SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, clerk of Court VI,
Shari’a District Court, Marawi City, respondent
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., a real
estate and housing compnay in Davao City. Ashari Alauya is imcumbent executive clerk
of court. A contract entered between Alawi’s Agency and Alaya regarding the purchased
on installment of one housing unit. Not long after, Alauya submit a letter to the President
of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co. regarding his intent to terminate the contract aggreement.
On the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deciet, fraud,
dishonest and abuse of confidence by Sophia Alawi.
Aluya sent a copy of letter to the Vice President of Villarosa & Co., through th post
and bore no stamps instead a word “Free Postage-PD 26 “ was typed.
On January 25, 1996, Alawi filed a complaint to the court and accused Alauya
regarding on the envelope bearing the typwritten word “Free Postage-PD 26”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya can use the title of attorney.
RULLING:
No. Alauya can not used the title attoryney. Supreme Court has declare that
persons wo pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledge members of the Philippine Bar. The
title attorney is reserved to those obtain degree in the study of law and succesfully passed
the Bar Examination, and admitted to the Itegrated Bar of the Philippines and remains in
good standing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,
defendant-appellant
G.R No. L-19450, May 27, 1965
FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the crime of Malicious Mischief on
September 4, 1959 before the Justice of the Peace Court. Villanueva was represented by
councel de officio but later on replaced by councel de parte. The complainant was
represented by city Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo. The appearance of Atty. Fule was
questioned by the councel for the accused and invoke the jurisprudence “when an
attorney had been appointed to the position off Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to to engage in private law practice”.
Councel of the accused also presented a “Motion to Ihibit Fiscal Rule From Acting as
Private Prosecutor in this case”, and inoking Sec. 32, Rule 27, ow Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rule of Courts which councel claims City Atty. Fule fallls under this limitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violated sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
RULLING:
NO. The court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Atty. Fule to appear
and further stating that the later was not actually engage in private law practice. Sec. 31,
Rule 127 of the rules of OCurt provides that in court of justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of the attorney. Assistant City Atty. Fule appeared in the JP Court
as agent or friend of the offended party. The court aslo believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning
and contemplation of the Rules.
As the Solicitor General stated in his observation, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner vs. CRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT AND HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
in his capacity as SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondent.
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Respondent is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examination in 1960.
Petitioner challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment and filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment be declared null and void. The 1987
Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent does not possess the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
RULLING:
The court find and, while interpreting the varoius definition of Practice of Law, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava which stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess
the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is
incorrect. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent
B.M No. 533, June 17, 1993
FACTS:
In 1984, Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the service of the big law firms. Now Petitioner Mauricio prays this Court "to order the
respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977
ISSUE:
Whether or not its advertisement may be allowed as far as Code of Professional
Responsibility concern.
RULLING:
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business.
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement: Advertisement in a reputable law list, Use of ordinary simple professional
card.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition.
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO
AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondent
CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995
FACTS:
Complainant Sally Bongalonta charge Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija,
with unjust and unethical conduct representing conflicting interest and abetting a scheme
to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgement which complainant might obtain
in Civil Case No. 56934. The complainant file before the RTC of Pasig against Sps. Luisa
and Solomer Abuel for estafa, and Atty. Castillo was the councel of the spouses. On the
pendency of case one Gregorio Lantin also filed a case against the spouses for the
collection of some of money and was respresented by Atty. Alfonso Marija.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned
cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same
PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 112-88.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULLING:
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. The court,
stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
In this case at bar, Respondent Atty. Castillo is GUILTY of committing falsehood
in violation of his lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspend
for a period of six months and a warning that commission of the same or similar offenses
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty, while the complaint
against Atty. Martija is DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH
46 SCRA 14, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
Petioniner Al Argosiono passed the bar exam, buth the court however deffered his oath
due to his previous conviction. The criminal case arose from the death of neophyte Raul
Camaligan during initiations rites. On February 11, 1993 the cort rendered judgement
imposing on each accused including Mr. Argosino of improsonment. On June 18, 1993,
the trial court granted petitioners application from probation. On April 14, 1994,
petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
ISSUE:
Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the
practice of law when he previously convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide.
RULLING:
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The court issued a resolution requiring Mr. Argosino to submit evidence that he may be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
seeking admission to bar. The court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts
to atone the death of Mr. Camaligan. The court recognized that Mr. Argosino is no
inherently bad moral as supported by certificates he submit in fact a devout Catholic with
a genuine concern for civic and public service.
Hence, premises considered and allowed Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, to sign
the Roll of Attorney and to practice legal professions.