Constitutional Law I Atty. Marcelino Marata
Submitted by: Erwin Jay A. Calisas
Class Schedule: Sunday (8:00 AM to 12:00 PM)
CASE 1
NAREDICO, INC., Petitioner,
v.
KROMINCO, INC., Respondent.
GR Number 196892
December 05, 2018
Justice Marivic Victor F. Leonen
Facts:
Malayan Wood Products, Inc., entered into an Operating Contract with the Government, through the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They aimed to explore, develop, exploit, and use the
chromite deposits over a 50,600.38-hectare area within Parcel III of the Surigao Mineral Reservation. The
contract had a lifespan of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.[6] On April 27, 1978, Krominco and
the Government entered into a second Operating Contract for a portion of Parcel II within the Surigao
Mineral Reservation.[7] On May 30, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda canceled
both contracts due to violations of their terms and conditions.[8] Krominco moved for reconsideration of
the cancellation. However, while its motion was pending, it negotiated a new agreement to replace the
canceled Operating Contracts
February 21, 1989, Krominco and the Government signed a new Operating Contract[11] that had a
lifespan of 16 years, renewable for another 25 years.[12]
Issues:
First, whether or not respondent's Petition before the Court of Appeals had become moot; and Second,
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board.
Ruling:
A case is deemed moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to a
supervening event. The lack of an actual or justiciable issue means that there is nothing for the court to
resolve and will be in effect only rendering an advisory opinion.[
As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes relative to mining rights, the Mines
Adjudication Board's findings should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and
technical knowledge over such matters.[117] Additionally, Rule 43, Section 10[118] of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, acknowledging the primacy and deference accorded to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies,
states that the factual findings of a quasi-judicial agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be
binding on the Court of Appeals.
The 1987 Constitution, the State is expected to take on a more hands-on approach or "a more dynamic
role in the exploration, development[,] and utilization of the natural resources of the country"[130] as a
consequence of its full control and supervision over natural resources. It exercises control and supervision
through the following modes: The State may directly undertake such activities; or The State may enter
into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations; Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens; For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance.[131] (Emphasis in the original) Instead of a first-in-time, first-in right
approach toward applicants for mining claims and mining rights, the State decides what the most
beneficial method is when it comes to exploring, developing, and utilizing minerals. It may choose to
either directly undertake mining activities by itself or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production sharing agreements with qualified applicants.
CASE 2
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
717 Phil. 141
September 03, 2013
Justice Lucas Birsamen
Facts:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a
parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his
predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said land
for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which passed
down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son
of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and disposable by the DENR
on March 15, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.
Issue:
Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Ruling:
No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect them. The case settles
down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those
who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the
other.
It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD
1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being
only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the
application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory and the
provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent
state.
The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art.
1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial
property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is converted
into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia,
there is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was
classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through
prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive
evidence was presented.
Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of
the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Petition Denied.
CASE 3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents..
235 SCRA 567
August 24, 1994
Justice Abdulwahid Bidin
Facts:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian... citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic... court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question... petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.
It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the...
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the
land since it still pertains to the State.
As found by the trial court:
"The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration... of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long
before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to
the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been
complied... with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree."
(Rollo, p. 26)
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone
established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit 'P').
Issues:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Ruling:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title
has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
Respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired
all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title, open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the
same to private property
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessorsin-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act Torrens system
It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
private... respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon... certified true copy... of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and
her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia... a...
report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of
Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of
the government and that no forestry interest was affected... private respondents were undoubtedly naturalborn Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of... owner and the prescribed period
of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied
by respondent Lapiña's mother.
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law."
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to
a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains... to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by... respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in--interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive... possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since
1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino... citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of
land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration
This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of
the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to... the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
CASE 4
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO,
AL CONRAD B. ESPALDO, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C.
ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA MARI C.
BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IREN A. TOLENTINO AND AUREA I.
GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, VS. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD (LEB), REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIR, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER, HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO,
RESPONDENTS;
ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN,
JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO, KRYS
VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO AND KENNETH C. VARONA,
RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION,
APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D.
FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHER SIMILARY
SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT, RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN
AND PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART
WALFORD A. TAN, NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED
CITIZENS, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS.
[ G.R. No. 242954 ]
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHEN M. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S.
ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS,
DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA
PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL
ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY
B. FRANCISCO, SHIELA MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R.
VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS,
VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND LEGAL EDUCATION
BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE,
RESPONDENTS.
[ A.M. NO. 20-03-04-SC ]
RE: REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE STATUS AND TREATMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST (PHILSAT) IN THE LIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION IN G.R. NO. 230642 (OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ET AL. VS.
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD) AND GR. NO. 242954 (FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA,
ET AL. VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE AND LEGAL EDUCATION
BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE)
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS
(PALS), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, DEAN JOAN S. LARGO, AND ITS
PRESIDENT DEAN MARISOL DL. ANENIAS, INTERVENOR.
G.R. No. 230642
November 09, 2021
Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of
1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional
the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system of continuing legal
education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and implementing the
nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT
pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA
7662. Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking
power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom, and
violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA
7662 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by
the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the
consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas
of education, including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine
education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however,
is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory
powers of the political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and supervision of
legal education:
First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a
necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart
from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of
legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper
form of judicial activism.
As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice of law
and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the
argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides academic
competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the
exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens
and this includes legal education.
2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an
applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power
of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to
promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.
3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the power to
supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning
the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered
the practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in
measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law
school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the PhilSAT presently operates not only as a
measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law
schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable
and therefore, unconstitutional.
CASE 5
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
G.R. No. 89572
December 21, 1989
Justice Isagani A. Cruz
FACTS:
Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. Zoology, had taken
and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take another test. NMAT Rule
provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court
held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.
RULING:
NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving
the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving
the quality of medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.
CASE 6
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC., SISTER CONCEPCION CAJILIG, NENALYN
ABIODA, MARY ESPINO, RHODORA AZUCENA, MA. DULCE SOCORRO POSA and
COSETTE MONTEBLANCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO H. LARA, EDUARDO MAGANTE, JOSE SANCHO,
REYNALDA F. SO and WINNEFRIDA C. VALENZUELA, as parents/guardians of Antonio
Marco Ho, Ma. Elanie Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardina
Cainoy, respondents.
Tirol & Tirol for petitioner.s
Nilo S. Sampiano for private respondents.
G.R. No. 100588
March 7, 1994
Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon
Facts:
Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and
Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who
were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of... school year 19891990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104
(Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced
their right to freely choose their field of study and... finish a college degree and worse, no other school
within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and
school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City,... to command petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they
also prayed for actual and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them.
Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion
Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro
Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private... respondents from finishing their Nursing
course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the school's policy that
only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two
minor subjects, are allowed... enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed
and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed
reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of...
students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up
to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section
13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the... right to determine on academic grounds who
shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.
Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under
the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither
do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to... re-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private
educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom.
Issues:
The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention policy of the
school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in two minor subjects may they
compel the school to allow them to complete their... course?
Ruling:
When petitioning students enrolled at respondent university, they and their parents/ guardians signed
agreements of admission wherein they
"When petitioning students enrolled at respondent university, they and their parents/ guardians signed
agreements of admission wherein they bound themselves to abide by the policies of the school, otherwise
to discontinue. This is also provided for in the Nursing Catalog of respondent university.
"These petitioning students have been given warnings of their sub?standard performance after and before
examination periods and informed of their efficiency and performance ratings. During the evaluation and
promotional meetings, some of the students were advised to... discontinue while those on the boarder (sic)
line were, for humanitarian reasons (sic), allowed to sign promises to improve, otherwise they agreed to
withdraw from the course. Respondents' judgment not to readmit petitioning students was based on sound
reasons and good... faith."
CASE 7
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
G.R. No. 127325
March 19, 1997
Justice Hilario Davide Jr
FACTS:
December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative.
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the
notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense and setting the
case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter
of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents conducting a signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein that R.A No.
6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the
constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
RULING:
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates
to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the
case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative
on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include,
as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case
of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws.
CASE 8
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.
Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.
G.R. No. 4349
September 24, 1908
Justice Richard Tracey
FACTS:
In 1904, Congress, through a law, Act No. 1136, authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not
exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular,
only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information
against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding
P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of
not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the
penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.
In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of Circular No. 397 on the ground that if the
acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such
a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority conferred to the Collector to promulgate said Circular constitutes an invalid
delegation of legislative power
RULING:
Yes. A law authorizing the Collector to impose penalties for violations of his rules is invalid, as vesting in
him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively
lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by
Act No. 1136. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where
the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by that constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute
the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit
confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
Basis of Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers. - The doctrine of non-delegation of powers is based on
the maxim of "potestas delegata non potest delegari" which means what has been delegated cannot in turn
be delegated. The doctrine rests on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter and not through the intervening mind of another.
CASE 9
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R.
CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
MANDALUYONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 102782
December 11, 1991
Justice Isagani Cruz
Facts:
Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation,
his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court
asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages
for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file... their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining
against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic
violation in Mandaluyong.
Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati
Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste,
another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan
Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the... confiscation of his driver's license
Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the
confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of
license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter
was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the
confiscation of license plates was invalid in... the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why
Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked
collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which... does not permit,
and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of
examining the said ordinance in the... absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority,... which reiterated its contention that
the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the
Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can
be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle.
Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including
Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of
the statute making the... delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.[5]
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions
such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be
delegated is not the discretion to... determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how
the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard,
the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the
delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been... met. It is settled that the "convenience
and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable
sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority.[6]
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; 5) must not be... unreasonable; and 7) must be general and consistent with public
policy.[7]
Issues:
The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
Ruling:
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be
imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof... expressly provides that "in case of traffic
violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties... upon traffic violators. At the same
time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such
sanctions, including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any... rate, the fact
is that there is no statutory authority for - and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition
of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be
imposed by the challenged... enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No.
7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of
motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's licenses for traffic
violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED