WEEK 4 L ECTURE
THE THEORIES OF REALISM,
LIBERALISM, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
Couse Instructor:
Professor Brian C. H. Fong
LECTURE OUTLINE
❑ From Theory to Paradigm.
❑ Realism.
❑ Liberalism.
❑ Constructivism.
❑ Theory In Practice.
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
❑ Theory.
▪
IR theory is the lens through which we
understand the world.
▪
Ole Holsti (1976) highlights that each IR
theory is just like a different coloured
sunglasses bringing a different perspective
to the events.
▪
All people need theories (or some form of
analytical frameworks) to make sense of the
complex world and make decisions.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
Holsti, Ole. "CHAPTER TWO. Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively". Structure of Decision, edited by Robert Axelrod, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 18-54.
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
❑ Theory.
▪
Theory is a simplifying device that
abstracts from the complex world, i.e.,
all theories simplify the complex world
by emphasizing certain factors and
ignoring others.
▪
Therefore, no single theory can capture
all the complexity of the world. Good
theories should be able to explain/predict
the world better across space and time.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
❑ Theory.
▪
Descriptive theories: Explain why
states have behaved as such in the
past and predict how they may
behave in future.
▪
Prescriptive theories: Outlines what
states should behave in international
politics.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
❑ Paradigm.
▪
Theories which share common assumptions,
approaches, and arguments can be seen as belonging
to a broad family, i.e., “paradigm”.
▪
The advantage of paradigm is that it highlights a
distinctive way of intellectual inquiry for interpreting
the complex world; Its disadvantage is that it fosters
tunnel vision, limiting creativity in intellectual inquiry.
▪
Paradigm shift: An established paradigm breaks down
and a new paradigm is being constructed.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
FROM THEORY TO PARADIGM
Realism
Constructivism
Liberalism
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
REALISM
❑ Major Argument:
International politics is a
struggle for power among
states.
❑ Theoretical Approach:
System-level theories
which highlight exogenous,
“outside-in” explanations,
i.e., State behaviours are
principally determined by
external structures in which
they are living under.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
Classical
Realism
Realism
Structuralism
Realism
(Defensive &
Offensive)
Power
Transition
Realism
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
❑ Classical Realism.
▪
Descriptive theory: Human’s will to power has
formed the basis for states’ inherent desire for
maximizing power, which in turn leads to states’
continuous struggles for supremacy.
▪
Prescriptive theory: State’s foreign policy should
be guided by hard-headed pursuit of national
interests (i.e., the well-beings of its own citizens),
rather than by universal moral principles (i.e.,
morality that applies to all states).
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
❑ Structural Realism.
▪
Descriptive theory:
Structural realism: International anarchy + security
Defensive realism: International anarchy will
compel states to prioritize security over power, and
potential balancing coalition by status-quo states
will deter power-maximizing behaviours.
Offensive realism: International anarchy will
induce states to maximize security by maximizing
their relative power, resulting in perpetual great
power competition and potential great power wars.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
❑ Structural Realism.
▪
Prescriptive theory:
Defensive realism: States should follow a
defensive realist logic of self-restraining powermaximizing behaviours and managing security
dilemma.
Offensive realism: States should follow an
offensive realist logic of making best use of every
possible chance to maximize their relative power in
the international system.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
REALISM
❑ Power Transition Realism.
▪
Descriptive theory: History is always
about the rise and fall of hegemons.
Relative power dominance by a
hegemon will foster geopolitical
stability; While relative power parity
between a rising challenger and a
declining hegemon will lead to
geopolitical rivalry and most often
catastrophic wars.
▪
Prescriptive theory: NO explicit policy
prescription.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LIBERALISM
LIBERALISM
❑ Major Argument:
International cooperation is the
consequence of states’ economic,
political, and institutional
structures.
❑ Theoretical Approach:
Unit-level theories which
highlight endogenous, “insideout” explanations, i.e., State
behaviours are principally
determined by the internal
characteristics of the states.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LIBERALISM
Economic
Liberalism
Liberalism
Democratic
Peace
Liberalism
Institutional
Liberalism
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LIBERALISM
❑ Economic Liberalism.
▪
Descriptive theory: A higher level of
economic interdependence among
states fosters international peace, as
economic-oriented trading nations are
unlikely to take aggressive actions
against each other (i.e., economic
structure matters).
▪
Prescriptive theory: The maintenance of
a liberal economic order that promotes
free trade is a key to international peace.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LIBERALISM
❑ Democratic Peace Liberalism.
▪
Descriptive theory: Democratization
will promote international peace, as
democracies are inherently more
peaceful than autocracies and they will
not fight against each other (i.e.,
political regime matters).
▪
Prescriptive theory: A world with more
democracies will be a safer world than it
otherwise would be. Thus, democracy
promotion should form the very core of
the West’s foreign policy objectives.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LIBERALISM
❑ Institutional Liberalism.
▪
Descriptive theory: Rule-based
international system, which prescribes
acceptable and unacceptable forms of
state behaviours, will foster
international cooperation and constrain
state revisionism (i.e., international
institution matters).
▪
Prescriptive theory: Multilateralism
through international and regional
institutions should be encouraged to
foster international peace.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
CONSTRUCTIVISM
CONSTRUCTIVISM
❑ Major Argument:
There is no objective political reality
independent of our understanding of it;
People “construct” the world in which
they live and act according to those
“constructions”.
❑ Theoretical Approach:
Theories in-between system and unitlevels explanations, i.e., The
interaction of structures and states are
mediated by ideational factors.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
CONSTRUCTIVISM
❑ Constructivism.
▪
Descriptive theory: Socially constructed
beliefs, values, culture, and identity
structure state behaviours and their
understanding of national interests.
▪
Prescriptive theory: Countries should be
encouraged to participate in US-led
international institutions so as to make
their elites’ beliefs, values, culture, and
identity more leaning toward the West.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
IR PARADIGMS
Realism
Liberalism
Constructivism
Major Argument:
International politics is a
struggle for power among
states.
Major Argument:
International cooperation is the
consequence of states’
economic, political, and
institutional structures.
Major Argument:
People “construct” the world in
which they live and act
according to those
“constructions”.
Theoretical Approach:
System-level theories.
Theoretical Approach:
Unit-level theories.
Theoretical Approach:
Theories in-between system
and unit-levels explanations.
Heywood, A. (2011). Global Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 3.
LECTURE ACTIVITY:
THINK-PAIR-SHARE
❑ Question: In your opinion, which IR
paradigm is most suitable for
making sense of Taiwan’s current
international situations? Why?
▪
Think: Think individually about this question
first and write down your ideas on a paper.
▪
Pair: Pair up with classmate(s) sitting next to
you and exchange your ideas.
▪
Share: Share with the whole class your ideas.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The millennium debates on US-China relations.
▪
The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
The Pessimists and their predictions.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The millennium debates on US-China relations.
▪
At the millennium turn, there was an extensive
debate within the Western scholarly community
about China’s rise.
▪
Based on different arguments, Optimists predicted
that the relations between China and the US would
be constructive and peaceful (and an engagement
policy should be adopted); Pessimists predicted
a growing hostility between China and the US,
including great power war and an intense great
power competition (and a containment policy
should be adopted).
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Economic liberals.
▪
Democratic peace liberals.
▪
Institutional liberals.
▪
Constructivists.
▪
Defensive realists.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Economic liberals: Expanding trade and investment ties between China
and the US would create a strong mutual interest, thus motivating both
sides to choose cooperation over conflict.
“Western governments, and also the World Bank, appear to be acting on the assumption that interdependence--involving China deeply
in the global economy--is the safer bet. To treat China as an enemy today because of fears for the day after tomorrow could very well be
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The interdependence hypothesis is not, unfortunately, self-fulfilling, but to act on it improves its chances of
realization”.
Richardson, J. L. (1994). Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism. The National Interest, 38, 28–39.
“These shared interests in economic ties have in no small measure sustained the U.S.-China relationship …… They do so by reinforcing
the bet that Beijing’s leadership has made on globalization and on China’s incorporation into the global community. This engagement
with the international community has tended to foster greater openness in Chinese society as China increasingly adjusts its economic
policies, as well as its social and political structures, to the demands of a more market-driven world economy and to the kinds of
business practices that globalization entails”.
Hormats, R. D. (2001). Beginning the Journey: China, the United States and the WTO. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p.8.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Democratic peace liberals: Rapid economic development would expand the
Chinese middle class and create a functional need for rule of law in China, putting
Beijing on the path toward greater political liberalization and motivating it to
form a constructive partnership with Western democracies (including the US).
“China’s extraordinary integration into the international economy has made it increasingly responsive to pressure from abroad and
has brought the interests of various Chinese constituencies in line with international interests in political transparency, legal reform,
and human rights protection …… As China strives to become a beneficent regional power and a global player, international attention
will continue to influence its domestic policies”.
Economy, E. (2004). Don’t Break the Engagement. Foreign Affairs, 83(3), 96–109.
“The experiences of South Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan demonstrate that a variety of paths can lead from one-party rule toward
political liberalization …… it is in the interest of Beijing’s next generation to attempt reform. And it is in the interest of the United
States to encourage them to do so”.
Gilboy, G., & Heginbotham, E. (2001). China’s Coming Transformation. Foreign Affairs, 80(4), 26–39.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Institutional liberalists: China’s participation in international institutions
and regional institutions would increase its stake in the US-led order,
constraining Beijing to make a cost-benefit choice of working within the
existing system rather than challenging it.
“…… judging by the evolution in attitudes of key domestic policy makers and bureaucrats within China, and changes in Chinese
policies since the late 1970s, the effort of multilateral economic institutions to bring about engagement appears thus far to have been
successful in encouraging China to play by the ‘rules of the game”.
Pearson, M. M. (1999). “The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross
eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, London: Routledge, pp. 212-240.
“The United States cannot thwart China’s rise, but it can help ensure that China’s power is exercised within the rules and institutions
that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century …… The United States’ global position may be weakening,
but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century”.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23–37.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Constructivists: China’s participation in international institutions would
gradually socialize the Chinese elites’ underlying beliefs, culture, and identity
toward the liberal rules of the US-led order.
“China has undergone a socialization process to the extent that it is sensitive to the normative (as opposed to concrete material)
image effects generated by participation in institutions”.
Johnston, A. I. and Evans, P. (1999). “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and
Robert S. Ross eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, London: Routledge, pp. 241-278.
“China’s cooperation in major security institutions in the 1990s had a potentially constraining effect on its relative power. More to
the point, it proceeds from the constructivist claim that social interaction in international relations can affect actor interests in such a
way as to then change the fundamental characteristics of the normative structures that constitute the world political system”.
Johnston, A. I. (2008). Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
preface xiv.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Optimists and their predictions.
▪
Defensive realists: A rising China would be a status quo power owing to its
rational calculations of potential risks, in particular the anticipated balancing
reaction from the US and its allies.
“Chinese power is also limited by the international system itself. Nations’ balance against threats. Beijing is coming to realize, just as
Washington and Tokyo do, that for every international action it takes, an equal and opposite reaction will occur”.
Lampton, D. M. (2007). The Faces of Chinese Power. Foreign Affairs, 86(1), 115–127.
“If China’s security strategy is now firmly rooted in defensive realism, the principal implications for the United States, the Asia-Pacific
region, and the world are that the outside world can afford to take a more relaxed approach towards China’s rise and that
engagement with China is the way to go. While China may become more powerful, it is unlikely that it will use its newly gained power
to intentionally threaten other states. And if there is a security dilemma between China and another state, two genuine defensive
realist states can find a way to signal their true benign intentions and work out their differences. On that account, both China and the
world have something to celebrate”.
Tang,SP. (2008). From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy. In R. S. Ross
& Z. Feng (Eds.), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (pp. 141–162). Cornell University Press.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Pessimists and their predictions.
▪
Power transition realists.
▪
Offensive realists.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Pessimists and their predictions.
▪
Power transition realists: When China and the US approached power parity,
their hostility against each other would reach a crisis level, resulting in either a
preventive war staged by the US to forestall China’s rise or a hegemonic war
initiated by China to displace the US.
“As a new century begins, the rise of China under leaders opposed to U.S. hegemony entails the risk of a new cold war. Such
a cold war could produce crises with the intensity of the Berlin crisis of 1961 or the Cuban missile crisis of 1962”.
Copeland, D. (2000). The Origins of Major War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.3-4.
“More likely the current and future near-challenger to American dominance is the People’s Republic of China. With more than
one billion people and some of the fastest economic growth on record, China looks certain to achieve parity with the United
States early in the next century. Should China evaluate the status quo negatively (a strong possibility given the domestic
differences between China’s and America’s political and economic systems), power transition anticipates war between them”.
Kugler, J. and Lemke, D. (2000) The power transition research program: assessing theoretical and empirical advances. In M.
Midlarsky (eds.), The Handbook of War Studies II, Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, pp.129-163.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ The Pessimists and their predictions.
▪
Offensive realists: A rising China would make a run to establish a Sino-centric
order in Asia, resulting in an intense great power competition with the US.
“Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act
aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should
engage China in order to promote the latter's integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage
China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China
to promote peace around the globe. Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail.
If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make
a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic
and autarkic will have little effect on its behaviour, because democracies care about security as much as nondemocracies
do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbours nor the
United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain
China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China
and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them”.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton., pp.4.
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ Two decades after the millennium debate, which school of
thought’s prediction is correct and to what extent?
▪
Optimists: Failing to anticipate the
impact of changing relative power
distribution on their arguments of
economic interdependence
(economic liberals), democratic
transition (democratic peace
liberals), international institutions
(institutional liberals and
constructivists), and China’s selfrestraint (defensive realists).
▪
Pessimists: Adhering to a dynamic
logic of relative power distribution
which forcefully accounted for the
shift of US-China relations to the
verges of war-prone crises (power
transition realists) and intense
security competition (offensive
realists).
THEORY IN PRACTICE
❑ “In short, each of these competing
perspectives captures important aspects of
world politics. Our understanding would be
impoverished were our thinking confined to
only one of them. The ‘compleat diplomat’ of
the future should remain cognizant of
realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of
power, keep liberalism’s awareness of
domestic forces in mind, and occasionally
reflect on constructivism’s vision of change”.
Walt, S. M. (1998). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign
Policy, 110, 29–46.
LECTURE SUMMARY
❑ IR theory is the lens through which we
understand the world; and each theory
captures certain aspects of global politics.
❑ Realism, liberalism, and constructivism are
the three major paradigms in contemporary
international relations scholarship.
FURTHER READING