Why Intentional Systems Are Not Sufficient
In Conditions of Personhood, Dennett argues that rationality, consciousness, and stance or as he calls it
“intentional system” are mutually interdependent, meaning you cannot attain one without the others.
And merely meeting these conditions are not adequate conditions for personhood. First, he denotes
that an intentional system is fundamental and key but not sufficient for reciprocity (respect of self and
others), just as much as reciprocity is necessary but not yet sufficient for self-consciousness, and the
same belief for self-consciousness which is necessary for moral personhood. Then, it is clear that the
metaphysical interpretation of the person is more crucial than the moral concept of the person. An
intentional system appears to be a system whose very behaviour can be predicted and explained by
observing the systems beliefs and desires. From this it is evident that if something is valued as a rational
being with mental states appointed toward objects only will be decisive on how we choose to interpret
it, but that it is dependent whether it is sensible for others to talk about believing and perceive these
things.
It is now apparent that not only humans possess intentional systems but so do many other things, such
as insects, animals, and nature. Intentional system is deemed to be very insipid, for instance it is
possible to project the idea of intentional systems on a plant who is seeking light or perceiving an insect
predicting that is going for the garbage that has been left out for days or even a computer/Artificial
Intelligence. From this it is concluded that unless we would want to treat things which are not worthy of
the title of personhood like persons, then it is better to be very specific about what the prerequisites of
being a person.