Case
Ansay v. DBP
GR L-13667
April 29, 1960
Facts
Issue
Ansay, et al filed against BOD of the National
Development Company in the CFI a complaint
praying for 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954
to 1955.
Whether or not such moral
obligation/natural obligation
produces a legal obligation on
the part of NDC to give
Christmas bonus to Ansay, et al
Dismissed because:
a) A bonus is an act of liberality (not within the
judicial powers of the Court)
b) Ansay, et al admitted that giving of
Christmas bonus is a moral obligation of the
respondents, however, the Court has no
power to compel a party to comply with a
moral obligation
Ruling (with Atty’s notes)
No.
An element of natural obligation before it
can be cognizable by the court is
“voluntary fulfillment by the obligor.”
Retention can be ordered only after there
has been voluntary performance.
Art 1423, NCC: “...Natural obligations,
not being based on positive law but on
equity and natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their
performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize
the retention of what has been delivered
or rendered by reason thereof.”
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
Atty’s notes: Misplaced ang interpretation
nila Ansay sa natural obligations.
Obviously, walang natural obligation dito
dahil walang voluntary fulfillment.
Voluntary fulfillment muna (on the part
of the obligor/debtor/passive subj), bago
magkaroon ng right of retention (on the
part of the obligee/creditor/active subj).
Ang gusto nila Ansay magbigay ng
Christmas bonus ang NDC na hindi
naman legally demandable. Hindi ganon
ang natural obligation.
DBP v. Adil
February 10, 1940 - Sps. Patricio Confesor and
1. Whether or not first
1. First p.note already prescribed?
GR L-48889
May 11, 1988
Jovito Villafuerte (debtor/passive subj) executed a
promissory note for the payment of loan obtained
from DBP (creditor/active subj), payable in 10 equal
annual amorts
p.note has already
prescribed
2. If yes, whether or not
second p.note is valid
Prescriptive period: 10 years
After the prescriptive period, p.note remained
outstanding and unpaid.
April 11, 1961 - second p.note expressly
acknowledging said loan with a promise to pay the
same on or before June 15, 1961 was executed by the
spouses.
June 15, 1961 - p.note remained outstanding and
unpaid
September 11, 1970 - DBP filed a case against the
spouses for the payment of the loan
Heirs of Roldan v.
Heirs of Roldan and
Heirs of Magtulis
GR 202578
September 27, 2017
Decedent Natalia Magtulis owned an agricultural
land in Kalibo, Aklan. Her heirs included Gilberto
Roldan and Silvela Roldan (legitimate) and
allegedly, Leopoldo Magtulis (illegitimate). After her
death in 1961, Natalia left the lot to her children.
However, only Gilberto and his heirs took possession
of the property.
May 19, 2003 - respondents filed before the RTC a
complaint for partition and damages against
petitioners. Latter refused to yield the property on the
ground that Silvela and heirs already sold her share
to Gilberto.
Whether or not prescription and
laches bar respondents from
claiming co-ownership over the
parcel of land
Yes (counting from February 10,
1940). Action upon a written
contract must be brought within
10 years ( Art. 1144, NCC).
2. Atty’s notes: Execution of the
second p.note which
acknowledged/recognizing the
existence of the obligation
contained in the first p.note,
binuhay ni second p.note ang
nagprescribe na debt under first
p.note. Nagkaroon ng bagong
obligation na mayroong bagong
prescriptive period which is 10
years, now based on the date of
execution of second p.note
(Refer to Art. 1112, NCC)
Remember class: PWEDENG
I-WAIVE ang prescription
No. “Prescription cannot be appreciated
against the co-owners of a property,
absent any conclusive act of repudiation
made clearly known to the other
co-owners.”
There is a need to determine the veracity
of factual matters such as the date when
the period to bring the action commenced
to run. The determination is factual in
nature.
Atty’s notes: You need to prove laches.
Even yung prescription, kung sino ang
nag-aassert ng prescription and laches,
siya ang magpprove. So kailangan ng
evidence and supporting documents to
prove the same.
Laches and prescription, lalo na ang
laches, you are losing a right. Nawawalan
ka ng power to enforce a right because of
prescription. So kinakailangan,
patunayan ng nag-aassert ng prescription
and laches, na they indeed exist. Ang
principle dito is you have to
substantiate your claim.
Cruz v. JM Tuason
& Co
GR L-23749
April 29, 1977
Appellant Faustino Cruz made permanent
improvements on a parcel of land in relation to an
agreement entered into with the family of Telesforo
Deudor who laid claim on the land in question on the
strength of an “informacion posesoria.” However,
since the tract of land supposedly improved had been
registered since 1914 in the name of JM Tuason and
Co., Inc., plaintiff-appellant contends that
defendants-appellees were benefited by said
improvements. Hence, the former claims that he is
entitled to reimbursement from JM Tuason and Co.,
Inc. based on Art. 2142, NCC.
Whether or not the complaint
based on Art. 2142, NCC is
tenable
Atty’s notes: Bakit walang quasi-contract
in this case? Kasi mayroong existing
contract.
Art. 2142, NCC: “Certain lawful,
voluntary, and unilateral acts give rise
to the juridical relation of quasi-contract
to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.”
Kapag may existing contract, hindi siya
unilateral, therefor, hindi siya
quasi-contract.
“A presumed quasi-contract cannot
emerge as against one party when the
subject matter thereof is already covered
by an existing contract with another
party.”
“EXTRA-Contractual Obligations” are
obligations which do not arise from
contracts.
Hermanos v. Orense
GR L-9188
December 4, 1914
Engracio Orense had been the owner of a parcel of
land, with buildings and improvements erected
thereon, situated in Guinobatan, Albay. On February
14, 1907, Jose Duran, nephew of Orense, with
Orense’s knowledge and consent, executed a public
instrument selling and conveying unto Gutierrez
Hermanos the aforementioned property, with Duran
reserving to himself the right to repurchase it within
a period of four years. Hermanos had not entered
into possession of the purchased property, owing to
its continued occupancy by Orense and Duran by
virtue of a contract of lease which was in force up to
February 14, 1911.
After the lapse of the stipulated period of
redemption, Orense refused to deliver the property to
Hermanos and to pay the rental thereof for its use
and occupation since February 14, 1911.
1. Whether the sale is
valid
2. Whether or not Orense
is bound to fulfill the
obligation to deliver the
land to Hermanos
arising from the
contract entered into by
his nephew Duran
Atty’s notes:
In the court proceedings, Orense testified
that he indeed authorized Duran to
execute the contract selling and
conveying the parcel of land to
Hermanos.
This case discusses the concept of
ratification. The testimony made by
Orense in open court serves as
ratification and cures the defect of the
contract. “Ratification purifies the
contract of its flaws.”
Estoppel din ito. Example, binawi ni
Orense iyong testimony niya, estopped na
siya to do that. Why? His testimony in
the open court will serve as the
ratification and cures the defect of the
contract between Hermanos and Duran.
Ratification ay same concept with
voidable marriages and marriages subject
to legal separation.
Kailangan i-honor ni Orense ang
obligations niya kasi sinabi niya may
consent siya at authorized niya si Duran.
“Principal must therefore, fulfill all the
obligations contracted by the agent
who acted within the scope of his
authority.”
Adille v. CA
GR L-44546
January 29, 1988
Felisa Azul owned a property located in Legaspi
City. Felisa married twice in her lifetime; the first,
with Bernabe Adille with whom she had as an only
child defendant Rustico Adille; in her second
marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were
the plaintiffs.
In 1939, Felisa sold said property through pacto de
retro sale with a right to repurchase in three years,
however, she died in 1942 without being able to
redeem said property. After her death but during the
period of redemption, Adille repurchased the
property, by himself alone, and thereafter, executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition representing himself
as the sole heir of Felisa.
1. Whether or not a
co-owner acquire
exclusive ownership
over the property held
in common
2. Whether Adille acted
within the scope of
negotiorum gestio or is
guilty of fraud
First-The right of repurchase may be
exercised by a co-owner with respect to
his share alone.
Second-Adille took over the property
either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which
event, he had constituted himself a
negotiorum gestor, or for his exclusive
benefit, in which case, he is guilty of
fraud. Fraud attended the registration of
the property. He cannot therefore be said
to have assumed the mere management of
the property abandoned by his co-heirs,
the situation Art. 2144, NCC
contemplates.
Atty’s notes: Negotiorum gestio is NOT
a mode of acquiring ownership.
Mayroon bang negotiorum gestio dito?
(Hindi niya sinagot. Sad. Open for
discussion. Hehe)
Andres v.
Manufacturers
Hanover
GR 82670
September 15, 1989
Petitioner operating under the name “Irene’s Wearing
Apparel,” was engaged in the manufacture of
garments, apparel, and linens for local and foreign
buyers. Among its foreign buyers was Facets
Funwear, Inc. In August 1980, Facets instructed
FNSB to transfer $ 10,000 to Andres via PNB. FNSB
Whether or not private
respondents has the right to
recover the second $ 10,000
remittance it had delivered to
petitioner
Yes. The doctrine of solutio indebiti as
embodied in Art. 2154, NCC, applies in
the case at bar, and that Manufacturers
Hanover is entitled to recover the second
$ 10,000 that was paid by mistake.
instructed Manufacturers Hanover to effect the
transfer through its facilities and to charge the
amount to the FNSB account of private respondent.
The payment was not effected immediately because
the payee was only “Wearing Apparel.” Once
clarified with PNB on August 27, 1980, petitioner
received the remittance of $ 10,000 on August 28,
1980.
Atty’s notes:
Two elements of solutio indebiti:
1. No pre-existing contract/no
right to demand something
2. Delivery/payment was made by
mistake
Thus, obligation to return arises.
(Solutio indebiti, lalabas sa exam.)
On August 25, 1980 Facets learned about the delay
and instructed FNSB to effect the payment through
the PCIB. Facets and Manufacturers Hanover are
both unaware that the petitioner had already received
the previous remittance. Accordingly, private
respondent instructed the PCIB to pay $ 10,000 to
petitioner. Hence, on September 11, 1980, petitioner
received a second $ 10,000 remittance.
The contract of petitioner was with
Facets. It was the latter and not private
respondent which was indebted to
petitioner. On the other hand, the contract
for the transmittal of dollars from the US
to petitioner was entered into by private
respondent with FNSB. Neither was
private respondent a party to the contract
of sale between petitioner and Facets.
There being no contractual relation
between them, petitioner has no right to
apply the second $ 10,000 remittance
delivered by mistake by private
respondent to the outstanding account of
Facets.
Private respondent asked petitioner for the return of
the second remittance but the latter refused to pay
contending that Art. 2154 does not apply because its
requisites are absent given that Facets still had an
unpaid balance of $ 49,324. Hence, petitioner argued
that the last $ 10,000 remittance was in payment of a
pre-existing debt, thus, petitioner was not unjustly
enriched.
CBK Power v. CIR
GR 198279-30
January 15, 2014
Petitioner is principally engaged in the business of
operating hydroelectric power plants in Laguna.
On December 29, 2004, petitioner filed an
application for VAT Zero-Rate with the BIR, which
was duly approved thereby. Thus, petitioner’s sale of
electricity to the NPC from January 1, 2005 to
Whether or not the principle of
solutio indebiti applies to the
present case
No.
Though the principle of solutio indebiti
may be applicable to some instances of
claims for a refund, the elements thereof
are wanting in this case.
October 31, 2005 was declared to be entitled to the
benefit of effectively zero-rated VAT. Petitioner filed
administrative claims for the issuance of tax credit
certificate (TCC/applied for refund) for its alleged
unutilized input taxes on its purchase of capital
goods, local purchases and/or importation of goods
other than capital goods, and services, with BIR
RDO No. 55 of Laguna, covering the first three
quarters of 2005.
First, there exists a binding relation
between petitioner and the CIR, the
former being a taxpayer obligated to pay
VAT.
Second, the payment of input tax was not
made through mistake, since petitioner
was legally obligated to pay for the
liability. The entitlement to a refund or
credit of excess input tax is solely based
on the distinctive nature of the VAT
system. At the time of payment of input
tax, the amount paid was correct and
proper.
(No additional notes from Atty. on this
case)
Puyat and Sons v.
Manila
GR L-17447
April 30, 1963
On August 11, 1958, the plaintiff Gonzalo Puyat &
Sons, Inc., primarily engaged in the business of
manufacturing furniture with a factory and display
room located in Manila, filed an action for refund of
Retail Dealers Tax paid for the periods from the first
Quarter of 1950 up to the third quarter of 1956,
against the incumbent City Treasurer of Manila,
defendant Marcelino Sarmiento.
However, according to Sec 18(n) of Republic Act
No. 409, manufacturers who are retail dealers of
their own products shall be exempt from the payment
of retail dealer’s tax. On October 30, 1956, the
plaintiff filed with defendant City Treasurer of
Manila, a formal request for refund of the retail
dealer’s tax unduly paid, which the latter denied.
1. Whether or not the
retail dealer’s taxes
paid without protest are
refundable
2. Assuming that the
plaintiff-appellee is
entitled to the refund of
the retail taxes in
question, whether or
not the claim for refund
filed in October 1956,
insofar as said claim
refers to taxes paid
from 1950 to 1952, has
already prescribed
First-Yes. The retail dealer’s taxes paid
without protest are refundable. Art. 2155,
NCC provides that payment made by
reason of a mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law may fall under the
principle of solutio indebiti. Thus, such
erroneous payment may be recovered
even when there was no protest made
upon payment.
Second-Tax payments made before
October 30, 1950 already prescribed.
As provided in Art. 1146, NCC, actions
upon a quasi-contract must be
commenced within six years. This
provision shall apply to retail dealer’s tax
paid after the effectivity of the NCC on
August 30, 1950. Insofar as payments
made prior, the period of prescription is
10 years, as provided in Act No. 190.
However, Art. 1116 of the NCC further
provides that, although prescription
already running before its effectivity shall
be governed by laws previously in force,
NCC shall be applicable should the entire
period required in the NCC have
elapsed, even though the former laws
required a longer period.
Hence, this present complaint.
Tax payments:
1. First to third quarter, 1950
Covered by old law and Art.
1116, NCC, prescribed
2. Fourth quarter, 1950
Covered by NCC, prescribed
3. 1951 thereafter
Recoverable
Atty’s notes: Minsan nangyayari talaga sa
mga LGU na may mga pinababayad na
taxes na hindi naman dapat, so ang sinabi
lang ng SC, may solutio indebiti.
Sagrada Orden v.
NACOCO
GR L-3756
June 30, 1952
This is an action to recover the possession of a piece
of real property (land with warehouses) situated in
Pandacan, Manila and the rentals for its occupation
and use.
Whether or not Sagrada Orden
is entitled to recover rentals
from NACOCO
No.
If NACOCO is liable at all, its
obligations must arise from any of the
four sources of obligations–law,
The land belongs to the plaintiff. However, during
the Japanese military occupation, the land was
acquired by Japanese corporation Taiwan Tekkosho.
After liberation, more specifically on April 4, 1946,
the Alien Property Custodian (APC) of the USA took
possession, control, and custody thereof for the
reason that it belonged to an enemy national.
contracts, quasi-contracts, crimes, and
quasi-delicts.
NACOCO is neither guilty of any offense
nor was there any negligence on its part.
There was also no privity (of contract or
obligation) between the APC and Taiwan
Tekkosho.
The property was occupied by the defendant under a
custodianship agreement with the APC. Defendant
was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land
and actually spent a sum of money for repairs.
Atty’s notes: The list in Art. 1157, NCC
is exclusive in nature. Meaning, kapag
wala doon, hindi siya isang civil
obligation. Kapag hindi siya kasama sa
listahan, if it is not an obligation based on
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts,
and quasi-delicts, hindi siya civil
obligation.
The Republic of the Philippines (RP) intervened and
entered into an agreement with Sagrada Orden that
the sale in favor of Taiwan Tekkosho was null and
void because it was executed under threats, duress,
and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title
issued in the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be
cancelled and the original title of plaintiff reissued.
NACOCO was ordered to vacate the property on or
before February 28, 1949. Pursuant to the agreement,
the court reserved to Sagrada Orden the right to
recover from the NACOCO reasonable rentals for
the use and occupation of the premises.
Metrobank v.
Rosales
GR 183204
January 13, 2014
Petitioner MBTC issued a “Hold Out” order against
the account of Liu Chiu Fang and the joint account
of Ana Grace Rosales and Yo Yuk To following a
series of alleged fraudulent activities involving their
respective accounts with the petitioner.
Respondents filed before the RTC a complaint for
Breach of Obligation and Contract with Damages.
Whether or not MBTC is liable
for damages for breach of
contract
Yes.
Bank deposits, which are in the nature of
a simple loan or mutuum, must be paid
upon demand by the depositor.
The “Hold Out” clause applies only if
there is a valid and existing obligation
Respondents alleged that they attempted several
times to withdraw their deposits but to no avail
because of the “Hold Out.” No explanation, however,
was given by petitioner as to why it issued the “Hold
Out” order.
Petitioner alleged that respondents have no cause of
action because it has a valid reason for issuing such
order. It averred that the “Hold Out” order was due to
the fraudulent scheme of respondent Rosales and the
ongoing criminal complaint for Estafa against the
same.
arising from any of the sources of
obligations enumerated in Art. 1157,
NCC. In this case, petitioner failed to
establish that respondents have an
obligation to it under any law, contract,
quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The
criminal case is not enough reason for
petitioner to issue a “Hold Out” order as
it has not yet reached final judgment. In
fact, the “Hold Out” order was issued
even prior to filing the criminal
complaint.
RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for
damages for breach of contract. Petitioner appealed
to the CA. However, CA affirmed RTC’s ruling with
modification.
Petitioner is guilty of breach of contract
when it unjustifiably refused to release
respondent’s deposit despite demand, and
therefore, is liable for damages.
Hence, this recourse by petitioner.
Atty’s notes: Bakit invalid yung hold out
order? Dahil wala pang criminal case na
na-file. Always remember class, the
contract between the depositor and the
bank is not a contract of deposit, it is a
contract of loan/simple loan/mutuum.
Creditor ang mga nagbabangko o
nagdedeposit ng savings account,
debtor/borrower ang bank. Therefore,
may breach of contract kasi
unreasonable yung refusal ni bank to
give the money of the depositor, kasi
wala namang na-file na kaso. If ever may
kaso man, wala pang final judgment.
Therefore, no basis for the “Hold Out”
order.
Saludaga v. FEU
GR 179337
April 30, 2008
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law
student of respondent FEU when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on August 18,
1996. Rosete was brought to the police station where
he explained that the shooting was accidental. He
was eventually released considering that no formal
complaint was filed against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages
against respondents on the ground of breach of
obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the CA which
rendered the assailed decision. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
Whether or not
1. What transpired is a
fortuitous event/force
majeure
2. FEU violated the
implicit contractual
obligation to provide a
safe and secure
educational
environment to its
students
3. FEU exercised due
diligence in selecting
Galaxy as its security
agency
4. Galaxy is liable to pay
damages caused by
Rosete
1. No. When the effect is found to
be partly the result of a person’s
participation–whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to
act–the whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
2. Yes.
3. Yes. Respondent failed to prove
that the guards assigned in the
campus met the requirements
stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement with Galaxy. Total
reliance on the security agency
on matters involving the
qualifications of security guards
assigned to the school constitutes
negligence (culpa contractual) on
the part of FEU. To do so would
result to contracting away its
inherent obligation to ensure a
safe learning environment for its
students.
4. Yes. Respondent cannot be held
liable for damages under the
rules of quasi-delicts because
FEU is not the employer of
Rosete, rather, Galaxy, shall be
liable to pay damages to FEU for
negligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
There was negligence on the part
of Galaxy when it supplied FEU
with an unqualified security
guard.
Atty’s notes: May iba-ibang klase ng
negligence: 1) culpa contractual
(contractual negligence) 2) culpa
aquiliana (quasi-delict). Si FEU is liable
for culpa contractual.
People’s Car v.
Commando Security
GR L-36840
May 22, 1973
People's Car Inc. (plaintiff) entered a "Guard Service
Contract" with Commando Security Service Agency
(defendant) to safeguard and protect its business
premises from theft, pilferage, robbery, vandalism
and all other unlawful acts of any person or person
prejudicial to their interest.
On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., the
defendant's security guard on duty at plaintiff's
premises, without any authority, consent, approval,
knowledge or orders of the plaintiff and/or defendant
brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car
belonging to its customer, and drove said car for a
place or places unknown, abandoning his post. While
driving said car, it lost control causing the same to
fall into a ditch by reason of which the plaintiff's
complaint for qualified theft against said driver and
was blottered in the office of the Davao City Police
Department.
Whether or not the defendant is
obliged to indemnify the
plaintiff for the entire costs as a
result of the incident
Atty’s notes: Actually ang issue dito ay
hindi naman kung dapat bang
i-indemnify. Ang issue dito is kung ano
ba ang provision na dapat sundin. Par 4
or Par 5 of the contract?
Ang sabi ni Commando, par 4 daw kasi
maliit lang doon ang kanilang liability,
parang P 1,000 pesos per guard post.
Kaso nga lang, ano ang difference nilang
dalawa?
Par 4 ang premise nito ay mayroong
negligence of the guards. However, what
occurred is not a case of negligence, but a
criminal act (qualified theft). The security
guard willingly and unlawfully took the
car outside without the consent of
People’s Car, Inc. So ang mag-govern is
Par 5 dahil hindi pwedeng i-invoke ang
negligence dahil breach of contract ang
nangyari. Par 5 inaassume ni Commando
Security Agency ang responsibility for
the acts done by the security guards
during their watch hours.
Ano’ng kinalaman sa lecture natin?
Again, autonomy of contracts. The
provisions of the contracts are the laws
between the parties as long as they are
not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy
(Art. 1306, NCC). The stipulations serve
as the law between the parties.
Cangco v. Manila
Railroad
GR L-12191
October 14, 1918
Atty’s notes: For example, si A sumakay
sa isang bus, ang drive ng bus ay isang
reckless driver na sa sobrang
pagka-reckless, na-aksidente yung bus.
Injured si A.
Question: sino ang dapat kasuhan ni A?
Baka lumabas ito sa bar exam ninyo, etc.
Depende yan kung ano ang ifa-file
niyang kaso.
Kung ang basis mo ay contract, ang
pwede mong kasuhan ay yung
operator/owner ng bus because you have
a contract with the owner of the bus
(contract of carriage na ang main
objective is to deliver passenger/goods
from one point to another), not with the
driver. Kapag contract, ang vinculum
juris nangyayari upon the execution of
the contract. Dito, whether or not may
negligence, may vinculum juris na yan
dahil mayroon nang existing contract.
Walang makukulong dito.
Kung ang basis mo ay quasi-delict, ang
pwede niyong kasuhan ay yung dalawa:
driver and owner. Ang basis nito ay
naging negligent si driver because of the
negligence of the owner in hiring its
employees. Kapag nangyayari ang
negligence, dito pa lang nag-aarise ang
obligation (compared with contract, dito
pa lang nagkakaroon ng vinculum juris).
Here, the vinculum juris will exist upon
the happening of negligence/lack of
care/lack of foresight. Wala ring
makukulong dito.
Kapag ang kaso niyo naman ay based
on crime/delict, ang pwede niyong
kasuhan ay si driver. Ito kung gusto
niyong may makulong. In case of
insolvency of driver, the operator is
subsidiarily liable.
Depende yan sa inyo kasi magdedepende
yan sa kung anong theory ang gagamitin
niyo sa case ninyo. Depende kung ano
ang ebidensya on hand. Pwede ring
depende sa defense ng kalaban.
One act can be a source of different
causes of action. But ang rule is you
cannot recover twice for the same act.
Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez
GR 34840
September 23, 1931
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an
automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on
the Manila South Road in Las Pinas, Rizal.
The truck was driven by chauffeur Abelardo Velasco,
and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile
was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18
years of age, and was owned by his parents.
A passenger in the truck, Narciso Gutierrez,
fractured her right leg and required medical
attendance.
Narciso Gutierrez blames both sets of defendants
(Saturnino Cortez and Abelardo Velasco, and
Bonifacio Gutierrez, et al). The owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, which in turn
blames the truck.
Whether or not the defendants
to the plaintiff for the payment
of damages
Yes.
Atty’s notes: Single act, pwede siyang
maging different kinds of causes of
action.
Ano ang naging basis ng liability ng
owner ng car (father of Bonifacio
Gutierrez? Quasi-delict. Liability
arising from the acts of the driver who is
a minor is assumed by the head of the
house/family (father, who was not in the
automobile while 18-year old Bonifacio
was driving)
Ano ang naging basis ng liability ng
truck driver? Contract. Liable si truck
driver for breach of contract with the
owner.