Virata vs Ng Wee (Myling) Summary: Petitioners filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 5 July 2017 decision holding the directors and officers of Wincorp jointly and severally liable with the company for the unpaid investment made by Ng Wee to Power Merge through Wincorp. The Court dismissed the petitions finding the grounds relied on in the MR were the same or substantially similar to those raised in their respective petitions thus were denied. Santos-Tan, however, did not appeal the CA decision and thus was only participating in the proceedings in this reconsideration. The Court however found her liable in the same way as Cua and the Cualopings. They were found personally liable as directors for either being complicit to the fraud, or at the very least guilty of gross negligence following Section 31 of the Corporate Code. Said section provides that directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. DOCTRINE: The Board of Directors is expected to be more than a mere rubber stamp of the corporation and its subordinate departments. It wields all corporate powers bestowed by the Corporation Code, including the control over its properties and the conduct of its business. Being stewards of the company, the Board is primarily charged with protecting the assets of the corporation in behalf of its stakeholders. FACTS: 1. Before the Court are the Motion for Reconsiderations filed in view of its 5 July 2017 Decision holding the directors and officers of Wincorp jointly and severally liable with the company for the unpaid investments of Ng Wee made to Power Merge through Wincorp. 2. [From the 5 July 2017 Decision] Ng Wee, as a valued client of Westmont Bank, was enticed by the bank manager to make investments with Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp). Wincorp would match a corporate borrower with an investor willing to provide funds. 3. Ng Wee’s initial investments were matched with Hottick Holdings Corporation whose majority shares were owned by Halim Saad. The Credit Facility extended to Hottick by Wincorp was secured by, among others, a Suretyship Agreement executed by Luis Juan Virata and another Suretyship Agreement by Halim Saad. 4. Hottick fully availed of the loan facility but defaulted in payment during the Asian financial crisis. Wincorp filed collection suits against Hottick but Virata eventually brokered a compromise. 5. Ng Wee confronted Wincorp about the default of Hottick. Wincorp assured Ng Wee that it will absorb the losses from Hottick and Ng Wee’s investments will be transferred to another borrower, Power Merge. Virata is the majority stockholder of Power Merge owning 374,996 out of its 375,000 subscribed capital stock. 6. In a special meeting of Wincorp’s board of directors held on 9 February 1999, Wincorp approved Power Merge’s application for a P1.3bn credit line. On 15 February 1999, Wincorp President Antonio Ong and Vice-President for Operations Anthony Reyes executed the Credit Line Agreement in favor of Power Merge. On 11 March 1999, Wincorp, through another board meeting, increased the credit limit to P2.5bn and an Amendment to the Credit Line Agreement was executed. Power Merge drew a total of P2,183,755,253.11 from the line covered by Promissory Notes (PN) in favor of Wincorp for itself or as agent in behalf of investors which included Ng Wee who put in the total amount of P213,290,410.36. 7. Unknown to Ng Wee, however, on the same date the two Agreements were separately signed, Side Agreements were also entered between Wincorp (represented by Ong and Reyes) and Power Merge absolving Power Merge of liability on the PNs. 8. Ng Wee was not able to collect his investment from Power Merge. On 19 October 2000, he instituted a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against 17 defendants of which only Virata, Power Merge, UPDI, UEM-MARA, Wincorp, Ong, Reyes, Cua, Tankiansee, Santos-Tan, Vicente and Henry Cualoping, and Estrella were duly served with summons. The last six were board directors of Wincorp. Virata filed a cross claim against Wincorp and its board of directors. 9. [Start of Case] On 5 July 2017, the Court issued its Decision in the present consolidated cases. The Court held that the actuations of Wincorp establishes actionable fraud for which it can be held liable while Power Merge is liable to Ng Wee based on the promissory notes even as an accommodation party. 10. On the basis of fraud, the Court pierced the veil of Wincorp and held the directors and officers personally liable to Ng Wee. The basis of the liability was Section 31 of the Corporation Code when they assented to the grant of the Credit Line Agreement and its Amendment to Power Merge. 11. The cross claim of Virata against Ong, Reyes and the board members were also granted and Wincorp, Ong and Reyes together with the board members were ordered jointly and severally liable to pay and reimburse Virata for any payment or contribution he made to Ng Wee. Petitioners filed for an MR which is the basis of this Resolution. 12. The Court notes that the grounds relied upon by Virata, Estrella, Ng Wee, Cua and the Cualopings, Reyes, and Wincorp are the same or substantially similar to those raised in their respective petitions thus were denied. 13. Santos-Tan however did not appeal the decision of the CA holding her liable with her co-parties to Ng Wee and was only participating in the proceedings in her plea of reconsideration. She argues that the cross-claim should not have been granted because the Side Agreements which served as the basis thereof never got the imprimatur of the Board of Directors. Moreover, considering the P2.18bn drawdowns of Power Merge, she found it iniquitous and immoral to require her and her co-directors to reimburse Virata of whatever he was required to pay Ng Wee. ISSUES: 1. Are the board of directors personally liable to Ng Wee for the investment he placed with Power Merge through Wincorp? YES RATIO: 1. In its 5 July 2017 decision, the Court explained the liabilities of the board directors in view of Section 31 of the Corporation Code. 2. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides: Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers . — Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquire, in violation of his duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the corporation. 3. For Cua and the Cualopings, the totality of circumstances proves that they are either complicit to the fraud, or at the very least guilty of gross negligence. a. The board is charged with a fiduciary duty which it failed to fulfill when it did not heed the warning signs which would have cautioned it from approving the loan in haste: (1) Power Merge has only been in existence for two years when it was granted a credit facility; (2) Power Merge was thinly capitalized with only P37,500,000.00 subscribed capital; (3) Power Merge was not an ongoing concern since it never secured the necessary permits and licenses to conduct business, it never engaged in any lucrative business, and it did not file the necessary reports with the SEC; and (4) no security other than its Promissory Notes was demanded by Wincorp or was furnished by Power Merge in relation to the latter's drawdowns. b. Further, prior to Power Merge’s application for a credit facility, Virata had outstanding unpaid transactions with Wincorp for its Hottick obligations. Instead of impleading Virata in the Hottick account, however, Wincorp released him from liability and granted him a credit facility in the amount of P1.3bn. c. It is immaterial if Cua and the Cualopings approved or not the Side Agreements or authorized its signing. Wincorp could have avoided its troubles if they were vigilant enough to disapprove the Power Merge credit application. likewise did not allow him to use as defense his being a mere nominee and that he only had one nominal share as well as whether or not he received compensation or honoraria for attending the board meetings. 6. The liability of Santos-Tan is no different from Cua and the Cualopings in their personal capacity under Section 31 of the Corporation Code. 7. The contention that the Side Agreements were without the imprimatur of its board of directors cannot be given credence. The totality of circumstances supports the conclusion that the Wincorp directors impliedly ratified, if not furtively authorized, the signing of the Side Agreements in order to lay the groundwork for the fraudulent scheme. a. Virata had existing obligations to Wincorp from the Hottick account. However, the board excluded Virata as a party respondent to its collection suit against Hottick and, on the same day, approved the P1.3bn credit line to Power Merge. b. Proceeds of the credit line were released to Power Merge before the corresponding Agreements were signed. This lends credence to Virata’s claim that Wincorp did not intend for Power Merge to be 4. Tankiansee was absolved because his immigration records clearly show that he was outside the country during the dates when the Agreements were approved by the board. 5. Estrella tried to echo the same defense as Tankiansee although the minutes of both board meetings indicate his presence. He claims to have left the meeting before the matter of Power Merge’s application was discussed. He however failed to offer concrete evidence for this alibi. The Court strictly bound by the terms of the credit facility. 8. RULING: The MRs were denied. DISSENTING OPINION, Tijam, J. : In his dissent, Justice Tijam found no basis in holding Cua, the Cualopings, Santos-Tan and Estrella jointly and severally liable with Virata, Wincorp, Ong and Reyes to pay Ng Wee the amount of his investment. 1. Directors, Trustees or Officers can be held personally and solidarily liable with the corporation in situations enumerated by law and jurisprudence. In this case, there was no proof showing that the approval of the Credit Line Agreement and its Amendment were patently unlawful acts of the corporation. 2. The directors did not willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to the execution of the Side Agreements that exonerated Power Merge of its liability on the promissory notes, except for the signatories who were Ong and Reyes. 3. Neither are the directors guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing or dealing in the affairs of the corporation, they merely approved the Credit Line Agreements because the screening committee of the corporation and its subordinate departments approved the same. 4. The Credit Line Agreements of Wincorp as approved by its officers may be merely called as a business strategy which turned out to be unfavorable.