communication was violated by the seizure of
his personal effects by the Father of the victim.
RULING: NO. Such right applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies. In the instant case,
the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by the accused-appellant's father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals.
SAKIR
Case No. 300
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
People vs. Bongcarawan
GR 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused boarded M/V SuperFerry 5, sailing from Manila to Iligan City. Its security officer, Mark Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about a missing jewelry. Diesmo and four other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Nothing was found after the body search. But when
requested by the security, the accused opened his Samsonite suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately
reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. Accused
was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not when the Samsonite suitcase was allegedly opened forcibly and searched without his consent is a
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: NO. In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental
function.
Salazar 301
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Probable Cause)
Henry V. US
361 US 98, November 23, 1959
FACTS: After an investigation of a theft from a shipment of whiskey, federal officers after seeing cartons placed
in a motorcar, then arrested petitioner and another man without a warrant for search or arrest. They searched the
car, and seized cartons containing radios stolen from the shipment. At the petitioner's trial for unlawful possession,
his timely motion to suppress the evidence seized was overruled and he was convicted. Petitioner was convicted of
unlawfully possessing three cartons of radios valued at more than $100 which had been stolen from the said
interstate shipment.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was probable cause for the arrest that lead to the search which produced the evidence
on which the conviction rests
RULING: No. The officers did not have probable cause for the arrest when they stopped the car; the search was
illegal; the articles seized were not admissible as evidence; and the conviction was reversed. No warrants for either
searches or arrests shall be issued except "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Dissenting view of Justice Clark):
The time at which the agents were required to have reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was committing a
felony was when they began the search of the automobile, which was after they had seen the cartons with interstate
labels in the car. The earlier events certainly disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the car, the
subsequent stopping thereof, and the questioning of petitioner by the agents.
Salazar 302
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Search)
People v. Syjuco
64 Phil 667, G.R.No. L-41957 August 28, 1937
FACTS: Respondent is alleged of the crime of fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search
warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. The validity of a search warrant
is questioned for it is based upon affidavits which contained the statement of "It has been reported to us by a person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and records.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid
RULING: No.It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents or records are being used in the commission
of fraud against the Government, and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that they are
actually being used for such purpose. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant the issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that untruthfulness could be charged thereon in case the
allegations contained therein prove false.
Salazar 303
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Search)
Alvarez v. CFI
64 Phil 33, G.R.No. L-45358, January 29, 1937
FACTS: Petitioner demands that the warrant issued by Judge Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of
accounting documents be declared illegal. He argues that Agent Almeda has no personal knowledge of the
facts and that he got it only from a “reliable source” which served as the basis for the issuance of the
warrant, and that the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search and seizure made.
RULING: NO. The search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons, a.) Because the warrant was
based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts which was
insufficient because such knowledge was not personal but merely hearsay. b.) because the warrant was issued for
the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted
against the petitioner for violation of the anti - usury law. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient that the judge is satisfied that there exist
probable cause; but when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary.
Salazar 304
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Arrest)
Webb v. De Leon
GR 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS: The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Petitioners then filed a complaint against the respondent Judge who issued warrants of arrest
against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
RULING: No. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.” Clearly, our laws reject the contention of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted “preliminary investigation” before issuing warrants of arrest against
them. In arrest cases, there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested committed it. Before issuing warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt, of an accused.
Salazar 305
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Arrest)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-64261, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984
FACTS: The Metropolitan Mail and WE Forum newspapers were searched and articles seized based on
search warrants issued based off a broad statement of the military that Burgos, Jr. “ is in possession of has
in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which are
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion.”
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
RULING: No. The reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the particularities of
the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Thus, the broad statement is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants.Probable
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched
Salazar 306
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Search)
Prudente v. Dayrit
G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989
FACTS: Police officers applied for a search warrant which was subsequently issued by respondent judge
Dayrit that Petitioner Prundente (PUP) is found in violation of PD No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms).
Petitioner assailed the validity of the search warrant
ISSUE: 1. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it is based on hearsay evidence.
2. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place & there were several
rooms.
3. WON search warrant is valid on the ground that it violated the rule that it can be issued only with one specific
offense.
RULING:
1. Yes. The police authorities had conducted continuous surveillance for several days and "gathered
information from verified sources" that the holders are not licensed to possess.
2. Yes. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended. The search warrant itself
described the place to be searched
3. Yes. the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms, etc.) the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the
failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision does not render the warrant invalid.
Salazar 307
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (For Search)
United States V Jones
January 23, 2012
FACTS: The case concerned Antoine Jones, who was the owner of a Washington nightclub when the police came
to suspect him of being part of a cocaine-selling operation. They placed a tracking device on his Jeep Grand
Cherokee without a valid warrant, tracked his movements for 28 days and used the evidence they gathered to
convict him of conspiring to sell cocaine. He was sentenced to life in prison.
ISSUE: WON the government can constitutionally install or use a GPS to track a person’s movement without a
warrant under the Fourth amendment? And whether the FBI violated Jones’ rights.
RULING: Yes. The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment which states that “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here, the
Government’s physical interference on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search.”
The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose. Warrantless GPS tracking is considered a
search and violated the Fourth Amendment., “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Salazar 308
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Who determines probable cause?)
People V. CA
G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999
FACTS: Jonathan Cerbo was charged for murder in connection to the fatal shooting of Rosalind Dy inside the
office of his father, Billy Cerbo. The information was amended after petitioner Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda
Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo as co-accused. The prosecution filed a
murder case including Billy Cerbo. The latter filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was
issued without probable cause
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against Cerbo
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to
the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The determination of
probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest, which is judicial function. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report. The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for the
purpose different from that made by the judge.
Salazar 309
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Evidence needed to establish probable cause)
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp
G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004
FACTS: NBI agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrants against Maxicorp for alleged violations
of Intellectual Property and Art 189 of the RPC(unfair competition). Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that there was no probable cause and they are general warrants. RTC found probable cause
after examining three witnesses. The CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present conclusive evidence that
Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The CA pointed out that the NBI Agent Samiano presented as
evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of Joel Diaz.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to issue search warrant
RULING: Yes. probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched. The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause. The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. Reliable
information is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant
and his witnesses.
Salazar 310
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (In General)
Nala v. Barroso
G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003
FACTS: SPO3 Alcosar applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Nala,
for violating Illegal Possession of Firearms. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash Search and
Seizure Warrant. Respondent judge denied this but ordered the return of the air rifle to the petitioner. As to the
validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and
examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a
surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
Ruling: No. the search & seizure warrant is void for lack of probable cause. While Alcosar testified before the
respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as "personal
knowledge" but only "personal belief" because neither he nor Nalagon verified or secured, a certification from the
that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.In determining the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, the examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or
pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses.
Salazar 311
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (In General)
Betoy v. Judge
AM NO. MJJ-05-1108, February 26, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Betoy charges Respondent Judge with Dereliction of Duty in an illegal possession of firearm
case. Petitioner alleged that the Search & Seizure Order was issued solely relying on mere affidavits of deponents
police officers which should be considered hearsay and that no information personally known to the Judge as
required by settled jurisprudence through examination with probing and exhaustive questions of witnesses in order
to determine probable cause. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted a Memorandum wherein it
found that respondent Judge was able to establish probable cause for the issuance of the questioned search
warrant; however, respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having failed to conduct a judicial
inquiry as to the whereabouts of the seized firearms and ammunitions, in violation of Section 12(b), Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to thoroughly examine in a manner that would sufficiently establish
the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms, the elements of which are: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same. Probable cause as
applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm and that he does not
have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of the witness nor
in the application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a
firearm. While the witness testified before the respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are
not licensed, this does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because the witness neither
verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed
to possess a firearm.
A witness testifying that firearms in possession are not licensed does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only
"personal belief" if such witness can neither verify, much more secure, a certification from the appropriate
government agency that accused was not licensed to possess a firearm.
Salazar 312
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (In General)
20th Cebtury Fox v. CA
G.R. No. 76649-51, August 19, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corp sought NBI’s assistance in the conduct of searches and
seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. The NBI conducted surveillance of the
outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and filed 3 applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned
by the respondents. The RTC issued the search warrants. The NBI raided the video outlets and seized the
items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the respondents. However, a
motion was filed by private respondents to lift the 3 search warrants issued earlier and the same was granted
by the RTC. Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the questioned search warrants after finding the
existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance and that the RTC arrived at this conclusion on the basis
of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses which were taken through searching questions and
answers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants were valid.
RULING: No. The RTC lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private respondents in the
absence of probable cause, on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search
warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers
and effects.
Salazar 313
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (In General)
Columbia Pictures v. CA,
G.R. No. 111267, September 20, 1996
FACTS: The Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of
Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia Pictures. Jingco filed a
motion to quash the search warrant but the same was denied. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to
Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. The RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled
based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. CA.
ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the Motion to
Quash Search Warrant.
RULING: No. In the recent Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals the case which resolved the same issue
involving the same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held that mindful as it is of the
ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of
20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated hence the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied
to justify the quashal of Search Warrant. Petitioners' consistent position that the search warrant was properly
issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for
determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more
evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence,
then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause. The instant case
also differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private respondent put in issue was the application of the
ruling in that case, not the conduct of the Judge in the issuance of the Search Warrant. From the records, it is
clear that the Judge observed all the requirements necessary before the search warrant was issued: he heard
the testimonies and studied the depositions of the witnesses for the petitioners on the existence of probable
cause before issuing the warrant.
Salazar 314
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
Placer v. Villanueva
G.R. No. L-60349-62, December 29, 1983
FACTS: Petitioners, the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed Informations in the city and were certified
by investigating Fiscals. Respondent Judge then set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent Judge issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to
the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the Informations to aid
him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause. A petition for certiorari with
mandamus to compel respondent Judge to issue warrants of arrest was filed by the petitioners as they contended
that the fiscal’s certification in the Informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification
for the Judge to issue warrants of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause
obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
RULING: No. Petition dismissed. The Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable
cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out
with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information,
the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution— The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Salazar 315
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
Lim v. Judge Fenix
G.R. No. 94054-57, February 19, 1991
FACTS: Congressman Espinosa and his security escorts were killed by a lone assassin. Siblante, a security
escort, survived the assassination. Lim is one of the accused for the murders. The RTC of Masbate concluded that
probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Fiscal Alfane filed with the
RTC-Masbate, 4 separate informations of murder against the 12 accused with a recommendation of no bail.
Petitioners filed a petition for change of venue from the RTC-Masbate to the RTC-Makati. The cases were raffled to
respondent Judge Felix. Petitioners filed an order requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
investigation for the personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. Respondent court denied it for
lack of merit and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
RULING: No. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is
made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause, or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. : Mere Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes and all other supporting documents
behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Salazar 316
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
People v. Inting
G.R. No. 88919, July 25,1990
FACTS: Barba, a permanent Nursing attendant, filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote
barangay without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary
investigation of the complaint, Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. He filed with
the respondent RTC-Dumaguete City a criminal case for violation of section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, before the accused could be
arrested, the trial court set aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC through its Provincial Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine the existence
of probable cause in an election offense which it seeks to prosecute in court.
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination. The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make
the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of
the Prosecutor.
Salazar 317
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
People v. Delgado
G.R. No. 93419-32, September 18, 1990
FACTS: COMELEC received a complaint for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, who
eventually recommended the filing of an information. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against
the private respondents as recommended. Private respondents filed MRs and the suspension of the warrant of
arrest on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent
court directing the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion
for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court
that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Court has the power or authority to order the Comelec Law Department to furnish said
respondent the records of preliminary investigation of the above criminal cases for purposes of determining a
probable cause.
RULING: Yes. When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation
of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court,
said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. The records of the preliminary investigation required to be
produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the
COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require
that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which
will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The refusal of the COMELEC to comply with the order of the trial
court on the ground that only this Supreme Court may review its actions is untenable.
Salazar 318
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
Allado v. Diokno
G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Alexander Van Twist.
An information was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal,
who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners.
Respondent judge Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended. Petitioners,
contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests. They
further contend that the judge did not personally determine the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where
the investigation was based from.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest of
petitioners because he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his
witnesses.
RULING: Yes. Respondent judge merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
He would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of
petitioners. Probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he
has good grounds for his action. In the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed
themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have
presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause.
Salazar 319
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
Gozos v. Tac-an
G.R. No. 11123191 , December 17, 1998
FACTS: Varez, Investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, charged respondents with murder in an information
filed with the RTC-Batangas after a shooting incident during a school party where in Dyogi, who was armed with a
handgun, were with several drunk men and were trying to force theirway to the school’s gate. Respondents,
members of the PNP, arrived and demanded from Dyogi to surrender his gun. After an altercation and fight over the
gun, Blanco fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Private respondents prayed that the Court first determine WON there is
probable cause before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner Dyogi opposed the motion. Respondent Judge
Tac-an concluded that there is probable cause for Homicide. Petitioner Dyogi moved for a reconsideration, arguing
that the crime committed was murder. Petitioner filed another MR, contending that the power to determine the
nature of the offense to be charged was vested in the Provincial Prosecutor and not in the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting another preliminary
investigation in a proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
RULING: Yes. While the power of an investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is undoubted, no
similar authority is vested in judges of Regional Trial Courts as they are not among those authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations. In this case, respondent judge conducted an inquiry, not only for the purpose of
determining whether there was probable cause to order the arrest of private respondents but for the purpose of
determining whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them as well. He did not only determine the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest, but also what the charge should be and who
should be charged. In so doing, respondent judge exceeded his authority.
Salazar 320
Art III Sec 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant (Personally determined by judge)
Flores v. Sumaljag
AM-MTJ-97-1115 , June 5, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners of the Sangguniang Pambarangay in Leyte were charged with three counts of falsification of
public documents. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination, during which the complainant, Parmis,
and his witness testified in each of the criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein
complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the complainants were arrested and detained. They were later
released on bail. The complainants later instituted an administrative case against respondent judge upon which they
raised claims and one of them is that there was no cause under the law to arrest them as the possibility of fleeing to
escape the hands of justice is remote as they are barangay officials.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest of complainants ordered by respondent was without justification of doing so in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice?
RULING: Yes. What differentiates the present rule from the previous one before the 1985 revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is that while before, it was mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused if he found probable cause, the rule now is that the investigating judges power to order the arrest of
the accused is limited to instances in which there is a necessity for placing him in custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. The arrest of the accused can be ordered only in the event the prosecutor files the case and the
judge of the Regional Trial Court finds probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, in Mantaring v. Roman,[7] we reprimanded a judge in a preliminary investigation for issuing a warrant
without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody in order to prevent a frustration
of justice. In this case, it appears that respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest solely on his finding of
probable cause, totally omitting to consider whether it was necessary to do so in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice
TALAVER
Case No. 321
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, No. L-32409 February 27, 1971
MAINT POINT: Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. The determination of whether
or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
FACTS:
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., petitioned to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued for violation of
Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case so he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions and she read her stenographic notes to him. Afterward,
Judge Ruiz asked the respondents to take the oath and warned about perjury. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then
signed by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is null and void?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the issued search warrant was void. The examination of the complainant and
the witnesses, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. It is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. In the case at bar, no personal examination at all
was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and his witness. So the search warrant is declared null and
void.
Case No. 322
Personal Examination by the Judge
Soliven v. Makasiar, GR 8287, Nov. 14 1981
MAINT POINT: In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
FACTS:
Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President
sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the respondent judge complied with the prescribed procedure for
the issuance of warrants of arrest, pursuant to SC Circular No. 12. Hence, Beltran’s rights were not violated.
Case No. 323
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310, No. L-27511 November 29, 1968
MAINT POINT: No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
FACTS:
Simon Luna appeals the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, dated April 20, 1967 that
dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for the charge of murder of the victim Jaime Diaz Ng. The murder
complaint was supported by sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of questions and
answers taken by T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing
of the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the
questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared that the answers were
made by them, true freely and voluntarily made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge’s order was valid?
RULING: Yes. The Court found that the trial Judge committed no error when he held that, based upon the
facts shown during the hearing of this case. In the instant case, as stated above, the respondent Municipal
Judge personally examined under oath the witnesses by asking questions, that were adopted from a previous
investigation, and considered by him as sufficiently searching and which questions and the answers thereto were in
writing and sworn to before him prior to his issuance of the order of arrest. Thus, the search warrant order was valid.
Case No. 324
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Kho v. Judge Makalintal, GR 94902-06, April 21, 1999
MAINT POINT: In the absence of any showing that the judge was recreant of his duties in connection with
the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the
reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.
FACTS: BENJAMIN V. KHO AND ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the
objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return
immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment,
handsets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.
ISSUE: Whether or not subject search warrants were issued without probable cause?
RULING: Yes. The Court held that there is no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by
the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. In the case at bar, The Judge was the one
who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the
applications for search warrants. It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search
warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
Case No. 325
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Narciso Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, No. 45358 January 29, 1937
MAINT POINT: If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is insufficient, the judge must require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
FACTS:
Narciso Alvarez assails the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the
search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and
papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later
date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was illegal?
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the warrant issued is illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of
the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
insufficient, the judge must require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge
is satisfied that there exists probable cause. In the case at bar, the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay so the affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Therefore,
that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no
personal knowledge of the facts.
Case No. 326
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Bache v. Cruz, 37 SCRA 823
Same case as Case No. 321
MAINT POINT: Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
FACTS:
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., petitioned to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued for violation of
Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case so he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions and she read her stenographic notes to him. Aftewards,
Judge Ruiz asked the respondents to take the oath and warned about perjury. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then
signed by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is null and void?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the issued search warrant was void. The examination of the complainant and
the witnesses, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. It is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. In the case at bar, no personal examination at all
was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and his witness. So the search warrant is declared null and
void.
Case No. 327
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Borlongan v. Pena, GR 143591, Nov. 23, 2007
MAINT POINT: For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally determine the existence of
probable cause.
FACTS:
In a Resolution dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty
of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part
of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to
dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest
were properly issued?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of probable
cause. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence
with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. Simply put, the judge must
personally determine the existence of probable cause.
Case No. 328
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
People v. Mamaril, GR 147607, Jan 22 2004
MAINT POINT: The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and to attach them to the record.
FACTS:
SPO2 Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family
residence of appellant Mamaril. The results of this search warrant led to the RTC finding Benhur Mamaril guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. This rendered the search warrant
invalid.
Case No. 329
PERSONAL EXAMINATION
Ortiz vs. Palaypayon, 234 SCRA 391, A.M. No. MTJ-93-823 July 25, 1994
MAINT POINT: No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
FACTS:
Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is administratively charged with
gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression relative to the complaint for damage to
property thru reckless imprudence on May 19, 1993 involving a collision between a Toyota Corolla owned by one
Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck owned by one Juliana Lu which
was entrusted to herein complainant, and then driven by one Rodrigo Vasquez. Judge Palaypayon issued an order
for the arrest of accused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David Ortiz, on the basis of mere
affidavits by the offended party and without conducting the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Palaypayon is guilty of ignorance of the law?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that he is guilty due to the lack of preliminary investigation conducted. Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the case at bar, Judge Palaypayon did not personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause as mandated by law. He simply ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural
due process. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to hold him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Case No. 330
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, No. 23051 October 20, 1925
MAINT POINT: The law, constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless
the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized.
FACTS:
Veloso, a congressman and the manager of the Parliamentary Club alleged to be a gambling house, was found
guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of authority. Detective Geronimo applied for and obtained a search
warrant from Judge Garduño to search the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila. Once inside
the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was Congressman
Veloso who resisted arrest because the warrant indicated a John Doe and that the police had no right to search the
house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the John Doe warrants are valid?
RULING: Yes. Those warrants are valid. John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The
police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult
enough to perform under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to a technicality or far-fetched judicial
interference.
Case No. 331
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, No. 45358 January 29, 1937
MAINT POINT: The affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether
probable cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvarez asks that the warrant issued by Judge Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of certain
accounting documents at any time of day and night as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized be declared illegal and set aside and the items be returned to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure warrant is valid?
RULING: No. It is not valid. Pursuant to Section 2, of Article III of the Constitution, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In the case at bar, the affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the
oath was made. Therefore, the Court held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner
was subjected.
Case No. 332
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, No. L-69899 July 15, 1985
MAINT POINT: Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized
FACTS:
Rommel Corro filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to review the order of Judge Esteban Lising of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. XCV. On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge
Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary
Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of
Philippine Times paraphernalia, under the crime of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said warrant is valid?
RULING: No. The Court found no basis for the issuance of the search warrant, absent of the existence of probable
cause. A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the
case at bar, the search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable. WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29,
1983, is declared null and void.
Case No. 333
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Pangandaman vs. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, No. L-71782 April 14, 1988
MAINT POINT: Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized
FACTS:
The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the
respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional
provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the John Doe arrest warrant is valid?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.”
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could
or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional
and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.
Case No. 334
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
MAINT POINT: Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the
business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal,
contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly
described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
FACTS:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and or the corporations of
which they were officers, to search books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers), for violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants, and the searches and seizures made are valid?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the search warrants, searches and seizures are invalid. The Constitutional
mandates: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at
bench, none of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. They violate the Constitution,
and hence, are invalid.
Case No. 335
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People vs. Martinez, 235 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 105376-77 August 5, 1994
MAINT POINT: Regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating his first
name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against the accused-appellant, having been
obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was charged with (1) violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act and possession of illegal firearms in the Zamboanga City RTC after a buy bust operation. The
accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search warrant issued in connection with the
buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wrong name in the search warrant in a buy bust operation invalidates the search?
RULING: No. The Court held that such cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a
matter of fact the information filed identify him as “Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor,
accused.” The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-bust” operation and the ensuing search of the
premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is therefore clear that regardless of the alleged defect of the
search warrant in erroneously designating his first name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against
accused-appellant, having been obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.
Case No. 336
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)
MAINT POINT: All evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure are inadmissible in court
due to lack of specificity.
FACTS:
An agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed
that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. They then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of
Windows, Using it as evidence. a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer
unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a
case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with
respect to the objects to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL WARRANTS”?
RULING: Yes. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in
any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
Case No. 337
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 890
MAINT POINT: Typographical error in specifying the address to search is not sufficient to invalidate a
search warrant where the address intended to be searched also appears on the face of the warrant
FACTS:
The military applied for a search warrant for 2 addresses of the newspaper WE Forum: 728 units C, RMS Building
Quezon Avenue, QC and No 19, Road 3, Project 6, QC 2 warrants nonetheless were made of the RMS Building
address. The search of the latter is sought to be invalidated on the ground that the place was not sufficiently
described.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant sufficiently described place is enough to invalidate the search warrant?
RULING: No. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. In determining the sufficiency of the
description of the address, the executing officer’s prior knowledge of the intended in warrant is relevant. In this case,
the executing officer was also the affiant on whose affidavit of the warrant had been issued. Therefore he knew
where the addresses referred to.
Case No. 338
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Frank Uy v. BIR , 344 SCRA 36
MAINT POINT: The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community.
FACTS:
A certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing
Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code. 3 search warrants were issued for different violations. The authorities searched in the
premises. Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their nullification.
They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as
inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. They
claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners,
render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place invalidates the warrant?
RULING: Not if the place if properly described (Bernas p.47) The rule is that a description of a place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out
the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement. In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City.
Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of Petitioner Corporation.
That Search Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premise to be searched is, is not a
defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.
Case No. 339
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA GR 126859 Sept. 4 , 2001
MAINT POINT: Items recovered without particularity of description in search warrant cannot automatically
be used as evidence.
FACTS:
Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in
Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police found unlicensed
firearms and explosive and a caliber in Apartment 8 in the same area. Petitioners contend that the search and
seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights because the place searched and articles seized
were not described with particularity. Solicitor General avers that the search of Apartment 2 was legal, and the
items seized therein are admissible in evidence. However OSG agrees with petitioner since there was no mention of
Apartment No. 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not items recovered from Apartment no. 8 cannot be used as evidence?
RULING: Yes. We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their right to raise any attack
on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file a motion to quash. But, in conducting
the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the search warrants, the
police committed a gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that the gun seized in Apartment
No. 8 cannot be used in evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized in
Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Case No. 340
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. CA – 291 SCRA 400
MAINT POINT: The Constitution requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant
issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. An
application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang
Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served
not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the
arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been unreasonable search and seizure committed by the police for having
searched a place that is different from that stated in the warrant and that there was only a typographical error in the
address?
RULING: Yes. The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an “obvious typographical error”
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, but the search of a place different from that clearly
and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 341
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Paper Industries v. Asuncion
FACTS: Police inspector Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City. After having the joint
deposition, Judge Asuncion issued the contested warrant against Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP), herein petitioner, by only stating “PICOP COMPOUND”, Thus, an appeal is made by herein petitioner to
quash the warrant made by Judge Asuncion on the ground that it does state particularity the place where such
warrant is to be enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement “PICOP COMPOUND” complies with the particularity description in a search
warrant as required by the constitution.
RULING: No. The warrant only contains PICOP compound, which has multiple building and structures. The warrant
failed to indicate what building or particular location in that compound where the search warrant is to be made.
In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and
the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 342
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Malalaon v. CA
*an issue regarding RTC’s territorial jurisdiction to issue a warrant, outside the topic.
FACTS: An application for a search warrant was made by Lt. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Center before the
RTC of Kalookan City. That a violation of PD 1866 or the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is
perpetrated at Newport, Quezon City. After the search, herein petitioners argue that the warrant was issued
outside their jurisdiction, that only the RTC located in RTC may issue such warrant because it is the only court
that has jurisdiction over the area where the search warrant was initiated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizance of an application of a search warrant in connection with an
offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue warrant to conduct a search on a place
likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. Petitioners argument that the search warrant is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing judge
is erroneous. It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial
agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties
and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if
compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application
therefor in and obtain the same.
Note: A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court.
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the
crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the
commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances,
another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 343
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. Estrada
FACTS: A search warrant was made and 52 boxes of drugs were confiscated. In the search warrant, it failed to
indicate whether such drugs are fake, misbranded, adulterated or unregistered. The accused now asking for
the return of such drugs on the ground that there was an unreasonable search warrant for the warrant to failed to
particular indicate the item to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invalidity of the warrant, for failure to particularly indicate the item to be seized, is subject
to the return of the confiscated drugs.
Ruling: No. Although the search warrant was declared illegal for not complying with the requirement of particularity
of description in a warrant. The confiscated items cannot be returned as the possessor thereof, the accused, have
not acquired a licensed to possess the items, though they are legal.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 344
ART 3 SEC2: ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT
Salazar v. Achacoso
FACTS: Then Secretary of Labor and public respondent herein Tomas D. Achacoso issued a warrant to seized the
documents and paraphernalia used by hererin petitioner in running his illegal recruitment agency. The
warrant was made in pursuance of PD 1920 and EO 1022, which was enacted during the Marcos Era.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor may issue a warrant of search and arrest.
RULING: No. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. The 1987 constitution also made it clear under Sec 2 of
Article 3 that such warrant of search and arrest may only be done by a Judge.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 345
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) issued separate orders against private
respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their sequestration. PCGG also
issued a “Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking Corporation. On the basis of the PCGG’s order
which read in part, “you are hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the
above-mentioned premises which our representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being
conducted by this Commission,” Allied contended that this is not one for sequestration but is particularly a general
search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.
RULING: No. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in “Baseco,”
and the PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” because
Executive Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants/orders.
Only a “judge” and “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” were empowered by the
Freedom Constitution to issue search warrants.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 346
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wah, and Fuh Yan Fun v. Hon. Martiniano Vivo
FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin. She arrived in the
Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son by the first marriage. She and her minor son were permitted only into the
Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos.
Months later, she married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. To prolong their stay in the Philippines,
Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. Upon the expiration of the last extension, a letter from
the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son to leave the country upon a certain date
with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of
their bond.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the Commissioner is valid.
RULING: Yes. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of international
law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. The constitutional guarantee set forth in Article III of the
Constitution requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge does not extend to
deportation proceedings.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 347
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Sy v. Commissioner of Immigration
FACTS: Chiu Wan Hong, a Chinese citizen, came to the Philippines and was admitted as a non-immigrant or
temporary visitor. Over five (5) years later, the Commissioner of Immigration caused petitioner who now claims to be
Aurora Villamin Sy, to be arrested preparatory to proceedings for her deportation for overstaying. Petitioner
claimed that she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the warrant for her deportation is allegedly illegal or
void. Having been issued in compliance with a decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the legality
of said warrant depends upon that of said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant issued by the Commissioner is valid.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Immigration may issue a warrant of arrest only for
the purpose of carrying out a final decision of deportation or when there is sufficient proof of the guilt of the
alien.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 348
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag
FACTS: Petitioner, Lucien Tran Van Nghia, is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Originally admitted to the Philippines as a temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant based
on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines. However, petitioner has not
made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure. Respondent CID
Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being
an undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to public safety and progress.” Respondent issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner after the latter twice refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and legal.
RULING: No. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on
the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single
individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. It is essential that there
should be a specific charge against the alien to be deported and arrested.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 349
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa
FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born
Filipino citizen. William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino
citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. The then Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of
Immigration issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.
RULING: No. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole
purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of the
mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the same
was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 350
Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Harvey v. Santiago
FACTS: Petitioners Harvey, Sherman (both Americans) and Van Elshout (Dutch) were suspected alien pedophiles
after 3 months of close surveillance by the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents. Respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Warrants of Arrest against petitioners for violation of Sections 37,
45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners question the
validity of their detention as there is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.
RULING: YES. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it
must be based upon probable cause. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a
warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule
113, Section 5). The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for 3
months, which justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
Further, that petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal because they found with
young boys in their respective rooms, and Sherman was even naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents
had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion
involving children".
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 351
Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Ho v. People
FACTS: Petitioners were charged in an information with a violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the information were the resolution of Graft Investigation
Officer (GIO) Labrador and the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) Tamayo. Pursuant to such
information, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners who questioned such issuance,
alleging that in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, the Sandiganbayan
merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other
supporting evidence, in violation of Art III Sec 2 of the Constitution and settled jurisprudence.
ISSUE: May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining sufficient
evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?
RULING: NO. Art III Sec 2 states that xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce xxx. Following established doctrine and procedure, the judge
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. In the instant case, the public
respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of
the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information. It had no other documents from which to sustain its own
conclusion that probable cause exists and issued challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors
findings and recommendation.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 352
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa
FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born
Filipino citizen. William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino
citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. The then Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of
Immigration issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian
ISSUE: Whether the Board of Commissioners can issue a warrant
RULING: YES, The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue warrants to carry out a final finding of
a violation. It is issued after a proceeding has taken place. This is an exception to the rule that only a judge may
issue a warrant. the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the... existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien...
to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 353
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Material Distributions (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Felipe Natividad and Lope Sarreal
FACTS: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money judgment against petitioners Material Distributors (Phil.)
Inc. and Harry Lyons, and filed a motion for the production and inspection of the books or papers of said petitioners,
which the respondent Judge granted and consequently required the petitioners to produce the same. Petitioners
argued that Sarreal is not entitled to the production and inspection of the said documents because his only
purpose, was to find out if a case of falsification has been made. Sarreal contended that the inspection of said
documents was to enable him to designate with particularity in the subpoena duces tecum, to be obtained in
connection with the trial of the case, the specific books and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments
made by the petitioners, such books and papers being material to the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production and inspection of the books and papers would violate the petitioners’ right
against unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose.
RULING: NO. The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, pertain to
a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of books and documents in
question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent Judge
placed them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. Sarreal has an interest in the books and
documents in question because such contain evidence material to the matters involving the issues between him and
petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial
court. Rule 21 of the Rules of Court: xxx Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court may (a)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection of any designated documents, papers, books oraccounts which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody
or control xxx
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 354
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (U.S. Case)
NOTE: Walling was the federal official authorized by law to investigate whether certain businesses were acting
consistently with the Federal Labor Standards Act.
FACTS: The instant case concerns Administrator Walling’s right to judicial enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum
(an order to compel the production of documents). The subpoenas sought the production of specified records to
determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards Act. Petitioners, newspaper publishing
corporations, refused to have their books and records examined, claiming that the enforcement of the
subpoenas would permit the Administrator to conduct general fishing expeditions into petitioners' books,
records and papers, in order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act, without a prior charge or
complaint and simply to secure information upon which to base one, all allegedly in violation of the search and
seizure provisions
ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the subpoenas duces tecum would violate the provisions on search and
seizure.
RULING: NO. The records in the instant case present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the
question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made; and no sufficient
showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises
against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or papers without their assent,
otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law. The very purpose of the subpoena and of the
order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and procure evidence, not to prove a pending
charge or complaint, but upon which to make one. Further, petitioners were corporations. The only records or
documents sought were corporate ones and were relevant to the authorized inquiry, the purpose of which was to
determine two issues, whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it. These
were subjects of investigation authorized by Section 11(a) of the act. It is not to be doubted that Congress could
authorize investigation of these matters.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 355
ART III SEC 2: Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Camara v. Municipal Court
FACTS: A housing inspector from San Francisco’s health department entered an apartment building to
conduct a routine inspection to locate possible code violations. The building manager informed the inspector
that Camara might be using his space contrary to permitted policy. The inspector approached Camara to enter
the area, but the Camara denied entrance for lack of a search warrant. The inspector returned twice more,
again without a search warrant, and was again denied entry. A complaint was subsequently filed against Camara,
and he was arrested for violating a city code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Camara has a constitutional right to refuse an inspection without a warrant.
RULING: YES. Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant
procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to an individual. In other words,
building inspection by administrative officers shall comply with the warrant procedure.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 356
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Aminuddin
FACTS: On the basis of a tip, Aminuddin was arrested and searched upon disembarking from M/V Wilcon in Iloilo
City. The detention and search yielded marijuana. The officers were not armed with a warrant although the officers
had at least two days to obtain a warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
RULING: NO. As a general rule, an officer shall first obtain a warrant before conducting a search and seizure. In this
case, the officers had all the time to obtain a warrant.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 357
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Valdez
FACTS: Abe Valdez was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted,
cultivated and cultured 7 fully grown marijuana plants. The prosecution presented its witnesses, all members of
the police force, who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its
details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut.
They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants and arrested him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
RULING: NO. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least
1 day to obtain a warrant to search appellant’s farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could
have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six
hours and inconvenient to them.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 358
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Oliver Edano
FACTS: Oliver arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached Oliver and talked to him
inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the
appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. They chased the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to
grab Oliver, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag
from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other
members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to
the police station for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
RULING: NO. In this case, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from
it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure. Moreover, trying to run away when no
crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
TINGKAHAN
Case No. 359
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
Dale Grady v. North Carolina
FACTS: Dale Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a trial court
civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for the duration of his life.
The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure that
participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged the
constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to an unreasonable search. Both
the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of GPS monitoring bracelet constitutes a search.
RULING: YES. The Court held that participation in the North Carolina program amounted to a search because
requiring someone to wear a bracelet that tracks the person’s whereabouts constitutes a “physical occupation of
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 360
ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH?
Valmonte v General De Villa
FACTS: As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners herein aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of the checkpoints is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the
military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.