State Immunity
State Immunity from Suit
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Republic vs Purisima
G.R. No. L-36084
31 August 1977
FACTS:
The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of
the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated
doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from
suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of
respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged
breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc.
ISSUE:
Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball
Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?
HELD:
NO.
The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute,
not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn
Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the
contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of
a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.
The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a
duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his
authority.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found
in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without
its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even
prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the
positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of
any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such
a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise
to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to
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engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance
to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability.
Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek
collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the
Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence
Washington Insurance
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Farolan vs CTA
217 SCRA 298
FACTS:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at
the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to
Baging BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff
Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong
Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00. The Office
of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon
hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of
nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon reexamination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and
value as previously declared. Thus, the Collector of Customs forfeited the
shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on
August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied.
On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay
after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent
claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good
condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands that
the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards
actually lost by the private respondent.
HELD:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit
privaterespondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereignim
munity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay
for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the
government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into
a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its
consent,”
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without
any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys im
munity from suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with
an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of
Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is
defined not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondents claim for damages
against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.
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USA vs Reyes
G.R. No. 79233, March 1, 1993
FACTS:
Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at
the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine
Bradford, also an American citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG
Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to the oppressive and
discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store
manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22,
1987 when Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter
was already in the parking area after buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail
store, where she had purchasing privileges. To support the motion, the
petitioners claimed that checking of purchases is a routine procedure observed
at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash, and
equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST.
5500.1. 7. Therefore, Bradford’s order to check all employee purchases was
done in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
No. Under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the
JUSMAG, “only the Chief of the Military Adviser Group and not more than six
other senior members thereof designated under by him will be accorded
diplomatic immunity”. The court also ruled that Art. 31 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provided an exception; stating that even
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform any
professional or commercial activity outside his official functions. Therefore,
since Bradford works as NEX-JUSMAG’s Manager, she is not among those
officers granted diplomatic immunity.
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Republic vs Feliciano
148 SCRA 124
FACTS:
Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The
claim of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property
traced from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of
Proclamation No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes. The
Proclamation contained the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any
there be. “Feliciano asserts that the subject property must be excluded from the
coverage of the resettlement project. The trial court dismissed the case on the
ground of non-suability of the State.
ISSUE#1:
Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action for
recovery and possession of parcel of land?
HELD#1:
YES.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the
State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece
of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an
action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties,
and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed
by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit
against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails
to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis
alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
ISSUE#2:
Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of State
Immunity?
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HELD:
NO.
No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The
exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by
Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the
State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not
be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made
by an act of the legislative body.
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Express Consent
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Sayson vs Singson
54 SCRA 282
FACTS:
Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways
who found overpricing in the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8
bulldozer. Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint
in the lower court against the Auditor claiming for the payment of the balance,
amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to alleged overpricing. The lower
court adjudged Singson as entitled to collect the balance. Hence this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for
contractual money claims against the government?
HELD:
NO.
Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to
approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot
prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In
other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe
the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed.
It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing
to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain
administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in
the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by
the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had
there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is
this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have
the imprint of validity.
RATIO:
With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the
appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary
of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured,
an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such
statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had
and the exhausted.
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Meritt vs Government
34 Phil 344
FACTS:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the
plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was
so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back
part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely
unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury. Upon recovery
the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a
half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the
collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up
contracts he recently had. As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once
arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that
authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the
Attorney- General to appear in said suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
RULING:
No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. It being quite clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government’s liability to any cause not previously recognized.
That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case,
the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing
the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State
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(GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself
legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called
upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.
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PNB vs CIR
81 SCRA 314
FACTS:
What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner’s branch in Quezon City, to satisfy
a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously
been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity
of the order assailed is challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the
garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to quash,
petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to
abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Are the funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation exempt from
garnishment?
HELD:
NO.
The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be
accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was
a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt
from garnishment.
It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United States v.
Planters’ Bank, was promulgated by the American Supreme Court as early as
1824, the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was
pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns
the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of
a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its
prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and
takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which
is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an interest in
banks, are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the
corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the
capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character,
so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives the privileges of that
character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its
sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the
management of the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the
incorporating act.”
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SSS vs CA
120 SCRA 707
FACTS:
Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted
a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street,
Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the conditions of mortgage have been
broken, SSS filed an application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney’s fees
against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their
monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
ISSUE:
Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be held liable for damages?
HELD:
YES.
There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical
entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and
distinct from the Government. SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in Court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil
process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it
claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental
functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the forecited enabling law, the
Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS,
although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given
to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights.
The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs
governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor.
For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising
from contract and even for tort.
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Implied Consent
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RP vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 85384, Feb. 28, 1990
FACTS:
One of the key mandates of the PCGG is to sequester business enterprises,
entities, and other properties believed to be ill-gotten wealth. One of such
sequestrations were the 227 shares of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country
Club, Inc. (NOGCCI), which shares were supposed to be owned by Roberto
Benedicto. Following the sequestration of such shares, PCGG representatives
sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which subsequently
approved the imposition of monthly membership due to share owners
amounting to P150 per share. This was later changed to P250 per share.
Instead of opposing such impositions, the PCGG representatives sitting as
members of the Board of Directors approved the same. Due to either sheer
incompetence or collusion with other share owners, PCGG representatives
virtually neglected the shares between 1987 until 1989, at which point PCGG's
failure to pay the monthly membership dues now amounting to P2,959,471.00
led to the auction sale of the delinquent shares.
On November 3, 1990, in Civil Case No. 0034, the PCGG entered into a
Compromise Agreement with Benedicto. This agreement stated that PCGG was
lifting the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, implying that said shares
were not ill-gotten wealth after all and that it was well within Benedicto's
capacity to purchase said shares using his own money.
From the time this Compromise Agreement was made, both the PCGG and
Benedicto had been turning to Sandiganbayan in trying to carry out the terms
of the agreement. Because PCGG did not seem intent to return the shares to
him as agreed upon, Benedicto instituted actions against the Commission. In
all instances, the Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Benedicto.
Subsequently the PCGG filed the instant petition before the SC, contending
that: (a) Sandiganbayan's directive on March 28, 1995 compelling PCGG to
bring before the Clerk of Court the 227 shares registered in the name of
Benedicto or in default thereof pay P150,000 per share using public money, and
its ruling on March 13, 1997 denying PCGG's Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration, constituted grave abuse of discretion; and (b) that PCGG is
immune from any lawsuit following the principle of the non-suability of the
State.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling in favor of Benedicto.
Whether or not PCGG is immune from any lawsuit.
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HELD:
1. No, the Court ruled that all of Sandiganbayan's rulings regarding the matter
were all in keeping with the Compromise Agreement that was entered into by
the PCGG and Benedicto. Therefore, it cannot be faulted for simply following the
terms of something that PCGG had instituted itself. As a matter of fact, the
Court ruled that the two assailed rulings have firm basis in fact and in law.
2. No, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the PCGG had
stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the level of its
adversary. When the State enters into a contract through its officers and agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express
consent. By entering into a contract, the sovereign descends to the level of the
citizen.
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Lim vs Brownell
107 Phil 344
FACTS:
1.
1.
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated
in Tondo, City of Manila. The lands were found by the Alien Property
Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan.
(After the last world war)
2.
Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of
the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States vesting in himself
the ownership over two lots.
3.
The Philippine Alien Property Administrator issued a supplemental
vesting order vesting in himself title to the remaining lots.
4.
The Philippine Alien
Property Administrator executed
two formal
agreements to transfer all the said four lots to the Republic of the
Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United
States for all claims in relation to the property transferred.
5.
Benito E. Lim (administrator of his mother’s estate) filed a formal notice
of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator. He alleged that the lots were once the property of Arsenia
Enriquez (his mother.
6.
They were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of China, that
the mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means
of threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez
from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa never
acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under
the Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason
of alien age.
7.
Benito
Lim filed
a claim
in CFI
against the
Philippine Alien
Property Administrator (Recover the property and damages/rents over
the said land) The Republic of the Philippines intervened in the suit.
8.
8. The complaint was dismissed: applying the rule that foreign state
or its government cannot be sued without its consent.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the suit should be dismissed based on the doctrine of
immunity from suit? It should not be entirely dismissed!
HELD:
The immunity of the state from suit cannot be invoked where the action is
instituted by a person who is neither an enemy nor ally of an enemy for the
purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of
recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit
has expressly been given by the United States. (Right to sue for claims over
the lands was granted by law)
As to the damages:
The relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has been vested
by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to those expressly
provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which does not include a suit
for damages for the use of such vested property.
Damages against the intervenor, Republic of the Philippines:
Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect,
waived its right of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic
intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of
the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no
affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed.
This is not a case where the state takes the initiative in an action against a
private party by filing a complaint in intervention, thereby surrendering its
privileged position and coming down to the level of the defendant.
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Malong vs PNR
138 SCRA 63
FACTS:
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30,
1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from
a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was
overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints
Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages
totaling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had
no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action
was a suit against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No.
5440.
ISSUE:
W/N the PNR is immune from suit?
HELD:
NO.

Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No.
4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No.
741, it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when
it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not
remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code
on common carriers.

However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government
entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits.
Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for
which the entity was organized.”

The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in
a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.”
The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National
Railways. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of
the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private
common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that
private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. Notes 
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Fontanilla vs Maliaman
194 SCRA 486
FACTS:
On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing
Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,
son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along
the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and
Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan
Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent
after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
authorities.
Spouses Fontanilla instituted a civil case against respondent NIA for damages
in connection with the death of their son resulting from the foretasted accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NIA, a government corporation, be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent acts of its driver.
HELD:
YES. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. It is
a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of
the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting
from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of
negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the
negligence of supervision.
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GOVERNMENTAL
and
PROPRIETARY
FUNCTIONS
DISTINGUISHED:
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed to be “governmental” in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a
service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
“proprietary” one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.
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JUSMAG vs NLRC
G.R. No. 198813, Dec. 15, 1994
FACTS:
Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74security assistance
support personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance
Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from
1969-1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent
Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc., a labor org. duly
registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due to the
abolition of his position. Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground
that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He
asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity
from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of
jurisdiction". Sacramento appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the
labor arbiter and held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued bec. (1)
the principle of estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employeremployee rel. (2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it
hired the services of private respondent. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not JUSMAG has immunity from suit?
Held:
Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing
a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military
Assistance Agreement between the Phils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air,
Naval and Army group and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils.
on air force, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one against the
United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the
latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.
Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of
international law that the Phils. recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the
land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its
organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the
principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habeat
imperium (an equal has no power over an equal)As it stands now, the
application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private
and proprietary acts.
22 | P a g e
A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government and in the
absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot prosper.
In this jurisdiction we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of state from suit is
one of these universally recognized principles. In international law immunity is
commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the
judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of
sovereignty of equal states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over
another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal
power has no power over an equal).
As it now stands, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jus imperii) and does not
extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jus gestionis).
23 | P a g e
Santiago vs Republic
87 SCRA 294
FACTS:
In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of
Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are: that the Bureau should construct
a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by December
7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot.
However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted
Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of the contract of donation.
The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
HELD:
No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by
virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a
beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the
Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying
with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court
and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical
and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.
24 | P a g e
Ministerio vs CFI Cebu
40 SCRA 464
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927 the National Government
through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of
it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu
City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either
written or verbal.
The respondent lower court ruled that the suit was against the government
without its consent. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner
of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there
is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It may
be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General and not against the National
Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their official
capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have
been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials.
RULING:
YES. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff.
As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications v. Aligean: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights,
is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against
a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.”
However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, this Court speaking through Justice
Montemayor, restoration would be “neither convenient nor feasible because it is
now and has been used for road purposes.” The only relief, in the opinion of this
Court, would be for the government “to make due compensation, …” It was made
25 | P a g e
clear in such decision that compensation should have been made “as far back
as the date of the taking.”
If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there
was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to
benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms
on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too
much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which
is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.
26 | P a g e
Consent to Execution
27 | P a g e
Municipality of Makati vs CA
190 SCRA 206
FACTS:
An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati
against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., Home
Building System and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo involving a parcel of land
and improvements thereon located at San Antonio Village, Makati.
An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to the petitioner‘s complaint
was a certification that a bank account had been opened with the PNB. After
the decision has become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued and
a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB where the
petitioner had bank accounts. However, the sheriff was informed that a hold
code was placed on the account of the petitioner.
The petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB cocked neither be garnished
nor levied upon execution for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law.
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for the first time that
it has actually two accounts with the PNB, one exclusively for the expropriation
of the subject property with the outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other
account was for the obligations and other purposes of the municipal government
with a balance of P170,098,421.72.
Issue
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding?
Held
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts
with PNB. Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and
account B is primarily intended for financing governmental functions and
activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the
remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful
to get the remaining balance from Account B without an ordinance
appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose.
Thus, the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The
respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay
its remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.
28 | P a g e
City of Caloocan vs Allarde
G.R. No. 107271
FACTS:
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant
City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected
employees assailed the legality of the abolition.
The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all
the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other
emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was
dismissed.
In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her backwages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her
unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release
the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not
entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at
public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.
The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity
of the sale of motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from
execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and
schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles.
On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages,
plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the
check but the City Treasurer can‘t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the
check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that
it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the
withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e.
exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim.
HELD:
Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the
plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of
a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the
defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited
in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any
of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,
29 | P a g e
remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the
absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the
rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been
judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to
pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will
recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined
exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by
law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for
Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the
exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against
such funds.
30 | P a g e
Suit Against Foreign State
31 | P a g e
City of Caloocan vs Allarde
G.R. No. 107271
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private
respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name
of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name
of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to
private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed
by private respondent.
The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated
the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign
immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.
32 | P a g e
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the
petitioner is dismissed.
Reason:
Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or
absolute theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts
of another sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive theory, which puts
conditions on when to recognize immunity.
Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental
functions) . If the act is private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit),
then immunity cannot be invoked. In this case, the petitioner had denied that
the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot 5-A were made for profit. It
claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature
in the Philippines.
The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for
the purpose of building official residence of Papal Nuncio. However, when the
informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner decided to dispose
the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as they
established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege of sovereign
immunity of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all
rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the
country. When the plea of immunity has been recognized by the executive
department, such shall be conclusive to courts.
33 | P a g e
USA vs Ruiz
136 SCRA 487
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales provided
under the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
some projects.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
But the United States inform the company that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of
the U.S.
Naval Station in Subic Bay and that the projects had been awarded to third
parties. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only
of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint
being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant
United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent
to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the US naval base can invoke the state immunity.
HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver.
This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
34 | P a g e
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
35 | P a g e
Republic of Indonesia vs Vinson
G.R. No. 154705
FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water
motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement.
The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim
that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign
immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that
petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
provision in the Maintenance Agreement.
HELD:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or
juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that
the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may
enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings
and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit
of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the
discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.
36 | P a g e
Liang vs People
G.R. No. 125865
FACTS:
Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker
Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country.
As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement.
RULING:
No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and
staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from legal
process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the acts was done in “official capacity”. Slandering a person is not covered
by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
37 | P a g e
GOVERNMENT
Definition, Distinguished from
Administration
38 | P a g e
US vs Dorr
2 Phil 332
G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of
writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the
Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.
The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06
April 1902 as an editorial issue.
The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for
brevity).
The following are part of the article:
“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a
protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind
of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating
insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during struggle, at
the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”
“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who
are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal
character”.
“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the
Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.
4.
5.
Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense
against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the
policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as
having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called
disaffection or a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law
and institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by
whom the government of the Islands is administered”?
ISSUE:
Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292
for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the
Phil. Island?
39 | P a g e
RULING:
1.
In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the government is the
aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration)”.
2.
On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is
used in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the
existing political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines
that it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292)
under consideration.
3.
Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the
Phil. Islands” is the government as a system, however, the article in
questions attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials
who run it.
4.
The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon
the governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S.
is enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of
men who are entrusted with the administration of the government
which the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public
integrity, and private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The
publication does not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent
to be in violation of Art. 292.
Respondents are acquitted.
ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being.
40 | P a g e
People vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 145951, 2003-08-12
Facts:
Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito,
Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 25741. The Information alleged that respondents misappropriated and
converted for their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00 from the funds
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS).
On November 12, 1999, respondent Ramiscal filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest."
He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion
was later adopted by respondents Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on January 6,2000.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued
on May 12, 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained respondents' contention that
the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741.Upon denial of its Motion
for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the resolution dated May 9, 2000 insofar as it
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II
Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of excess of jurisdiction in denying prosecution's motion for reconsideration
dated June 1, 2000, supplemental motion for reconsideration dated July 10,
2000 and second supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 12, 2000.
Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
dismissed Criminal Case No. 25741 was a final order which finally
disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of said Rule
45 explicitly provides:
41 | P a g e
Filing of petition with Supreme Court A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
xxx xxx xxx.
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Issues:
Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled
corporation or a private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are
public or private.
Rulings:
The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that the AFP-RSBS is a private
entity on its findings that the Government does not provide counterpart
contribution to the System; that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive
any salary from the Government and are not covered by the salary
standardization law; that their remittances and contributions were made to the
Social Security System and not to the Government Service Insurance System;
and that the contribution to the System of the sum of P200,000,000.00 under
Presidential Decree 361 cannot be deemed as equity of the government in the
System but rather, a donation or "seed money" which was never increased
thereafter.
Generally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on us.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as where: (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact
of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted
by evidence on record.
The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose
and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military
service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of
1997.
42 | P a g e
Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally
employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for
their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Moreover, the investment of
funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense.
Indeed, the clear import of the above-quoted provision is that, while it may be
true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the
AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds
in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above
considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are
imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government
entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 2000
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 25741 is ordered
REINSTATED, and the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resume proceedings
thereon with dispatch.
43 | P a g e
ACCFA vs CUGCO
30 SCRA 649
Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA
Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association
(AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors
and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA.
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days later,
the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint
against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor
practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of
promotions and refusal to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending,
RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA
and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA.
While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed
which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.
Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the
appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
Issue: W/N ACA is a government entity?
Ruling:
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was
enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry
out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform
program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality.
It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from
the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares
that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and
programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA,
but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;
and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
44 | P a g e
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as
to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered
this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic,
not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their welldefined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course
this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA
under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land
Reform Program of the government is a governmental function NOT a
proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately
with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However,
the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of
the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and
governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are
absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and
move towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
45 | P a g e
Valmonte v. Belmonte
170 SCRA 256 (1989)
Facts:
Atty. Ricardo Valmonte and his co-pettioners wrote a letter to GSIS
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte requesting the list of opposition members
of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guarranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. They invoked the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall and access to official records
shall be afforded. In reply, GSIS answered in negative, that it has a duty to its
customers to preserve confidentiality and that it would not be proper for GSIS
to breach the same unless so ordered by the courts. Accordingly, Valmonte, et.
al filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to the list of
the names and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners
access to the public records for the subject information.
Issue:
Whether or not Valmonte, et. al may access GSIS records pertaining to
behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the
opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.
Ruling:
Yes.
The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the
government. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful
right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to
information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by
the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government.
The constitutional right to information is not an absolute right, hence,
before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of
“public interest” or “public concern” and that the same is not exempted by law
from the operation of such constitutional right.
46 | P a g e
The information sought by herein petitioners as to the truth of reports
that some opposition members were granted “clean loans” by the GSIS is a
matter of public interest and concern.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit
of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS
law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity “to preserve at all times the
actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System” [Second Whereas
Clause, P.D. No. 1146. Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS
“is not supposed to grant ‘clean loans’.” It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view
of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, it
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. It may be invoked only by
the person whose privacy is claimed to have been violated. In this case, neither
can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to
fprivacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.
47 | P a g e
In re: Bermudez
October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180
Facts:
Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same
Court to clarify exactly who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision reads in part: "The six-year term of
the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992."
Issue:
Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to
elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino?
Held:
Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following
reasons:





petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
SC;
petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to
a suit against incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is immune
from suits during her incumbency;
it should be fairly obvious mutatis mutandis, there should be no
question that the aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President
Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel.
The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other
nations, and all eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the land under her government; and the
people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one
in effective control of the country, such that it is not merely a de
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one
that exercises power as if legally constituted even though it is not formally
recognized. De jure means "by right" or something that is based on laws or actions
of the State.
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Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil 113
Facts:
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation
with the CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that
a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines.
Issues:
I.
II.
III.
Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American
occupation.
Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the
American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation.
Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to
continue now the proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the
time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the
American and Filipino forces
Ruling:
I
YES. All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive
Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation
of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
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II
No. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not
only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well
as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention
of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other
government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of
said principles of international law.
[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates
or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during
the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of
the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation, it is
to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent
or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to
act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court
of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions
of 1907.
III
AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take
the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in
practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially
as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with
the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels
the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity
will permit.
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
Principle of Checks and Balances
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Bowsher v. Synar
478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986)
Brief Fact Summary.
To offset rising government budget deficits, Congress passed the GrammRudman-Holings Act (the Act), which gave the Comptroller General authority
to mandate spending reductions if certain estimated target deficits were
exceeded.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Congress cannot reserve for itself power of removal of an officer charged with
the execution of the laws except by impeachment.
FACTS:
Concerned about the size of the federal budget deficit, Congress passed
the Act. The Act established maximum allowable deficit amounts (“targets”) for
each year beginning in 1986. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was
required to estimate the budget deficit for each year. If the deficit was ever
estimated to exceed the target, the CBO was to calculate the budget reductions
necessary to meet the target. Thereupon, the Comptroller General was obligated
to mandate spending reductions giving “due regard” to the CBO’s estimates, but
also exercising his own independent judgment. The Comptroller General is
removable only at the initiative of Congress.
ISSUE:
Did the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the
United States of certain functions under the Act violate the separation of powers
doctrine?
HELD:
Yes. The judgment and order of the District Court are affirmed.
Under the statute, the Comptroller must exercise judgment concerning facts
that affect the application of the Act. The Comptroller’s duties are not merely
“ministerial and mechanical.” Interpreting a law to implement legislative
mandate is the very essence of “execution” of the law.
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable
only to Congress would essentially reserve in Congress control over the
execution of laws. Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control powers
it does not itself have. Otherwise, Congress could remove or threaten to remove
an officer for executing laws in a way contrary to what Congress desires.
Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Act is unconstitutional
because the Comptroller General must be characterized as an agent of
Congress. Therefore, it must follow the procedures mandated in Article One of
the United States Constitution (Constitution) regarding lawmaking.
52 | P a g e
DISSENT:
Justice Byron White (J. White) wrote that under the Budget and
Accounting Act, Congress may remove the Comptroller only through a joint
resolution, which by definition must be passed by both Houses and signed by
the president. Therefore, removal under the statute satisfies the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
DISCUSSION.
The problem with the position of the Comptroller General in this case
lay in the total mix of features characterizing the official. For example, if an
official were characterized by all of the same features of the Comptroller General
here except the power of discretion in mandating spending limits, the position
would have arguably been permissible. Or, with all other characteristics of the
official being the same, Congress was not allowed to participate in the removal
of the Comptroller General, the position arguably would have been permissible.
53 | P a g e
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952)
Brief Fact Summary. In 1952, after the employees of steel companies
threatened to strike, the President of the United States Harry Truman (President
Truman) ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the Nation’s steel
companies. The steel companies sued.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must
stem from an act of Congress or the United States Constitution (Constitution).
FACTS:
In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United States steel
companies and their employees. In 1952, the employee’s union gave notice of a
nationwide strike. Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would
jeopardize our national defense, President Truman issued an order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After
obeying the orders under protest, the steel companies brought suit in District
Court. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order against the
government, which the Court of Appeals stayed.
ISSUE:
Did President Truman have the authority to order the seizure of the
steel mills?
HELD:
No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred
upon President Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of
the Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President
the authority to take possession of property as he did.
DISSENT:
Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) argued that we must consider the
context in which the President’s powers were exercised – a national exigency.
The President’s power to seize the steel mills derives from his duty to executive
legislative programs the success of which depends upon the continued
production of steel.
CONCURRENCE:
Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) stated that Congress could
not have more emphatically expressed its will that the executive seizure was not
authorized than it did in the Taft Hartley Act of 1947.
54 | P a g e
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) said that when the President takes actions
inconsistent with the will of Congress, his powers are at their lowest level. Then,
he can only rely on his own constitutional powers minus any powers given to
Congress on the same matter.
(Justice Douglas) The branch of government with the power to pay for
a seizure is the only one that can authorize one -Congress. If we authorized the
President’s act, we would be expanding his powers under Article Two.
DISCUSSION.
This case calls into question the extent and the source(s) of the
emergency powers of the President, if any, under the Constitution.
55 | P a g e
Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28, 2005, the
President then issued Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern; and
Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when
they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
HELD:
1.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to
legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation is one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation.
2.
Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending
to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.
3.
Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does
not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a
direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised
of its issuance before it was implemented.
56 | P a g e
Doctrine:
Executive Privilege exempts the executive from disclosure requirements where
such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations. The varieties
of Executive Privilege are:
(1) State secrets privilege- invoked by ( U.S.) Presidents on the ground that the
information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military
or diplomatic objectives. [military or diplomatic info];
(2) Informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Govt not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law. [whistleblowers];
(3)Generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
Varieties of Executive Privilege
State secrets privilege- invoked by U.S. Presidents on the ground that the
information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military
or diplomatic objectives.
Informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law.
Generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach
to Intragovernmental
documents
reflecting
advisory
opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
Determining the validity of a claim of privilege
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however,
necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked
is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given
procedural setting.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it
and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere
57 | P a g e
fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Dispositive:
Petitions are Partly Granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. are
declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
Other Notes:
 Executive privilege protects information/categories of information not
persons
o Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials
o




Executive privilege must be clearly asserted it being a claim of
exemption from obligation to disclose information
Who may invoke: President or authorized representative; it can neither
be claimed nor waived by a private party.
No implied claim of executive privilege
o For claim of privilege to be valid, person invoking must identify
the ground for such claim
o Blanket claim not allowed
2 powers of Congress: a) Question hour – may only request their
appearance b) Inquiry in aid of legislation – appearance is mandatory
NON-DELEGATION OF
POWERS
Emergency Powers to the President
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Philippine Interisland Shipping Association Of
Philippines V. CA
GR No. 100481, 1997-01-22
FACTS:
Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage
service in different ports of the Philippines.
On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase
in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM
AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN
AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS.
The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees
previously fixed by the PPA. However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive
order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior
consultation; that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the
operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its...
implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was
exorbitant and detrimental to port operations.
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective
November 16, 1986. Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a
complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on February
26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No.
02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE.
The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties,
i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the... fixing of mutually acceptable rates
for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under
Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its
order had rendered the case moot and academic and that consequently E.O. No.
1088 had ceased to be effective. Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court,
without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a decision[5]
holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic and
that the PPA was under obligation to comply with E.O. No. 1088 because the
order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal.
The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition
for review. The petition was filed in this Court which later referred the case to
the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. In a
decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division[6] of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590
and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072.
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and Petitioners are Bound
to Obey it.
2.
Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the Appeal of
Intervenors from the Decision of the Trial Court Invalidating
Administrative Order No. 02-88 of the PPA.
3.
Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and Decide the
Contempt Charges... against Petitioners.
RULING:
For issue no. 1
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. On February 3, 1986, when
he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under
the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the
PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports.
Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it
became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed... by it through the
imposition of uniform rates. As the President could delegate the ratemaking
power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby
withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to
impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the
services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port
District." We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is
duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but
it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.
For issue no. 2
Both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review
to this Court. In G.R. No. 100109, the government's petition was dismissed for
lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The...
dismissal of the government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the
intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481 for the review of the same decision of
the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially
the same grounds as those stated... in the government's petition. It is now
settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication
on the merits of a controversy.[16] Such dismissal can only mean that the
Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of... the Court of
Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct.
For issue no. 3
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The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event of an attempt to block
execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the
trial... court.[20] Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal
with alleged contemptuous acts.
The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their
petition for review in G.R. No. 100109, petitioners rendered execution of the
decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to
disobey the court's final injunction as... embodied in its decision would be
properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that
private respondents' complaint must be the subject of a separate action would
nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful
processes of a... court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning
in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously
prohibited by the court.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt
filed by private respondent, subject to any valid defense which petitioners may
interpose.
PRINCIPLES:
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
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Potestas delagata non delegare potest
People vs Vera
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
PEOPLE VS VERAG.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAIBANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge. of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CUUNJIENG, respondents.
FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to
the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The
Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The
IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative
power
2.
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
DISCUSSIONS:
1.
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any
of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
62 | P a g e
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits
of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality, leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
RULINGS:
1.
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying
out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegation of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of
the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have
the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate
the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
2.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our
Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of
the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the
result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsels for the petitioners in
the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary
fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter.
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This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the
law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while
another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those
same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible
for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries
of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in
operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation
by all the provincial boards.
Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937,
further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and
therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief
Executive to grant pardons and reprieves.
For the PURPOSE OF PROBATION ACT, the provincial boards may be
regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the
Act should take effect in their respective provinces.
They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The
rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive
officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here
adopted.
An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can
be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence
of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the
delegate in exercising the granted discretion.
In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that
is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
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Emergency Powers to the President
Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued
on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for
urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
2.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war
or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing
the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules
and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in section 1."
3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was
vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent
resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency
powers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative
NO.
1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The
Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating
funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be
deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to
withdraw the same from the President.
2.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision; it has to be
assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period.
If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President,
the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed
65 | P a g e
by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto.
3.
If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise,
he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is
significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that
continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful
whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
4.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general
power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable
the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce
its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven
years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act,
would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful
in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period
"in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the
good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency
by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in
itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials
and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
SUMMARY:
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the
general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for
about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on
every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the
Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited
period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus
entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our
democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish
patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
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Araneta v. Dinglasan
(G.R. No. L-2044)
August 26, 1949 | 84 Phil. 368
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of multiple petitions challenging the validity of
various executive orders issued pursuant to the President's emergency powers
as outlined in Commonweath Act No. 671. The said CA was enacted during a
special session by the National Assembly when it became apparent that it was
most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session on
January 1, 1942 due to air attacks during WWII. Although the President's
emergency powers were supposed to be for a limited period only, CA 671 did not
indicate a specific date when such powers would end.
The assailed executive orders included the following:
 EO 62, which regulated rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings;
 EO 192, which aimed to control exports in the Philippines;
 EO 225, which appropriated funds for the operation of the GRP from
July 1949 to July 1950; and
 EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection
with the November 1949 elections.
Petitioners argued that the abovementioned EOs enacted pursuant to CA 671
were invalid because the latter had ceased to have any force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671, otherwise known as the Emergency Powers Act, has
ceased to have any force and effect upon the resumption/opening of the regular
session of Congress on May 25, 1946.
HELD:
Yes, the Court held that CA 671 ended ex propio vigore with the opening of the
regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946.
Section 26, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution states that "in times of war or
national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period x x x to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." It is to be presumed CA 671 was promulgated with this
limitation in view. In fact, Section 4 of CA 671 stipulates that "the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
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There being no definitive expiration period, the Court held that the session of
the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act. And since all the assailed EOs
were enacted after May 25, 1946, the Court held they are void.
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Power of Subordinate Legislation
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Miners Association v. Factoran
240 SCRA 100
Facts:
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary
issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of
1989 which provides that "all existing mining leases or agreements
which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases
and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering
an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity
of these guidelines."
In petitioners’ petition for certiorari, they contended that the Secretary
of DENR excess his rule-making power because said orders are violated
to the non-impairment of contract under Art. III, Sec. 10 of 1987 Phil.
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Orders Nos. 57 & 82 of DENR Secretary
are valid.
Held:
Yes.
There is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has
transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the
exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of
discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes
said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as
may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof.
Moreover, the subject sought to be governed and regulated by the
questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive
Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No.
57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211.
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The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment.
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in
the case of United States v. Barrias.
The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly
expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in
1914, thus: “Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not
be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law. they are valid.” Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100,
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
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Lagman vs Senator Pementel
(G.R. No. 235935)
February 13, 2018
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December
31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation
No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60)
days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled
him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S.
Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution
No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause
to revoke the same.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the
effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017,
the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation
No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana,
AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons
based on current security assessment.”
On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a
similar recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication
of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other likeminded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups
(ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and
financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction
efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic
development and prosperity in Mindanao.”
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Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated
December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may
determine.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending
the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31, 2018.
ISSUE:
PROCEDURAL:
1.
Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses
No. 4 fatal to their petitions.
2.
Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.
3.
Whether or not the Congress
the consolidated petitions.
4.
Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
5.
Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No.
216.
6.
Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the
President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
7.
Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the
period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
8.
Whether or not the President and the Congress
factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
was
an
indispensable
had
party
to
sufficient
9.
Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner
of the President’s exercise of military powers.
10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites
for the issuance of an injunctive writ.
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HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No.
4 fatal to their petitions. NO.
The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of
Congress, the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts
of the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.
Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution
to their Consolidated Comment.
SECOND ISSUE:
Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES.
The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent
considering that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit. The Court
reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government.
THIRD ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress
the consolidated petitions. YES.
was
an
indispensable
party
to
The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of
sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable
party thereto.
The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are
questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the
approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly,
therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has
interest in the subject matter of these cases.
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FOURTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. NO.
The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of
issues between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at
bar.
Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the
re-litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in
a succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere
identities of parties and issues is required.
The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court
already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger
the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in
the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which
would justify the extension of martial law.
The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence
of the rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by
the transitory nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the
factual basis for a declaration of martial law.
Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the
existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The
gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should
necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on
whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of
martial law.
FIFTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking
review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.
The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized
that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a
petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of
his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of
emergency powers.
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Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1
or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari
will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII,
which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible
martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ.
PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW
Congressional check on martial law
Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus
consists of:
1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke
such proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense
that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke
the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension,
upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if
the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act
When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or
suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution,
becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between
the President and the Congress.
SIXTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s
request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO.
The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in
the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the
above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under
the Constitution.
Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating
its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted
power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It
76 | P a g e
should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or
publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly
cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The
Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or
it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage
in undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the
President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for
deliberation was too short.
SEVENTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how
many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are
1. that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative;
2. that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and
3. that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its
factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the
authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the
extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was
not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers
evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the
duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and
the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the
view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the
determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and
public safety requires” such extension.
EIGHTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.
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Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for
the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and
(b) public safety requires the extension.
Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate
that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues
to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS
territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new
members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and
continued attacks.
AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance
of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also
showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to
the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.
Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the
DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during
the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the
situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but
simply moved to other places in Mindanao.
Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the
extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general
public.
The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law
or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based
principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive
Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities
of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to
open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”
The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave
its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data,
which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on
the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in
affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the
PNP. According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for updates, was given
to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been
challenged or questioned as regards its reliability.
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The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply
establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly
endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis
for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress
in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
NINTH ISSUE:
Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of
the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.
The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the
determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should
be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the
President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article
VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the
President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.
TENTH ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ. NO.
By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the
burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is
an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists
to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on
respondents’ gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the
martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that
petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the
extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil
liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the
Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military
forces”.
The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the
grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged
violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They
likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his
martial law powers and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will
target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed uprising or
struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties”
specifically refer to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would
threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently,
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petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear
legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ.
This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must
depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable
under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive
writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even
presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be
determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof.
Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports
petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be
utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power
to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction
petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against
the principle of separation of powers.
As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such
transgressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action.
Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office
or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring parties.
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Delegation to the Administrative
Bodies
Test for Valid Delegation
Sufficient Standard Test
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Ynot vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
Facts:
EO 626 was enacted prohibiting the INTERPROVINCIAL MOVEMENT
OF CARABAOS. Those found violating the law shall be subject to
confiscation and FORFEITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT.
The law further provides that the confiscated beef shall be distributed
to CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, and OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS
AS THE CHAIRMAN of the NMIC may see fit.
Ynot was found to have violated the law, transporting 6 carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. Ynot assails the constitutionality of
EO 626, claiming that there is undue delegation of legislative powers to
the chairman of the NMIC, with respect to the MANNER OF
DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED BEEF. Ynot argues that the
term, “as may see fit” is extremely generous and dangerous, and with
an opportunity for partiality and abuse.
Issue:
Whether the phrase “as may see fit” is a sufficient standard.
Ruling:
LAW INVALID. NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD.
There are no limitations or reasonable guidelines which said officers of
the NMIC must observe when they make their distribution or disposition
of the confiscated beef. There is invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers who are granted UNLIMITED DISCRETION in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of the
beef and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named
can supply the answers, and they alone may choose the grantee as they
see fit, in the own executive discretion. Definitely there is here a roving
commission, a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within
the banks that keep it from overflowing. In short, a CLEARLY
PROFILGATE AND INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
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We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see
fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
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De la Llana vs Alba
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
Facts:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking
any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of
the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the reorganization violates the security of tenure of
justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
Ruling:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity
of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount
to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Delegation to President of power to fix salary of new judges valid there
being a clear standard laid down by legislature.
Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation
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and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A
more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought
to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of
the statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows:
“Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan
Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.” The existence of a standard
is thus clear.
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Legislative Standard Need Not
Expressed
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Hirabayashi v. United States
320 US 81
Facts:
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt
acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals
of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued two executive
orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of
War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas"
and exclude certain persons from them. The second established the War
Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and
supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was
convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order.
Issue:
Did the President's executive order and the power delegated to the
military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens
of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Ruling:
The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the
curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military
installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast
and the "solidarity" that individual of Japanese descent felt with their
motherland. He reasoned those restrictions on Japanese actions served
an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation
issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a
necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination
was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations
with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those
of a different ancestry."
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Chiongbian vs Orbos
245 SCRA 253
Facts:
Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite
in Mindanao. Only four provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (Lanao
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi Tawi) The other provinces who did not
vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions,
provided that
the PRESIDENT may
by
ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. So, President
Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote
for ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of
EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no authority to restructure
new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should
remain as they are.
Issues:
I.
Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative
power to the President by allowing Cory to merge the existing
regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.
II.
Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President
Cory’s discretion.
Defense:
The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue
delegation but only a POWER TO FILL IN THE DETAILS OF
LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.
Ruling:
SC: LAW VALID.
NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
PRESIDENT. While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the
President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus, there is no abdication by Congress of
its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO
MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
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As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE
EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need
it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN
OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged
legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative
regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE SAME POLICY
underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO
REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
Under said law, the standard is “to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent
with national goals for acceleration socioeconomic development and to
improve the service in the transaction of public business.” Since the
original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/
policy, it is but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to
merge by administrative determination, the existing regions (following
the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in
enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis
for the organization of administrative regions.
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