G.R. No. 150274 August 4, 2006
IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways.
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the
pertinent provision on the execution of decisions pending
appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
thus:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of
Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera Administrative
Region, with several others, was found by the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public
documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and ordered their dismissal from the
service with accessory penalties. Their MR was denied. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision
finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service while the other two
respondents were exonerated from administrative liability
for lack of evidence. Petitioner, together with his two coaccused, appealed from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which was docketed as G.R. No. 144694.
Meanwhile, while appeal was still pending, Secretary
Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order
dismissing him from the service. Hence, the instant petition
to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court for
issuing the MO despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R.
No. 144694 which is a contumacious conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.
“An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.”
ISSUE: WON Sec. Datumanong can be held liable for
contempt of court
RULING:
NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary
Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious,
implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or
a result of confusion considering the different rules
regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite
him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher
court for review and correction. However, two events
supervened since the filing of this petition that would
support its dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in
G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of
Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed
from the service for dishonesty, falsification of public
documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Second, Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed
to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural
laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights
because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman are clearly procedural, and no vested right
of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing
as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right
to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.
Colmenar v. Colmenar, et al., G.R. No. 252467, 21 June
2021
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint, alleging, among others, that he
is the legitimate and lawful heir of his father, when his father
died, he left real properties and that Respondents pollo,
Jeannie and Victoria executed Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of his father, where it was made to appear that only
the Respondents Appollo, Jeannie and Victoria were the
surviving heirs of his father, and allocating unto themselves
the interests of his father over said properties. Respondents
Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria then sold the properties in
separate contracts of sale to Respondents PEC, ProFriends
and Crisanta Realty. Respondent PEC then sold the
property it purchased to Respondent Amaia. Petitioner
claimed that the sale to PEC, Crisanta Realty, Profriends
and Amaia were void because the respondents Appollo,
Jeannie and Victoria were not the rightful heirs of his father,
and therefore had no right of claim over his father’s
properties, thereby making the sale to the said respondents
companies void.
Apollo and Amaia filed their respective Motion to Dismiss.
Amaia claimed in the Motion to Dismiss that the Complaint
stated no cause of action against it as it was allegedly a
buyer in good faith.
ProFriends, in its Answer, invoked as affirmative defense
lack of cause of action. In their Answer, PEC and Crisanta
Realty claimed that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action against them, claiming they were innocent
purchasers for value and that Petitioner’s claim had
prescribed. They also invoked common defenses of being
innocent purchasers for value, and that the claim is barred
by laches and/or prescription.
PEC and Crisanta Realty then filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defenses.
In an Order dated a April 2019, the trial court through then
Assisting Judge Pascua granted the motion to set the
affirmative defenses for hearing, and deferred the resolution
of the motion to dismiss.
In an Order dated 26 December 2019, Assisting Judge Gill
set aside the Order dated 1 April 2019 which set the
affirmative defenses for hearing and deferred the ruling on
the motion to dismiss and instead, deemed that the Motion
for Leave of Court and Motions to Dismiss were submitted
for Resolution.
Since Sec. 12, Rule 15 of the 2019 Rules prohibited the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the court’s action on
the affirmative defense, Petitioner assailed the 22 May 2020
Order directly with the Supreme Court by Rule 45, on the
basis of pure question of law. Petitioner questions whether
it was correct for the trial court to apply the amended rules
on the motu proprio resolution on the affirmative defense to
the present case, which was pending before the amended
rules took effect.
ISSUES:
1. Did Petitioner avail of the correct remedy to go
straight to the Supreme Court by Rule 45?
2. Was the trial court correct in applying the 2019
amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses
pleaded by respondent companies?
3. Did the Complaint state a cause of action against
the respondents’ companies?
4. Was it correct for the trial court to consider
Profriends’ Affirmative defense of lack of cause of
action as one that is failure to state a cause of
action?
RULING:
1.
Yes, a question of law exists in this case as the
issue in this case is whether the trial court
committed reversible error when it applied the
2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative
defenses pleaded by the respondent companies,
albeit the same was already pending when the
amendments took effect. The issue of whether the
trial court correctly applied a specific law or rules
to a particular case is a question of law. The issue
of whether the complaint states a cause of action
also does not require the Court to re-evaluate the
credibility of any witnesses or the veracity of any
evidence. The Court only needs to examine the
Complaint itself, the allegations of which are
assumed to be true, to determine whether the
complaint states a cause of action against
respondent companies for declaration of nullity of
deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds
of sale, cancellation of titles and damages against
respondent companies. This is a pure question of
law as well.
2.
No. The application of the 2019 amendments to
resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by
respondent companies should not have been done
because it was both not feasible and would work
injustice, as provided under Rule 144 of the 2019
Rules, which provides that the amendments shall
govern all cases after their effectivity on 1 May
2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to
the extent that in the opinion of the court, their
application would not be feasible or would work
In an Omnibus Order dated 12 February 2020, Judge Gill
denied the motions, on the ground that: (1) the issues raised
by Respondents were complex and evidentiary, which could
be best threshed out during trial; and (2) pursuant to the
exercise of discretion under Sec. 1, Rule 16, the motion to
hear affirmative defenses were being denied as the issues
raised by each party were complex and would be better
threshed out in trial.
PEC, Crisanta Realty and Amaia filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Amaia also filed its answer,
pleading failure to state a cause of action as an affirmative
defense.
In the meantime, the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of
Court took effect on 1 May 2020.
The affirmative defenses were set for hearing.
On 22 May 2020, the trial court issued an order of even
date, dismissing the Complaint against PEC, Crisanta
Realty, Amaia and ProFriends on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action against them,
applying Sec. 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Gill resolved motu
proprio the affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of
action.
injustice, in which case, the procedure under
which the cases were filed shall govern.
declare void the extrajudicial settlement of estate,
declare void the subsequent deeds of sale.
Sec. 12, Rule 8 provides that the court shall motu
proprio resolve the affirmative defenses within 30
calendar days from the filing of the Answer. Here,
the said 30-day period form th4e filing of the
answer had long expired when the trial court
issued the resolution on the affirmative defenses
on 22 May 2020. ProFriends filed its answer in
December 2018, PEC and Crisanta Realty on 3
January 2019 and Amaia on 27 February 2020.
The trial court should have desisted from applying
the 2019 amendments because when it did, the
same was no longer feasible, as it was already
more than 30 days from the filing of the answer.
Whether respondents’ companies are buyers in
bad faith or not is not the issue nor the trigger that
gave rise to the complaint. Petitioner’s cause of
action hinged on his averment that the individual
respondents are not the owners of the properties
and thus, cannot validly sell the same. Good faith
or lack of bad faith is a matter of defense for the
buyers. It can be pleaded in the answer and
proved during trial.
The application of the 2019 rules also caused
injustice for as a consequence, petitioner lost his
substantial right to be heard on the common
affirmative defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty and
Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of
the order of dismissal, which were both granted
him under the 1997 Rules.
It was also inaccurate for the trial court to say that
it was motu proprio acting on the affirmative
defenses. In truth, the trial court had already
resolved this common affirmative defense of
failure to state a cause of action, together with the
other affirmative defenses in the Omnibus Order
dated 12 February 2020, where it held that the
issues were complex and would be better threshed
out in trial. PEC, Crisanta Realty and Amaia also
had filed their respective motions for
reconsideration to assail that Omnibus Order,
which motions for reconsideration were pending
when the trial court motu proprio resolved their
common affirmative defenses and dismissed the
complaint. This rendered the pending motions for
reconsideration as moot. Instead of applying the
2019 amendments, the trial court should have
resolved the pending motions for reconsideration
of PEC, Crisanta Realty and Amaia.
3.
Yes, the Complaint stated a cause of action
against the respondents’ companies. Assuming
the allegations in the complaint are true, i.e.,
petitioner is the legitimate child and lawful heir of
his father, his father left real properties that would
legally pass to him upon his death, individual
respondents are not the lawful heirs of his father
and have no claim to the properties but
nevertheless executed a void extrajudicial
settlement and that their sale to respondents
companies were without authority and thus void,
petitioner has the right to the relief porayed for – to
There is no allegation in the complaint that speak
of co-ownership among petitioner and the
individual respondents. The allegations in the
complaint, assuming to be true, are about the
unlawful conveyances of properties by individual
respondents who had no right to do so since the
true and lawful owner of the properties is
petitioner, no other.
4.
No. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of
cause of action are distinct and separate grounds
to dismiss a particular action. Failure to state a
cause of action reefers to the insufficiency of the
allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of the factual
basis of the action.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may
be raised at the earliest stage, such as an
affirmative defense in the answer. Lack of cause
of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis
of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented
by the plaintiff, such as in a demurrer to evidence
under Rule 33. In Failure to state a cause of action,
the veracity of the allegations is immaterial. In lack
of cause of action, this is invoked after the plaintiff
has rested its case, and the judge must determine
the veracity of the allegations based on the
evidence presented.
Labao v. Flores [G.R. No. 187894. November
15, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of
a
licensed
security-service
contractor.
Respondents were security guards assigned to the
National Power Corporation (NPC-Mindanao).
Petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all
security guards to submit their updated personal
data files, security guard professional license, and
other pertinent documents. When respondents
failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive,
despite several notices to do so, the petitioner
relieved them. Respondents filed individual
complaints with Labor Arbiter (LA) for illegal
dismissal and money claims, claiming they were
constructively dismissed when they were not given
new assignments for a period of over 6 months,
despite their repeated requests.
Petitioner countered that the respondents’ relief
from duty was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Furthermore, petitioner issued a
notice directing the respondents to report to
SMPSA’s main office for new assignments, but the
latter failed or refused to comply without any valid
reasons. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision.
Counsel for the respondents appealed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) outside the reglementary
period, yet the ruling was in favor of respondents.
The petitioner and SMPSA moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have
dismissed the petition outright for late filing, and
that there was no compelling reason for the
reversal of the LA and the NLRC’s factual findings.
CA considered the respondents’ petition as timely
filed and also opined that disregarding any
procedural lapses best served substantial justice.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
acting on the respondents’ petition despite of
its late filing.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.
HELD:
1. Yes. Late filing should not be allowed. Under
Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. Procedural rules do not
exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules
were established primarily to provide order to, and
enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system.
While procedural rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays and are necessary
to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a
jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot
trifle with.
2.
Yes. The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10)
days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’
failure to file the petition within the required (60)day period rendered it impervious to any attack
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no
court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
All the issues between the parties are deemed
resolved and laid to rest once a judgment
becomes final and executory; execution of the
decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested
rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a
losing party has the right to appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision
on the case.
After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred
is tantamount to a decision on the merits.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and
this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
Petition was granted and the decision of Labor
Arbiter is reinstated.
GIOS-SAMAR, INC. V. DOTC
G.R. No. 217158
March 12, 2019
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct
recourse to [the Supreme] Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of
paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional
filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus
on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it
by the highest law of the land.
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Prequalify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport development,
operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao,
Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto
Princesa Airports (collectively called “Projects”). The total
cost of the Projects is P116.23 billion. The Invitation stated
that the Projects aim to improve services and enhance the
airside and landside facilities of the key regional airports
through concession agreements with the private sector. The
Projects will be awarded through competitive bidding.
Herein Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its
Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a
taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the
issue, filed the present petition for prohibition directly with
the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleges that it is a nongovernmental organization composed of subsistence
farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the
victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government
assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and
livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of
the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP
from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of
paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional
filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus
on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it
by the highest law of the land. Thus, although the SC, the
CA, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a
rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked court.
Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the
petition.
Through the years, however, the Supreme Court has
allowed litigants to seek direct relief from It upon allegation
of "serious and important reasons." The Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections (Diocese) summarized these
circumstances in this wise:
1.
Petitioner argues that the bundling of the Projects is
unconstitutional because it will: (i) create a monopoly in
violation of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution; (ii) allow the
creation and operation of a combination in restraint of trade;
(iii) violate anti-dummy laws and statutes giving citizens the
opportunity to invest in public utilities; and (iv) enable
companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate
in the Projects. Petitioner asserts that the foregoing
arguments involve legal as opposed to factual issues, and
consequently, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to resolve
the same.
For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the
basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. It argued
that the petitioner had not alleged any special and
compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the
Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court
because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed
out in a full-blown trial.
In its reply, the petitioner argues that it need not wait for the
conduct of the bidding to file the suit because doing so
would render useless the very purpose for filing the petition
for prohibition. As it is, five groups have already been prequalified to bid in the Bundled Projects. Petitioner also
submits that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of
the illegally bundled projects are matters of public interest
and transcendental importance."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition violated the fundamental
principle of hierarchy of courts
HELD:
Yes. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct
recourse to [the Supreme] Court is allowed only to resolve
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate
time;
when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance;
cases of first impression;
the constitutional issues raised are better decided
by the Court;
exigency in certain situations;
the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ;
when petitioners rightly claim that they had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from
the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression;
and
the petition includes questions that are "dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered
as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the
foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator
- the issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal.
Similarly, the Court in Diocese of Bacolod decided to allow
direct recourse in said case because what was involved
was the resolution of a question of law, namely, whether the
limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in question violated the
right to free speech of the Bacolod Bishop.
The Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify that the
presence of one or more of the so-called "special and
important reasons" is not the decisive factor considered by
the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at
the first instance of its original jurisdiction over the issuance
of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question
raised by the parties in those "exceptions" that enabled the
Supreme Court to allow the direct action before It.
The SC is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its function to
make its own findings of certain vital facts different from
those of the trial court, especially on the basis of the
conflicting claims of the parties and without the evidence
being properly before it. While petitioner asserts that the
arguments it raises involve legal (as opposed to factual)
issues, the SC’s examination of the petition showed
otherwise.
Petitioner's
arguments
against
the
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are
inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact,
the determination of which require the reception of
evidence.
Given that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and
cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance, It
resolved to DISMISS the petition.
TERESITA TAN , petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO,
SIMON LORI HOLDINGS, INC., PENTACAPITAL
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FORTUNATO G. PE,
RAYMUNDO G. PE, JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR., AND
DEPUTY SHERIFF ROMMEL IGNACIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato
G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose
Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders) extended a loan to
one Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of P50,000,000.00.
The loan was facilitated by PentaCapital Investment
Corporation (PentaCapital) and was secured by Dante's
shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC).
When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and
despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling
his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI,
the individual lenders, and PentaCapital (respondents).
However, when he was due to execute the corresponding
deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his
obligations unpaid. 9 Hence, respondents �led an action for
sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 146.
RTC Makati: ordering Dante to pay respondents the sum of
P100,100,000.00 with legal interest. Dante's attempts to
reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of
Execution 12 (writ) was issued. An auction sale was then
conducted.
Consequently, Dante sought the quashal of the writ by
presenting an af�davit executed by his wife, herein
petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting to the conjugal
nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to
redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption
having been made; hence, a Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale 15
was issued in favor of respondents.
Dante filed an Omnibus motion claiming that the property
was a family home and therefore, exempt from execution,
and that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to
answer for his personal obligations without any showing
that it had redounded to the bene�t of the family.
RTC Makati denied.
On May 2, 2007, Teresita — Dante's wife — filed before the
Parañaque RTC a complaint 25 against respondents for the
nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the
certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents.
Paranaque RTC: Parañaque RTC initially dismissed 27 the
nulli�cation case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that
the issues raised therein had already been passed upon by
the Makati RTC with Teresita's active and voluntary
participation.
However, on MR, reversed its initial disposition and instead,
nulli�ed the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the
Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents. 31 It held that
Teresita was considered a third party in the collection case
before the Makati RTC, not having been impleaded therein
together with her husband Dante, and that the submission
of her Affidavit before the Makati RTC did not make her a
party to the said case. 32 Moreover, she had not waived her
right to institute a separate action to recover the subject
property, and the nullification case was not, after all, barred
by res judicata.
Respondents failed to file a notice of appeal on time.
Parañaque RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having
been �led out of time. MR denied.
CA: CA granted the petition and directed the Parañaque
RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. Citing the
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court, it found that the
af�rmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances
would allow Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to
evade his obligations which was already �nally adjudicated
by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take
cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the
doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the
nulli�cation case �led by Teresita and declared as null and
void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final
Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in
the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court
can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for
the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion
of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an
issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that there should be a
remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not
the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court
with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This
is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution,
under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and
which this Court has operationalized through a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The various branches of the regional trial courts of a
province or city, having as they do the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less
with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC
violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullifcation case despite the fact
that the collection case from which it emanated falls within
the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nulli�cation
case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to
nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was
legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and
co-equal court.
To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy
and sale of a property in the execution of a judgment was
valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
Thus, Teresita's nullifcation case filed before the
Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the
doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the
Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution
thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not
be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power
to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not
only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
judgment or order is rendered or issued. 53 Consequently,
the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same,
rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the
Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of
jurisdiction.
EDGAR ERICE vs. PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO
SISON, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017
FACTS: Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan
City filed a complaint against then Mayor Echiverri and
other city officials before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman issued an Order of Preventive Suspension
against Echiverri, et. al. The CA affirmed this Order of
Suspension. Echiverri, et al. Filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injuction. RTC Executive Judge Kwong issued a 72-hour
ex-parte Order to enjoin DILG and Erice from implementing
the Order of Suspension. Without giving the OSG a chance
to cross examine the witness presented by Echiverri
Respondent Judge Sison issued an Order extending the
TRO to 20 days. This Compelled Erice to file an Urgent
Motion to Inhibit. Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit,
Judge Sison issued an Order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Thereafter, the OCA in its Report dated November 4, 2014,
the OCA recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount equivalent
to his one (1) month salary with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The basis for the OCA's recommendation, among others
was Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction against Erice and the DILG to enjoin the latter
from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension
constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 6770, which provides:
SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued
by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is valid.
HELD:
No. In Carpio Morales, the Court: (1) declared as
unconstitutional Section 14(2) of RA 6770, and (2) declared
as ineffective the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 against
the issuance of a provisional injunctive writ by courts other
than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman until the Court
adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases
are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to
interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases, more so, because at the
time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and
proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January
17, 2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman Order
of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same
Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012.
In any event, Judge Sison should have at the very least,
been aware that court orders or decisions cannot be the
subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are
not included within the purview of the words "other written
instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing
petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to
orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies,
and this is anchored on the principle ofresjudicata.
Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasijudicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to
appellate authority. The losing party cannot modify or
escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action
for declaratory relief.
Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief
specifically prayed that the RTC "make a definite judicial
declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties
asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the
implementation of the order of preventive suspension,"
effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed
Ombudsman Order of Suspension - a matter clearly beyond
the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction.
DE BALLESTEROS v. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN INC.,
November 24, 2010
G.R. NO. 176260
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De
Ballesteros for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against her nine (9) children and the Rural Bank of
Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.
Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2)
parcels of land, however, without her knowledge and consent,
her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and
waiver of the estate of her husband wherein all the heirs,
including Lucia, agreed to allot the two parcels to Rico
Ballesteros and that, still, without her knowledge and consent,
Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which
mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan
secured by the lot.
RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the RTC-Iriga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action. RBCI stated that pursuant to Section 30, Republic
Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the "New Central Bank Act,"
the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order, as the
liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the liquidation of
RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court.
Lucia contends that since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained
jurisdiction over the case it should continue exercising such
jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. The
jurisdiction of a court once attached cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to
continue trying and ultimately decide the present civil case.
HELD:
NO. The Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on
the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence
of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the
exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character. For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in
character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication
of the disputed claims against the Bank.
The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in
the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended
to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and
designed to establish due process and orderliness in the
liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations
and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible,
should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and
that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of
Banks and regulate his operations. It is clear, therefore, that the
liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims, including that
of Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, regular courts do not
have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an
insolvent bank, unless there is a clear showing that the action
taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure
of financial institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. The same is not obtaining in this
present case.