G.R. No. L-20851
September 3, 1966
JESUS AGUIRRE, petitioner,
vs.
VICTOR S. PHENG, in his capacity as General Manager of the LEONORA & COMPANY, and NATIONAL
SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, respondents.
DOCTRINE: Although ordinarily, the owner would be entitled to any accession thereto, the rule is different where the
works or improvements or the accession was made on the property by one who acted in good faith.
FACTS:
On June 28, 1954, Vicente Aldaba and Teresa V. Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank with a capacity
of 5,000 gallons, for the sum of P900.00,for which the latter delivered to the sellers duly endorsed, Security Bank & Trust
Company check No.
281912, in the amount of P900.00. Aguirre, however, failed to, take physical possession of the tank, having been
prevented from doing so by the municipal authorities of Los Baños, Laguna (where the tank was located), in view of the
claim of ownership being made by the Bureau of Public Highways. It appears, however, that Vicente and Teresa Aldaba
again sold the same tank on December 2, 1954 to Zosimo Gabriel, for P900.000.Gabriel, in turn, sold it to the Leonora &
Company on December 5, 1954, for P2,500.00. After some alterations and improvements made on the tank, Leonora
&Company was able to sell the tank to National Shipyards& Steel Corporation (Nassco), for P14,500.00.
ISSUE:
1. WON Aguirre can take ownership of the property -- YES
2. WON Aguirre should reimburse Leonora for the improvements -- YES
HELD:
It is clear that we have here a case of accession by specification: Leonora and Company, as purchaser acting
in good faith, spending P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of the tank which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner
Aguirre. There is no showing that without the works made by Leonora & Company, the tank in its original condition when
Aguirre paid P900.00 therefor, would command the price of P14,500 which Nassco was willing to pay. Although ordinarily,
therefore, Aguirre, as
owner of the tank, would be entitled to any accession thereto, the rule is different where the works or improvements or the
accession was made on the property by one who acted in good faith.
And, it is not contended that the making of the improvements and incurring of expenses amounting to P11,299.00 by
Leonora & Company was done in bad faith. Furthermore, to uphold petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the sum of
P14,500.00 the price of the tank in its present condition, would be to allow him to enrich himself at the expense of another.
The lower courts, therefore, acted correctly in ordering the reimbursement to Leonora &Company of the expenses it made
on the tank.
Wherefore finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review, the present petition is hereby dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 94283
March 4, 1991
MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA F. EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO EDUAVE, respondents.
FACTS:
The parties to this case dispute the ownership of a certain parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental,
forming part of an island in a non-navigable river. Private respondents (Janita Eduave) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of private respondents as plaintiffs therein to establish by preponderance
of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation. The court found that the island is a delta forming part of the
river bed which the government may use to reroute, redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held
that it was outside the commerce of man and part of the public domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. The trial court,
however, recognized the validity of petitioners' possession and gave them preferential rights to use and enjoy the property.
The trial court added that should the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership, the petitioners have rights
better than that of private respondents.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court found that the island was formed by the branching off of the Tagoloan
River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil
Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to
private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court correctly applied the provisions of Articles 463 and 465 of the new Civil Code to the facts
of the case at bar; and
HELD:
The Court of Appeals also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than
the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the
length of their property along the margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established by petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be recognized?
It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465, also
granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best
position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is
required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of
third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the Torrens system must itself still be registered.
Petitioners may therefore, acquire said property by adverse possession for the required number of years under the doctrine
of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot be considered in good faith, however, because they are presumed to
have notice of the status of private respondents as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the island as recognized
and accorded by law. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only
through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of thirty years. By their own admission, petitioners have been in
possession of the property for only about fifteen years. Thus, by this token and under the theory adopted by petitioners, the
island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.
This case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership over an accession but rather between
a riparian owner and the one in possession of the island. Hence, there is no need to make a final determination regarding
the origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was initially formed by the branching off or division of the river and covered
by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there is strictly no accession because the original owner retains ownership,
or whether it was due to the action of the river under Article 465, or, as claimed by petitioners, whether it was caused by the
abrupt segregation and washing away of the stockpile of the river control, which makes it a case of avulsion under Article
459.
We are also well aware that this petition is an upshot of the action to quiet title brought by the private respondents against
petitioners. As such it is an action quasi in rem. Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this nature is conclusive only between
the parties and does not bind the State or the other riparian owners who may have an interest over the island involved
herein. We find no error committed by respondent court and DENY the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by respondent court and DENY the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, (represented by his heirs, Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan, Lillian Rhodora, Roy Victor, Roger
Lyle and Alexander Nicolai, all surnamed Rosales) and LILY ROSQUETA-ROSALES, Petitioners
vs.
MIGUEL CASTELLTORT, JUDITH CASTELLTORT, and LINA LOPEZ-VILLEGAS, assisted by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Rene Villegas, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 368564 and
designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baños, Laguna.
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan,
from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a
survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages.
To the complaint, the Castelltorts claimed in their Answer with Counterclaim that they were builders in good faith.
Lina soon filed a Motion for Intervention.
In her Answer to the complaint, Lina alleged that the Castelltorts acted in good faith in constructing the house on
petitioners’ lot as they in fact consulted her before commencing any construction thereon, they having relied on the
technical description of the lot sold to them, Lot 16, which was verified by her officially designated geodetic engineer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
HELD:
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has
the right to build thereon and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.
Article 527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part
of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners’ lot, he believed that it was the
Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas. The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was eventually traced to
the error committed by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera’s employees in placing stone monuments on petitioners’
property, instead of on Lot 16, the lot sold to Castelltort, based on the survey made by the engineer in 1992.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable
provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the
land.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by
suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
In the case at bar, Castelltort’s good faith ceased on August 21, 1995 when petitioners personally apprised him of their
title over the questioned lot.
Considering that appellants had ceased as builders in good faith at the time that appellant Miguel was notified of
appellees’ lawful title over the disputed property, the payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that
time since he can no longer avail of the rights provided under the law for builders in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 2, 2002 and Resolution dated February 6, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the trial court shall include for determination the
increase in value ("plus value") which petitioners’ 315 square meter lot may have acquired by reason of the existence of
that portion of the house built before respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort were notified of petitioners’ rightful claim
on said lot, and the current fair market value of said portion.
G.R. No. 153625
July 31, 2006
Heirs of MARCELINO CABAL, represented by VICTORIA CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses LORENZO CABAL1 and ROSITA CABAL, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner in this case, Marcelino, is one of the heirs of Marcelo Cabal. Before he died on August 1954, Marcelo Cabal
(Marcelo) was the owner of a 4,234-square meter parcel of land situated at Barrio Palanginan, Iba, Zambales, registered
with the RD. Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a
portion of the lot. Since then, the son of Marcelino also built his house on the lot.
On August 17, 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the Lot into undivided equal shares of
423.40-square meters each. In the interim, based on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was revealed that Marcelino and
his son occupied and built their houses on an area located on the southernmost portion of another lot and not the adjacent
lot designated to him, but to his brother Lorenzo and the latter’s wife, Rosita. The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal
(respondents) confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to an agreement on March 1, 1989 to a re-survey and
swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles.
However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not materialize and efforts to settle the dispute in the barangay
level proved futile.
Hence, on August 10, 1994, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against Marcelino
before the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. Marcelino contended that respondents have no cause of action against
him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondent’s knowledge and acquiescence. He
further avers that acquisitive prescription has set in. On January 24, 1997, during the pendency of the trial of the case,
Lorenzo died. MTC ruled in favor of Marcelino.
Respondents appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC’s ruling, stating that Marcelinos possession was in the
concept of a co-owner and therefore prescription does not run in his favor; that his possession, which was tolerated by his
co-owners, does not ripen into ownership.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the lot where Marcelino built his house was co-owned by Marcelo’s children
2) Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith
HELD:
1) NO. It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in 1949 with the consent of his father.
Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before
his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership was already
particularly designated or physically segregated. Thus, even before the lot was subdivided, Marcelino already occupied
the disputed portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot. Elementary is the rule that there is no
coownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that
said portion is still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does make said portion less determinable or
identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective
owners. Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion since 1949, with the consent of
his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his
favor and not one adjacent to it.
2) Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by respondents of his encroachment
on their property. Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the lot covered by his
title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare
allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’ property when he continued to occupy and possess
the disputed lot after partition was effected. The case was remanded to MTC for further proceedings to determine the
facts essential to the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 64729 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 165907
July 27, 2009
SPS. DOMINADOR R. NARVAEZ and LILIA W. NARVAEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ROSE OGAS ALCISO and ANTONIO ALCISO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Larry Ogas owned a parcel of land, and a portion was subject to a 30-year lease agreement with Esso standard eastern,
Inc. Ogas sold the property to his daughter Rose Alciso. Rose later sold the property to Jaime Sansano, repurchased the
property then sold it again to Celso Bate. I the deed of sale, it stated that it recognizes the lease over the property in favor
of ESSO, upon sale, the rights over the land as lessor and seller were likewise transfers in full to Bate. The TCT was then
cancelled and new TCT was issued in the name of Bate.
Bate then sold the property to Narvaez. Alciso demanded a stipulation be made in the deed of sale allowing her to
repurchase the property from the Narvaez. Upon repurchasing the property, Narvaez and Alciso did not reach an
agreement for the price.
Alciso filed a complaint claiming that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of real estate mortgage and
not a contract of sale with right of repurchase.
RTC held that:
1. The 25 August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase became functus officio when Alciso repurchased the
property;
2. The action to annul the 28 March 1980 Deed of Absolute Sale had prescribed;
3. Alciso had no legal personality to annul the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty;
4. The 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Alciso — Alciso could
repurchase the property;
5. Alciso communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui;
6. The repurchase price was P80,000;
7. Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its
market value when constructed or sell the land to the Spouses Narvaez;
8. Alciso was entitled to P100,000 attorney’s fees and P20,000 nominal damages.
Spouses Narvaez appealed to the CA claiming that:
1. the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty did not contain a stipulation pour autrui — not all requisites were
present;
2. The RTC erred in setting the repurchase price at P80,000
3. They were purchasers for value and in good faith
4. They were builders in good faith.
Court of Appeals held that:
1. The 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui;
2. Alciso accepted the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui;
3. The RTC erred in setting the repurchase price at P80,000;
4. The 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty involved a contract of sale with right of repurchase and not real estate
mortgage;
5. The Spouses Narvaez were builders in good faith;
6. Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses
Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the RTC for determination of the property’s reasonable repurchase price.
ISSUE:
Narvaez claimed that Alciso did not communicate her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui;
thus, she could not repurchase the property.
HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner
of the land is the builder, sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco v. Regalado:
Article 1311, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code states the rule on stipulations pour autrui:
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not
sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
The requisites of a Stipulation Pour Autrui:
1. There is a stipulation in favor of a third person;
2. The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract;
3. The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person — the favor is not an incidental
benefit
4. The favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
5. The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation
6. The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party.
All the requisites are present in the instant case:
1. There is a stipulation in favor of Alciso;
2. The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract;
3. Bate and the Spouses Narvaez clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to Alciso;
4. The favor is unconditional and uncompensated;
5. Alciso communicated her acceptance of the favor before its revocation — she demanded that a stipulation be
included in the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the Spouses
Narvaez, and she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property;
6. Bate and the Spouses Narvaez did not represent, and were not authorized by, Alciso.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 October 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63757 with MODIFICATION. Respondent Rose O. Alciso may exercise her right of
redemption by paying the petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2)
the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful
expenses made on the subject property. The Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 8, La
Trinidad, Benguet, to determine the amounts of the expenses of the contract, the legitimate expenses made by reason of
the sale, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property.
After such determination, respondent Rose O. Alciso shall have 30 days to pay the amounts to petitioners Spouses
Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez.
G.R. No. 193517
January 15, 2014
THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S. MAXIMO, ALBERTO A. SARILI,
IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A. SARILI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS MOJICA,Respondent.
FACTS:
Lagrosa filed a complaint against Sps. Sarili alleging that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan
City covered by TCT No. 55979 and has been religiously paying the real estate taxes therefore since November 29, 1974.
He and his wife had immigrated to the USA since 1968 and is now a resident of California, USA and he only discovered
that a new certificate of title to the subject property was issued by the register of deeds in the name of Victorino, married
to Isabel Amparo, during his vacation in the Philippines. He further alleged that it was due to a falsified Deed of Absolute
Sale purportedly executed by him and his wife, dated February 16, 1978, which was a result of the fraudulent, illegal and
malicious acts committed by Sps. Sarili and the Register of Deeds in order to acquire the subject property.
Sps. Sarili, on the other hand, maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the subject
property from one Ramon Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose of the
same, and, in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute sale dated November 20, 1992 conveying the said property in
their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili
PRINCIPLE:
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered
owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. In such a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only
the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the latter’s
legal authority to convey the property.
HELD:
There was no valid conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili.
The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof of capacity of the
seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such
public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but
there appears to be flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must
show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its execution.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Sarili purchased the subject property from Ramos on the strength of the
latter’s ostensible authority to sell under the subject SPA. The said document, however, readily indicates flaws in its
notarial acknowledgment since the respondent’s community tax certificate (CTC) number was not indicated thereon;
which is required under the governing rule on notarial acknowledgements at that time. Despite this irregularity, however,
Sps. Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the subject SPA and into the circumstances of its
execution as required by prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, Sps. Sarili cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for
value.
Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void." In other words, if the subject SPA was not
proven to be duly executed and authentic, then it cannot be said that the foregoing requirement had been complied with;
hence, the sale would be void.
The Court also holds that the due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA were not sufficiently established under
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as above-cited.
Since Sps. Sarili’s claim over the subject property is based on forged documents, no valid title had been transferred to
them (and, in turn, to petitioners). Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine the rights and obligations of
the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article
449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he
be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. As for Sps. Sarili, they knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the
very beginning that they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering
the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any
further investigation on Ramos’s capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house
thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in
their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal
contemplation.
The case is therefore remanded to the court a quo for the proper application of the above-cited Civil Code provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2010 and Resolution dated August 26, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76258 are AFFIRMED. However the case is REMANDED to the court a quo for the
proper application of Article 449 in relation to Articles 450 451 452 and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code
with respect to the house Spouses Victorino Sarili and Isabel Amparo had built on the subject property as herein
discussed.
G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P. PADILLA, Petitioners, v. LEOPOLDO MALICSI, LITO CASINO, AND
AGRIFINO GUANES, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City in 1984.The lot was covered by Transfer
Certificate Title No. T-45565 and had an area of 150 square meters.5 It had an assessed value of more than
P20,000.00.6chanrobleslaw
Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.)
constructed houses on their lot.
Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et al. to vacate the premises and pay a monthly
rental of P2,000.00, but Malicsi, et al. refused to heed Spouses Padilla's demands.
The matter was referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation proceedings and amicable settlement, but all
efforts at conciliation failed.
On August 6, 2007, Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Malicsi, et al., along with three
(3) others: Larry Marcelo, Diosdado dela Cruz, and Rolando Pascua.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that
the lot belonged to Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld).11 They claimed that they possessed the land and
built their houses on the lot only after receiving De Mossessgeld's permission.
Malicsi, et al. also claimed that they and De Mossessgeld agreed that she would sell them the areas occupied by their
houses, provided that pending full payment, they would pay her P40.00 per month as rent.
Between 1980 and 1983, Malicsi, et al. constructed their respective houses on the lot in the belief that they would
eventually own the areas they were occupying. Malicsi and Casino even introduced improvements to the houses they had
built.
Malicsi, et al. stated that they first found out about Spouses Padilla's claim of ownership sometime in 2002. They admitted
receiving the demand letters to vacate and pay rentals, but they refused to leave the premises.They denied that
conciliation and mediation proceedings for amicable settlement were ever conducted before the Katarungang
Pambarangay.
On September 3, 2008, a commission was created to determine the actual valuation of the lot, including the
improvements erected on it.18 In its Report, the Commission found that "the prevailing valuation of similar lots in the
vicinity ranges from P4,000 to P6,000 per [square] [meter] or an average valuation of P5000.00/[square] [meter] as per
information gathered from several bank appraisers in the locality."
On January 30, 2009, Spouses Padilla, exercising their option to sell the land to Malicsi, et al. under Article 448 of the
Civil Code in the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, filed a Motion and Manifestation with Offer to Sell. In their
Comment, Malicsi, et al. stated that by filing the Motion and Manifestation, Spouses Padilla had, in effect, recognized
Malicsi, et al.'s standing as builders in good faith. They did not accept the offer to sell.21chanrobleslaw
In the Decision22 dated July 15, 2009, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Malicsi, et al. cannot be considered as builders in
good faith.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to Malicsi, et al.'s allegation that they relied on De Mossessgeld's representation that
she owned the lot and gave them permission to build their houses on it.
Petitioners Spouses Pablo M. Padilla, Jr. and Maria Luisa P. Padilla elevated the case to this Court. In their Petition for
Review on Certiorari,they point out that respondents Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and Agrifino Guanes failed to
substantiate their claim of being builders in good faith:
ISSUE: WON respondents are builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or her title when he or she introduced
improvements on a lot that turns out to be owned by another.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land
until he is paid the value of his building, under article [546]. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article [448], either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to
remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land,
the other party fails to pay for the same.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rosales v. Castelltort49 has emphasized that the choice belongs to the landowner, but the landowner must choose from
the two (2) available options:
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.50
Even before the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, petitioners had already intimated their willingness to sell the
property to respondents at P5,000.00 per square meter, which was the valuation recommended in the Commissioner's
Report. However, respondents refused to accept the offer to sell.51chanrobleslaw
Respondents claim to be builders in good faith because they believed that the lot was owned by De
Mossessgeld.52 Operating under this belief, they entered into an agreement with her where she would sell them the areas
occupied by their respective houses, and pending full payment, they would each pay her P40.00 monthly as rent.
However, the Regional Trial Court was not swayed by respondents' assertion of being builders in good faith since it found
that the property was titled, as early as 1963, to petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother, while respondents only entered
the lot sometime between 1980 and 1983, thus:
Undoubtedly, [Malicsi, et al.] can not claim that they were builders in good faith because they relied on the
promise of one Mrs. Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld who will sell the same to them but such allegations are
contrary to the actual circumstances obtaining in this case.
A check with the Office of the Register of Deeds will show that the property in question had already been registered in the
name of the mother of [Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.] way back in 1963 under TCT-T-8303 such that [Malicsi, et al.] "can not claim
good faith when they constructed their residential houses thereon in 1980 and 1983. Said Mrs. Mossessgeld had never
been an owner thereof to sell the same to them.
[Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.] is merely giving [Malicsi, et al.] some liberalities by allowing them to buy the lots they occupy but the
latter adamantly refused as can be gleaned from their written Comment dated March 27, 2009.
Respondents say that they believed De Mossessgeld when she told them that the lot belonged to her. Yet, the records
show that De Mossessgeld was a complete stranger to them. The lack of blood relation should have been enough to put
respondents on guard and convince them not to rely on her claim of ownership. If respondents had looked into the
ownership of the lot, they would have easily discovered that it was titled to petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother as
early as 1963 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8303.
To support their assertion, respondents claim that they were made to believe by De Mossessgeld that she owned the lot.
Respondents also claim that they received permission from De Mossessgeld to build their houses on the land, subject to
their eventual purchase of the portions where their houses stood. However, aside from this naked and self-serving
testimony, respondents failed to present any evidence to bolster their claim.
Respondents likewise failed to adduce evidence that they entered into an agreement to sell with De Mossessgeld, or that
they paid her P40.00 per month as rent, pending full payment of the areas they were occupying.
Furthermore, respondents neither presented De Mossessgeld herself nor submitted proof on which she might have based
her purported ownership of the lot. If De Mossessgeld proved elusive, respondents could then have presented statements
from disinterested third parties who could testify that it was so well-known in the community that De Mossessgeld owned
the lot that they had to believe her claim of ownership. Respondents likewise failed to prove that they exercised the
necessary diligence required by their situation. They did not examine the tax declarations or the title to the property before
they built on it.
Failing to substantiate their claim, respondents cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Therefore, the benefits and
rights provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code do not apply.
As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their expenses over the improvements they have introduced
to petitioners' lot under Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity.
Under Article 45267 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the
preservation of the land. However, respondents neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they introduced
improvements for the preservation of the land.
Therefore, petitioners as landowners became the owners68 of the improvements on the lot, including the residential
buildings constructed by respondents, if they chose to appropriate the accessions. However, they could instead choose
the demolition of the improvements at respondents' expense or compel respondents to pay the price of the land under
Article 450 of the Civil Code.
Considering that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court Decision ordering respondents to vacate
the lot and surrender its possession to them, petitioners are deemed to have chosen to appropriate the improvements
built on their lot without any obligation to pay indemnity to respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
96141 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 15, 2009 of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 5469 is REINSTATED IN TOTO.
Leviste Management System v Legaspi Towers
DOCTRINE:
Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act.
The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or
member under Sec. 10 of the Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership with other unit owners as
members or stockholders of the condominium corporation. The purchaser of a condominium unit binds himself to a
contract with other unit owners.
A builder must gain the consent of other registered owners and follow the by-rules of the condominium before amending
the Master Deed.
FACTS:
Legaspi Towers is a 7-floor condominium building with a deck roof and 2 levels above the deck roof, as stated in the
Master Deed, at Paseo De Roxas, Makati City with a unit on the roof deck and 2 levels above said unit called Concession
2 and Concession 3. Concession 3 was bought by Leviste Management System (Petitioner).
Petitioner sought to build another unit called Concession 4 on top of Concession 3 and was able to secure a buiding
permit for its construction. However, Legaspi Towers 200 Inc. (Respondent) sent a notice to Petitioner that its construction
was illegal but the latter did not heed such. Petitioner filed a writ of mandatory injunction against Respondent..
The RTC affirmed Respondent wherein it found application of Art. 448 of the Civil Code and Depra v. Dumlao . The “air
space” above the unit actually belongs to Respondent.
Respondent sought to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Petitioner. Respondent argued that Petitioner should first
get the consent of the registered owners of the condominium project before amendment of the Master Deed under Sec. 4
of the Condominium Act. Petitioner argued that there must be a determination of the required values under Depra before
Respondent can take action.
RTC: Affirmed Respondent.
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent can build Concession 4 on top of Petitioner’s condominium building.
HELD:
No. Petitioner contravened the Master Deed by adding a 3rd level above the roof deck and by violating the Condominium
Act and Respondent’s by-laws.
RATIO:
Instead of procuring the required consent of the registered owners under Sec. 4 of the Condominium Act or having
Concession 4 approved by the members in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose under Respondent’s bylaws, Petitioner merely had an internal agreement with the former president of Respondent. This cannot bind corporations
since they can act only through their Board of Directors.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith does not apply where there is contractual relation between the parties.
The RTC erred in considering Art. 448 and Art. 546 of the Civil Code in this case.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof. (361a)
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain
the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who
has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or
member under Sec. 10 of the Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership with other unit owners as
members or stockholders of the condominium corporation. Thus, the purchaser of a condominium unit binds himself to a
contract with other unit owners.
Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act
where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property and by
contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 199353 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 199389
is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated November 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 88082 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Leviste Management System, Inc. is ORDERED to remove
Concession 4 at its own expense.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170189
September 1, 2010
SPOUSES ELEGIO* CAÑEZO and DOLIA CAÑEZO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES APOLINARIO and CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (appellees) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 186 square
meters, covered by TCT No. 32911. Whereas, Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (appellants) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of 181 square meters, covered by TCT No. 31727. Both parcels of land are
located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to that of appellees.
Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the construction, appellees
discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees’ knowledge and
consent.
Three surveys were conducted which confirmed the fact of encroachment. However, despite oral and written demands,
appellants failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching appellees’ lot.
Spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order
dated 15 August 2000, the trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer within the reglementary
period. The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses
Bautista built structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The spouses Bautista also refused to
remove the structures and respect the boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay
Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad
faith, such that spouses Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.
On appeal, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the Trial Court’s Decision. The appellate court ruled
that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before the filing of the complaint, the
spouses Cañezo should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ
of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses Cañezo’s complaint should
be dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed to specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property.
Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the appellate court
ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that the encroachment
was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the appropriate
indemnity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition
HELD:
PROPERTY LAW
The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action
to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Accion reivindicatoria seeks the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion
reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession.
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached property. Aside from testimonial evidence,
the spouses Cañezo were also able to present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs,
transfer certificates of title, and a relocation survey plan.
The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Cañezo’s testimony on the reason for the spouses Bautista’s attitude
regarding the encroached property. The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautista’s property encroached
upon that of the spouses Cañezo by 0.97 centimeters, while the spouses Bautista’s property was encroached upon by
1.01 centimeters by another landowner.
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon
their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Cañezo.
This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are
entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article
450 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685 promulgated on
17 October 2005 is SET ASIDE and the dispositive portion of the Decision of Branch 213, Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City promulgated on 25 March 2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the
encroaching structures should be issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista
upon the finality of this judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay Spouses
Elegio and Dolia Cañezo ₱30,000 as actual damages; ₱50,000 as moral damages; and ₱30,000 as attorney’s fees. The
interest rate of 12% per annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200265
December 2, 2013
LAURA E. PARAGUYA, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO and EMETRIO CRUCILLO,* and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
SORSOGON, Respondents.
FACTS:
On December 19, 1990, Paraguya filed before the RTC a Complaint against Sps. Crucillo and the RD for the annulment of
OCT No. P-17729 and other related deeds, with prayer for receivership and damages, alleging that Escurel obtained the
aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. Paraguya claimed that she is the lawful heir to the subject properties left by her
paternal grandfather, the late Ildefonso Estabillo while Escurel was merely their administrator and hence, had no right
over the same.
On January 18, 1991, the RD filed its answer and denied any involvement in the aforesaid fraud, maintaining that its
issuance of OCT No. P-17729 was his ministerial duty. Thereafter, or on February 7, 1991, Sps. Crucillo filed their answer
with motion to dismiss, averring that Paraguya's complaint had already been barred by laches and/or prescription. They
further alleged, among others, that Escurel, through her father, the late Angel Escurel, applied for a free patent over the
subject properties, resulting in the issuance of Free Patent No. V-3 005844 under OCT No. P-17729 in her name.
In a Decision dated April 22, 2009, the RTC granted Paraguya s complaint, ordering the annulment of OCT No. P-17729.
Accordingly, it directed the RD to cancel the said title and Sps. Escurillo to surrender ownership and possession of the
subject properties to Paraguya.
On May 15, 2009, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Heirs of Sps. Crucillo, who had substituted the latter due
to their supervening death. The said motion was, however, denied on December 16, 2009, prompting them to elevate the
case to the CA.
In a Decision dated June 27, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling and ordered the dismissal of Paraguya's complaint.
ISSUE:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Paraguya' s complaint for annulment of title.
RULING:
It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership. Verily, a party may seek its
annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action must be seasonably filed, else the same
would be barred.
In this relation, Section 32 of PD1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1 year from
the date of its entry and that, after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes
incontrovertible and indefeasible.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is impelled to sustain the CA’s dismissal of Paraguya's complaint for annulment of OCT
No. P-17729 since it was filed only on December 19, 1990, or more than eleven (11) years from the title's date of entry on
August 24, 1979. Based on Section 32 Of PD 1529, said title had become incontrovertible and indefeasible after the lapse
of one (1) year from the date of its entry, thus barring Paraguya’s action for annulment of title.
G.R. No. 204926
December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the June 13, 2012 Decisionnand the December
5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153, entitled "Dionisio Ugay v. Anacleto C.
Mangaser, represented by his Attorney-in-fact Eustaquio Dugenia," a case of forcible entry and damages.
FACTS:
On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Eustaquio Dugenia (petitioner),
filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent) before the Municipal
Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC). In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor
of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT
No. RP-174 (FP-13787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that
respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation, but no
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were sent to
respondent but he still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy.
Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses, to wit: that he had been a
resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel
of land in that place then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as
part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on
the property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a "bahay kubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a
fence made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments which
he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's property; that while he could not locate some of the monuments,
he based the boundaries on his recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the boundaries
of petitioner's property because he knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a company on the said property;
that petitioner was never in actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when
he discovered the alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that be refused to vacate and surrender the premises
despite receipt of the demand letters because in his letter-reply, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the
premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to
him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the MTC.
MTC Ruling
On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent[5]. It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove
that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174 ( 13789). The MTC opined that
petitioner could have presented a relocation survey, which would have pinpointed the exact location of the house and
fence put up by respondent, and resolved the issue once and for all. It also explained that petitioner failed to prove his
prior physical possession of the subject property. The OCT No. RP-174(13789) registered under petitioner's name and the
Tax Declaration were not proof of actual possession of the property. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff (petitioner) having failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence, the complaint is
hereby DISMISSED.
RTC Ruling
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was raffled to Branch
33.
In its August 23, 2011 Decision,[8] the RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It relied on the
cases of Barba v. Court of Appeals and Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc.,[10] which held that in ejectment cases,
possession of the land did not only mean actual or physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the
action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The RTC stated that
petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789) issued in March
1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995. It added that the boundaries of the property were clearly indicated
in the title, thus, there was no need to conduct a survey. As the owner, petitioner knew the exact metes and bounds of his
property so that when respondent intruded stealthily, he filed the subject suit.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after a thorough perusal of the facts and evidence in this case, this Court reverses the decision of the
MTC, Caba, La Union, dated April 26, 2011 and rules in favor of plaintiff­ appellant (petitioner) and against defendantappellee (respondent), ordering the latter and all other persons claiming rights under him to:
VACATE the portion of the subject property encroached by him;
SURRENDER actual physical possession of the subject portion peacefully to plaintiff-appellant;
REMOVE all the improvements he introduced therein;
PAY attorney's fees in the amount Php20,000.00 to plaintiff-appellant, and pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan, it emphasized that petitioner must allege
and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the presentation of the OCT
No. RP-174( 13789) and his tax declarations. It reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry
cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de jure. What petitioner
proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC misquoted
Nuñez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions by giving the wrong notion of what kind of possession was contemplated in forcible
entry cases. In other words, physical possession was the crux in forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon
ownership.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the Decision dated August 23,
2011 and Order dated October 25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC dated April 26, 2011 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, dated July 6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by the CA in a Resolution,
dated December 5, 2012.
It reads:
This Court, after a meticulous study of the arguments set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent, finds
no cogent reason to revise, amend, much less reverse, the assailed Decision dated June 13, 2012. The Motion for
Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF 0WNERSHIP OF
PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER
SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.
Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or physical possession or
occupation but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right; that the CA should have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as
proofs of prior physical possession over the property; and that the issuance of the same are considered to by law as
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner cited Tolentino, as one of the authors and
experts in Civil law, stating that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to juridical acts, or the acquisition of possession by
sufficient title, inter vivos or mortis causa, onerous or lucrative. These are the acts which the law gives the force of acts of
possession.
Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA Resolution was not valid as it did not state the legal basis required by
the Constitution.
On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his Comment before this Court. He stated that the issues raised and the arguments
presented by petitioner have been thoroughly resolved and ruled upon by the CA. The appellate court did not err in
reversing the RTC decision because petitioner was never in prior physical possession of the property in dispute.
Respondent asserts that he has been in prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in
the concept of an owner of the property in dispute.
On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his Reply, reiterating the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., where a
party was able to demonstrate that it had exercised acts of ownership over the property by having it titled in its name and
by paying real property taxes on it. Petitioner also laments the wrongful insistence of respondent that his possession over
the property was one in the concept of an owner. To petitioner's mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce evidence
to show proof of his right to possess the property when his possession came under attack with the filing of the subject
case.
RULING:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the
property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat. strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the
action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
physical possession of the property.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that
is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in
the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the
issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."
The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical possession is an indispensable
requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from the principle that
possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan,which
surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory
information titles and the like.The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.[34] It is
sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Here, respondent failed to show that he
falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he
promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.
In the case of Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, inc., the subject parcel was acquired by the respondent by virtue of
the June 4, 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The
petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and
unguarded, the respondent's claim of prior possession was clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy
thereof since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said:
Although it did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property
to be registered in its name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the
sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that,
by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the land
since 1999.
Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient to establish the respondent's prior possession
of the subject property.
The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer. lnc., also involves an action for forcible entry. On June 11,
1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot to respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner forcibly entered the
property in December 1993, the respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a complaint for forcible entry. One of the 1ssues
raised therein was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the subject property, to which the Court answered in
the affirmative. It ruled that:
Prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and
registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when
petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act,
specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with
the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.
Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant
in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this
limited instance to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership.
This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be provisionally determined in this case. First, the
juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the registration of the free patent and the
issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent
also asserts ownership over the land based on his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute. Because there are conflicting claims of ownership, then
it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession de facto.
Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax
declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences
ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof.
Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Together with the Torrens title,
the tax declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of possession over the land before
his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.
The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v. Lacaba[43] to support its ruling. In that case, the respondent tried to
prove prior possession, by presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification from the municipal assessor
attesting that he had paid real property tax from previous years. The Court did not give credence to his claim because tax
declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. The situation in the present case differs
because aside from presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted OCT No. RP-174(13789) which is the best
evidence of ownership from where his right to possession arises.
Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on.
Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the
subject property.
When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of respondent over his registered property, he immediately filed a
complaint with the Lupong Tagapamayapa and subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC. Instead of
taking the law into his own hands and forcefully expelling respondent from his property, petitioner composed himself and
followed the established legal procedure to regain possession of his land.
If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it would create
an absurd situation. It would be putting premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title holders, who spent months,
or even years, in order to register their land, and who religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They cannot
immediately repossess their properties simply because they have to prove their literal and physical possession of their
property prior to the controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort to ordinary civil procedure by filing either
an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria and undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders
continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary procedure of
an action for forcible entry.
The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel
the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings
are summary in nature so the authorities can speedily settle actions to recover possession because of the overriding need
to quell sociaI disturbances.
As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner had sufficiently
complied with them. Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession of the property by stealth. The complaint was
also filed on October 30, 2007, within the one year reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry
by respondent to the property on October 31, 2006.
The second issue raised is the validity of the CA Resolution dated December 5, 2012. Petitioner alleges that the CA
denied his reconsideration without indicating its legal basis in violation of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. This requirement, however, was complied with when
the CA, in its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, stated that it "finds no cogent reason to reverse,
amend, much less reverse the assailed Decision, dated June 13, 2012."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
AMADA C. ZACARIAS v. VICTORIA ANACAY, GR No. 202354, 2014-09-24
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24,
2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named
respondents,... Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land...
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of... petitioner... the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for unlawful
detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents' occupation of the subject property was
unsubstantiated. It noted that the... averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner's counsel that respondents entered
the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner's own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent with an
action for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from... the discovery of the alleged entry. Since
petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after
the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the... case.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that respondents entered her
property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of
respondents to stay in the premises until May
2008 but respondents' reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for
unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay
there for one year.
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became final
and executory.
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
respondents' counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court that
on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies of which were
served to petitioner thru her counsel and... to the RTC.
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court... is REVERSED... and SET ASIDE.
The CA held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has
lapsed, petitioner could... not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her
action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject property, she availed of
the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with
the proper... regional trial court.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer
RULING:
Yes. The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts
as to bring... the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1[12] of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy,
and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[13] Such remedy is
either... forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the... expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
The MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner's complaint make out a case for forcible entry but not for
unlawful detainer.
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
1. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit
bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property
and occupied the... same;
2. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested for time to leave and she
acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end of May, 2008;
3. Inspite of several repeated demands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject premises prompting the
Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and
to pay reasonable compensation for their... illegal use and occupancy of the subject property.
The above complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the
respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner
of such lawful possession.
Petitioner's insistence that she actually tolerated respondents' continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into
the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents' occupation in May 2007. Such
possession could not have been... legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based
on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or... termination of the right to possess.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from... the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
It is the nature of defendant's entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is... legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, as these proceedings are... summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either... be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation
of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and
occupied the same", as... correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built
their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction... over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the
lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
December 6, 2017
G.R. No. 220389
TERESITA BUGAYONG-SANTIAGO, EARL EUGENE SANTIAGO, EDWARD SANTIAGO, and EDGARDO
SANTIAGO, JR, Petitioners
vs.
TEOFILO BUGAYONG, Respondent
FACTS:
On 24 November 1993, petitioner Teresita Bugayong-Santiago (Teresita) and her husband Edgardo Santiago (Edgardo),
through a Deed of Absolute Sale, bought a 169 square meter commercial land with a building structure located in
Poblacion, Asingan, Pangasinan. The land was originally owned by Teresita's parents, the late spouses Francisco
Bugayong and Segundina Ventura-Bugayong, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 37637, which was
issued to the late spouses on 9 November 1961.
On 23 May 2007, Edgardo died. He was survived by Teresita and their children, petitioners Earl Eugene, Edward, and
Edgardo, Jr. The children inherited one-half of the land.
In 2008, petitioners sent a letter dated 15 February 2008 to respondent Teofilo Bugayong (Teofilo), Teresita's brother,
demanding him to vacate the subject property within 15 days from receipt of the letter and to pay the amount of P3,000
monthly. Respondent received the letter on 20 February 2008 but refused to vacate the property.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer dated 15 March 2008 with the MCTC. Petitioners alleged that
since 2002, they have been tolerating the stay and occupation of Teofilo over the two-third (2/3) eastern portion of the
land and a part of the commercial building without paying any lease rental. Petitioners added that Teofilo had been
harassing Teresita whenever she went to Asingan, Pangasinan and that on 3 June 2006, Teofilo slapped and pulled her
hair which caused some injuries. Thus, she filed a criminal case for physical injuries against him. Also, before they
executed the complaint, petitioners exerted serious efforts to settle the case amicably but to no avail.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Teofilo alleged that his parents, Francisco Bugayong and Segundina Ventura-Bugayong,
were the absolute and registered owners of the subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. 37637 where a commercial
building had been erected. Prior to their death, the late spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim dated 21 December 1995
in favor of all their six children, namely: Antonio, Teofilo, Erlinda, Teresita, Francisco, Jr., and Estrellita Bugayong-Cachola
(Cachola). Teofilo stated that when he was about to register the quitclaim with the Register of Deeds after paying the
necessary taxes, petitioners caused the annotation on the title of the Deed of Absolute Sale by way of Adverse Claim on 4
March 2004. Teofilo also claimed that during the lifetime of his parents, they reported the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 37637 as lost and they executed an Affidavit of Loss on 16 November 1995 and had it annotated at the back of the
title. Consequently, a Second Owner's Duplicate Copy was granted by the RTC in lieu of the lost title. Teofilo maintained
that while the petitioners claimed that they purchased the subject property in 1993, he had been paying the realty taxes of
the subject property for the benefit of the estate of his deceased parents and all the heirs, including the northwestern
portion of the building occupied by Cachola, the sister of both Teofilo and Teresita. Further, Teofilo contended that he had
been in actual possession and enjoyment of the subject property long before the execution of the assailed Deed of
Absolute Sale between his parents and Teresita and Edgardo.
In a Decision dated 29 September 2008, the MCTC ordered Teofilo to vacate the property. The MCTC resolved the
question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession. The MCTC reasoned that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 24 November 1993 should be given effect and validity since it was executed before the Deed of Quitclaim was
executed on 21 December 1995 and had been annotated at the back of TCT No. 37637. Also, the MCTC considered
Teofilo's occupation over the subject property as mere tolerance and demanded that Teofilo vacate the property.
Teofilo filed an appeal with the RTC. Teofilo averred that petitioners had failed to establish a cause of action for unlawful
detainer against him such that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
In a Decision dated 11 December 2009, the RTC reversed the decision of the MCTC. The RTC stated that tolerance must
be present right from the start of possession to bring the action within the ambit of unlawful detainer. In this case, there
was forcible entry at the beginning and tolerance thereafter; thus, there can be no basis for the action for unlawful
detainer.
The RTC declared that the remedy of the petitioners was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC, in an Order dated 7 September 2010, denied the motion.
On 29 October 2010, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. In a Decision dated 29 September 2014, the CA
denied the petition for lack of merit
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration dated 24 October 2014 which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 6
August 2015.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC which dismissed the unlawful detainer case against
respondent.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners contend that from the start, they have tolerated and have been tolerating the stay and occupation of
respondent over two-third (2/3) portion of the commercial lot and the building situated thereon. Petitioners explain that
when they bought the land, it has been agreed upon between Teresita and her husband Edgardo, that Teresita's parents
would stay on the land until their death. Teresita's mother passed away on 11 February 1997 and her father on 26
November 1999. Afterwards, Teresita allowed her sister, Cachola, to occupy the subject property located in Asingan,
Pangasinan since petitioners have been residing in San Fernando, Pampanga since 1974. Petitioners allege that
sometime in 2002, Teofilo, in the presence of Cachola, just entered the prope1ty without their knowledge and consent and
had been occupying two-third (2/3) portion of the property without paying any lease rental. Since petitioners wanted to
take possession of the subject property, they sent a demand letter for Teofilo to vacate the premises.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had been in actual possession and enjoyment of the subject property,
being one of the forced heirs of the registered owners, his parents. Respondent contends that the MCTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint since the complaint failed to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer -
how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started. Thus, the complaint or case filed should not have been
for unlawful detainer with the MCTC but one for accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
Ejectment or accion interdictal takes on two forms: forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The remedies for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are laid down in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action
which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1)
year from the date of the last demand.
In the present case, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent before the MCTC. Petitioner Teresita
alleges that she and her husband Edgardo bought the subject property from her parents on 4 November 1993. Since her
family stays in San Fernando, Pampanga she allowed her sister Cachola to live in the property. However, sometime in
2002, without Teresita's knowledge and consent, respondent Teofilo entered the property and occupied the two-third (2/3)
eastern portion of the same. Teresita maintains that she had been merely tolerating Teofilo's stay and occupation in that
part of the property. In 2008, when petitioners were ready to make use of the property, they demanded that Teofilo vacate
the premises but he refused.
In Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, we held that the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer
case is physical or material possession of the property, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties
involved. However, as emphasized in the Sarmiento case above, what determines the cause of action in ejectment cases
is the nature of defendant's entry into the land.
Petitioners insist that Teofilo entered the property without their knowledge and consent. Meaning, Teofilo's entry into the
property had been illegal from the beginning. Later on, when they found out that he occupied the subject property,
petitioners merely tolerated his stay there.
The Rules are clear that if the entry into the property is illegal, the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible
entry and this action must be brought within one (1) year from the illegal entry. But if the entry is originally legal then
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess, an unlawful detainer case may be brought
within one (1) year from the date of the last demand. This action will only prosper in a case where the plaintiff allows the
defendant to use the property by tolerance without any contract, and the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate on demand.
However, based on the record, petitioners claimed that respondent entered the property "without their knowledge and
consent" on one hand, and by mere "tolerance" on the other. It can be concluded then that respondent occupied the
subject property without petitioners' knowledge and consent and thereafter petitioners tolerated respondent's stay in the
property for many years. Thus, there was illegal entry into the property at the start.
As correctly observed by the RTC, since here was forcible entry at the beginning and tolerance thereafter, an action for
unlawful detainer cannot prosper since a requisite for an action for unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally
lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. In Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, we
held that to justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed act of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful at the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
The complaint was not clear on how entry into the subject property was effected and how or when dispossession started.
The complaint merely states that "since 2002, plaintiff Teresita B. Santiago and her late husband have been tolerating the
stay and occupation of the defendant, brother of plaintiff Teresita B. Santiago, over the two-third (2/3) eastern portion of
the lot and portion of the commercial house thereon, without paying [any] lease rental." However, in succeeding
pleadings, petitioners insisted that respondent entered the property without their knowledge and consent. Also, no
contract, whether express or implied, existed between the parties and there were no other details submitted or evidence
presented by petitioners to show how respondent exactly entered the property and when petitioners were dispossessed of
such. As similarly held in the case of Zacarias v. Anacay.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners'
claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupied the land in question by building their house
[o]n the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents' entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
However, on a final note, this ruling is limited only to the determination of whether the complaint for unlawful detainer was
properly filed and whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case. This adjudication is not a final determination of the
issue of possession or ownership and thus, will not bar any party from filing a case in the proper RTC for (1) accion
publiciana, where the owner of the property who was dispossessed failed to bring an action for ejectment within one (1)
year from dispossession, or (2) accion reivindicatoria alleging ownership of the property and seeking recovery of its full
possession.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 29 September 2014 and the Resolution dated 6
August 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116322.
G.R. No. 163551
July 18, 2011
DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, Respondent.
FACTS:
Lantud filed with the RTC an action to quiet title with damages against Sampaco for forcibly and unlawfully entering his
property and destroying the improvements therein in1984. Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot (described in
his complaint as residential lot) from his grandmother. He had been residing on the lot for more than 30 years, applied for
a title thereto, and was issued an OCT.On the other hand, Sampaco testified that the subject lot is only a portion of a land
he inherited from his father in 1952. Since then, he had been in adverse possession and ownership of the lot. He also
alleged that Lantud’s OCT was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation considering that Lantud’s free patent title is
issued over a residential lot. Sampaco prayed for the cancellation of Lantud’s OCT and for the reconveyance of the lot.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Sampaco. It declared:
1. Lantud’s OCT as null and void and of no legal effect on the ground that it was tainted with fraud based on
acetification from the Natural Resources Office verifying that the data in Lantud’s OCT had no record in the office
and for the reason that the lot described in the Complaint is a residential lot and Lantud’s free patent title thereto
cannot validly be issued (free patents are normally issued for agricultural lands)
2. Sampaco the absolute owner and possessor of the land on the ground that Lantud failed to establish with
competent and credible evidence that he was in prior possession of the lot and no corroborative witness was
presented to further prove his prior possession, while Sampaco offered documentary evidence consisting of real
estate mortgage of the lot, tax declarations, an official tax receipt, and testimonial evidence that he had been in
OCEN possession of the lot in the concept of an owner.
The CA reversed the RTC’s judgment. It declared Lantud as the owner of the lot because:
1. OCT was not tained with fraud and misrepresentation;
2. There was no controversy that Lantud is a holder of a Torrens title
3. 3 Sampaco failed to show that the disputed property is part of his larger property
4. Sampaco’s counterclaim for the cancellation of Lantud’s OCT and for reconveyance was filed beyond the statutory
one-year period; hence, Lantud’s title had become indefeasible.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the OCT was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation.
2. Whether Sampaco is the owner of the lot 3.
3. Whether Sampaco is entitled to reconveyance of the lot
4. Whether Sampaco’s counterclaim for the annulment of title and reconveyance ofthe lot has not prescribed
5. Whether Sampaco’s counterclaim was a collateral attack on Lantud’s title
RULING:
1. NO. The certification from the Natural Resources Office certifying that the data contained in Lantud’s OCT had
no records in the said office is, by itself, insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being
adequate. Fraud is question of fact that must be proved. The signatory of the certification was not presented in
court to testify on the fact of fraud, if any. Hence, Lantud’s Torrens title is a valid evidence of his ownership of the
land in dispute. The allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by Lantud, but the true
classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to have been made by the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to the Public Land
Act(CA 141). Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of Lantud’s free patent
title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the Complaint, which stated that the property was
residential land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the disputed property as residential.
The OCT itself stated that the free patent title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not only
agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free
patent by any natural born Filipino citizen.
2. NO. The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to ownership of the land described therein, and other
matters, which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts
cannot prevail over a certificate of title, which is an incontrovertible (not able to be denied or disputed)proof of
ownership. An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible (not subject to being lost, annulled, or overturned) as a certificate of title issued under judicial
proceedings.
3. NO. Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus: Art. 434. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property,
the person who claims he has a better right to it must prove 2 things: first, the identity of the land claimed; second,
his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area, and
boundaries thereof. In this case, Sampaco claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property.
However, he failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that
the same may be compared with technical description contained in Lantud’s title, which would have shown whether
the disputed property really formed part of his larger property. In regard to the second requisite of title to property,
both Lantud and Sampaco separately claim they are entitled to ownership of the property by virtue of OCEN
possession of the land in the concept of an owner. Lantud has an OCT to prove his title to the subject property,
while Sampaco merely claims that the property is already private land by virtue of his OCEN possession of the land
in the concept of an owner. Sampaco failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the
identity of his larger property in relation the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of OCEN possession of
the disputed property in the concept of an owner is nebulous (vague or ill-defined) in the light of a similar claim by
Lantud who holds a free patent title over the subject property.
4. NO. In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, the Court ruled that the one-year prescriptive
period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This
is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible. A person in actual possession of a
piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
However, the counterclaim seeking for the cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject property has
prescribed as Sampaco has not proven actual possession and ownership of the property due to his failure
to prove the identity of his larger property that would show that the disputed property is a part thereof, and his claim
of title to the subject property by virtue of OCEN possession in the concept of an owner is nebulous in the light of a
similar claim by Lantud who holds a Torrens title to the subject property.
5. NO. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject
to a collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an
attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack indirect when the object of an action is to annul or set aside
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is indirect or collateral when, in action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the
title. In DPB v. CA, the Court ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact the nullity thereof was
raised only as a counterclaim. It was held that a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the
original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as
if it were an independent action. Based on the forgoing, the SC holds that Sampaco’s counterclaim for cancellation
of Lantud’s title is not a collateral attack, but a direct attack on Lantud’s Torrens title.
Wherefore the petition is DENIED. The CA’s decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED
D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTIONV. RICARDO PANES, ET AL
GR No. 167232, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
A parcel of land containing an area of 240,146 square meters situated in Novaliches, Quezon City was included in TCT
No. 200519, entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in favor of BC Regalado& Co. It was later on conveyed by BC Regalado
to Plaintiff DBT through dacion en pago for services rendered.
In June 1992, defendants Ricardo Panes, et al filed a complaint for “Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No.
200519” arguing that they are the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property and have declared the property for
taxation under their name since 1985. They also alleged that their possession preceded the Second World War.
Respondents basically alleged that Regalado and DBT, through deliberate scheme and collusion with others, included the
said property in their subdivision plan and then offered the same for sale to the public.
DBT argues that it is the legitimate owner of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by BC Regalado.
The RTC ruled in favor of Respondents Ricardo and held that since he occupied the subject property since 1936 in the
concept of an owner, he had equitable ownership of the same. The RTC also ruled that the subject property should not
have been included in TCT No. 200519 registered in the name of BC Regalado and ceded to DBT.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC reversed its ruling and held that prescription does not run against registered
land; hence, a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or notorious possession. Also, the RTC
ruled that the action was already barred by prescription/laches since they did not assert their rights when Regalado
registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the same to individual lot buyers.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and reinstated the earlier RTC ruling holding that the properties described and
included in TCT No. 200519 are located in different part than where the subject property is located. CA also opined that
the defense of laches and prescription was merely an afterthought on the part of DBT.
ISSUE:
Is respondents barred by laches/prescription in filing the action against DBT?
Which between DBT and respondents have a better right over the subject property?
RULING:
No, the action filed before the RTC was not simply for reconveyance but an action for quieting of tile which is
imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on fraud must be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the OCT. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of the OCT
or TCT. The rule is that registration of an instrument in the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of the registration.
HOWEVER, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession. If the plaintiff, as the real owner also remains in possession, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature
of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
DBT however has better right.
It is a well-settled rule that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession.
Art. 1126 of the Civil Code in connection with Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act clearly supports this rule. Prescription
is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. Possession is a mere
consequence of ownership where the land has been registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of
which must be protected.
Thus, respondents’ (Ricardo Panes, et al) claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under
Art. 1126, acquisitive ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496 as amended provides that “no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.”
Furthermore, there was no evidence that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. It is an innocent purchaser for value and
good faith which, through dacion en pago, duly entered into with BC Regalado, acquired.
Torrens system
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice and
equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet the title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality
of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued acquired rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright
cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every
instance on whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evidence purpose of the law.
Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor,
and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated October 25, 2004 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the
respondents for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005
GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR CALACALA, SOLOMON CALACALA, FELICIDAD
CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and SALOME CALACALA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C.
MARQUEZ,Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Calacala, the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners, were the registered owners of the parcel of land
subject of this case. The land was offered by the spouses as a property bond in a case then pending to secure the
provisional release of an accused. The accused failed to appear at his scheduled arraignment, and the bondsman also
failed to produce the body of the accused in court. Because of this, the court ordered the bond forfeited in favor of the
government. The land was sold at public auction to satisfy the amount of the bond, and the Republic emerged as the
winning bidder. The Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on the subject property’s title in 1982, thereby giving
spouses Calacala a period of 1 year within which to redeem the property. Spouses Calacala, however, never did, up to
their deaths in 1988 and 1994.
Petitioners now claim to be the owners of the land as heirs of the spouses. They filed a complaint for Quieting of Title
against Republic and the Sheriff. They premised their argument on the Republic’s failure to secure the Certificate of Final
Sale, execute
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property within 10 years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale in 1982.
They contended that Republic’s right over the property in question has already prescribed or has been abandoned and
waived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint for Quieting of Title will lie.
RULING:
No, it will not because the essential requisites are not present. Under Article 476 and Article 477, the common law remedy
of Quieting of Title may only be availed of when these requisites concur:
1. Plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title on the real property subject of the action, and
2. The alleged cloud (a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding) on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid and
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution and order of the trial court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200042, July 07, 2016
FELIZARDO T. GUNTALILIB, Petitioner, v. AURELIO Y. DELA CRUZ AND SALOME V. DELA CRUZ,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On July 14, 2009, respondents Aurelio and Salome dela Cruz filed a Complaint6 for "Quieting Of Titles x x x;
Annulment and Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages," against petitioner Felizardo Guntalilib and other heirs
of Bernardo (or Bernardino) Tumaliuan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6975 and assigned to Branch 28
of the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
The subject property is Lot 421 located in Nueva Vizcaya consisting of 8,991 square meters and which, as
respondents claimed in their Complaint, was originally registered on August 7, 1916 as Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 213. Respondent Aurelio's grandfather, Juan dela Cruz, later acquired the property in 1919, and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-3 was issued in his name; when he passed away, the property was
inherited by Aurelio's father, Leonor, and, in lieu of TCT R-3, TCT 14202 was issued in Leonor's favor. Later on,
Leonor conveyed the property to Aurelio and his brother, Joseph, and TCT T-46087 was then issued in their favor.
In turn, Joseph waived ownership in favor of Aurelio by deed of quitclaim dated December 31, 2001, in which case
a new title, TCT T-126545, was issued in Aurelio's name as sole owner.
Respondents claimed further that all this time, the dela Cruz family was in full possession, occupation and
enjoyment of the property, and petitioner and his co-heirs have never set foot on the property; that later on, Lot 421
was subdivided and new titles were issued in lieu of TCT T-126545; and that Aurelio sold portions thereof to
several individuals, but he remains the registered owner of the remaining portion.
Respondents likewise alleged that on February 20, 2008, petitioner filed in court a petition, docketed as LRC Case
No. 6544 and assigned to the Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya RTC, Branch 29, for reconstitution or issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu of an allegedly lost unnumbered OCT which was issued on August 29, 1916 in the name of
petitioner's predecessor, Bernardo Tumaliuan, and covering the very same property, or Lot 421, which they owned;
that said petition was eventually granted, and the Nueva Vizcaya Register of Deeds was ordered to issue another
owner's duplicate copy of their predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT; and that said unnumbered OCT
constituted a cloud upon their titles that must necessarily be removed.
Petitioner and his co-defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss7 Civil Case No. 6975, arguing that the Complaint stated
no cause of action; that the case constituted a collateral attack on their unnumbered OCT; that respondents failed
to implead all the heirs of Bernardo Tumaliuan, who are indispensable parties to the case; and that the Complaint's
verification and certification on non-forum shopping were defective.
Respondents filed a Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint,8 with attached Amended Complaint9 for
"Quieting Of Titles x x x; Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages."
Petitioner and his co-defendants opposed the Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint, arguing in their
Opposition (Ad Cautelam)11 that the motion was a mere scrap of paper because it did not comply with Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure12 (1997 Rules), as no date of hearing was set and the
motion was addressed to the Clerk of Court alone; that the verification and certification on non-forum shopping
contained in the original Complaint, being defective, could not be cured by the subsequent filing of the Amended
Complaint; and that the Amended Complaint was improper and prohibited, as it is essentially aimed at setting aside
the Decision in LRC Case No. 6544 issued by a court of concurrent jurisdiction.
On January 12, 2010, the trial court in Civil Case No. 6975 issued an Order13 admitting respondents' Amended
Complaint and denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration; meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 27 of the RTC of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. On June 21, 2010, the trial court issued an Order16 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and ordering the defendants in the case to file their answer.
Petitioner filed an original Petition for Certiorari17 with prayer for injunctive relief before the CA, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 115963. In seeking reversal of the trial court's January 12, 2010 and June 21,2010
Orders, petitioner essentially reiterated the arguments contained in his Motion to Dismiss, adding that the trial court
should not have admitted respondents' Amended Complaint since the original Complaint was a mere scrap of
paper as it was defective in form and substance; that since in the first instance the Complaint was a mere scrap of
paper, then there is no Complaint to be amended; and that the assailed Orders were null and void.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the CA denied in its subsequent January 5,2012 Resolution.
Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUES:
i) WON THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS IN THE PRESENT ACTION, WHICH IS, TO ANNUL AND
REVERSE THE DECISION OF RTC-BRANCH 29, THAT ORDERED THE ISSUANCE OF OCT WITH DECREE
NO. 54584 IN THE NAME OF BERNARDINO TUMALrUAN, IS IMPROPER FOR AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE,
THUS, THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION, WARRANTING THE PROMPT AND TIMELY
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.
WON FOLLOWING THE DOCTRINE OF NON¬INTERFERENCE, THE COURTS A QUO HAVE NO
JURISDICTION TO INTERVENE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF EQUAL JURISDICTION, MUCH
LESS ANNUL THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF A CO¬EQUAL BRANCH, I.E. RTC BRANCH-29. THUS
RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT DESERVES OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL.
The Court denies the Petition.
Petitioner's claim that respondents' Amended Complaint must be disallowed for failure to implead all indispensable
parties has been rendered moot by the parties' agreement that respondents shall further amend their complaint
after petitioner and his co-defendants furnish them with the complete list of Bernardo Tumaliuan's heirs. Pursuant
to this agreement, the trial court issued its June 29,2012 Order, which petitioner does not assail.
Next, petitioner's claim that the trial court should not have admitted respondents' Amended Complaint since the
original Complaint on which it was based is void for being a mere scrap of paper as it contained a defective
verification and certification against forum-shopping, is fundamentally absurd. A party to a civil case is precisely
given the opportunity to amend his pleadings, under certain conditions, in order to correct the mistakes found
therein; if one were to follow petitioner's reasoning, then the rule on amendment of pleadings might just as well be
scrapped, for then no pleading would be susceptible of amendment. In the present case, respondents' Complaint
was amended even before petitioner could file any responsive pleading thereto; under the 1997 Rules, a party may
amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served.31 No motion to
admit the same was required; as the amendment is allowed as a matter of right, prior leave of court was
unnecessary.32Indeed, even if such a motion was filed, no hearing was required therefor, because it is not a
contentious motion.
On the final procedural matter that must be tackled, suffice it to state, as the CA did, that as a general rule, the
denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned through a special civil action for certiorari.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case; it is
interlocutory as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this
remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion
to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been
rendered. Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.33
Such a rule applies especially when, as in this case, the petition is completely lacking in merit.
Moving on to the substantive issues raised, the Court finds without merit petitioner's claim that respondents'
quieting of title case constitutes a prohibited attack on his predecessor Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT as
well as the proceedings in LRC Case No. 6544. It is true that "the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed
in an action for quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the
cancellation of a certificate of title."34 Indeed, it is settled that a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack.
However, while respondents' action is denominated as one for quieting of title, it is in reality an action to annul and
cancel Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT. The allegations and prayer in their Amended Complaint make out
a case for annulment and cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of title: they claim that their predecessor's
OCT 213, which was issued on August 7,1916, should prevail over Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT which
was issued only on August 29, 1916; that petitioner and his co-defendants have knowledge of OCT 213 and their
existing titles; that through fraud, false misrepresentations, and irregularities in the proceedings for reconstitution
(LRC Case No. 6544), petitioner was able to secure a copy of his predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT; and
for these reasons, Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT should be cancelled. Besides, the case was
denominated as one for "Quieting Of Titles x x x; Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages."
It has been held that "[t]he underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-oftitle cases are essentially the same — adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of
the two certificates of title."35 Nonetheless, petitioner should not have been so simplistic as to think that Civil Case
No. 6975 is merely a quieting of title case. It is more appropriate to suppose that one of the effects of cancelling
Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT would be to quiet title over Lot 421; in this sense, quieting of title is
subsumed in the annulment of title case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2011 Decision and January 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115963 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.