MIDTERM REVIEWER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Schedule
Class
JD 102 Statutory Construction
Type
Lecture
Materials
Reviewed
Class Allocation
TEACHER
Statutory Constructions
ATTY. Marc M. Guison
MIDTERMS REVIEWER - STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
I.DEFINITION OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In Caltex vs. Palomar GR No. L-19650, The supreme Court
defined construction as “the art or process of discovering
or expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to the application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.”
Construction is also defined as “the act of construing,
interpreting or explaining the meaning or effect of a
statute or contract.”
Also called Legal Hermeneutics, which is defined as “the
systematic body of rules which are recognized as
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applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal
writings.”
II.NORMAL AND EXPANDED CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, vests
judicial power in the Supreme Court and such other courts
established by law.
TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
Refers to “the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable before the court of justice
or the redress of wrongs for the violation of such
rights”
EXPANDED CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
Refers to “the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.”
RULES IN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
When the law is clear, the court’s duty is to apply it,
not to
interpret it. (Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326)
It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without
fear or favor.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. (Art 10, NEW
CIVIL CODE)
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When construction or interpretation is necessary, the
court
should interpret the law according to the meaning the
legislature intended to give it.
If there are two possible interpretations of a law,
that which will achieve the ends desired by Congress
should be adopted.
Laws of pleadings, practice and procedure are liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason of
the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (Art.
9, New Civil Code).
In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws, a judge may still be guided by the following:
• Customs
• Court Decisions / Jurisprudence
• Legal Opinions of Qualified writers and professors
(Amici Curae)
• General Principles of Justice and Equity
• RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
III.CALTEX V. PALOMAR (CASE)
FACTS OF THE CASE
Caltex promoted a contest where participants were to
submit an estimate of the number of liters that a
hooded gas pump will dispense at a specified period,
with the closest estimate winning certain prizes.
The entries are to be submitted via mail, which
according to the Postmaster General, is not allowed on
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the ground that the scheme falls within the purview of
Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code.
SECTION 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code
“Classifies as non-mailable written or printed matter
containing lottery, gift enterprise or similar
scheme.”
The Postmaster General argued that there is no need to
construe Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative
Court and that is should be simply applied to the same
to Caltex.
ISSUE
Whether the said Contest initiated by Caltex violates
Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code
RULING, APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court rejected the argument and ruled that
the issue calls for the construction of Section 1954 of
the Revised Administrative code.
Section 1954 of the Revised Administrative code
empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders
against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of
the postal service to, any information concerning "any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind.
Upon analyzing the said provision, it was agreed that
“the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution
of property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.”
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This in turn led to a decision to determine that the
said contest does not qualify in the definition of a
lottery
As for a gift enterprise, it was held that a gift
enterprise is to be construed the same as a lottery,
that it is only condemnable if there exists the element
of prize, chance and consideration.
The resolution of the question whether the scheme falls
within the prohibitive provisions of the law requires
an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein.
The petition is
AFFIRMED
NOTES IN THE CASE
The case provides a definition for statutory
construction and it is applied in the case by defining
the administrative code applies with respect to the
contest applied to by caltex.
In the case at hand, the definition of Statutory
Construction was defined as follows:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTRUCTION DEFINED; CASE AT
BAR. — Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided
for in the law. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p.
1).
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IV.WHEN SHOULD WE APPLY STATUTORY CONSTRUTCION
Statutory Construction is Necessary when the legislative
intent Cannot be Readily Ascertained from the words used
in the law as Applied under a set of Facts.
In BOLOS V. BOLOS, It is held that:
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application. As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plainmeaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."
In ALLARDE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et.al , it is held that
“It is an elementary principle of statutory
construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the meaning and
intention of the legislature should be determined from
the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity
in the words, there is no room for construction.”
In People Vs. Mapa, it is held that:
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.”
The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.
V.AMBIGUITY - 3 TESTS TO DETERMINE AMBIGUITY
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Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning,
indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression
used in a written instrument.
In Del Mar V. PAGCOR, et al., A statute is ambiguous when
it is capable of being understood by reasonably well
informed persons in either two or more senses.
TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A STATUE IS AMBIGUOUS
1. TEST OF MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS
When the statute is capable of two or more reasonable
interpretations, such that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application
2. TEST OF IMPOSSIBILITY
When literal application is impossible or
inadequate.
3. TEST OF ABSURDITY OR UNREASONABLENESS
When a literal interpretation of the statute leads
to an unjust, absurd, unreasonable or mischievous
result, or one at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole.
THREE CARDINAL RULES
Verba Legis
The words used in the Constitution must be given
ordinary meaning except when technical terms are
employed.
Ratio Legis Est Anima
The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers.
Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
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Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but
if plain meaning of the word is not found to be
clear, resort to other aids is available.
(Extrinsic aids)
VI.BOLOS V. BOLOS (CASE)
FACTS
Cynthia and Danilo bolos got married.
Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Danilo Bolos under Article
36 of the family code.
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered
judgment declaring that the marriage between petitioner
Cynthia Bolos and Respondent Danilo which was
celebrated on February 14, 1980, null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of both of them with legal consequences provided
by law. It was declared as final and executory.
Respondent Danilo Bolos filed a notice of appeal to the
rtc, which was denied due course to the appeal for
Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
Danilo Bolos filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to void the
orders of Regional Trial Court regarding their marriage
on the ground that the RTC rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
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As a response, CA granted the petition and reversed the
case stating that “the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on
February 14, 1980, before the Family Code took effect.
It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli to the effect that the
“coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.”
Cynthia appealed to the Supreme Court, stating that
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS
RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN
A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS"
RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
ISSUE
Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is
applicable to the case at bench.
RULING
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March
15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the
Rule, in fact,
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Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
"petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application. As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plainmeaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."
PETITION IS DENIED
NOTES ON THE CASE
This is the case that determines where should on apply
Statutory Construction.
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When one gives out the explanation, Cite the case of
BOLOS v. BOLOS
VII.ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (CASE)
FACTS
The petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,were
candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas.
The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for
the said district, for having received the most number
of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified.
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in
the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period
during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c)
that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period.
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Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion
of Dismissal” alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a
protest against the election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936,denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to
Dismiss the Protest.
ISSUE
Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance
of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.
RULES/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
“SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly.”
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention
it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and
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impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide
for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With
this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented
to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location
of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled “Legislative
Department” of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the
legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the
National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within
which protests should be filed, the grant of power to
the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
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Commission in such case would be invested with the
power to determine contested cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of
totally transferring this authority from the
legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of
powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the
bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred
to, but in reality without the necessary means to
render that authority effective whenever and whenever
the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation
worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers
of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part
of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly
of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission,
and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result
should not be permitted.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when
the power to decide election contests was still lodged
in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
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constitutional power to be “the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly”, to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to
dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is
not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
seat in the national Assembly and to render him
eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1,
Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll
the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent
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of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the
purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
NOTES
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION also talks about the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the relation of
these 3 branches its relation to constitutional
principles.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government.
It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
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an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the
government.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution.
In order for the Supreme Court to determine the correct
interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution, it used the deliberations of our
Constitutional Convention in order to define the powers
vested by the government.
VIII.STARE DECISIS
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta non movere ( Follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled)
is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code, which provides
that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
It is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.
This principle is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability in judicial
decisions.
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Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet (the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.)
The Supreme Court is described as having the last word on
what the law is, as it is the final arbiter of any
justiciable controversy. As such, lower courts are
enjoined to follow the decisions of the supreme court.
(CASE) Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc v. maritime Building Co.,
Inc., et al
This case described the significance of the principle
of stare decisis as follows:
Chief Justice Castro preface cites the governing
principle of precedents and stare decisis which has
given consistency and stability to the law:
In the famous essay of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
the Path of the Law, he defined law as a prediction
of what the court will do.
The prediction is based on precedents. The governing
principle, which has given consistency and stability
to the law, is stare decisis et petition quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled.)
The officials enforcing statutory law and
regulations, the lawyers and litigants seeking to
know the law in concrete controverted cases, and the
judges in adversary litigations, should be well
posted on precedents.
Such precedents and jurispudence of the court form
part of the legal system by force of the provision of
Article 8 of the new Civil Code.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
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system of the Philippines’ and may not be lightly
treated.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is
well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been established
by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction
will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation.
It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability in the law and does not require identity of or
privity or parties.
Such decisions assume the same authority as the statute
itself until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the applications not only of
those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in
duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Abandonment thereof must be based on strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this court would be immeasurably
affected and the public’s confidence in the stability of
such pronouncements be diminished.
Factual circumstances of the precedent however must
substantially be the same as a different factual milleu in
a subsequent case can be used as justification for the
non-application of stare decisis.
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Furthermore, for the doctrine of Stare decisis to apply,
the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
precedent case must pertain to the main issue of the case
and not merely obiter dictum.
A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not embody
the resolution or determination of the court and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point,
not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge
himselg.
As such mere dicta is not binding under the doctrine of
stare decisis.
The last point to consider is that in spite of the
principle of stare decisis, the Supreme Court is not
prevented from changing its mind and reversing a previous
doctrine that it laid down.
Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Philippine Constitution
states in part that “no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in a
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.”
The court explained in Ting v Ting that “the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted, and that “it is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is Overruled, and a different view
is adopted. that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of lex prospicit, non respicit.”
IX.PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, and PEPSICO,
INCORPORATED, v. PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN (CASE)
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FACTS
This case stemmed from a Complaint filed by herein
respondents Pepe B. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) and
Pepito A. Lumahan (Lumahan) against herein petitioners
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI)
and PEPSICO, Incorporated (PEPSICO) before the Regional
Trial Court , for Sum of Money and Damages.
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) approved and supervised underthe-crown promotional campaign entitled "Number Fever"
sometime in 1992.
On account of the success of the promotional campaign,
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO extended or stretched out
the duration of the "Number Fever" for another five
weeks or until 12 June 1992.
On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced
the notorious three-digit combination "349" as the
winning number for the next day, 26 May 1992. On the
same night of the announcement, however, petitioners
PCPPI and PEPSICO learned of reports that numerous
people were trying to redeem "349" bearing crowns
and/or resealable caps with incorrect security codes.
Upon verification from the list of the 25 pre-selected
winning three-digit numbers, petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO and the DTI learned that the three-digit
combination "349" was indeed the winning combination
for 26 May 1992 but the security codes do not
correspond to that assigned to the winning number
"349".
As “goodwill” however, Pepsi-Cola offered to give the
respondents a small sum of money.
Respondents demanded the payment of the corresponding
cash prizes, but Pepsi-Cola refused to take heed. This
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21
prompted the respondents to file a collective complaint
for sum of money and damages before the RTC.
RTC dismissed the same for lack of action, holding that
the three-digit number must tally with the
corresponding security code, and that it was made clear
in the advertisements and posters put up by Pepsi-Cola
that the defendants must acquire both.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied by the
same tribunal, they elevated the case to Court of
Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s order. Hence, the
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Pepsi-Cola is estopped from raising stare
decisis as a defense.
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
Arguments:
Pepsi-Cola: In the previous Pepsi/”349″ cases, i.e.,
Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, and De Mesa, SC held that
both the three-digit number and the security code
must be acquired in order for the person to be
entitled to such cash prize. Pepsi-Cola raised this,
alleging that the principle of stare decisis should
have been determinative of the outcome of the case at
bar.
Respondents: They justified the non-application of
stare decisis by stating that it is required that the
legal rights and relations of the parties, and the
facts, and the applicable laws, the issue, and
evidence are exactly the same. They contended that
they are not similar nor identical with the previous
cases, and that their basis of their action is Breach
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22
of Contract whereas the Mendoza case involved
complains for Specific Performance.
The Supreme Court held that the cases of Mendoza (and
the other previous Pepsi/”349″ cases), including the
case at bar, arose from the same set of facts
concerning the “Number Fever” promo debacle of PepsiCola. Like the respondents, Mendoza (and the other
previous Pepsi/”349″ cases) were also the holders of
supposedly-winning crowns, but were not honored for
failing to contain the correct security code assigned
to such winning combination. In those old cases, SC
held that the announced mechanics clearly indicated the
need for the authenticated security number in order to
prevent tampering or faking crowns; that in those
cases, the legal rights and relations of the parties,
the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action,
the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as
those preceding cases.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code,
to wit: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
When a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same.
In the case at bar, therefore, The Supreme Court had no
alternative but to uphold the ruling that the correct
security code is an essential, nay, critical,
requirement in order to become entitled to the amount
printed on a “349” bearing crown and/or resealable cap.
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23
The same judicial principle should also prevent
respondents from receiving the money as goodwill
compensation, as the respondents rejected the same and
that Pepsi-Cola’s offer of small money had long
expired.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving
a similar situation.
It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability in the law and does not require identity
of or privity of parties.
This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of
the Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions
“assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound
to enforce obedience thereto.”
Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would
be immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in
the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.
The instant petition was GRANTED
X.1.VERBA LEGIS
Under the plain meaning rule or Verba Legis, if the
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
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24
be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.
Verba legis non est Recendendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure. It is expressed in
the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention."
In Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Lacap, The
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
expresses its intention and precludes the court from
construing it differently since they are presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute.
Absoluta Sentencia Expositore non indiget - To the plain
words of a legal provision, we should make no further
explanation.
Under the verba legis rule, the intent of the authors of
legislation is gleaned from what is said, not from what
they may have intended to say.
X.2.RE: QUERY ON THE EFFECT OF THE 10% SALARY INCREASE UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 611 (CASE)
FACTS
Congress enacted R.A. No. 9227, which grants additional
compensation in the form of special allowances to
justices, judges and other positions in the judiciary.
Subsequently, Former President Arroyo issued E.O. No.
611, directing the implementation of a 10% increase in
the basic salary of civilian government personnel whose
positions are covered under R.A. 6758.
In view of R.A. 9227, the Department of Budget of
Management released funds with the advise that it also
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25
covered the 10% implementation of E.O 611.
This in turn, led to the corresponding decrease in the
monthly income of the incumbent justices, judges and
judicial officers of equivalent rank.
The court recognized that the long term effect of RA
9227 will defeat its purpose to entice lawyers to join
the judiciary.
RULING
Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum
While continued, long-term implementation of Section 6,
R.A. No. 9227 would, indeed, defeat the very purposes
for which said law was passed, there is no escaping the
express provisions of the law. Well-established is the
rule that "from the words of the statute there should
be no departure."
Hindi dapat lumihis sa mga titik ng batas.
Where, by the use of clear and equivocal language
capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the
legislature, it must be enforced even though it is
absurd or mischievous.
Hence, there is nothing to do but to allow the 10%
increase in basic salary of justices, judges and those
other officials likewise directly benefiting from R.A.
No. 9227 to be sourced from the SAJ fund, and to allow
the corresponding 10% reduction in SAJ.
Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the
law. Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit ngunit ito ang
batas.
NOTES ON THE CASE (IMPORTANT)
The present case gave emphasis on the difference
between an absurd interpretation of law to an absurdity
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26
of the law.
A key concept in determining whether a law is ambiguous
is the test of absurdity.
In Re: EO 611 However, the court mentioned that if the
law is clear, it must be enforced “even though it is
absurd and mischievous.”
There must be a distinction between an absurd
interpretation of the law and the absurdity of the law.
The former is a matter of statutory construction, the
latter is not.
The former is the proper subject of construction
since the literal interpretation will lead to absurd
results, which is presumed not to be the intention of
the legislature.
The latter cannot be a subject matter of construction
as it delves into the wisdom of the law, which is the
province of the legislature.
XI.1.RATIO LEGIS
Ratio legis et anima- The reason of the law is the soul of
the law.
A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,
and that what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within its letter and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within
the statute.
This principle of construction is used when legislative
intent cannot be ascertained purely from the letter of the
law.
XI.2.SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK (CASE)
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27
FACTS
Bartelli, an American tourist, detained and raped karen
Salvacion. Salvacion was rescued and Bartelli was
arrested. The policemen recovered from Bartelli several
dollar checks and a dollar account in China Bank.
A criminal case was filed against Bartelli. Bartelli
however escaped from prison resulting to the criminal
case not prospering
In the civil case filed against Bartelli, the trial
court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s
fees.
Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar
deposit with China Bank. But China Bank refused arguing
that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
relief in the Supreme Court and questioned the
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A No. 6426 and
Central Bank Circular 960.
ISSUE
Whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or
other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits
by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the
deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a
mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain
the deposit in the bank for long.
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
The present petition has far-reaching implications on
the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong
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28
committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and
regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not
contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the
alien.
More specifically, the petition raises the question
whether the protection against attachment, garnishment
or other court process accorded to foreign currency
deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies
when the deposit does not come from a lender or
investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is
not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for
long.
The resolution of this question is important for the
protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum
by foreigners who are merely passing through.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against
attachment, garnishment and other court process to
foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases
(WHEREAS CLAUSE)
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection
accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure
the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in
the Philippines" (3rd Whereas clause).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No.
1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are found
in the whereas clauses.
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit
system was created by PD. No. 1035 and the purpose
are found in the whereas clauses.
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that
the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency
Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
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29
foreign lenders
and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034;
third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits
that are induced by the two laws and given protection
and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and,
therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist
or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General
thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg
Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246
against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
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30
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente
con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section
113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device
by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the
belief that we have served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to
COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli
y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE
to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.
XII.1.HOW CERTAIN PROVISIONS ARE CONSTRUED (SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
4)
Directory laws are laws that are permissive in operation.
Compliance with directory laws is discretionary because
they do not have mandatory effect. Generally, directory
laws contain the word "may/may not.”
Substantial Rights are affected
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31
Mandatory laws are laws that are imperative and impose a
duty upon those covered by the law. Generally, these laws
contain the words “shall” or “must.”
Acts contrary to mandatory laws are void, unless there
is an exception in the law.
No substantial rights are affected
Prohibitory laws are mandatory laws that imposes duty to
refrain from doing a forbidden act. Generally, they use
the phrases “shall not,”
“must not,” or “may not.”
Acts contrary to prohibitory laws are void, unless
there is an exception in the law.
General Principles of Construction
1. Law Construed as a Whole
A law must be construed as a whole and the words,
phrases and clauses in a law should not be studied in
isolation but rather analyzed in light of other cognate
provisions of the statute in order to understand that
meaning attached to them by the legislature.
2. Presumption of Justice (Article 10, Civil Code)
Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that in case
of doubt in the interpretation of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
3. Construction consistent with the Constitution
Statutes must be construed in a manner consistent with
the Constitution. This principle is based on the
fundamental criterion that all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute, considering that all laws have in their favor
the presumption of constitutionality.
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32
4. Construction to Render the provision Effective
A statute must be construed in such a way so as to
render it effective.
The maxim Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam pereat means the
thing may reather have effect than be destroyed.
Under this principle, care should be taken that every
part thereof is given effect, based on the theory that
the statute was enacted as an integrated measure and
not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.
XII.2.LEGISLATIVE POLICIES AND PRESUMPTIONS (CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY)
Personal note: Prescriptive periods and Constitutional
Construction are not included(Chapter 4 pages 122 to 147)
PENAL LAWS
NULLUIM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE - There is no
crime where there is no law punishing it, is a key
principal under criminal law.
Under this principle, there must be a clear definition
of the acts constituting the punishable offense as well
as the penalty that may be imposed.
It is a basic rule in statutory Construction that penal
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the
accused.
IN CENTENO V. VILLALON-PORNILLOS if the statute is
ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in
favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be
preferred.
The principle is that acts in and of themselves
innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal
unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of
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33
the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is
not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute
should be regarded as without its intendment.
The principle of in dubio pro reo (Latin for "[when] in
doubt, for the accused") means that a defendant may not
be convicted by the court when doubts about his or her
guilt remain. The rule of lenity is the doctrine that
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the more
lenient punishment.
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting
criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused.
In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until
and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro
reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine
that "a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of
the more lenient punishment."
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case
is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness."
Since the goal of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to
look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an
application or interpretation that is more favorable to
the accused.
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34
TAX LAWS
A statute will not be construed as imposing a tax
unless it does so clearly, expressly and unambiguously.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of
Appeals, what applies is the equally well-settled rule
that the imposition of a tax cannot be presumed.
Where there is doubt, tax laws must be construed
strictly against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer. This is because taxes are burdens on the
taxpayer, and should not be unduly imposed or
presumed beyond what the statutes expressly and
clearly import".
As a rule, Tax exemptions are construed strongly
against the claimant.
In NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, As a rule, tax
exemptions are construed strongly against the
claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly
and categorically, and supported by clear legal
provisions
Tax exemptions are to be construed strictly against the
taxpayer.
SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS ( LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)
Article 4 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, provides that “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.”
RULES OF COURT
The Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
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35
ADOPTION LAWS
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship
of paternity and filiation between the adopter and
adoptee where none existed.
In “IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA”, It is a settled rule that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law.
LOCAL AUTONOMY
Article X, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the territorial and subdivisions of the
Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy.
The interpretation of the provisions of The Local
Government Code, the following rules shall apply:
1. Any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
2. In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue
measure shall be construed strictly against the
local government unit enacting it, and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive
or relief granted by any local government unit
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36
pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it;
3. The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers to local
government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for
the people in the community;
NATURALIZATION LAWS
Naturalization laws are construed strictly and doubts
thereof resolved against the applicant.
It should be rigidly enforced in favor of the
government.
If the Language of the law on naturalization is express
and explicit, it is beyond the province of the courts
to take into account question of expidency, good faith
and other similar provisions in the construction of its
provisions.
IN THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION TO PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP OF CUAKI TAN SI. CUAKI TAN SI vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, it is held that:
At the outset, it should be noted that a
naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial
contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose
claim is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence. Indeed, naturalization is no a matter of
right, but one of privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting
nature, affecting as it does, public interest of the
highest order and which may be enjoyed only under the
precise conditions prescribed by law therefor. Such
conditions are of two (2) kinds, namely: (1)
substantial and (2) formal or procedural.
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37
ELECTION LAWS
In Rulloda V. Commission on elections, it is held that
Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
XIII.WORDS BEING USED (CHAPTER 5)
USE OF SPECIFIC WORDS
AND/OR
As a general rule, the use of the word “and” is
interpreted as conjunctive, while “or” denotes a
disjunctive relationship.
The word “and” implies conjunction, jointer or union.
The word or is a disjunctive term, signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the
other things enumerated.
(CASE) MICROSOFT V. MANANSALA, et al.
FACTS
The case is an example of where the Supreme Court
clarified that the use of the word “and” does not
necessarily signify a conjunctive relationship if
such interpretation will be contrary to the clear
legislative intent.
The case involves Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 49 specifically defined copyright as an
exclusive right in the following manner:
Section 5. Copyright shall consist in the
exclusive right:
(A) To print, reprint, publish, copy,
distribute, multiply, sell, and make
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38
photographs, photo-engravings, and pictorial
illustrations of the works;
ISSUE
The issue in the case is whether in respect of
Section 5(A) of PD. No. 49 quoted above, a person can
be held liable for copyright infringement if it is
engaged in the selling 8 and distribution of
unauthorized Microsoft computer programs, without
evidence that the same person is also the one who
printed or copied the products for sale in his store.
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the
criminal charges held against private respondents
on the ground that the term "and as used in
Section 5(A) of P.D. No. 49 should be read as
conjunctive.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument
and directed the filing of cases against private
respondents.
The CA erred in its reading and interpretation of
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49. Under the
rules on syntax, the conjunctive word "and"
denotes a "joinder or union" of words, phrases, or
clause; it is different from the disjunctive word
"or" that signals disassociation or independence.
However, a more important rule of statutory
construction dictates that laws should be
construed in a manner that avoids absurdity or
unreasonableness.
As the Court pointed out in Automotive Parts &
Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lingad:
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39
Nothing is better settled then that courts are
not to give words a meaning which would lead to
absurd or unreasonable consequence. That is a
principle that goes back to In re:Allen decided
on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That
is a strong argument against its adoption. The
words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt.
Thus: ‘The fact that the construction placed
upon the statute by the appellants would lead
to an absurdity is another argument for
rejecting it’
It is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a
deplorable result. That has long been a
judicial function. A literal reading of a
legislative act which could be thus
characterized is to be avoided if the language
thereof can be given a reasonable application
consistent with the legislative purpose. In the
apt language of Frankfurter: "A decent respect
for the policy of Congress must save us from
imputing to it a self-defeating, if not
disingenuous purpose. Certainly, we must reject
a construction that at best amounts to a
manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly
satisfies the test of rationality on which law
must be based.
The conjunctive "and" should not be taken in
its ordinary acceptation, but should be
construed like the disjunctive "or" if the
literal interpretation of the law would pervert
or obscure the legislative intent.
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40
To accept the CA’s reading and interpretation
is to accept absurd results because the
violations listed in Section 5(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 49 – "To print,
reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply,
sell, and make photographs, photo-engravings,
and pictorial illustrations of the works" –
cannot be carried out on all of the classes of
works enumerated in Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 49.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on February 27, 2004
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 76402;
INCLUDING/INVOLVING
The use of the word “Including” followed by an
enumeration generally denotes that the enumeration is
not exclusive
(CASE) Sterling Selections Corporation Vs. Laguna Lake
Development
FACTS
The court was called upon to interpret the
coverage of Section 29300 of LLDA Resolution No.
41
Section 2. Exemptions. The following
activities, projects, and installations are
exempt from the above subject requirements:
30. Cottage Industries, including
- stuffed toys manufacturing
- handicrafts, and
- rattan/furniture manufacturing
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41
The petitioner in the case was engaged in the
fabrication of sterling silver jewelry and was
claiming exemption from the requirement of
securing an LLDA Clearance Permit on the ground
that it is engaged in a cottage industry.
The Court of appeals concluded that those arising
from Section 2(30) are not environmentally
critical, and did not include petitioner in its
inclusion in the rule.
Petitioner questioned the interpretation arguing
that “including” connotes a sense of containing or
comprising and not a sense of exclusivity or
exclusion.
ISSUE
Whether Petitioner is included in the exemption
indicated by the provision
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that the word “include”
means “to take part in or comprise as a part of a
whole” and held:
Thus, this Court has previously held that it
necessarily conveys the very idea of nonexclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not
apply where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or
where the enumeration is by way of example only.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
does not apply when words are mentioned by way of
example. Said legal maxim should be applied only
as a means of discovering legislative intent which
is not otherwise manifest.
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42
In another case, the Court said:
[T]he word "involving," when understood in the
sense of "including," as in including technical or
financial assistance, necessarily implies that
there are activities other than those that are
being included. In other words, if an agreement
includes technical or financial assistance, there
is [–] apart from such assistance – something else
already in[,] and covered or may be covered by,
the said agreement.
As the regulation stands, therefore, all cottage
industries including, but not limited to, those
enumerated therein are exempted from securing
prior clearance from the LLDA. Hence, the CA erred
in ruling that only the three activities
enumerated therein are exempted.
While the court declared that the Court of Appeals
erred in its definition of “including” petitioner
was still held not covered by the exemption as the
business exceeded the threshold on maximum capital
for cottage industries exempt from the clearance
requirement.
Petition was DENIED
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Also known as the doctrine of associated words,
provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may
be made clear or specific by considering the company in
which it is found or with which it is associated.
In Caltex v. Palomar the Doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis
is applied as follows:
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43
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the
term in question is used in association with the word
"lottery." With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217
aforesaid also relied upon although only in so far as
the element of chance is concerned — it is only
logical that the term under construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is
not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent
to eliminate that element of consideration from the
"gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief
sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid
in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the
mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters
which on grounds of public policy are declared nonmailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises
and similar schemes, justification lies in the
recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals. Since in gambling it is inherent that
something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a
larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no
consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be
said to obtain. If, as it has been held —
"Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance
does not constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted
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to as a device to evade the law and no consideration
is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party
receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby.
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a
gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold
that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve
the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes
thereof.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
Under the rule of Ejusdem generis, where in a statute,
general
words follow a designation of particular subjects or
classes of persons, the meaning of the general words
will be ordinarily presumed to be restricted by the
particular designation, and to include only things or
persons of the same kind, class or nature as those
specifically enumerated.
Ejusdem generis means "of the same kind, class or
nature or "of the same kind or specíe.
"The doctrine is "an
attempt to reconcile an incompatibility between
specific and general words so that all words in a
statute and other legal instruments can be given legal
effect, all parts of a statute can be construed
together and no words will be superfluous."
The purpose of this rule was laid down in National
Power
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45
Corporation v. Angas, et al., to wit:
The purpose of the rule on Ejusdem generis is to give
effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class
and the general words as including all that is
embraced in said class, although not specifically
named by the particular words.
This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking
body intended the general terms to be used in their
unrestricted sense, it would have not made an
enumeration of particular subjects but would have
used only general terms.
REQUISITES OF EJUSDEM GENERIS (BELGICA V.
OHCOA)
1. A statute contains an enumeration of particular and
specific words, followed by a general word or phrase
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or
are of the same kind.
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is
not exhaustive or is not merely by examples.
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give
the general words or phrases a broader meaning.
THE RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS DOES NOT APPLY IN
THE FOLLOWING INSTANCES
1. When there is a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, as can be seen from other parts of the
statute.
2. When the items specifically enumerated do not
constitute a readily discernible class and are patently
not of the same kind
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3. When the provision is also qualified by phrases which
clearly shows such enumeration is by way of example
only.
EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCEPTION
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or
"express mention is implied exclusion," means that "the
express mention of one thing in law, as a general rule,
means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned."
The The purpose of this rule is to limit the coverage
of a legal provision to those expressly mentioned
therein.
It is based on the rule of logic and the natural
working of the human mind in determining the probable
intention of the lawmakers in mentioning some and not
others of the same class.
This is borne from the reasoning that "when people say
one thing, they do not mean something else."
(CASE) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. CITY OF CABANATUAN
FACTS
The issue raised before the Court is whether the
National Power Corporation continues to enjoy its
exemption from local taxation notwithstanding the
subsequent passage of the Local Government Code,
Section 193
"Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption
Privileges.Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including government
owned or controlled corporations, except local
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47
water districts, cooperatives duly registered
under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
Code."
ISSUE
Whether the National Power Corporation continues to
enjoy its exemption from local taxation
notwithstanding the subsequent passage of the Local
Government Code, Section 193
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that following the rule of
construction that the mention of one person,
thing, act or consequence excludes all others
under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
The National Power Corporation, not being a local
water district, cooperative registered under R.A.
No. 6938, or a non-stock, non-proft hospital or
educational institution, it is incumbent then upon
the National Power Corporation to point to the
Court that it is exempt from local taxes under the
Local Government Code (and no longer under its
legislative franchise).
Failing to establish its exemption under any other
provisions of the Local Government Code, the Court
held that the National Power Corporation is liable
to pay the City of Cabanatuan franchise tax.
NECESSARY IMPLICATION
CASE OF CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS
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48
In Chua V. Civil Service Commission, et al.," R.A.
No. 6683 was approved to streamline the government
workforce. Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all
appointive
officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as
well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act
shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Chua, who has been hired and re-hired by
the
National Irrigation Administration for more than 10
vears, and acting on the belief that she is qualified
under the law, filed an application with National
Irrigation Administration for voluntary separation.
The NIA however, denied her application to avail of
the
higher separation pay under R.A. No. 6683 and offered
to pay her a lower amount. The Civil Service
Commission held that she is not entitled to
separation pay under R.A. No. 6683 as her employment
with NIA is co-terminus with the NIA project and that
her position is not included in the regular
plantilla, which makes her employment contractual in
nature.
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49
The Civil Service Commission held that applying the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
contractual employees are not included in those
covered under Section 2 of the law, and hence, deemed
excluded.
ISSUE
Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus
employee is excluded from the coverage of R.A. 6683.
RULING/APPLICATION/CONCLUSION
In deciding in favor of the petitioner, the Supreme
Court held that the rule expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is not applicable and what should be applied
instead is the doctrine of necessary implication, to
wit
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
..In Pelwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29,
1966,
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically Situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1)it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present;
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(4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early
Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents submission that
the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as
those covered by said law.
The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
should not be the applicable maxim in this case but
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may
be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events
of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary
implication.
The doctrine states that what is implied in a
Statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, Including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms,
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51
Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed
in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et
minus. (The less is always Included in the
greater.)
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon
(re Early retirement Law), in response Congressman
Dimaporo’s Interpellation on coverage or state
university employees who are extended appointments
for one year, renewable for two or three years, he
explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go
on early retirement and voluntary separation. It
is irrespective of the actual Status or nature of
the appointments one year but it he opts to retire
under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently pending in Congress,
is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the
scope
of the Early Retirement Law). Its Wording Supports
the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 are qualified
group of civil servants.
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary is
to trim the bureaucracy, hence Vacated positions are
deemed abolished upon voluntary retirement of their
occupants,
Will the inclusion of co-terminus personnel (Like the
petitioner)defeat such objective?
In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the Project personnel from the service,
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52
the term of employment is considered expired, the
office functus officio.
Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for
shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish
2 years or continuous service to qualify.
This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that
co-terminus or project employment is inherently
short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas,
retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
Here, violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are
not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled
to the benefits of early retirement.
How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of
trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting
early retirement benefits to a group of employees
(casuals) without plantilla positions?
There would, in such a case, be no abolition of
permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it
would merely be
a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain,
and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminus or project personnel, on the other hand,
who have rendered years of continuous service should
be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement
Law, as long as they file their application prior to
expiration of their term, and as long as they comply
with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose.
In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14
implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 require as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an
aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government
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53
which need not be continuous, in the career or noncareer service, whether appointive, elective, casual,
emergency seasonal, contractual or co-terminus,
including military and police service, as evaluated
and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission.
A similar regulation should be promulgated tor the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminus
personnel who survive the test of time. This would be
in keeping with the coverage of all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and
mental well-being of public servants.
After all, co-terminus personnel are also obligated
to the government for GSIS contributions, Medicare
and income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the
denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep.
Act
No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law.
While the application was filed after expiration of
her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own without
the assistance of counsel. In the interest of
substantial justice, her application must be granted;
after all, she served the government not only for two
(2) years the minimum requirement under the law but
for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
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IMPORTANT NOTES ON THE CASE
The case is a prime example on determining the extent
on which statutory construction be used in the
interpretation of a statute.
In the case at, bar, an interpretation using the
maxim of EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS was
deemed not applicable as it violated the Equal
Protection Clause cited in Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution.
A new interpretation, instead, was made by the
Supreme Court, using the Doctrine of Necessary
Implication as basis, in order to construe that
petitioner Chua must be granted application of her
coverage in the early retirement law.
Based on the foregoing, The following information can
be summarized on the extent on which statutory
construction can be applied:
1. The interpretation of such statute must not
violate the rights given by the Constitution.
a. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (MEMORIZE)
i. The equal protection clause applies only
to persons or things identically Situated
and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of
legislation.
ii.
A classification is reasonable where:
1. It is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences;
2. these are germane to the purpose of the
law;
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3. the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present;
4. the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
2. A new interpretation may be used via other
doctrines in order to fully get the legislative
intent of a statute.
a. DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION
i. The doctrine of necessary implication
holds that:
1. No statute can be enacted that can
provide all the details involved in
its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought,
at the time of enactment, to be an
all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future.
2. So-called gaps in the law develop as
the law is enforced. One of the rules
of statutory construction used to fill
in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication.
3. The doctrine states that what is
implied in a Statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed.
Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or
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to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, Including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its
terms,
4. Ex necessitate legis (From the
necessity of law). And every statutory
grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo
plus sit, simper inest et minus. (The
less is always Included in the
greater.)
XIV.SUBSTANTIVE AND PROVEDURAL LAW
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.
Procedural law consists of the set of rules that govern the
proceedings of the court in criminal lawsuits as well as
civil and administrative proceedings.
The court needs to conform to the standards setup by
procedural law, while during the proceedings.
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