Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that
R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
1R 2011-2012
CASE DIGESTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Justice Francisco P. Acosta
I.NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main
thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections
Facts:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65
raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s
initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to
which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on
people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing
initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally
did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections
Facts:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the
Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that
Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be
amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
Issue:
R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
people’s initiative?
Held:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the
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be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general elections
to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the
same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators
and members of the House of Representatives to become
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . .The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval
by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution
are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3
permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they
should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.
Issue:
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution.
Facts:
Held:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes
in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct
16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of
PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD
No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring
Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are
hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed
collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon
the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are
obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office;
and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his
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“whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033
to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written
in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree
Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue
of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by
the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or
law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant
to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in
nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time.
Held:
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of
the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
Lambino, et.al. vs. Commission on Elections
Facts:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a
petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec.
5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under
the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not
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give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec
ruling
the proposed amendments before – not after – signing. Moreover,
“an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
Issues:
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single
word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text
of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet
merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers
signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception,
and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be” directly proposed by
the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on
a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On
so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
(1) Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment
or revision
(2) Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people
Held:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct
proposal by people Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a)
the framers intended to adopt relevantbAmerican jurisprudence on
people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence
of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
disallowing revision through initiatives article XVII of the Constitution
speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode
is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode
is through a people’s initiative.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text
of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was
intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
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contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet
all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2)
an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case,
only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the
provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the
Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment.
II. The Constitution and the Courts
Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections
Facts:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired
from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits there
from. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof)
providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed
the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His
petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are
more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may
not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them
and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at
the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might
not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may
also be good elective local officials.
Issue:
Whether or not the there is cause of action.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing,
there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged
Held:
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65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
PACU vs. Secretary of Education
of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal
Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the
matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable
necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in
estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is
constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed
by the court.
Facts:
Issue:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a
petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the
Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended
by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of
the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty
and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the
parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic
efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative
powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706 “It shall be the duty of the
Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private
schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in
accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,
and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate
said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of
instruction given in the same,”
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and
unconstitutional?
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Held:
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs
no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no
justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an
established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has
merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of
executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained
common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the
power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for
their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power
is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the
authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the
constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the
constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be
necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between
litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to
obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a
mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The
court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary
of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the
original Act 2706.And in support to the first proposition of the
petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right
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sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the
regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to
show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the
statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such
statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there
has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the
petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official
documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or
pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.
And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as
would entitle them to bring this suit.
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
Facts:
Facts:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from
Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a
writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants
moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety
moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without
raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground
that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the
amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO’s charter
and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated
the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 8555-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners’ standing to bring this
suit.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in
view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the
filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not
exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the
instant petition.
Whether or not the Surety bond is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.
Held:
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special
concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law
or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in
fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit.
Yes. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its
motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question
in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
Kilosbayan vs. Morato
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unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
-"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession,
as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
In re Cunanan
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of the law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the
S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice
of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in
such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in
place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the
court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the
Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and
only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A.
972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made
by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules
promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional
Issues:
Whether or not the Republic Act. 972 is constitutional.
Held:
Facts:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of
unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al
petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so
much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as
the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling
below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the
passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the
correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 194870% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have
been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar
went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but
was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it.
Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill
then became law on June 21, 1953.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law
is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
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and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to
the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in
force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from
1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the
examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a
grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed
whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)
in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that
the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of
Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in
the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and
absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high
risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes
the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to
only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that
this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
III. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
A. POLICE POWER
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA
Facts:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations.
This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to
screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant
to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step
plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which
a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity
of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing
contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights.
JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court
ruled in favor of EIAC.
Lutz vs. Araneta
Facts:
Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta,
the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the
estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under
Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or persons in
control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane.
Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act
shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz
contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence
making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The
Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before
the Supreme Court.
Held:
Issue:
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid
exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property
Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act
( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional.
Issue:
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Held:
Issue:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The
tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our
nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of
the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows
that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is
necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If
objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the
implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only rational
that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it.
Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to
be constitutional.
Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were
constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in
exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of
President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and
Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under
CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely
a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of
just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of DAR
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and
229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full
owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners
now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill
Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial
fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of
rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and
purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be
determined is the method employed to achieve it.
Lozano vs. Martinez
Facts:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for
short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's
constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any
check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
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does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a
fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double
said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused
of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said
presumptions.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not BP 22 violates the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt.
(2) Whether or not BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
(3) Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
HELD:
(1) No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since
this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes
arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the
holder the amount of the check.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of
evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid
and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay
"stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason
therefore, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless
check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of
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penal sanctions.
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed
4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative
power by the former President.
(2) No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.
(3) No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for
the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would
be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give
equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.
Held:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as
there’s no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this
extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction
3. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of
powers and invalid exercise of police power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and was immediately condemned and
punish
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported
six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond
of P12,000.00.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta
Facts:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR
BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”
The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constitutionality and filed case in
the lower court. However, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner appealed the decision to IAC with the following
contentions:
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be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by
invoking police power.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
Held:
Held:
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is
no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process
clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity
sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual
rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
B. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Facts:
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled
“An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and
motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The
City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beer houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
Facts:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a
portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal
Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not
necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed
that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
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The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not
necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine
the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again
the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged
in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity
is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have
the right to inquire to.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the
view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character.
To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
People vs. Fajardo
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others
that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the
expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The
request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Republic vs. Castelvi
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-
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year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in
1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however,
did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of
the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because
in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law
independent of contract.
Issue:
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947
or 1959.
Facts:
Held:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on
the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner
also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free “Comelec Space” and at the same
time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of
Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues
that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression.
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private
property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3)
it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must
be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi
property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be
paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the
contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can
give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a
lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land
in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does
not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General,
the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be
followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space,” the
procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates
and the conditions or requirements for the candidate’s utilization of
the “Comelec space” procured. At the same time, however, the
Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and
its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same
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would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication
and information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be
expropriated are the petitioners'' lands. They brought this suit in the
SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
Commission on Elections is valid.
Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only
a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving
concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is
recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that
there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which
are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their
small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test
to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of
the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted.
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to
designate the property. The property owner may not interpose
objections merely because in their judgment some other property
would have been more suitable. The provisions on just
compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same
provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay
(1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives.
Issue:
Whether or not it is a valid exercise of eminent domain.
Held:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related
letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null
and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it
relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,
purports to require print media enterprises to “donate” free print
space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent
it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual,
justiciable case or controversy.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero
EPZA vs. Dulay
Facts:
Facts:
On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a
complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo,
Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where
the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to
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be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.
over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation
Facts:
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on
a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case
wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain.
Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that
a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent
domain.
Issue:
Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA
7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its
power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its
legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution
is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making
body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP
337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is
obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of
ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts
inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for
financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve
as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as
to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co
Facts:
The petitioner herein, NPC, is a government corporation created
under R.A. No.6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric
generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear,
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geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric
power on a nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among
others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain. Sometime
in June 27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-ofway over three (3)lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga
belonging to respondent herein for purposes of construction of its
transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project.
On March 25, 2002, NPC obtained a writ of possession and on April
15, 2002 theytook possession of the property.On hearing the RTC
appointed 3 commissioners to determine the fair market value of
theproperty as of 15 April 2002. The first two commissioners
appraised the property atP1,900.00 per square meter or a total of
P1,179,000.00. While the third commissionerpeg the value of the
property at P875.00 per square meter. The RTC rendered its Partial
Decision, wherein it declared the validity of theexpropriation and
ordered petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest
at6% per annum beginning April 15, 2002, the date of actual taking,
until full payment.Not satisfied with the ruling of lower court NPC
elevate the case to CA, which theappellate court also rendered
Decision holding petitioner liable to pay the full fair marketvalue at
the time of actual taking, with interest at 6% per annum from 15 April
2002.Aggrieved with the order NPC appealed to SC hence this case.
upon proper determination by the courts. The presence of
transmission lines undoubtedly restricts respondent’s use of
hisproperty. Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market
value of theproperty.UPON THE DATE OF FILING. Rule 67 clearly
provides that the value of justcompensation shall “be determined as
of the date of the taking of the property or thefiling of the complaint,
whichever came first.”It is settled that just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of thetaking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriationproceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
There are exceptions— (1) grave injustice to the property owner, (2)
the taking did not have color of legal authority, (3) the taking of the
property was not initially for expropriation and the owner will begiven
undue increment advantages because of the expropriation.
However, none of these exceptions are present in the instant
case.Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the
determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001,
the date when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.
C. Power of Taxation
Issue:
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
Whether or not petitioner herein should pay the subject property in its
full marketvalue?Is the reckoning date for the determination of just
compensation is upon position or uponthe date of filing?
Facts:
Pascual, in his official capacity as the Provincial Governor of Rizal,
petitioned for a writ of certiorari against the dismissal of the case and
dissolving of the preliminary injunction held by the Court of the First
Instance. Petitioner prayed for that RA #920 be declared null and
void, that the alleged Deed of Donation made by Zulueta be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner also prayed for an injunction enjoining
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Director of Public
Works and Highways and the disbursing officers of the latter
department from making and securing any further release of funds
for the said road project. RA# 920 contained an item appropriating
Held:
YES. As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended, substantiallyprovides that properties which will be
traversed by transmission lines will only beconsidered as easements
and just compensation for such right of way easement shallnot
exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to
construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value
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P85,000.00 which the petitioner alleged that it was for the
construction of roads improving the private property of Jose Zuleta, a
member of the Senate.
Held:
1. RA #920 is unconstitutional because the Congress is without
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose.
2. Pascual has the personality to sue as a taxpayer recognizing the
right of the taxpayer to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating public funds.
The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall
be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of
occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the
courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered
to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government. That matter is within the domain of political
departments. The argument against double taxation may not be
invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed
by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the
same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions
thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the
ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila
Llandoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No.
3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal
occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city
and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said
ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a
municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions.
Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section
201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under
protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared
the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing
it.
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated
amount was spent for such purpose.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr.
Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic
Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the
constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RA # 920 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not Pascual has the legal capacity or to sue.
Held:
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax
return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class
legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.
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Held:
Issue:
Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article
VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of
taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra
distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the
property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the
Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.
Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for
educational purposes.
Held:
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for
cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable
emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first
floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by
any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use
of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in
interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated
to the church for religious purpose.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
Facts:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the
“Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer,
defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the
modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground
floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second
floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied
by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for
the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being
used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground
floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a
commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation
Facts:
Philippine Planters Products (PPI) and Fertiphil Corp. are private
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, which are both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides
and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, Pres. Ferdinand
Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the
aformentioned LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold
in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA), which remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depository bank of PPI. After the 1986 EDSA
revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy, for
which Fertiphil demanded PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under
LOI No. 1465. But then, PPI refused to give in to the demand. With
that, Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against
FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust and unreasonable,
and favoring one privately owned corporation, which is the PPI.
RTC's decision on November 20, 1991 favored Fertiphil and ordered
the latter to pay a certain sum of the previously collected amount
with an interest, and some other fees.
IV. ARTICLE III - THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1 -- Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the
Laws
Due Process of Law
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition
against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from
engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the
petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the
international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the
Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or not the P10 assessment on fertilizer sale a valid exercise
of taxation?
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police
power.
No. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose.
Taxes are exacted on for a public purpose and cannot be used for
purely private purposes or for exclusive benefit of private persons.
The LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI,
a private company. Thus, this already exceeded the limitation which
taxes are supposed to be limited to, inherently and naturally. Even if
the levy was acted for the enforcement of police powers, it is still
unconstitutional because it did not promote public interest. Being
void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be
refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against
unjust enrichment: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern." The petition was denied.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained
away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also
provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If
ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the
same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of
the state.
PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES
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Facts:
and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance
with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine
the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification
election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that
as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory
employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. MediatorArbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and
technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition
with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties
therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis
thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an
order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification
election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and
confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision
through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the
appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on
the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique
for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the
advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of
power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing
trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election
returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the
Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the
private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming
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the private respondent the winner in the election.
the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still
fit for farm work or breeding.
Held:
Issue:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall
give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due
Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power,
because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law
and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the
transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their
indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef,
after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter
either.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Alonte v. Savellano
Facts:
Pending before the court are two separate petitioners, one filed by
petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.r. No. 131652, and the other
by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728,
that assail the decision of the respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, of Manila
finding both petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The two petitioners were consolidated.
On December 5, 1996, an information for rape was filed against
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan Laguna
and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by
Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan.
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and as signed by
raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Biñan Laguna presided over by
Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her
counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
YNOT VS. IAC
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos
and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of
petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A
while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in
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Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator a petitione for a change of venue (docketed
Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred
and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of petitioners,
moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the
ground that it had become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of
desistance. On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his comment on
the motion to dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in
any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public
prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the
criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On September 17, 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal case
No. 97-159935 by the Clerk of Courts of Manila, was assigned by
raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Atty. Balbin,
submitted to the Manila court, a compliance where she reiterated her
decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance.
In an order, dated October 9, 1997, Judge Savellano found probable
cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte
and Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this
Court’s separate determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the private complainant’s desistance in
the lights of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab.
case once it is filed in court.
*Whether or not the proceedings did conform with the procedure for
trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
*Whether or not an opportunity to cross-examine was afforded
petitioners and their counsels such that they can be deemed to have
waived said right by inaction.
*Whether or not an evidence which a party desires to submits for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered be offered by him.
Held:
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1)
Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefore been scheduled for the purpose;
(2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present
rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for
the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in
the information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial.
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused hiss full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our
Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private
complainant is also frowned upon by the courts. Although such
affidavit may deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly an
instance when this court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed
the case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed
where there exist special circumstances that raise doubts as to the
reliability of the affidavit.
Issue/s:
*Whether or not there can be short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be an excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court.
*Whether or not a case can be dismissed upon a mere affidavit of
desistance of the complainant.
*Whether or not any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, can extinguish
criminal liability.
*Whether or not the death of the offended party can extinguish the
Article 344 also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in
private crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which
when validly and timely made, result in the total extinction of criminal
liability of the offender. The pardon in private crimes must be made
before the institution of the criminal action. In adultery and
concubinage, the pardon may be express or implied while in
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seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon
must be express. In all cases, the pardon must come prior to the
institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in
court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by
sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal
liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal action and the
penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the
offender and the offended party.
clearly and expressly provide that “the court shall consider no
evidence which has not formally offered.” Evidence not formally
offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in
disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected.
The death of the offended party cannot extinguish the case once it is
filed in court. If the offended party dies immediately after filing the
complaint but before the institution of the criminal action, his death is
not a ground to dismiss the case. Clearly, the will and participation of
the offended party is necessary only to determine whether to file the
complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of the State prevails.
(a) The submission of the “Affidavit of Desistance” executed by
Juvie-lyn Y.Punongbayan on June 25, 1997, having been filed after
the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, does not warrant the
dismissal of said criminal case;
The Court hereby RULES that-
(b) For failure of due process, the assailed judgement, dated
December 12, 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL and
VOID and thereby Set Aside; accordingly, the case is Remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings; and
The proceedings did not conform with the procedure for trial as
provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioners were
never instructed to present evidence to prove their defenses. The
parties were never given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There was
no admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to
justify a change in the order of trial.
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano Jr., presiding judge of Branch 53 of
RTC of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No.
97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for
raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
Following respondent judge’s finding and assuming that the
November 7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits,
petitioners were never afforded their right to confront and crossexamine the witness. The court did not, at the very least, inquire as
to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine private
complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No
opportunity to cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their
counsels such that they cannot be deemed to have waived said right
by inaction.
Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec
“Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. – petitioner
charged in violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun ban)– invokes
deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.”
Facts:
Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in
connection to the national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the
House of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2
firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner
ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to
return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex,
Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search the
The admission of private complainant’s affidavit of October 21, 1996
was made solely in response to respondent judge’s questioning. It
was this affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the
petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it
formally offered before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence
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car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and
his case was referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office.
Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was invited to
shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how
Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the
prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the charges. The prosecutor
recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a
resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against
petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which
was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car
was illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the
preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process
was violated.
unreasonable intrusion of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his
property in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in
any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded
against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those
charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the
warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence
inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner.
Issue:
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Facts:
Held:
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And
this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR,
decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion
for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion
for opposing the said motion.
The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However,
this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles
(2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at
police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search, and (4) Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police
officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also
recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that
either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime
in the vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient
evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to
justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an
Issue:
Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the
CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion
to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
Facts:
As a result of the initiation rights held by the Aquila Legis Fraternity
on February 8-10, 1991, Leonardo Lennie Villa died of serious
physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital. A Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Committee was tasked to investigate
the circumstances resulting in Villas death within 72 hours.
Respondent students Mendoza, Abas, et al, were also required to
submit written statements within 24 hours from receipt. Said
respondents failed to give a reply, while being placed on preventive
suspension. On February 14, 1991, after receiving the written
statements and testimonies of several witnesses, the Committee
found prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue (Discipline). The students were
required to file answers on or before February 18, otherwise, they
would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defense.
On February 20, Dean del Castillo created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against said respondent students. On the same
day, the students were
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
informed of their violation, giving them until the 22nd of February to
respond. After several postponements and a letter from petitioner
Bernas, a resolution dated March 9 found respondents guilty of
violation of Rule 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules of Discipline, for
having participated in the initiation as auxiliaries, heightened by the
fact that they made no effect to prevent the infliction of further injury.
The board, however, left the imposition of the penalty to the
Administration. Petitioner Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on
all respondent students. On March 10, respondent students filed a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and TRO with
preliminary injunction, alleging lack of due process. After the issuance
of a TRO on April 7, a special civil action for certiorari was filed with
the SC.
which became the basis of the February 14 order. Granting without
admitting that they were denied such, disciplinary cases involving
students do not necessarily need or include the right to cross
examination. It may be summary in nature.
Ruling: RESPONDENT STUDENTS, DISMISSED
Equal Protection of the Laws
Quinto and Tolentino v. Commission on Elections
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing
a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense,
the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of
R.A. 9369.
Issue:
Were respondent students denied due process? NO.
Held:
ISSUE:
Contrary to respondents argument of denial of procedural due
process, the Court finds no indication that such right has been
violated. Petitioners have meticulously respected respondents rights
in a school disciplinary proceeding, as stated in Guzman vs. NU,
Alcuaz vs. PSBA-QC, etc. Further, the Guzman case, and not the
ANG TIBAY case asserted by respondents, provides the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary actions in
academic institutions:
1.Students must be informed in writing of the nature or cause of the
accusations against them.
2.They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with
the assistance of counsel.
3.They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
4.They shall have the right to address evidence in their own behalf
5.The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by school authorities to hear and
decide the case. The requisites as stated have been met adequately.
Respondents cannot hide behind the argument that they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA.
9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for
giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive
officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions
between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held
that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing
clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective
officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso
does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
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The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in
government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will
also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate
of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield
influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices,
whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they
be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not
shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
involved on such a sweeping scale.
officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections
and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is
constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the
assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the
constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the
equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is
reasonableness which requires that:1. The classification rests on
substantial distinctions;2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;3. It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and4. It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction
between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot
and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs.
Executive Secretary, et. al.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTS
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission
: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on
Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the
Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” Be it
noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior
to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno
Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to
carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
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The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article
VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive
order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or
not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally
mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives
of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue
interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the
nation’s thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the
respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying
out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
Issues:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause; and
Held:
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of
this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the
PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be
accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of
graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (86 SCRA 270 [1978])
FACTS:
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27
March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance
No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be
employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from
the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04
May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance
alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction
between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00
employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of
the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should
be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
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registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or
limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle
on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI
ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null
and void.
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired
from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980
local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1
thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao
assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan
Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected
officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring
persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord
6537.
HELD:
The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not
lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise
of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.
Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences
in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount
of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is
casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged
to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD:
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet
all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2)
an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case,
only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the
provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
Dumlao v. Comelec
FACTS:
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The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at
the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might
not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also
be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not
a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Measure is assailed for being discriminatory against female domestic
workers/helpers and that it is violative of the right to travel. Further,
the company contended that the measure is an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, being that police power is legislative and not
executive in character.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order is a valid regulation.
Held:
The Labor Code has vested the Department of Labor and
Employment with the rule-making powers in order to effectively
promote the welfare and interests of Filipino workers. Protection to
labor does not only signify the promotion of employment alone, more
important is that such be decent, just and humane. The preference for
female workers being covered by the said regulation has been
motivated by a growing incidence of Filipina abuses overseas. Official
acts enjoy a presumed validity.
Himagan v. People
FACTS:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He
was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the
attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant
to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint
or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
(6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed
the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon
Facts:
PASEI is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female, for overseas employment. It challenged the validity of
Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and
Employment in the character of Guidelines Governing the Temporary
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
Workers.
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contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the
case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably
delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed
by the Constitution.
HELD:
The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within
which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar
as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over
90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word
“shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”,
there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treas. of Ormoc City
FACTS:
Ormoc city passed an ordinance which provides: "There shall be
paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc
City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Ormoc Sugar Company filed a complaint against the city of
Ormoc, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art.
VI, Constitution)
ISSUE:
W/N the ordinance violates the equal protection clause and the
uniformity of taxation/
HELD:
YES. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of
the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
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classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A
perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city
of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is
set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On
December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on
June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s
signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a
city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
League Of Cities Of The Philippines v. Commission On
Elections; Municipality Of Baybay, Etc.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the
12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No.
29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No.
29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause.
HELD:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that
did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect
or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower
annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
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bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the
purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.
1.No. ³The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in aprivate capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities.Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has
been violated. Stated otherwise,may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said
inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure
on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.´
2. No. ³The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was
informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have
regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no
evidence to the contrary.´
3.No. ³Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper
thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.´
Section 2 -- Searches and Seizures
People v. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991])
FACTS:
Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four
packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by
the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he
refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs
and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened
said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the
standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several
grams of its contents. He brought a letter and the said sample to the
National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that
the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went
back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the
packages. Afterwards,the NBI took custody of said packages. The
contents, after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be
marijuana flowering tops.The appellant, while claiming his mail at the
Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning. Later
on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the items admitted in the searched illegally
searched and seized.
2.Whether or not custodial investigation was not properly applied.
3.Whether or not the trial court did not give credence to the
explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his
possession.
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967)
FACTS:
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
HELD:
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued
against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides
authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major
groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just
because the government blunders.
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however
that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant
issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party
hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or
board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the
people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides;
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was
issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of
a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.
HELD:
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the
accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.
month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another
charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3
petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988,
deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Soliven v. Makasiar
UNAVAILABLE
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for
violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of
Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988
but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4
April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Silva v. Presiding Judge
UNAVAILABLE
Morano v. Vivo
UNAVAILABLE
Issues:
Harvey v. Santiago
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable
cause.
Facts:
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch
Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan
Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued
Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation
Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young
boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his
room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that
two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects
confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures
by CID agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to
petitioners.
Held:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it
violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The
arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined
after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense.
The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore
the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules
on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They
were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas,
alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is
keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities
as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of
the law.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning
its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing
presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not
be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning.
In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of
his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information
received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned
affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of
the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of
the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him
(judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night
and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the
petitioner.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of
Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be
arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against
them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure.
Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be
a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired.
The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the
seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books,
documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in
Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the
agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be
declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done
under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure
against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of
the people.
Issues:
1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in
the law?
2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance
3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit?
Facts:
4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation
is constitutional?
the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution
or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute
or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in
general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable
while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the
presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75
Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292
Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282
Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16
Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees?
Held:
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the
People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the
peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95,
General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886).
Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal
security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books,
and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific
Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce
Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law.
ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of
government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it
is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to
be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore,
if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge
may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit
of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant
the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal
and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there
exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is
mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore,
that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only
on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts.
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the
rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362;
State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6
Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118
So., 613).
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be
made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As
we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued
exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is
equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made
at night.
and that the documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner
cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he
has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise
whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading
the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that
there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has
emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if
there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal
proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would
have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner
voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in
question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested
from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
inventory furnished him by the agents.
The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to
the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him
in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no
other more adequate and detailed description could have been
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description
of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially
complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who
executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him
to identify the articles, which he did.
Mata v. Bayona
Facts:
At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it
clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been
seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation
and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against
him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found, is
unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it
is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting
the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin
vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620;
Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed.,
679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132).
Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in
question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for
violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game
by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or
from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that
during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he
had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which
inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court
of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the
records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led
Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for
the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of
Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in
fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that
documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are
to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme
Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to
comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the
search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
People v. Del Rosario
Facts:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs,
particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the
search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s,
an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and
to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber
pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Issue:
Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Issue:
Held:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.
Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule
of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must
before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has
to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
Held:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein
case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was
the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure
of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
Umil v. Ramos
Facts:
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On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a
confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two
(2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed
by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM,
for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s
house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things
three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt.
Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was
reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that
moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt.
Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and
Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw
the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the
chapel.
Issue:
Issues:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Held:
(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
Held:
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante.
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v.
Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems
from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However,
warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE
CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the
actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities
of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
People v. Sucro
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
their duties.
On July 2 1991, Eldon Maguan was allegedly shot to death by
accused Rolito Go due to a traffic altercation when
petitioners car and the victims car nearly bumped each other. The
Security Guard of the Cravings Bake Shop saw the whole
incident and point herein petitioner as the gunman, which he
positively identified when questioned by the authorities. Being
convinced of the suspects identity, the police launched a manhunt
operation that caused petitioner to present himself before the
San Juan Police Station to verify the said issue; he was then
detained by the police.
People v. Rodrigueza
Facts:
An informer of the Narcotics Division reported activity on illegal drug
trafficking to the authorities and a buy-bust operation was conducted
where the informer successfully bought 100 grams of marijuana for
P10.00 from the accused. The authorities immediately conducted a
raid and apprehended the accused while confiscating marijuana
leaves and syringes. The raid however was not authorized by a
search warrant. Accused now contends that the court erred in
admitting the evidence seized without any search warrant and in
violation of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein petitioners arrest valid?
Issue:
RULING:
Whether or not evidence obtained without a valid search warrant
may be used to prosecute the accused.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil
v.Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In the
instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was
murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed
at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that
the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime." ..... none of
the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting  one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge."
Held:
The court held that a buy bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught
redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a
person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the
procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this
qualification. The Narcom agents should have secured a valid search
warrant prior the raid since they have already been conducting
surveillance against the accused for quite sometime already and the
urgency of their cause of action cannot be justified in court. Hence
the accused was acquitted.
Posadas v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Go v. Court of Appeals
Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the INP of the
Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were
FACTS:
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., Davao City. While
they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
was stopped by the 2. They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver,
w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade,
& 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the
police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City
wherein after a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision
was rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed
decision in toto. Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of w/c
is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items
w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence against him. The Sol-Gen argues that under
Sec. 12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a
commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances
did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant. However, there are many
instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily
being preceded by an arrest, foremost of w/c is the ''stop & search''
w/o a SW at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c
has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa. As bet. a
warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or
police checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar, there is
no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering
that, unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search
the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have
obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
People v. Mengote
ISSUE:
FACTS:
WoN a person may be arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons, etc.
-the Western Police District received a telephone
c a l l from an informer that there were three suspicious
-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and NorthBay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila, shortly before noonof August 8, 1987, a
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was dispatched to the
place.
- Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan,
s a i d that they saw two men "looking from side to side," one
of whom was holding his abdomen. Theyapproached these
persons and identified themselvesas policemen, whereupon the
two tried to run awaybut were unable to escape because the
otherlawmen had surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched. One of them, whoturned
out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with
HELD:
From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may
be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when
in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, or when an
offense has in fact, just been committed, & he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense.
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
sixl i v e b u l l e t s i n t h e c h a m b e r . H i s c o m p a n i o n , l a t e r i
dentified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knifesecreted in his
front right pants pocket. The weaponswere taken from them.
Mengote and Morellos werethen turned over to police
headquarters forinvestigation by the Intelligence
Division.- I n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d w i t h R T C c h a r g i n g
a c c u s e d i n violation of Violation of PD 1866 illegal possession
of firearms.- Besides the police officers, one other
witnesspresented by the prosecution was
RigobertoD a n g a n a n , w h o i d e n t i f i e d t h e s u b j e c t w e a p
o n a s among the articles stolen from him during therobbery in
his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. Hepointed to Mengote as
one of the robbers.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) afterhe has
committed or while he is actually committingor is at least attempting
to commit an offense, (2) inthe presence of the arresting officer.
o
These requirements have not beenestablished in the case
at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen." There wasa p p a r e n t l y n o o f f e n s e t h a t h a d
j u s t b e e n committed or was being actually committedor at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its
n o l e s s stringent requirements have also not been satisfied.The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of M e n g o t e ' s
a r r e s t a n o f f e n s e h a d i n f a c t j u s t b e e n committed and
that the arresting officers had
personal knowledge
of facts indicating that Mengotehad committed it. All they had
was hearsayinformation from the telephone caller, and
about acrime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know
thenwhat offense, if at all, had been
c o m m i t t e d a n d neither were they aware of the participation
thereino f t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t . I t w a s o n l y l a t e r ,
a f t e r Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters,that they
learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein.
Issue:
W/N there was the warrantless arrest made
w a s legal? No.
Ratio:
Rules of Court Sec. 5.
Arrest without warrant when lawful.
Apeace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arresta
person;( a ) W h e n , i n h i s p r e s e n c e , t h e p e r s o n t o b e
a r r e s t e d h a s committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commitan offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and hehas personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person tobe arrested has committed it; and( c ) W h e n t h e
person to be arrested is a prisoner who hasescaped
from a penal establishment or place where he
i s serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his caseis
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
oneconfinement to another.
Clearly circumstances of the case doesn’t comeunder Par.
(c).
-
People v. Aruta
FACTS:
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received
information from an informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling
Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would
be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta
alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers;
NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of
her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the
same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to
the NARCOM office for investigation.
poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article
III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what
were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an
NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of
the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense,
Aminnudin disclaimed themarijuana, averring that all he had in his
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs
of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At
the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he
was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece
of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he
was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know
what marijuana looked like and that his businesswas selling watches
and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time
and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly
sustained.
People v. Aminnudin
Facts:
Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug
traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said
to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street
and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she
was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana
that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of
the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as
it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance
of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the
NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there
being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal,
it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be
used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
Issue:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held:
The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante
delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the
moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he
about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. The saidmarijuana therefore could not be appreciated as
evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of
the crime as charged.
People v. Musa
Facts:
People v. Malmstedt
A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
to Musa's house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to
buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
FACTS:
Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form
of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found
guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the
arrest was illegal without the search warrant.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right
hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded
to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to
100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was
going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he
wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back,
giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the
other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa
inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a 'cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.' They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a
search warrant.
HELD:
NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a
warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the
possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his
passport.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then
placed under arrest.
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political dev''t of the NCR. As
part of its duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver
that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
residents are worried of being harassed and of their sarety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for
ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired
in the air.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not
be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where
the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the 'plain
view' of the object.
Issue:
Whether or not the concerns of the petitioners are sufficient to
declare the checkpoints illegal
Held:
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the 'plain view' of the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the
plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the 'plain view' of said object.
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of
petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Therefore, the 'plain view' does not apply. The plastic bag was
seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Valmonte v. De Villa
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp Inc. (Sept. 13, 2004)
UNAVAILABLE
Facts:
On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting
security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral
People v. Maribel Lagman and Zeng Wa Shui
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
Facts:
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a
position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur:
a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
On appeal is the CA Decision affirming that of the RTC of Angeles
City, Pampanga, Branch 59 convicting Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng) alias
“Alex Chan,” and Maribel Lagman (Maribel) of violation of R.A. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. 7659.
1996 January - from the surveillance conducted by NBI agents of a
piggery farm in Porac, it was gathered that three Chinese nationals,
namely Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng), Li Wien Shien (Li) and Jojo Gan (Gan)
occupied the farm, and Maribel frequented the place while Zeng and
Liu would go over to her rented house in Balibago, Angeles City.
1996 March 14 – in the early morning, two NBI teams, armed with
search warrants, simultaneously raided the Porac farm and the
Balibago residence. The search of the farm, covered by Search
Warrant No. 96-102, yielded no person therein or any tell-tale
evidence that it was being used as a shabu laboratory. Only pigs in
their pens, and two (2) containers or drums the contents of which
when field-tested on-the-spot by NBI chemist Januario Bautista
turned out to be acetone and ethyl, were found. The leader and
members of the raiding team thereupon brought their vehicles inside
the farm and closed its gates, expecting that the suspected operators
would arrive.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. "Alex Chan," as one
of the subjects thereof. When he arrived in his L-300 van at the
piggery during the NBI’s stakeout, he came within the area of the
search. The drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine
was placed in the open back of the van, hence, open to the eye and
hand of the NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the
plain view of the NBI agents, hence, a product of a legal search.
At around 12:00 noon, Zeng arrived at the farm on board an L-300
Mitsubishi van bearing a blue drum containing liquid which, when
field-tested on the spot also by NBI Chemist Bautista, was found
positive for shabu.
Secretary Of National Defense V. Manalo
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or not the search and seizure made on the van driven by
Zeng is valid.
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military
men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were
members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention
and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Held:
YES, the search and seizure made on the van driven by Zeng is
valid. It falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing petition as amparo petition.
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals and Garcia
UNAVAILABLE
Zulueta v. CA
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of
the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment
of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and
records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by
her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge
and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers
were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct
Held:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a
continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of
Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or
employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that
there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,”
the Court explained.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence;
Held:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]
Section 3 -- Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b)
amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications
of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political
propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section
11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers
and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing
and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
Navarro v. Court of Appeals (313 SCRA 153 [August 26, 1999])
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
constitutional.
Held:
Section 4 -- Freedom of Expression and Assembly and Petition
Freedom of Expression
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression
and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article
IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period — ie, "during the election period." In
our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may
have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the
basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26
of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential
question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such
National Press Club v. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass
media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time
for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates
for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the
coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that
their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners
that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates
the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
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act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that
Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Issue:
Whether or Not the COMELEC's prohibition unconstitutional.
Held:
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to
restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not
to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage
that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political
office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of
free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more
for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests —
individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on
the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases
because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the
Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest,
and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where
freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on
the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of
election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too
general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application,
if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion
of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting,
and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus
with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of
the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Adiong v. Comelec
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by
such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's
right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present
danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,
to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
Facts:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or
private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the
May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the
petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print
political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
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candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to
where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case
is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation
to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists
on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because
nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
CA however reversed it hence this petition.
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated
by the COMELEC becomes censorship.
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not
constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression.
Iglesia ni. Cristo v. CA
Held:
Facts:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called
"attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTC's ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions
by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is
not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often
at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot
censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
Issue:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified
the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to
the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the
letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of
free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses
any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited
its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
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may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to
apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or
manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries
of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot
be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors."
A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by
judges and not left to administrative agencies.
WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.
Held:
The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power
of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon
the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty
gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to
free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the
right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students.
Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that
the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of
the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts
class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and
the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or
expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that
Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against respondent students.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. CA
Facts:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College
Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by
the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that
contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit
a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the
Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote
to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they
alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with
the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty
and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed
before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said
decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said
Discipline Board over the defendants.
US v. Bustos
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Issue:
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Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace
include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending
cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused
published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against him.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or
moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting
in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives
of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by
virtue of his right to free speech and free press.
Held:
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity.
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is
a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. v. Capulong
Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in
1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means
that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of
penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must,
of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons
have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and
of public affairs.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
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and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script.
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based
on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical
in its presentation of events.
Reyes v. Bagatsing
Facts:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States
Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a
short program would be held. The march would be attended by the
local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be
followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution
adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There
was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.
However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where
a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent
suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An
oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted
on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial
of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any
foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.
Issue:
Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to
film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical
stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
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and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble violated.
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak
FACTS:
Held:
Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on
condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on
adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of
their freedom of expression.
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly
carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor
is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether
an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to freedom of expression was violated in the
case at bar
HELD:
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Motion pictures are important both as a method for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse.
The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. For
freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The
power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only
under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of
discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However
there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave
as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the
scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and
caressing each other like lesbians.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was
violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way
he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
Chavez v. Gonzales and NTC
Facts:
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The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary
Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to
release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.
On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In another press
briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have
caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President
about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.
Primicias v. Fugoso
Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in
Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The
reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the
permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the
part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace
and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace,
and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot;
or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public
Place.1
Issue:
Is the warning to media in not airing the “hello Garci” tapes a case of
prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements
made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were
made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.
Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the
easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free
speech and press.
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section
provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit
for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion
to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with
the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
Assembly and Petition
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adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount
to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our
democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An
oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted
on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial
of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any
foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.
The Mayor's first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot
alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly
carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor
is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether
an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.
Reyes v. Bagatsing
Facts:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States
Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a
short program would be held. The march would be attended by the
local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be
followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution
adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There
was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.
However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where
a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent
suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was
violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way
he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
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A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held:
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They
would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to
the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."
Malabanan v. Ramento
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 AM to 12:00 PM, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students,
they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit,
not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they
marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It
was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied
beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same
day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the
holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture,
and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the
charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation
of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to
discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is
not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary,
the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under
the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly
is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its
school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Luzviminda de la Cruz vs. CA, et al.
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Facts:
upon the students for whose education the teachers were
responsible.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro
Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended,
and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection
with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their
respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike and
subsequently defying the return-to-work order by DECS constituting
grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.
Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a peaceful
assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances
in the exercise of their constitutional right and insist their assembly
does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of
classes.
PBM Employees Association v. PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of
the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they
decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The
Management, thru Atty. CS de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their
members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration
and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized
for the demonstration from 6 AM to 2 PM on March 4, 1969, filed a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace
Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith,
hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their right to freedom to
assembly and petition were valid.
Held:
The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that
public teachers in the exercise of their right to ventilate their
grievances by petitioning the government for redress should be done
within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The
conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning
classes is highly prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The
court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the
manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on
unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in
various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects
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employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished.
The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in
their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution.
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to
peaceable assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a
more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind
their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their
basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was
a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well
as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights
— freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KMP v. Ermita
UNAVAILABLE
Section 5 -- Freedom of Religion
Aglipay v. Ruiz
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be
appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of
church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein
the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further
their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to
respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as
would be advantageous to the government.
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Education (Allen) from removing appellant's members from office for
failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the
use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to
parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute
unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The
New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing
but the law is not unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not
mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052
“advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the
Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They
were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The
postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of
Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic
Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This
was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the
officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be
inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose
of the Government.
Issue:
Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid
(contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the
religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held:
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides
that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles
and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit
higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the
provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Facts:
New York's Education Law requires local public school authorities to
lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12,
including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and
Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of
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veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because
nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
CA however reversed it hence this petition.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not
find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted
by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be
considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business,
trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the
City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
Issue:
Iglesia ni. Cristo v. CA
Held:
Facts:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called
"attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTC's ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions
by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is
not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often
at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot
censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not
constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression.
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified
the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to
the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the
letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of
free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses
any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited
its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation
to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists
on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
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threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to
apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or
manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries
of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot
be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors."
A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by
judges and not left to administrative agencies.
viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of
his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him
from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Soriano V. Laguardia
Section 6 -- Liberty of Abode and of Travel
Facts:
Marcos v. Manglapus
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene
remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate
but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Facts:
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech
either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the
public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of
the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than
the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking
the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc.
To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1
and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan”
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5,
Art.III?
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and
considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the
Issue:
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Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Held:
Silverio v. Court of Appeals
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave
the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave
any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by
laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised
securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the
petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the
DFA to cancel petitioner's passport, based on the finding that the
petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show
that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the
permission of the court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the
court.
Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant
of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his
arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is
imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the
court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may
be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law
and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
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Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,SJ, Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which
issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner
to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any
allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of
Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered
as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with
in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
Held:
The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and
the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws.
Section 7 -- Right to Information
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise
of the public right.
Facts:
The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians
in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.
UNAVAILABLE
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of
Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that
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Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably
an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the 3 branches of the government.
Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality
of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it.
Chavez v. PCGG
The power to control the execution of the SC's decision is an
essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.
FACTS:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the
people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information
and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its
transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth.
ISSUE:
The Court also rejected public respondent's contention that by
granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
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Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of
access to information?
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was
probed further on PGMA’s and petitioner’s discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege.
The questions that he refused to answer were:
HELD:
1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project.
2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it.
3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.
Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still
in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.
The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees
upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained
that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He
was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his
arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony.
ISSUES:
Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II
and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding
Neri in contempt.
Romulo L. Neri V. Senate Committee On Accountability
Of Public Officers And Investigations
FACTS:
RULING:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the
supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount
of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China.
Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on
national security and government-xto-government contracts
regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent
Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN
Project. On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the
respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the
matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project
awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein
disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million
pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and
The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by
executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a
recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a
necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the
President and those who assist him with freedom to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately.” Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter
provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and
certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where
he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to
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answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public
information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other
right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified
by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information
subject to this case belongs to such kind.
The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for
having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required
to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.”
Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees
of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.
Section 8 -- Right to Form Associations
Held:
Social Security System Employees Asso. v. CA
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful
in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the
right to strike.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS)
have the right to strike.
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing nonstriking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The
complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages;
and that the strike be declared illegal.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act
on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
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shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this
exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on
freedom of association but instead reinforces it.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Facts:
Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later
resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the
prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with
any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop
agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their
employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a
member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No.
3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the
union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the
service after which he was informed by the company that unless he
makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be
dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350
impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and
discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be
affiliated with any labor unions.
In Re: Edillon (84 SCRA 554 [1978])
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Issue:
WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
Held:
Issue:
The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations
which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom,
i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby
an employee may join or refrain from joining an association.
Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic
Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or
coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
Whether or not the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional
infirmity?
Held:
No. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
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moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect
the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to
the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling
lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along
EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla
and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate
agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the
Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their
rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma
Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds
of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential
purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones
or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which
may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong
materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary
installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved
septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2)
meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange,
with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the
beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the
commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began
constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it,
which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding
police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal.
Issue:
Section 10 -- Non-Impairment Clause
Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank (94 SCRA 533 [1979])
Held:
Facts:
No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main
traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in
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the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality
are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power.
credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since
this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment
of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not
arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of
the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Lozano vs. Martinez
FACTS:
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of
evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid
and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay
"stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason
therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance
of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment
and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for
short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's
constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any
check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a
fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double
said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused
of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said
presumptions.
ISSUE:
W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract
RULING:
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
No. Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that: "No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." However, the
freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to
enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public
policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day
and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
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Section 12 -- Custodial Investigation
People v. Judge Ayson
Gamboa v. Cruz
Facts:
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines,
assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conductand Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos
stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings
of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling
said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not
ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution
contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion
for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this
appeal.
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a lineup of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a
complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his
counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process
violated.
Held:
No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not
been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is
a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver
shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible
as evidence the admission and statement of accused.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived
of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only
that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after
the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against
self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what
is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case
at bar).
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This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
oradministrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on
ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond reasonable
ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was
violated.
Held:
The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily
absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence
and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in
the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was
within the requirement of Miranda rights and within lawful means
where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona:
the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
People v. Maqueda
Facts:
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his
house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, TeresitaMendoza was
badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two
household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former
houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike
Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away
from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two
accused asked them for directions.
People v. Mahinay
Facts:
Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl.
He assailed the court decisions contending that his conviction was
based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial confession was taken
from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial
interrogation.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken
to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to
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SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights
before he signed suchdocument. Afterwards he was brought to the
Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda
filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and
Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon
only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth
of the admission because such testimony was objected to as
hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with
Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other
admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore
admissible.
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the
robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue:
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been
made by the SC:
Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the
Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.
Held:
Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in
clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he
was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At
the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges
in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel
but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite
his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he
still confessed when he did not have to do so.
People v. Deniega (251 SCRA 626, 637 [1995])
Facts:
The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The
prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial
confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a
counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the
prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of
the crime and the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused
was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to
such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a
warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The
exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not
confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants
based on their extrajudicial confession.
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extrajudicial admission is inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
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The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and
existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must
be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the
accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the
constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers
were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People
vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation
of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. “Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given.” Thus, because of these defects in observing
the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial
investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.
accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities,
hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted
under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later
by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not
entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution
is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime
charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of
custodial investigation.
Held:
No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated
since the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the
interrogation and he was not informed of his right to remain silent
and right to a counsel.When accused-appellant Bandula and
accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest,
they had no counselpresent. If at all, counsel came in only a day
after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao,
and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs
that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are
blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art.
III. Irregularities present include:
People v. Bandula
Facts:
Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut
Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were
identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano,
security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty.
Garay,counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and took with
them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accusedappellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others
who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was
convicted.
1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit
statements that would incriminate them.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the
accused for medical assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigo’s "black
eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandula’s
fractured rib.
During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial
confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It
was 2 weeks later that he was provided with one in the person of
Atty. Zerna, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a
sworn statement admitting the shooting of the victim.
Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and
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3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special
counsel,public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused.
started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend
the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied
by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of
Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero. The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his
house in Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when several
unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his
house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and
pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did
not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers.
Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be
one who is impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the
accused cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be
provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused with
municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial because of
conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty of said
counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure
to meet the requisites of due process for conducting custodial
investigation.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that
he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he
was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
complainant. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez
brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr.
Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to
line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the
fourth time. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial
confession under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty,
Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present
during his actual custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo
acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial
court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by
direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
People v. Lucero
Facts:
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with
handgun, blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board
a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pagasa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with
cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring;
one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth
P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused
shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended
party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the
instantaneous death of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez brothers
and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. When Lucero told him that
he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed
no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the
impression that Lucero understood his advice.When the investigator
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accusedappellant.
Held:
Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial
confession.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the
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commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. The Court
have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can
render them inadmissible.
that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since
Quiaño escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy
was established, hence this appeal.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of
choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no
reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant
understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant
gave an uncounselled confession.
Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are
admissible as evidence to warrant conviction.
Issue:
Held:
No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in
court. Despite asking for his uncle to represent him he was provided
with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private
prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes
of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the
accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the
accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but that was not
put in writing either. It would be in violation of the mandate of
custodial investigation to admit the statement of the accused when
the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard
requirements of the due process that should be accorded to the
accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from
Atty. Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro
Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
People v. Agustin
Facts:
Quiaño, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his
office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the
armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo
Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic
notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with
the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of
Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The
following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and
was afforded the privileges like that of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense
interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint
atKennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a
lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he
nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty.
Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and
Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise
People v. Pinlac
Facts:
The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for
robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the
contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial
confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture,
and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights
and without the assistance of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial
investigation of the accused.
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informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of
the1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
Held:
The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of
the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making
the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel
during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely
presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein
are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court
acquitted the accused.
(1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
People v. Andan
People v. Bolanos (211 SCRA 262 [1992])
FACTS:
Facts:
Instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the
Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals entitled
"People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, versus Anicia RamosAndan and Potenciana Nieto, accused, Anicia Ramos Andan,
accused-appellant." On February 4, 1991, Anicia Ramos-Andan,
herein petitioner, and Potenciana Nieto approached Elizabeth E.
Calderon and offered to buy the latter’s 18-carat heart-shaped
diamond ring. Elizabeth agreed to sell her ring. In turn, Potenciana
tendered her three (3) postdated checks.
Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan.
According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao,
deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of
whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased.
When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated.
They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the
police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the
vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted
him hence the appeal.
Inasmuch as the three checks (PDB Check Nos. 14173188,
14173189, and 14173190) were all payable to cash, Elizabeth
required petitioner to endorse them. The latter complied. When
Elizabeth deposited the checks upon maturity with the drawee bank,
they bounced for the reason "Account Closed." She then sent
Potenciana a demand letter to pay, but she refused.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel.
On July 10, 1997, Elizabeth filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan a Complaint for Estafa against petitioner and
Potenciana. Finding a probable cause for Estafa against them, the
Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information for Estafa
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan.
Subsequently, petitioner was arrested but Potenciana has remained
Held:
Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the
police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal
investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
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at large. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.
not proven in Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by
the Appellate Court. Hence a petition to the Supreme Court.
During the hearing, petitioner denied buying a diamond ring from
Elizabeth, maintaining
that she signed the receipt and the checks merely as a witness to the
transaction between
Elizabeth and Potenciana. Thus, she could not be held liable for the
bounced checks she did
not issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty under Art.315
HELD:
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner
guilty as charged and imposing upon her an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day ofpri si on mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Elizabeth E. Calderon in
the amount of P73,000.00 representing the purchase price of the
diamond ring.
The elements of the offense as defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did
not know that the offender had no funds or insufficient funds.
The trial court held that while it was Potenciana who issued the
checks, nonetheless, it was
petitioner who induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed
the same. Accordingly, petitioner cannot escape liability.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC
Decision. The maximum penalty imposed was increased to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal and the indemnity was reduced to P23,000.00 considering
the RTC’s finding that:
Complainant, however, was able to present in Court only Planters
Development Bank (Check) No. 14173188, dated June 30, 1991, in
the amount of P23,000.00 and the fact of its being dishonored. The
other two checks were neither presented nor the fact of being
dishonored proven. Likewise, the two checks were not mentioned in
the demand letter marked as Exhibit ‘C.’ Although, therefore, it is
clear from the records, in fact admitted by the accused, that the total
amount of P23,000.00 as purchase price of the diamond ring has not
been paid, the accused should only be held liable for the dishonor of
the check above- stated as the dishonor of the two other checks was
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution proved
that the checks were issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation,
i.e., the checks were issued in payment for the ring. The checks
bounced when Elizabeth deposited them for the reason "Account
Closed." There is no showing whatsoever that before petitioner
handed and endorsed the checks to Elizabeth, she took steps to
ascertain that Potenciana has sufficient funds in her account. Upon
being informed that the checks bounced, she failed to give an
adequate explanation why Potenciana’s account was closed. In
Echaus v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that "the fact that the postdated
checks…were not covered by sufficient funds, when they fell due, in
the absence of any explanation or justification by petitioner, satisfied
the element of deceit in the crime of estafa, as defined in paragraph
2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code."
People v. Macam
Facts:
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Prosecution’s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan
Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito
Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC.
Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have
lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the
companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while
E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken
their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito
Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They
tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo
Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while
Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she
was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was
also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was
P536, 700.00.
contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces
during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before
each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio
Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in
the said case.
Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the
arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.
Held:
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a
“critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding
appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the
accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the incourt identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.
Defense’s version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4
accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him,
he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be
paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused
inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and
swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced
the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he
abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of
Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang
mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such
phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also
testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the
province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the
following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of
the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to
get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they
are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because
they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court
by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque,
while remaining outside the house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as coconspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes,
betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard,
TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun
and money.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore
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People v. Herson Tan y Verzo
Held:
Facts:
No.It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled
confession or admission and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate
protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a
pertinent provision of which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice
of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any
violation of law.
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to
inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive.
His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen
stab wounds.
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando
Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with
respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During
their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of
what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and
co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle
and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that
they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit,
Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP
immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido
were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect
is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements
that the rule begins to operate.
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited
appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In
the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not
only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly
committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely
conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not
inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to
writing. In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted
appellant.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a
requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those
rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the
accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights
to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4)
it must be in writing.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police
investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is
admissible in evidence against him.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it
must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be
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made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."
Held:
Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that
when appellant was invited for questioning at the police
headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime.
This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The
constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent
and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values
liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional
rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative
and prosecutory powers of government."
In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its
credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused
to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him.
This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police
officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made
the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance
of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at
bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who
heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what
he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not
be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in
substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside
the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused
being guilty of the crime.
People v. Dy
People v Alicando (G.R. No. 117487, December 2, 1995)
Facts:
Facts:
Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was
sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss
national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in
admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he
came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and
informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the
accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the
court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing
and is in violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.
Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4
year old girl. He was arrested and during the interrogation he made a
confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue
of his uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find
the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like clothes
stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The
victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with
the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic
review.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was
accorded to the accused.
Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be
admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.
Held:
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discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated
June 29, 1995 was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated
June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant
Prosecutor Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed
and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated
June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant
Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition
was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another
hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.Respondent Judge alleged
that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to
oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the
bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the
prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the
discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that
when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the
prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with
the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the
public prosecutor recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that
in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion
for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration.
Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial
investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right to a
counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information
against him was written in a language he could not understand and
was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule
116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted
the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry
on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the
consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the
court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they
were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the
accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the
decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the
case back to the lower for further proceeding.
Juanita A. Aquino v. Teresita B. Paiste
UNAVAILABLE
Section 13 -- Right to Bail
Basco v. Rapatalo
FACTS:
Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August
141995, in a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M.Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful
disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in
a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused
Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set
for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the
respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995
but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The
hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the
accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail
was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in
connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was
made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.Complainant allegedly
saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later
learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the
petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant
ISSUE:
CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING
OR RECEIVINGEVIDENCE?
HELD:
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NO. If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has
the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in
direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution.
must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard,
there would be a violation of procedural due process. The cited
cases
(w/c I didn’t include kse madami)
are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be
conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of
it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. Corollary, another reason why
hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
Tucay v Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that
even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an
application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it
answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the
state' s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After
hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof,
the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether
the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of
the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application
for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the
In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an
accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the
judges might not want to release. It is in view of the abovementioned
practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where
the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person" charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."When
the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor
beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable
bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its
exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the
judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. Consequently, in the
application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
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prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both
the prosecution and the defense. An evaluation of the records in the
case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of
the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense
charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down
in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94.Respondent judge admittedly
granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration
not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he
has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having
conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the
petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to
exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for
granting bail to the accused. It is the court's determination after a
hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis
for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on
the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After
all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent
Judge grants the application for bail without hearing since Section 8
of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against
the accused's provisional release will be determined
at the hearing. The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to
the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to present evidence
to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be
traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v Director of Prisons. It is to
be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided 50 years ago under
a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was
indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration
with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under
the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments
introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court .It should be noted that there
has been added in Section 8 crucial sentence “The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is
dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.” is not
found in the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Court. The above-underscored sentence in section 8, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address
a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present
evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel dutybound to grant the bail application. The prosecution under the
revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail
hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused.
However, the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be
equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the
accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for
bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the
proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused
to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any
rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses could
always be recalled at the trial on the merits. In the light of the
applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just
enunciated, SC reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);(2)
Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion(Sections 7 and 8, supra);(3) Decide
whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);(4) If the
guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied. The above-enumerated procedure should now
leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of
bail applications.
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People v. Judge Donato
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a
reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.
Facts:
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on
October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and afterFebruary 1986.
Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the
respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of
RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoringto full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato
now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a
condition that he shall report to the court once every two months
within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to
deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not
comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since
the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right
to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the
right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to
change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearingthe
prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a
penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not
applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition
forhabeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to
remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition
that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said
petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional
rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the
accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and
was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPPNPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known
address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time
of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his
false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be
also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a
declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be
false;
People v. Fortes
Facts:
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Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter,
Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the
accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was
granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him
guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond
was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that
the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to
bail.
Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pretrial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A
motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990,
but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
libertyand a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then
granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released
immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing
court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
Issue:
Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition
forhabeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in
Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC.
Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against
the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that
before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence
of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined
that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of
the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at
the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given
until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date,
they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they
were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on
the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory
challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
Comendador v. De Villa (200 SCRA 80 [1991])
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of
the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial
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petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the
schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that
they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly
prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having
committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not
interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice
was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the
Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without
merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
Issue:
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception tothe general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.
Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in
the grant of bail to the accused.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the
judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for
bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately
conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an
opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in
Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law
that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the
accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should
have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before
making an outright grant of this motion.
Note:
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than
one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the precharge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers
and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the
respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the
orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail,
it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
Baylon v. Judge Sison
Facts:
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the
accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given
notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in
violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of
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Manotoc v. Court of Appeals
Section 14 -- Criminal Due Process
Criminal Due Process
Facts:
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were
charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pretrial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was
denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary
injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa
refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the
resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking
that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating
the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating
that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail
does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding.
Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he
termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public
Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely
known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December
12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the
complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after
petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by
referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command,
for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for
graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio
L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits
were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved
by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
(1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a
check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General
Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in
1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to
file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years
1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made
Issue:
Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional
guarantee on the right to bail.
Held:
The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in
the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule
involves the unique structure of the military and national security
considerations which may result to damaging precedents that
mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them
the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government.
Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the
petitioners was reversed.
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alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law
and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him.
It was denied hence the appeal.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day
period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the
contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;
that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy,
not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.
Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of
trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only
after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law
for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day
period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory,"
yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3)
years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the
killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court
from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the
Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order
prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file
a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent
Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio
inreverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued
ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a
new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served
on them).
Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was
killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported
within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose
identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and
that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people
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are entitled to due process.
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice,
Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A
conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to
the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice
by the visitors in the reception hallwaiting to see the President.
During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres.
Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that
on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to
the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting
all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted
that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case
had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus)
had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the AquinoGalman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all
criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by
his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore,
not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory
thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the
assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an
accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double
jeopardyclause.
Held:
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and
ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months
later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were
ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared
resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for
these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The
assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence
at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle,
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except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself.
The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and
developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The
partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President
Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may
not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in
favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the
Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was
issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent
judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to
lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must
now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any
order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case
or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice."
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts.
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided
only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at
bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth,
and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
Alonte v. Savellano
Facts:
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with
accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that
Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s
house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was
brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the
change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.
The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of
Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie
and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this
case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal
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due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life
elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did
not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised
about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.
Hence the appeal
Issue:
Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held:
Issue:
Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of
innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a
right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt
is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty
of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to
constitute the offense."
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
Held:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further
deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of
waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of
the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly
not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise
on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of
the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their
rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that
was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is
thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely
advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court,
notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the
element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the
party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime
charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.
Presumption of Innocence
People v. Dramayo
Facts:
Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he
could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The
idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was
returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby.
Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder.
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office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
Dumlao v. Comelec
FACTS:
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at
the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might
not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may
also be good elective local officials.
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired
from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof)
providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed
the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His
petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are
more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may
not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them
and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
ISSUE:
Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing,
there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged
65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD:
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet
all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2)
an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case,
only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the
provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
Marquez v. Comelec
Facts:
It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate
ofcandidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of
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insurance fraud or grandtheft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of LosAngeles, USA. A warrant issued by
said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet tobe served on private
respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country.
Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of
respondent’s certificateof candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s
disqualification was filed by petitioner,but COMELEC dismissed the
petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon.
Petitioner institutedquo warranto proceedings against private
respondent before the COMELEC but thelatter dismissed the
petition.
Corpuz v. People
Issue:
Issue:
Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his
certificate ofcandidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a
foreign court and evading awarrant of arrest comes within the term
“fugitive from justice.”
Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of
innocence of the accused of the charge against him
Held:
It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield
to the positive findings that he malversed the government funds
considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on
the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks
issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and
there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was
not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the
paymaster.
Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision finding
him guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the
acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurer’s office. He
denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was
discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending
that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their
paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner
was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer
Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually
receiving the amount.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
“Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
“(a)xxxx
“(e)Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
orabroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been
convictedby final judgment.”
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to
persons who has
been convicted by final judgment.
However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or
not privaterespondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly
denied the petition for quowarranto. The Court opted to remand the
case to COMELEC to resolve and proceedwith the case.
Antonio F. Trillanes IV v. Hon. Pimentel, Sr.
Facts:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
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No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati.
- Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the courtof First Instance
of Romblon with slight illegaldetention because according to the
information,being a private person, he did "feloniously andwithout
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain oneArtemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado forabout eight hours thereby depriving said
ArtemiaFabreag of her personal liberty
- During the trial, he plead guilty as he was without alawyer, and that
a certain Numeriano Ocampo toldHolgado to plead guilty. The Court
reserved thesentence for a two days despite the fiscal’sassurances
that the certain Numeriano Ocampo hasbeen investigated and found
without evidence to linkhim to the crime- It must be noticed that in
the caption of the case asit appears in the judgment above quoted,
the offensecharged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION whilein
the body of the judgment if is said that theaccused "stands charged
with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In
theformation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said thathe "accuses
Frisco Holgado of the crime of slightillegal detention." The facts
alleged in saidinformation are not clear as to whether the offense
isnamed therein or capital offense of "kidnapping andserious illegal
detention" as found by the trial judgein his judgment. Since the
accused-appellant pleadedguilty and no evidence appears to have
beenpresented by either party, the trial judge must havededuced the
capital offense from the facts pleaded inthe information.
Held:
WH E RE FO RE, the petition is DIS MIS S E D.
Ratio/Doctrine:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by
law.The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal
action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction of the lower court is valid
HELD:
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted
a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law
NO. It is invalid.- Under the circumstances, particularly the
qualifiedplea given by the accused who was unaided bycounsel, it
was not prudent, to say the least, for thetrial court to render such a
serious judgment findingthe accused guilty of a capital offense, and
imposingupon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and oneday of
prision mayor
to twenty years, withoutabsolute any evidence to determine and
clarify thetrue facts of the case.- rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3,
that –If the defendant appears without attorney, he mustbe informed
Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel
People v. Holgado
FACTS:
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by the court that it is his right to haveattorney being arraigned., and
must be asked if hedesires the aid of attorney, the Court must
assignattorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonabletime must be
allowed for procuring attorney.- the court has four important duties to
comply with:1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right
tohave attorney before being arraigned; 2 — Aftergiving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; 3 — If he desiresand is unable to employ attorney, the
court mustassign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — I
the accused desires to procure an attorney of hisown the court must
grant him a reasonable timetherefor.
uneducated.- It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
bycounsel is deemed so important that it has become aconstitutional
right and it is so implemented thatunder our rules of procedure it is
not enough for theCourt to apprise an accused of his right to have
anattorney, it is not enough to ask him whether hedesires the aid of
an attorney, but it is essential thatthe court should assign one
de oficio if he so desiresand he is poor grant him a reasonable time
toprocure an attorney of his own.- in the instant case, that the
accused who wasunaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with
thefollowing qualification: "but I was instructed by oneMr. Ocampo."
The trial court failed to inquire as tothe true import of this
qualification. the record doesnot show whether the supposed
instructions was real. and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty.
Noinvestigation was opened by the court on this matterin the
presence of the accused and there is now noway of determining
whether the supposed instructionis a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
becamesatisfied with the fiscal's information that he hadinvestigated
Mr. Ocampo and found that the samehad nothing to do with this
case. Such attitude of thecourt was wrong for the simple reason that
a merestatement of the fiscal was not sufficient toovercome a
qualified plea of the accused. But aboveall, the court should have
seen to it that the accusedbe assisted by counsel specially because
of thequalified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense
found to be capital by the court.
- IN THE CASE,
Not one of these duties had beencomplied with by the trial court. The
record disclosesthat said court did not inform the accused of his
rightto have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desiredthe aid of one.
The trial court failed to inquirewhether or not the accused was to
employ anattorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure orassign
an attorney
de oficio
.- The question asked by the court to the accusedwas "Do you have
an attorney or are you going toplead guilty?" Not only did such a
question fail toinform the accused that it was his right to have
anattorney before arraignment, but, what is worse,the question was
so framed that it could have beenconstrued by the accused as a
suggestion from thecourt that he plead guilt if he had no attorney.
Andthis is a denial of fair hearing in violation of thedue process
clause contained in our Constitution.- One of the great principles of
justice guaranteed byour Constitution is that "no person shall be held
toanswer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that
all accused "shall enjoy the right to beheard by himself and counsel."
In criminal casesthere can be no fair hearing unless the accused
begiven the opportunity to be heard by counsel. Theright to be heard
would be of little avail if it does notinclude the right to be heard by
counsel. Even themost intelligent or educated man may have no
skillin the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may beconvicted not because he is guilty
but because hedoes not know how to establish his innocence.
Andthis can happen more easily to persons who areignorant or
Dispositive
The judgment appealed from isreversed and the case is remanded to
the Courtbelow for a new arraignment and a new trial after
theaccused is apprised of his right to have and to beassisted by
counsel. So ordered
People v. Agbayani
Facts: T
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he appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and
was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was
filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to
choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a
2 day preparation for trial.
represent the accused stating on record that his representation is
without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel.
This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the
complainant already expressed frustration on the so many
postponement of the hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his
own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that
the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is
sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send
the case back for a new trial.
Held:
The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent
judge devoid of merit. An examination of related provisions in the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is
the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not,
in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due
process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited
this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the
scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the
proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing
him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is
prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the
administration of justice.
Held:
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that
the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not
sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the
trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in
the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to
inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that
the accused was informed by the court of such right.
Amion v. Chiongson
Ferdinand A. Cruz v. Judge Mijares
UNAVAILABLE
Facts:
This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for
vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de
officio despite the appellant’s opposition because he has his own
counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many
instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which
prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
Pecho vs. People
Facts:
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The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the
complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed with the contention of the
defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for
double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of
RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes
consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the
crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court
held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of
double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA
3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document and that the
accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of
the information.
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It
follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It
has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as
charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to
object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the
charges.
Issue:
Soriano v. Sandiganbayan
Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of
the crime to which he is convicted
Facts:
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient
evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator
to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of
the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence,
thus the accused was acquitted.
Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst.
Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the
investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an
entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had
supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a
principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Held:
The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as
follows:
1.To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; 2.To avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; 3.To inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
Issue:
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated:
not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation
Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be
regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
Held:
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without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit
his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered
The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be
annulled because there was no arraignment.
R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage
or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he
was not arraigned.
Held:
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery
under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b).
The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not
included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3
(b). The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not
limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds
of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned
so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what
penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to
disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that
requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused,
for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must
be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard
by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the
Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed
on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an
arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of
due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the
investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor
transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210
of the RPC.
Borja v. Mendoza
Facts:
Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu.
However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent
Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was
appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign
him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of
respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973,
finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is
nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge
Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The
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case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the
offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance
of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment
of petitioner.
Held:
It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine
the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the public
prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is
not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. Gauging such standard
against the wording of the Information in this case, the Court finds no
violation of petitioner’s rights. The recital of facts and circumstances
in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified theft.
Sheala P. Matrido v. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Sheala Matrido (petitioner) assails the May 31, 2007 Decision and
August 1, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the trial court’s Decision of December 13, 2004 convicting her of
qualified theft.
As a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire
East Land Holdings, Inc., petitioner was tasked to collect payments
from buyers of real estate properties such as Laguna Bel-Air
developed by private complainant, issue receipts therefor, and remit
the payments to private complainant in Makati City. On June 10,
1999, petitioner received amortization payment from one Amante
dela Torre in the amount of P22,470.66 as evidenced by the owner’s
copy of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted only
P4,470.66 to private complainant as reflected in the treasury
department’s copy of Official Receipt No. 36547 submitted to private
complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of petitioner
and reflect a difference of P18,000. On private complainant’s
investigation, petitioner was found to have failed to remit payments
received from its clients, prompting it to file various complaints, one
of which is a Complaint-Affidavit of September 21, 2000 for estafa,
docketed as I.S. No. 2000-I-32381 in the Makati Prosecutor’s Office.
As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain
therefrom and without the use of force upon things or violence
against or intimidation of persons, a personal property consisting of
money in the amount P18,000 belonging to private complainant,
without its knowledge and consent, thereby gravely abusing the
confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant who had
access to payments from private complainant’s clients, specifically
from one Amante Dela Torre.
The penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than the
applicable penalty for simple theft. The amount stolen in this case
was P18,000.00. In cases of theft, if the value of the personal
property stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Two degrees higher than this penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 20 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary
Issue:
Whether the appellate court “gravely erred in affirming the decision
of the trial [court] convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified
theft despite the fact that the prosecution tried to prove during the
trial the crime of estafa thus denying the petitioner the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against her?
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surrender being present, the maximum penalty shall be the minimum
period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or
within the range of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 16 years, 5
months and 20 days.
case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in
obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of
speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed
such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and
conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and
damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find
the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to
constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a
speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always
subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the
absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or
oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity
in prosecuting the accused.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
People vs. Tee
Facts:
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against
Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and
sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court
for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the
accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further
contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by
failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to
appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial
procedure.
Flores v. People
Facts:
Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by
certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against
petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment
rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the
case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its
affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not
a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of
Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took
all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes
of the original trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial
prejudiced during the hearing of the case?
Held:
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and
speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in
general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to
speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1)
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked
for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
trial was violated?
Held:
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the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the
constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed
with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural
defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA
should have been made party-respondent to the petition.
Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation
and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not
completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to
contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to
dismiss the case against the petitioners.
Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz (50 SCRA 18 [1972])
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with robbery in band with homicide. They
filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases which were not
immediately resolved by the respondent Judge. In the meantime,
another suspect, one Rolando Reyes was arrested. He executed an
extra-judicial statement and signed and swore to its truth before the
respondent Judge wherein he implicated the petitioners. On this
basis, the respondent Judge deferred action on the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss until after the prosecution had presented and
rested its case against Reyes. Reyes was tried separately and in the
absence of petitioners. During the petitioner’s trial, Reyes was called
as an additional witness where he repudiated his extra-judicial
statement contending that the same was procured through threats by
a government agent. As a consequence, he petitioners filed a motion
to disqualify the respondent Judge on the ground that Reyes had
repudiated the extra-judicial statement which the latter sworn to
before the former and that the latter would have to pass upon the
repudiation. The motion to disqualify was denied by the respondent
Judge.
Conde v. Rivera
Facts:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas,
has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to
see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more
than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she
was when originally charged.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and
impartial trial?
Issue:
Held:
Whether the respondent Judge should disqualify was denied by the
respondent Judge.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a
speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a
right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and
she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down
Held:
Petition is granted. The restraining order issued is made permanent.
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It is beyond that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
application of the law to the facts as found by a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Petitioners can assert then that this court has the power to set aside
the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion
in the first instance belongs to the respondent Judge, its exercise is
subject to this court’s corrective authority. There can be no question
as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse
disqualification is to cast valid doubts as to court’s impartiality. In this
case, the respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what
apparently was asserted before him in such extra-judicial statement.
It is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the
affiant’s turn about which his later declaration that there was
intimidation by considering that the respondent Judge would have to
pass judgment on a question that by implication had already been
answered by him (having already given his opinion on the matter).
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said
eight (8) criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question was held,
with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the
chambers of Judge Garcia. During all the 14days of trial, spanning a
period of several months, the accused were at all times represented
by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their
clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients'
instance. There was only 1 day (April 20) when Atty. Consengco,
representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the
insistence of Carbonnel, the trial proceeded and said respondent
cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse
party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents
that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the
conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and
were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and
Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14page memorandum in support of their prayer for exoneration, and
conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges
against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said
respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out
any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; theme
memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of
the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases.- The
promulgation of judgment scheduled on Sep23, 1968 was postponed
to Sep 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Consengco, , and again to
Oct 1,1968. The applications for postponement were not grounded
upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.However, on October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their
counsel, filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge Felix
Domingo issued a restraining order thuscausing the deferment of the
promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was
an order from him declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory
rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their
'right to a free and impartial trial, noting 'that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and notin the
court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge
Garcia, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated
Garcia v. Domingo
FACTS:
On January 16, 1968, in the City Court of Manila presided over by
petitioner Judge Gregorio Garcia, 8informations were filed against
respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco
Lorenzana, for slight physical injuries, maltreatment, for violation of
Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer);
and for slander. The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly
held on March 4, 18, 23, 30, 1968; April 17, & 20, 1968, May4 & 11,
1968, June 1, 15, 22 & 29, 1968, August 3 &10, 1968. All the 14 trial
dates except March 4 and18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday.
This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence
of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under
suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated
as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for
trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
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the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases
pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.”- The MR was
denied. Hence, on January 28, 1969, the matter was elevated to the
SC by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition.
state constitution in 1776. Later it was embodied in the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. Today
almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or
judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the
public.- The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public
trial. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be
public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His
being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to
the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. Accdg to J. Laurel, the importance
of this right is its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus
understandable why such a right is deemed
ISSUE:
WON respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that the holding of the trial of the accused inside the chambers of
petitioner ,city court Judge Gregorio Garcia, as violative of the
constitutional right to public trial
HELD:
YES. The procedure had been agreed to beforehand by accused.
The hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate
occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of
evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded
being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took
place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
intentional secrecy.- The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the
time of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to
which an accused was entitled. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation
from Justice Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by
him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."It would have been
surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked
any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely are iteration what
appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known
as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the government of
this country as an unincorporated territory of the United
States.Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading
case of In re Oliver: This nation’s accepted practice of guaranteeing
a public trial to an accused has its roots in the English common law
heritage, but it likely evolved long before thesettlement of the US as
an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial.The
guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a
Trial in Absentia
People v. Salas
FACTS:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old
woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal
at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at
about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando
Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming
from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard
Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about
3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard
Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that
was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after
reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan
heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that
she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning;
Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head
and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck
which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the
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victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded
upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch,
earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9,
1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front
door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted
for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was
with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in
going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as
while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw
Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no
change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one
RamilTalens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay
that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in
the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping
the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse
and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00
by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat,
however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no
longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw
the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the
wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at
Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day,
he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no
longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together
with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the
parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that
their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but
since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he
returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at
Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the
Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio
message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a
vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer
Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at
Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and
not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for
Robbery with Homicide
(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction
of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
(2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with
homicide.
HELD:
There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or
to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever
recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from
which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of
culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to
insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,
all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of
guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the
author of the crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the
guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be
deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of
March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San
Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that
very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio
mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for
work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also
abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6,
1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting
project. He was not seen again from said date. Police investigators
found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on
his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed.
Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect,
ISSUES:
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a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not
present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a
full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement
in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a
Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used the
alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These
circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always
been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property.
Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of
the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi
is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to
another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d)
on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed."
Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim,
there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and
wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The
victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son,
RamilTalens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his
mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens
containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal
with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which
victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed
at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances
that the robbery occasioned her killing:
(1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake.
(2) The appellant knew that victim was winning.
(3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant.
(4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were
missing from her body when found.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial is
negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively
testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last
person seen with the victim alive.
The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against
appellant.So ordered.
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part
of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against
the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses
deserve full faith and credit.
Carredo v. People
FACTS:
Accused after arraignment waives his right to appear in court during
the trial while under a bond. At the presentation of the principal
witness the court issued a subpoena to the accused to appear on
trial for the purpose of meeting the witness face to face, however he
did not appear with the justification of his waiver. Subsequently the
municipal judge issued order of arrest of the accused with
confiscation of his cash bond and ordering the bondsman to show
cause why no judgment shall be rendered against him.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of
the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants
to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest.
Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the
accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to
resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being
investigated by the police authorities.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not an accused may be compelled by the court to appear
before the court despite waiver in favor of trail by absentia.
were then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at
large. Mangumnang however escaped while being in detention and
Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested,
the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and
Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
HELD:
The court held that such waiver only constitutes a waiver of the right
of the accused to meet the witness face to face. It does not in effect
deprive the prosecution of its right to require the presence of the
accused for the purpose of identification by its witnesses which is
vital in the conviction of the accused. It does not further release the
accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court
whenever so required. The accused is accorded with the right to
waive his own personal right but not his duty and obligation to the
court.
“Trial in absentia not allowed when it is necessary to establish the
identity of accused by the witness”
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the
Constitutional mandate on the presumption of innocence and proof
beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to
push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang.
HELD:
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that
the lower court has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the
latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the
requisites of trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction
over Magumnang.
People v. Mapalao
FACTS:
Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely
they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene
Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal,
Anwar HadjiEdris, GumanakOmpa and defendant-appelants in this
case, Omar Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in
absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation
in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional
mandate was not violated.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the
passengers could urinate. While the car was stopped the Bara-akal,
Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at
the other passengers and divested them of their properties.
People vs. Valeriano, et al.
Facts:
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the
precipice (bangin). When the car was near the precipice, Galvez
then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the
car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was
left inside the car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The
robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car, helped
Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers
The accusatory portion in the information for murder. Facts are as
follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at
Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
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accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and confederating
with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti', did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence on the person of one RizalinaApatanSilvano while
the latter was about to leave her house and inflicting upon her
injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked
behind the knee; abdomen hacked with visceraeevacerated,' and did
then and there set the house on fire while the aforementioned
RizalinaApatanSilvano was inside said house trying to escape
therefrom, and allowing her to be burned inside said house which
was burned to the ground, thereby causing upon said
RizalinaApatanSilvano her death and burning her beyond
recognition.
attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of
fire by burning the house of victim RizalinaApatan-Silvano in order to
forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse
of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its
maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetuataking into account
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is
Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the
wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that
simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused
EngracioValeriano only.
But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim
Wilson Silvano, accused EngracioValeriano only is nowhere to be
found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or
at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond the
jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused,
JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered
and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from
frustrated homicide.
But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was
located and the records of these two cases were burned. The
records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the
prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken,
however, before it could commence, accused EngracioValeriano
jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 November
1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. An
alias warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, but he
remains at large up to the present.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely:
JuanitoRismundo, MacarioAcabal and AbundioNahid are hereby
ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their
immediate confinement."
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the
witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were
re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by Judge
Pacifico S. Bulado.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court.
The decision of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated
31 October 1991 but promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained
no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last two
paragraphs which read as follows:
(2) Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused
is valid.
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the
killing of RizalinaApatan-Silvano having been proved by the
prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO,
MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the
(4) Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated
murder.
(3) Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia.
Held:
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We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of
Court on judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to
reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending
the commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused
in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived.
III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has
been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his
failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never
offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment
in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the
judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and
counsel.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the
accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to
acquit him.
It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in
open court their intention to appeal immediately after the
promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed
their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any
sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct
their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost
jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal.
Right of Confrontation
U.S. v. Javier
UNAVAILABLE
Talino v. Sandiganbayan
UNAVAILABLE
The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the
order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is
contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their
abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in
question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the
persons of the accused-appellants.
Section 15 -- Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus
Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971])
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be
imposed on accused EngracioValeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584
because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of
justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that
Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the
retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article
Facts:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus
in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.
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Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by
Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned
the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension
does not meet the constitutional requisites.
made to numerous documents. At the close of his examination, and
on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled hearing
of December 12, 1973 was cancelled, and Padua's crossexamination was reset on December 17, 1973. However, the hearing
of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of
defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and
trial was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and
13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." After defendants'
attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings,
as narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for
cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on March
1, 1974, Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on
March 6, 1974 in Tarlac and that the cancellation would "at any
rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March
7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the hearing
on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No opposition was filed
by the defendants to the motion. Apart from filing this motion on
March 1, 1974, plaintiff’s counsel took the additional step of sending
his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to
verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on
that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however
denied the application and dismissed the case. Padua moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD:
The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it
had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and
to annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this
matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant
classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the
end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and
systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE :
Section 16 -- Right to a Speedy Disposition of Cases
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case on
the ground that it violates the right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Padua v. Ericta
RULING:
FACTS :
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure
that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except
on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely
in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however,
that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the
light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of
Domingo Padua, petitioner sought to recover damages for the
injuries suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused
by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by
Antonio G. Ramos. Padua was litigating in forma pauperis. Trial of
the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced
presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave
testimony on direct examination in the course of which reference was
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the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases
may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by
all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the
precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in
plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced
liable under an ex parte judgment. Judge's action was unreasonable,
capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.
Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation
and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not
completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to
contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to
dismiss the case against the petitioners.
Section 17 -- Right Against Self-Incrimination
U. S. v. Tan Teng
Flores v. People
Facts:
Facts:
The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old
girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was
alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor
and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio
was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her
sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.
Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by
certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against
petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment
rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the
case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its
affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Philippines against whom it is filed
was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court
of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA
took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes of the original trial.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim
identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was
examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same
symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over
to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.
Issue:
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the
victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease
was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter.
The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible
because it was taken in violation of his right against selfincrimination.
Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy
trial was violated.
Held:
The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the
constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed
with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural
defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA
should have been made party-respondent to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation
of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination.
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Held:
Beltran v. Samson
The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not
a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any
admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken
from his body without his objection and was examined by competent
medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of
Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may
be used as evidence against him.
Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write
a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge.
The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him,
which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued
that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue:
Villaflor v. Summers
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner
for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision under examination.
Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial
judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical
examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the
determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein
petitioner refused to such physicalexamination interposing the
defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.
Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that
of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say
that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. It cannot be contended in thepresent case that if permission
Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the
petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of
the accused is permissible.
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to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that
the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult
matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen
or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that
is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.
should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if
and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the
question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the assurance
that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which
would incriminate him.
> prosecution version of what happened:
Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird(car) and asked if it
is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met Sumilang and informed
about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize
on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce
him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed
of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would
then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to
be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the
meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk
which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and
signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with
a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay
Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money
should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested
Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. The two
Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not
locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then
immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI
recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez,
Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in
Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a
golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the
14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the
name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of
Asistio in Caloocan.
>sumilang’s verson (one of the accused):
Chavez v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
>this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court that he is entitled to be freed from imprisonment
upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, HE WAS
DENIED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE
COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF.
>judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle
(thunderbird car together with accessories)
>an information was filed against the accused together with other
accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of
confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.
>all the accused plead not guilty.
>during the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez
to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal
Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary
witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will
only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on
the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there
Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told about the
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Thunderbird. They raised the money. Chavez went to Sumilang
house and asked if he was ready for the rest of money. He affirmed.
At Eugene’s Sumilang saw Pascual and warned Chavez was a smart
agent and advised that Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of
sale was executed. Two or three days after, Asistio offered to buy
the car of Sumilang and tendered the down payment.
himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer
to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as
a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to
testify.
>There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must
be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and
willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has
been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held
to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence
>trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang. As to
Chavez, his testimony established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and branded him “Self – confessed culprit”.
>trial court decision: freed all other accused except Chavez who was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
>The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a
high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless.
>chavez appealed to the Court of appeals but it was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self –
incrimination had been violated?
HELD:
>Supreme Court decision: Petition granted. Accused must be
discharge.
>Petitioner claims that there was a violation of right against self –
incrimation.
Section 19 -- Prohibited Punishment
People v. Estoista
UNAVAILABLE
>Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient
People v. Esparas and Libed
UNAVAILABLE
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
>During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but the judge
had impliedly forced him by saying that the prosecution has the right
and that his testimony will not be used against him.
Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality
>Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of
his will to resist; they foreclosed choice. With all these, we have no
hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate
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of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve.
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But theexercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend
laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the 3 branches of the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an
essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Theimportant part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by
granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possessescollateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity. Thesuspension of such a death sentence is indisputably
an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary
suspensionof the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death
Section 20 -- Non-Imprisonment for Debt
Serafin v. Lindayag (67 SCRA 166 [1975])
Facts:
Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito
Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife CorazonMendoza
and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant
admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against
respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant
of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since
elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no
person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of
money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case.
(Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant
desisted case was pursued.)
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it
ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held:
Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is
considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no
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collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the
spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of
demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep
her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under
the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a
"criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very
face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on
the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding
"that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged,"
respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society
as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
the exercise of its police power.
Lozano v. Martinez
Section 21 -- Double Jeopardy
Facts:
People v. Obsania (23 SCRA 1249 [1968])
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of
the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as
the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC.
The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief.
The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the
accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their
motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to
intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
Facts:
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the
Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His
counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege
vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of
dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double
Jeopardy.
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of
police power of the State.
Held:
Held:
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid
complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial
Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of
double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
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the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense because his action in having the case is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason
that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the
merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only
with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of
his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113,
if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double
jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.
Held:
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be
without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal
was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused,
he has deemed to have waived his protection against double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion
of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Paulin v. Gimenez
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The
latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is
beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case
atbar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as
to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
Facts:
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were
smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned
by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle
until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the
nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle.
Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly
pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his
subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the
petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put
their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of
dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution
because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated
and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right
tocomplete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary
procedure was correctly applied.
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal
Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion
of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was
reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition,
damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a
TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for
being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of
the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Facts:
Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17
February 1987 with the Supreme court against then acting Municipal
Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, herein petitioner Aurelio G.
Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and
incompetence. 1
Issues:
The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of detention
dated 18 and 27 November 1986 issued by the said acting judge
against complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because of her
continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. The
(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of
acquittal.
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Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of
merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988.
Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, complainant Magbago also filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint earlier filed
with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge
Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Sandiganbayan.
People v. Balisacan
Facts:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos
Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In
doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he
was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he
stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis
of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the
prosecution appealed.
Issue:
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Ruling:
It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double
jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was
administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also
against said petitioner is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any
of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as
personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court
judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not
strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan,
on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of
the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue:
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is
an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first
entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted
incomplete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating
his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to
plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be
entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no
standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental
that the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent
court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. 6 All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the
administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention
that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court,
which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the
defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the
People v. City Court of Silay
Facts:
Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y
Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with
"falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document"
under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Ernesto de la
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Paz, overseer of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz,
and the other three accused, scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine
Company, with intent of gain and to cause damage by conniving,
cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane
weight report card or "tarjeta", a private document showing the
weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, particularly
those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and 1022 by increasing
the total actual weight of 22.005 tons to 27.160 tons for said three
cane cars, thereby causing damage to the central and other cane
planters of about 8.68 piculs of sugar valued in the total amount of
P618.19, to the damage and prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other
sugarcane planters adhered thereto in the aforestated amount of
P618.19. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge
against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on
this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975,
dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not
constitute the crime of falsification as charged.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General,
the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas"
with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused
entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in
certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory
section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the
"tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document,
the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of
facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their
duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the
other accused as scalers of the offended party, the HawaiianPhilippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
Esmena v. Pogoy
Facts:
Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to
withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to
them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During
arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after
the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another
date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial
Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a
telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked
their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case
because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the
priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in
order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid
in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal
filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate
of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether the plea of double jeopardy is available in this situation?
Ruling:
We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the plea of double jeopardy is not
available in the instant situation.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on
motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the
prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
Issue:
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Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was
dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial,
would place the accused in double jeopardy
Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was separately
accused of having committed the crime of estafa and of falsification
both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. She sought the
quashal of the latter charge on the supposition that she is in danger
of being convicted for the same felony. Her first attempt was
unsuccessful but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding
Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the
belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of
committing estafa.
Held:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for
the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without
the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s
incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the
witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double
jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one,
there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done
before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused
has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information.
In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed
was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned
and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these
three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently
shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and
asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would
mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of
the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been
dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents
as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to
acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.
The accused filed an Application for Registration of her parcel of
land, which was already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V.
Ilano. She then sold the said parcel again to several other people,
which sales were registered and annotated with the Register of
Deeds. Despite several demands from Ilano, Naval refuses to return
the payment of the former.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the court below correctly quashed the information
for falsification.
2) Whether or not the court below correctly shared the notion that
private respondent was in danger of double jeopardy.
Held:
1) Assuming that falsification was indeed necessary to commit
estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code and thus susceptible to challenge via a
motion to quash, still, it was serious error of the defendant to have
appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this
matter was not specifically raised in the motion to quash but only in
the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this
additional ground after her motion to quash was denied. The theory
of a single crime advanced by private respondent in her belated, nay,
"second" motion to quash couched as motion for reconsideration is
not synonymous with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy". In
effect, therefore, respondent judge accommodated another basis for
People v. Judge Pineda
Facts:
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the quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in
the motion therefor.
2) It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the
notion that private respondent is in danger of being convicted twice
for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under Section
2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash,
because this plea is understood to presuppose that the other case
against private respondent has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge. In the Asuncion case, Justice
Nocon said that:
. . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may
successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had
previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case
against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge.
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense
is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy
since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused.
due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was
reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was
called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present.
The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his
absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office
of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was
denied by respondent judge.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of
the case.
Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their
case, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable
length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there
was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the
respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds
of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does
not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial
was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is
annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
People v. Tampal
Facts:
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel
Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were
charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo
Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private respondents,
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel
Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement
Melo v. People
UNAVAILABLE
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days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was
filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident
in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet
no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by
said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335
had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had
already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent.
People v. Adil
FACTS:
The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on
April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows:
That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at
Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use
personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter
with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby
inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require
medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring
complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto
attached.
People v. Judge Relova
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines
seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova
quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the
ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with
personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine
the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one
Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiringdevices have
been installed without authority from the citygovernment and
architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said
devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease thereadings of
electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case
was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was
filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior
to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right
to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr.
Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a
Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electricalinstallations
with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the
amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion
to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s
claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense
charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of
electricaldevices without the approval and necessary authority from
the CityGovernment which was punishable by an ordinance, where
in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which
Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a lettercomplaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo (Case No. 5241) against
Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito
Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same
incidents.
Issue:
Whether of not there has been a case of double jeopardy on the part
of the respondent.
Held:
The plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot
hold. In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335
was filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr.
had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the
certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the
offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9
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is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that
declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the
following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion
by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag
and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a
judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
Issue:
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke
doublejeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against
him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of
electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the
second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs
Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of
doublejeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second
sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an
ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution
for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the
charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or
definition of doublejeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy
of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a
violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact
that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the
2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of
the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an
act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force
and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means.
It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security
of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full
knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.
Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section
7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision
mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to
the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if
thought, assembly and association.
Section 22 -- Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
Issues:
People v. Ferrer
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Facts:
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Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,
careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association
is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.
Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the
benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured
as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is
also an ex post facto law.)
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that
the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of
the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN
POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not
only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same
purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not
person.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused
under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the
TRIAL COURT.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be
shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership
punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the
organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than
100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged
involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit
assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some
otheremployees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and
the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and
encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent
obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the
government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july
25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and
was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given
an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of
mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt.
This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter.
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other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against
them.
People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending
RA 3019.
Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo
Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political
leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito
Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur
on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor
Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free
patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector
of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable
lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his
application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for
violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then
filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary
investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the
private respondent contending among others that he is charged for
an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The
crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription
was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to
quash was being assailed.
Issue:
Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee
against an ex post facto law.
Held:
The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes thecrime
of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as amongcrimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from
public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which
violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex
post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and
public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not
a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if
acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional
provision against ex post facto law.
Issue:
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he
is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is
charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving
fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended
from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office
under which he was charged.
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.
Held:
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for
the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326,
which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and
not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on
March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to
fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a
violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the
crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the
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accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto
law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him
criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under
the law existing when it was committed.
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and
frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE:
Lacson v. Executive Secretary et al.
UNAVAILABLE
Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been
violated with the passage of RA 8249.
“Equal Protection” – KBG – Cases Before the Sandiganbayan
HELD:
FACTS:
The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to
equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made
by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the
law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when
there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub
out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple
murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996,
Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a
and c) of RA 7975 “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And
Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That
Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the “principal accused” are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was
authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law
as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were
in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it,
thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution
of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and
whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the
power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
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which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as
them.
The controversy in the case at bar centers on the citizenship of
Fernando Poe, Jr. as to whether or not he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.
RULING:
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases
involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in
Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those
affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the
new law (R.A. 8249).
Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth stressing that since
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939,
the applicable law then controlling was the 1935 constitution. The
issue on private respondent’s citizenship is so essential in view of
the constitutional provision that, “No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.” Natural-borncitizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme
consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo
Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September
11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least
to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his
death was also his residence before death. Considering that the
allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since
Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no
doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.
was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter is governed by the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution which constitution considers as
citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or
illegitimate.
V. ARTICLE IV -- CITIZENSHIP
Tecson, et al. v. Commission on Elections
FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners
questioning the certificate of candidacy of herein private respondent
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
party. He represented himself in said certificate as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, which reason that petitioners filed a petition
before the Comelec to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
on the ground that the latter made amaterial misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipinowhen
in truth his parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child.
The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
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Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Facts:
have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or
in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet
the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements.
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The congressional election for the second district of
NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu, originally a Portuguese national, was naturalized as a
Philippine citizen on 10February 1978. However, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed PortuguesePassport
No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.The CID detained the
petitioner pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a
petition forhabeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc.
The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong,
Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident
of the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
ISSUE:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in
the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private
respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court
an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree
Lim.For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered
himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those
elections.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those
born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed whenrequired and suppressed when
convenient. Petitioner, while still a citizen of the Philippines who
hadrenounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreignprince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to
theRepublic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents hesigned, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong
sometime inApril 1980. Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly andexplicitly and not left to
On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should
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inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity,after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed orreacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippinecitizen.
Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with hismaintenance of Philippine
citizenship.WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion
for release from detention is DENIED.Respondent's motion to lift the
temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediatelyexecutory.While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely andforever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to"maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality
asPortuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in Hongkong
sometime in April 1980.
help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private
respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that
their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio
because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the
Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a
citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not
cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend
the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus
Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument
that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable
because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the
annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed
that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's
incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not
a Filipino.
Frivaldo v. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in
due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on
the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized
in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May
22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely
forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added
that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of
the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
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qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal
if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987,
Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen
of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby
declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly,
he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly
elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision
becomes final and executory.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one
of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree
that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization
was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
Republic of the Philippines v. Judge de la Rosa
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily aims to
declare the naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as invalid and
consequently, nullify his proclamation as governor of Sorsogon.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance
to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
It appears that Frivaldo had served as governor of Sorsogon for six
terms already and was only compelled to renounce his citizenship
when he sought political asylum in US due to the precarious political
atmosphere here in the country during the Marcos regime. As he
wasn’t able to reacquire his citizenship through repatriation or
through act of Congress, he was forced to file a petition for
naturalization on September 1991.
The judge set the hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the
publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation---for three consecutive weeks, at least once every
week, the last publication to be made six months before the
scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked the court if the hearing
could be moved to an earlier date as he intends to participate in the
May 1992 elections, the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy
being March 15 1992, a day ahead of the scheduled hearing.
The court granted his request and set the hearing on Feb 21
1991. Of this advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born
citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the
more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price.
But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and
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of notice was made. Six days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa
rendered a decision granting Frivaldo’s application and allowed him
to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To this, petitioner
Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldo’s rival for governorship in Sorsogon, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging jurisdictional defects in the
proceedings.
period. Thus, as qualifications for public office is a continuing
requirement, once lost (citizenship), title may be seasonably
challenged.
3.
Hermo cannot be proclaimed as winner. Well settled is the rule
that upon disqualification of the winner in an election, the second
placer cannot be proclaimed as winner having failed to obtain the
mandate of the majority of the electorate.
Subsequently, two petitions were filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is
an American citizen and is therefore ineligible to run, and that the
court’s decision is null and void for being fraught with legal infirmities.
In one of the petitions, petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted
in favor Frivaldo be declared as stray votes and that he be declared
winner instead. These petitions were all dismissed by Comelec on
the ground that such petitions were filed out of time, as it should
have been filed within three days.
Labo v. Comelec
FACTS:
Ramon Labo Jr. is a person granted Australian citizenship in 1976
although this fact is still questionable since no direct evidence was
presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance2 as a
naturalized Australian citizen. Labo returned to the Philippines in
1980 and in 1988, Labo ran and won as mayor of Baguio City but
was protested against by Luis Lardizabal, alleging that Labo is an
alienand therefore, disqualified to run for office. Lardizabal asked for
Labo’s proclamation as mayor beannulled and as the person who got
the second highest number of votes in the previously held
election,he be declared as the new mayor of Baguio City.
ISSUES:
1.
W/N Comelec was correct in dismissing the petitions for
being filed out of time?
2.
W/N the proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo
not a Filipino citizen and thus ineligible for public office?
3.
W/N Hermo may be proclaimed winner upon
nullification of Frivaldo’s proclamation?
ISSUE:
RULING
Whether or not a runner up in the elections can replace an ousted
official.
1.Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that they
were filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are quo
warranto. As such, they are not covered by the 10-day appeal period
provided in Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2.
The proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have
cancelled Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy. The Court never
acquired jurisdiction over the case due to the following irregularities:
(1) there was no order published advancing the date of the hearing,
(2) the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication of the
petition, (3) Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance when there was still a
pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo did not observe the 2-year waiting
HELD:
Negative. Lardizabal can not assume the position of mayor because
he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio. Labo’s
disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office.Instead, the
vice mayor shall replace Labo.
Aznar v. Comelec
Facts:
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1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"Osmeña
filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position
of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections.
HELD:
SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision.
The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent
had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for
under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegia nceto support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.In the instant case, private respondent
vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport
and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss
of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña,
the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express",
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or
"implied"
2)
On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on
the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of
the United States of America.
3)
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28,
1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1")
4)
During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent,
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the
late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25,
1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;
and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19
65.
5)
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely
filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.
Mercado vs. Manzano & Comelec
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by
acquiring dual-citizenship?
Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. In the results of the elections,
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Manzano obtained the highest number of votes, however his was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground
that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective position.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the BOC,
Manzano as vice mayor of the City of Makati. Hence, this petition.
Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the
Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding
his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
WON Mercado has the right to bring suit?
WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
WON there was a valid election of citizenship?
HELD:
I.
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 3044, the BOC tabulated the votes
cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of
the winner.
On May 19, 1998, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification (case filed by Mamaril) it was however opposed by
Manzano. Aug. 31, 1998, COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, it
declared Manzano qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Right to bring suit.
At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from
running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of
R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered
voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action,
so was Marcado since the he was a rival candidate for
vice mayor of Makati City.
Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
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candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of guilt is strong.
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
III. Election of Philippine Citizenship
Mercado argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and
that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
was ineffective as it should have been made when he
reached the age of majority.
II. Dual citizenship as ground for disqualification
The disqualification of Manzano is being sought under
§40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 “those with
dual citizenship.” It is contended that through §40(d) of
the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
COMELEC, pursuant to §349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that
"A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by:…(e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite
to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To
be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Manzano’s certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath:
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of
an individual's volition.
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURALBORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
xxx xxx xxx
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By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen.
time allowed by present jurisprudence.
- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil. Citizenship (from
OSG):
1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a phil
citizen
2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c
means a reasonable time interpreted by the SOJ as 3 years from the
Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible, however,
held in the same case that 7 years not reasonable time)
- Ching to support his cause invokes these special circumstances:
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, being a CP, a
registered voter, and elected public official.
Petition is DISMISSED.
In re Ching
ISSUE:
FACTS:
WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time and
if so WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.
Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
- April 1964: Vicente Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat
Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union.
Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils
- During this time, the governing charter is the
1935Constitution.Father’s citizenship is followed, with a right to elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the’98 Bar Examinations.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams
provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert
from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC.
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed.
He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship.
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
- OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti
was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally
elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable
WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship.
HELD:
No. Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.
Being born in April 1965, he was already 35 years old when he
complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 in June 1999. He was
already more than 14 years over the age of majority.
Although the court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statutes
and jurisprudence compel the court in its decision. Also, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil. Citizenship,
the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process. Philippine
citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should
be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
No. The abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
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simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
anatural-born Filipino.
Bengzon III vs. HRET and Cruz
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960,
ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
UnitedStates. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen ofthe
Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen.”
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As
distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he
is so minded.
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1)
whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether
or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of
the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaintaffidavit.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and
academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of
a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioner's contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual
support.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law",
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the
allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his
counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding Closed",
in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in
a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation completed. All that is required is that the
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basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular
No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of
arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in
this resolution.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be
held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the
publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that
such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed
would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds
no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaintaffidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their
separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents,
the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585,
82827 and 83979. The Order to maintainstatus quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in
the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
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Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that
she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead
of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a
trial judge.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal
prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual
difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question
government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court
and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line.
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves the three
principal issues mentioned in its opening statement. However, as to
the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the
libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to
reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these
petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v.
Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience."
The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized,
criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common
good.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Paño (134 SCRA
438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal
prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in s
seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader
considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the
highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented
public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist,
the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing
editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for
alleged libel.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a
person in authority of such exalted position that
the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. 'In the eye of our Constitution and laws,
every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p.
900)
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be
limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead of observing
accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks,
irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths
which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
complainant. However, this case is not a simple prosecution for libel.
We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who
heads the investigation and prosecution service and appoints
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In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of
affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges would
actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It
would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at
the typical person should be examined from various perspectives
if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme
Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower
tribunals.
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of
legal business, and the other various other
formulae for the repression of expression that
have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks
justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of
the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should
not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility
that the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a
chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously
perform their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading
more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors
tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect
on a free press would be highly injurious.
xxx xxx xxx
"Those who won our independence believed .. that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risk to which all
human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument
of force in its worst form. . . .
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left
unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our decisions
which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed
in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be
characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117
[1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
"Thus we consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. . . " (at pp. 700701)
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
"In deciding the question now, we are compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other
'mere labels' of state law. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328.
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Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there
a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V.
Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly
participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free
speech aspects of these petitions, should not a differentiated
approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up
everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law
includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue
applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis
newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is
not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand
that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to
shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to
provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media
personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now
before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate?
There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.
extremely difficult is involving government power and freedom of
expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue
for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr.
Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343
U. S. 250) when he said.
"If one can claim to announce the judgment of
legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel
laws are consistent with the concept of ordered
liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved
to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression."
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in
the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied.
Appendix B
Silva vs. Presiding Judge
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided
to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to
disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue
on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure
now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a
Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent
the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an
incumbent President should not be sued. At the same time, the
President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the
nullification of Search Warrant No. 1 issued by respondentJudge as
well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00 seized
from petitioner Antonieta Silva.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The Court has decided to deter the "chilling effect" issue for a later
day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our fiscals and
judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers stand in
the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this
problem? And why should we allow possibility of the trial court
treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without
bothering to fully explore the more important areas of concern, the
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC
Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an
"Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners
Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This application was
accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur
M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2
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On the same day, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant
to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of
Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police
officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of
Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Pertinent
portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows: prLL
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money
belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the
said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized
the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and
joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the
said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. 4
"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned
after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T.
Villamor, Jr.and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M.
Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is
probable cause to believe that possession and
control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes,
joint has been committed or is about to be
committed and that there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves,
cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control
at Tama's Room (Rgt. side 1st Floor) located
at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which
is/are:
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1,
1986, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the disposition of the
said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in
connection with the search warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant
No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a
mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of
Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks
and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and
witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section
3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
"X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of
fruits of the offense;
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio
M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced retired JudgeOntal, issued an
Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites
necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied
with. 7
"X (Used or intended to be used as means
of committing an offense.
A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by
petitioners was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated
October 19, 1987.
"You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time of the day (night) of
the room of TamaSilva residence of his father
Comedes Silva to open (sic) aparadors, lockers,
cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and
take possession of the following
property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes,
joint and bring the said property to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs." 3
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was
tainted with illegality and that respondent Judge should be viewed to
have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave
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abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued
the Order dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash
Search Warrant No. 1.
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
"SECTION 4.Examination of complainant; record.
— The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted."
We rule for petitioners.
Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right to personal liberty and security of homes
against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section
provides: LLpr
"SECTION 2.The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judgeafter
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions,
the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether
there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses
through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14,
1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this Court defined "probable cause" as
follows:
"The 'probable cause' for a valid search warrant,
has been defined 'as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched'. This probable cause
must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay."
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 8
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for
the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
"SECTION 3.Requisite for issuing search warrant.
— A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned
search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply
with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and
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his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in
order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo,
which was submitted together with the "Application for Search
Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided
thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:
In the case of Nolasco vs. Paño, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1986,
139 SCRA 152, 163, this Court held:
"The 'probable cause' required to justify the
issuance of a search warrant comprehends such
facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof
Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th
pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not
searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to
the description of the personalities to be seized,
which is identical to that in the Search Warrant
and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The
examination conducted was general in nature and
merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and
does not satisfy the requirements or probable
cause upon which a warrant may issue."
"QDo you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo
Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search
warrant?"
AYes, sir.
"QDo you have personal knowledge that the said
premises subject of the offense stated
above, and other proceeds of fruit of the
offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to
be used as means of committing an
offense?"
Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the
search warrant issued as invalid due to the failure of the judge to
examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers.
Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
A Yes, sir. LexLib
"QDo you know personally who is/are the person
who has have the property in his/their
possession and control?"
"Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt.
Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and
short. Respondent Judge did not examine him 'in
the form of searching questions and answers'. On
the contrary, the questions asked were leading as
they called for a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. As
held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for
search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant." 10
AYes, sir.
"QHow did you know all this (sic) things?"
AThrough discreet surveillance." 9
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it
was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses
were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition
was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was
fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
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Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with
the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine
the existence of probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 667, "the capricious
disregard by thejudge in not complying with the requirements before
issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".
was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in
Hongkong on September 11, 1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted entry
into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2)
months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.
On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a
native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16,
1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their
authority when they seized the money of AntonietaSilva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named
as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the
seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints,
and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal
property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be
used as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal
property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the
offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his
discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner
Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan
Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on
September 10, 1962.
In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration
ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the
country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon
failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause
the confiscation of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau
Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned
the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioner's Alien Certificates
of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing
warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court,
on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of
facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is
hereby declared null and void. Respondent Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order the
return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which
had earlier been seized from her by virtue of the illegal search
warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. LexLib
Appendix C
Morano vs. Vivo
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January
6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her
cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her
children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai. With her
(a)Granting this petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU
WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the
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Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her
Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers upon the payment of proper
dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with
respect to her permanent admission, prohibiting
the respondent, his representatives or
subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said
petitioner;
Placed to the fore is paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473 [Revised Naturalization Act], which reads:
(b)Dismissing this petition with respect to
petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining
the respondent, his representatives or
subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said
petitioner;
To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) a valid
marriage of an alien woman to a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized.
(c)Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit
the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN SAU
WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of
P4,000.00; and
But can the same be said of the second requisite? This question by
all means is not new. In a series of cases, this court has declared
that the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily
show that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law. 3 Ly Giok Ha
alias Wy Giok Ha, et al. vs. Emilio Galang, L-21332, March 18, 1966,
clearly writes down the philosophy behind the rule in the following
expressive language, viz:
'Sec. 15.Effect of the naturalization on wife and
children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met. The
validity of the marriage is presumed.
(d)Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare
Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 unconstitutional
Without pronouncement as to costs."
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The
qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications
enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that
the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under
section 4, the result might well he that citizenship
would be conferred upon persons in violation of
the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
disqualified only —
Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.
We will deal with the claims of both appellants in their proper
sequence.
1.The Solicitor General's brief assails the trial court's declaration that
Chan Sau Wah is a citizen of the Philippines. The court a quo took
the position that "Chan Sau Wah became, by virtue of, and upon, her
marriage to Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a Filipino
citizen." 2
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(c)Polygamists or believers in the
practice of polygamy; and
Because of all these, we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan
Sau Wah did not become a Filipino citizen.
(d)Persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude',
2.Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of
Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, which reads:
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling
or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a
competent court, would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not
intend such a person to be admitted as a citizen in
view of the requirement of section 2 that an
applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral
character'.
"Sec. 37.(a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commission of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of
the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced
believer in racial supremacy, in government by
certain selected classes, in the right to vote
exclusively by certain "herrenvolk', and thus
disbelieve in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not
'opposed to organized government', nor affiliated
to groups 'upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments', nor
'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de
caeteris."
xxx xxx xxx
(7)Any alien who remains in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under which
he was admitted as a nonimmigrant."
Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon
the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Right] of
the Constitution, to wit:
"(3)The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shell not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart
from the wise precept affirmed and reaffirmed in the cases
heretofore noted.
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit
that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required
by the Naturalization Law.
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They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to
issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of
such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative
of the Bill of Rights.
purely accidental, and, though supported by the
same facts, a criminal prosecution and a
proceeding for deportation are separate and
independent."
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not
require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section
1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that the issue of
probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. 6
The following from American Jurisprudence, 5 is illuminating:
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of
sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions." 8 So it is, that this
Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the
fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is
to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the
expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to
deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated
the limitation or condition under which they were admitted as nonimmigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613,
as amended)" 9
The view, we, here express funds support in the discussions during
the constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as
sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of
liberty, other than by order of a competent court. 7
"It is thoroughly established that Congress has
power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to
the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an
alien who is found in this country in violation of law
is not a deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves
upon executive officers, and their findings of fact,
after A fair though summary hearing, are made
conclusive."
xxx xxx xxx
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the
Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged as
unconstitutional because "such power is only vested in a judge by
Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution", this Court
declared —
"The determination of the propriety of deportation
is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime;
nor is the deportation a punishment, even though
the facts underlying the decision may constitute a
crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect
simply a refusal by the government to harbor
persons whom it does not want. The coincidence
of local penal law with the policy of congress is
"This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of
appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is
subject to certain contractual stipulations as
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contained in the cash bond put up by him, among
them, that in case of breach the Commissioner
may require the recommitment of the person in
whose favor the bond has been filed. The
Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such
condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the
Commissioner to prepare the ground for his
deportation under section 37 (a) of
Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation
would render such power nugatory to the
detriment of the State." 10
"Sec. 13.Under the conditions set forth in this Act,
there may be admitted into the Philippines
immigrants, termed 'quota immigrants' not in
excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without
nationality for any one calendar year, except that
the following immigrants, termed 'nonquota
immigrants, may be admitted without regard to
such numerical limitations.
The corresponding Philippine Consular
representative abroad shall investigate and certify
the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his
admission into the Philippines. Qualified and
desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under
temporary stay may be admitted within the quota,
subject to the provision of the last paragraph of
section 9 of this Act.
It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration
Act of 1940 is not constitutionally proscribed.
3.A sequel to the question just discussed is the second error set forth
in the government's brief. The Solicitor General balks at the lower
court's ruling that petitioner Chan Sau Wah is entitled to permanent
residence in the Philippines without first complying with the
requirements of Sections 9 and 13 of the Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503.
(a)The wife or the husband or the unmarried child
under twenty- one years of age of a Philippine
citizen, if accompanying or following to join such
citizen:
We first go to the law, viz:
(b)A child of alien parents born during the
temporary visit abroad of the mother, the mother
having been previously lawfully admitted into the
Philippines for permanent residence, if the child is
accompanying or coming to join a parent and
applies for admission within five years from the
date of its birth;"
"SEC. 9 [last paragraph]
An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant
cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien
must depart voluntarily to some foreign country
and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo
examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance
with the requirements of this Act."
Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist
temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 15
just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last
paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily
to some foreign country;second, she must procure from the
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter
undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at
xxx xxx xxx
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the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance
with the requirements of the Immigration Act.
The ruling of the trial court on this score should be reversed.
4.It is petitioner's turn to point as error the dismissal of the petition for
mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Fu Yan Fun.
Petitioner's line of thought is this: Fu Yan Fun follows the citizenship
of his mother. They cite Section 15, paragraph 3, Commonwealth Act
473, which says that:
This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that
an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her
status without first departing from the country and complying with the
requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. 11
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that Chan Sau Wah has,
since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino,
Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to
appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan
Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such
solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage,
both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shell automatically be come a Philippine
citizen. . . ."
Petitioner's position is based on the assumption that Chan Sau Wah,
the mother, is a Filipino citizen. We have held that she is not. At best,
Fu Yan Fun is a step-son of Esteban Morano, husband of Chan Sau
Wah. A step-son is not a foreign-born child of the step-father. The
word child, we are certain, means legitimate child, not a step- child.
We are not wanting in precedents. Thus, when the Constitution
provides that "[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"
are citizens thereof, 13 the fundamental charter intends "those" to
apply to legitimate children. 14 In another case, the term "minor
children" or "minor child" in Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Law refers only to legitimate children of Filipino citizens. This Court,
thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, there said: 15
Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a
forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing into the
law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor
to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in this
country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of
discretion is allowed us. We cannot insulate her from the State's
power of deportation.
Really, it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but
actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt
the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable
character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a
Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act.
Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.
"It is claimed that the phrases 'minor children' and
'minor child', used in these provisions, include
adopted children. The argument is predicated
upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all
intents and purposes, a legitimate child.
Whenever, the word 'children' or 'child' is used in
statutes, it is generally understood, however, to
refer to legitimate children, unless the context of
the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary.
Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides
that 'those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines', and 'those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines' who shall elect
Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may
not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines.
Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. 12
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Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority are citizens of the Philippines Article IV,
Section 1, subdivisions [3] and (4]), our
fundamental law clearly refers
to legitimate children (Chiongbian vs. De Leon, 46
Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223,
May 12, 1952)."
of the bond." 16 The reason for the rule is found in 9 C.J., p. 26
(footnote), which reads:
"(a)Reason for rule. — 'Statutes requiring bonds to
be approved by certain officials are not for the
purpose of protecting the obligors in the bond, but
are aimed to protect the public, to insure their
solvency, and to create evidence of an
unimpeachable character of the fact of their
execution. When they are executed for a legal
purpose, before a proper tribunal, and are in fact
accepted and approved by the officer or body,
whose duty it was to approve them, it could serve
no useful purpose of the law to hold them invalid,
to release all the obligation thereon, and to defeat
every purpose of its execution, simply because the
fact of approval was not indorsed precisely as had
been directed by the Legislature.' American Book
Co., vs. Wells, 83 SW 622, 627, 26 Kyl 1159."
(emphasis supplied)
At any rate, Fu Yan Fun entered the Philippines as a temporary
visitor. The status of a temporary visitor cannot be converted into
that of a permanent resident, as we have heretofore held, without
first complying with Section 9 of the Immigration Law.
5.Petitioners finally aver that the lower court erred in authorizing
respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by petitioners
Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun in the amount of P4,000.00.
Here is petitioner's posture. They enjoyed their stay in the Philippines
upon a bond. Now they come to court and say that as the prescribed
form of this bond was not expressly approved by the Secretary of
Justice in accordance with Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 613,
which reads —
And another. This bond was accepted by the government. It has
been there. The form of the bond here used is of long continued
usage. If the government did not question the form of the bond at all,
then we must assume that it counted with the Secretary's approval.
For the presumption is that official duty has been legally performed.
"Sec. 3.. . . He [Commissioner of Immigration]
shall, subject to the approval of the Department
Head, such rules and regulations and prescribe
such forms of bond, reports, and other papers,
and shall issue from time to time such instruction,
not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best
calculated to carry out the provisions of the
immigration laws . . ." that bond is void.
Surely enough, equitable considerations will stop petitioners from
pleading invalidity of the bond. They offered that bond to enable
them to enter and stay in this country. They enjoyed benefits
therefrom. They cannot, "in law and good conscience, be allowed to
reap the fruits" of that bond, and then jettison the same. They are
"precluded from attacking the validity" of such bond. 17
Reasons there are which prevent us from giving our imprimatur to
this argument.
Actually, to petitioners the bond was good while they sought entry
into the Philippines; they offered it as security for the undertaking
that they "will actually depart from the Philippines" when their term of
stay expires. Now that the bond is being confiscated because they
overstayed, they make an about-face and say that such bond is null
The provision requiring official approval of a bond is merely directory.
"Irregularity or entire failure in this respect does not affect the validity
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and void. They shall not profit from this inconsistent position. Their
bond should be confiscated.
DIZON, J ., concurring:
I concur (in the result) with the majority opinion penned by Mr.
Justice Conrado Sanchez, for the reason that, as stated therein, —
"In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit
that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required
by the Naturalization Law".
Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby
modified as follows:
(1)The portion thereof which reads:
Appendix D
Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp Inc.
"(a)Granting this petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU
WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her
Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers, upon the payment of proper
dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with
respect to her permanent, prohibiting the
respondent, his representatives or subordinates
from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;"
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Court of
Appeals' Decision 2 dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution
dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Manila ("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.'s ("Maxicorp")
motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued
against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants
against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49") 4 and for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC"). 5
is hereby reversed; and, in consequence —
The petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner
Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and the judgment declaring her a
citizen of the Philippines, directing respondent to cancel her Alien
Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and
declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent,
are all hereby set aside; and
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent
Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several
applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC.
After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos.
96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996,
against Maxicorp.
(2)In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P.,
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ ., concur.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July
1996 a search of Maxicorp's premises and seized property fitting the
description stated in the search warrants.
Separate Opinions
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On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance
and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC
denied Maxicorp's motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also
denied Maxicorp's motion for reconsideration.
2.WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after
examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and
computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified
on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp.
NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that
they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed
activities using petitioners' products.
4.WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE
"GENERAL WARRANTS." IaECcH
3.WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC's order. On 23 December
1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order
denying Maxicorp's motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion on 29 November 1999.
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise
questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners
presented are questions of fact, which this Court should not consider
in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues
they presented in this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners
point out that the facts are not in dispute.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present
during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence
that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano
presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should
cover questions of law. 6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a
rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal, 7 subject to
exceptions as when the findings of the appellate court conflict with
the findings of the trial court. 8
Hence, this petition.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers
on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists
if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though
this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent
of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is
incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute
automatically involve purely questions of law.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for
resolution:
1.WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES
QUESTIONS OF LAW;
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There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence. 9 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. 10 If the query requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query
is factual. 11 Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno 12 is illustrative on this
point:
cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first
glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does
not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the
resolution of this issue would require this Court to inquire into the
probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a
question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. 13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising
arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and the
documentary evidence presented during the search warrant
proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own
judgment to that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals by conducting
our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation
which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring
the petition to raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of
facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or weigh
evidence. 14 When we give due course to such situations, it is solely
by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of
extremely meritorious circumstances. 15
Such questions as whether certain items of
evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or
whether or not the proofs on one side or the other
are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt
questions of fact. Whether or not the body of
proofs presented by a party, weighed and
analyzed in relation to contrary evidence
submitted by adverse party, may be said to be
strong, clear and convincing; whether or not
certain documents presented by one side should
be accorded full faith and credit in the face of
protests as to their spurious character by the other
side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of
proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify
refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are
issues of fact.
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the
findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the
RTC. 16 Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings of
the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such
contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this
Petition
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by
petitioners. But this situation does not automatically
transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The
issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this
petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office
of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the
Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception
governs this case. 17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 18 that the petitionercomplainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its
case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave
Of the three main issues raised in this petition — the legal
personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and
the presence of probable cause — only the first two qualify as
questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable
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error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This
avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in
the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to
pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The
circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently
similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. 20
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses.
The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause." 21 The applicant must
have personal knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable
information" is insufficient. 22 Mere affidavits are not enough, and
the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses. 23
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search
Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
RTC based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of
NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals
disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in
determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that
the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the
RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that
the RTC conducted was defective.
The Court of Appeals' reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on
the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary
examination failed to prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit
software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this
amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a connection between
the offense charged and the place searched.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the
RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent
Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the
fact that petitioners' other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted
that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement
under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189
of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the
testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and
Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners
charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of
counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally
saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's
findings.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper." 19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the
testimonies of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent
Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale
counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit
software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp's premises.
NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the
products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its
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customers without giving the accompanying ownership manuals,
license agreements and certificates of authenticity.
the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano
presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased
from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed
petitioners' software. 27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent
Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent
Samiano purchased the computer unit. 28 Pante, the computer
technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners'
software on the same computer unit. 29 There was a comparison
between petitioners' genuine software and Maxicorp's software preinstalled in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano
purchased. 30 Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the
name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI
Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrants.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed
several instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners' software into
computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the
sale of petitioners' software withinMaxicorp's premises. Petitioners
never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there
is reason to believe thatMaxicorp engaged in copyright infringement
and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit
software were not only displayed and sold
withinMaxicorp's premises, they were also produced, packaged and
in some cases, installed there.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals' ruling on Sacriz's
testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit
software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable
cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited
to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of
acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including
the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm
testimonies of petitioners' witnesses on such other acts stand
untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require
that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for
the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The
RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court. LibLex
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application
of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, 24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of
evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. 25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation. 26 Thus, it was improper for the Court
of Appeals to reverse the RTC's findings simply because the sales
receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano's purchase of counterfeit
goods is not in his name.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of
the judge who conducted the examination and who had the
opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. 31 For this
reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing
court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason. 32 Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination
proceedings reveal any impropriety on the part of the judge in this
case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not
the only proof that the sale of petitioners' software occurred. During
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the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof
is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a
compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence
at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left
for trial.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity
of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The
appellate court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which
noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to be used,"
were previously held void by this Court. 36 The disputed text of
the search warrants in this case states:
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General
Warrants
a)Complete or partially complete reproductions or
copies of Microsoft software bearing
the Microsoftcopyrights and/or trademarks
owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION contain
ed in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched
and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this
requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those
particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection
against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the
end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. 33
b)Complete or partially complete reproductions or
copies of Microsoft instruction manuals
and/or literature bearing
the Microsoft copyrights and/or
trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection with one
specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is issued. 34 Thus, this rule
requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the
search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission
of a specific offense.
c)Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia
bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in
scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to
be seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor ofMaxicorp and reversed the RTC's
Order thus:
d)Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official
receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase
orders and all other books of accounts and
documents used in the recording of the
reproduction and/or assembly, distribution
and sales, and other transactions in
connection with fake or counterfeit
products bearing the Microsoftcopyrights
and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in
the petitioner's store can be seized on the ground
that it is "used or intended to be used" in the illegal
or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the
private respondents' software and their
manuals. 35
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warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners . . ." were found too broad
since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video
tapes. 41 The mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the
defendant's store does not mean that the machines were used to
produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is
different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners.
In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court
voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records
pertaining to "all business transactions" of the defendant. 42 And
in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be
seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally
connected with the legitimate business of renting out betamax
tapes." 43
e)Computer hardware, including central
processing units including hard disks, CDROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens
and diskettes, photocopying machines
and other equipment or paraphernalia
used or intended to be used in the illegal
and unauthorized copying or reproduction
of Microsoft software and their manuals,
or which contain, display or otherwise
exhibit, without the authority
of MICROSOFTCORPORATION, any and
all Microsoft trademarks and
copyrights; and
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in
particularity. Paragraph (c) states:
f)Documents relating to any passwords or
protocols in order to access all computer
hard drives, data bases and other
information storage devices containing
unauthorized Microsoft software. 37 (Emp
hasis supplied)
c)Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia
bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. 38 The description of the property
to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature
of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the
property or its character is a matter of concern. 39 Measured against
this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The
articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically,
they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the
offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles
used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of
petitioners' software. This language meets the test of specificity. 40
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers
property used for personal or other purposes not related to
copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the
description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought
legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph
(c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing
the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not.
Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright
infringement or unfair competition.
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those
cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular
circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase "used or
intended to be used." InColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially
defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular
with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically
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described in the warrant. 44 A search warrant is severable, the items
not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. 45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III
of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure.
Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants,
not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned
to Maxicorp.
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)
Good afternoon Ma'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)
Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka
na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano
ang gagawin ko sa iyo.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its
Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized
under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered
returned toMaxicorp, Inc. immediately.
CHUCHI
Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG
Appendix E
Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia
Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in
the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in
a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy." 1
Hindi ma'am, pero ilan beses na nila
akong binalikan, sabing ganoon.
ESG
Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw
kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang,
10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo,
nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aapply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as
follows:
CHUCHI
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Hindi Ma'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon
i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
CHUCHI
Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo.
ESG
ESG
Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano
ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong
ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan
mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do
you think that on your own makakapasok
ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na
kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI
Eh, di sana —
ESG
CHUCHI
Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka
kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
Itutuloy ko na Ma'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG
CHUCHI
Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan
doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG
ESG
Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit
alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo"
mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong
hindi ka papasa.
Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa
'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka pumarito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.
CHUCHI
ESG
Kukuha kami ng exam noon.
Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka
sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka
doon.
ESG
Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
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CHUCHI
private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988
is quoted herewith:
Kasi M'am, binabalikan ako ng mga taga
Union.
INFORMATION
ESG
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accuses
Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:
Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung
hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan
okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
That on or about the 22nd day
of February, 1988, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the abovenamed accused, Socorro
D. Ramireznot being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a
tape recorder secretly record
the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in
writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
CHUCHI
Ina-ano ko ma'am na utang na loob.
ESG
Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob,
kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastanganan
mo ako.
CHUCHI
Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG
Contrary to Law.
Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka. 3
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16,
1988.
MARIANO M.
CUNETA
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
Asst. City Fiscal
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Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trialcourt granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that
2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a
communication by a personother than a participant to the
communication. 4
merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the
substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping
her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of June 19, 1989. cdtai
We disagree. prLL
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurd or would
lead to an injustice. 12
On February 9, 1990,
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court'sorder of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and
Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
"[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari." 5
SECTION 1.It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court ofAppeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated
June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does
not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision
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distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as
respondent Court ofAppeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Suppose there is such a recording, would you say,
Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within
the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada:
That is covered by the purview of this bill,
Your Honor.
Senator Padilla:
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:
Even if the record should be used not in
the prosecution of offense but as evidence
to be used in Civil Cases or special
proceedings?
Senator Tañada:
xxx xxx xxx
That is right. This is a complete ban on
tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Tañada:
The qualified only 'overhear.'
Senator Padilla:
Senator Padilla:
Now, would that be reasonable, Your
Honor?
So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the
element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by
some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under Section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special
proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some
in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or
the act may be indicative of their intention.
Senator Tañada:
I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it
against him. It is not fair, it is not
sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor,
is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know
that the observations are being recorded.
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Senator Padilla:
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584,
March 12, 1964)
This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Diokno:
Senator Tañada:
Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public
speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public,
but the recording is done secretly.
Well no. For example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors where a
tape recording is taken, there is no
objection to this if all the parties know. It is
but fair that the people whose remarks
and observations are being made should
know that these are being recorded.
Senator Tañada:
Senator Padilla:
Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and
another person — not between a speaker
and a public.
Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada:
xxx xxx xxx
That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and that is
what we demand. Now, in spite of that
warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more.But if you are going to
take a recording of the observations and
remarks of a person without him knowing
that it is being taped or recorded, without
him knowing that what is being recorded
may be used against him, I think it is
unfair.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III. No. 33, p. 626,
March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. cdlex
Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing,intercepting or
xxx xxx xxx
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recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made
a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed." 14
social desires of views not intended to be taken
seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly
been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have
known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions
of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals
— free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means." 17
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative
body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case
which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that
the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing
a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A.
4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among
those devises enumerated in Section 1 of the law nor was it
similar to those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein," 19following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. cdtai
"It has been said that innocent people have
nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well as the undeniable
fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case
at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Appendix F
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Bayan, Karapatan, KMP vs. Ermita
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 4 Three other rallyists
were arrested.
Petitioners come in three groups.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as
the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced. CTEaDc
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, 1 allege that
they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights
as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del
Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, 2 who allege that they were
injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they
held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed
by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group
they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of
the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared"
martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and
many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY
THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT
PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND
PETITION THE GOVERNMENT [AND]
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in
session assembled:
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in
G.R. No. 169881, 3 allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions
and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual
members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are
affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated
Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
SECTION 1. Title . — This Act shall be known as
"The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
SEC. 2.Declaration of policy. — The constitutional
right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances
is essential and vital to the strength and stability of
the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the
free exercise of such right without prejudice to the
rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection
of the law.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They
further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España
Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
SEC. 3.Definition of terms. — For purposes of this
Act:
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(a)"Public assembly" means any rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a
public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful
cause; or expressing an opinion to the general
public on any particular issue; or protesting or
influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government
for redress of grievances.
the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and
similar changes.
SEC. 4.Permit when required and when not
required. — A written permit shall be required for
any person or persons to organize and hold a
public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly
shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned
and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period as
provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations,
public meetings and assemblages for religious
purposes shall be governed by local
ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of
this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include
picketing and other concerted action in strike
areas by workers and employees resulting from a
labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations, and by the
Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
SEC. 5.Application requirements. — All
applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(b)"Public place" shall include any highway,
boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open
space of public ownership where the people are
allowed access.
(a)The applications shall be in writing and shall
include the names of the leaders or organizers;
the purpose of such public assembly; the date,
time and duration thereof, and place or streets to
be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and
the public address systems to be used. HECaTD
(c)"Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree
of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(b)The application shall incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c)The application shall be filed with the office of
the mayor of the city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at
(d)"Modification of a permit" shall include the
change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march,
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least five (5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(e)If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law.
(d)Upon receipt of the application, which must be
duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city
or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in
the city or municipal building.
(f)In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of
the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit
or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall be immediately executory.
SEC. 6.Action to be taken on the application. —
(a)It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(g)All cases filed in court under this section shall
be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date
of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(b)The mayor or any official acting in his behalf
shall act on the application within two (2) working
days from the date the application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be deemed granted.
Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(h)In all cases, any decision may be appealed to
the Supreme Court.
(i)Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal
appeals are hereby allowed.
(c)If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting
the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be
heard on the matter.
SEC. 7.Use of Public throroughfare. — Should the
proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway,
boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent
grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or
reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so
(d)The action on the permit shall be in writing and
served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
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that there will be no serious or undue interference
with the free flow of commerce and
trade. TAcDHS
law enforcement contingent under the command
of a responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100)
meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
SEC. 8.Responsibility of applicant. — It shall be
the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all
reasonable measures and steps to the end that
the intended public assembly shall be conducted
peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to
the following:
SEC. 10.Police assistance when requested. — It
shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders
or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably
to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement
agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a)To inform the participants of their responsibility
under the permit;
(a)Members of the law enforcement contingent
who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units
to which they belong displayed prominently on the
front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as
herein defined;
(b)To police the ranks of the demonstrators in
order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public
assembly;
(c)To confer with local government officials
concerned and law enforcers to the end that the
public assembly may be held peacefully;
(b)The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but
may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields,
crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or
ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(d)To see to it that the public assembly undertaken
shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit;
and
(e)To take positive steps that demonstrators do
not molest any person or do any act unduly
interfering with the rights of other persons not
participating in the public assembly.
(c)Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or
any similar anti-riot device shall not be used
unless the public assembly is attended by actual
violence or serious threats of violence, or
deliberate destruction of property.
SEC. 9.Non-interference by law enforcement
authorities. — Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly.
However, to adequately ensure public safety, a
Sec. 11.Dispersal of public assembly with permit.
— No public assembly with a permit shall be
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dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes
violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
SEC. 12.Dispersal of public assembly without
permit. — When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the
said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
(a)At the first sign of impending violence, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall call the attention of the leaders of the public
assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
possible disturbance;
SEC. 13.Prohibited acts. — The following shall
constitute violations of the Act:
(a)The holding of any public assembly as defined
in this Act by any leader or organizer without
having first secured that written permit where a
permit is required from the office concerned, or the
use of such permit for such purposes in any place
other than those set out in said permit: Provided,
however, That no person can be punished or held
criminally liable for participating in or attending an
otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b)If actual violence starts to a point where rocks
or other harmful objects from the participants are
thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or
at any property causing damage to such property,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that
if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will
be dispersed; CSHcDT
(b)Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification
of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act
by the mayor or any other official acting in his
behalf;
(c)If the violence or disturbance prevailing as
stated in the preceding subparagraph should not
stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
warning to the participants of the public assembly,
and after allowing a reasonable period of time to
lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith
disperse;
(c)The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit
by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d)Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise
denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(d)No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant
shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law,
statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act.
Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(e)The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member
of any law enforcement agency or any person to
disperse the public assembly;
(e)Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach
of the peace during the public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
(f)Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
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(g)Acts described hereunder if committed within
one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity
of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
(c)violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one
day to six years without prejudice to prosecution
under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
1.the carrying of a deadly or offensive
weapon or device such as firearm,
pillbox, bomb, and the like;
(d)violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
2.the carrying of a bladed weapon and the
like;
SEC. 15.Freedom parks. — Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or
designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far
as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
3.the malicious burning of any object in
the streets or thoroughfares;
4.the carrying of firearms by members of
the law enforcement unit;
5.the interfering with or intentionally
disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound
systems.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from
the effectivity this Act.
SEC. 14.Penalties. — Any person found guilty and
convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in
the immediately preceding section shall be
punished as follows:
SEC. 16.Constitutionality. — Should any provision
of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional,
the validity or constitutionality of the other
provisions shall not be affected thereby.
(a)violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished
by imprisonment of one month and one day to six
months; ECDaTI
SEC. 17.Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees,
letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
(b)violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f),
and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six
years;
SEC. 18.Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
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Approved, October 22, 1985.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The
majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by
Malacañang dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex "A" to the
Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
MalacañangOfficial
We appeal to the detractors of the government to
engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of
a democratic society. EcHTCD
Manila, PhilippinesNEWS
The President's call for unity and reconciliation
stands, based on the rule of law.
Release No. 2September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. 5
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible
plans of anti-government groups to inflame the
political situation, sow disorder and incite people
against the duty constituted authorities, we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local
government units to strictly enforce a "no permit,
no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of
this standard and arrest all persons violating the
laws of the land as well as ordinances on the
proper conduct of mass actions and
demonstrations.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage
a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place
of a public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does
not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now
in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill
intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into actions that are
inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of
the national community.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a
condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes
public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
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allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations
but are actually prohibitions.
of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as
Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief,
MPD, and all other public officers and private individuals acting
under their control, supervision and instruction.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without
providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws
(clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive
Secretary, PNP Director General Arturo Lomibao, the
Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro
Bulaong. CAcEaS
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that
alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880,
aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
Respondents argue that:
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no
limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put
the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that
the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear
and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly,
otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
1.Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented
evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or detained because
of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with
violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2.Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners
cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner regulation
embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a
measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no
reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the
interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less
intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open
alternative channels for communication of the information. 6
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their
act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of
B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
3.B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law.
Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly's time, place
and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave
public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free
flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880
authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally's program
content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the
constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test." The
status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been
recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec. 7
Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive
Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital
Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol,
and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive
Secretary and in his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary
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4.Adiong v. Comelec 8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely,
these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After
the submission of all the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral
arguments on April 4, 2006, 14 stating the principal issues, as
follows:
1.On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a)
and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No.
7160:
5.Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court 9 held that a local chief
executive has the authority to exercise police power to meet "the
demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor
is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d),
(e), 13 and 15 of the law.
(a)Are these content-neutral or contentbased regulations?
6.The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present
danger test."10
(b)Are they void on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness?
(c)Do they constitute prior
restraint? ATCaDE
(d)Are they undue delegations of powers
to Mayors?
7.CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed
by existing laws and ordinances to protect public interest and restore
public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather it
is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws,
regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does
not replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
(e)Do they violate international human
rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
2.On the constitutionality and legality of the policy
of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his
Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed
on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to
deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of
permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there was
a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the
lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 11 Primicias
v. Fugoso, 12 and Jacinto v. CA, 13 have affirmed the
constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use of
a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No.
880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
(a)Is the policy void on its face or due to
vagueness?
(b)Is it void for lack of publication?
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(c)Is the policy of CPR void as applied to
the rallies of September 26 and
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 4.No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments
took place and were approved and/or noted by the Court:
1.Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions,
withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or
CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5
and 6, 2005.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy
in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute
the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the
other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated
in Jacinto v. CA, 15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century,
in U.S. v. Apurado, 16 already upheld the right to assembly and
petition, as follows:
2.The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief
Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch
as, according to respondents, it was merely a "catchword" intended
to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as
stated in the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not
replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in
that law.
There is no question as to the petitioners' rights to
peaceful assembly to petition the government for a
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to
organize or form associations for purposes not
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5)
of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII.
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the
people's exercise of these rights. As early as the
onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs.
Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and
petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking
into account the foregoing developments.
Petitioners' standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by
B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly
assemble in the nation's streets and parks. They have, in fact,
purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits
to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required
without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the
other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and
dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
"It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real
or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,
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and the greater, the grievance and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which
they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing
to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must
be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising."
rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police
power," which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power
is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil
rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and
cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils enact ordinances for
purpose. 18
Reyes v. Bagatsing 19 further expounded on the right and its limits,
as follows:
1.It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to
protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite
explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." Free
speech, like free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that [the
State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, 17 the Court likewise sustained the
primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over
comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks. cIDHSC
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of
the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a
settled principle growing out of the nature of wellordered civil societies that the exercise of those
rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
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matters of public concern. It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican
institutions and complements the right of free
speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it
was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these
rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed
on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called
upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
and explosions due to restrictions upon rational
modes of communication that the guaranty of free
speech was given a generous scope. But
utterance in a context of violence can lose its
significance as an appeal to reason and become
part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was
not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment
of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed,
being in a context of violence. It must always be
remembered that this right likewise provides for a
safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to
give vent to their views, even if contrary to the
prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful
means of communication cannot be availed of,
resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the
expression of dissent. It means more than just the
right to be heard of the person who feels
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they
are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be
something worth hearing from the dissenter. That
is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of
course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is
peaceable assembly. One may not advocate
disorder in the name of protest, much less preach
rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending
a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out
and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The
utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out
in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be
precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to
be expected that more or less disorder will mark
the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the
greater the grievance and the more intense the
2.Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the
freedom of expression and peaceable assembly
better expressed than in this excerpt from an
opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the
child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of
free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to
reason by all the peaceful means for gaining
access to the mind. It was in order to avert force
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feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for
the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous
conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism
must be avoided. To give free rein to one's
destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is
to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty in our scheme of
values. ICHAaT
outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a
contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiffmunicipality. Reference was made to such plaza
"being a promenade for public use," which
certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve.
To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a
permit should not be granted for the proposed
march and rally starting from a public park that is
the Luneta.
There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the
place where the peace rally would start. The
Philippines is committed to the view expressed in
the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage of, Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use
the streets and parks for communication of views
on national questions may be regulated in the
interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but must not, in the guise
of respondents, be abridged or denied." The
above excerpt was quoted with approval
in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit
what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas,
a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically
affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are
4.Neither can there be any valid objection to the
use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy,
hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any
lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the
then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should
grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically
declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the
decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute
of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2,
providing that no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless
a special license therefor shall first be obtained
from the selectmen of the town or from licensing
committee,' was construed by the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to
grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme
Court of the United States, in its decision (1941)
penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the
judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a
statute requiring persons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of
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assembly or of freedom of speech and press,
where, as the statute is construed by the state
courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited,
in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of
the time, place, and manner of the parade or
procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, . . . .
"Nor should the point made by Chief Justice
Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be
ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestricted abuses. The authority of a
municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people
in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend.
The control of travel on the streets of cities is the
most familiar illustration of this recognition of
social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote
the public convenience in the interest of all, it
cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise
of some civil right which in other circumstances
would be entitled to protection."
the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech
which the Constitution protects." There could be
danger to public peace and safety if such a
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would
deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that
the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. It is not, however,
unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that
there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption — especially so where the assembly
is scheduled for a specific public place — is that
the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."
xxx xxx xxx
8.By way of a summary. The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant
but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for
the decision reached. If he is of the view that there
is such an imminent and grave danger of a
xxx xxx xxx
6.. . . The principle under American doctrines was
given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these
words: "The question, if the rights of free speech
and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is
not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of
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substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on
the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them
at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they
can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with
the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked
in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be
too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even
more so than on the other departments — rests
the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
respect for and deference to such preferred rights.
No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of
course, dispense with what has been so
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless,
the presumption must be to incline the weight of
the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. . . . .
persons to organize and
were a private place, only the consent of the ownerhold a
public assembly in a public
or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.place.
However, no permit shall be
Such application should be filed well ahead in timerequired
if the public assembly shall
to enable the public official concerned to appraisebe done
or made in a freedom park
whether there may be valid objections to the grantduly
established by law or ordinance
of the permit or to its grant but at another publicduly
established by law or ordinance
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusalor in
private property, in which case
or modification that the clear and present danger testonly
the consent of the owner or the
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is ofone
entitled to its legal possession is
the view that there is such an imminent and graverequired,
or in the campus of a
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
begovernment-owned and operated
heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whethereducational institution which shall
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them atbe
subject to the rules and
the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they
canregulations of said educational
have recourse to the proper judicial authority.institution.
Political meetings or
rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by
law are not covered by this Act.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision
in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. BagatsingB.P. No. 880
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicantsSEC. 4. Permit
when required and
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform thewhen
not required. — A written
licensing authority of the date, the public placepermit shall
be required for any
where and the time when it will take place. If itperson or
SEC. 5. Application requirements.
— All applications for a permit shall
comply with the following
guidelines:
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(a) The applications shall be in
writing and shall include the names
of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the
date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address
systems to be used.
the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting
in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working
days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept
the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(b) The application shall incorporate
the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed
with the office of the mayor of the
city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to
be held, at least five (5) working
days before the scheduled public
assembly.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit,
he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the
matter.
(d) Upon receipt of the application,
which must be duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the
same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
(d) The action on the permit shall be
in writing and served on the
applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the
application. —
(e) If the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf to
issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that
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A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies 22 that would use public
places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to
any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional
Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court
within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, thus:
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20
1.Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and association.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be
followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.
Article 29
1.Everyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to
in Osmeña v. Comelec, 20 where the Court referred to it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding
public assemblies. 21
2.In the exercise of his rights and freedoms,
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
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securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere
vague in its provisions. "Public" does not have to be defined. Its
ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster's Dictionary defines it,
thus: 23
3.These rights and freedoms may in no case be
exercised contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
public, n, . . . 2a: an organized body of people . . .
3: a group of people distinguished by common
interests or characteristics . . . .
The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers
to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form
of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not
cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Article 19.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the
right to prevent.
1.Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference. DSEIcT
2.Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech
is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a
precise and sufficient standard — the clear and present danger test
stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing
and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor
has the same power independently under Republic Act No.
7160 24 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and
was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
3.The exercise of the rights provided for in
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for
an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no
prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
(a)For respect of the rights or reputations
of others;
(b)For the protection of national security or
of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Sec. 15.Freedom parks. — Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or
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designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far
as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the
Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now
be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in
the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from
the effectivity this Act.
14.The truth of the matter is the policy of
"calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance
with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance"
under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the
"highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe
during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same." Unfortunately, however, the phrase
"maximum tolerance" has acquired a different
meaning over the years. Many have taken it to
mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in
the face of mayhem and serious threats to public
order. More so, other felt that they need not bother
secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this
would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular
connotation of "maximum tolerance" has departed
from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his
knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park — Fuente
Osmeña. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been
converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880's mandate that
every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six
months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful
revolution of 1986. AaCTcI
15.It should be emphasized that the policy of
maximum tolerance is provided under the same
law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a
permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without
a permit, and which recognizes certain instances
when water cannons may be used. This could only
mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict
with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the
dispersal and use of water cannons under certain
circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of
tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful
or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers
should calibrate their response based on the
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential
part of the law's system of regulation of the people's exercise of their
right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to
rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no
prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any
public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or
municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For
without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be
to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the
authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
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circumstances on the ground with the view to
preempting the outbreak of violence.
xxx xxx xxx
(c)"Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree
of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the dispersal of the same. AEIHaS
16.Thus, when I stated that calibrated
preemptive response is being enforced in lieu
of maximum tolerance I clearly was not
referring to its legal definition but to the
distorted and much abused definition that it
has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse
the minds of the public from the notion that
law enforcers would shirk their responsibility
of keeping the peace even when confronted
with dangerously threatening behavior. I
wanted to send a message that we would no
longer be lax in enforcing the law but would
henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said,
"we have instructed the PNP as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce a no
permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all persons
violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful
mass actions will be dispersed." None of these
is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for
complainants to even claim that I ordered my corespondents to violate any law. 25
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 9.Non-interference by law enforcement
authorities. — Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly.
However, to adequately ensure public safety, a
law enforcement contingent under the command
of a responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100)
meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
SEC. 10.Police assistance when requested. — It
shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders
or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably
to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement
agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means
the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means
something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be
that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which
specifically means the following:
(a)Members of the law enforcement contingent
who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units
to which they belong displayed prominently on the
front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as
herein defined;
SEC. 3.Definition of terms. — For purposes of this
Act:
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(b)The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but
may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields,
crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or
ankle high shoes with shin guards;
and after allowing a reasonable period of time to
lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith
disperse;
(d)No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant
shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law,
statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act.
Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(c)Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or
any similar anti-riot device shall not be used
unless the public assembly is attended by actual
violence or serious threats of violence, or
deliberate destruction of property.
(d)Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach
of the peace during the public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
SEC. 11.Dispersal of public assembly with permit.
— No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes
violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 12.Dispersal of public assembly without
permit. — When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the
said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed. CHcTIA
(a)At the first sign of impending violence, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall call the attention of the leaders of the public
assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
possible disturbance;
SEC. 13.Prohibited acts. — The following shall
constitute violations of the Act:
(b)If actual violence starts to a point where rocks
or other harmful objects from the participants are
thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or
at any property causing damage to such property,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that
if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will
be dispersed;
(e)Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise
denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(f)The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member
of any law enforcement agency or any person to
disperse the public assembly;
(c)If the violence or disturbance prevailing as
stated in the preceding subparagraph should not
stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
warning to the participants of the public assembly,
(g)Acts described hereunder if committed within
one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity
of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
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xxx xxx xxx
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand,
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
4.the carrying of firearms by members of
the law enforcement unit;
5.the interfering with or intentionally
disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound
systems.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30
days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided
under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so
identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks
and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be
deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be
required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayor's office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by
petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce
one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a
necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists
who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date
can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit
being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the
procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880
through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public
parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied
with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE
the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are
DISMISSED in all other respects, and the CONSTITUTIONALITY of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED. THcaDA
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of
our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against
the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and
actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a
heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are
subjected to heightened scrutiny." 26
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
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No costs.
Sir:
SO ORDERED.
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain
citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one
of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
Appendix G
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray
that respondent be directed:
(a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
If we could not secure the above documents could
we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the
following provision of the Freedom Constitution of
the present regime.
(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of
the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law.
(Art. IV, Sec. 6).
(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records
for the subject information. [Petition, pp. 4-5;
paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent Belmonte the following letter:
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt
hereof we will receive your favorable response on
the matter.
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
Very truly
yours,
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila.
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(Sgd.)
RICARDO
C. VALMO
NTE
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the
image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we
cannot respond positively to your request.
[Rollo, p. 7.]
Very truly
yours,
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS
replied:
(Sgd.)
MEYNARD
O A. TIRO
June 17, 1986
Deputy
General
Counsel
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
[Rollo, p. 40.]
Caloocan City
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received
the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it
contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred
to me for study and reply your letter to him of June
4, 1986 requesting a list of "the opposition
members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos."
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other
petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item
reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and
regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition
members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p.
41.].
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for
the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
Separate comments were filed by
respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners
filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and
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the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties
having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed
upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or
its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal
question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of
the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now
address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies
to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners
to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.
Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of
Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative
remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of
action.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative
acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of
whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised
a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of
the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with
a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to
information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,
1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case ofLegaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA
530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be
informed of matters of public interest and ordered the
government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the
petitioners.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that
before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity
and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106
Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396,
July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No.
L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is
Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
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The right of access to information was also recognized
in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the
extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say
that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore
restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure ** and honesty in the public service. *** It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents
in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under
our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate
within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied
access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to
whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public
office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art.
XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental
power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the
Constitution.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and
is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear
that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public
concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
supra, at p. 542.].
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they
have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the
accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom
of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the
exercise of their professions. The right of access to information
ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the
government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the
terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed
in Legaspi: prcd
In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
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"public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis,
it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
[Ibid. at p. 541.]
that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A No. 186, as
amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the
actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems
[Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as
respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant
`clean loans'." [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and
were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board.
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered
by the constitutional right to information was the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. InLegaspi, it was
the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.].
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make
the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the
truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans
from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos.
A second requisite must be met before the right to
information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be
among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a
policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination
of information.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its
funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b)
and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual
appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and
other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the
GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely
on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what
the law should be. Under our system of government, policy
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issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of
all State power.
private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444445.]
Respondent however contends that in view of the right
to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by
existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the
GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to
information. llcd
When the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between
the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this
case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court
in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies
like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v.
Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no
right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to
privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party
and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415
(1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr.
Justice Fernando, stated:
. . . The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This
is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of
his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector —protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual —has
become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of technological age
—industrialization, urbanization, and organization
—operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right
is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co.,
121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v.
Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)], and
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case,
the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer
public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R.
Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx,
211 P. 2d 321 (1949).].
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Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing
the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the people's right of access to official records. llcd
MR. OPLE.Very gladly.
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. May I ask the
Gentleman a few question?
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the
GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan
transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full
public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable
only to "official" transactions.
When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions" —referring to the
transactions of the State —and when we
say the "State" which I suppose would
include all of the various agencies,
departments, ministries and
instrumentalities of the government. . . .
First of all, the "constituent —ministrant" dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been repudiated.
In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605,
November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the same function of service
to the people.
MR. OPLE.Yes, and individual public officers, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.Including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE.That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion
of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
MR. SUAREZ.And when we say "transactions
which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the
contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
Moreover, the intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include governmentowned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into
by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public
disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
MR. OPLE.The "transactions" used here, I
suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can
xxx xxx xxx
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cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the
first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list
of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos."
MR. SUAREZ.This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information
and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or
matters of public concern. cdrep
MR. OPLE.Yes, subject only to reasonable
safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. [V Record of the
Constitutional Commission 24-25.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court
is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation
are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant
to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of
mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act
must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,
November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of
the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on
the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to
the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented
and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at
p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The
petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be
done by petitioners, is meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted
and respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to
documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of
the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify,
inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may
deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
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Fernan C .J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
After respondent was shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to
go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told
that it was genuine. However, she told the three that she had no
money.
Separate Opinions
Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of
respondent the following day. The two convinced her to go with them
to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar.
They reached Angeles City around 2:30 p.m. and met Arnold who
showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth
PhP60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no
money, petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold bar
would be good investment. The three left and went home.
CRUZ, J ., concurring:
Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my
concurrence, I write this separate opinion simply to say I have
nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent
celebration of the right to information on matters of public
concern.
On March 16, 1991, petitioner, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the
house of respondent. Again, they failed to convince her to buy the
gold bar.
Appendix H
Juanita Aquino vs. Teresita Paiste
On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent
that the price was reduced to PhP10,000. She agreed to go with
them to Angeles City to meet Arnold once more. Arnold pretended to
refuse the PhP10,000 offer and insisted on PhP50,000.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by
which the offense was perpetuated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused persons themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interests. In this
case before us, a series of overt acts of a co-conspirator and her
earlier admission of participation documented in an amicable
settlement she signed in the presence of counsel, all lead to the
conclusion that the co-accused conspired to commit estafa.
On petitioner's insistence, on March 18, 1991, the two went to
Angeles City and bought the gold bar for PhP50,000. 1
On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was
informed that it was fake. 2 Respondent then proceeded to
petitioner's house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake.
Petitioner replied that they had to see Garganta, and that she had
nothing to do with the transaction. 3
The Court of Appeals (CA) culled the facts this way, as established
by the prosecution:
At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1991,
petitioner Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another woman
identified only as "Adeling", went to the house of
respondent Teresita Paiste at 611 Peñalosa St., Tondo, Manila. The
children of respondent and petitioner were grade school classmates.
After the usual pleasantries, petitioner started to convince
respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot.
On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty.
Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would
locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be
disregarded should they locate Garganta. The amicable settlement
reads:
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In view of the acceptance of fault by
MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO of the
case/complaint filed by
MRS.TERESITA PAISTE before the NBI-National
Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs.
J. Aquino agreed to pay the complainant half the
amount swindled from the latter. Said P25,000.00
offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as settlement for the
case of Estafa will be paid by her through
installment scheme in the amount of P1,000.00
per month beginning from the month of March,
1991 until fully paid.
Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S.
Uy.
(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO
(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE 4
On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of
respondent. In the presence of Barangay Chairperson Pablo Atayde
and a police officer, respondent pointed to Garganta as the person
who sold the fake gold bar. Garganta was brought to the police
station where there was a demand against Garganta alone.
In witness whereof, the parties hereunto set their
hands this 27th day of March 1991 at NBI-NCR,
Taft Avenue, Manila.
Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an
Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the
crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-99911 was filed before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Information reads:
(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO
That on or about March 18, 1991, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together with three others,
whose true names, real identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Teresita B.Paiste in the
following manner to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to the
said Teresita B. Paiste to the effect that a certain
Arnold, an Igorot is selling a gold bar for
P50,000.00, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the
said Teresita B. Paiste to buy the said gold bar
and to give and deliver to said accused the total
amount of P50,000.00, the herein accused well
knowing that their manifestations and
representations were all false and untrue and were
made only for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact
Respondent
(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE
Complainant
Witnesses:
1.Signed (Illegible)
2.
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The undersigned accused/respondent hereby
waives her right to counsel despite the recital of
her constitutional rights made by NBI agent Ely
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they did obtain the said amount of P50,000.00,
which once in their possession, they thereafter
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the
said Teresita B. Paiste in the aforesaid amount of
P50,000.00, Philippine Currency. 5
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and
Arnold in committing the crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave
credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of
petitioner's guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an
implied admission of guilt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner
was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
Aggrieved, petitioner brought on appeal the above RTC decision
before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 22511.
Trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonial
evidence of private complainant, herein respondent, Yolanda Pomer,
and Ely Tolentino. For her defense, petitioner testified along
with Barangay Chairperson Atayde, JoseAquino, and SPO1 Roberto
Cailan. The prosecution presented as documentary evidence three
(3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed in the
NBI, while the defense relied solely on its testimonial evidence.
After the parties filed their respective briefs, on November 10, 2000,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in
toto 7 the July 16, 1998 RTC Decision.
In affirming the trial court's findings and conclusions of law, the CA
found that from the tenor of the amicable settlement, the
investigation before the NBI did not push through as both parties
came to settle the matter amicably. Nonetheless, the CA pointed out
that petitioner was assisted, although unnecessarily, by an
independent counsel, a certain Atty. Gordon S. Uy, during the
proceedings. The CA held that petitioner's mere bare allegation that
she signed it under threat was insufficient for she presented no
convincing evidence to bolster her claim. Consequently, the
amicable settlement was admitted and appreciated as evidence
against petitioner.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting
petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused Juanita Aquino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby sentences
her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FIVE (5)
YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
minimum to NINE (9) YEARS OF PRISION
MAYOR as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant,Teresita B. Paiste the sum of
P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum counted
from the filing of the Information until fully paid,
and to pay the costs of suit.
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that even if the amicable settlement was
not admissible or was totally disregarded, the RTC still did not err in
convicting petitioner as it was indubitably shown by the prosecution
through convincing evidence replete in the records that respondent
conspired with the other accused through active participation in the
commission of the crime of estafa. In fine, the CA found that the
prosecution had indeed established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.
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Through the assailed April 6, 2001 Resolution, the appellate court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
IMPUTED TO HER AND IN DECLARING HER
GUILTY THEREFOR BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The Issues
Hence, we have the instant petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, ascribing the following errors, which are
essentially the same ones raised before the CA:
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HER COACCUSED, ELIZABETH GARGANTA DELA
CRUZ. 8
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
LACKING IN CERTAIN PRESCRIBED
REQUIREMENTS THE INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY THE INVESTIGATOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND COROLLARY
THERETO, TO CONSIDER ANY AND ALL
EVIDENCE PROCURED THEREBY TO BE
INADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
The Court's Ruling
In gist, the instant petition proffers the twin issues on (1) whether the
amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence,
and (2) whether conspiracy has indeed been proven to convict
petitioner of the crime of estafa.
The instant petition hinges on the issue of the assessment of
evidence and their admissibility. As consistently ruled in innumerable
cases, this Court is not a trier of facts. The trial court is best
equipped to make the assessment on said issues and, therefore, its
factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless the
courts a quo are perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if
properly considered, would affect the result of the case and warrant
a reversal of the decision involved. We do not find in the instant case
any such reason to depart from this general principle. However, in
the interest of substantial justice, we shall deal with the issues raised
by petitioner.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
LACKING IN CERTAIN POSITIVE PARTICULARS
AND STRICT COMPLIANCE THE MANNER IN
WHICH THE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
HAD BEEN ASKED TO BE EXECUTED AND
SUBSCRIBED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
First Core Issue: Admissibility of amicable instrument
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK AN ACTIVE
PART IN THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY
Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and
consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to
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counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation.
She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely
and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12 (1) 9 of the Constitution which
guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.
Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached
and she signed the document under duress falls flat for the following
reasons:
First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the
person of Atty. Uy. The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and
independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner
has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA
and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an independent and
competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such
claim, it cannot be entertained.
We are not convinced.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that
the rule begins to operate. 10 Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 11 has
extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
"invited" for questioning. 12 Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides
that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing
an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed . . . ."
Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not
presented as witness by the prosecution and that what petitioner and
Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented.
Basic is the principle that consultation and information between
counsel and client is privileged communication and the counsel may
not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party
in a case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as
testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. We cannot second guess
the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty. Uy's testimony,
more so on account of the counsel-client privileged communication.
Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses", 13 for
which she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not.
It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before
the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already
under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her
rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a
lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy,
which fact is undisputed.
Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy's
appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when
she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held
in People v. Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection
against the lawyer's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer" 14 the accused is deemed
to have engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is
deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and
thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right to
counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent
Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioner's counsel
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly
pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry
or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push
through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably
settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel
appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on
it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
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in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the
fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.
truth or that it would be better for him to tell the
truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it
would be better for him to speak or tell the truth
does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient
inducement, to render objectionable a confession
thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are
applied. These threats or promises which the
accused must successfully prove in order to
make his confession inadmissible, must take
the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of
reward or leniency. 19
Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she
undoubtedly executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was
provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth." 15 An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the
nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract
between the parties within the parameters of their mutually
recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence
of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial
investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of
violence, coercion, or intimidation.
In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even
assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement is not admissible,
still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was
duly proven by other pieces of evidence.
Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner's Miranda rights
were not violated, still we will not be remiss to reiterate what we held
in People v. Malimit that the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible "only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation." 16 An admission is an
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, 17 while
confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein. 18
Second Core Issue: Conspiracy duly proven
It is petitioner's strong contention in her last two assigned errors that
conspiracy has not been proven to convict her ofestafa. She asserts
that there was no strong showing of any convincing and solidly
conclusive proof that she took an active part in any phase of the
transaction concerning the overt acts constituting estafa that has
been imputed to her. She argues that whatever act that might have
been imputed to her has always been through the request or
insistence of either Garganta or respondent as the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals. She points out that after she introduced
Garganta to respondent in the morning of March 14, 1991, she
almost immediately left them and she did not accompany Garganta
when the latter went back to respondent's house in the afternoon of
March 14, 1991. And she avers that significantly, she did not remain
in Pampanga after the completion of the transaction on March 18,
1991, but came to Manila with respondent. According to her, her
non-participation in these two crucial meetings shows she was not
part of any conspiracy to defraud respondent.
Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the
nature of an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be
admissible since none of her constitutional rights were violated.
Petitioner's allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain
but bare allegations. Allegations are not proof. Pertinently, this Court
ruled in People v. Calvo:
A confession is not rendered involuntary merely
because defendant was told that he should tell the
We are not persuaded.
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Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime. 20 In criminal law, where the
quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. 21
First, petitioner was with her co-accused Garganta and Adeling when
they went to respondent's house on March 14, 1991 to tell her of the
existence of a gold bar, showed her a sample, tried to convince
respondent to buy one, and went to a pawnshop in Tondo to have
the sample gold bar tested.
Second, the following day, March 15, petitioner was again with her
co-accused when they went to Angeles City to view the gold bar in
the residence of Arnold, and participated in convincing respondent to
raise PhP50,000 for the purchase of the gold bar, and if respondent
did not have money, to find a buyer.
Third, on March 16, petitioner was again with her co-accused when
they returned to the house of respondent to ask if she had found a
buyer. Since she had not, they again pressed her to look for one.
It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy —
conspirators may act separately or together, in different manners but
always leading to the same unlawful result. The character and effect
of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing
its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole — acts done to
give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent
acts. 22 Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the
conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent
or degree of their participation.
Fourth, on March 17, she with her co-accused again accompanied
respondent to Angeles City and met with Arnold to convince him to
accept PhP10,000 as deposit, but were refused.
Fifth, on March 18, respondent again pressed respondent to buy the
gold bar until the latter finally succumbed and paid PhP50,000.
Petitioner even re-counted the cash payment, wrapped it in
newspaper, and handed the money herself to Arnold.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the
accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Mere presence when the
transaction was made does not necessarily lead to an inference of
concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime of estafa.
Even knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy because the rule
is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof
of conspiracy. 23
It is unquestionable that petitioner was not a passive observer in the
five days from March 14 to 18, 1991; she was an active participant in
inducing respondent to buy the gold bar. We find no cogent reason
to alter the conclusions of the CA. Indeed, the records bear out that
conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of petitioner
and her companions.
Clearly, petitioner's contention that all she did was at the behest of
either Garganta or respondent is belied by the fact that she took part
in all the phases of the inducement right up to the purchase by
respondent of the fake gold. If it was true that she had no part in the
transaction, why would she still accompany Garganta to visit
respondent on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of March 1991?
In the instant case, the courts a quo unanimously held that
conspiracy was duly proven. As aptly observed by the CA, the
records are replete with instances to show that petitioner actively
participated to defraud respondent. The following instances all point
to the conclusion that petitioner conspired with others to commit the
crime:
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Moreover, with trips to Pampanga made on the 15th, 17th, and 18th
that take several hours, it is unfathomable that petitioner was only
doing a favor to either Garganta or respondent, or to both.
65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing
the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 1and July 31, 2002 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied
the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner,
as party litigant, and the refusal of the public
respondent, Judge PriscillaMijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from
trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.
Ineluctably, after having been introduced to respondent, Garganta
could have made the visits to respondent without tagging along
petitioner. Yet, the facts clearly show that respondent could not have
been thereby induced without petitioner's active participation in
encouraging respondent to buy the gold bar. Petitioner is the
lynchpin upon whom respondent's interest was stoked, and
ultimately to succumb to the lure of gaining a fat profit by buying the
gold bar.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission
to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC,
Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for
Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,
anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court 3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct
his litigation personally.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner went back on the 18th with
respondent to Manila instead of staying in Pampanga does not
preclude her active participation in the conspiracy as shown by the
foregoing narration. It would have been strange to respondent if
petitioner stayed in Pampanga after the transaction. Thus, petitioner
indeed took active part in the perpetration of estafa. And, petitioner
has not shown any convincing proof that she was not part of the
transaction given the undisputed factual milieu of the instant case.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to
secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he
could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant.
Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been
filed. Judge Mijares then remarked,"Hay naku, masama 'yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2,
2002. DTIcSH
Finally, it bears stressing that petitioner was the one who knows
respondent. She introduced respondent to the other accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's
November 10, 2000 Decision and April 6, 2001 Resolution in CAG.R. CR No. 22511 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Inhibit, 4 praying for the voluntary inhibition ofJudge Mijares. The
Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the
contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It
asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will
not be served. 5
Appendix I
Ferdinand Cruz vs. Judge Mijares
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule
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In an Order 6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion
for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality
based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pretrial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the said
order. aSCHcA
NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE
ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT
SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO
PRESERVE THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND
CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS. HcACST
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamusunder
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the
petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit
herself from trying the case.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In
the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence,
and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, 9 petitioner reiterated that the basis
of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138.
He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same,
still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order 10 dated July 31, 2002.
This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with
the Court of Appeals. 12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and
only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted
by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance
of petitions filed directly before it. 13 aAHTDS
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND
IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO.
01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138,
SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NONLAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of
Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the
Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner
is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this
Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved
with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants
who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays
more important concerns before us.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138,
Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
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Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was
Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
RULE 138-A
Sec. 34.By whom litigation is conducted. — In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1.Conditions for Student Practice. — A
law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may
appear without compensation in any civil, criminal
or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school. aDcEIH
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to
be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It
recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case
to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member
of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the
course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation. 14 Considering that a party personally conducting his
litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
those qualified to practice law, 15 petitioner, not being a lawyer
himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can
personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would
then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising
his right to represent himself. cSTHAC
Sec. 2.Appearance. — The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for
himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule
138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely
finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued
Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure
of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized
school's clinical legal education program and is under supervision of
an attorney duly accredited by the law school. SaITHC
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is
a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the
Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the
basis of the petitioner's claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former
rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in
courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as
a party representing himself.
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The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule
138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never
intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for
limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum
to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was
incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A. aCHcIE
that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her
alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay
naku, masama 'yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers
that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested
conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner's
and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and confidence in the respondent's
impartiality. DACIHc
We do not agree.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right
of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel,16 this Court has
held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived. 17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
Holgado, 18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence".
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an
administrative case 19 against the respondent for violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court's findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part ofJudge Mijares when she did not inhibit
herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias
and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify
a judge from participating in a particular trial, 20 as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the
sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should
inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment
of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. 21 Absent
clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed. AEDCHc
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff
therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the
accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil
case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can,
without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the successful
pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that
he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is
aware of the perils incident to this decision. EHTADa
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of
a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as
party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant
his wish.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay
City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is
DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil
Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the
respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling
SO ORDERED.
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Appendix J
U.S. vs. Javier
tax assessed in his province under the provisions of Act No.
1652.
Applying the reasoning of our decision in the case of U.
S. vs. Melecio Estavillo et al., No. 6133, 1 just decided, to the
facts satisfactorily established at the trial of this case, the
judgment of conviction in the court below must be affirmed, but
the sentence must be modified by striking out therefrom so much
thereof as imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of
failure to pay the costs, and by fixing the rate at which the
subsidiary imprisonment in the event of nonpayment of the fine is
to be estimated at P2.50, instead of P2 per diem.
The appellant was charged in the court below with a
violation of the Election Law in that he falsely swore that he was
not delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since
August 13, 1898, when, in truth and in fact, he was delinquent in
the payment of the "road and bridge fund" cedula tax assessed
in his province under the provisions of Act No. 1652. The
appellant admits and the proof establishes that at the time when
he took said oath, he had not paid the "road and bridge fund"
cedula tax assessed in his province under the provisions of Act
No. 1652. He contends, however, that having once paid a cedula
tax in Manila, which included the special additional "road and
bridge fund" tax, the imposition of which is authorized under Act
No. 1652, he was not required to pay the special additional "road
and bridge fund" tax levied in the province wherein he resided at
the time of taking the oath. But the law is so clear and explicit
upon this point that there can be no room for discussion, Act. No.
1652, amending Act No. 83 and Act No. 1189, expressly
providing that:
Thus modified, the sentence imposed by the trial court is
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Appendix K
Talino vs. Sandiganbayan
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the coaccused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to
cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is whether or not such
testimony was considered by the respondent court against the
petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his
conviction. prLL
". . . All residents of a province subject to
the payment of a cedula tax wherein the increase
herein provided is in effect shall pay the same
within that province, and payment thereof in any
province other than that of their residence shall not
exempt such residents from paying also in the
province in which, they reside the additional
cedula tax for which provision may be made by
resolution of the provincial board in accordance
with this section . . ."
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four
separate informations with estafa through falsification of public
documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government
in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs
claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never
made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments 2 Docketed as
CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly
for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when
Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
It is quite clear, therefore, that at the time when the
defendant made oath that he was not "delinquent in the payment
of public taxes assessed since August 13, 1898," he was in fact
delinquent in the payment of the "road and bridge fund" cedula
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petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. 3They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the
other accused continued defending themselves in the original
proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging
testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in
the questioned transactions. 4 In due time,
the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases
finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while
absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This
decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it
violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and
put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal
evidence. Had this been done, there would have
been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's
testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court
and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in
this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules
of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be
filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before
the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an
exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the
prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an
antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an
event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record
against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal
in the separate trial of the other accused. 8
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the following remarks
about the separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the
fact that We allowed, upon their petition, separate
trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only
consider, in deciding these cases as against them,
the evidence for the prosecution as well as their
own evidence. Evidence offered by the other
accused can not be taken up.
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the
utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial,
allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed
justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may
arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent
court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
"It would really have been simpler had there been
no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat
said so many incriminatory things against the
other accused when he took the stand in his own
defense. But because Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and
they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even required to be
present when the other accused were presenting
their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now
be considered against said three accused.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and
must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No
accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his
absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot
stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is
also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the
affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the
cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the
long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand,
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In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
defraud, he would have questioned this obvious
irregularity. He would have asked whoever was
following up the vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to `D'Alfenor' were
cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and
when the new bidding was made.
". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of
Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in
a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. [1911],
221 U.S. 325) that it `intends to secure the
accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only
such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial who give their testimony in his presence, and
give to the accused an opportunity of crossexamination. It was intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex
parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the
right of the accused to test the recollection of the
witness in the exercise of the right of crossexamination.' In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential.
A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v.
Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example
U.S. v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v.
Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz
[1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . . ."
"The very same case is true as regards the
accused Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or
sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of
funds may have been ministerial, his failure to
observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence
of his complicity in the conspiracy.
"Talino declared that in the morning of May 23,
1980, four vouchers (including three made out in
favor of `D'Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to
him for his certificate as regards the availability of
funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the
afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers
were also presented to him for certification as to
funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits
`A', `B' and `C' which he had earlier signed but
which, according to Talino, were disallowed and
cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the
supporting documents of the last three vouchers
— the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops
and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is
true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in the
morning, where `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to
be the lowest bidder, must have been different
from the ones submitted together with vouchers in
the afternoon. This would have raised his
suspicions as to why these last three abstracts
could be dated as they were (May 18, May 15 and
May 11, respectively) when it was only that
morning that the abstracts containing the name of
`D'Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact
that he readily approved the substitute vouchers
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that
the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in
convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision
finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself
to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as
proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
Thus: LexLib
"If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no
knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to
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with the substitute winning bidders is a clear
indication that he knew he was facilitating an
irregular transaction.
Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal
possession of firearm under one information, the appellant
was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the
second, for which he was sentenced to one year
imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising
factual, legal and constitutional questions. The
constitutional question, set up after the submission of the
briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty — from
5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines — provided by
Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.
"It is our view that the evidence on record has
established beyond doubt the participation of both
AgustinTalino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all
the four felonies charged in the informations." 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the
petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the
prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not
the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's
analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said
testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did
not cross examine Ulat," and was not even required to be present
when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even
expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness
in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been
"no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other
accused." As this was not done, the trial court could not and did not
consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner' s part in the
offenses.
As to the facts. The firearm with which the
appellant was charged with having in his possession was
a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held
a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same
house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging
to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass,
tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the
plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the
defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon
Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for
wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by
the accused.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether
the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the time of
the accidental killing.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by
substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason
to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional
presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the
trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the
accident, February 10, 1949, his son told him that there
were wild chickens on the plantation "scratching palay and
corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them; that Bruno
told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker,
handed it over to Alberto who is a "sharp- shooter" and
"shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the
young man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto when the
latter fired and accidentally wounded their servant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioner. LLphil
Appendix L
People vs. Estoista
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The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard
wild rooster crowing I told my father about the said wild
rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot
the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it."
admission, he had been in the habit of going out hunting in
other places and for target practices, and because by
Bruno's unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of
his own, is a sharpshooter and shoots better.
Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct
contradiction to his and his son's statements at the
Constabulary headquarters on the same morning of the
shooting, and sworn to by them before the justice of the
peace soon after.
It being established that the defendant was alone
when he walked to the plantation with his father's gun, the
next question that presents itself is: Does this evidence
support conviction as a matter of law?
In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited
by defense counsel, it was held that carrying a gun by
order of the owner does not constitute illegal possession
of firearm. The facts in that case were that a shotgun and
nine cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who
had a proper permit to possess them, were seized by the
police from Samson while walking in the town of Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the shotgun in
hunting that day and, as he was coming along on
horseback, sent Samson on ahead.
Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went
to hunt for wild roosters;" that "later on my son Alberto
came to inform me that he had accidentally hit our
laborer;" that thereupon he "went with my son to see what
happened." Queried "who was with Alberto when he went
out hunting," Bruno replied, "He was alone."
On his part, the defendant declared on the same
occasion that Diragon Dima, after being shot, requested to
be taken to his (Dima's) house; that as the accused was
able to carry the wounded man on]y about 50 meters,
Dima asked the defendant to call Bruno "who was in the
house" — which Alberto did. To the question who his
companion was when he shot at a rooster, Alberto said, "I
was alone."
Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, in its pertinent provision is
directed against any person who possesses any firearm,
ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this
connection is the meaning of the word "possesses. "It
goes without saying that this word was employed in its
broad sense so as to include "carries" and "holds." This
has to be so if the manifest intent of the Act is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public
security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the
unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the
proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatever. "Ownership of the weapon is necessary
only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the
guilt or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in
the United States, where the right to bear arms for
defense is ensured by the federal and many state
There is not the slightest ground to believe that
these affidavits contained anything but the truth, especially
that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts when the
defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent,
the affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival
at the Constabulary headquarters, there is no hint of any
undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and,
above all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement
that the accused was unaccompanied. In contrast, Bruno's
testimony in court was interested, given with his son's
acquittal in view. And especially is the father's veracity in
court to be distrusted because by Alberto's unsolicited
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constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted
severely restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and
the power of state legislatures to do so has been upheld.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference
between the case at bar and the Samson case. Although
Samson had physical control of his employer's shotgun
and cartridges, his possession thereof was undoubtedly
harmless and innocent, as evidenced by the fact that,
apparently, he bore them in full view of the people he met
and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein,
Samson carried the gun solely in obedience to its owners
order or request without any inferable intention to use it as
a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in the United
States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a
means of defense is guaranteed, possession such as that
by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a
violation of similar statutes.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake
to point to United States vs. Samson, supra, as authority
for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The implied holding in
that case that the intention to possess is an essential
element of a violation of the Firearms Law was not
intended to imply title or right to the weapon to the
exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only
intention to own but also intention to use. From the very
nature of the subject matter of the prohibition control or
dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder
regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential
factor.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the
Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the
duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that
confinement from 6 to 10 years for possessing or carrying
firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the
prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress
or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property,
person, and even the very security of the Government,
directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous
carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify
imprisonment which in normal circumstances might
appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an
act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of
exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the
heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to
be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that
courts are advised to make a recommendation to the
Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
(Art. 5, Revised Penal Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92
Phil. 906.)
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves
are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and
opinions on the degree and character of control or
dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule
laid down by United States courts — rule which we here
adopt — is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless
possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a
statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind
of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where
"a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to
examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some
object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; 68 C.J., 22)
Appellant's case does not meet the above test.
His holding or carrying of his father's gun was not
incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his
father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only
purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal
consequences.
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The sentence imposed by the lower court is much
below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The
judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the
accused to imprisonment for five years. However,
considering the degree of malice of the defendant,
application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh
and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be
furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice,
with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein
imposed be reduced to six months. The appellant will pay
the costs of both instances.
the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."(Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a
radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not
believe that five years' confinement for possessing
firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases,
can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or
excessive to the extent of being shocking to public
conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on
constitutional grounds of the Act in question was
contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed
brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the
course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is
also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial
reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in
the statute, that some members of the court at first
expressed opposition to any recommendation for
executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he
deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla,
Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
December 3, 1953
TUASON, J.:
The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's
conviction under Republic Act No. 4 likewise had received
close attention and study. There is no need on our part to
add anything to what has been said, except to point out for
clarification that the references to defendant's previous
uses of his father's gun and the fatal consequences of his
last use of it, were made simply to emphasize that his
possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual,
incidental, or harmless. His previous conduct was relevant
in determining his motive and intention, and to disprove
the claim that his father followed his son so as not to lose
control of the firearm. It was far from the thought of the
court to condemn the appellant for acts with which he had
not been charged or of which he had been pronounced
innocent.
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4, with
reference to the penalty therein provided, was carefully
considered. In branding imprisonment for five years too
harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in mind
that six months was commensurate and just for the
appellant's offense, taking into consideration his intention
and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes
the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive,
out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual." (24 C. J. S., 1187- 1188.) Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
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The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in
accordance with section 1 of Republic Act No. 4, which
reads:
carry with it the forfeiture of the prohibited
article or articles to the Philippine
Government.
"SECTION 1.Section twenty-six
hundred and ninety-two of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-six, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"The possession of any instrument
or implement which is directly useful in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition on
the part of any person whose business or
employment does not deal with such
instrument or implement shall be prima
facie proof that such article is intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition."
"SEC. 2692.Unlawful manufacture,
dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or
possession of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. — Any person who
manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes,
or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms,
or ammunition therefor, or instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of firearms or ammunition
in violation of any provision of sections eight
hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred
and six, inclusive, of this Code, as
amended, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment for a period of
not less than one year and one day nor
more than five years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, in the discretion of the
court. If the article illegally possessed is a
rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine
gun, submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb,
artillery of any kind or ammunition
exclusively intended for such weapons,
such period of imprisonment shall be not
less than five years nor more than ten
years. A conviction under this section shall
This provision does not say that firearms
unlawfully possessed or carried are to be confiscated only
if they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention
deducible from the language of the act. We are inclined to,
and do, believe that, except perhaps where the lawful
owner was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his
property by another, confiscation accords with the
legislative intent.
We can foresee the objection that such legislation
deprives one of his property without due process of law.
The answer to this is that ownership or possession of
firearms is not a natural right protected by the
Constitution. Above the right to own property is the
inherent attribute of sovereignty - the police power of the
state to protect its citizens and to provide for the safety
and good order of society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.)
Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right to
private property may be limited, restricted, and impaired
so as to promote the general welfare, public order and
safety. (Id., 611.) The power of the legislature to prohibit
the possession of deadly weapon carries with it the power
to provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons
unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed owner to be
used.
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Appendix M
People vs. Esparas and Libed
upon by the Supreme Court, it has none of the
attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is a
mere recommendation to the Supreme Court,
based upon the facts on the record which are
presented with it. This is meant in no sense to
detract from the dignity and power of Courts of
First Instance. It means simply that the portion of
Spanish procedure which related to cases where
capital punishment was imposed still survives.
Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged, with violation of R.A. No.
6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country
twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897
before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in
absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as
charged and imposed on her the death penalty.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass on
a case in which capital punishment has been
imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one
having for its object simply and solely the
protection of the accused. Having received the
highest penalty which the law imposes, he is
entitled under the law to have the sentence and all
the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the highest tribunal of the
land to the end that its justice and legality may be
clearly and conclusively determined. Such
procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for
life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive
it. It is a provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions."
(Emphasis supplied)
As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue
that confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed to
automatically review her death sentence. The issue need not
befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
et al., 1 we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of
this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be
waived either by the accused or by the courts, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is apparent from these provisions that the
judgment of conviction and sentence thereunder
by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the
trial of the accused. Such trial is not terminated
until the Supreme Court has reviewed the facts
and the law as applied thereto by the court
below. The judgment of conviction entered on the
trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court. In a sense
the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes
the testimony and reports thereon to the Supreme
Court with his recommendation. While in practice
he enters a judgment of conviction and sentences
the prisoner thereunder, in reality, until passed
The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General Orders No. 58 as
amended, which provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It shall not be necessary to forward to the
Supreme Court the record, or any part thereof, of
any case in which there shall have been an
acquittal, or in which the sentence imposed is not
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death, unless such case shall have been duly
appealed; but such sentence shall be executed
upon the order of the court in which the trial was
had. The records of all cases in which the death
penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of
First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, and of all cases in which appeals
shall have been taken shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for investigation and judgment as
law and justice shall dictate. The records of such
cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the
Supreme Court within twenty days, but not earlier
than fifteen days after the rendition of sentence."
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not
serve to render the decision of the People's Court
final. In fact, as was said by this court through
Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by
this court of a decision imposing the death penalty,
the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court
is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta;
that although a judgment of conviction is entered
by the trial court, said decision has none of the
attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that
until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court
which finally passes upon it, the same is not final
and conclusive; and that this automatic review by
the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the
death penalty is something which neither the court
nor the accused could waive or evade."
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty. Its section 2(4) of Article VIII provided for review by this
Court of death penalty cases. Both our Rules of Court
of 1940 2 and 1964 3 require the transmission to this Court of the
records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been
imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law and justice shall
dictate. It will be noted that these rules were taken from the second
part of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Section 4, Act No.
194. 4
The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al., 6 involves
the escape of a death convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the
escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of
reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case ofPeople vs. Daban, et
al., 7 the ponencia of former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed,
to wit:
Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated
the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the 1953 case of People vs.
Villanueva, 5 we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death
convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his
conviction, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx"
"Now, as to the law. It would appear that
respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section 9 of
Rule 122. Thus: 'The records of all cases in which
the death penalty shall been imposed by any
Court of First Instance, whether the defendant
shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to
the Supreme Court fore review and judgment as
law and justice shall dictate. The records of such
cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the
Supreme Court within twenty (20) days but not
"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing
him to death may be allowed to withdraw his
appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary
criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his
withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the
case from the jurisdiction of this court which under
the law is authorized and called upon to review the
decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
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earlier than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or
promulgation of the sentence in the form
prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript
shall also be forwarded as provided in section 12
of Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographer.' The penalty imposed
on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of
November 21, 1969 being one of death, the case
was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover,
until after this Court has spoken, no finality could
be attached to the lower court decision. As
explained in former Chief Justice Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court: 'In this
connection, it must be emphasized that the
judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty
entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be
executed and is wholly without force or effect until
the case has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court en consulta; that although a judgment of
conviction is entered by the trial court, said
decision has none of the attributes of a final
judgment and sentence; and that until is has been
reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally
passes upon it, the same is not final and
conclusive; and this automatic review by the
Supreme Court is something which neither the
court nor the accused could waive or evade.' The
mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could
not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as
sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant’s
brief."
of People vs. Saliling, et al., 9 we held, thru former Chief Justice
Aquino, that this Court is not precluded from reviewing the death
sentence of an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case
of People vs. Buynay, et al., 10 we reiterated the rule that
theescape of a death convict will not automatically result in the
dismissal of his appeal.
Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes Congress so provides. 11 On December 13, 1993, Congress
reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of
heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court
reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It
remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death
convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without
any option. 12
With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our esteemed
colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter
alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps
bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been
imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory.
This is the text and tone ofsection 10, Rule 122, which is the more
applicable rule, viz.:
"Section 10.Transmission of Records in Case of
Death Penalty. — In all cases where the death
penalty is imposed by he trial court, the records
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20)
days but not earlier than (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of
any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10)
days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter."
Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the
death penalty. 8 Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the
procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court. Section
10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even
reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it expressly used
the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court. Our case
law continued its fealty to the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case
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Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla, 13 by our dissenting
colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is not a death penalty case. Only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant.
Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his
refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his
appeal.
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing
jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases,
regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the
court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible.
We must strive to realize this objective, however, elusive it may be,
and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn
his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his
appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception
of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy
remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and
misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor
should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its
jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but
the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate
this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more
of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure
the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in
crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the
conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.
Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between ". . . a
death convict, i. e. one convicted to death by a trial court who
remains in the custody of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his
appeal and a death convict, i.e., one convicted to death by the trial
court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the
pendency of the appeal." They rationalize the distinction by holding:
"It should be clear in the first case, that even if the
death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial
court's judgment convicting him to death, the
appellate court may still and nonetheless review
the judgment of conviction for the convictappellant has at least remained in the custody of
the law to await final verdict in his case. In the
second case, however, the accused no longer
recognizes and respects the authority of law and
the duly-constituted authorities in general and this
Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of
an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly
by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the
authority of the Court is an essential and implicit
element in an effective and credible judicial
system.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous
crimes for as discussed above, we have alwaysreviewed the
imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict.
Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should
not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this
Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last; effective hedge
against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This
enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the
taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal concern that
transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this
societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which
is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved
alone by the outrage of the public in the multiplication of heinous
crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing
winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an
accused does not cease to have rights just because of his
conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which
recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to a minority of one
"No, one, it should be stressed, should be allowed
to make a mockery of the justice system by, in one
breath, seeking its protection and even vindication
via an automatic review of a death sentence and,
in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from
justice and repudiating the very authority of the
system whose protection he seeks and invokes."
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has the right to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming,
has no right to be wrong.
submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court (People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA
196; People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79). A contrary view would
encourage the accused to trifle with the administration of justice, and
provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment (People v.
Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366). In this case, the accused escaped from
confinement and heretofore refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities, thus she must be deemed to have abandoned the appeal
(See People v. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32; People v. Acol, 232 SCRA
406; People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new
period of thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to file the
Brief of the accused Josefina A. Esparas.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima,
JJ ., concur.
In criminal cases, appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court via the
following steps: by filing a notice of appeal in those cases where the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed, by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 where the penalty imposed is not
reclusion perpetua and the appeal would involve only questions of
law (People v. Pagsanjan, 221 SCRA 735), and by automatic review
where the penalty imposed is death (R.A. No. 7659, Sec. 22; Rule
122, Sec. 10, Revised Rules of Court). An appeal has "for its object
simply and solely the protection of the accused." 1Appeal by way of
automatic review is plainly another mode of appeal and has an
objective similar to any other modes of appeal, i.e., the protection of
the accused. If the accused has escaped, then he refuses to avail of
the protection of the Court. Why then should the Court insist in
protecting him. In the same vein, "the law providing for automatic
review of a death sentence seeks to favor the [accused]." 2 If the
accused has absconded or escaped from confinement then who is to
be favored by the automatic review — a fugitive from justice? Hence,
if the escape of the accused may be deemed waiver of the right to
appeal in any other mode of appeal, then the same must apply to an
appeal by way of automatic review. I fail to see, in this connection,
any cogent reason why an automatic review should be given a status
different from the other modes of appeal. I thus find, and with due
respect to my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Puno, unacceptable
the proposition that an appeal by way of automatic review is not
subject to waiver. If the constitutional rights of the accused enshrined
under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, such as right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, right against self-incrimination,
Vitug, J ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
FRANCISCO, J ., dissenting:
I fully agree with Mr. Justice Padilla's opinion that if the accused fails
to surrender to the proper authorities and remain in the custody of
the law then her right to appeal is deemed waived and forfeited. I
wish to express, nonetheless, my observations on this issue.
An appeal is a statutory remedy for the correction of errors which
might have been committed. With the accused lies the power and
option to avail of the remedy, and with the appellate court belongs
the power to affirm or reverse the accused's conviction. Appeal,
however, presupposes jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
And since appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural
right nor part of the due process, it may only be exercised in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law (Bello v.
Fernando, 4 SCRA 135, citing Aguila v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898,
and Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397; Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 537; Borre v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA
560; Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 254; U.S. v. Yu Ten, 33
Phil. 122). Thus, an accused who escapes from prison or
confinement loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
right to remain silent, among others, can be waived, then with more
reason with the right to appeal which is merely statutory origin.
exercise of the said tribunal's power of review. 3 An escapee mocks
the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary.
I am not unaware of the cases cited by my esteemed colleague Mr.
Justice Puno establishing the rule that the Court is not precluded
from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. But
in the words of a known author, "[e]ven those Justices most opposed
to overruling constitutional decisions have acknowledged that the
'law may grow to meet changing conditions' and that the doctrine of
stare decisis should not required a 'slavish adherence to authority
where new conditions require new rules of "conduct." 3 Considering
the manifest intent of the legislature in enacting the death penalty
law to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous
crimes and to serve as effective deterrence, it is high time for the
Court to depart from the old doctrine which, to my mind, promotes
nothing except disobedience to and repudiation of our judicial
system.
Without repeating the legal arguments pro and con, as these were
already eloquently presented by Mr. Justice Puno, Mr. Justice Padilla
and Mr. Justice Francisco, I hold that the judicial taking of life cannot
be left to mere legal logic. Life is too precious to be settled by
legalisms, however exalted. I believe that this Court cannot abandon
its sacred duty to God and country to see to it that a lower court
judgment that takes away life is ERROR FREE and can stand THE
MOST SEARCHING SCRUTINY . 4 And at the same time, this Court
must not enable an escaped convict to make a mockery of the
foundations of human justice. Consequently, I believe we must
combine the sacred with the human.
After prayer, study, reflection and discernment, I am thoroughly
convinced that this Court has the inescapable duty to review this and
similar life-taking decisions, but only after the accused is re-arrested
and taken back into the custody of the law.
PANGANIBAN, J ., separate opinion:
This normally run-off-the-mill matter of granting an extension of time
to file brief for the accused has merited vigorous and in-depth
discussion in the Court because two monumental and hallowed
doctrines appear to collide in its disposition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the accused's motion
for extension to file brief and in view of the delay in the disposition of
such motion due to the lengthy court deliberation thereon, to give her
a new period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file her
Brief.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
On the one hand, there is historically entrenched principle that
impels this Court to review a decision imposing the death
penalty. 1 Such historicity is reinforced by the pro-life provisions of
our 1987 Constitution, one of which 2 had in fact prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty, "unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it."
After a careful study of the issue submitted for resolution, I am
constrained, based on considerations of justice and fairness not only
for the accused but for society in general as well, to register my
dissent from the majority opinion.
The factual antecedents upon which this Court is called to decide
whether or not to dismiss the appeal of the accused in this case, are
as follows:
Upon the other, there is the legal, equitable and logical tenet that a
person convicted by the lower courts must first submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the appellate court before he/she can plead for the
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Accused Josefina A. Esparas was convicted on 13 March 1995 by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 in Criminal Case
No. 94-5897, for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep.
Act No. 7659, more specifically, for importing into the country twenty
(20) kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known
as "shabu." She was sentenced to death. Prior to conviction by the
trial court, but after arraignment, accused escaped from confinement.
The records of the case (Criminal Case No. 94-5897) were
nonetheless elevated to this Court for automatic review, involving as
it does the imposition of the death penalty.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is also required by the
Rules of Court during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of
conviction in the trial court so that, in the event of an accused's
escape from detention during his appeal, the appeal may be
dismissed outright by the appellate court.
On 14 November 1955, the Court required counsel for accused to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed given the fact
that she had escaped from confinement even prior to judgment by
the trial court and remains at-large since her escape from detention.
"Sec. 8.Dismissal of appeal for abandonment for
failure to prosecute. — The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion
and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by this Rule, except in case the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court gives the appellate court
the authority to dismiss an appeal when the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal. It provides:
Counsel for accused has failed to show cause, as required. Instead,
he has filed motions for extension of time to file appellant's brief,
which the Court has not acted upon, as there has been failure to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee
or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal."
The Solicitor General was required by this Court to comment on the
effect of accused's escape from confinement on the present appeal.
The Solicitor General, in his comment dated 9 January 1996,
recommends that the Court proceed with the appeal and review the
judgment of conviction despite the accused's escape, as the penalty
involved is the death penalty.
In People v. Codilla(G.R. Nos. 100720-23, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA
104), the Court reiterated the sound doctrine that the escape of the
accused-appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper
authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.
It is basic in procedural law that one who seeks positive relief from a
court of law should submit to its jurisdiction. In criminal law and
procedure, it is likewise settled that the trial court has to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused before it can proceed to
try the case and render judgment against him. Thus, in the present
case, trial proceeded only as to accused Josefina A. Esparas, who
earlier entered a plea of not guilty, while her co-accused Rodrigo
O. Libed has remained at large and has not been arraigned or tried.
We are not unaware of the ruling of the Court in People v.
Cornelio (G.R. No. L-1289, 10 June 1971 SCRA 435) stating that:
"The escape of the accused does not relieve the
Court of the burden of automatically reviewing the
case, in the same manner that a withdrawal of
appeal by a death convict would not remove the
case from jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, the
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court will no longer permit the case to remain
further in its docket and will proceed to discharge
its task of passing upon the case en consulta and
reviewing the facts and the law as applied thereto
by the trial court, and determining the propriety of
its imposition of the death penalty." (reference to
footnotes omitted)
for an escape since, in any case, such escape will not be taken as
admission of guilt and the Supreme Court will have, in any event, to
review his conviction.
If the accused, upon review by the Supreme Court, is acquitted or
meted out a penalty lower than death, then he can re-surface. If his
death sentence is affirmed by the Supreme Court, then he will most
likely remain a fugitive from justice.
It is my considered view however that a distinction should be made
between a death convict, i.e. one sentenced to death by a trial court,
who remains in the custody of the law, but who voluntarily withdraws
his appeal and a death convict, i.e. one sentenced to death by the
trial court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the
pendency of the appeal. It should be clear in the first case, that even
if the death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial court's
judgment sentencing him to death, the appellate court may still and
nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the convictappellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to await
final verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused
no longer recognizes and respects the authority of law and the dulyconstituted authorities in general and this Court in particular. Such
supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not be taken
lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority of
the Court are essential and implicit elements in an effective and
credible judicial system.
I do not believe that this is the wish or intention of the general public
now outraged by the still-rising incidence of heinous crimes
punishable with death. To infuse sense, nay, sanity into the system, I
submit that "mandatory jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court to review
death penalty cases and "automatic review" of death penalty cases
have to assume implicitly that the accused in his person is subject to
the processes and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court if it is to review
his conviction to death by the trial court.
It is therefore my considered opinion that accused Josefina
A. Esparas should be given a non-extendible period of thirty (30)
days from receipt by her counsel of record of the Court's resolution.
to surrender to the proper authorities and remain in the custody of
the law, failing in which, this appeal should be deemed and stand
dismissed and, thereupon, the judgment of the trial court convicting
and sentencing her to death should be final ordered remanded to the
court of origin for appropriate execution, after re-arrest of the
accused.
No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery
of the justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and
even vindication via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in
another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from justice and
repudiating the very authority of the system whose protection he
seeks and invokes.
Appendix N
Melo vs. People
Petitioners Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo were convicted, as
principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime of corruption of
minor, as defined in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code, by the
City Court of San Pablo, and sentenced as follows: LLpr
A soft, bended approach whereby an sentenced to death by a trial
court for a heinous crime may escape from confinement and, still
require the Supreme Court just the same to review his conviction, will
shatter to pieces the present drive against heinous crimes
punishable with death. All that the accused in such cases has to do
— after being sentenced to death by the trial court — is to arrange
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". . . The accused Francisca Alimagno, to suffer
the penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and ten (10) days as maximum, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, which shall not be more than one-third
of the principal penalty herein imposed and to pay
the proportionate costs; the accused Jovita Melo,
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum
of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency which shall not be more than onethird of the principal penalty herein imposed and to
pay the proportionate costs."
"Complainant Filomena de la Cruz, who was
undisputedly born on August 10, 1946 at
Calamba, Laguna (Exh. B), was employed in the
house of Pita Alvero at San Pablo City as a
domestic helper for a period of only nine (9) days
from November 20, 1964 to November 29, 1964.
On November 27, 1964, she came to know
defendant Francisca Alimagno who was bringing
money to her employer Pita Alvero. On said date,
defendant Alimagno tried to convince her to leave
the house of Pita Alvero, promising her a better
job. Defendant Alimagno, having gained her
confidence, succeeded in thus persuading her to
leave the house of Pita Alvero. Hence, on
November 29, 1964, after leaving a selfexplanatory note, Exh. A, which was admittedly
written by accused Francisca Alimagno herself,
which reads:
The Court of Appeals modified the decision with respect to the
subsidiary penalty, thus:
'Ako ho ay nagtanan kasama ko
ay lalake.
"However, the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency of the defendants to pay the respective
indemnities imposed upon them should be
eliminated from the dispositive portion of the lower
court's decision. (Rep. Act No. 5465). Moreover, it
should be ordained therein that in the event of
insolvency of one of them, the other should be
subsidiarily liable thereto, with right of
reimbursement, pursuant to Article 110 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Y
our
Utus
an'
complainant abandoned the house of her
mistress and went with defendants
Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo in a
jeep, together with a man and a driver. They
then proceeded to Barrio Putol, San Pablo
City, where she was brought to a hut thereat
and there allowed to be ravished by a man,
whom she saw for the first time, after the
latter had covered her month with a rag and
tied her hands, so that she was rendered
speechless and helpless from offering any
resistance, so much so that he was able to
"WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated
above, the decision appealed from, being in
keeping with the evidence and the law, is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants."
The main facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
from which We quote:
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satiate his lust with her until 12:00 o'clock
midnight. Thereafter, she was brought by
the man to the house of defendant
Jovita Melo only to be transferred later to
the house of defendant Francisca Alimagno,
where she stayed for more or less three
days until she was found there and taken
back by Leovigildo Perez and Pita Alvero.
The two thereafter brought her to the Police
Department for the corresponding
investigation."
Code in view of the fact that from her own
statement, Exh. 1, she admitted that she had
sexual intercourse with other men.
"This argument is clearly untenable. Complainant,
who does not know how to read and write
vehemently denied the contents of Exh. 1, saying
that it was not the statement she gave to the
police. Indeed, she testified that previous to the
incident, she did not have any coition with any
man and the trial court so believed her. In any
event, even assuming it to be true, Article 340
does not prescribe that the persons corrupted be
of good reputation, as in the case of simple
seduction under Article 338, much less that they
be virgins, as in qualified seduction under Article
337, both of the Revised Penal Code. It follows
that the above-mentioned traits are of no
consequence. . .
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in convicting
them of the crime of corruption of minor upon wholly unsubstantial
and inherently conflicting evidence; (2) in not holding that the facts,
as found by it and the trial court, do not constitute the crime of
corruption of minors as defined and penalized by Article 340 of the
Revised Penal Code; (3) in not holding that the minor referred to in
Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code should be below 18 years of
age; (4) in not holding that a person who is already corrupted can no
longer be the victim of corruption of minors committed through abuse
of authority or confidence; (5) in not acquitting the petitioners of the
crime of corruption of minors; and, (6) in not holding that the penalty
imposed upon petitioner Melo is incorrect. cdrep
xxx xxx xxx
"With regard to the letter (Exh. A), appellant
Francisca Alimagno admitted having written the
same out of pity to the complainant Filomena de la
Cruz (tsn., p. 70, April 22, 1966). But, if she had
nothing to do with complainant's sexual adventure,
it is strange why she wrote said letter, containing
false averments, and then took the complainant
away from the house of Pita Alvero, without the
knowledge and consent of the latter. She, being a
friend of Pita Alvero should have known that her
actuation in writing the letter was ill-advised and
morally wrong. Her admission that she wrote the
same clearly indicates her plan to facilitate or
promote the prostitution or corruption of the
complainant.
Petitioners argue that they were convicted upon unsubstantial and
inherently conflicting evidence. This contention is devoid of factual
basis considering the findings of the Court of Appeals which are
hereunder reproduced if only to demonstrate that the same were
made after a thorough analysis of the evidence, and hence are
beyond this Court's power of review:
"Appellants (herein petitioners) further contend
that the lower court erred in not finding that even
before November 29, 1964, the complainant
Filomena de la Cruz was already a corrupted
person and therefore she could no longer be the
victim of the crime of "Corruption of Minors"
penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal
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"Appellant Francisca Alimagno testified that the
witness for the prosecution Leovigildo Perez was
demanding P5,000.00 from her and later was
reduced to P2,000.00 (tsn. p. 83, April 22, 1966) to
quash the case against her. On crossexamination, she (Francisca Alimagno) said that
Perez was asking the aforesaid amount on the
ground floor of the Secret Service Division. The
pertinent portion of her testimony read, thus:
ABecause we called up Atty. Alvero and
asked him to assist us.
QAnd you told Atty. Alvero that Leovigildo
Perez was asking you P5,000.00?
ANo, sir, he just told me go home.
QIn other words when Atty. Alvero arrived
he just told you to go home?
"QYou stated that Leovigildo Perez asked
P5,000.00 from you, can you tell
where Leovigildo Perez asked
P5,000.00 from you?
AYes, sir.' (tsn., pp. 100-101, ibid.)
AAt the ground floor, sir.
"If there is truth on the matter that Leovigildo
Perez was extorting money from her (Francisca
Alimagno) for the purpose of quashing the case,
appellant Alimagno should have reported or
denounced immediately to the police such attitude
of Perez, inasmuch as they were near the office of
the Secret Service Division or told the matter to
Atty. Alvero, but she allegedly kept the matter to
herself. The truth, however, is that it was appellant
Alimagno who made an offer of P50.00 to
Leovigildo Perez to drop the case against her.
Thus, the pertinent portion of his (Perez) testimony
reads:
QAre you referring to the Office of the
Secret Service Division?
AAt the ground floor but not within the office
of the Secret Service Division.
QWas that when you were called by the
Secret Service men?
AYes, sir.
QDid you immediately denounce Perez to
the police what he was asking from
you?
'AThe truth is that the spouses went to our
residence and asked me to accept
the amount of P50.00 and drop the
case. I told them to ask the
complainant, but the complainant
refused and said that let the court
decide the case.
ANo, sir.
QWhy did you not tell or report the matter to
the police?
xxx xxx xxx
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QIn your answer you refer to the spouses,
will you please specify whom you
are referring to?
jurisdiction that an offer of compromise is an
evidence of guilt. (People vs. Manzano, CA-G.R.
No. 00204-R, Nov. 29, 1962.)"
AThe spouses, Alimagno, Sir.' (tsn., pp.
145-146, June 1, 1966)
We find no reason in this case to depart from the rule which limits
this Court's appellate jurisdiction to review only errors of law
"accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon
its own assessment of the evidence." (Evangelista vs. Abad Santos,
51 SCRA 416.)
"The above-quoted testimony of Leovigildo Perez
was strengthened by the testimony of Detective
Sergeant Francisco Escondo, a disinterested
witness for the prosecution who testified, thus:
On the question raised that petitioners could not be guilty of the
crime of corruption because the offended party is more than eighteen
years of age at the time the alleged offense is committed, the point to
consider is whether "under age" means below eighteen or twentyone years old. Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
'QWill you please tell the conversation
between you and the accused for
the second time?
"Any person who shall habitually or with abuse of
authority or confidence, promote or facilitate the
prostitution or corruption of persons under age to
satisfy the lust of another, shall be punished
by . . ."
AThey seek our service to help them in
settling the case.
QWhat was your answer?
AI told them, 'its up to you.' (tsn., pp. 14-15,
June 7, 1965.)
Petitioners contend that in "crimes against chastity, like seduction,
acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and
consented abduction, the age of the victim is pegged at below 18
years of age; . . . that the phrase 'person under age' (in Article 340 of
the Revised Penal Code) was meant by the lawmakers to refer to
persons below 18 years of age." (p. 61, Petitioner's Brief.) cdrep
"On cross-examination, the same witness further
testified, thus:
'AAfter Francisca Alimagno had talked with
the complainant she requested us
to help them to settle this case.
(tsn., p. 22, Ibid.)
We cannot subscribe to this view. Article 402 of the Civil Code
provides that "majority commences upon the attainment of the age of
twenty-one years." When the lawmakers specifically provide
"persons under age", instead of "below eighteen years of age", they
could mean no other than that the offended party must be below 21
years old, and not below 18 years of age. The same is true in Acts of
Lasciviousness in Article 336. White Slave Trade in Article 341, and
Forcible Abduction in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, where
the age limit is not set at eighteen. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his
"It is clear from the foregoing testimony of both
witnesses for the prosecution that the appellants
made an offer of compromise for the settlement of
the case. These overtures made by the appellants
to have the case settled out of court are indicative
of a guilty conscience and it is well-settled in this
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1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS
commentary on the Revised Penal Code, page 1623, Book II, states
that "Art. 340 was taken from art. 444 of the old Penal Code. The
requisites of the crime of corruption of minors are that the accused
acted habitually or with the abuse of authority or confidence; that he
promoted or facilitated the prostitution or corruption of persons below
21 years of age and that he so acted in order to satisfy the lust of
another." (emphasis supplied).
However, We take note of the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that with respect to petitioner Jovita Melo who was found
guilty as accomplice in a consummated crime where the penalty is
arresto mayor, medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day
to 6 months), and where there is no modifying circumstances
present, the penalty in its medium period should be imposed, or not
less than 3 months and 11 days nor more than 4 months and 20
days. Otherwise stated, the petitioner Jovita Melo should suffer the
penalty of 4 months and 20 days, instead of 6 months of arresto
mayor. llcd
WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
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