AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, J R.
G.R. No. L-12219
Mar ch 15, 1918
Facts:
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, the
plaintiff was riding a horse over the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach,
he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, the defendant
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony
had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward
the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then
no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it
as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described
was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done;
and we are of the opinion that he is so liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The defendant was guilty of negligence.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.
he plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
In the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), This Court
there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not
constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which
would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. In a case like the one
now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile
which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence
of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their
relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the
immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum
of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is
estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date
of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of
such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION vs. VIVIAN TAN LEE
G.R. No. 166869
Febr uar y 16, 2010
Facts:
Vivian Tan Lee’s husband died due to the vehicular accident. The immediate cause
of his death was massive cerebral hemorrhage. The accident involved a motorcycle, a
passenger jeep, and a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation,
and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City
a Complaint against Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila for damages
based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991
in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
respondent’s husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against petitioner. Respondent sought
the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages,
funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the
motorcycle’s repair, attorney’s fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioner’s driver, and whether
negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death
of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent;
(2) whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
(3) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.
Ruling:
On to the first issue in this case, yes, the Court finds the bus driver guilty of simple
negligence. The bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the
necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also
the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent
in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Moving on the second issue, whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise
the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for
having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.
Indeed, petitioner’s tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to
do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents.
Lastly, for the third issue, the indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In this case, the records show that respondent’s husband was leasing and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned
an annual income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of
Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that
respondent’s husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to
use the Certificate and respondent’s testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual
income of the deceased at one million pesos before respondent’s husband died on March
17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income
derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such
income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings,
are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the
creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In the
absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease
and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living
expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses). Actual
damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to
prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries
sustained by the victim.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of respondent’s husband. Moral damages are not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow
the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendant’s culpable action and must,
perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in the
amount of ₱10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondent’s motorcycle. Under Art.
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by
respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a job estimate
of the cost of the motorcycle’s repair amounting to ₱17, 829.00. The Court of Appeals
aptly held that there was no doubt that the damage caused on the motorcycle was due to
the negligence of petitioner’s driver. In the absence of competent proof of the actual
damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate
damages by the appellate court in the amount of ₱10,000.00 was reasonable under the
circumstances.
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the
physical injuries she sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.
However, the award of ₱50,000.00 should be reduced to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the
death of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00. The
award is proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.
To conclude, the Court held that Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila
are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil
indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the
amount of One Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and
Eighty-Five Centavos (₱127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the amount of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00; (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00); and (e) temperate damages in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).
FIDEL C. CABARDO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and J UANITO C. RODIL
G.R. No. 118202
May 19, 1998
Facts:
Jose Peralta was a driver of the Consolidated Industrial Gases Incorporated (CIGI).
On October 26, 1987, while driving the companys truck-tanker on the southbound lane of
the South Luzon Expressway, on his way back to the CIGI office in Santa Rosa, Laguna,
he met an accident. Peralta claimed that when the truck-tanker reached Barangay San
Francisco, Bian, Laguna, a Volkswagen car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his
truck, as a result of which he was forced to swerve to the left. This caused the
truck-tanker to veer and roll over the center island of the expressway until it fell on its
right side, lying perpendicular to the expressway with its underside facing the north. With
him at the time of the accident was petitioner Fidel Cabardo who was his helper and
pump operator.
Moments later, private respondent Juanito Rodil came along in a Toyota Corolla car,
also southbound, on the inner lane of the highway. There was a heavy rain which affected
visibility along the highway. Rodil claimed that upon seeing the disabled vehicle on the
center island, he immediately stepped on his brakes, causing his car to swerve to the left
and slide sideways towards the truck-tanker, stopping only after it had crashed into the
underside of the truck-tanker. With private respondent was his wife Leveminda.
Private respondent and his wife were injured. The truck-tanker driver, Jose Peralta,
was unhurt but his helper, petitioner Cabardo, suffered a fractured left leg. He and the
Rodil spouses were taken to the hospital by passing motorists.
A PNCC highway patrol team, with investigators, arrived later at the scene of the
accident. Only Peralta was there to give a statement. The police investigators made a
report, on the basis of which the accident was entered in the police blotter.
On March 1, 1988 and March 22, 1988, petitioner Fidel Cabardo and the truck driver
Jose Peralta gave their respective statements, on the basis of which a criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed by the Bian INP
police against private respondent Juanito Rodil.
On April 12, 1988, the Rodils filed a complaint for damages against CIGI and truck
driver Jose Peralta, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna.
On the other hand, petitioner Cabardo filed a complaint for damages against private
respondent Juanito Rodil in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. In his
complaint, petitioner claimed that he and Peralta were able to get out of the vehicle
unhurt after the truck tanker fell on its right side in the middle portion of the center island
of the [South Luzon] Expressway; that, as he was about to put up the early warning
device, however, private respondent, driving a Toyota Corolla in a reckless and negligent
manner, bumped the truck-tanker and hit [him] on his left leg, causing him to be thrown
off balance and lose consciousness and that as a result, he suffered a fractured left leg and
other injuries.
Issue/s:
Whether petitioner’s injuries were caused by private respondent’s car or whether he
was injured as a result of the fact that the truck-tanker in which he was riding turned
turtle and fell on its side.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner’s injuries were cause by private respondent’s car.
To begin with, both the Santa Cruz court and the Malolos court found private
respondent Juanito Rodil guilty of negligence in running his Toyota Corolla at a high
speed in driving rain with the result that he did not see the disabled truck-tanker until it
was late and thus failed to stop his car on time.
After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are inclined to agree with the trial
courts finding that petitioners injuries were caused by private respondents car. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision on the ground that petitioner, as plaintiff
below, failed to prove that he sustained injuries as a result of having been hit by private
respondents car and not as a result of the truck-tanker having veered and rolled over its
side. The appellate courts decision is based mainly on alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness Jose Peralta.
In view of the apparent inconsistencies in the statements of appellee and Peralta
which cannot be considered as insignificant, their version of the incident can not inspire
credence and should not have been given much weight by the court a quo.Where the
narrations concern essential facts and the very event sought to be established, such
inconsistencies cannot inspire belief in the integrity of the witnesses testimonies.
There are indeed inconsistencies but these are minor and inconsequential. What is
important is that the statements dovetail in essential details with the testimonies given in
court: Petitioner claimed that he was unhurt after their vehicle turned turtle and fell on its
side; that he and Jose Peralta, who was driving the vehicle, got out of the truck-tanker;
that he was asked by Peralta to put up the EWD; and that petitioner was hurt because he
was hit by private respondents car. Petitioner said in court that he was hit while checking
the pressure gauge. It is possible that this happened before he could put up the EWD.
It is noteworthy that at the scene of the accident, Peralta told police investigators of
the Bian Police Station that petitioner had been hit by a car which crashed against their
truck-tanker. That was shortly after the accident and before he had time to invent a story.
His statement to the police is reflected in the entry made in the police blotter on the day
of the accident.
Indeed, it is more probable that petitioners injuries were caused by private
respondents car hitting him. First, as the Court of Appeals itself found, petitioner was
taken to a hospital in Bian, Laguna together with the Rodils. Had he been injured earlier
when the truck-tanker turned turtle, he would, in all probability, have been taken for
treatment much earlier.
Second, as the trial court observed:
The plaintiff, as passenger of the truck-tanker was seated at the right side of the
driver. The driver did not sustain any injury. On the other hand, the plaintiff
sustained and was treated of the following injuries.
Fracture, closed, complete,
lateral tebial condyle, knee.
If the plaintiff sustained his injuries when the truck-tanker he was riding turned turtle
and landed on its right side in the center island of the expressway, it would not have been
on his left knee but in some parts of the body, more especially on the right side that must
have came in contact with the door. This is the law of gravity, and testimony to the
contrary should not be given credence. The plaintiff was categorical in his testimony that
after the car fell on its right side the driver and he came out of the truck and he was
already looking at the guage [sic] carrying the EWD when the car hit him. The defendant,
in contrast, did not state categorically that his car did not hit the plaintiff. What defendant
testified was that he did not see a person hit by the car. Moreover, defendant admitted
that immediately before the accident he was driving on the left lane at the rate of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour and he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten (10) meters
because of the heavy rain.
ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR vs
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. 164749 Mar ch 15, 2017
Facts:
To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames,
organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon"
scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course
starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through
public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle.
Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the
contest and after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted
and he was given an official number. Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated
time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants and ran the course plotted by
the defendants. As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed
to provide adequate safety and precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence
required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and
protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the
marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route
of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of
medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same
day due to severe head injuries.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of negligence,
and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant;
(2) whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient
intervening cause;
(3) whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and
(4) whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity
of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.
Ruling:
For the first and second issues, given the facts of this case, We believe that no
amount of precaution can prevent such an accident. Even if there were fences or barriers
to separate the lanes for the runners and for the vehicles, it would not prevent such an
accident in the event that a negligent driver loses control of his vehicle. And even if the
road was blocked off from traffic, it would still not prevent such an accident, if a jeepney
driver on the other side of the road races with another vehicle loses control of his wheel
and as a result hits a person on the other side of the road. Another way of saying this is: A
defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of plaintiffs damage if that damage
would have occurred just the same even though the defendant's tort had not been
committed.
It is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to providing
financial assistance in the form of sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was
merely in pursuance to the company's commitment for spo1is development of the youth
as well as for advertising purposes. The use of the name Cosmos was done for advertising
purposes only; it did not mean that it was an organizer of the said marathon. As pointed
out by Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not even have the
right to suggest the location and the number of runners.
To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is the proximate
cause of the harm done to the plaintiff. The nexus or connection of the cause and effect,
between a negligent act and the damage done, must be established by competent
evidence.
In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the
appellant Intergames considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has
conducted at least thirty (30) road races.
Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial
sponsorship and the death of Rommel Abrogar. The singular act of providing financial
assistance without participating in any manner in the conduct of the marathon cannot be
palmed off as such proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never relied on any
representation that Cosmos organized the race. It was not even a factor considered by the
appellants-spouses in allowing their son to join said marathon.
Moving on to the third issue, as explained by a well-known authority on torts:
"The general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is that a
plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or
reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm. The defense may
arise where a plaintiff, by contract or otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a risk or
harm arising from the defendant's conduct, or where a plaintiff who fully understands
a risk or harm caused by the defendant's conduct, or by a condition created by the
defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his property to enter
or remain, within the area of such risk, under circumstances manifesting his
willingness to accept the risk.”
With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of assumption of risk
applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious condition of
the place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included vehicular accidents
for the simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by vehicles. Thus, it
cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track race which is
held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is always the
risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train or compete. That risk is
inherent in the sport and known to runners. It is a risk they assume every time they
voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or contest, he
assumes the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the
promoter or operator of the game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom.
Proprietors of amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not
insurers of safety of the public nor of their patrons.
In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel
Abrogar, appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well
as for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot
and academic.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERNEST E. SIMKE
G.R. No. L-51806
November 8, 1988
Facts:
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons
went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a
better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck
or terrace of the airport.
While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent
slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. As a
result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about
three hours.
Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner Civil Aeronautics
Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage, control,
maintain and develop the Manila International Airport ... ."
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills,
consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in private
respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions and for the publication of
notices announcing the postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which
had to be cancelled because of his accident.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of
respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to petitioner's negligence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay
actual, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees to
respondent Simke.
Ruling:
These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence, the CAA
cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the elevation since under
Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing,
equipping, expanding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures,
improvements or air navigation facilities [Section 32, supra , R.A. 776]. In the discharge
of this obligation, the CAA is duty-bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing the
construction and maintenance of the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault
or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of
the time and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing
deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers
using it. As these people come to the viewing deck to watch the planes and passengers,
their tendency would be to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and
not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck. The CAA should have
thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck
to prevent any undue harm to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176
of the Civil Code which provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done... As the
CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made
precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper
drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo, p. 391, its
failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard constitutes
such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.
The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty of
contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover,
unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code
contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not
the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no
contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent.
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court,
could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the
attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where
he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.
Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private respondent.
The liability of CAA to answer for damages, whether actual, moral or exemplary, cannot
be seriously doubted in view of one conferment of the power to sue and be sued upon it,
which, as held in the case of Rayo v. Court of First Instance, supra , includes liability on a
claim for quasi-dilict. In the aforestated case, the liability of the National Power
Corporation to answer for damages resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which caused the death of several residents of
the area and the destruction of properties, was upheld since the o,rant of the power to sue
and be sued upon it necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious acts
or any wrongful act for that matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that the same be
proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one are entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual on compensatory damages [New Civil
Code].
Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical and hospitalization bills.
This Court finds the same to have been duly proven through the testimony of Dr.
Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private respondent and who Identified
Exh. "H" which was his bill for professional services.
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other expenses such as the
transportation of the two lawyers who had to represent private respondent abroad and the
publication of the postponement notices of the wedding, the Court holds that the same
had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown the existence of
such losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court holds private
respondent entitled thereto because of the physical suffering and physical injuries caused
by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217 and 2219 (2), New Civil Code].
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code explicitly, states:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages, are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, liquidated or compensatory
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the term "notorious
negligence" and consists in the failure to exercise even slight care [Caunan v. Compania
General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542 (1932)] can be attributed to the CAA for its failure to
remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to even post a warning
sign directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the elevation of the floorings
notwithstanding its knowledge of the hazard posed by such elevation [Rollo, pp. 28-29;
Record oil Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard by the CAA of the safety of the people
using the viewing deck, who are charged an admission fee, including the petitioner who
paid the entrance fees to get inside the vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and
are, therefore, entitled to expect a facility that is properly and safely maintained —
justifies the award of exemplary damages against the CAA, as a deterrent and by way of
example or correction for the public good. The award of P40,000.00 by the trial court as
exemplary damages appropriately underscores the point that as an entity changed with
providing service to the public, the CAA. like all other entities serving the public. has the
obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe service.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art. 2208
(1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are
awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the
discretion to grant the same when it is just and equitable.
However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has taken over
the management and operations of the Manila International Airport [renamed Ninoy
Aquino International Airport under Republic Act No. 6639] pursuant to Executive Order
No. 778 as amended by executive Orders Nos. 903 (1983), 909 (1983) and 298 (1987)
and under Section 24 of the said Exec. Order 778, the MIAA has assumed all the debts,
liabilities and obligations of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
the liabilities of the CAA have now been transferred to the MIAA.
SPOUSES ED DANTE LATONIO AND MARY ANN LATONIO and the minor ED
CHRISTIAN LATONIO vs. MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES INC., CEBU
GOLDEN FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., and TYKE PHILIP LOMIBAO
G.R. No. 206184
December 6, 2017
Facts:
On September 17, 2000, the petitioners, spouses Ed Dante (Ed) and Mary Ann
Latonio (Mary Ann); accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed Christian to a birthday
party at the McDonald's Restaurant, Ayala Center, Cebu City.
During the party and as part of the birthday package, McDonald's presented two
mascots – "Birdie" and "Grimace" - to entertain and dance for the guests. Respondent
Tyke Philip Lomibao (Lomibao )5 was the person inside the "Birdie" mascot suit.
After the mascots danced, guests had their pictures taken with them. Intending to
have her child's photo taken with the mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed Christian on a chair
in front of the mascot "Birdie." The mascot positioned itself behind the child and
extended its "wings" to give a good pose for the camera.
As photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed Christian.
Seconds later, the child fell head first from the chair onto the floor.
Several guests attended to Ed Christian. Meanwhile, the employees of respondent
McDonald’s Cebu Golden Food6(Cebu Golden Food) assisted petitioners in giving first
aid treatment to Ed Christian. Petitioners, nevertheless, remained and continued with the
party and left only after the party was over.
At about 9:30 in the evening of the same day, Mary Ann called up Cebu Golden
Food to inform them that their doctor advised them to get an x-ray examination on Ed
Christian. Cebu Golden Food then assured her that they were willing to shoulder the
expenses for the x-ray examination of Ed Christian. Later, McDonald’s reimbursed Mary
Ann for the expenses incurred relative to the x-ray examination. It further offered to pay
the expenses for the CT scan to be conducted on Ed Christian.
For some time, nothing was heard from petitioners. Nonetheless, a staff of Cebu
Golden Food visited the Latonios in their residence to follow up the results of the CT
scan test. The staff was met by the brother of Mary Ann, who allegedly repeatedly
shouted at them saying that they would file a case against Cebu Golden Food. Thus, Cebu
Golden Food reported the incident to their licensor, McGeorge Food Industries, Inc.
Sometime in October 2000, McGeorge received a Letter from the lawyer of the
Latonios regarding the September 17, 2000 incident. In its reply, McGeorge immediately
assured the Latonios that the health and safety of all McDonald's customers is its utmost
concern and that the best medical and hospital care would be made available to Ed
Christian.
McGeorge also sent its Field Service Director, together with its lawyer, to meet with
the Latonios and their lawyers to assure them that McDonald's was ready to assist in
whatever medical attention would be required of Ed Christian.
During the meeting, McGeorge agreed to contact a neurologist for consultation to
ensure Ed Christian’s health. McGeorge conferred and consulted with two neurosurgeons
at the St. Luke's Medical Center and the Makati Medical Center, who both recommended
to first study the x-ray results and CT scan to determine the extent of the injury sustained
by the baby.
Thereafter, McGeorge relayed the doctor’s requirement to the Latonios who initially
agreed to give McGeorge copies of the x-ray and CT scan results. However, the Latonios
had a change of heart and informed McGeorge that they had decided against lending
them the x-ray and CT scan results and other related medical records.
Instead, the Latonios sent a Letter to McGeorge demanding for compensation in the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (₱15,000,000.00).
As their demand remained unheeded, the Latonios caused the publication of the
accident in the local newspaper, Sun Star Cebu on February 8, 2001 with a
headline "Food outlet sued for ₱.9 M damages". Simultaneously, the Latonios also
instituted a complaint for damages and attorney's fees against McGeorge.
Issue/s:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the proximate cause of Ed
Christian’s fall was the negligence of petitioner Mary Ann Latonia.
Ruling:
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, which states thatWhoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.
The trial court held that the proximate cause of Ed Christian's fall and the resulting
injury was Lomibao’s act of holding the baby during the party which was purportedly
prohibited under the rules and policy of the establishment.
We disagree. We agree with the appellate court that despite Mary Ann’s insistence
that she made sure that her baby was safe and secured before she released her grasp on
Ed Christian, her own testimony revealed that she had, in fact, acted negligently and
carelessly.
Clearly, based on the foregoing, Mary Ann’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Ed Christian’s fall which caused him injury. Proximate cause is defined as –
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.22
Here, it is beyond dispute that the cause of Ed Christian’s fall is traceable to the
negligent act of Mary Ann of leaving him in the "hands" of Lomibao who was wearing
the Birdie mascot suit. We noted that "hands" and "wings" were used interchangeably
during the testimonies of the witnesses, thus, causing confusion. However, it must be
stressed that while indeed Lomibao has hands of his own, at the time of the incident he
was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. Suffice it to say that the Birdie mascot suit have no
hands but instead have wings. Lomibao cannot possibly hold or grasp anything while
wearing the thick Birdie mascot suit. In fact, even if he wanted to hold Ed Christian or
anything, he could not possibly do so because he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit
which do not even have hands or fingers to be able to hold or grasp firmly.
Notably, while the CA and the trial court made conflicting rulings on the negligence
of Cebu Golden Food and Lomibao, they, however, concur on Mary Ann's own
negligence.
Thus, all the aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by Ed Christian was due to Mary Ann's own
negligence.
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents Cebu Golden Foods
and Lomibao, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay
for the damages prayed for by the petitioners.
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom.1âwphi1 Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-24084
November 3, 1925
Facts:
On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez,
the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin Menor to hunt in the
mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three last
named proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer
from the place where the act complained of took place. Upon the hunters having arrived
at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying the shotgun of Bartolome
Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay
there and watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus Victoriano Ranga
and Agusto Menor were waiting when suddenly the report of the shotgun was heard
hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that night
as a result of the wounds.
It does not appear that the matter was judicially investigated until the month of
October, 1924, when the complaint was filed which initiated this proceedings.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Pedro Ramirez was acting negligently which resulted to the death of
Victoriano Ranga.
Ruling:
The night being dark like that when the event took place, the hunter in the midst of a
forest without paths is likely to get confused as to his relative situation; and after walking
around, he may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the point of
departure. and so, judging the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and
Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and taking into account that there existed no motive
whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended party, we are
compelled to conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide through reckless
imprudence. The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid
of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised all the
necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that
unfortunately occurred on the person of Victoriano Ranga.
While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered to the
mother of the deceased a carabao and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one
hand that the defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it shows that
he performed that act without criminal intent and only through a real imprudence.
The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable doubt in
favor of the defendant. After considering carefully the evidence and all the circumstances
of the case, we are of the opinion and so hold that the defendant is guilty of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1 of
article 568 of the Penal Code.
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE vs. NTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, J AIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,
G.R. No. L-68102
J uly 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, J ULIETA KOH TUQUERO,
ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, J AIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO
G.R. No. L-68103
J uly 16, 1992
Facts:
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo
Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga,
a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate
No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang,
and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh
McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors
George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the
baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated
on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli
and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on
the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound
car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were
moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn
back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The
collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City;
consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the
spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is
described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide — seven (7)
"footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both sides. 2 Pulong
Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders and
concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the
cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left
front portion was touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the
car resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from
the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the
opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9)
"footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5)
"footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the findings of the Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution are
supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
Ruling:
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave
rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of
this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two
(2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
Araceli Koh McKee’s credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross
examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid
what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or injury to the two (2) boys.
Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining
in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering
the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and
could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find
that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them.
Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined
as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at
all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same
caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is
7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in
width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance
of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could
have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given
situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private
respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by the investigating officer of
the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers
per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been regularly
performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant
case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier
quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the
testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take
the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was
the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which
was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the
private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily
liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris
et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, the indemnity for death must, however,
be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WILLIAM ADDENBROOK Y BARKER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. L-22995
J une 29, 1967
Facts:
At about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper of the Stanvac
Service Truck, while travelling southward along Marquez de Comillas being driven then
by accused William Addenbrook, and in front of House No. 1010, came into contact with
the body of a pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo with the result that the latter fell and was
taken to the Philippine General Hospital by accused and his helper in the truck named
Amando Valeriano, but was dead on arrival, it having been found that he had received
abrasions on the left forehead, and contusions with lacerations on the face, left arm, right
thigh, knee joints, and right buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull, so that the Fiscal
filed the present criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused
resulting in his conviction.
Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a distance of
fifteen (15) paces, as shown by two (2) sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Emilio
Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the occurrence of the incident.
From these facts, the appellate court found it difficult to believe that the van was
travelling at a slow and reasonable speed. Considering further that as postulated by the
accused himself, his view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of
house No. 1010, Marquez de Comillas, from behind which the deceased tried to cross the
street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his horn despite the visual
obstruction by the parked car, the Court of Appeals concluded that he failed to observe
that reasonable care required of a driver of a motor vehicle.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the claim that the deceased suddenly
darted from behind the parked car. Neither did the trial court do so, considering the lack
of corroboration of petitioner's version, and the circumstance that the victim, being a
grown-up man, and not a child, would not have ignored the noise of the oncoming
vehicle, there being no reason shown for his disregarding the obvious danger.
At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to
the truck when he, as alleged by appellant, suddenly darted across the street, does not
exculpate the accused, since the latter was driving at excessive speed.
The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that the
driver could not stop and avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car was
being driven at an unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances.
While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to
take the wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the
emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.
CONSOLACION J UNIO vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-37044
Mar ch 29, 1933
BEATRIZ SOLORIA vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-37045 Mar ch 29, 1933
Facts:
At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein
with some other persons were traveling in a PU-Car on the road between Calasiao
and Santa Barbara. When they arrived at the intersection of the road of the
defendant's railway, the car tried to cross the track and collided while the engine
of the night express which left Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night
and which was then passing over the crossing in question at great speed. As a
result of the collision, the car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg
was amputated and her right arm fractured, and Soloria received various injuries
on her head.
The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the same
is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact that gates were required at that
crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act No. 2100.) On the night
of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there was no notice to the effect
that they were not operated at night or that they were temporarily out of order.
However, a notice to the effect that that was a railroad crossing was there.
As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and a
railroad company at a public crossing are mutual and reciprocal. Both are
under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid causing or receiving
injury. Each is in duty bound to exercise reasonable or ordinary care
commensurate with the risk and danger involved.
In the case under consideration, the driver alleges that he slowed down
from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16 miles, and that
he was on the lookout for any approaching train, while the engineer insists
that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.
Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant company were
completely so, the plaintiffs would have no cause of action against it.
In addition to the facts mentioned above, it has also been proved that the gate in
question was about three hundred (300) meters from the railroad station at Calasiao; that
on each side of the crossing there was a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by
a woman employee of defendant, and that just before the crossing on one side, of the road
leading from the town of Calasiao there was a signpost bearing the notice, "RAILROAD
CROSSING", written crosswise.
The evidence also show that the car driven by the chauffeur, Pedro Talbo, was an old
Ford bearing number plates. PU-3636, which meant that it was a hired car. The plate,
Exhibit 2, was found by the engineer on the side of the engine upon arrival at Paniqui, the
next station, which indicates that it was torn from the front of the radiator when the auto
collided with the right side of the engine of the night express.
Issue/s:
Whether the driver's negligence is imputable to them so as to bar them from the right
to recover damages suffered by them by reason of the accident.
Ruling:
It is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a driver,
who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who
has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no
relation of master and servant. This rule is applied more strictly when, as in the present
case, hired cars or those engaged in the public service, are involved.
The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory negligence of
the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a person voluntarily riding
with him. But the general rule is that the negligence of the driver of a vehicle
is not to be imputed to an occupant thereof who is ]injured at a crossing
through the combined negligence of the driver and the railroad company
when such occupant is without fault and has no control over the driver. And
the law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an
invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority or purpose
to direct or control the driver or the movements of the team, and without any
reason to doubt the competency of the driver, the contributory negligence of
the owner or driver of the conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or
passenger, so as to bar him of the right to recover damages from a railroad
company whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is
so riding. This rule has been applied in a number of cases involving the
corresponding relation between the driver of an automobile and an occupant
having no control over him. The rule is not confined to cases of gratuitous
transportation, but has been applied where a conveyance is hired, and the
passenger exercises no further control over the driver than to direct him to the
place to which he wishes to be taken. Nor is any distinction made between
private and public vehicles, such as street cars and stages.
As a general rule the negligence of a driver of a vehicle approaching a
railroad crossing, in failing to look and listen for approaching trains, cannot
be imputed to an occupant of the vehicle who is without personal fault, unless
such driver is the servant or agent of the occupant, unless they are engaged in
a joint enterprise whereby responsibility for each other's acts exists, or unless
the occupant is under the driver's care or control or has the right to direct and
control the driver's actions, or where the driver is of obvious or known
imprudence or incompetency. This rule that negligence of the driver is not
imputable to an occupant only applies to cases in which the relation of master
and servant or principal and agent does not exist between the parties, or
where the occupant has no right to direct or control the driver's action, as
where the occupant is a passenger for hire or is the guest of the owner or
driver and has no reason to believe the driver careless or imprudent, or where
the occupant is seated away from the driver or is separated from him by an
inclosure so that he is without opportunity to discover danger and inform the
driver thereof. . . . (52 C.J., pp. 315, 316 and 317.)
A passenger in the automobile of another having no control over the
owner driving the car or the operation of the car which he occupied merely as
passenger was not chargeable with contributory negligence of the owner and
driver at a railroad crossing. (Carpenter vs. Atchison 195 Pac, 1073).
In railroad crossing accident, negligence of truck driver was not
imputable to truck passenger not himself guilty of contributory negligence.
There is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have incurred in any
negligence imputable to them and we do not see any reason whatsoever why they should
be made responsible for the driver's negligence. The doctrine established in the cases
cited above should be applied to the case at bar and it should be held that the appellants
herein are entitled to recover from the appellee damages occasioned by the accident of
which they were victims.
We shall now proceed to determine the amount of the damages. With respect to
Soloria, we do not find any difficulty because the evidence shows that she spent only
three hundred pesos (P300) for her treatment and stay in the hospital. Her injuries are not
of such a nature as to entitle her to a further indemnity. The damages to which she is
entitled may, therefore, be assessed at the amount stated above.
Such is not the case with respect to Consolacion Junio. According to the evidence
presented, she was a dancer earning from six pesos (P6) to eight pesos (P8) a day for two
or three days every week that she danced. She lost her right leg which was amputated,
suffered a fracture of her right arm and was wounded on her occipital region. With these
details in view, the members of this court are of the opinion that she may justly be
awarded the sum of two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500) as damages and five
hundred pesos (P500) as indemnity for expenses incurred by her in her treatment, medical
attendance and stay in the hospital, making the total amount she is entitled to recover
aggregating three thousand pesos (P3,000).