The Inerhandel Case (SWITZERLAND vs USA)
Recit Ready Summary
[Oct. 2, 1957] This case was instituted when the Swiss Government filed an application with the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming restitution of assets of its national, Interhandel, which had been vested
in the US during WWII under the claim that they were enemy and not neutral property. The application invoked the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (under article 36 (2) of its Statute) which both parties formally accepted.
The Court proceeds to consider the following objections. On the First and Second Objections, the Court said that
reciprocity may not be used to justify a State, in this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which
the other Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own Declaration. On the Fourth Objection, the Court held that in
challenging the seizure and retention by the United States of Interhandel assets, the Swiss Government had invoked
both general international law and a specific international act and the interpretation of the terms raised is a question
of international law which affects the merits of the dispute. Lastly, with respect to the Third Preliminary Objection
(which the Court upheld) said that this is considered one to the admissibility of the case for adjudication rather than
to its jurisdiction. US laws make available adequate remedies for the defense of their rights against the Executive
and US courts are competent to apply international law in their decisions when necessary. Further, as the character
of the principal Submission of Switzerland is that of a claim for the implementation of the Jan. 5, 1948 decision by
the Swiss Authority of Review, which the Swiss government regards as an international judicial decision, there are
no local remedies to exhaust for the injury has been caused directly to the State. Ultimately, it ruled the Swiss
application inadmissible.
Facts
[1942] The US government, under the Trading with the Enemy Act, vested almost all of the shares of theGeneral
Aniline & Film Corp. (GAF), on the ground that those shares in reality, belonged to the IG FarbenCo. of Frankfurt or
that GAF was controlled by that enemy co.
[1940] The links between the German co. & the Swiss co. were severed. The Swiss co. was named “Societe
international pour participations industrielles et commerciales S.A. (Interhandel)” & the largest item in its assets
was its participation in the GAF.
[1945] The property in Switzerland belonging to the Germans in Germany was blocked under a provisional
agreement between Switzerland, US, France and the UK.
The Swiss Compensation Office held investigations on Interhandel and the question of its character wasraised. It
did not undertake the blocking of its assets in Switzerland considering it to have been proved thatthis company had
severed its ties with the German company. For its part, the Government of the UnitedStates, considering that
Interhandel was still controlled by I.G. Farben, continued to seek evidence of suchcontrol. With these, the Swiss
Federal Authorities ordered the Office to provisionally block the assets of Interhandel.
[May 25, 1946] The Allies and Switzerland concluded in Washington an Agreement.
a. Switzerland undertook to pursue its investigations and to liquidate German property in Switzerland
through the Compensation Office, in collaboration with a Joint Commission composed of
representatives of each of the 4 Governments. In the event of disagreement between the Joint
Commission and the Compensation Office, or if the party in interest so desired, the matter might be
submitted to a Swiss Authority of Review.
b. The US Government was to unblock Swiss assets in the United States (Article IV).
c. In case differences of opinion arose with regard to the application or interpretation of the Accord
whichcould not be settled in any other way, recourse was to be had to arbitration.
[Jan. 5, 1948] The Swiss Authority of Review annulled the blocking of the Company's assets in Switzerland.
[May 4, 1948] The Swiss Legation in Washington, through a note to the Department of State, invoked thisdecision
and the Washington Accord to request US to restore to Interhandel the property which had been vested in the US.
[July 26] The Department of State rejected this, contending that the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review did
not affect the assets vested in the US.
[Oct. 21] Interhandel, relying upon the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, instituted proceedings.
[Aug. 9, 1956] A Swiss Note formulated proposals for the settlement of the dispute either by arbitration or
conciliation as provided for in the Treaty between Switzerland and the US of 193 1, or by arbitration as provided
for in the Washington Accord.
[Jan. 11, 1957] However, the US government rejected these proposals. Furthermore, in a Memorandum
appended to the Note, it was said that Interhandel had finally failed in its suit in the United States courts. Itwas
then that the Swiss Government addressed to the Court its Application instituting the proceedings.
Procedural History
1.
2.
3.
4.
The Court denied and found unnecessary Switzerland’s request for interim measures of protection.
Plaintiff filed its memorial and defendant replied with preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court.Consequently, proceedings on the merits were suspended (Art. 62 of the Rules of Court).
[Nov. 1958] US preliminary objections were heard while the Swiss government presented its
submissions in the application, pleadings, and oral proceedings. The US government re-affirmed
submissions accompanying its preliminary objections at the time of the oral proceedings which were
concerned with theobjections to the jurisdiction of the Court.
[Mar. 21, 1959] The Court, after a brief historical review of the dispute, disposed in a judgment of a
request by Switzerland for a declaratory judgment on the ground that it was inadmissible at the
present stage of proceedings (Art. 62 of the Rules).
a. The Swiss submissions asked for judgment that the Government of the United States was under
obligation to restore the Interhandel assets or else to submit the dispute regarding them to
arbitrationor conciliation under agreements to which both parties to the dispute were parties.
b. The Court then proceeded to consider the United States' objections to its jurisdiction, four in
number, one of them consisting of two parts, choosing the order to suit the convenience of its
presentation.
Issue
Whether the World Court lacked jurisdiction in this case-NO
RULING:
Objections: Lack of Jurisdiction:
First objection
There is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear ordetermine the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial
since the dispute arose before August 26, 1946, the date on which the acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction by this country became effective.
Second preliminary objection
Also, the United States Declaration, whichwas effective August 26th, 1946, contained the clause limiting the Court's
jurisdiction to disputes "hereafter arising," no such qualifyingclause is contained in the Swiss Declaration which was
effective July 28th, 1948. But the reciprocity principle . . . requires that as between the United States and
Switzerland the Court's jurisdiction be limited to disputes arising after July 28th, 1948 Otherwise, retroactive
effect would be given to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
COURTS REPLY: Reciprocity enables the State which has made thewider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court
to relyupon the reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other Party. There the effect of reciprocity ends.
It cannot justify a State, in this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the other Party,
Switzerland, has not included in its own Declaration.
Fourth Preliminary Objection Part (b)
There is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear ordetermine any issues raised by the SwissApplication or Memorial
concerning theseizure and retention of the vested shares ofGeneral Aniline and Film Corporation asinternational
law provides that these arematters within the domestic jurisdiction of theUnited States.
COURTS REPLY: The Court noted that in challenging the seizure and retention by the United States of Interhandel
assets, theSwiss Government had invoked both generalinternational law and a specific international act.
Here, the parties disagreed with the meanings of the terms “unblock” and “Swiss assets”. Switzerland invoked the
Washington Accord and argued that Interhandel's assets in the United States were coveredby the provision that
the United States "will unblock Swiss assets." US contended that the Accord related toGerman property in
Switzerland and the provision for unblocking was "of no relevance whatever in thepresent dispute."
The interpretation of these terms, including that of thearbitration clause, is a question of international law
which affects the merits of the dispute.
Part (a)
The sale or disposition of the shares vested have been determined by the US pursuant to paragraph (b) of the
conditions attached to itsacceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to be a matter essentially within
its
domestic jurisdiction.
COURTS REPLY: This only applies to the claim of the Swiss governmentregarding the restitution of the vested assets
and having regard to the decision of the Court in respect ofthe Third Objection, it is without object at the present
stage of the proceedings.
Third Preliminary Objection (upheld)
Interhandel, whose case Switzerland isespousing, has not exhausted the localremedies available to it in the
United Statescourts.
COURTS REPLY: This objection is considered one to the admissibility of the case for adjudication rather than to its
jurisdiction.
US laws make available adequate remedies for the defense of their rights against the Executive and US courts are
competent to apply international law in theirdecisions when necessary.
Further, as the character of the principal Submission ofSwitzerland is that of a claim for the implementation ofthe
Jan. 5, 1948 decision by the Swiss Authority of Review, which the Swiss government regards as an international
judicial decision, there are no local remedies to exhaust for the injury has been caused directly to the State.
Disposition
Consequently, the Court rejects the First Preliminary Objection (by ten votes to five) and also the Second
(unanimously) and part (b) of the Fourth (by 14 votes to one). The Court finds that it is not necessary to adjudicate
on part (a) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection (by ten votes to five) and it upholds the Third (:by nine votes to
six) and holds that the Swiss Application is inadmissible.
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania)
On International Responsibility
DOCTRINE: It was Albania’s duty to notify the ships proceeding through the Strait of the danger to which
they were exposed. Nothing was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, and this omission involved
international responsibility.
FACTS:
In May 1946, an Albanian battery fired at two British cruisers while such were passing southward through
the North Corfu Strait, following a channel in Albanian waters. The UK protested that innocent passage
through straits is a right recognized by international law; while Albania replied that foreign warships and
merchant vessels had no right to pass through Albanian territorial waters without prior authorization. UK,
in turn, stated that if in the future, fire was opened on a British warship passing through the channel, fire
would be returned.
Months later, in October, a squadron of British warships again entered the North Corfu Strait. The channel
they followed was regarded as safe, as it had been swept and check-swept in the years prior. However,
two of the ships struck mines and were gravely damaged. 45 died, with 42 others wounded.
After the explosions, UK announced its intent to sweep the Corfu Channel. Albania withheld its consent,
stating that any sweep taken within Albanian waters would be a violation of its sovereignty. However, the
British Navy effected the sweep and found a minefield.
The Security Council recommended that the two States submit the dispute to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Albania was responsible for the explosions, thus, responsible to pay compensation to UK
2. W/N the UK violated international law by the acts of its Navy in Albanian waters
RULING:
1. YES.
2. YES, through the sweeping of the Corfu Channel.
RATIO:
1. The Court considered two sets of facts. Firstly, the laying of the mines took place in a period in
which Albania had shown its intent to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters and in which
it was requiring prior authorization before vessels could enter. Moreover, when Albania knew of
the existence of a minefield, it did not protest against it even if it would have been a serious
violation of her sovereignty. Secondly, the existence of coastguards in Albania’s territory would
have allowed the possibility of observing the minelaying from the Albanian coast. Hence, the
laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of Albania.
As to its obligations resulting from this knowledge, it was Albania’s duty to notify the ships
proceeding through the Strait of the danger to which they were exposed. Nothing was attempted
by Albania to prevent the disaster, and this omission involved her international responsibility.
2.
Albania’s claim to make passage conditional on a prior authorization conflicts with the generally
admitted principle that States, in time of peace, have a right to send their warships through straits used
for international navigation between parts of the high seas (to which Corfu Strait belongs geographically),
provided that the passage is innocent.
As to the October passage, it was shown that the object of sending the warships through the Strait
was to test Albania’s attitude. While the two States did exchange diplomatic notes, it did not lead
to any clarification. This urged the UK to ascertain by other means whether Albania would
maintain its illegal attitude and again fire at passing ships as it did in May. Such then, constitutes
innocent passage.
However, the operation of sweeping the minefield was executed contrary to the clearly expressed
wish of Albania. It did not have the consent of the international mine clearance organizations, and
could, thus, not be justified as an exercise of the right of innocent passage. While UK claims that
the operation was based on the theory of intervention, the Court ruled that such a theory is a
manifestation of a policy of force which cannot find a place in international law. Additionally,
respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation for international relations.
In a Judgment given on April 9th, 1949, the Court held Albania responsible, under international law, for
the explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1!346, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss
of human life that resulted to the United Kingrlom. In the same Judgment, the Court concluded that it
had jurisdiction to assess the amount of the compensation, but it: was not able to do so immediately, as
certain information1 was lacking.
2. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and
to Nuclear Disarmament
Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom
On existence of a dispute
DOCTRINE:
• A dispute is "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests" between
parties. Whether a dispute exists is a matter for objective determination by the Court which must turn
on an examination of the facts. The conduct of the parties may also be relevant, especially when there
have been no diplomatic exchanges. In principle, the date for determining the existence of a dispute
is the date on which the application is submitted to the Court. Indeed, when it is stated in Article 38,
paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute that the Court's function is "to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it", this relates to disputes existing at the time of
their submission.
FACTS:
• Since the creation of the United Nations, and in line with its purposes under Article 1 of the Charter,
the issue of disarmament has been central to the Organization's concerns. In this regard, the Charter
gives three separate bodies a role in international disarmament efforts: the General Assembly (Art.
11, para. 1), the Security Council (Art. 26) and the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47, para. 1).
• By resolution 21 of 2 April 1947, the United Nations Security Council placed a group of Pacific Islands,
including those making up the present-day Marshall Islands, under the trusteeship system established
by the United Nations Charter, and designated the United States of America as the Administering
Authority. From 1946 to 1958, while under this trusteeship, the Marshall Islands was the location of
repeated nuclear weapons testing. By resolution 683 of 22 December 1990, the Security Council
terminated the Trusteeship Agreement concerning the Marshall Islands. By General Assembly
resolution 46/3 of 17 September 1991, the Marshall Islands was admitted to membership in the United
Nations.
• The Respondent is one of the founding Members of the United Nations and a permanent member of
the Security Council. The United Kingdom first detonated an atomic device in the Monte Bello Islands
off north-western Australia on 3 October 1952 and possesses nuclear weapons.
• Following extensive negotiations in the 1960s, in which both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclearweapon States participated, the NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968. It entered into force on
5 March 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995.
• The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) seeks to limit the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and provides certain rights and obligations for parties designated as "nuclearweapon State Parties
• For the purposes of the NPT, a "nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967" (Article IX.3). There are
five nuclear-weapon States under the NPT: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America. In addition, certain other States possess, or are believed to possess
nuclear weapons.
• On 24 April 2014, the Marshall Islands filed, in addition to the present Application (see paragraph 1
above), separate applications against the eight other States which, according to the Marshall Islands,
possess nuclear weapons (China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), also alleging a failure to fulfil
obligations concerning negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament.
•
The United Kingdom has raised five preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court or the
admissibility of the Application. According to the first preliminary objection, the Marshall Islands has
failed to show that there was, at the time of the filing of the Application, a justiciable dispute between
the Parties with respect to an alleged failure to pursue negotiations in good faith towards the cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament. In its second and third
preliminary objections, the United Kingdom argues that the Court's jurisdiction is precluded by
reservations in the Parties' declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The fourth
preliminary objection is based on the absence from the proceedings of third parties, in particular the
other States possessing nuclear weapons, whose essential interests are said to be engaged in the
proceedings. According to the fifth preliminary objection, the Court should decline to exercise its
jurisdiction because a judgment on the merits in the present case would have no practical
consequence.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not there exists a justiciable dispute in this case? NO
RULING:
• Under Article 38 of the Statute, the function of the Court is to decide in accordance with international
law disputes that States submit to it. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court has
jurisdiction in all "legal disputes" that may arise between States parties to the Statute having made a
declaration in accordance with that provision. The existence of a dispute between the Parties is thus
a condition of the Court's jurisdiction.
• According to the established case law of the Court, a dispute is "a disagreement on a point of law or
fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests" between parties
• The Court's determination of the existence of a dispute is a matter of substance, and not a question of
form or procedure
• Whether a dispute exists is a matter for objective determination by the Court which must turn on an
examination of the facts. The conduct of the parties may also be relevant, especially when there have
been no diplomatic exchanges.
• In principle, the date for determining the existence of a dispute is the date on which the application
is submitted to the Court. Indeed, when it is stated in Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute
that the Court's function is "to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it", this relates to disputes existing at the time of their submission.
• The Court notes that the Marshall Islands, by virtue of the suffering which its people endured as a
result of it being used as a site for extensive nuclear testing programs, has special reasons for concern
about nuclear disarmament (see paragraph 16 above). But that fact does not remove the need to
establish that the conditions for the Court's jurisdiction are met. While it is a legal matter for the Court
to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it remains for the Applicant to demonstrate the facts
underlying its case that a dispute exists (Border and Transborder Armed Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 75, para. 16).
• The Marshall Islands accepts that no bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place on these issues.
This is despite the fact that a number of bilateral exchanges, including visits by senior United Kingdom
personnel to the Marshall Islands, took place in the period prior to the filing of the Application at
which such issues could have been raised.
• The Marshall Islands relies on the statement made at the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly
on Nuclear Disarmament, on 26 September 2013 by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, "urg[ing] all
nuclear weapons states to intensify efforts to address their responsibilities in moving towards an
effective and secure disarmament". However, this statement is formulated in hortatory terms and
cannot be understood as an allegation that the United Kingdom (or any other nuclear power) was in
breach of any of its legal obligations. It does not mention the obligation to negotiate, nor does it say
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that the nuclear-weapon States are failing to meet their obligations in this regard. It suggests that they
are making "efforts" to address their responsibilities, and calls for an intensification of those efforts,
rather than deploring a failure to act. Moreover, a statement can give rise to a dispute only if it refers
to the subject-matter of a claim "with sufficient clarity to enable the State against which [that] claim
is made to identify that there is, or may be, a dispute with regard to that subject-matter"
The statement made by the Marshall Islands at the Nayarit conference on 13 February 2014 (see
paragraph 28 above) goes further than the 2013 statement, in that it contains a sentence asserting that
"States possessing nuclear arsenals are failing to fulfil their legal obligations" under Article VI of the
NPT and customary international law. However, the United Kingdom was not present at the Nayarit
conference. Further, the subject of the conference was not specifically the question of negotiations
with a view to nuclear disarmament, but the broader question of the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons, and while this statement contains a general criticism of the conduct of all nuclear-weapon
States, it does not specify the conduct of the United Kingdom that gave rise to the alleged breach. Such
a specification would have been particularly necessary if, as the Marshall Islands contends, the
Nayarit statement was aimed at invoking the international responsibility of the Respondent on the
grounds of a course of conduct which had remained unchanged for many years. Given its very general
content and the context in which it was made, that statement did not call for a specific reaction by the
United Kingdom. Accordingly, no opposition of views can be inferred from the absence of any such
reaction. The Nayarit statement is insufficient to bring into existence, between the Marshall Islands
and the United Kingdom, a specific dispute as to the scope of Article VI of the NPT and the asserted
corresponding customary international law obligation, or as to the United Kingdom's compliance with
such obligations.
None of the other more general statements relied on by the Marshall Islands in this case supports the
existence of a dispute, since none articulates an alleged breach by the United Kingdom of the
obligation enshrined in Article VI of the NPT or the corresponding customary international law
obligation invoked by the Marshall Islands.
Secondly, the Marshall Islands argues that the very filing of the Application could suffice to establish
the existence of a dispute: "nothing excludes the possibility of conceiving the seisin of the Court as an
appropriate and perfectly legitimate mode by which the injured State ‘notifies its claim' to the State
whose international responsibility is invoked". It also points to other statements made in the course
of the proceedings by both Parties as evidence of their opposition of views.
The Marshall Islands relies on three cases in support of its contention that the statements made by the
Parties during the proceedings may serve to evidence the existence of a dispute (see paragraph 32
above). However, these cases do not support this contention. In the case concerning Certain Property,
the existence of a dispute was clearly referenced by bilateral exchanges between the parties prior to
the date of the application. As stated above, although statements made or claims advanced in or even
subsequently to the application may be relevant for various purposes — notably in clarifying the
scope of the dispute submitted — they cannot create a dispute de novo, one that does not already exist
(see paragraph 43 above).
Thirdly, the Marshall Islands refers to the Parties' voting records in multilateral fora on nuclear
disarmament
In the Court's view, considerable care is required before inferring from votes cast on resolutions
before political organs such as the General Assembly conclusions as to the existence or not of a legal
dispute on some issue covered by a resolution. The wording of a resolution, and votes or patterns of
voting on resolutions of the same subject-matter, may constitute relevant evidence of the existence of
a legal dispute in some circumstances, particularly where statements were made by way of
explanation of vote. However, some resolutions contain a large number of different propositions; a
State's vote on such resolutions cannot by itself be taken as indicative of the position of that State on
each and every proposition within that resolution, let alone of the existence of a legal dispute between
that State and another State regarding one of those propositions.
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Fourthly, the Marshall Islands invokes the United Kingdom's conduct in declining to co-operate with
certain diplomatic initiatives, in failing to initiate any disarmament negotiations, and in replacing and
modernizing its nuclear weapons, together with statements that its conduct is consistent with its
treaty obligations. According to the Marshall Islands, this conduct and assertion of legality, juxtaposed
with statements of the Marshall Islands containing a complaint aimed precisely at that conduct and
the legal position of the United Kingdom, demonstrate the existence of a dispute as to the scope of and
compliance with its obligations under Article VI of the NPT and a corresponding customary
international law obligation.
The Court recalls that the question whether there is a dispute in a particular contentious case turns
on the evidence of opposition of views (see paragraphs 37, 39 and 40 above). In this regard, conduct
of a respondent can contribute to a finding by the Court that the views of the parties are in opposition
(see paragraph 40 above). However, as the Court has previously concluded (see paragraphs 49-52
above), in the present case none of the statements that were made in a multilateral context by the
Marshall Islands offered any particulars regarding the United Kingdom's conduct. On the basis of such
statements, it cannot be said that the United Kingdom was aware, or could not have been unaware,
that the Marshall Islands was making an allegation that the United Kingdom was in breach of its
obligations. In this context, the conduct of the United Kingdom does not provide a basis for finding a
dispute between the two States before the Court.
The Court therefore concludes that the first preliminary objection made by the United Kingdom must
be upheld. It follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its
Statute. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the other objections raised by the
United Kingdom.
Self-defence and state of necessity (paras. 138-141)
Article 51 of the Charter, the Court notes, recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed
attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.
The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat
which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event
invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article
51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.
The Court considers further whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity which would preclude the wrongfulness of the
construction of the wall. In this regard, citing its decision in the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), it observes that the state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law that “can only be
invoked under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied” (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 40, para. 51), one of
those conditions being that the act at issue be the only way for the State to guard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
peril.
Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests
of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that construction. While Israel has the right, and indeed the duty to
respond to the numerous and deadly acts of violence directed against its civilian population, in order to protect the life of its citizens,
the measures taken are bound to remain in conformity with applicable international law.
Israel cannot rely on a right of self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction
of the wall. The Court accordingly finds that the construction of the wall, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law.