Last set of cases to be recited during our next sessions:
1.
Remman Enteprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Association vs Professional Regulatory Board Of Real Estate Service And
Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. No. 197676, February 04, 2014
The Court will not declare a statute as unconstitutional when its regulation is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.F
FACTS
 This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real
Estate ServiceAct of the Philippines.
 R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was passed.
 Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory
scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners.
 The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional
RegulatoryCommission (PRC).
 The law required that companies providing real estate services must transact
with the employ of duly licensed real estate brokers.
 Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due
process clause and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers
enshrined in Art. 428 of the CivilCode. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the
equal protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their
properties without the need of a licensed real estate broker.
 The provisions in question are
Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate
Service.
Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.
 The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1.Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process. No.
The requirements for substantive due process are
–1. Lawful government purpose;
And2. Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose.
The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and
increase its standards.
The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous
flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress.
The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is
reasonable as it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the
exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights. [YAP, K.] C2020 |
Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of
private who want to sell their private property.
Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real
estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of
business, a business which is highly regulated by the State To ensure the health and
safety of home and lot buyers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD
Ref: https://www.scribd.com/document/341845096/Remman-Enterprises-v-PRB-Yap-KC2020
Other Ref: https://abagosto.wordpress.com/creba-vs-prbres-and-prc/
2. Antonio A. Mecano Vs. Commission On Audit; G.R. No. 103982 December 11,
1992
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
(RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the
same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his
claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that
“the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly
maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD: NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s
claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new
law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest;
otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation
of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the
same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.
Ref: https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2013/04/16/mecano-vs-coa-g-r-no-103982december-11-1992/
Other Ref: https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2011/03/26/mecano-vs-coa/
3.
Mun. of Nueva Era v. Mun. of Marcos, G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008
FACTS:
The municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era was in a boundary dispute when the
former claimed the middle and isolated northern portions of the latter’s territory,
pursuant to RA 3753 which created the Marcos town in the Province of Ilocos Norte,
contending that the law requires that the land area of a municipality must be compact
and contiguous. Nueva Era, on the other hand, argued that its entire land area has
always been an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community,
and thus the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected and preserved as part of
Nueva Era. On March 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte declared
the disputed portions as part of Nueva Era’s territory since none of Nueva Era’s
barangays were mentioned to comprise the municipality of Marcos in RA 3753. The
latter appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the SP decision. In the petition for review
with the CA, the court held that Marcos was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era
in view of the boundary set by RA 3753 but denied its (Marcos) claim over the disputed
isolated northern portion, invoking Sec 7(c) of the 1991 Local Government Code which
allows the separation/isolation of two or more islands as an exception to the rule
requiring the land area of an LGU to be contiguous. Unpleased, Nueva Era raised the
issue to the Supreme Court. In addition, in the present case, Nueva Era contends that
the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required
plebiscite.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Marcos may validly claim a portion of Nueva Era as part of its eastern
boundary pursuant to its creation by virtue of RA 3753. 2. W/N approval in a plebiscite is
required before the municipality of Marcos may be validly created.
RULING:
1. No, Marcos cannot claim a portion of Nueva Era’s territory pursuant to its
creation by virtue of RA 3753. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Since
only the barrios of Dingras are named in RA 3753, the territory of Nueva Era is therefore
excluded. Moreover, only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of
Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the
listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. The Court upheld
the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only. 2. No, approval
in a plebiscite is not required for the creation of the municipality of Marcos. At the time
Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government
unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. Under the
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, it is basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law
should
be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive
application is so provided.
Ref: https://pdfcoffee.com/12-nueva-era-vs-marcos-gr-no-169435-february-27-2008pdf-free.html
Other Ref: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_169435_2008.html
4.
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, August 30, 1962
Facts:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of section 54 of the
Revised Election Code in the Province of Pangasinan.
Section 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. - No justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army,
no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid in any candidate, or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant contends that the provision excludes justice of peace and as such, he
is excluded from this prohibition.
The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of
peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of
peace is within the purview of section 54. A second motion was filed by the defense
counsel who in cited in support the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraig, where a justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition of sec. 54. The
lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon authority of the ruling in
the case cited by the defense.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Justice of Peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.
Held:
Yes. Petitioner argues that when section 54 of the Revised Election Code
omitted the words "Justice of Peace" from the Revised Administrative Code provision
from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature in the omission;
however, petitioner's contention is without merit. The word judge in the former provision
was qualified by the phrase "of First instance" the term judge in section 54 is not
modified or qualified making it more broader and generic to comprehend all kinds of
judges.
Note:
The rule of Casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim
only applies and operates if and when the omission has been clearly established.
Ref: http://rulecasedigest.blogspot.com/2019/06/people-of-philippines-vs-guillermo.html
Other Ref: https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/cotabato-state-university/corporatelaw/168047671-statutory-construction-case-digest/34128525
5.
PACU v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955
Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request
that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as
well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2)
They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic
efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation
of legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on the other hand points out that
none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They have
suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court
Decision:
Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a
statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited
to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary
of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not
constitute a justiciable controversy.
Ref: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/09/pacu-vs-secretary-of-education-grno-5279-31-october-1955/
Other Ref: https://lawiqlegal.wordpress.com/2021/01/08/pacu-vs-secretary-ofeducation/
6.
Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344. January 20, 2004
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed
Resolution No. 049 Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish,
operate and maintain a cockpit in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur.
Canet, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, filed an application for mayor’s
permit. Mayor Julieta Decena denied the application since under the Local Government
Code of 1991, the authority to give licences for such business is vested in the
Sanguniang Bayan. Moreover, Mayor Decena could not issue the permit as well
because there was no ordinance passed by the Sanguniang Bayan to authorize it.
On July 26, 1999, Canet filed a complaint against Decena for mandamus and damages
with application for preliminary mandatory injunction in RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch XXXI. Decena’s move to dismiss the complaint was denied. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on Feb. 1, 2000.
Decena, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. On April 3, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order instructing
Canet and the presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on Feb. 1, 2000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to
issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance which
would empower her to do so.
HELD:
NO. Since there was no ordinance allowing the operation of cockpit, it cannot be
implemented. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the maxim
expression unius est exlusio alterius and expressium facit cessare tacitum what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2002 is made permanent.
Ref: https://mjunico.wordpress.com/2016/09/19/canet-vs-decena/
Other Ref: https://philawsophically.com/canet-vs-decena/
7.
Malinias v. Comelec, G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002
FACTS:
On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for
governor and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the
COMELEC's Law Department Against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others
for their violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections
232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguezwas then the incumbent Congressman of
Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of
the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then theChief of
Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to
said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating in the canvassing of
election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way
to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, MountainProvince.
Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag Submitted their joint
Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of
checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other
pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No.2968 purposive of the maintenance of
peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also,they said that the
presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who
reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such
a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in
fact, the petitioners were among them.COMELEC’s
Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition
against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence
thereon. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC petition for review on certiorari
on this case.
ISSUE:
Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found
the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction
and duties under the law. In this case,COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of
the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari
Ref: https://pdfslide.net/documents/sario-malinias-v-comelec-gr-146943.html
Other ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cc985?user=4540
8.
PLDT Co. v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-26762 August 29,
1975
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c52df
9.
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111722 May 27,
1997
Facts:
On August 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Emiliano T. de Asis rendered a decision that
the respondent Alpha Investigation and Security Agency and Mariano Marcos State
University to pay each complainant the amount of P41,459.51 representing salary
differential for the period from February 16, 1990 to September 30, 1991, or the total
amount of P787,730.69 to the nineteen (19) respondents.
AISA and DMMSU interposed separate appeals. The NLRC, on May 7, 1993, rendered
a decision affirming the solidary liability of AISA and DMMSU and remanding the
records of the case to the arbitration branch of origin for computation of the salary
differential awarded by the Labor Arbiter.
Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC on July 1,
1993, for lack of merit.
In this petition, AISA alleges that payment of the wage increases under the
current minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU, pursuant to
Section 6 of Republic Act 6727 (RA 6727) which reads as follows:
"Sec. 6. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and
similar services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be
borne by the principals or clients of the construction/service contractors and the contract
shall be deemed amended accordingly. In the event, however, that the principal or client
fails to pay the prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall be jointly
and severally liable with his principal or client."
It further contends that Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally
refer to the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages in accordance with
the Labor Code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages would make the
employer and contractor jointly and severally liable for such payment. AISA insists that
the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials or wages increases,
as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general, as
provided by the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to the
failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages involve only on wage
differentials or wages increases (and not wages in general)?
Held:
This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction
that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of
the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. In fact,
legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole,
and not of an isolated part or aparticular provision alone.
AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by
the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including the statutory
minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer,
while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the
purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This
gives the workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social justice
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Ref: http://lexaequitas.blogspot.com/2017/09/alpha-investigation-and-securityagency.html
Other Ref: https://pdfslide.net/documents/alpha-investigation-and-security-agency-vnational-labor-relations-commission.html?page=1
10.
Serana v. Sandigabayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent
of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The
Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to
quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not
a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation
to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not
from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP
student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the
SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27
and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of
PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of
a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her position as a board
of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her.
Ref: https://jeffsarabusing.wordpress.com/2017/05/08/case-brief-serana-vssandiganbayan/
Other Ref: http://dev2.pinayjurist.com/serana-v-sandiganbayan-g-r-no-162059-january22-2008/
11.
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489.
April 30, 1970
Facts:
In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens
del Rosario, dated September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the
time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to
his death... on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the
decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the
past three months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded in a marriage... ceremony solemnized at the San Pedro Hospital in Davao City
where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage
was facilitated through the intercession of the general manager of the respondent...
company."[1] The decision likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8,
1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel
Tantoy Macabenta.
Issues:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred
after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be... considered dependents
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act
Ruling:
We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with
the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if
under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried,...
whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered dependents.
Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that
the marriage took... place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the
time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the
letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel
Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision,
while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had
already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three... months. The
child born, of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the
posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company seems bent on ignoring is that our
Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that
are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely,
that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's... womb.[4]
Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to
support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of
September 27, 1966 is affirmed.
Principles:
Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all
purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions
specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the
mother's... womb.[4] Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of
the one called upon to support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his
death before her birth.
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c55e7?user=2
Other Ref: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1970aprildecisions.php?id=124
12.
City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c556c
13.
Tan Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004
FACTS:
HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was
born May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents
CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO
BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines
with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no.
270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD
1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as
Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC
Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth
which was denied on the ff. grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject
matter,they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children
of the applicant; **Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and
applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the
naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD:
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise
mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized
as a Filipino citizen.
Ref: https://pdfslide.net/documents/co-vs-civil-registrar-of-manila.html?page=2
Other Ref: https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/adamson-university/courseintegration-1/7-citizenship-tan-co-v-civil-register-of-manila/22902744
14.
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
Facts:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To
Bid"... doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction
Supply (Carwin Construction),... he was awarded the contract for the concreting... a
Contract Agreement was executed... personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of
San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100%
completed... respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.
The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.[9] However, the
DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that
the contractor's license of respondent had expired
DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566),
otherwise known as the Contractor's License Law, does not provide that a contract
entered into after the license has... expired is void and there is no law which expressly
prohibits or declares void such contract,... the District Engineer requested clarification
from the DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for
works accomplished... no payment... was made to respondent.
respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.
the RTC rendered... that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it
has accepted the completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise
would be to overrun the long standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching
oneself at the expense of... another.
petitioner filed an appeal with the CA
It held that since the case involves the application of the principle of estoppel against
the government which is a... purely legal question, then the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply; that by its actions the government is estopped
from questioning the validity and binding effect of the Contract Agreement
Issues:
whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
Ruling:
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits
or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of
this
Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate... another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be
deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis...
supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation.[40] This rule derived from the maxim
Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or
will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed... to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[41] Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no... departure.[42]
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as
void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be... paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is
without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed und
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c9f7a?user=6099
Other Ref: https://pdfcoffee.com/republic-v-lacap-gr-no-158253-march-2-2007-pdffree.html
15.
Rural Bank of San Miguel v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. 150886, February 16,
2007
FACTS:
Petitioner bank was prohibited by the Monetray Board (MB) from doing business
in the Philippines and was placed under receivership with PDIC, as its receiver, on the
basis of reports prepared by the PDIC. This was done by MB through a Resolution. On
the basis of another set of reports prepared by PDIC stating that RBSM could not
resume business with sufficient assurance of protecting the interest of its depositors,
creditors and the general public, the MB passed a Resolution directing PDIC to proceed
with the liquidation of the bank under Section 30 of RA 7653. Hence, petitioner files this
instant petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the CA.
ISSUE/S: WON Section 30 of RA 7653 require a current and complete examination of
the bank before it can be closed and placed under receivership.
HELD:
NO. Section 30 of RA 7653 provides that “upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department” the Monetary Board may place a bank under
receivership or liquidation. Hence, RA 7653 only requires a "report” of the head of the
supervising or examining department". Examination is no longer needed. The Bank’s
reliance on Section 29 of the old law (RA 265), which required examination, is
misplaced since such law has been repealed by the current RA 7653 (The New Central
Bank).
Furthermore, to make the meaning of “report” as “examination” would be wrong since it
is an established rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation (plain meaning rule or verba legis). The word "report"
has a definite and unambiguous meaning which is clearly different from "examination."
A report, as a noun, may be defined as "something that gives information" or "a usually
detailed account or statement.” On the other hand, an examination is "a search,
investigation or scrutiny." Hence it is it clear that RA 7653 no longer requires that an
examination be made before the MB can issue a closure order
Ref: http://noobcasedigest.blogspot.com/2019/03/rural-bank-of-san-miguel-vsmonetary.html
Other Ref: https://thestudentandthelaw.wordpress.com/2016/10/16/rural-bank-of-sanmiguel-v-monetary-board-g-r-no-150886/
16.
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the
deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven abovenamed private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square
meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of
land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio
Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by
them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas,
productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by
respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for
P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof,
seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of
P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share
tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of
pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic
Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to
petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor
were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas
in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by
respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of
land they are working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given
to them by the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the
property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of
RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale.
OR
Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share
tenants?
Held:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share
tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of
the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as
those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were
earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the
lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their
acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the
court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or
intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520,
Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its
spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons,
Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the
subject landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to
the agrarian court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to
Procorpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the
observations made.
Ref: http://simplelawstudent.blogspot.com/2013/05/hidalgo-v-hidalgo.html
Other Ref: https://cassielawst.blogspot.com/2020/12/case-digest-hidalgo-v-hidalgo.html
17.
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, Corona, J., Sep.
Op.
Facts:
Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco
and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited
and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in
Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but
eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the overseas
recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus they filed separate
criminal complaints against accused in Manila.
The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and
estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed with
modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to
insufficiency of evidence.
Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment, and be
charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.
Ruling:
The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5
counts of estafa.
Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal recruitment and
estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she was just echoing the
requirement of her employer, the Court believes that Temporada actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.
The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal recruitment
by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused were convicted
separately also for 5 counts of estafa.
Ref: http://jeanneguian.blogspot.com/2016/11/gr-no-173473-case-digest.html
Other Ref: https://pdfcoffee.com/people-v-temporada-pdf-free.html
18.
People v. Salas, G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Cebu originally charged Mario Abong of
homicide but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of
prosecution and as a result of this an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which Abong pleaded not guilty. While the trial was in progress,
Abong took advantage of the situation and deceived the courts into granting him bail
after which he was released and escaped. When the respondent judge learned of this
he canceled the bail and ordered the rearrest of Abong but he already fled. Regardless of the absence of Abong the
prosecution moved the hearing to continue and observed the constitutional provision
of trial in absentia but the respondent judge denied the motion and instead suspended
all the proceedings until the return of the Mario Abong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge erred in suspending the proceedings of the accused
due to the principle of trial on absentia.
HELD.
YES. The judge erred in the suspension of all the proceedings until the
return of the accused because he did not see the woods for the trees and took the literal
reading of the rule when he should have viewed it in a broader point of view of the true
intention of the rule. Contrary to Article IV, Sec. 19 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
the doctrine of in the case at bar has been modified by Section 19, which
now allows a trial in absentia and because of this the prisoner cannot simple escape
to escape his continued
prosecution or even his later conviction provided that: a) he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear
is unjustified. The respondent judge was still probably thinking of the old doctrine when
he ruled trial in absentia and he might have forgotten that the fugitive already waived his
right to be duly notified due to his escape and also it makes his failure to appear
unjustified. The present rule will operate to his disadvantage rather that rewarding him
because his continual absence will most likely result to conviction. The too-literal
reading of the law
should be rebuked and rather fulfill its purpose. The intention of the law is what is of
great importance when the courts should apply it and it is usually
found not “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth,”. Judges should
have looked in a broader light rather than clinging to the language of the law and seek
by their own lights the intention for its enactment and of course apply it in the most
proper way and according to its ends. The trial judge is directed to
investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario
Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the
withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his
investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the
motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The
respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent
Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
Ref: https://pdfcookie.com/documents/salas-case-digest-eg273dzn03v0
Other Ref: http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/people-vs-salas-143-scra-163-gr-nol.html
19.
Alonzo v. IAC, G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his
undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con
Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of
the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed
the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil
Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period
began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,
[courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to
the law maker’s will.
Ref: https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2013/04/16/alonzo-vs-intermediate-appellatecourt-and-padua-g-r-no-l-72873-may-28-1987/
Other Ref: https://upxateneo.wordpress.com/2018/09/22/alonzo-v-intermediateappellate-court-g-r-no-72873/
20.
Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
G.R. No. 132051, June 25, 2001
FACTS:
Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on August 25,
1981. its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco
Filipino has continued to occupy the premises even after the expiration of the lease. On
June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the following terms and conditions: that
the bank should pay P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as of September 1, 1992,
with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance deposit equivalent to rents for four
months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00. Banco Filipino did not comply and in April
1994, it stopped paying rents. Banco Filipino denied having executed the lease contract
providing for a term of eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for twenty
(20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on August 25, 1981.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eleven-year lease contract superseded the twenty-year lease
contract
HELD:
The eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then
Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed
the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the said contract,
Atty.Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and (3) the said
contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the latter's rules and
regulations. It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease
contract which is the real and genuine contract between petitioner Tala Realty and
private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract
is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession
of the subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the
other terms and conditions thereof. The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract
was further reinforced on June 20, 2000 when the First Division of this Court rendered a
Decision in G.R. No. 137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract,
thus:
"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we
have no option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year
contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid down
a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 'Stare decisis
et non quieta movere.”
That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the
subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. Stare decisis simply declares that, for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which
follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
Considering the above rulings, the term of the lease in the present case is also twenty
(20) years.
Ref: https://pdfslide.net/documents/land-titles-and-deeds-case-digests-part2.html?page=7
Other Ref: http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/08/case-digest-banco-filipinosavings-and-mortgage-bank-v-hon-amalik-p-espinosa-et-al/
21.
J.R.A. Phils. Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 177127,
October 11, 2010
Doctrine:
– The absence of the word “zero rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT.
– Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a
case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent
cases involving the same issue in the same manner.
Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of
unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim
for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was
constrained to file a petition before the CTA.
The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word “zero-rated” on the
invoices/receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the invoices/receipts is
fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales
Held:
Yes. The absence of the word “zero rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a
claim for credit/refund of input VAT. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic
Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business
Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No.
178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the claim for tax credit/refund
was denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95,
which requires the word “zero rated” to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering
zero-rated sales.
From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the
word “zero-rated” on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers
from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If,
absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be
refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus,
once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve
subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner [Agencia Exquisite of
Bohol, Incorporated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 150141, 157359
and 158644, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 539, 550].
Ref: https://wrmanuel.wordpress.com/2010/10/29/cd-jra-philippines-inc-v-cir/
Other Ref: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/gr_177127_2010.html
22.
Pagcor v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction Inc., G.R. No. 177333, April 24,
2009
Facts
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No. 7903 was enacted into law, to which it conceived
the ZamboangaCity Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority the following power underSec. 7 (f)Section 7.(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary entity,or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games,amusements and recreational and sports facilities;In the exercise of its
power granted under the above provision, public respondentZAMBOECOZONE
Authority approved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of online/internet/electronicgaming/games of chance within the economic zone.Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the present petition forProhibition
which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license,or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
WoN ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate of authorizing a private
company,PEJI, to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.
Held
No. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE andDESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise
authorize and regulate the operation of any games of chance.The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly
different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses,
diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which
chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as
"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining
something of value."The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or
will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed
to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba Legis non est
recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.
Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude" games of
chance" and "gambling"does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither
does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed
the words "games of chance" and"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to
grant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Ref: https://dokumen.tips/documents/pagcor-vs-peji-digest.html
Other Ref: https://www.scribd.com/document/235247353/Pagcor-vs-Peji
23.
Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
Doctrine:
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis (Plain Meaning Rule); A cardinal rule in
statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation—there is only room for application.
Bolos vs. Bolos, 634 SCRA 429, G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
Facts:
On February 14, 1980, Cynthia and Danilo bolos got married. On July 10, 2003,
nonetheless, Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the family code. On January 16, 2007, the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City rendered judgment declaring that the marriage between
petitioner Cynthia Bolos and Respondent Danilo which was celebrated on February 14,
1980, null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
both of them with legal consequences provided by law. It was declared as final and
executory.
On the other hand, the respondent Danilo Bolos filled with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to void the orders of Regional Trial Court regarding
their marriage on the ground that the RTC rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. As a response, CA granted the petition
and reversed the case stating that “the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980, before
the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli to the effect that the “coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988.” Bolos vs. Bolos, 634 SCRA 429, G.R. No. 186400 October 20,
2010
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under
the Family Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the
word “marriages”
Ruling:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule
reads: “Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.” Therefore, the categorical
language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. Bolos vs. Bolos, 634
SCRA 429, G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
Ref: https://philawsophically.com/bolos-vs-bolos/
Other Ref: https://mylawdiaries.wordpress.com/2016/08/16/c-bolos-vs-d-bolos-digest/
24.
Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287 September 14, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee simple Lot
4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the
property of Vicente Medina (Medina)... with an area of 1,877... square meters. On 17
March 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the
heirs of Bartolome Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores Bañas, Crispino
Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela)
On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for
P60,000.00.the heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina
to inquire about it. he heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina
replied that there was already a deed of sale executed between the parties.[7] Also, the
Bañas heirs failed to tender the P60,000.00 redemption amount... to Medina.
Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997.
According to one of the Bañas heirs, Barcellano told them that he would be willing to
sell the property but for a higher price of P90,000.00.
On 24 October 1997, Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the
Regional Trial Court. However, on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn
On 11 March 1998, Dolores Bañas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action[12]
for Legal Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the
provisions of Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Bañas failed to exercise her... right
within the period provided by law.
On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bañas heirs for their
failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for
failure to file an action in court together with the consignation of the redemption... price
within the reglementary period of 30 days.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and
granted the heirs the right to redeem the subject property.
Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to
adjoining owner was no longer necessary because there was already actual notice.
Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a
written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of thirty days
within which the right of legal pre-emption may be exercised, does not start
Issues:
The person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice
Ruling:
The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written... notice to the family of
Bañas.
The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in
danger of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the
barangay, no tender of payment or no... consignation.
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c7fce?user=1696
Other Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c7fce?user=2371
25.
People vs. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
FACTS:
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel
who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court
dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the
case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and
this case was remanded for trial on the merits.
RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact
that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present
case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s
contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54
must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the
rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices
of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature
had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
Ref: https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2012/08/15/people-vs-guillermo-manantan-g-r-nol-14129-july-31-1962/
Other Ref: https://pdfcoffee.com/people-vs-manantan-pdf-free.html
26.
People v. Almuete, G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976
FACTS:
WenceslaoAlmuete, Fernando Fronda, CiprianoFronda and FaustoDurion were
charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in
the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland,
without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective
harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage. The lower held that
the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances
under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused
tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it
does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent
of their net share based on the last normal harvest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice
to the landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.
HELD:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share
tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from
defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim,
cessanterationelegis, cessatipsalex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also
ceases). applies to this case. Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared
agricultural share tenancy throughout the
country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural l
easehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform
area". The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and
pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of
Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it
abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and
pre-threshing.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to
the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be
an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as
an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant
or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest
legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to
landholder.
Ref: https://vbook.pub/documents/people-vs-almuete-case-digest-j20lqpjy692m
Other Ref: https://kupdf.net/download/statcon-digests-people-v-almuete-amp-tomawisv-balindong_5998f2a8dc0d607871300d1b_pdf
27.
Obiasca v. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010
Facts:
Herein respondent was appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, of
DepEd,Tabaco National High School in Albay by the City Schools Division
Superintendent. In the following month, she was informed that her appointment could
not be forwarded to the CivilService Commission and was advised instead to return to
her former teaching position, which she did. The new City Schools Division
Superintendent, however, appointed herein petitioner to the same position of
Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the
CSC. Upon learning this, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of theDeputy
Ombudsman. In its decision, the City Schools Division Superintendent and the school
principal was held administratively liable and was suspended for 3 months.
Respondentelevated the matter to CSC and approved her appointment and recalled the
approval of petitioner's appointment. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
CA who denied such petition for the appointment was made effective when the
respondent accepted the appointment and assumed its duties and responsibilities.
Being qualified therein, respondents already holds the office by virtue of appointment
and any other appointment to that office is null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other
responsible officials) to submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30
days from its issuance made her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Decision:
The court found out that the appointment paper of the respondent was wrongfully
not submitted by the proper persons to the CSC for attestation. The alleged failure of
respondent to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales— was not a valid reason
because the PDF was not even required for the attestation of respondent’s appointment
by the CSC. More so, that CSCresolution dated November 29, 2005 recalling
petitioner’s appointment and approving that if respondent has long become final and
executor under Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of theOmnibus Rules. Petitioner’s failure to
do this constitutes a valid waiver of her rights thereto.Substantially, Section 12, Book V
of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that all
appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within 30 days,and it being
lifted and amended, is already abandoned. Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent
appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. Petition
is denied
Ref: https://fdocuments.net/document/digested-cases-in-statutory-principles.html
Other Ref: https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/cotabato-state-university/law-of-thejungle/164592-2010-obiasca-v/28736203
28.
Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 189755 July
4, 2012
FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle
its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of
land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the
successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility
is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water
of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was
issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes,
subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the over
headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation,
petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the
respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement
for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein
the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open
space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.” The Court
used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether
the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis – states that
where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words
of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be
restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration
refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the
phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is
without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a
basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.
Ref: https://lawiqlegal.wordpress.com/2021/01/23/liwag-vs-happy-glen-loophomeowners-association-2012/
Other Ref: https://casedigests-ph.blogspot.com/2017/08/liwag-v-happy-glen-loophomeowners.html
29.
Malinias v. Comelec, G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002
FACTS:
On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for
governor and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the
COMELEC's Law Department Against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others
for their violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections
232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguezwas then the incumbent Congressman of
Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of
the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then theChief of
Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to
said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating in the canvassing of
election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way
to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, MountainProvince.
Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag Submitted their joint
Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of
checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other
pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No.2968 purposive of the maintenance of
peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also,they said that the
presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who
reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such
a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in
fact, the petitioners were among them.COMELEC’s
Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition
against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence
thereon. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC petition for review on certiorari
on this case.
ISSUE:
Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found
the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction
and duties under the law. In this case,COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of
the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari
Ref: https://pdfslide.net/documents/sario-malinias-v-comelec-gr-146943.html
Other ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cc985?user=4540
30.
Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434 March 5, 2010
Facts:
Respondents herein, daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a
District Court an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land against petitioner Tomawis,
alleging that they are the absolute owners of the lot, that petitioner assumed ownership
of the land and removed the small houses they built therein, and thereby unlawfully
deprived them of their possession of the land. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint
assailing SDC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as it is the
regular civil courts that had such jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129. Respondent judge
denied the motion asserting in his decision SDC’s original jurisdiction over the case,
concurrently with the RTC. Petitioner sought relief before the CA, but the latter
dismissed the petition. Petitioner now asserts that BP 129 as amended, vesting original
exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs/MTCs over real actions, effectively removed the
concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC.
Issue:
Whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of
title, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of RTCs or MTCs over such cases.
Ruling: YES.
The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the
elimination of the “cloud of doubts on the title of ownership” on the subject land, are
within the SDC’s jurisdiction to grant.
A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a
law of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the
provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Shari’a courts. BP 129
was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to
the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Shari’a courts.
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in
pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to
giving effect to both. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will
yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. We
must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an
exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws.
In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.
We hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Its
reliance on the provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and
unassailable.
Ref: https://thestudentandthelaw.wordpress.com/2017/12/07/tomawis-v-balindong-g-rno-182434/
Other Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cd1bb?user=4540
31.
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union, G.R. No. L-47796,
April 22, 1941
Ref: https://www.scribd.com/document/446856397/Statcon-Case-Manila-Trading-vsPhil-Labor-Union
32.
PDIC v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, G.R. No. 181556,
December 14, 2009
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)...
alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public.[1]
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course.[2]
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted
as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.[3]
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)[4] was enacted, Section 12 of which
provides:
SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance
with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge
against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the
proper court,... reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of
receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets.
PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets
and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings
The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses
P3,795,096.05;
The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this
distribution and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc.
The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99,... The write-off of liabilities
in the total amount of P1,562,185.35,... The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity
Savings and Loan Bank... to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends
allocated in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3)
years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor.
Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable
laws, rules and regulations
By Order of July 5, 2006,[6] Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except
the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer,
Issues:
whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle
Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends,
Ruling:
it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to... prevailing
jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having
been paid their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.
PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7] before which respondent Stockholders of
Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that
the proper recourse should be to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari...
since the question involved was purely one of law.[8]
By Resolution of October 17, 2007,[9] the appellate court dismissed the appeal,
sustaining in the main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008,[10] PDIC... filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cc790?user=4306
Other Ref: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2009decemberdecisions.php?id=1381
33.
Valeroso v. CA, G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of
kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily
searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist.
The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the
petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched
(without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns
on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back
inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room
exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was
issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the
necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be
reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has
merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A
person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any
weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of
the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence
that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his
immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist
arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the
room where the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental
searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon that
they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However,
the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not
incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to
court and cannot be used against him.
Ref: https://ivansalanguitcpa.wordpress.com/2015/07/19/valeroso-vs-court-of-appealsg-r-no-164815/
Other Ref: https://pdfcoffee.com/jerry-valeroso-vs-people-digested-pdf-free.html
34.
Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
The 1987 Constitution, aiming to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary
from political pressure and partisan activities, created a separate and independent body
to recommend nominees to the President called the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the composition of the JBC, that it
will be under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, the Congress would send alternate
representatives to the JBC. However, in 1994, the Congress sent two representatives –
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, each entitled to onehalf (1/2) of a vote. Then in 2000 and 2001, the JBC En banc allowed the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allow more then one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC.
RULING:
The provision of Section 8 enumerates the regular members of the JBC: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court
and a representative from the private sector; and the ex officio or special members are
the Chief Justice who will be the Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. The use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and indicates that the Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. The principle of constitutional
construction provides that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of the statute there should be no departure because they
express the objective sought to be attained and the Constitution is primarily a document
of the people.
The records of the Constitutonal Commission show that it was intended that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose as it provides a solution whenever there is a stalemate in
voting. With this reason, a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2) between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC. The
composition of the JBC intends to have a representation from the major elements of the
community. The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the
three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of
various stakeholders in the judiciary.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared that the numerical composition of
the Judicial and Bar Council other than seven is declared unconstitutional. The Judicial
and Bar Council is enjoined to reconstitute itself so that inly one (1) member of
Congress will sit as representative in its proceedings.
Ref: https://mylinecordial.wordpress.com/2016/10/13/chavez-vs-judicial-and-barcouncil-g-r-no-202242-july-17-2012/
Other Ref: https://legalvault.blogspot.com/2017/05/chavez-v-jbc-case-digest.html
35.
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent
of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The
Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to
quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not
a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation
to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not
from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP
student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the
SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27
and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of
PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of
a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her position as a board
of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her.
Ref: https://jeffsarabusing.wordpress.com/2017/05/08/case-brief-serana-vssandiganbayan/
Other Ref: http://dev2.pinayjurist.com/serana-v-sandiganbayan-g-r-no-162059-january22-2008/
36.
League of Cities v. Comelec, G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009
Facts:
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas[8] assail the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each converting... the municipality covered
thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote,
granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the
Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection... clause.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009
Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec.
4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent
voting on the... motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually
votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances
As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation
of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities,
the petitioners... bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all
cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.[26]
Issues:
whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution
and (2) the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
By constitutional design[27] and as a matter of long-established principle, the
power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.[28]
But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by... law, create, divide,
merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.
In any event, petitioners' constitutional objection would still be untenable even if
we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz:
that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other
things, the... income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise,
the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of
contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the
LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income
criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,... which merely carried out the intent of RA
9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government
Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to
discuss this exemption angle.[36]
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37] or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience,... an
absurd situation or injustice.[38] To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,[39] resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its... letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical
inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.[41]
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting
a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context
and promotes... in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we
see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in
question.
Principles:
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must
be read according to its spirit or intent,[1] for what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within its letter, and that... which is within the letter but not within the
spirit is not within the statute.[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the
letter of the... statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cc820?user=4540
Other Ref: https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2018/06/case-digest-lcp-vscomelec.html
37.
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) engaged in operating hotels /
motels / sostels / lodging business filed for Declaratory Relief against City of Manila for
enacting Ordinance No 7783 for violating their constitutional rights being confiscatory
and invading their property rights. The said Ordinance prohibits the establishment of
certain business and for those existing business forced to relocate outside ErmitaMalate or to convert their business to allowable business in the area. Judge Laguio
decided in favour of MTDC declaring the Ordinance ultra vires. Hence the appeal from
City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected?
Decision:
Petition denied and decision of lower court affirmed. A valid ordinance must not
prohibit but may regulate trade and must not be unreasonable and for the public good.
The problem is not the establishment , it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community, but the human activity that may occur within its premises. The second
option instructing owners to relocate qualifies s taking w/o just compensation. The
solution will not end the problem but only relocates it. The conversion into allowed
business is essentially destroying property w/o due process and just compensation.
Ref: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/city-of-manila-vs-judge-laguio-gr118127-12-april-2005/
Other Ref: http://lexveritatis.blogspot.com/2021/02/city-of-manila-vs-judge-laguio-grno.html
38.
Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Summary: When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish
Doctrine:
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed... to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Facts:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the
Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed...
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office
of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list
organization Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives,... In her Petition for Quo Warranto... petitioner alleged that, among
other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was... disqualified to be a nominee of the
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new
sector under Section 15... of RA No. 7941
Issues Ratio:
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
Dispositive:
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is
thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in
1987. Under this... interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held
in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound
legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent's ratiocination that
after the third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired
in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the
law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish
a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected
at least six months before the elections.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of
either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the
May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of
age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.[15] Moreover,
he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007,... public
respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC's overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector only on March 17, 2007.[16]