Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
:
:
:
JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
What is Law according to Philippine case law?
1
Lapitan vs Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, 60 O.G. 6841
No. 28228
15 October 1963
Petitioner: Jose Lapitan
Respondent: Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
Quick Digest
Lapitan bought one share of a winning ticket (which was divided into
four). He only had with him a mutilated ticket to evidence the fact that
he owns the share. The PCSO refused to release the payment to
Lapitan since he did not establish that the mutilated ticket was Ticket
No. 073522. The CFI and the CA agreed with the PCSO. The CA
noted that the testimonies given by the plaintiff were self-serving, and
that the writing down of the number of the ticket was “not in accord
with the ordinary course of human behavior.” The SC ruled in favor
of Lapitan and stated that the action of Lapitan (in writing down the
ticket number) supports the principle of res gestae. Moreover, a
testimony should not be rejected for being self-serving merely because
it had been given by an interested party, especially where it is not
contradicted by direct or circumstantial evidence and, upon the whole,
appears to be plausible.
FACTS:
1. On 2 June 1958, PCSO drew winning ticket number 073522. This
ticket was divided into four shares, with a total prize of Php 100,000.00.
2. Lapitan went to PCSO on 7 August 1958 with a mutilated ticket,
claiming to be the holder of one share.
3. PCSO presented the mutilated ticket to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and requested for a lab test. NBI reported that the
mutilation made it physically impossible to ascertain the ticket number.
4. PCSO refused to effect payment of the Php 25,000 (1/4 of the
prize), based on the NBI report.
5. Lapitan filed this collection case with the Court of First Instance.
6. The CFI held that Lapitan was not able to establish that the
mutilated ticket bears Serial No.073522.
7. Lapitan appealed the case and contended that the CFI erred in
holding that Lapitan did not duly establish that the mutilated ticket
bears Serial No. 073522. PCSO argued that the assignment of error of
Lapitan was a question of fact that the lower court has decided against,
based on the CFI’s findings, which were substantiated by evidence.
The CFI expressed the same view as the PCSO.
8. Issues NOT disputed: that a.) Petronillo Ajon, a sweepstake agent,
purchased four (4) booklets of sweepstake tickets for the June 2 lottery,
one of which contained tickets bearing Serial Nos. 073520 to 073529,
b.) Among his customers were Alvarez, Malana, and Lapitan, c.)
Holders of the four shares: Malana (1/4), Alvarez (2/4), all residents
of Los Baños,Laguna, and townmates of Lapitan. The only claimant of
the prize corresponding to the fourth share was Lapitan.
9. Testimony of Lapitan: a.) He bought one share of Sweepstake Ticket
No. 073522 on 28 May 1958 from Ajon. b.) This was the first ticket he
had ever purchased. Because it was his first ticket, he had written down
the number on top of page 12 of the printed calendar for the year 1958,
and encircled the figure “2” on the same page, to refer to the date of
the draw. c.) He placed this ticket inside a wooden wardrobe. In the
morning of June 2, he put the ticket inside a pocket of his trousers to
have it handy for verification. He hung his trousers to a nail on the
afternoon of the same day. Late in the afternoon, he found that his
trousers were missing. After searching, he found the trousers soaked
in a basin of water, as his wife had laundered the trousers. The ticket
was inside the pocket, but already wet and mutilated. He gathered the
torn pieces and wrapped them in a sheet of paper. d.) He saw the list
of winning tickets from a newspaper on June 4. Ajon went to Lapitan
on the same day and inquired about the ticket. When Ajon saw the
mutilated ticket, he told Lapitan to keep it, and that Ajon would inform
PCSO of the matter. Lapitan sought the help of Atty. Baes, who went
with both Lapitan and Ajon to claim the prize on August 7.
10. PCSO did not any testimonial evidence; the testimonies of Lapitan
and Ajon were not controverted.
11. The Court of Appeals (CA) stated that Lapitan’s testimony was
“not only self-serving but also irrational and not in accord with the
ordinary course of human behavior”. It ruled in favor of PCSO.
SUBSCRIPTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI and the CA erred in holding that Lapitan did
not duly establish that the mutilated ticket bears Serial No. 073522.
HELD:
1. YES. While it may seem unusual to record the number of a ticket, it
was not impossible for Lapitan, who had bought a ticket for the first
time, had done so. In fact, this act would be expected of a poor
fisherman like him, who could not afford to pay for a ticket and bought
the ticket on credit.
2. “It is easy enough to imagine what others would have or would not
have done when made to step into the plaintiff’s shoes. But individuals
are not born from the same mold, their temperaments differ and their
responses dissimilar. Should we not be justified to compare plaintiff’s
conduct, in the light of his new experience, to that of a teenager when
seized by the thrill of his first romance? x x x His actions were still
natural and normal and, besides, was certainly beyond suspect as
having been purposely staged and conceived for the occasion.
3. In this regard, it is so common to hear he proverb that “whom the
Gods love, they first made him suffer.” This is as imponderable that
has not been, or cannot be explained, for life and the endless incidents
of life are sometimes a bundle of strange contradictions.
4. All that need be said in this respect is that the plaintiff-appellant was
in a state of thrill and excitement and, under the spell of his emotions,
he could not have acted with a certain amount of queerness not
dissimilar to an anxious father awaiting his first born at the hospital. Is
this not the kind of queerness that supports the principle of res
gestae which, despite its hearsay character, is attributed great weight by
tribunals of justice?”
5. The SC did not think that the delay in claiming the ticket was
unexplained. It considered that Lapitan’s lawyer, Atty. Baes, needed
time to study the various aspects of the case. There is nothing to
suggest that a fraudulent scheme existed to enable Lapitan to claim for
a prize he did not win.
6. A testimony should not be rejected for being self-serving merely
because it had been given by an interested party, especially where it is
not contradicted by direct or circumstantial evidence and, upon the
whole, appears to be plausible.
Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
:
:
:
JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
7. A meritorious claim should not be sacrificed for the mere desire to
close all possible avenues of fraud x x x is it not a better rule that each
case must be decided upon the facts and circumstances obtaining
therein?
8. Humanitarian consideration leans in favor of giving a chance to this
man to improve his lot, as envisioned by those who conceived the
PCSO.9. To do an act of charity in pursuance of the objective of the
law is a duty. The decision concurred in not only fulfills that duty
but also makes justice a living reality.
What is Law according to Edgardo Paras?
2
Article 2(7) U.N. Charter
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter Vll.
RATIO: As a constitutional document the Charter of the United
Nations is not known for its simplicity. Its apparently simple terms
contain a considerable number of problems of interpretation of some
complexity. Of these problems one of the oldest, most written on and
talked about is that which relates to the meaning of the word
"intervene" in art. 2 (7) of the Charter. Article 2 (7) states simply and,
one is initially tempted to say, clearly that the United Nations must not
"intervene" in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State.
The clarity which is ostensibly to be found in the Charter in this respect
is, however, quickly dispelled when even a cursory glance is taken at
the history of this provision in the debates which have taken place in
the United Nations. Almost from the word go there has been
continuing dispute as to what this term means. The disputants have,
perhaps fortunately, ranged themselves in two fairly well defined and
coherent groups. One group has contended that this prohibition
prevents the United Nations, through any of its organs, from
discussing, making recommendations on, studying or inquiring into
any matter which falls essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State. Supporters of this point of view have been able, latterly, to
call in aid the commentary on the Charter of Professor Kelsen, and
have maintained that "intervene" as used in art. 2 (7) bears its ordinary
dictionary meaning of interference. The other group opposes this point
of view. In the opinion of the States of this persuasion intervention
within the meaning of art. 2 (7) must be interpreted in the light of
general international law. In their opinion intervention in general
international law means "dictatorial interference, not interference pure
and simple." Supporters of this point of view have been able to call in
aid the writings of the late Professor Lauterpacht and have maintained
in consequence that such activities as discussion of or
recommendations concerning the domestic affairs of any State do not
amount to intervention.
This dispute has proved a regular attender at debates in both the
General Assembly and, to a lesser extent, the Security Council. In these
debates the opposing sides have, with unfailing regularity, put forward
their stock arguments whenever any subject which in any way touched
upon domestic jurisdiction was raised. One side has maintained that as
a matter is domestic it cannot even be discussed, because discussion
itself constitutes intervention. The other, with similar tenacity, has
maintained that to adopt such an interpretation would rob much of the
Charter of its significance, an argument which is very persuasive in
view of the terms of the Charter.
Obviously, a choice must be made. However, it does not follow that
the choice must be restricted to the two points of view outlined above
or that the definition of intervention adopted will necessarily be the
same for each organ of the United Nations. It is submitted that,
contrary to what appears to be the normal practice of those States
which take sides in this interpretation battle, a distinction must be
drawn between the General Assembly and the Security Council and
that the same arguments cannot automatically be applied to both
bodies. This is so because the functions and powers of the two are
fundan1cntally different.
The nature and scope of the powers of the General Assembly predicate
that a definition of intervention which represents a compromise
between the two extreme points of view outlined above be adopted.
The General Assembly has a broad power to discuss and make
recommendations on anything within the scope of the Charter. That
scope is, as is well known, very wide. In one way or another the United
Nations is concerned with almost every aspect of inter- and intra-state
SUBSCRIPTS
life. Within the scope of the Charter and hence within the General
Assembly’s mandate for discussion and recommendation are such
diverse subjects as the maintenance of international peace and security
and disarmament, subjects which are manifestly international in aspect,
human rights and fundamental freedoms, a subject about the status of
which there was until recently, and perhaps still, much dispute, and also
standards of living and economic and social progress and development,
subjects which remain for many, if not most, purposes essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of members. The scope of the Charter
is so wide that there is a considerable overlap between the permissive
jurisdiction of the United Nations and the domain of domestic
jurisdiction. Some things are within the jurisdiction of the United
Nations in some measure and yet are still in many respects essentially
domestic. It is because of this overlap that the problem of interprcting
"intervene" arises.
Causes of Failure of the Legal System
3
Tañada vs Tuvera, G.R. L-63915, April 24, 1985
FACTS: The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to
compel respondents to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders.
Petitioners: Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must
be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Respondent: Issuances intended only for the internal administration of
a government agency or of particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2
of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement
of publication?
Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
:
:
:
JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Summary of Principles:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC
refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of
publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
2. The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot
be dispensed with.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they
did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated
to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
3. For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity,
the term "laws" refer not only to those of general application, but also
to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules enforcing
a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of
the Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative rules regulating and
providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although
it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject
of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not
to the public as a whole.
4. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
5. Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not
covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are
SUBSCRIPTS
municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government
Code.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
6. Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
7. Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be
made in full in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a
law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely
to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the
political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
:
:
:
JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
8. Laws must be published as soon as possible.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least
as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article
2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of
the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Causes of Failure of the Legal System
4
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs The Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 138810, September 28, 2004
FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct,
install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its
subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however,
that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates
from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor
wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant
to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition
for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has
no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to
regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber
rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the
above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power
over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs
under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV
system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities
of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of
ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions –
allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare
clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that
respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The
flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing
laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV
industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
Applications of Natural Law
5
Book IV, Titles III, IV, and V of the Civil Code of
the Philippines
BOOK IV – OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
TITLE III – NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
Article 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a
right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant
a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are
set forth in the following articles.
Article 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by
extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the
contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the
service he has rendered.
Article 1425. When without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, a third person pays a debt which the obligor is not legally
bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, but the debtor
SUBSCRIPTS
later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot
recover what he has paid.
Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent
or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the
whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not
been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price
thus returned.
Article 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent
or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible
thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover
the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
(1160A)
Article 1428. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has
failed the defendant voluntarily performs the obligation, he cannot
demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value
of the service he has rendered.
Article 1429. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of
the decedent exceeding the value of the property which he received by
will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the
payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the payer.
Article 1430. When a will is declared void because it has not been
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, but one
of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased,
pays a legacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the
payment is effective and irrevocable.
TITLE IV – ESTOPPEL (n)
Article 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Article 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as
they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of
Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
:
:
:
JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Article 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title
thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Article 1441. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts
come into being by operation of law.
Article 1435. If a person in representation of another sells or alienates
a thing, the former cannot subsequently set up his own title as against
the buyer or grantee.
Article 1442. The principles of the general law of trusts, insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules
of Court and special laws are hereby adopted.
Article 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the
thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
CHAPTER 2 – Express Trusts
Article 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.
Article 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning
immovable property, one of them is misled by a person with respect
to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment
of facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the
facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the
misrepresentation.
Article 1438. One who has allowed another to assume apparent
ownership of personal property for the purpose of making any transfer
of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a pledge has been
constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge of the property,
made by the other to a pledgee who received the same in good faith
and for value.
Article 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto
or their successors in interest.
TITLE V – TRUSTS (n)
CHAPTER 1 – General Provisions
Article 1440. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one
in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of
another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose
benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary.
Article 1444. No particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.
Article 1445. No trust shall fail because the trustee appointed declines
the designation, unless the contrary should appear in the instrument
constituting the trust.
Article 1446. Acceptance by the beneficiary is necessary. Nevertheless,
if the trust imposes no onerous condition upon the beneficiary, his
acceptance shall be presumed, if there is no proof to the contrary.
CHAPTER 3 – Implied Trusts
Article 1447. The enumeration of the following cases of implied trust
does not exclude others established by the general law of trust, but the
limitation laid down in article 1442 shall be applicable.
Article 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The
former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the
person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or
illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.
Article 1449. There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to
a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to
the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or
only a part thereof.
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Article 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one
person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the
lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by
operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned
or for whom its is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel
a conveyance thereof to him.
Article 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he
causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is
established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
Article 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and
by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them
for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each.
Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon
his declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the
grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit
is contemplated.
Article 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order
to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the
grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the
obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a
fiduciary relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and
causes the conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust
is established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the
funds belong.
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
Article 1457. An implied trust may be proved by oral evidence.
Course Code
Course Title
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Applications of Natural Law
6
Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Phillipines
Chapter 2 – Human Relations
Article 19
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
Article 19 of the Civil Code is a statement of principle that supplements
but does not supplant a specific provision of law (Capitle, et al. v. Vda.
De Gaban, et al., G.R. No. 146890, June 8, 2004).
Definition of Terms
Right – Every well-grounded claim on other is called a right, and, since
the social character of man gives the element of mutuality to each
claim, every right conveys along with it the idea of obligation (2 B.L.D.,
2960).
Duty – A human action which is exactly conformable to the laws which
requires us to obey them. A moral obligation or responsibility (1
B.L.D., 962).
Justice – The constant and perpetual disposition to render to every
man his due (Justinian, Inst. b. 1, tit. 1; Co. 2d Inst. 56). The
conformity of our actions and our will to the law (Teullier, Droit Civ.
Fr. Tit. prel. n. 5).
Good Faith – An honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even though the forms or
technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or
belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious
(Wood v. Conrad, 2, S. D. 334, 50 M.W., 95).
Coverage of the law
The foregoing rule pervades the entire legal system and renders
impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision, should find himself without relief.
Necessity for the law
It has been said that since law is the mode of regulating conduct by
means of sanctions imposed by politically organized society, and since
law prescribes rather than describes, the codifiers, in formulating this
new provision have seen fit to indicate the range of allowable conduct
among the citizens of the Philippines and they have done it in an
imperative mode, form, and context.
The core of Article 19, NCC is bad faith
It is a well-settled rule that good faith is always presumed. Bad Faith is
never presumed, for whoever alleges bad faith has the burden of
proving it. Once again that has been the basis of the SC in deciding the
case of Elizabeth Diaz v. Encanto, et al., G.R. No. 171303, January 20,
2016, Leonardo- De Castro, J.
Standards of Human Conduct are set forth by law
In the exercise of a right and in the performance of an obligation, there
are norms of conduct that a person must observe. It is not because a
person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even to the prejudice
and disadvantage of another. The same rule applies in case he performs
his duties. Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
The standards are:
1. to act with justice;
2. to give everyone his due;
3. to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article
19, New Civil Code must be observed.
Exercise of right must be in good faith
One standard laid down by law in the exercise of one’s right is good
faith, for no one has a license to injure the rights of others, even on the
pretext of exercising one’s rights.
For every right, there is a right to be respected
This simply means that strict legalism is not alone the law for there
beside it or above it the law of justice and equity. One, therefore
should, in the performance of his duties, strive to bring a measure of
humanity into the law.
SUBSCRIPTS
Principle of abuse of right
A person has the right to exercise his rights, but in so doing, he must
be mindful of the rights of other people. If he exercises his rights and
causes damage to another, he can be liable for damages.
Requirements for Liability
To be liable under the law, the following requisites must be met:
1. The party claiming damages must have sustained the loss;
2. The party against whom they are claimed must be chargeable
or guilty of the wrong complained of;
3. The loss must be the natural and proximate consequence of
the wrong;
4. The wrong complained of must be contrary to law and the act
or omission causing the damage should be either willful or a
direct or approximate result of negligence.
In the absence of compliance with the above requirements, it would
result in no right of recovery for damages, or what is known as damage
without injury.
Elements of abuse of right
The elements of right under Art. 19 are the following:
1. The existence of a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
MALICE or BAD FAITH – implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity
Public officer may be liable for his wrongdoing under Article 19
The occupancy of a public officer is not a license or a justification to
do wrong. A public officer is a public trust.
Petitioner cannot invoke the principle of damnum absque injuria
Petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised
on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise
will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords.
When damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability
cannot be obscured, much less abated.
Course Code
Course Title
Course Professor
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Applications of Natural Law
7
Rutter vs Esteban, 93 Phil 68
FACTS: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of
land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid
outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or
before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of
said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor
of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed
upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted
an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's
fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties
mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar
obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his
claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he
had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2
of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be
enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was
dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
ISSUE: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment
clause grounds.
RULING: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or
the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
However, based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with
what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and
enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and
void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectiveness of monetary
obligations.
Applications of Natural Law
8
Luna vs IAC, 137 SCRA 7
FACTS: Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate
child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner
Liberty Hizon-Luna. She is married to her co-respondent Sixto
Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also
known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child
custody case.
Private respondents gave their daughter to petitioners two or four
months after birth. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them
Mama and Papa. She calls her natural parents mommy and daddy.
The petitioners decided to take the child to the US. When the
petitioners asked for the respondents’ written consent to the child’s
application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the
petitioners’ surprise and chagrin. The petitioners had to leave without
Shirley whom they left with the private respondents. The petitioners,
however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley
from school every day.
When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had
transferred Shirley to another school. The private respondents refused
to return Shirley to the petitioners. Neither did the respondents allow
Shirley to visit the petitioners.
The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal,
against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and
deliver her to their care and custody.
The CFI granted the petition. The CA reversed. Consequently, the
petitioners filed a petition for review of the decision of the appellate
court to the Supreme Court but the latter denied for lack of merit.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of
origin and assigned to the RTC of Makati presided over by respondent
Judge Roque A. Tamayo who issued the issuance of writ of execution
satisfy and enforce the resolution of the Supreme Court which
SUBSCRIPTS
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioners opposed
the execution of the judgment who filed a motion for there
consideration of the order and to set aside the writ of execution on the
ground of supervening events and circumstances particularly, the
subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of
the child which would make the enforcement of the judgment be
unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair, and cause irreparable damage to
the welfare and interests of the child.
Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or
run away from home if she should ever be separated from the
petitioners.
However, the respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion to set
aside the writ of execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the duty of lower courts to enforce a final
decision of appellate courts in child custody case should prevail over
the preference of the child.
HELD: NO. It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a
higher court is returned to the lower court, the only function of the
latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution.
The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or
examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor review it upon
any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with
it further than to settle so much as has been demanded.
It is also equally well-known that a stay of execution of a final judgment
may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of
justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties
which makes such execution inequitable; or when it appears that the
controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or
when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong
party; or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied;
or when the writ has been issued without authority.
In child custody cases, the child’s welfare and future is paramount and
execution of a final judgment which may run contrary thereto may be
set aside.
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
In the instant case, the manifestation of Shirley that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the
herein petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents is a
circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered
in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to
the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter’s
welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor
can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children. Moreover, the child is in an age when she can
exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect,
enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her
right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and
intellectual development.
Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat
her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the
child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered, cautious and
distrusting of her biological parents.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
AQUINO; Concurring
A judgment for the custody of the child, like a judgment for support is
not final and irrevocable. The welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration. It would be for Shirley's welfare to remain in the custody
of the petitioners.
MAKASIAR; Dissenting
Determination, therefore, as to whose custody the child belongs must
necessarily and initially involve the question of parental authority.
Parental authority is defined as "the mass of rights and obligations
which parents have in relation to the person and property of their
children until their majority age or emancipation, and even after this
under certain circumstances"
In the case of Celis vs. Cafuir:
Whether a child should stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with
his own mother, is not to be determined alone by considerations of
affluence or poverty, Poor youths who had to work their way thru
school and college, have, not infrequently, scaled the heights of
success, as easily and swiftly as their more favored companions, and
done so with more, inner satisfaction, and credit to themselves and
their humble parents.
This Court has long recognized that "the right attached to parental
authority is a purely personal one, and it is extinguished upon the death
of the parent exercising it" (Abieravs. Orin, 8 Phil. 193),
The right of the parents to the custody of their minor children is one
of the natural rights incident to parenthood a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or by the decision of the courts but derives from
the nature of parental relationship. Since the rights of parents to the
custody of their minor children is both a natural and a legal right, the
law could not disturb the parent and child relationship except for the
strongest reasons, and only upon a clear showing of a parent's gross
misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child.
Applications of Moral Law
9
Articles 6, 21, 1306, and 1352 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines
Preliminary Title
Chapter I – Effect and Application of Laws
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.
Chapter 2 – Human Relations
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
BOOK IV – OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
Title II – Contracts
Chapter 1 – General Provisions
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
SUBSCRIPTS
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
Chapter 2 – Essential Requisites of Contracts
Section 3 – Cause of Contracts
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce
no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
Ends and Effects of Law - Full development of the
Human Personality
10
Article XVI, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution
Article XVI – General Provisions
Section 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full
development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the
nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across
the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of
speech and of the press.
Ends and Effects of Law - Justice
11
Article III, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution
Article III – Bill of Rights
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Senate Bill 3434 – Employment Practice Act of 2010
Employment discrimination occurs whenever an employer or its
representatives adversely single out employees or applicants on the
basis of age, race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion and a
variety of other reasons.
Under the equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, employers can't
discriminate against a person in any aspect of employment, such as:
hiring and firing; compensation; assignment; or classification of
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
employees; transfer; promotion; layoff; or recall; job advertisements;
recruitment; testing; use of company facilities; training and
apprenticeship programs; fringe benefits; pay; retirement plans; and
disability leave.
To be considered as "illegal", such discrimination must however be in
violation of a specific law. Otherwise, no protection from
discrimination may be had even how unfair or unethical it may seem.
For example, an employer may be harder on a specific employee from
anyone else for no apparent reason, While it might be unethical
behavior for a boss, it's not discrimination by law, But if he or she is
extra hard on the employee for a reason that's protected by law, such
as religion, age or sex, then such shall constitute illegal discrimination,
especially if such employee suffers damage such as getting passed over
for a well-deserved raise or promotion.
This measure seeks to prevent certain acts of discrimination to protect
employees and advocate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Ends and Effects of Law - Equity
12
Article 9 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Chapter 1 – Effect and Application of Laws
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Ends and Effects of Law - Equity
13
David Reyes vs Jose Lim, Chuy Cheng Keng and
Harrison Lumber, Inc., G.R. No. 134241, August
11, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of
contract and damages against respondents. The complaint alleged that
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel
of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly
rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to
vacate the Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also
informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8
March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a
month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim
connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the
unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to
defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their request for an extension
of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new
location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already
started transferring some of its merchandise to its new business
location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes
through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their
meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim
because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the
Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status
of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold
the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving
with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes. Reyes filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening
facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against
Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of
sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The trial court
granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the
Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ
of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10
million down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
SUBSCRIPTS
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order
practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer.
The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same
order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and
prayed that the orders of the trial court be set aside for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on
the matter?
RULING: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a
case where there is hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If this
case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes
at the expense of Lim. Here the court exercised equity jurisdiction. The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice
may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of
ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the
person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged
to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order
the deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the
Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Ends and Effects of Law – Human Rights
14
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
Article XIII – Social Justice and Human Rights
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
Development (GAD) Framework and Mainstreaming have been
initiated.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
The GAD approach seeks to promote equitable and sustainable
development by changing unequal gender relations between men and
women. This GAD approach addresses not only the practical needs of
both sexes but to improve their conditions, but also more importantly,
women’s strategic needs.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
SUBSCRIPTS
Different Schools of Jurisprudence - Historical
17
Article 25 Civil Code of the Philippines
Chapter 2 – Human Relations
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display
during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by
order of the courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.
Ends and Effects of Law – Equality and Equal
Ends and Effects of Law – Equality and Equal Access before the Law
16
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
Access before the Law
15
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
In 2008, Baguio City suspended the issuance of permits for motorcades
along its roads, citing the a Civil Code provision against splurging
during critical times. In 2002, a court in Nueva Vizcaya issued a
“temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members from buying 13 luxury vehicles” for their own
individual use, citing the same Civil Code provision.
Article II – Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.
Anyone, of course, is entitled to spend his money in any manner he
pleases, so long as it is not against the law. Perhaps this is captured by
the saying: “Work hard, party hard”. The law, however, provides for a
limitation against thoughtless extravagance.
The state should formulate strategies to expand women’s participation
in non-household and productive activities, and make them as direct
contributors to the country’s economic growth.
It is the duty of the state to ensure equality before the law in all aspects
of national life by rectifying or ending all practices and systems that are
disadvantageous to women or discriminate against them.
The 1987 Constitution states two prominent provisions. The first in
the Declaration of Principles Article II Section 14 and the Article XIIILabor: Section 14 provided that “The state shall protect working
women by providing safe and healthful working conditions taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities
that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation”.
Following from constitutional provisions and the subsequent efforts
to broaden its principles, numerous legislation were enacted that relates
to the various aspects of women and gender concerns including the
Gender and Development Law requiring 5% of the government
agencies’ budget is for gender concerns. Further, Gender and
Article XIII – Social Justice and Human Rights
Labor
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and
a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and
to expansion and growth.
The rationale for this legal provision is succinctly pointed out by a
respected civil law author: “When the rich indulge in thoughtless
extravagance or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency, they may unwittingly kindle the flame of unrest in the
hearts of the poor who thereby become more keenly conscious of their
privation and poverty and who may rise against the obvious
inequality.”
There is yet no definitive Supreme Court ruling which involves this
legal provision. Nevertheless, it would appear that three requisites must
be present for this provision to apply. First, there must be an acute
public want or emergency. Second, there must be a thoughtless
extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display. Third, only
government or private charitable institutions could file the action
seeking to stop the thoughtless extravagance.
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Different Schools of Jurisprudence - Historical
18
Article 14 and 15 of the Family Code
of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos.
Executive Order No. 209 – The Family Code of the Philippines
Chapter 1 – Requisites of Marriage
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having
been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of
the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to
their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or
persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such
consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who
personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form
of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested
before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal
manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage
license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached
to said applications. (61a)
Different Schools of Jurisprudence - Historical
20
Article 332, 333, and 334 of the Revised Penal
Code
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and
twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice
upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it
be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three
months following the completion of the publication of the application
therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect
that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice
given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license.
Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall
be stated in the sworn statement.
Different Schools of Jurisprudence - Historical
19
Article 351 of the Revised Penal Code
Act No. 3815 – The Revised Penal Code
Title 12 – Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons
Chapter 2 – Illegal Marriages
Article 351. Premature marriages. - Any widow who shall marry within
three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband,
or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time
Title 10 – Crimes Against Property
Chapter 10 – Exemption From Criminal Liability in Crimes Against
Property
Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but
only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged
to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the
possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to
strangers participating in the commission of the crime.
Title Eleven – Crimes Against Chastity
Chapter One – Adultery and Concubinage
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery. - Adultery is committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing
her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being
abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty
next lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding
paragraph shall be imposed.
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Article 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling, or shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Different Schools of Jurisprudence – Teleological
and Natural
21
Article 1423 to 1430 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
Book IV – Obligations and Contracts
Title II – Natural Obligations
Art. 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right
of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being
based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are
set forth in the following articles.
Art. 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by
extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the
contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the
service he has rendered.
Art. 1425. When without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, a third person pays a debt which the obligor is not legally
bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, but the debtor
later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot
recover what he has paid.
Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent
or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the
whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not
been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price
thus returned.
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Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent
or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible
thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover
the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
(1160A)
On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on
one hand, that the judgment rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
in the protest case is a bar to this action under the principle of res
judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any
reservation the claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in
prosecuting the protest.
Art. 1428. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed
the defendant voluntarily performs the obligation, he cannot demand
the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value of the
service he has rendered.
The issue having been thus joined upon the motion to dismiss, the
Court entered on an order dismissing the complaint with costs. From
this order plaintiff has appealed.
Art. 1429. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of
the decedent exceeding the value of the property which he received by
will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the
payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the payer.
Art. 1430. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed
in accordance with the formalities required by law, but one of the
intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a
legacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment is
effective and irrevocable.
Particular Justice According to Aristotle
22
Rodriguez vs Tan, 91 Phil 724
Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of
P18,400 as salaries and allowances, and the sum of P35,524.55 as
damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the office of Senator of
the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from December
30, 1947, to December 27, 1949.
Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the
office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until December
1949, he continuously collected the salaries, emoluments and privileges
attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been
filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have
been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation,
plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses
he incurred in prosecuting the protest.
The averment in the complaint that "defendant usurped the office of
Senator of the Philippines" is a conclusion of law, — not a statement
of fact, — inasmuch as the particular facts on which the alleged
usurpation is predicated are not set forth therein. Hence such averment
cannot be deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss (Fressel v.
Mariano Uy Chaco & Sons & Co., 34 Phil., 122). Moreover, such
averment is negatived by the decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
in the protest case which says that defendant was one of those
proclaimed elected as Senator in the general elections held on
November 11, 1947. Defendant, cannot, therefore, be considered a
usurper as claimed in the complaint.
With this preliminary statement, let us now proceed to determine the
only issue involved in this appeal, to wit, whether defendant, who has
been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of
Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he
has received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been
legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Plaintiff claims that, as defendant was found by final judgment not to
have been entitled to the office of Senator, and, as such, he was during
the time he discharged that office a mere de facto officer, he should
reimburse to the plaintiff the salaries and emoluments he has received
on the following grounds; (1) because the salaries and emoluments
follow and are inseparable from legal title to the office and do not
depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not; and
(2) because such a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the
danger and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into the office.
Plaintiff invites the attention of the Court to the annotation appearing
in 93 A.L.R. 258, 273 et seq., supplemented in 151 A.L.R. 952, 960, et
seq., wherein more than 100 cases are cited in support of the rule.
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Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the rule invoked by
plaintiff, while sound and plausible, cannot be invoked in the present
case, since it runs counter to the principle and rule long observed in
this jurisdiction to the effect that one who has been elected to an office,
and has been proclaimed by the corresponding authority, has a right to
assume the office and discharge its functions notwithstanding the
protest filed against his election, and as a necessary consequence he has
likewise the right to collect and receive the salaries and emoluments
thereunto appertaining as a compensation for the services he has
rendered. Defendant avers that plaintiff already attempted to seek the
reimbursement of the salaries and emoluments he had received in the
protest he has filed against him but failed and the implicit denial of his
claim by the Senate Electoral Tribunal constitutes a bar to his right to
collect the same salaries and emoluments in the present case.
After a careful consideration of the issue in the light of the law and
precedents obtaining in this jurisdiction, we are inclined to uphold the
point of view of the defendant. There is no question that the defendant
acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator.
He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of
November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been
elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the
oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the
duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator
and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed
that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and
allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (article
VI, section 14). This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the
ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The emolument must
go to the person who rendered the service unless the contrary is
provided. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with
any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that
has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with
positions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later
ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the persons
elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been
recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary
rule has been upheld.
A case which may be invoked in support of this point of view is Page
v. U. S. (127 U. S. 67; 32 Law ed. 65), decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States. In that case, one William A. Pirce was declared
elected, received a certificate of election, was sworn in and took his
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seat in the Congress of the United States. His election was contested
by Charles H. Page, and as a result the House of Representatives found
that Pirce was not duly elected and declared his seat vacant. An election
was thereafter held to fill the vacancy and Page was duly elected.
Thereupon Page was sworn in and took his seat. Page later sued to
recover the salary received by Pirce during his incumbency. The
Supreme Court ruled that he was not entitled to it holding that "one
whose credentials showed that he was regularly elected a member of
Congress, and who was sworn in and took his seat, and served, and
drew his salary, was — although his seat was contested, and
subsequently he was declared by Congress not to have been elected,
and his seat was declared vacant — the predecessor of the person
elected to fill the vacancy." This case, though it arose under a special
statute, is significant in that it regarded Pirce as the lawful predecessor
of Page in the office to which he was later legally elected. Pirce was
declared entitled to the salary and emoluments of the office.
We are sympathetic to the rule earnestly advocated by the plaintiff
which holds that the salaries and emoluments should follow the legal
title to the office and should not depend on whether the duties of the
office are discharged or not, knowing that it is predicated on a policy
designed to discourage the Commission of frauds and to lessen the
danger and frequency of usurpation or intrusion into the office which
defeat the will of the people. We are conscious that, if the role is
adopted, it would indeed have a wholesome effect in future elections
and would serve as a deterring factor in the commission of frauds,
violence and terrorism which at times are committed in some sectors
of our country to the detriment of public interest. But an examination
of the cases relied upon by him, discloses that in some states, like
Indiana, New York, Michigan, California, Louisiana, Idaho, Missouri
and Washington, the doctrine advocated is premised on express
statutory provisions which permit recovery of the damages sustained
by reason of usurpation (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public
Offices and Officers, pp. 223-224; 93 A. L. R. pp. 284-287), whereas
in the rest the ruling is based on common law (Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer,
24 A. L. R. 223-224). Under such predicament, it is indeed hard to see
how we can extend here the force and effect of such doctrine as we are
urged, knowing well that, as a rule, "neither the English nor the
American common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the
doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts" (U. S. v. Cuna,
12 Phil., 241; Arnedo v. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 257, 262),
while, on the other hand, there is nothing in our statutes which would
authorize us to adopt the rule. For us to follow the suggestion of the
SUBSCRIPTS
plaintiff would be to legislate by judicial ruling which is beyond the
province of this Court. Nor are we justified to follow a common law
principle which runs counter to a precedent long observed in this
jurisdiction.
Different Schools of Jurisprudence - Functional
23
De los Santos vs Roman Catholic Church of
Midsayap, G.R. No. L-6088, 50 O.G. 1588
Another reason that may be invoked in opposition to the claim of the
plaintiff is the principle of res judicata. It appears that plaintiff had
already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the defendant
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided
on the merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. In our
opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a denial of the relief. This is
a matter which can be considered as an incident to the power and
authority given to the Electoral Tribunal by our Constitution, whose
jurisdiction over election cases is ample and unlimited (Sanidad Et. Al.
v. Vera Et. Al., Case No. 1, Senate Electoral Tribunal), and when the
Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or ignore altogether, this important
claim, the clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified. This matter,
therefore, cannot now be passed upon in line with the doctrine laid
down in the case of Kare v. Locsin, (61 Phil., 541), wherein this Court,
among other things, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
FACTS:
A homestead patent covering a tract of land situated in the municipality
of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was granted to Julio Sarabillo. Julio
Sarabillo sold two hectares of said land to the Roman Catholic Church
of Midsayap for the sum of P800 to be dedicated to educational and
charitable purposes. It was expressly agreed upon that the sale was
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
"Locsin drew his pay by resolution and authority of the Legislature.
The propriety of those payments cannot be questioned on this
complaint. We recognize Locsin’s right to receive and to retain the
compensation because the Legislature voted it to him in spite of Mr.
Kare’s pending contest and claim to that compensation. The
Legislature’s determination of Mr. Locsin’s right to compensation
necessarily carries the corollary of Mr. Kare’s lack of right to the same
compensation. The Legislature might possibly have required
reimbursement by Locsin had it been its intention to recognize Mr.
Kare’s claim to the same compensation; but not having done so,
Locsin’s superior right to this compensation is res judicata for the
courts." (Kare v. Locsin, 61 Phil., pp. 541, 546.)
The same consideration may be made with regard to the claim for
damages contained in the second cause of action of the complaint.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
Appellant.
In the meantime, Julio Sarabillo died and intestate proceedings were
instituted for the settlemen tof his estate and Catalina de los Santos
was appointed administratrix of the estate. And having found in the
course of her administration that the sale of the land to the Roman
Catholic Church was made in violation of section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the administratrix instituted the present
action in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato praying that the sale
be declared null and void and of no legal effect.
In their answer defendants claim that the sale is legal and valid it having
been executed for educational and charitable purposes and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. They further
claim that, even if it be declared null and void, its immediate effect
twould be not the return of the land to appellee but the reversion of
the property to the State as ordained by law. Defendants also set up as
a defense the doctrine of pari delicto.
ISSUE:
Whether the Roman church owned the land where it is situated.
RULING: No, they do not own the subject land.
It is true that under section 121, Commonwealth Act No. 141, a
corporation, association ,or partnership may acquire any land granted
as homestead if the sale is done with the consent of the grantee and
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
is solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable
purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no limitation
therein as to the time within which such acquisition may be made. But
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this provision should be interpreted as a mere authority granted to a
corporation, association or partnership to acquire a portion of the
public land and not as an unbridled license to acquire without
restriction for such would be giving an advantage to an entity over an
individual
which
finds
no
legal
justification.
It is our opinion that the authority granted by section 121 should be
interpreted as subject to the condition prescribed in section 118,
namely, that the acquisition should be after the period of five years
from the date of the issuance of the patent. In this case, the land was
sold by Sarabillo to the Church, within the five year prohibitory period
and the approval of the Secretary of DENR was released only after ten
years from the grant of homestead.
Therefore, the land cannot be owned by the Church
Social Interest in General Security
24
Republic of the Philippines vs Baylosis, 96 Phil
461
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2d25
Social Interest in General Morals
25
Yu Singco vs Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. L-6152, 50 O.G. 104
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, the Hon. Juan A. Sarenas, presiding, approving the petition
for naturalization of petitioner Yu Singco, a Chinese citizen.
Opposition to the petition was presented by the Government on the
ground that "he had lived an immoral life by maintaining two Chinese
wives and had formerly illicit relationship with one Pura Ortuoste, with
whom he had begotten three children." There is no evidence of the
supposed illicit relations between Pura Ortuoste and the petitioner.
However, there is evidence to the effect that a certain Conception Cua
had relations with the petitioner, as a result of which five children were
born to her. Petitioner did not deny the relationship or that the children
were his. He even admitted that he had lived in the same home with
her and had been giving her money, although the excuse he gives is
that he had received help from Cua's father, when still living with the
latter. The petitioner now has ten children with Chua Hoc Ty whom
she married in Amoy, China in 1924. As to all other qualifications,
there was sufficient evidence that petitioner was fully qualified for
naturalization.
SUBSCRIPTS
circumstances be considered "proper and irreproachable" within the
meaning of the law, even if he actually gives support to his
children.1awphil.net
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, hereby reversed and the
petition for naturalization denied. So ordered
The trial court held:
. . . There must be some grain of truth in this piece of evidence that
cannot be entirely ignored, especially in the case of Conception Cua
with whom, it is alleged, the petitioner has begotten some children. But
the court, however, believes that such love affair if at all true, did exist
once upon a time when the petitioner was still a young married man.
This case is not unusual in life and is true in any part of the world. The
allegation with respect to the regular support and maintenance that the
petitioner is extending to his alleged children with Conception Cua,
were it a fact, militates more in his favor than not, because it only goes
to prove the grandeur of heart and consciousness of a grace
responsibility on the part of the petitioner. Not many people, the court
has observed, are gifted with such a noble human sentiment and
gentlemanliness.
Social Interest in General Morals
26
People vs Yuson, Criminal Case No. 58138, CFI
Manila, December 11, 1962
On this appeal, the Solicitor General contends that the petitioner has
not conducted himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines . . . ", as required
by section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. We are constrained to
uphold this contention. What constitutes "proper and irreproachable
conduct" within the meaning of the law must be determined, not by
the law of the country of which the petitioner is a citizen (polygamy is
allowed in China), but by the standards of morality prevalent in this
country, and these in turn by the religious beliefs and social concepts
existing therein. This country is predominantly Catholic and universally
Christian in religious belief. Both seduction and bigamy are punished
as crimes, and while seduction is a private crime and illegitimates
declared legal heirs, a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife, if known to be unmarried, are in general despised and avoided in
society, even if not considered social outcasts. Society may pardon the
sins of their members, but such pardon should not be confused with
approval. In the case at bar, we disagree with the conclusions of the
trial court and hold that as petitioner had previously lived with another
woman with whom he has had five children and subsequently
abandoned them, marrying another, his conduct can under no
Herein lies the inconsistency of the judge's approach to the problem.
His solution was not only wrongly based on his own personal outlook
on the materials in question, but it was not also cradled along rational
and plausible lines. Having found the magazines in question to be
inoffensive to morals. he acquitted the accused person presumably on
the ground that the materials involved were covered by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Why then, did he
order in his decision the forfeiture of the magazines in favor of the
government to prevent them from getting into the hands of the public?
In People vs Yuson, the accused Yuson was charged with offering for
sale and selling magazines allegedly offensive to the contemporary
morals of the community. The trial judge observed that Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code does not define the term “offensive to
morals.” According to the trial judge, this leaves each individual,
including himself, free to determine what the term “offensive to
morals” means. The trial judge stated in his decision that “in my own
belief they are not offensive to morals.”
The sociologists approach to the problem is something else. They
make use of sophisticated techniques or methods of public opinion
research. But this methodology, even with allowance for potential
sampling errors. Cannot, for obvious reasons, be done by the courts
for each and every case involving this issue or any other issue for that
matter. And even if the parties in every particular case were to agree
on such an opinion survey the results would still be unreliable because
the respondents included in the sampling group would not have the
slightest idea of both the legal and metalegal implications of their
responses.
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The social interest in the general morals is based on the right and
concern of the entire community against those forms of acts and
practices which are offensive to the contemporary moral standard of
the community. It is expressed or evidenced by the following national
policies:
1. The policy against acts and practices promotive of dishonesty.
impropriety and corruption.
2. The policy against social and commercial gambling whether as a
form of recreation or producer of revenues.
3. The policy against acts and practices calculated to excite and sustain
immoral thoughts and prurient interests.
4. The policy against acts and practices exploiting sexual materials
which though not obscene are offered for pecuniary gain.
5. The policy against works which express or present something which
do not have earnest literary. artistic or scientific merit or value.
6. The policy concerning the protection and preservation of the values
of the community.
7. The policy concerning the regulation of private recreational
enterprises offered to the public.
8. The policy for the suppression of matters tending to harm mentally
and emotionally persons not mature enough to avoid such matters.
9. The policy against acts and practices that exploit illicit sex or sexual
immorality.
Social Interest in General Progress
27
Guide vs Rural Progress Administration, G.R.
No. L-2089, 84 Phil 847
FACTS:
• This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress
Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of petitioner Justa G.
Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined
area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, ...
grounds me adduced in support of the petition, to wit:
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted
without jurisdiction or corporate power in filing the expropriation
complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of
P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the... land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and
therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid
contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and
expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the
land at P118,780.00 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent
RPA.
ISSUE:
• That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore
excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.
• That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid
contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and
expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
RULING:
• In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity,
and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or
city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people... benefitted, and the extent
of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes
the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery,
feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords and... tenants,
and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and
public peace and order.
• The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50
persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public
to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The
expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the...
economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public
health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is
proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we
know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's...
security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the
stipulated rent or leave the premises.
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Social Interest in General Health
28
Republic Act No. 11332
An Act Providing Policies and Prescribing Procedures on Surveillance
and Response to Notifiable Diseases, Epidemics, and Health Events
of Public Health Concern, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,
Repealing for the Purpose Act No. 3573, Otherwise Known as the
"Law on Reporting of Communicable Diseases"
Section 1. Short Title. -This Act shall be known as the "Mandatory
Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health
Concern Act".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. -It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them. It shall endeavor to protect the
people from public health threats through the efficient and effective
disease surveillance of notifiable diseases including emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, diseases for elimination and eradication,
epidemics, and health events including chemical, radio-nuclear and
environmental agents of public health concern and provide an effective
response system in compliance with the 2005 International Health
Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO). The
State recognizes epidemics and other public health emergencies as
threats to public health and national security, which can undermine the
social, economic, and political functions of the State.
The State also recognizes disease surveillance and response systems of
the Department of Health (DOH) and its local counterparts, as the
first line of defense to epidemics and health events of public health
concern that pose risk to public health and security.
Section 4. Objectives. -This Act shall have the following objectives:
(a) To continuously develop and upgrade the list of nationally
notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern with their
corresponding case definitions and laboratory confirmation;
(b) To ensure the establishment and maintenance of relevant, efficient
and effective disease surveillance and response system at the national
and local levels;
(c) To expand collaborations beyond traditional public health partners
to include others who may be involved in the disease surveillance and
response, such as agricultural agencies, veterinarians, environmental
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agencies, law enforcement entities,
communication agencies, among others;
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and
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transportation
and
(d) To provide accurate and timely health information about notifiable
diseases, and health-related events and conditions to citizens and
health providers as an integral part of response to public health
emergencies;
communities, other government agencies, and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) to actively participate in disease surveillance and
response; and
ISSUE:
• Whether or not there was a political question that courts cannot
review - No
(i) To respect to the fullest extent possible, the rights of people to
liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy while maintaining and preserving
public health and security.
• The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in
issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-avis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
(e) To establish effective mechanisms for strong collaboration with
national and local government health agencies to ensure proper
procedures are in place to promptly respond to reports of notifiable
diseases and health events of public health concern, including case
investigations, treatment, and control and containment, including
follow-up activities;
Social Interest in the Conservation of Natural
Resources
29
Oposa vs Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
(f) To ensure that public health authorities have the statutory and
regulatory authority to ensure the following:
FACTS:
• The principal plaintiffs therein, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents.
(1) Mandatory reporting of reportable diseases and health events of
public health concern;
(2) Epidemic/outbreaks and/or epidemiologic investigation, case
investigations, patient interviews, review of medical records, contact
tracing, specimen collection and testing, risk assessments, laboratory
investigation, population surveys, and environmental investigation;
(3) Quarantine and isolation; and
(4) Rapid containment and implementation of measures for disease
prevention and control;
(g) To provide sufficient funding to support operations needed to
establish and maintain epidemiology and surveillance units at the
DOH, health facilities and local government units (LGUs); efficiently
and effectively investigate outbreaks and health events of public health
concern; validate, collect, analyze and disseminate disease surveillance
information to relevant agencies or organizations; and implement
appropriate response;
(h) To require public and private physicians, allied medical personnel,
professional societies, hospitals, clinics, health facilities, laboratories,
pharmaceutical companies, private companies and institutions,
workplaces, schools, prisons, ports, airports, establishments,
SUBSCRIPTS
• The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that
the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
rainforests."
• On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government.
• "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
RULING:
• WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
• In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
Social Interest in General Aesthetics
30
Churchill vs Rafferty, G.R. No.
December 21, 1915
• On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim -- that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question -- sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province
“quite distance from the road and strongly built, not dangerous to the
safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is
filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.”
However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue, decided
to remove the billboards after due investigation made upon the
complaints of the British and German Consuls.
L-10572,
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove after due investigation, any billboard exposed to the public
view if it decides that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.
In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs
"admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the
sight."
The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the
defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the
plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914,
and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the
property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of the bond
given by the plaintiffs.
Hence, this petition.
Schools of Jurisprudence – Realist, Interpretivist,
Constructivist
31
People of the Philippines vs Judge Eusebio
Lopez, G.R. No. L-1243, April 14, 1947
FACTS:
Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Tanada, as head of the Office of Special
Prosecutors, and Prosecutors Juan R. Liwag and Pedro C. Quinto filed,
in the name of the People of the Philippines, a petition praying that a
writ of prohibition be issued commanding
Associate Judge Eusebio M. Lopez, of the Second Division of the
People's Court, "to desist from further proceedings in, or further
exercising his jurisdiction in the trial of, and from otherwise taking
further cognizance of criminal cases for treason against Benigno S.
Aquino
ISSUE:
WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the Government?
(No. 3527) and against Antonio de las Alas (No. 3531), and other
treason cases of the same nature actually pending before the Second
Division of the People's Court or in any other division where he may
hereafter be assigned, and declaring him disqualified to sit therein."
RULING:
YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing,
may be suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly
populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power of
the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and safety.
On March 14, 1946, an information for treason was filed in criminal
case No. 3534 against Guillermo B. Francisco. The accused entered his
plea of not guilty and the case was heard on diverse clays in the months
of June and July, 1946, before the Second Division of the People's
Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy
social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and
convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the
police power of the State.
Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.
Court, composed of Associate Judges Salvador Abad Santos and Jose
P. Veluz and the respondent judge.
After the prosecution had rested its case, counsel for the accused
moved to dismiss, upon the sole ground that the overt acts charged in
the information were not testified to by two witnesses as required by
the treason law, article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
On August 24, 1946, a decision penned by Associate Judge Salvador
Abad Santos, dated August 15, 1946, and concurred in by Associate
Judge Jose P. Veluz, was promulgated, dismissing the case. Associate
Judge Lopez reserved his decision.
On September 26, 1946, Judge Lopez promulgated a separate
concurring opinion in which, according to the petition, "not satisfied
SUBSCRIPTS
with dismissing the aforementioned case on the ground raised by the
accused therein, expressed views and conclusions of facts, not
warranted by the... evidence or by the issues raised by the parties nor
necessary to the decision of the case, justifying the aid and comfort
given to the Empire of Japan by the 'Filipino leaders' or the so-called
political collaborators and holding them in effect to be patriots and
therefore not... guilty of the crime of treason with which they stand
charged."
Upon the allegation that "the respondent judge had shown that he does
not possess that unprejudiced, dispassionate, unbiased and impartial
state of mind in regard to the cases of the political collaborators now
pending trial in the People's Court, which is a requisite under the...
statute and which is essential and necessary as a matter of right in the
proper administration of justice," the prosecution filed petitions to
disqualify respondent judge from sitting and participating in any
manner in the hearing and decision of the criminal cases against
Benigno" S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas and other treason cases
of the same nature pending before the Second Division of the People's
Court. It is alleged that the petitions were filed under section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, otherwise known as the People's Court
Act, in... relation to section 1 of Rule 124.
After due hearing and argument, the majority of the Second Division,
Judges Abad Santos and Veluz, promulgated a resolution on
November 8, 1946, granting the motions for the disqualification of
Judge Lopez. On the same date Judge Lopez promulgated a resolution
denying... them.
The petition alleges that in said separate resolution respondent judge
"again manifested his bias and prejudice in favor of political
collaborators" and reaffirmed with more vigor the views and
conclusions
He alleges also that the resolution of Judges Abad Santos and Veluz,
granting the petitions to disqualify Judge Lopez, is contrary to law and
to the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, and that the resolution
of Judge Lopez was not manifestation of his bias and prejudice in...
favor of political collaborators, but was merely a restatement of the law
and a summary of well-known principles of international law and the
law of evidence; that the majority cannot remove Judge Lopez from
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Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
the Second Division, and any attempt to this effect, being unlawful,...
can be ignored by him.
As a matter of principle, the idea of recognizing in the majority of a
collegiate court the power to disqualify a member thereof is repugnant
and destructive of the very nature of such court. The basic assumption
behind the creation and existence of a collegiate tribunal is that... it has
to pass upon highly debatable juridical or factual issues and that, to
obtain the wisest possible conclusion, full opportunity must be given
for each side of a controversy to present and argue their contentions.
ISSUES:
The first legal problem arising out of this controversy is the
determination of whether, upon the facts alleged in the petition and
appearing in the annexes on record, Judge Eusebio M. Lopez is
disqualified from sitting and participating in any manner in the
hearing,... consideration and decision of the treason cases against
Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527), Antonio de las Alas (No. 3531), and of
other criminal cases of the same nature pending before the Second
Division of the People's Court or in any other division where
respondent judge may... hereafter be assigned.
RULING:
Counsel's enthymeme runs as follows: "Judge Lopez cannot administer
justice impartially; therefore, he is disqualified." But the assumed
major premise, which if expressly stated would complete the syllogism,
finds no support at all in the invoked reglementary... provision. There
is absolutely nothing in said provision or in any part of section 1, Rule
124, in support of the thesis that, because a judge cannot administer
justice impartially (the minor premise of the syllogism which is yet to
be determined), ipso facto he is... disqualified.
PRINCIPLES:
As a matter of principle, the idea of recognizing in the majority of a
collegiate court the power to disqualify a member thereof is repugnant
and destructive of the very nature of such court. The basic assumption
behind the creation and existence of a collegiate tribunal is that... it has
to pass upon highly debatable juridical or factual issues and that, to
obtain the wisest possible conclusion, full opportunity must be given
for each side of a controversy to present and argue their contentions.
Schools of Jurisprudence – Realist, Interpretivist,
Constructivist
32
Chua-Qua vs Clave, G.R. No. L-49549, August 30,
1990
FACTS: Petitioner was a teacher in, Tay Tung High School (private
respondent), an educational institution in Bacolod City, since 1963. In
1976, Petitioner was the class adviser in the sixth grade where Bobby
Qua was enrolled. The school extended remedial instructions and it
was during the course thereof that Petitioner and Bobby Qua fell in
love. On December 24, 1975, the couple got married in a civil
ceremony in Iloilo City. Petitioner was thirty (30) years old and Bobby
Qua was only sixteen (16), consent and advice was given by his mother,
Mrs. Concepcion Ong. On January 10, 1976, the two got married in a
church wedding.
On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the Department of
Labor an application for clearance to terminate the employment of
petitioner on the ground of “abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher”. Petitioner was then placed
under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976.
SUBSCRIPTS
On March 30, 1977, private respondent elevated the case to the
Minister of Labor. The latter reversed the decision of the NLRC and
petitioner was awarded six (6) months’ salary as financial assistance.
On May 20, 1977, Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President.
On September 1, 1978, herein public respondent, Presidential
Executive Assistant Hon. Clave reversed the appealed decision,
thereby ordering reinstatement of the petitioner and other privileges
and with full back wages. However, on December 6, 1978, public
respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration, reconsidered and
modified the aforesaid decision. Public respondent gave due course to
the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services
of petitioner.
In this petition for certiorari, private respondent argues that “as a
school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her
pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over
Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and
respect extended to her.” Private respondent further alleged that
Petitioner violated a pertinent provision of Code of Ethics for teachers
which provides that a “school official or teacher should never take
advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student.”
On September 17, 1976, the Executive Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
the private respondent, holding that:
Petitioner maintains that there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling
in love with her pupil and subsequently contracting a lawful marriage
with him.
“While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral
acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a
sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and
took place during these times…”
ISSUE: Whether or not the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality
and/or grave misconduct.
On October 7, 1976, Petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC for brevity) contending that there was
nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into a
lawful wedlock with her student. Hence, the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision on December 27, 1975, stating that there is nothing
immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room
after classes with lights on and with the door open. It further held that
the depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No
statements whatever were sworn that they were eyewitnesses to
immoral or scandalous acts.
RULING: No. The Court in this case held that there is no substantial
evidence of the imputed immoral acts. The Labor Arbiter, from the
outset, has already conceded that there was no direct evidence to show
that immoral acts were committed and the same was the finding of
herein public respondent but in a patently unsubstantiated decision,
ruled in favor of the private respondent.
The Court further held that with the finding of unsubstantiated
evidence of alleged immoral acts, the alleged violation of the Code of
Ethics governing school teachers should also fail. Private respondent
her student. The Court held that the school’s policy in rearing and
educating children “should not be capitalized on to defeat the security
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JD 101
Philosophy of Law
Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases,
the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee
rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified.”
The Court went on to say that “the deviation of the circumstances of
their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as
a defiance of contemporary social mores. If the two eventually fell in
love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only
lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own
which reason does not know.”
Hence, the subject resolution was set aside. Private respondent was
ordered to pay Petitioner back wages equivalent to three (3) years,
without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the
amount of one (1) month for every year of service.
Schools of Jurisprudence – Realist, Interpretivist,
Constructivist
33
Cayetano vs Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September
3, 1991
FACTS: In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed by President
Corazon Aquino as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the
ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional
requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC
should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one
year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in
economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for
various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.
2. What constitutes practice of law?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to
court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely
described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of
a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
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perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no
means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
FALLO:
The petition is DISMISSED.
SOCIAL JUSTICE
34
Calalang vs Williams, G.R. No. 70 Phil 726
FACTS:
• Calalang filed a petition for writ of prohibition against certain officials
in enforcing the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles in certain areas
and during certain periods of the day. The Court ruled that
Commonwealth Act No 548, the law in question, is constitutional.
• The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.
ISSUE:
• WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation
of legislative power
• NO. The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power
upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly.
• WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion
• NO. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
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JD 101
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Philip Adrian G. Nazario ♡ CC
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
• WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice
• NO. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in
our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."
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