State Immunity State Immunity from Suit 1|Page Republic vs Purisima G.R. No. L-36084 31 August 1977 FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit? HELD: NO. The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. RATIO DECIDENDI: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to 2|Page engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance 3|Page Farolan vs CTA 217 SCRA 298 FACTS: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon reexamination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus, the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost. ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by the private respondent. HELD: Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit privaterespondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereignim munity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys im munity from suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails. 4|Page USA vs Reyes G.R. No. 79233, March 1, 1993 FACTS: Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter was already in the parking area after buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had purchasing privileges. To support the motion, the petitioners claimed that checking of purchases is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash, and equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7. Therefore, Bradford’s order to check all employee purchases was done in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG. ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. HELD: No. Under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG, “only the Chief of the Military Adviser Group and not more than six other senior members thereof designated under by him will be accorded diplomatic immunity”. The court also ruled that Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provided an exception; stating that even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform any professional or commercial activity outside his official functions. Therefore, since Bradford works as NEX-JUSMAG’s Manager, she is not among those officers granted diplomatic immunity. 5|Page Republic vs Feliciano 148 SCRA 124 FACTS: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property traced from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of Proclamation No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes. The Proclamation contained the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that the subject property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-suability of the State. ISSUE#1: Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action for recovery and possession of parcel of land? HELD#1: YES. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed. ISSUE#2: Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of State Immunity? 6|Page HELD: NO. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. 7|Page Express Consent 8|Page Sayson vs Singson 54 SCRA 282 FACTS: Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways who found overpricing in the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint in the lower court against the Auditor claiming for the payment of the balance, amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to alleged overpricing. The lower court adjudged Singson as entitled to collect the balance. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for contractual money claims against the government? HELD: NO. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity. RATIO: With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and the exhausted. 9|Page Meritt vs Government 34 Phil 344 FACTS: It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury. Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had. As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. RULING: No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. It being quite clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously recognized. That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State 10 | P a g e (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. 11 | P a g e PNB vs CIR 81 SCRA 314 FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner’s branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Are the funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation exempt from garnishment? HELD: NO. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank, was promulgated by the American Supreme Court as early as 1824, the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives the privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the incorporating act.” 12 | P a g e SSS vs CA 120 SCRA 707 FACTS: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the conditions of mortgage have been broken, SSS filed an application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney’s fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. ISSUE: Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be held liable for damages? HELD: YES. There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the forecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort. 13 | P a g e Implied Consent 14 | P a g e RP vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 85384, Feb. 28, 1990 FACTS: One of the key mandates of the PCGG is to sequester business enterprises, entities, and other properties believed to be ill-gotten wealth. One of such sequestrations were the 227 shares of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI), which shares were supposed to be owned by Roberto Benedicto. Following the sequestration of such shares, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which subsequently approved the imposition of monthly membership due to share owners amounting to P150 per share. This was later changed to P250 per share. Instead of opposing such impositions, the PCGG representatives sitting as members of the Board of Directors approved the same. Due to either sheer incompetence or collusion with other share owners, PCGG representatives virtually neglected the shares between 1987 until 1989, at which point PCGG's failure to pay the monthly membership dues now amounting to P2,959,471.00 led to the auction sale of the delinquent shares. On November 3, 1990, in Civil Case No. 0034, the PCGG entered into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto. This agreement stated that PCGG was lifting the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, implying that said shares were not ill-gotten wealth after all and that it was well within Benedicto's capacity to purchase said shares using his own money. From the time this Compromise Agreement was made, both the PCGG and Benedicto had been turning to Sandiganbayan in trying to carry out the terms of the agreement. Because PCGG did not seem intent to return the shares to him as agreed upon, Benedicto instituted actions against the Commission. In all instances, the Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Benedicto. Subsequently the PCGG filed the instant petition before the SC, contending that: (a) Sandiganbayan's directive on March 28, 1995 compelling PCGG to bring before the Clerk of Court the 227 shares registered in the name of Benedicto or in default thereof pay P150,000 per share using public money, and its ruling on March 13, 1997 denying PCGG's Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, constituted grave abuse of discretion; and (b) that PCGG is immune from any lawsuit following the principle of the non-suability of the State. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of Benedicto. Whether or not PCGG is immune from any lawsuit. 15 | P a g e HELD: 1. No, the Court ruled that all of Sandiganbayan's rulings regarding the matter were all in keeping with the Compromise Agreement that was entered into by the PCGG and Benedicto. Therefore, it cannot be faulted for simply following the terms of something that PCGG had instituted itself. As a matter of fact, the Court ruled that the two assailed rulings have firm basis in fact and in law. 2. No, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the PCGG had stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the level of its adversary. When the State enters into a contract through its officers and agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent. By entering into a contract, the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. 16 | P a g e Lim vs Brownell 107 Phil 344 FACTS: 1. 1. The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila. The lands were found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. (After the last world war) 2. Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States vesting in himself the ownership over two lots. 3. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator issued a supplemental vesting order vesting in himself title to the remaining lots. 4. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator executed two formal agreements to transfer all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation to the property transferred. 5. Benito E. Lim (administrator of his mother’s estate) filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. He alleged that the lots were once the property of Arsenia Enriquez (his mother. 6. They were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of China, that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason of alien age. 7. Benito Lim filed a claim in CFI against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (Recover the property and damages/rents over the said land) The Republic of the Philippines intervened in the suit. 8. 8. The complaint was dismissed: applying the rule that foreign state or its government cannot be sued without its consent. 17 | P a g e ISSUE: Whether or not the suit should be dismissed based on the doctrine of immunity from suit? It should not be entirely dismissed! HELD: The immunity of the state from suit cannot be invoked where the action is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy nor ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has expressly been given by the United States. (Right to sue for claims over the lands was granted by law) As to the damages: The relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has been vested by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to those expressly provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which does not include a suit for damages for the use of such vested property. Damages against the intervenor, Republic of the Philippines: Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed. This is not a case where the state takes the initiative in an action against a private party by filing a complaint in intervention, thereby surrendering its privileged position and coming down to the level of the defendant. 18 | P a g e Malong vs PNR 138 SCRA 63 FACTS: The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440. ISSUE: W/N the PNR is immune from suit? HELD: NO. Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.” The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.” The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. Notes 19 | P a g e Fontanilla vs Maliaman 194 SCRA 486 FACTS: On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration (NIA) authorities. Spouses Fontanilla instituted a civil case against respondent NIA for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the foretasted accident. ISSUE: Whether or not NIA, a government corporation, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent acts of its driver. HELD: YES. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. It is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. 20 | P a g e GOVERNMENTAL and PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DISTINGUISHED: Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be “governmental” in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a “proprietary” one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. 21 | P a g e JUSMAG vs NLRC G.R. No. 198813, Dec. 15, 1994 FACTS: Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc., a labor org. duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued bec. (1) the principle of estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employeremployee rel. (2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not JUSMAG has immunity from suit? Held: Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Phils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on air force, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an equal)As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts. 22 | P a g e A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. In this jurisdiction we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of state from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of sovereignty of equal states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal power has no power over an equal). As it now stands, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jus imperii) and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jus gestionis). 23 | P a g e Santiago vs Republic 87 SCRA 294 FACTS: In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are: that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of the contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit. HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper. 24 | P a g e Ministerio vs CFI Cebu 40 SCRA 464 FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. The respondent lower court ruled that the suit was against the government without its consent. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials. RULING: YES. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.” However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor, restoration would be “neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes.” The only relief, in the opinion of this Court, would be for the government “to make due compensation, …” It was made 25 | P a g e clear in such decision that compensation should have been made “as far back as the date of the taking.” If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. 26 | P a g e Consent to Execution 27 | P a g e Municipality of Makati vs CA 190 SCRA 206 FACTS: An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building System and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at San Antonio Village, Makati. An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to the petitioner‘s complaint was a certification that a bank account had been opened with the PNB. After the decision has become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued and a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB where the petitioner had bank accounts. However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the account of the petitioner. The petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB cocked neither be garnished nor levied upon execution for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB, one exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property with the outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other account was for the obligations and other purposes of the municipal government with a balance of P170,098,421.72. Issue Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding? Held The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus, the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose. 28 | P a g e City of Caloocan vs Allarde G.R. No. 107271 FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her backwages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the sale of motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can‘t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim. HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, 29 | P a g e remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds. 30 | P a g e Suit Against Foreign State 31 | P a g e City of Caloocan vs Allarde G.R. No. 107271 FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. ISSUE: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit. 32 | P a g e RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is dismissed. Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or absolute theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive theory, which puts conditions on when to recognize immunity. Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked. In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot 5-A were made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of Papal Nuncio. However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner decided to dispose the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as they established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the plea of immunity has been recognized by the executive department, such shall be conclusive to courts. 33 | P a g e USA vs Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales provided under the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for some projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. But the United States inform the company that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay and that the projects had been awarded to third parties. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the US naval base can invoke the state immunity. HELD: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. 34 | P a g e The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 35 | P a g e Republic of Indonesia vs Vinson G.R. No. 154705 FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years. The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement. HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. 36 | P a g e Liang vs People G.R. No. 125865 FACTS: Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement. ISSUE: Whether Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement. RULING: No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in “official capacity”. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 37 | P a g e GOVERNMENT Definition, Distinguished from Administration 38 | P a g e US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332 G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903 FACTS: 1. 2. 3. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission. The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06 April 1902 as an editorial issue. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity). The following are part of the article: “…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.” “The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character”. “it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”. 4. 5. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil. Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands is administered”? ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292 for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the Phil. Island? 39 | P a g e RULING: 1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the government is the aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration)”. 2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration. 3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil. Islands” is the government as a system, however, the article in questions attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run it. 4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men who are entrusted with the administration of the government which the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292. Respondents are acquitted. ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being. 40 | P a g e People vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 145951, 2003-08-12 Facts: Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25741. The Information alleged that respondents misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On November 12, 1999, respondent Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by respondents Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on January 6,2000. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on May 12, 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained respondents' contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741.Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the instant special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: I Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the resolution dated May 9, 2000 insofar as it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. II Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction in denying prosecution's motion for reconsideration dated June 1, 2000, supplemental motion for reconsideration dated July 10, 2000 and second supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 12, 2000. Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which dismissed Criminal Case No. 25741 was a final order which finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of said Rule 45 explicitly provides: 41 | P a g e Filing of petition with Supreme Court A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. xxx xxx xxx. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issues: Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are public or private. Rulings: The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity on its findings that the Government does not provide counterpart contribution to the System; that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive any salary from the Government and are not covered by the salary standardization law; that their remittances and contributions were made to the Social Security System and not to the Government Service Insurance System; and that the contribution to the System of the sum of P200,000,000.00 under Presidential Decree 361 cannot be deemed as equity of the government in the System but rather, a donation or "seed money" which was never increased thereafter. Generally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on us. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. 42 | P a g e Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. Indeed, the clear import of the above-quoted provision is that, while it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 2000 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 25741 is ordered REINSTATED, and the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resume proceedings thereon with dispatch. 43 | P a g e ACCFA vs CUGCO 30 SCRA 649 Facts: 1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA. 2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days later, the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal to bargain. 3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA. Issue: W/N ACA is a government entity? Ruling: YES. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of 44 | P a g e standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their welldefined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic forces. 45 | P a g e Valmonte v. Belmonte 170 SCRA 256 (1989) Facts: Atty. Ricardo Valmonte and his co-pettioners wrote a letter to GSIS General Manager Feliciano Belmonte requesting the list of opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. They invoked the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall and access to official records shall be afforded. In reply, GSIS answered in negative, that it has a duty to its customers to preserve confidentiality and that it would not be proper for GSIS to breach the same unless so ordered by the courts. Accordingly, Valmonte, et. al filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to the list of the names and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Issue: Whether or not Valmonte, et. al may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa. Ruling: Yes. The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the government. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. The constitutional right to information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public concern” and that the same is not exempted by law from the operation of such constitutional right. 46 | P a g e The information sought by herein petitioners as to the truth of reports that some opposition members were granted “clean loans” by the GSIS is a matter of public interest and concern. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity “to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System” [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146. Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS “is not supposed to grant ‘clean loans’.” It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, it cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. It may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to have been violated. In this case, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to fprivacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature. 47 | P a g e In re: Bermudez October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180 Facts: Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify exactly who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992." Issue: Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino? Held: Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons: petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC; petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue; although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her incumbency; it should be fairly obvious mutatis mutandis, there should be no question that the aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and all eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her government; and the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective control of the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one that exercises power as if legally constituted even though it is not formally recognized. De jure means "by right" or something that is based on laws or actions of the State. 48 | P a g e Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Facts: Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines. Issues: I. II. III. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces Ruling: I YES. All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. 49 | P a g e II No. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. [I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. [T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907. III AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. [I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit. 50 | P a g e SEPARATION OF POWERS Principle of Checks and Balances 51 | P a g e Bowsher v. Synar 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) Brief Fact Summary. To offset rising government budget deficits, Congress passed the GrammRudman-Holings Act (the Act), which gave the Comptroller General authority to mandate spending reductions if certain estimated target deficits were exceeded. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot reserve for itself power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. FACTS: Concerned about the size of the federal budget deficit, Congress passed the Act. The Act established maximum allowable deficit amounts (“targets”) for each year beginning in 1986. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was required to estimate the budget deficit for each year. If the deficit was ever estimated to exceed the target, the CBO was to calculate the budget reductions necessary to meet the target. Thereupon, the Comptroller General was obligated to mandate spending reductions giving “due regard” to the CBO’s estimates, but also exercising his own independent judgment. The Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative of Congress. ISSUE: Did the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Act violate the separation of powers doctrine? HELD: Yes. The judgment and order of the District Court are affirmed. Under the statute, the Comptroller must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. The Comptroller’s duties are not merely “ministerial and mechanical.” Interpreting a law to implement legislative mandate is the very essence of “execution” of the law. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would essentially reserve in Congress control over the execution of laws. Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control powers it does not itself have. Otherwise, Congress could remove or threaten to remove an officer for executing laws in a way contrary to what Congress desires. Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Act is unconstitutional because the Comptroller General must be characterized as an agent of Congress. Therefore, it must follow the procedures mandated in Article One of the United States Constitution (Constitution) regarding lawmaking. 52 | P a g e DISSENT: Justice Byron White (J. White) wrote that under the Budget and Accounting Act, Congress may remove the Comptroller only through a joint resolution, which by definition must be passed by both Houses and signed by the president. Therefore, removal under the statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. DISCUSSION. The problem with the position of the Comptroller General in this case lay in the total mix of features characterizing the official. For example, if an official were characterized by all of the same features of the Comptroller General here except the power of discretion in mandating spending limits, the position would have arguably been permissible. Or, with all other characteristics of the official being the same, Congress was not allowed to participate in the removal of the Comptroller General, the position arguably would have been permissible. 53 | P a g e Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952) Brief Fact Summary. In 1952, after the employees of steel companies threatened to strike, the President of the United States Harry Truman (President Truman) ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the Nation’s steel companies. The steel companies sued. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must stem from an act of Congress or the United States Constitution (Constitution). FACTS: In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United States steel companies and their employees. In 1952, the employee’s union gave notice of a nationwide strike. Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would jeopardize our national defense, President Truman issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying the orders under protest, the steel companies brought suit in District Court. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order against the government, which the Court of Appeals stayed. ISSUE: Did President Truman have the authority to order the seizure of the steel mills? HELD: No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred upon President Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President the authority to take possession of property as he did. DISSENT: Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) argued that we must consider the context in which the President’s powers were exercised – a national exigency. The President’s power to seize the steel mills derives from his duty to executive legislative programs the success of which depends upon the continued production of steel. CONCURRENCE: Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) stated that Congress could not have more emphatically expressed its will that the executive seizure was not authorized than it did in the Taft Hartley Act of 1947. 54 | P a g e Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) said that when the President takes actions inconsistent with the will of Congress, his powers are at their lowest level. Then, he can only rely on his own constitutional powers minus any powers given to Congress on the same matter. (Justice Douglas) The branch of government with the power to pay for a seizure is the only one that can authorize one -Congress. If we authorized the President’s act, we would be expanding his powers under Article Two. DISCUSSION. This case calls into question the extent and the source(s) of the emergency powers of the President, if any, under the Constitution. 55 | P a g e Senate v. Ermita G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. HELD: 1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation is one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. 2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of its issuance before it was implemented. 56 | P a g e Doctrine: Executive Privilege exempts the executive from disclosure requirements where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations. The varieties of Executive Privilege are: (1) State secrets privilege- invoked by ( U.S.) Presidents on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. [military or diplomatic info]; (2) Informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Govt not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. [whistleblowers]; (3)Generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Varieties of Executive Privilege State secrets privilege- invoked by U.S. Presidents on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to Intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Determining the validity of a claim of privilege That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere 57 | P a g e fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Dispositive: Petitions are Partly Granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID. Other Notes: Executive privilege protects information/categories of information not persons o Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials o Executive privilege must be clearly asserted it being a claim of exemption from obligation to disclose information Who may invoke: President or authorized representative; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. No implied claim of executive privilege o For claim of privilege to be valid, person invoking must identify the ground for such claim o Blanket claim not allowed 2 powers of Congress: a) Question hour – may only request their appearance b) Inquiry in aid of legislation – appearance is mandatory NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS Emergency Powers to the President 58 | P a g e Philippine Interisland Shipping Association Of Philippines V. CA GR No. 100481, 1997-01-22 FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines. On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA. However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation; that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its... implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986. Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the... fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and that consequently E.O. No. 1088 had ceased to be effective. Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a decision[5] holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under obligation to comply with E.O. No. 1088 because the order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal. The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. The petition was filed in this Court which later referred the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division[6] of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. 59 | P a g e ISSUES: 1. Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and Petitioners are Bound to Obey it. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the Appeal of Intervenors from the Decision of the Trial Court Invalidating Administrative Order No. 02-88 of the PPA. 3. Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and Decide the Contempt Charges... against Petitioners. RULING: For issue no. 1 The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed... by it through the imposition of uniform rates. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. For issue no. 2 Both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court. In G.R. No. 100109, the government's petition was dismissed for lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The... dismissal of the government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481 for the review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those stated... in the government's petition. It is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the merits of a controversy.[16] Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of... the Court of Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct. For issue no. 3 60 | P a g e The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the trial... court.[20] Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts. The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in G.R. No. 100109, petitioners rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction as... embodied in its decision would be properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents' complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful processes of a... court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the court. We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose. PRINCIPLES: The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. 61 | P a g e Potestas delagata non delegare potest People vs Vera UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW PEOPLE VS VERAG.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAIBANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge. of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CUUNJIENG, respondents. FACTS: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power 2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws DISCUSSIONS: 1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any 62 | P a g e standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality, leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. 2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. RULINGS: 1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. 2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsels for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. 63 | P a g e This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. For the PURPOSE OF PROBATION ACT, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. 64 | P a g e Emergency Powers to the President Rodriguez v Gella G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 Paras, C.J.: FACTS: 1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. 2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1." 3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative NO. 1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. 2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision; it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed 65 | P a g e by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. 3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise, he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations. 4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict. 5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution. SUMMARY: The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution. 66 | P a g e Araneta v. Dinglasan (G.R. No. L-2044) August 26, 1949 | 84 Phil. 368 FACTS: This case is a consolidation of multiple petitions challenging the validity of various executive orders issued pursuant to the President's emergency powers as outlined in Commonweath Act No. 671. The said CA was enacted during a special session by the National Assembly when it became apparent that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session on January 1, 1942 due to air attacks during WWII. Although the President's emergency powers were supposed to be for a limited period only, CA 671 did not indicate a specific date when such powers would end. The assailed executive orders included the following: EO 62, which regulated rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings; EO 192, which aimed to control exports in the Philippines; EO 225, which appropriated funds for the operation of the GRP from July 1949 to July 1950; and EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the November 1949 elections. Petitioners argued that the abovementioned EOs enacted pursuant to CA 671 were invalid because the latter had ceased to have any force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671, otherwise known as the Emergency Powers Act, has ceased to have any force and effect upon the resumption/opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. HELD: Yes, the Court held that CA 671 ended ex propio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Section 26, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution states that "in times of war or national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period x x x to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is to be presumed CA 671 was promulgated with this limitation in view. In fact, Section 4 of CA 671 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." 67 | P a g e There being no definitive expiration period, the Court held that the session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act. And since all the assailed EOs were enacted after May 25, 1946, the Court held they are void. 68 | P a g e Power of Subordinate Legislation 69 | P a g e Miners Association v. Factoran 240 SCRA 100 Facts: Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989 which provides that "all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines." In petitioners’ petition for certiorari, they contended that the Secretary of DENR excess his rule-making power because said orders are violated to the non-impairment of contract under Art. III, Sec. 10 of 1987 Phil. Constitution. Issue: Whether or not Administrative Orders Nos. 57 & 82 of DENR Secretary are valid. Held: Yes. There is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. 70 | P a g e The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: “Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law. they are valid.” Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 71 | P a g e Lagman vs Senator Pementel (G.R. No. 235935) February 13, 2018 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same. On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017. In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.” On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other likeminded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao.” 72 | P a g e Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. ISSUE: PROCEDURAL: 1. Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. 2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. 3. Whether or not the Congress the consolidated petitions. 4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. 5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. 6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. 7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 8. Whether or not the President and the Congress factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. was an indispensable had party to sufficient 9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. 10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. 73 | P a g e HELD: FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. NO. The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative department without the introduction of evidence. Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated Comment. SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES. The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit. The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit: It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress the consolidated petitions. YES. was an indispensable party to The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto. The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these cases. 74 | P a g e FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. NO. The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar. Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required. The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial law. The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial law. Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of martial law. FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO. The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. 75 | P a g e Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW Congressional check on martial law Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists of: 1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President. 2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it. Joint executive and legislative act When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between the President and the Congress. SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO. The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution. Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It 76 | P a g e should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short. SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are 1. that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; 2. that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and 3. that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.” Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension. EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES. 77 | P a g e Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah. Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao. Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public. The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.” The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its reliability. 78 | P a g e The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4. NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO. The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised. TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO. By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’ gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military forces”. The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his martial law powers and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed uprising or struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, 79 | P a g e petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ. This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof. Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers. As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action. Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring parties. 80 | P a g e Delegation to the Administrative Bodies Test for Valid Delegation Sufficient Standard Test 81 | P a g e Ynot vs IAC G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 Facts: EO 626 was enacted prohibiting the INTERPROVINCIAL MOVEMENT OF CARABAOS. Those found violating the law shall be subject to confiscation and FORFEITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT. The law further provides that the confiscated beef shall be distributed to CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, and OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS AS THE CHAIRMAN of the NMIC may see fit. Ynot was found to have violated the law, transporting 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. Ynot assails the constitutionality of EO 626, claiming that there is undue delegation of legislative powers to the chairman of the NMIC, with respect to the MANNER OF DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED BEEF. Ynot argues that the term, “as may see fit” is extremely generous and dangerous, and with an opportunity for partiality and abuse. Issue: Whether the phrase “as may see fit” is a sufficient standard. Ruling: LAW INVALID. NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD. There are no limitations or reasonable guidelines which said officers of the NMIC must observe when they make their distribution or disposition of the confiscated beef. There is invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers who are granted UNLIMITED DISCRETION in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of the beef and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answers, and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, in the own executive discretion. Definitely there is here a roving commission, a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within the banks that keep it from overflowing. In short, a CLEARLY PROFILGATE AND INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. 82 | P a g e We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. 83 | P a g e De la Llana vs Alba GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982 Facts: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Issue: Whether or not the reorganization violates the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution. Ruling: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Delegation to President of power to fix salary of new judges valid there being a clear standard laid down by legislature. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation 84 | P a g e and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: “Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.” The existence of a standard is thus clear. 85 | P a g e Legislative Standard Need Not Expressed 86 | P a g e Hirabayashi v. United States 320 US 81 Facts: In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order. Issue: Did the President's executive order and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment? Ruling: The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individual of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned those restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry." 87 | P a g e Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253 Facts: Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao. Only four provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (Lanao Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi Tawi) The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should remain as they are. Issues: I. Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION. II. Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Cory’s discretion. Defense: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER TO FILL IN THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory. Ruling: SC: LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT. While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus, there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS. 88 | P a g e As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is “to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socioeconomic development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business.” Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions. 89 | P a g e