US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Facts: On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named
Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that
said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate
shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted in most of the animals
to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to
Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is contended that cases cannot be filed
because it was not said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take
jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
Issue: Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship
while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance
of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall
apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas, In light of
the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred
and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Facts: The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the
defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half
miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court on the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case
Issue: WON the PH courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdictional waters
Held: Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the PH courts
have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked
within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore,
the demurrer is revoked and the court ordered further proceedings.
People vs. Look Chow, 18 Phil. 19
Facts: During, August 19, 1909, government agents went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards
in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium,
and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The
hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's control, who
moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred
to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and
voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling
them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several
times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. It is to be taken into account
that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly constitute the corpus delicti.
Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of
investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department of the port of Cebu
testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that
they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel
should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of
opium, always provided it should not be taken shore. And, finally, another can of opium, marked
"Exhibit D," which the witness related as a can of opium which was bought from the defendant
by a secret-service agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had
opium in his possession to sell. The internal-revenue agent said that a party brought him a sample
of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the steamer, and the
agent asked that the vessel be searched. The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the
ground of its being hearsay evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there
was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.
Issue: WON the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime and the facts concerned.
Held: the court found that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession
of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered
that the fiscal should separate one charge from the other and file a complaint for each violation;
this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. Even admitting
that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does
not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be
imposed in the maximum degree. Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. Mere
possession of opium (a thing of prohibited use in these Islands), aboard a foreign vessel in transit,
in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality (in this
case, the vessel is of English nationality), because that fact alone does not constitute a breach of
order. Mere possession of opium on such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring
about in this country those disastrous effects that our law contemplated avoiding. However, said
courts acquire jurisdiction when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation
of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime and only the court established
in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
People v Lacson, GR 149453, April 1, 2003
Facts: In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of 11 male persons. These cases were later provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir,
Jr. A new rule states that provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal
of the cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for such when he filed his motion
for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held that although
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need
to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. In support of their Motion for Reconsideration,
the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his
resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private prosecutors,
were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor
was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely
prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
Issue: Whether Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable in the cases.- NO
Ruling:
Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable in Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689. The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount,
or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof,
namely:
a. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
b. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
c. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
d. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new
rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. The respondent has failed to prove that the first
and second requisites of the first paragraph. The prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of
the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and for examination of prosecution witnesses.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August
24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED.
Go v. Dimagiba, GR 151876
Facts:
Dimagiba issues to Susan Go 13 checks. Go presented the checks to the drawee bank for
encashment but were dishonored due to the reason “account closed”. Dimagiba was prosecuted
for the violation of BP 22 under separate complaints filed with the MTC in Baguio City. After
the joint trial, the MTCC rendered a decision convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
Dimagiba filed for a motion for reconsideration of the MTCC order. He prayed for the recall of
the order of arrest and modification of the final decision arguing that the penalty of fine only,
instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. On oct 2001, he filed with the
RTC of Baguio a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The RTC issued an order directing
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of 100,000 in
lieu of imprisonment.
Issue: WON the principle of retroactivity be applied in this case
Ruling: No. Principle of retroactivity shall not be applied in this case. SC Admin Circular No.
12-2000 is not a penal law hence, the article 22 of the RPC is not applicable. The circular merely
lays down a rule of preference, it only services as a guildine for the trial courts. Thus it is
addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider factual circumstances of each case prior to
imposing the appropriate penalty.
People vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 257
Facts: The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cooked while the deceased Pascual Gilberto who
was a house boy. The two of them shared a room having a door with no permanent lock. As a
means of securing it, a chair was placed against the door. At around 10 in the evening, Ah Chong
who was sleeping was awakened by someone trying to forcefully open the door. He called twice
but there was no response. Fearing that the intruder might be a thief, Ah Chong took his knife
and struck the intruder when it entered the room. It turned out that the said intruder was his
roommate Pascual. Despite his plea of self-defense, said defendant was found guilty with
homicide by the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts criminally liable.
Ruling: The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due
to ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of
the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the law, is an essential element
to the crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of intent and works for an acquittal. In
the case, the defendant struck the fatal blow on the belief that the intruder was a robber, on which
his life and property was in danger. It is clear that he acted in good faith without negligence and
without any criminal intent in exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no crime, large or
small, without an evil mind. The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be
an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors. It is a principle that the essence of
an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist. In other words, punishment is the
sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. This doctrine confirmed by the maxim actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea in which the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention
were so. Thus, the Court held that the defendant should be acquitted.
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
Facts: As a group taking the route to Rizal street, Chief of Police Antonio Z. Oanis and his coaccused Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest Anselmo Balagtas, a
notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding
to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, simultaneously fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without
firstmaking any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be a peaceful and
innocent citizen, Serapio Tecson who upon autopsy, multiple gunshot wounds were found on his
body which caused his death.
The defendants alleged and appealed that in the honest performance of their official duties, they
acted in innocent mistake of fact.
Issue: Whether or not Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were guilty of murder.
Ruling: New Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2 paragraph 2 provides, No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. As the deceased
was killed while asleep, the crime committed by both was murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even
the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the
fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying
People vs Pugay, GR L-74324 Nov. 17, 1988
Facts:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate (mentally disabled), and the accused Pugay were friends. In
May 19, 1982, a fiesta fair was held in the plaza of Rosario, Cavite. Pugay, Samson, and their companions
appeared to be drunk. They saw Miranda walking nearby the ferris wheel and started to make fun of him
by making him dance using a piece of wood to tickle him. Pugay was not contented of what they were
doing to Miranda and took a can of gas under the engine of the ferris wheel. Pugay poured the gasoline onto
the body of Miranda, and Samson set his body on fire. The Rosario Police Force came to the scene of the
incident, due to the report of the operator. Everyone at the scene of the crime pointed at Pugay and Samson
to be the actors. At the same night, they gave their written statements after the said incident. The crime
committed was with qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the
burning of the body of Miranda. Both of the accussed pleaded not guilty. The court rendered a decision
finding both of the accused guilty of murder, but crediting in favor of Pugay the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to commit. Both of the accused appealed and a re-investigation was commenced.
Issue:
Whether or not the conspiracy present in this case ensure that murder can be the crime?
Held:
No. Conspiracy is not present in the crime. According to the definition of conspiracy, it is determined when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with
the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It
is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its executed.
No records showed that there were previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between
the accused before the commission of the crime. According to the accused there were no animosity between
them and the deceased Miranda. Their meeting was also purely coincidental. They had only intended to
tease and make fun of the deceased.
***As for the criminal responsibility of the accused:
Pugay poured the contents of the can on the body of the deceased knowing that the can contained gasoline,
as distinguished by the stinging smell. He also stated that his action was with the intention of making fun
and teasing of Miranda. As a result, he clearly failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. It is agreeable that the Solicitor General proposed that the accused is only
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
As for Samson, there was also no record or evidence that the accused intended or planned to kill Miranda
before the incident occurred. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely
a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be
deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make. There is no doubt that Samson knew that the liquid poured on the deceased was a
flammable substance, for he would not commit his act otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call
be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His
act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause
at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code.
If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
People vs. Garcia, GR 153591 February 23, 2004
Garcia vs. CA, GR 157171 March 14, 2006
Facts: Petition seeks for the review of judgement of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
24547. Affirming conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. Note: Republic Act No. 6646 section 27 (b)
from the Official Gazette. Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran
in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and
Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). Within Canvassing period in
election in Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Accused Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia,
Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray,
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with each other, unlawfully decreased the votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by
Precincts, a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes. The RTC acquitted all the
accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner Garcia who was convicted sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS;
however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision. WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to
one (1) year. Grounds: Secretary Viray merely relied on what the petitioner (as chairman)
dictated, and that it could not also be the tabulator since petitioner was the one who read the
adding tape. Petitioner did not produce the said tapes during the trial. Petitioner was the one who
entered the reduced figure of 1,921 in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) when it is the duty of the
Secretary of the board. The reduction of votes of the candidate was clearly not willful or
intentional.
Issue:
Whether the is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or
mala prohibita
Ruling:
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. Even errors and mistakes committed
due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. And it could not be the intent of the law to
punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as
well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal,
particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter
coincide. The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year
instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
Manuel vs. People, GR 165842 November 29, 2005
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy. The petitioner was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who was convicted
for estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him. Manuel met
Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. The two got married
through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense
being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he
had to go to court to seek nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional
Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him to imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to
the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy as the reasons stated. The
CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification to RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from
2 years, months, and, 1 day to ten years. The pecuniary reward for moral damages was
affirmed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error of law when it ruled that the petitioner’s
wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no
judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code
and when it affirmed the award of Php 200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact
and in law.
RULINGS:
No, the CA did not commit any error of law when it ruled the petitioner’s case. The petitioner’s
sole dependence on Article 390 of the Civil Code as the basis for his acquittal for bigamy
is misdirected. The presumption of the death of the spouse who had been absent for seven
years is created by law and arises without the necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article
41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides
that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The petitioner is also liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damage. Hence, the petition is DENIED.
People v. Delim, GR 142773, January 28, 2003
FACTS OF THE CASE:
It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding
the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas. The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are
“related” to Modesto an adopted son of their father. On January 23, 1999, Marlon, Robert, and
Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at Modesto, and herded him outside the
house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that Randy and Rita stayed
put. Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon
used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge. *alibis are the weakest of all defences
since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy and treachery present, in this case, to ensure that murder can be the crime?
Yes, there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of the
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto
There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted in the appellant’s case there is
no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does
mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that Modesto was defenseless
during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants. Sheer numbers by the
appellants when they attacked Modesto do not constitute proof that the three took advantage of
their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.
HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WAS MODIFIED TO LOWER
THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)
Ivler v. San Pedro, GR No. 172716, November 17, 2010
Fact:
1. Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC),
with two separate offenses: (1)Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce), and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouse Ponce’s vehicle.
2. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, the
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, the petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
3. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC),
in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, the petitioner sought from the MeTC
the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
4. Without acting on the petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of the petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
5. Relying on the arrest order against the petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
Issues at Hand:
1. Whether the petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
2. If in the negative, whether the petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Held:
1. No. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124. The
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could
be convicted or acquitted.
2. Yes. Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do
no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In
short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one piece of information
shall be filed in the same first-level court.
Ruling:
Petition granted. Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157 REVERSED. Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner
Jason Ivler pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 was DISMISSED
on the ground of double jeopardy
People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181
Facts:
On June 5, 1934, while the general elections were being held, Cornelio Bayona had a revolver
with him and was in his automobile on the road in front of the electoral precinct no. 4 in the
neighborhood of Aranguel, Pilar, Capiz. He was then called by his friend, Jose D. Benliro.
Bayona left his car to approach his friend without leaving his revolver in his car for fear that he
might lose it because there were a lot of people surrounding the electoral precinct. He was
already inside the fences surrounding the polling place when the revolver was taken from him by
Jose Desiderio who was a representative of the Secretary of Interior.
Issue:
Whether or not Cornelio Bayona was guilty of the violation of an electoral law even without an
intention of violating such law (criminal intent)
Held:
YES. Cornelio Bayona was guilty of the violation of an electoral law even without an intention
of violating such law because such an act falls under mala prohibita. The rule is that in acts mala
prohibita, it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. The law which Bayona
violated is an electoral law and a statutory provision, therefore making the intent of the violation
immaterial. It may be noted that he had no intention to influence in any way the free and
voluntary exercise of suffrage and that he had no interest in the elections or in violating the law
in any other way, he just went inside the premises to approach his friend. Nevertheless, the act
prohibited by the electoral law has already been done. "While it is true that, as a rule, and on
principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts
committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New
Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, on
grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, 'the great master of things', to forbid in a
limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer. (U. S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U. S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488.)
US vs. Chico, 14 Phil. 128
Facts:
On or about the 4th day of August 1908, appellants Go Chico displayed in one of the windows
and one of the showcases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of medallions,
in the form of a small button, upon which was printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo
and the tag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate
and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States.
On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the said medallion
and sold it at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila.
On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of
displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase and on
one of the windows of his store.
The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and had
consequently no corrupt intention.
The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is
that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use of
identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those
in armed rebellion against the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not criminal intent is necessary for crimes punishable by special laws.
Held:
The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
In acts mala in se, such as those penalized under the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent, apart
from the act itself, is required, but in those which are mala prohibita the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated. Whether a statute is to be so construed depends upon the intent of the
legislature, taking into consideration the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished,
and such other factors as will throw light upon the meaning of the language.
Where a statute plainly prohibits an act to be done and uses no word implying that the prohibited
act shall be done knowingly or wilfully, and the act is done, the statute implies the guilty intent,
although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violated. Where the
language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful
intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
The words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United States” mean not only the identical tags actually used
in the insurrection but any tag which is of that type. The description refers not to a particular tag,
but to a type of tag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently
fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
People v. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643
Facts:
At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the rice mill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan
Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix
Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan,
upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed.
Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an hour, passing by
the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no longer being
chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his
house so that he could change into his working clothes and report for work as a bus conductor.
While the trio was walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside, and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. Based on the autopsy Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained a shock and massive cerebral
hemorrhage due to multiple fractures of the entire half of the frontal left, temporal, parietal, and
occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the brain tissue with some incised wounds
and abrasions. The doctor also found that the deceased was run over by a vehicle that causing the
separation of his head. On October 21, 1980, an information for murder was filed against
Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog despite the alibi of the defendants that they
were in their respective houses at the time the crime was committed. At the trial, the defense
used as the main argument the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas, to the effect that
Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. During his presentation as an expert witness,
Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered tire marks on the victim’s left shoulder
and the right side of his neck. He also testified that the incised wound located at the victim's right
eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it could not have
caused the victim's death. The Court of First Instance ruled out such testimony of the expert
witness. It ruled that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the
victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and
Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed the penalty o reclusion Perpetua and
indemnified the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter's death
and P256,960representing the victim's unrealized income. Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed
this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For the second
time, they attributed deceased’s death to a vehicular accident
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court was correct its decision?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred in finding that the separation of one-half of
the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record pointed to a different
conclusion. The Supreme Court was convinced that indeed after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from
the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. However, the Supreme
Court also ruled that such a finding did not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the
death of Quiñones, Jr. The High Court discussed that under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability shall be incurred “by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act has done be different from that which he intended.” The Supreme Court ruled that
based on the doctrine “elque es causa de la causa es causa del malcausado” (he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), in relation to the said article, the following essential
requisites of Article 4 are present in the instant case, to wit: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. In the instant case, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones,Jr.
by Iligan. The fact that it was considered superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is
beside the point, according to the High Court, what is material is that by the instrument used in
hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of
the body: the head. The Supreme Court also held that while Iligan's hacking of Quiñones, Jr.'s
head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter's death.
Proximate legal cause, according to the High Court, is defined as “that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.”
Applying the said cause to the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled that the sequence of events
from Iligan's assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering
the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such
events, Iligan cannot escape liability. Moreover, the Supreme Court also disagreed with the
lower court with regard to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. The Supreme Court clarified that for treachery to be appreciated, there must be
proof that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the perpetrator to make it impossible
or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. To the mind of the Supreme Court, the hacking
of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group
of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. As for
evident premeditation, the Supreme Court also ruled that requisites necessary to appreciate the
same have likewise not been met in the instant case because the prosecution failed to prove that
at the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, there was an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and that there
was a lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act, these are the elements for evident premeditation to be
considered in a case, which were not present in the instant case. Hence, according to the
Supreme Court, absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for
homicide. The High Court also acquitted Edmundo Asis because there was no showing that he
took any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones Jr. which led to his
running over by a vehicle and consequent death. It may be true, according to the High Court that
Asis knew the criminal intent of Iligan but, the Supreme Court ruled that mere knowledge,
acquiescence, or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute a party to a conspiracy because there must be intentional participation in the
act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence, Asis’ mere
presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal, or an
accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. As a conclusion, the Supreme Court imposed to
Iligan the penalty of prison mayor as a minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum or
the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and an indemnity
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
People v. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 198
Facts:
 Prosecution’s version
I.
II.
1965 Mar 6: At about 11 pm, Valentina Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay
City, where her husband was working as a security guard.
She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft
Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a coffee bottle.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
She was angry at her husband, Elias Day, because the latter had burned her clothing, was
maintaining a mistress, and had been taking all the food from their house.
Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door.
Immediately after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at his wife and castigated her, saying
“PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON”
The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents
thereof on the face of the victim
Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame
Defense’s version
Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten
centavos’ worth of gasoline, intending to use the same to clean her shoes, which she needed for
church the next day
Then she remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his
place of work
She saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by the window
She entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but when he saw his wife he
shouted at her.
She told him that she had brought him fluid for his lighter, but Elias, who was drunk, cursed her
“PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON.” This shouting continued despite her telling him that
she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted
She trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling
gasoline on her husband’s face.
She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she remembered her grandson who
was alone in the house so she went home, leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and
not paying attention to her
She went to bed but could not sleep. She returned to NAWASA to apologize to her husband, but,
upon arriving, saw that police officers were present
An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she was Elias’s wife
When she said yes, the officer accused her of setting her husband on fire an accusation she denied
The police took her to the headquarters and prepared a written statement which she was made to
sign upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it
Issue
WON appellant’s extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given – YES
WON burns sustained by the victim contributed to causing pneumonia which was the cause of
the victim’s death – YES
Rationale:







The court found “appellant’s aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as
true,” “no error in the trial court’s pronouncement that the appellant’s sworn statement was
voluntarily given by her”
Contrary to her claim, she knew and understood Tagalog even though she was not a
“Tagala” as she had stayed in Manila continuously for 14 years
Her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that had to be fallen the
victim supports the theory that she “has murder in her heart and meant to do harm” to her
husband
Mananquil claimed that the victim’s pneumonia, from which he died, was caused by the alcohol
which he was drunk on that night. But as testified by a doctor, taking alcohol cannot cause
pneumonia
Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court held on to state that this
could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second-degree burns
Quinto v. Andres et.al. GR 155791 March 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 511
Facts:
Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante Andres and Randyver
Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where they
three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held
that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilsona’s death. The petitioner appealed the order to the
Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the
acquittal, in this case, is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above
rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal
action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the extinction of respondents’ criminal liability carries with it the extinction of
their civil liability.
Held:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him, or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose
of the civil action is the restitution, reparation, or indemnification of the private offended party
for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may
arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part
of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability
of the respondent’s rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for
damages.
People v. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162
Facts:
On February 1, 1934, in the house of Victoria Cacpal at the barrio, near the Poblacion of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased was held with the attendance
of relatives and friends including Andres Aribuabo. Between 1500 hours to 1600 hours,
Aribuabo went to the kitchen and asked for food from Juan Quianzon who was in Quianzon’s
care. This irritated Quianzon, as it was the second or third-time Aribuabo approached him for the
same purpose. Quianzon took a firebrand and struck Aribuabo, the latter immediately ran to the
gathering crying that he was wounded and dying while showing the wound in his abdomen
below the navel. With the foregoing facts, the one responsible for wounding Aribuabo should be
determined; thus summoning Simeon Cacpal, and Roman Bagabay, to the witness stand, as they
were present during the gathering. As well as Gregorio Dumalao and Julian Llaguno who took
part in the investigation. Simeon Cacpal claimed that he had witnessed the wounding by Juan
Quianzon to Andres Aribuabo. However, Cacpal’s testimony was improbable, incongruent, and
contradictory. Roman Bagabay’s claimed that he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the
neck of Aribuabo who afterward ran to the area where everyone was gathered, exclaiming that he
was wounded and identifying Quianzon as the person who wounded him. Bagabay further
testified that he asked Quianzon and Quianzon admitted that he attacked Aribuabo with a
bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, the barrio lieutenant who conducted the initial investigation
also testified that Aribuabo claimed that it was Quianzon who wounded him. Quianzon also
stated that it was he who wounded Aribuabo with a bamboo spit when he was questioned by
Dumalao. Quianzon was later brought to the Chief of Police of Paoay, Juan Llaguno, for
questioning, where Quianzon confessed that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo’s neck and
later wounded him a with a bamboo spit. However, before the confession was put into writing,
Quianzon retracted and denied that he had wounded Aribuabo with a bamboo spit, and only
admitted applying a firebrand to Aribuabo’s neck. However, the statements of Bagabay,
Dumalao, and Llaguno were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the witness for the prosecution as
he testified that he had seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor no to Quianzon on the afternoon
of the crime. With this, the defense invoked Cacpal’s testimony for discrediting the other
witnesses for the prosecution as indefensible, as proved that Bagabay, Dumalaoand Llaguno has
no unlawful, corrupt, or wicked motive for them to testify falsely. Wherein Bagabay is not
related to the deceased, Dumlao was a nephew of the accused, while Llaguno was purely in
incompliance with his official duties. The court believed this claim of the defense as true
Aribuabo died on the tenth day after the incident as a result of an infection of the wound he
obtained from the incident. Wherein, drainage had been placed to control or isolate the infection,
or traumatic peritonitis which Aribuabo twice attempted to remove.
Issue:
Whether or not Quianzon is criminally liable for the homicide of Andres Aribuabo.
Held:
With Cacpal’s testimony being discharged, the evidence of the prosecution relative to
Quianzon’s criminal liability for the death of Andres Aribuabo consists of the following:
1. Statements as part of there’s gestae wherein, Andres Aribuabo’s names the accussed as the
one who attacked him, immediately after receiving the wound, and the accused’s admission that
he had applied a firebrand into Aribuabo’s neck and had wounded him.
2. The extrajudicial confession of the accused, admitting that he inflicted the victim with a
bamboo spit on the same afternoon of the crime.
And despite the contention of the defense that the accused should not be convicted of homicide,
but only of serious physical injuries as the wound was not considered fatal and he may have
survived it had he not twice removed the drainage. According to Dr. Mendoza who examined
Aribuabo, the wound inflicted may occasionally result in traumatic peritonitis and is considered
as a fatal consequence. The element of the patient’s act in due to severe pain does not alter the
judicial consequences of the punishable act of the accused.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes immediately or immediately to the death of such another. The fact that the other
causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the patient had unconsciously removed the drainage due to
pathological conditions and a state of health brought on by the severe pain that he was
experiencing.
As the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any
aggravating circumstances adverse to him. The appealed judgment was modified by sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years of prison correctional, and a
maximum of eight years of prison mayor, affirming it in all other respects, with costs to said
Appellant.
Urbano v. IAC, GR 72964, January 7, 1988
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field at Brgy. Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the
place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. He asked Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urabano was enraged by
this and a confrontation ensued between them. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier
hitting him in the right palm of his hand and on the left leg, causing swelling on said leg. When
Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from
hacking Javier.
Javier went to the hospital for the treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to
his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in
a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde
who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus.
The RTC and CA found Urbano guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Urabano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.
Ruling:
NO. Urbano’s action was not the proximate cause of death of Javier, according to medical
science the incubation period of tetanus only lasts for 2 weeks. However, Javier died 22 days
after the hacking incident took place. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The in ec
on was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
Intod v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
Facts:
O the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and
asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Afterwards, they all went
to meet Aniceto Dumalagan. He (Dumalagan) told Mandaya that due to a land dispute between
Palangpangan, he wanted him to be killed; and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4)
men, otherwise he would also be killed.
At around 10:00 pm of February 4, 1979, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig armed with
firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez, Jaena, Misamis Occidental. With
Mandaya’s instructions, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig fired the bedroom of Palangpangan.
However, it turned out that Palangpangan was in another city, and the home was being occupied
by their son-in-law and his family who were not in the room during the gunfire.
Witnesses has identified the petitioners and his companions, and one even testified that prior to
leaving the premises, they shouted: “We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
Palangpangan and will come back if you were not injured.”
The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder after the trial was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. A modification of the judgment was sought by Intod by holding him liable
only for an impossible crime.
Issue:
Whether or not Intod is criminally liable for an impossible crime.
Held:
As per Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code wherein criminal responsibility shall be incurred
by any person performing an act that should be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means. Palagpangan’s absence from the room on the night of the crime
where his companions threw a gun fire made the crime inherently impossible.
However, the crime was not impossible as argued by the Respondent People of the Philippines,
and the facts were enough to establish an attempt to convict Intod for attempted murder, since
there was intent. In the Comment to Petition, the respondent pointed out that: “The crime of
murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment as
described in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner’s and his accused’s own spontaneous desistance as per Article 3, Palagpangan did not
sleep at her house that time, making the crime possible.”
Intod may have not been held as criminally liable only if the following conditions were not
present:




Execution of the act has been commenced
That the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed
Employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become reality
That the result or end contemplated shall have been physically liable.
Article 4(2) refers to protection against criminal tendencies wherein, it recognizes the offender’s
The capability of an act that was not aimed at something quite impossible that would establish a
felony against a person or property. In this case, execution of the act has been commenced
though there was a failure to accomplish its expected result since the victim was not present at
the time and place the incident happened. However, the factual situation present a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible to accomplishment due to the
absence of Palangpangan which makes him not liable to the criminal act of attempted murder,
but will be held liable and guilty of an impossible crime, considering the social danger and
degree of criminality as stated on Article 4 par. 2 and 59.
People v. Domasian, 219 SCRA 245
Facts:
1. On the morning of March 11, 1982, Enrico Paulo Agara, a minor, who was 8 years old at that
time, was walking with a classmate along Roque Street in the Poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, and
was approached by a certain Pablito Damasian, who requested his assistance in getting his
father’s signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with Domasian in a
tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the latter into a building to get the
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the
hospital, Domasian flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. He
told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they arrived at Gumaca,
they took another tricycle and went to the municipal building from which they walked to the
market. Here, Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, Enrico’s father. The two boarded a tricycle headed for San Juan Vicente, with
Domasian still holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver,
Alexander Grate. When the two alighted from the tricycle, Alexander immediately reported the
matter to two barangay tanods and went after them and saw the man dragging the boy. Domasian
managed to escaped, leaving Enrico behind.
2. At about 1:15 pm of the same day, after Enrico’s return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise
the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar and after
complaining about it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which
referred it to the NBI for examination. The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson
Tan. Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so he could identify the man who
had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.
3. Tan and Domasian were charged with the crime in violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code for kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.
4. Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game at a friend’s
house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the reflection of his eyeglasses. Tan said
he was in Manila. Tan also claimed that the lower court erred in not finding that sending of the
ransom note was an impossible crime that is not punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED, holding that Dr. Samson Tan and Pablito Domasian, in
conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 267 of RPC, states that any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion of perpetua to death.
Under paragraph 4, the said law shall apply if the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
female, or a public officer. In the case at the bar, it is noted although Enrico was not confined in
an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from going home and
Enrico was a minor at that time.
As for Dr. Samson’s contention that the crime was an impossible crime and that he should be
liable for the crime, he conveniently forgets that the firsts paragraph of Article 4, is clearly
applicable to him, which states, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act is different from that which he intended. Also, even
before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective
means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the
offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.
U.S v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209
Facts:
Defendant Protasio Eduave, who was the querido of the victim’s mother, attacked the victim
from behind using a bolo creating a gash 8 and a half inches long and 2 inches deep because the
latter accused the dependant of raping her. Knowing that he has already killed the victim, he
threw the body into the bushes and left. Then, he gave himself up and declared that he had killed
the compliant.
Issue:
At what stage of the crime of murder is committed by Eduave?
Held:
The accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that Eduave attacked the victim from behind,
in a vital portion of the body, shows treachery qualifying it as murder. In the case of frustrated
crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed making the crime subjectively complete. The
crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the
will of the offender. Adueva did all that was necessary to be independent of the will of the
offender. Adueva did all that was necessary to commit the crime but it did not result as a
consequence due to something beyond his control.
The crime was not consummated because the elements of the crime’s execution and
accomplishment were not complete, as the victim did not die.
Neither was the crime an attempted one because the accused’s actions has already passed the
subjective phase, that is, there was no external force or intervention of a foreign or extraneous
cause or agency between the beaning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all
of the acts have been performed preventing the defendant from performing all the acts of
execution necessary to commit the felony. That external force is the essential element that
distinguishes an attempted from a frustrated felony. Consequently, the victim did not die because
an external element prevented such death after Eduave has performed all the necessary acts of
execution that would have caused the death of the victim.
People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105
Facts:
The accused poked a “balisong” to college freshman Cristina Abayan as soon as he got into her
boarding house the early morning after arriving from a party. Cristina was dragged inside the
house up the stairs while his left arm wrapped around her neck, and his right hand poked the
Batangas knife into her neck. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
asked her to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina, while still poking the knife into her. She
followed, but the appellant could not fully penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on
his back and commanded her to mount him, but he cannot fully penetrate her. When the
accused’s hands we both flat on the floor, the complainant escaped naked. She ran from room to
room as the appellant pursued her. She went to the municipal building nearby and knocked on
the back door but there was no answer. When the door opened, the policemen inside the building
saw her crying and naked. She was given a jacket for cover by the first policeman who saw her.
The policemen dashed to her boarding house but failed to apprehend the accused.
The RTC convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated rape.
Ruling:
No. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose, and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. [Art.
266 and Art. 6] We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina, is sufficient to warrant a conviction.
People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270
Facts:
Campuhan was a helper in the business of the family of the victim, a 4-year-old girl. One time,
the mother of the victim heard the latter cry, “Ayoko!”, prompting her to rush upstairs. There,
she saw Campuhan kneeling before the victim, whose pajamas and panty was already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees. Campuhan was apprehended. Physical examination
of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted.
Her hymen was intact and its orifice was only .5 cm in diameter.
The trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death.
Issue:
Whether or not Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.
Ruling:
No. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12
as provided in RPC 335(3). The victim was only 4 years old when the molestation took place,
thus raising the penalty from “reclusion perpetua to death” to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659 Sec. 11, the offended party being below 7 years old. In concluding that
carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient,
nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of external genitalia by the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act
of touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the
female organ, and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum (the part instantly
visible within the surface). Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ,
i.e., touching of either labia by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only
be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Here, the prosecution failed to discharge its onus
of proving that Campuhan’s penis was able to penetrate the victim’s vagina however slightly.
Also, there were no external signs of physical injuries on the victim’s body to conclude that
penetration had taken place.
Issue #2:
What crime did Campuhan commit?
Held #2:
ATTEMPTED RAPE. Under RPC 6 in relation to RPC 335, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape are present in this case.
The penalty for attempted rape is 2 degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the
crime of statutory rape of minors below 7 years. Two degrees lower is reclusion temporal, which
is 12 years 1 day to 20 years. Applying ISLAW, and in the absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the maximum penalty shall be a medium period of reclusion temporal (14 years 8
months 1 day to 17 years 4 months), while the minimum is the penalty next lower in degree –
prison mayor (6 years 1 day to 12 years).
Issue #3:
May there be a crime of frustrated rape?
Held #3:
NO. In People vs Orita, SC finally did away with frustrated rape. Rape was consummated from
the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim. All elements of the offense were
already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do. Perfect penetration was not
essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient.
For attempted rape, there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
the execution was performed or the offender merely commenced the commission of the felony
directly by an overt act.
Valenzuela v. People, 525 SCRA 306
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post in the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw
the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a pushcart loaded with cases of detergent and
unloading them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned to
the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed
a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the
security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by
fleeing on foot but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both
Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the
Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not
able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the
Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.
Held:
No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary
for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, thef ollowing elements
should be present
(1) That there be taking of personal property;
(2) That said property belongs to another;
(3) That the taking is done with the intent to gain;
(4) That the taking is done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) That the taking is accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of
persons or force upon things.
The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with
intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from
the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrating stage,
and can only be attempted or consummated.
People v. Lamahang, 62 Phil 703
Facts:
Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods in
Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling police
caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside the store as it was early dawn. Convicted of
the attempt of robbery
Issue:
WON crime is attempted robbery?
Held:
No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular and
concrete offense which would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish unavoidable
connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show clear intent to
commit a crime. In the case of the bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force,
other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from the nature of acts executed.
Acts susceptible to double interpretation can’t furnish ground for themselves. The mind should
not directly infer intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts themselves
obviously disclose criminal objective
People v. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671
Facts:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with homemade guns and
hand grenades robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office. In the office of Rodita; her two
daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside. One of the accused asked Mary to get the paper
bag that contained money. All accused held victims, hostage, when the police and military
authorities surrounded the lumber yard. After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police make
their move in assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also
got an injury.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated.
Held:
Yes. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
Epifanio v. People, GR 157057, June 26, 2007
Facts:
On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan), were
walking to their respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since the
pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called
banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed
weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw
his attacker, the petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo
again but only hit the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to
Crisaldo's side which caused the petitioner to run away. Allan then brought Crisaldo to his
father's house where Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to
the Peñaplata Hospital where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical
Center where he stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds. Subsequently, the
petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, the petitioner pleaded
"not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered
its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which
affirmed the decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder
Held:
No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a
felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the
commission of the offense.
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill
the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the
offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed, and (e) words uttered
by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim. In the present case,
the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt through the
unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of execution of the attack as well as the number
of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by the petitioner. When Crisaldo
turned around, the petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the left arm as the latter
tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which the petitioner perpetrated the crime is
shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by
the deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetrated. Nonetheless, the petitioner failed to
perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the aid of Crisaldo and the petitioner
was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to
stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized the petitioner. Thus, the
subjective phase of the crime had not been completed.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds
sustained by Crisaldo. No evidence, in this case, was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would
have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there
is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
People v. Sy Pio, 94 Phil 885
Facts:
Note: This is an appeal of the Court of First Instance of Manila ’s judgement finding Sy Pio
guilty of frustrated murder against Tan Siong Kiap, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1 month, and11 days of prision mayor , to 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal , to indemnify Tan Siong Kiapin the sum of P350, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Sy Pio shotthree people on
September 3, 1949.
 The prosecution’s evidence shows:
A. September 3, 1949, early morning, Sy Pio entered a store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila,
and started firing with a .45 caliber pistol. The first to be shot was Jose Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who
saw Sy Pio enter and fire at Jose Sy, asked, “What is the idea?” Sy Pio then turned around and
fired at him as well. Tan was shot in his right shoulder and then ran to a room behind the store to
hide. Tan heard a few more gunshots before Sy Pio ran away.
B. Tan Sion Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was treated from
September 3 to 12. Tan was requested to return for further treatment, and in a span of 10 days and
after five visits, his wound was completely healed. He spent P300 on hospital and doctor’s fees
C. Sy Pio shot two other people that day - Ong Pian and Jose Sy - before shooting and wounding
Tan Siong Kiap.
D. On September 5, the Manila Police Department received information that Sy Pio was in the
custody of the Constabulary in Tarlac, so Captain Daniel V. Lomotan of the Manila police
proceeded there. The two had a conversation and Sy Pio admitted to shooting Tan Siong Kiap,
Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary in Tarlac delivered to Lomotan the pistol Sy Pio had
used, which the Constabulary had confiscated beforehand. Lomotan then brought Sy Pio to
Manila, where his statement – detailing the assaults against Tan, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy – was
taken down in writing.

Sy Pio’s declaration:
A. Some months prior to the incident, he was employed as an attendant in a restaurant owned by
Ong Pian. SyPio’s wife, Vicenta, was also employed by On Pian’s partner, Eng Cheng Suy.
When Sy Pio tried to borrow money from Ong Pian for Vicenta’s sick father, Ong Pian could
only lend him P1. Vicenta was able to borrow P20 from her employer. Afterwards, Sy Pio was
dismissed from his work and became a peddler.
B. Ong Pian presented a list of Sy Pio’s debts, which were deducted from Vicenta’s monthly salary.
Sy Pio could not remember incurring such debts, and so he resented Ong Pian’s conduct.
C. A few months before September 3, Sy Pio was able to realize the sum of P70 from peddling
medicine, and he kept the money in his room. The following morning, Sy Pio found that the
money was gone. TanSiong Kiap and Jose Sy told Sy Pio that he must have given the money to
his wife.
D. Thereafter, Sy Pio overheard hear Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy say that Sy Pio had actually lost
the money gambling. Because of these accusations against him, Sy Pio nurtured resentment
against the two.
E. September 3, early morning, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman and the owner of a caliber .45 pistol,
was away from his room, Sy Pio took the gun and tucked it in his belt. Sy Pio proceeded to Ong
Pian’s restaurant in Ongpin and shot him. Afterwards, Sy Pio went to the store in Misericordia,
Sta Cruz, Manila, and shot Jose Sy and Tan Siong Kiap. From there, he went to his mother’s
house in Malabon and told her that he had killed two people.



Sy Pio disowned the confession and explained that he signed it without having read its contents
during the trial, however.
Sy Pio alleged that he did not shoot the three men, but that Chua Tone – with whom he had
previously connived to kill the three – did. Sy Pio did not introduce any witnesses to support his
denial. Neither did he deny that he admitted before Captain Lomotan having killed the three
persons, or having been found in possession of the caliber .45 pistol.
The trial court refused to believed his testimony and found him guilty of the crime charged.
On appeal, Sy Pio’s contentions:
1. The trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot accidentally from
the same bullet that hadbeen fired at Jose Sy (TF?) and in finding that Sy Pio had committed a
crime separate from that of Jose Sy’s murder. The court found no merit in this contention. Tan
Siong Kiap’s testimony – that Sy Pio turned around and fired at him instead of answering when
he asked why Sy Pio was shooting – was uncontradicted by Sy Pio.
2. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. The court found no merit
in this contention. Against Tan Siong Kiap’s uncontradicted testimony; Sy Pio’s admissions
before Captain Lomotan in Tarlac; and Sy Piopossession of the .45 caliber pistol, plus the
testimony of the physician who examined and treated Tan Siong Kiap ’s wounds, matching his
wounds to the caliber .45 bullet, Sy Pio “has only made a very unbelievable story.”
3. Sy Pio should be found guilty only of less serious physical injuries instead of frustrated
murder. While the intent to kill was proven, the wound inflicted was not fatal because it did not
touch any of Tan Siong Kiap’s vital organs. Additionally, TanSiong Kiap’s physician’s medical
certification stated that the wound was to heal within a period of fourteen days.
Issue:
Whether or not Sy Pio can be convicted of frustrated murder. (Did he perform all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the death of his victim?)
Ruling:
The court had previously held (U.S. vs. Eduave, People vs. Dagman, and People vs. Borinaga)
that it is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of his victim, that it is sufficient that he believes that he has committed all said
acts. In these cases, the court held that the crimes committed were frustrated murder because
there was a full and complete belief on the part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts
of execution necessary to produce the death of the intended victim. In the case at the bar, Sy Pio
fired at Tan Siong Kiap, and the latter was hit but was able to escape and hide in another room.
Sy Pio must have seen that Tan Siong Kiap was able to escape; Sy Pio knew that he had not
performed all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. It cannot be said that the
subjective phase had been completed. But because Sy Pio ran away after the incident, there was
reasonable doubt in the court that Sy Pio may have actually believed that he had committed all
the acts of execution. This doubt must be resolved in Sy Pio’s favor.
Sy Pio was found guilty of attempted murder.
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance.
The Stages of Acts of Execution:
1. Attempted;
2. Frustrated; and
3. Consummated
Elements of Attempted Felony:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
In attempted felonies, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense – the portion
of the acts constituting the crime. If the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt.
Elements of Frustrated Felony:
1. The offended performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator
People v. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655
Facts:
The accused Pedro Ravelo, Bonifacio “Patyong” Padilla, Romeo Aspirin, Nicolas
Guadalupe and Hermie Pahit appeal the two (2) judgments of the RTC, which convicted them of
the murder of one Reynaldo Cabrera Gaurano and of the frustrated murder of Joey
Lugatiman.The accused-appellants are all members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)
stationed at a checkpoint near the airport at Surigao del Sur. The prosecution alleged that they
stopped the two (2) victims for questioning on suspicion that the latter were insurgents or
members of the New People’s Army (NPA).
They were charged with having committed kidnapping with murder in the following manner:
At approximately 6:30’ clock in the evening in Surigao del Sur, Philippines the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping each other, feloniously kidnap by
means of force, Reynaldo Cabrera Gaurano, a minor, while the latter was walking along Tandag
Bridge, then the above- named accused carried away the said, Gaurano to another barangay and
kept and locked him in a room at the house of Pedro Ravelo for a period of 10 hours under
restraint and against the will of said minor.
During the said period of kidnapping, they maltreated and refused to release said Gaurano, and
armed with a pistol, armalites, and carbines, assault, attack, cut, slash, and burn, the said
Gaurano, inflicting upon the latter the following wounds or injuries:
1. Blisters formation noted all over the body reddish in color, which easily peels off on pressure;
containing clear fluids with hemorrhagic reaction beneath blisters;
2. Swollen face with contusion and hematoma formation; loosening of hair notes; right ear
missing with a circular incised wound around;
3. Incised wound 24 cm. length around the neck cutting the esophagus, pharynx, arteries, and
veins; up to the 2nd cervical bone in depth;
4. Contusions and hematomas were noted anterior chest wall, abdomen, and at the back; upper
and lower extremities of different sizes end forms.
They were charged with kidnapping with frustrated murder committed as follows:
Conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another armed with deadly weapons such as
pistols, Armalite, and carbine, by means of force and at gunpoint stopped the hauler truck of the
South Sea Merchant Company which was on the way to Tandag, Surigao del Sur from Sitio
Lumbayagan and kidnapped Joey Lugatiman, who is on board the said hauler truck by forcibly
taking him and carrying him to the house of accused Pedro Ravelo then to the Airborne
Headquarters and while taking advantage of their superior strength being armed with deadly
weapon did then and there feloniously assault, by hitting and inflicting upon the latter the
following wounds or injuries.
1. Small abrasion and hematoma, both wrist and left ankle;
2. Multiple small abrasions, chest and right neck, and right ankle,
3. Multiple small abrasions and small hematoma, back;
4. Abrasion, upper left lips
Witness Joey Lugatiman, 22 years old, resident of Dawis, Tandag, Surigao del Sur testified that
he personally knew all the accused for quite a long time. With ten companions he went to a place
called Maticdum and went home on board a cargo truck. On the way near the Tandag Airport
they were stopped by all the accused. They, including himself, were ordered by the accused
Pedro Ravelo to come down from the truck. Then he was brought to the nearby house of Pedro
Ravelo and there he was asked if he was Joey Lugatiman and if he knows Reynaldo Gaurano.
His companions were ordered to proceed to Tandag while he was loaded on a service pickup
driven by the accused Pedro Ravelo. In the Headquarters, he was interrogated if he was an NPA.
After hearing his denial of being an NPA he was boxed, kicked, and pistol-whipped by the
accused Pedro Ravelo, and his co-accused. He was manhandled by the accused with the use of
firearms for almost an hour. Later he was brought back again to Awasian Airport to the house of
Pedro Ravelo and then to the house of Bonifacio Padilla. But before proceeding to the house of
Bonifacio Padilla, he saw his friend Gaurano one meter away, already weak with bruises on the
face, hands, tied at the back, and gagged around the mouth.
Reynaldo Gaurano could not talk and he was moving in the act to free himself with a bleeding
mouth. Upon arriving in the house of Bonifacio Padilla he was chained and hogtied near the
open window by the companions of Pedro Ravelo. Not long after, through the window, he saw
Reynaldo Gaurano hanging up the mango tree and a big fire was set on the ground. He heard the
groaning and moaning of Reynaldo Gaurano. He saw Pedro Ravelo and Jerry Ravelo setting fire
on the right and left side of Reynaldo Gaurano with the use of dried coconut leaves. He saw all
the accused surrounding and watching the hanging and burning of Reynaldo Gaurano. It was
Pedro Ravelo who cut the right ear and who also slashed the neck of Reynaldo Gaurano. He
could not shout because he was afraid. While lying down after he saw the horrible incident he
fell asleep. At around 5:00 o' clock in the morning he awoke and saw Bonifacio Padilla
bringing a nylon line with which he was tied to a piece of wood; while Nicolas Guadalupe
gagged him, and he was blindfolded by Hermie Pahit. While the three were about to leave him
behind, he heard them saying that they will kill him at the Awasian bridge at 9:00o' clock
in the evening. When he was left alone in that house he successfully freed himself. He jumped
out of the window and escaped via the nipa palm grove. As a consequence of the manhandling of
the accused, he suffered several bruises on the breast, the back, and his mouth. On crossexamination, he testified that he escaped at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning from the house
of Bonifacio Padilla, andthat he knew all the accused to be members of the Civilian Home
Defense Force (CHDF).
Witness Dr. Petronila Montero testified that she is a resident physician of the Provincial Hospital
and examined Joey Lugatiman and she issued a medical certificate, Exhibit A; All her findings
were placed in Exhibit A; Upon being cross-examined, she testified that the hematomas and
small abrasions will not cause death. When she examined Joey Lugatiman, she found that he was
weak and haggard caused of the injuries mentioned in Exhibit A; (16) hours after such a
statement was made is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be
shown not only by a statement by the aggressor of the purpose to kill but also by the execution of
all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a
position to defend himself.
However, after the performance of the last act is necessary, or after the subjective phase of the
criminal act was passed, the crime is not produced by reason of forces outside of the will of the
aggressor.
Tying the victim’s left leg with a chain on a 2’3; piece of wood and leaving him inside the house
of the accused-appellant are not acts that would result in death. These were done only to restrain
his liberty of movement for the period of time the accused-appellants were busy hanging and
burning the body of Reynaldo Gaurano some thirty (30) meters away from where Lugatiman was
left. Also, tying Lugatima’s hands behind his back and his whole body to the wall, and
blindfolding him was for the purpose of restraining his liberty until the evening came.
Accused-appellants also maintain that the injuries sustained by Lugatiman from the manhandling
at the Headquarters of the Airborne Company were not fatal as stated by the prosecution’s expert
witness, Dr. Petronila Montero; hence, there can be no frustrated murder. Lugatiman did not lose
consciousness as a result of the blows he sustained.
It is worth noting that the trial court, in concluding the existence of frustrated murder, did not
even use as its basis, the manhandling of Lugatiman. The trial court in fact concedes that the real
purpose of the man-handling or torture was to have Lugatiman admit and confess his being a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA) and the activities of the NPA. It was the statement
made by the accused-appellant Nicolas Guadalupe that Lugatiman would later be killed, that was
the basis of the court for inferring the commission of frustrated murder. According to the trial
court, murder was not committed because of the timely escape. Escape from the aggressors
cannot establish frustrated murder without first showing that the aggressors intended to kill and
that they really attacked the victim.
Issue:
WON THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY
OF FRUSTRATED
MURDER HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW
Ruling:
YES. The court is of the view that the accused appellants are not guilty of frustrated murder but
only the crime of slight physical injuries. There is evidence to show that several small abrasions
on the chest, right neck, and right ankle of Lugatiman as well as the hematoma at his back was
due to the hitting by a rough, hard object like a butt of a gun. The prosecution witness, Dr.
Montero testified that the injuries were inflicted by some other persons aside from the victim,
and needed medical treatment of four (4) to five (5) days to avoid infection.
The facts and evidence on record do not show anything from which intent to kill could be
deduced to warrant a conviction for frustrated murder. A mere statement by the accused stating
that Lugatiman would be killed is not sufficient proof of intent to kill to convict a person of
frustrated murder.
There was no commencement of the criminal act by overt acts which have a direct connection
with the crime of murder intended to be committed. As stated earlier the manhandling, express
statement of purpose, and the restraint of liberty were not such as to put the victim in danger of
imminent death.
The small abrasions and hematomas of the victim resulting from the torture by the accused were
not mortal. After the victim was restrained from his liberty immediately before Gaurano was
killed, he was able to watch how Gaurano was burned hanging upside down from a mango tree
near the Awasian bridge.
Due to his fatigue and extreme weakness, he was even able to lie down and sleep after looking at
the horrible incident.
Note: In a crime of murder or an attempt or frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent
or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. For there to be frustrated
murder, the offender must perform all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a
consequence, but the felony is not thereby produced by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator. A verbal expression that Lugatiman would be killed at sixteen.
The records show that Lugatiman himself was not sure that the accused-appellants would pursue
it.
People v. Kalalom, 59 Phil. 715
Facts:
Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado had litigation over a parcel of land. Marcelo Kalalo
cultivated the land during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932, but when harvest time came
Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted.
On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and Arcadio Holgado decided to order the land plowed,
and employed several laborers. Marcelo Kalalo, having informed, proceeded to the place
together with 6 relatives, five of those are armed with bolos. Upon arrival, Marcelo Kalalo and
company ordered those who were plowing to stop which they did. Having informed of the
suspension of work, Marcelino Panaligan ordered Arcadio Holgado and other laborers to
continue the work. G.R. No. L-39303: At that point, Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio
Holgado, while G. R. No. L-39304: Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos approached
Marcelino Panaligan. They all simultaneously struck their bolos, which Arcadio Holgadoand
Marcelino Panaligan died instantly.G. R. No. L-39305: After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino
Panaligan had fallen, Marcelo Kalalo took the revolver on Marcelino Panaligan’s belt and fired
four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was running to save his own life.
ISSUE
1.
Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the murder or simple homicide
2.
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of attempted homicide
HELD
1.
G. R. No. L-39303 & 39304 constitute two homicides. Under Art. 248 of R. P. C., which defines
murder, the circumstance of “abuse of superior strength”, raises homicide to the category of
murder, but this court is of the opinion that said circumstance may not properly be taken into
consideration in the two cases at bar, it is borne in mind that the deceased was also armed, one of
them with a bolo, and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and
their strength was almost balanced, a revolver is as effective as 3 bolos. Therefore, the court
finds the crime committed by the appellants a homicide.
2.
G. R. No. 39305 is attempted homicide. The evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four
successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the latter is fleeing. He performed everything
necessary to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes
independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded
in dodging the shots. Therefore, the court finds the crime committed by the appellants an
attempted homicide.
US v. Dominguez, 41 Phil. 409
Facts:
The accused, as salesman of the bookstore "Philippine Education Co., Inc." sold on the morning
of January 19, 1920, five copies of Sams' "Practical Business Letters," of the value of seven
pesos and fifty centavos (pesos 7.50), which the accused should have immediately delivered to
the cashier but which he did not deliver, until after it was discovered that he had sold the books
and received their value. The accused alleges different reasons as to why he did not deliver the
money immediately after the sale, but there can be no doubt as to the injury that the accused
would have caused to the interests of the company in retaining for himself the proceeds of the
sale in question. Trial the court found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa, to which he
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated estafa.
Held:
Yes, the accused is guilty of frustrated estafa. Established by the supreme court of Spain in
previous decisions to the case at bar, it was held that the appellant is guilty of the frustrated
offense of estafa of 37 ½ pesetas, in as much as he performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime as a consequence, but which, by reason of causes independent of his
will, did not produce it, no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended party, such
damage being one of the essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts
prosecuted. Therefore, the SC modified the trial court’s decision and charged the accused with
frustrated estafa with modifications on the penalties.