JUSTICE HERNANDO CASES (2019-2022)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), ET.AL
GR 239878 (2022)
Political Law; Remedial Law
Doctrinal Rule
The period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be
included in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay;
the period shall be reckoned from the filing of a formal complaint.
Facts
1. Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan which dismissed the criminal cases against
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
2. This case arose from a complaint filed by Task Force Abono of
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents local
government officials of Surigao City.
3. The COA, finding variance between the cost of fertilizers
procured and the cost of fertilizers locally canvassed resulting to
an overpricing, issued a Notice of Disallowance (NOD) on 14 June
2006.
4. The OMB issued a resolution dated 5 October 2016 finding
probable cause for the filing of an Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
5. Respondents claimed that there was inordinate delay from the
fact-finding phase up to the filing of the Information.
6. The Sandiganbayan granted the motions of respondents and
dismissed the criminal case against them. More than 11 years
have passed from the COA's issuance of the NOD until the filing of
the Information. It held that the delay is not reasonable.
7. The prosecution claims that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the
doctrine of Balancing Test and that the period for fact-finding
investigation should not be added to the period for preliminary
investigation for purposes of computing length of delay.
Issue/s
WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motions
filed by respondents, which resulted to the dismissal of the
criminal
case
and
their
acquittal.
Held
NO. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the criminal cases. Applying the guidelines in Cagang,
the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right to
speedy disposition of cases.
1. The period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be
included in the determination of whether there is inordinate
delay; the period shall be reckoned from the filing of a formal
complaint. In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with the
OMB primarily pertains to the period taken for preliminary
investigation. Thus, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the
period for fact-finding in its determination of the period relevant
to inordinate delay.
2. The OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from
the filing of the complaint on July 4, 2011 and ended on the filing
of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on September 11,
2017. Thus, it took 6 years, 2 months, and 7 days for the OMB to
conduct its preliminary investigation.
Page 1 of 12
3. Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts
depending on when the right was invoked. The defense bears the
burden if the right was invoked within the periods prescribe.
Applying Sections 3(f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
graft investigation officer shall have 10 days after the investigation
to determine probable cause. It was only on October 5, 2016
when the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause, which
is almost three years after the case was submitted for resolution,
or more than four years from the date the last pleadings were
submitted—clearly way beyond the 10-day period.
4. The timing of invocation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases affects which side bears the burden of proof to justify the
delay. The earliest time respondents invoked the right was when
respondent Monteros filed a MR of the OMB October 5, 2016
Resolution. The right was invoked after the lapse of the periods
prescribed, resulting to the burden shifting to the prosecution.
5. The OMB merely made allegations that it is deluged with cases
and that the instant case is complex. The allegation of heavy case
load of a particular government agency should "still be subject to
proof as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the
importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a
fundamental right."
6. For the Court, the delay was unreasonable. Six years, two
months, and seven days for the preliminary investigation of a case
involving a single transaction and seven respondents is too long a
period for this Court to accommodate.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
*****
VILLAMOR V ATTY. JUMAO-AS
AC 8111 (2022)
Ethics
Facts
1. Motion to Reduce Penalty filed by Jumao-as. The Court
suspended Atty. Jumao-as from the practice of law for two years
for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
2. Atty. Jumao-as was found to have represented conflicting
interests.
3. Humbly admitting to his faults, he prays that the Court reduces
his penalty either to a stern warning or a two-month suspension
by considering the following reasons:
3.1 I was a new lawyer;
3.2 I already realized my mistake during the mediation
stage of my case and quickly offered to pay the debts; 3.3
That the Affidavit of Desistance be considered as a
mitigating factor; among others.
4. The Court treats Atty. Jumao-as' Motion to Reduce Penalty as a
motion
for
reconsideration.
Issue/s
WON the penalty of Atty. Jumao-as be reduced based on the
aforesaid reasons.
Held
YES. The Court reduces the penalty to ONE year. 1. His speedy
initiative to make amends and take responsibility of the entire
debt of Villamor to Yu in the amount of P650K is by all means
remarkable. He also expended extraordinary efforts to straighten
out the corporate scuffles involving him and complainant Villamor
Page 2 of 12
and they have resumed their business dealings in good terms. 2.
These acts of contrition, however, will not reduce Atty. Jumao-as'
administrative liability to the full extent that he desires. He may
have been forgiven by his complainant, but the disrepute to the
legal profession that he had caused cannot simply be repaired by
a mere warning or serving a short-lived suspension from law
practice. 3. In Legaspi v. Atty. Gonzales, the Court sanctioned the
erring lawyer with a year-long suspension from the practice of law
for advocating conflicting interests.
Disposition
The Motion to Reduce Penalty is TREATED as a Motion for
Reconsideration and the same is GRANTED IN PART. Respondent
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for the reduced period of
one year.
petitioner filed for the alleged enforced disappearance of her son,
Johnson.
2. Morada received text that Johnson was arrested and detained
by the barangay tanods of for alleged theft of a mobile phone in
the house of another barangay tanod, herein respondent Rias.
3. Morada went to the barangay hall and was told by Rolly that
Johnson was already released from the custody of the barangay
as evidenced by the entry in the barangay blotter, signed by
Johnson himself.
4. Morada went to the Northern Police District (NPD) to report
that her son is missing. An investigation was conducted but the
same was terminated in view of the lack of a witness to shed light
on Johnson's disappearance.
*****
Morada v Rias
GR 222226 (2022)
Political Law; Remedial Law
Doctrinal Rule
For the issuance of the writ of amparo, it is not sufficient that a
person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and
prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the
required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal
to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the missing persons.
Facts
1. Petition for review on certiorari from the Order of the RTC
which denied the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo
5. In the meantime, rumors circulated that Johnson had been
extrajudicially killed and that his body was mixed in cement in
order to conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to institute
a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
6. The RTC held that there was no showing of any refusal on the
part of the respondents to acknowledge or to give information on
Johnson's whereabouts such that there was no intention to
remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time. Thus, the third and fourth elements of enforced
disappearance are absent.
Issue/s
WON the RTC gravely erred in not giving due course to the petition
for issuance of writ of amparo despite substantial evidence
submitted
in
support
of
the
same.
Page 3 of 12
Held
NO. There was no substantial evidence exists to prove Morada's
claim.
1. The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined
under RA 9851 are as follows:
1.1 that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;
1.2 that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
1.3 that it be followed by the State or political
organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and
1.4 that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
2. The RTC is correct that the third and fourth elements are sorely
lacking.
3. It was sufficiently established by the respondents that he was
already released from their custody as evidenced by the barangay
blotter, signed by Johnson himself. Such evidence strongly
militate against Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.
4. There was no refusal to give information on the whereabouts
of Johnson evidenced by Morada being immediately informed by
Rolly that Johnson was captured but was also released from
detention the same day.
5. Accordingly, there was no intention to remove Johnson from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time as he had
been
released
already.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
*****
PARTSCH v. ATTY VITORILLO
GR 10897 (2022)
Ethics
Facts
1. Administrative complaint seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Vitorillo.
2. Partsch, a Swiss national, desired to purchase a piece of
beachfront real property located in Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro.
3. Atty. Vitorillo claimed ownership over 800 square meters of the
said beachfront lot.
3.1 He represented that 100 sqm were already titled under
his name.
3.2 The remaining 700 sqm were still pending registration
as it was still under litigation.
4. Partsch tendered a check in the amount of P230K and P20K cash
to Vitorillo as downpayment. Vitorillo promised Partsch to draw
the deed of absolute sale along with the land titles after 3 months.
5. Partsch followed up but was only told that the case over the
700-square-meter portion of the subject property was not yet
done. Vitorillo further advised Partsch to just possess the subject
property and fence it which the latter did not heed.
Page 4 of 12
6. Partsch demanded for reimbursement via a formal demand
letter. The reimbursement, however, remained unpaid.
7. Partsch had completely relied on Vitorillo's representations that
the latter was the absolute owner of the subject property. The
latter even advised Partsch that a foreigner like him can own a
beach lot in the Philippines after he pays its price in full.
8. The IBP CBD determined that Vitorillo's actuations and
misrepresentations have ripened into willful and Gross Dishonesty
and Gross Misconduct and deemed him guilty of violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the CPR.
4. This expectancy was admittedly conditioned on the issuance of
a final court ruling cancelling the title over the main lot in favor of
his clients, who were the ones directly claiming ownership over
the subject property in their own right.
5. He fed Partsch false assurances that the trial court would grant
his cause. He even openly blamed the trial court's supposed delay
in resolving the pending ownership dispute.
6. In so doing, Atty. Vitorillo demeaned the integrity of legal
processes and tarnished the image of impartiality of the courts
that he had professionally vowed to espouse, per Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the CPR.
9. Vitorillo was recommended to be suspended for TWO years.
Issue/s
WON Vitorillo violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.01 of
Canon 7 of the CPR.
Held
YES. Atty. Vitorillo is suspended for THREE years from the practice
of law.
1. The Court finds Atty. Vitorillo guilty of deceitful conduct
proscribed by Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
2. In the contract to sell that he himself submitted before the
Court, he expressly named himself as the seller and absolute
owner of the subject property.
3. What he had was at best an inchoate right, anchored on mere
hope that the subject property shall someday be transferred to
his name.
7. The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private
lands is too basic a rule for even non-attorneys to be unaware of.
As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is presumed to know this.
8. He is deemed to have acted in contravention of Canon 1, Rule
1.02 - CPR's proscription against counseling activities aimed at
defiance of the law.
9. In light of recent jurisprudence most akin to the present case,
the Court increases Atty. Vitorillo's suspension to THREE years.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, Atty. Reynaldo A. Vitorillo is found GUILTY of
deceitful conduct, gross misconduct, violation of Canons 1 and 7,
Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 7.03 of the CPR, and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath. Atty. Vitorillo is SUSPENDED for THREE years.
*****
Dayrit v Norquillas
Page 5 of 12
GR 201631 (2021)
Labor Law
Doctrinal Rule
First-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the
land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian
dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts
of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment
case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will
be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as
amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the
dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject
land.
Facts
1. Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA that reversed the RTC Decision that had
affirmed the MCTC ruling in favor of petitioner Angelina.
2. This arose from a complaint for forcible entry filed by Angelina
against respondents before the MCTC.
6. While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in
the DARAB, Angelina claimed that respondents surreptitiously
entered the property and refused to vacate despite repeated
demands.
7. Respondents alleged that Angelina lost her ownership over the
properties when these were awarded to respondents as CARP
beneficiaries. They also argued that they remain owners of the
parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment
of the CLOAs.
8. MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina holding that respondents
should not have taken the law into their own hands by entering
the property; they should have filed an appropriate action to
enforce their ownership pursuant to the CLOAs. RTC affirmed the
MCTC Decision.
9. The CA reversed the RTC and MCTC ruling that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the CARP.
3. Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land. In
1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the
CARP.
10. The CA found that the issue of possession in this instant case
is linked to an agrarian dispute. Respondents entered the
properties by virtue of the CLOAs issued to them. The MCTC
should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
4. Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled,
and new titles (pursuant to CLOAs) were issued in favor of
respondents.
11. The CA added that the complaint should have been dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia as the trial court was aware that
there was a separate proceeding in the DARAB.
5. Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before
the DARAB, and for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR.
Issue/s
WON the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for
forcible entry.
Page 6 of 12
Held
NO. The Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
instant action for forcible entry.
1. The MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over
agrarian disputes.
2. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, as
related to the instant case, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.
3. The amended CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall
automatically refer the case to the DAR if there is an allegation
from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one
of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant.
4. It must be stressed that David v. Cordova did not lay down the
rule that all ejectment cases, whether involving an agrarian
dispute or not, are cognizable by the first level courts. The reason
why the Court sustained the MCTC's jurisdiction therein is not
because the case is summary in nature, but because it does not
involve an agrarian dispute.
5. David should be read and understood to provide that first-level
courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is
public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute.
6. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of
jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case
is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be
divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended.
7. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute
(i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land.
8. Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon further clarifies
the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate
of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving
agrarian disputes to the DAR.
9. Chailese further provides for the retroactive application of
Section 50-A of RA 9700.
10. The case at bar meets the two requirements for automatic
referral, as set out by RA 9700.
10.1 The first requirement is the presence of an allegation
from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian
in nature. Despite the filing of the forcible entry case,
respondents have been consistent on alleging that the
controversy is agrarian in nature. They alleged that the land
in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries. As
stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an
agrarian dispute is enough.
10.2 As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that
proof must be adduced as to the person's status as farmer,
farmworker, or tenant. Here, it is undisputed that
respondents are farmers of the subject lands.
11. The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB,
has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being
an
agrarian
dispute.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
Page 7 of 12
MMDA v High Desert Stop
GR 213287 (2021)
Remedial Law
Facts
1. Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision which
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
2. MMDA entered into three agreements with HDSOI for the
construction of new public passenger stations.
3. However, MMDA Chairman Fernando terminated the
aforementioned agreements and directed HDSOI to remove all
their installed waiting sheds and commercial advertisements.
4. HDSOI filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of a TRO and/or WPI.
5. Later on, MMDA and HDSOI entered into a MOA or a
compromise agreement for and in consideration of dropping all
pending suits against MMDA.
6. The trial court approved the compromise agreement and
dismissed the complaint filed by HDSOI, including the
counterclaims of MMDA. The Judgment became final and
executory on August 12, 2010.
7. HDSOI moved for the execution of the Judgment. MMDA
opposed arguing that
7.1 The compromise agreement was entered into without
the prior notice, consultation, and approval of the OSG
before it was submitted for the trial court's approval; and
7.2 The compromise agreement failed to specify the factors
for setting P2,500.00 as a just and reasonable rental fee to
prove that it was not disadvantageous to the government.
8. The RTC granted the issuance of a writ of execution.
9. MMDA then filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before
the CA averring that:
9.1 The trial court acted without jurisdiction in approving
the MOA between MMDA and HDSOI that was null and void
for having been entered into without the imprimatur or
approval of the OSG; and
9.2 The terms and conditions of the MOA failed to protect
the interests of the Republic.
10. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that by
arguing that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in approving
the MOA entered into without its imprimatur or prior approval,
the OSG did not attack the absence of jurisdiction. Such argument
merely attacks the exercise of its jurisdiction.
11. The CA also noted that there is nothing in RA No. 7924, or the
law creating the MMDA, that requires the approval of the OSG to
validly enter into compromise agreements on matters over which
it
has
authority
to
do
so.
Issue/s
WON the Compromise Agreement between MMDA and HDSOI is
void for the lack of participation and approval of the OSG.
Held
NO. The petition is unmeritorious.
1. Republic v. Fetalvero discussed the role of a deputized counsel
in relation to the OSG, and the effect of the lack of approval of the
Page 8 of 12
OSG in a compromise agreement. There, despite the lack of the
Solicitor General's approval, the Court held that the government
is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to laches.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
2. Here, the Government is bound by the MOA due to estoppel.
2.1 The OSG is assumed to have known about the existence
of the MOA as petitioner's principal counsel. 2.2 At the very
least, even if the OSG had no prior knowledge of the MOA,
it was duly notified on November 10, 2010 when it received
a copy of the assailed Judgment dated July 2, 2010 together
with other Orders issued by the trial court which approved
the MOA.
2.3 Notwithstanding such knowledge, the OSG failed to file
an appeal or resort to other remedies to contest the validity
of the MOA.
ENDE V ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATURE
GR 191867 (2021)
Civil Law; Remedial Law
3. The Court also agrees with the CA that the action for annulment
of judgment is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
4. The CA is correct when it ruled that what is being assailed is not
the trial court's lack of jurisdiction but only the exercise thereof which is not a ground for Annulment of Judgment.
5. The Court finds it unnecessary to belabor itself as to the
propriety of the terms and conditions of the MOA.
5.1 After a decision is declared final and executory, vested
rights are acquired by the winning party.
5.2 Whether through inadvertence or negligence of its
deputized counsel or the OSG itself, the decision has
already become final and executory.
6. Thus. the MOA entered into by MMDA and HDSOI without the
OSG's
prior
approval
is
valid.
Facts
1. Spouses Butas Ende (Butas) and Damagi Arog (Damagi), both
Manobo natives, were the registered owners of a lot covered by
OCT No. P-46114. However, portions of the subject property are
presently occupied by respondents.
2. Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, claiming to be the surviving
heirs of the spouses Ende, filed a complaint for quieting of OCT
No. P-46114 and recovery of possession thereof.
3. They claimed that respondents' ownership over the portions of
the subject property was merely evidenced by tax declarations
and that the purported conveyances of said respective portions
were never annotated on OCT No. P- 46114.
4. Respondents claimed that they acquired ownership over their
respective portions of the subject property from Damagi or from
third persons who, in turn, acquired the same from Damagi. They
belied Amado, et al's allegation that they are the rightful heirs of
the spouses Ende. They also invoked acquisitive prescription
claiming that their possession of the respective portions of the
subject property spanned at least 30 years to at most 50 years
already.
5. Petitioner Amlayon and Quezon, claiming to be the surviving
children and legitimate heirs of the spouses Ende, intervened.
Page 9 of 12
5.1 They claimed that they are the children and legitimate
heirs of the spouses Ende and that Amado, et al, are mere
impostors.
5.2 They further claimed that they were not able to exercise
their rights over the subject propert after the death of the
Sps Ende because they were driven away from the subject
property by Inacara and Joseph, who are purportedly
nephews of the Sps Ende.
5.3 Thus, they prayed for the nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate of the Sps Ende and the dismissal of
the complaint for quieting of title.
6. The RTC dismissed the complaint for quieting of title and
recovery of possession of the subject property. It, however,
granted Amlayon and Quezon's claim who, by preponderance of
evidence, proved that they are the children of the Sps Ende, and
therefore the legal heirs.
7. The RTC found that the conveyances in favor of respondents
were null and void for being fictitious.
7.1 Except for Wilhelmina who acquired a portion of the
subject property from Damagi.
7.2 However, the portion was reduced to 7.4625 Ha instead
of 10 Ha as Damagi can only convey up to her lawful share
in the inheritance.
8. The RTC also ruled that the improvements of all the defendants
except Wilhelmina shall be governed by Articles 545 to 548 of the
New Civil Code.
9. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling in favor of
Amlayon and Quezon. However, the CA affirmed the RTC's
dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title.
10. The CA dismissed the complaint and the answer-inintervention for lack of cause of action.
10.1 Both parties failed to establish that they are the real
parties-in-interest to institute an action for quieting of title
or recovery of possession.
10.2 CA held that there was a need for a prior declaration
of heirship in a special proceeding to determine the proper
party who can institute an action.
11. The CA further ruled that petitioners' inaction to claim as
alleged rightful heirs of the spouses Ende begs for the application
of the doctrine of laches. Although the subject property covered
by the Torrens System which means that it cannot be acquired by
prescription, the right to recover the same may be barred by
laches.
Issue/s
I. WON petitioners Amlayon and Quezon are the legal heirs of the
Endes'
II. WON respondents validly acquired ownership over the
respective portions of the subject property.
III. WON petitioners Amlayon and Quezon are barred by the
principle of laches to recover the ownership and possession of the
subject
property.
Held
The petition is meritorious.
I.1 YES. The Court declares petitioners Amlayon and Quezon to be
the legal and rightful heirs of Sps Ende.
I.2 The Court laid down in Treyes v. Larlar that a prior
determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not
Page 10 of 12
prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights by virtue of succession.
I.3 What is abandoned in Treyes is the prior determination of
heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite for
filing an ordinary civil action.
I.3.1 Accordingly, when two or more heirs rightfully assert
ownership over another in an ordinary civil action to
recover the property of the estate against third persons,
the trial court may determine their status or right as legal
heirs to protect their legitimate interests in the estate,
since successional rights is transmitted by operation of law
from the moment of death of the decedent.
I.3.2 Thus, the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the
determination of heirship between Amado, Daniel, Felipe,
and Pilar, and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon.
I.4 In the absence of the record of birth and admission of
legitimate filiation, Article 267 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code provide that filiation shall be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
I.4.1 Here, petitioners offered testimonies of their relatives
to prove that they are legitimate children of the spouses
Ende.
I.4.2 Laureana and Cristina testified on petitioners Amlayon
and Quezon's family pedigree based on the declarations
relayed to them by other family members who were
already deceased and cannot testify in court. Such are
considered declarations about pedigree that are
admissible, as an exeption to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130.
I.5 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that between the positive
affirmation of petitioner's witnesses, that Amlayon and Quezon
are legitimate children of the spouses Ende.
I.6 Damagi owned 1/2 of the property while Amlayon and Quezon
each owns 1/4.
II.1 PARTLY. Dagami's share totaled 11 Ha and 190.385 sqm.
II.1.1 The sale to the predecessors-in-interest of Wilhelmina
of 10 Ha is thus valid.
II.1.2 The deed of absolute sale executed by Heirs of Zarza
in favor of respondent Juanito is valid only to the extent of
1 Ha and 190.385 sqm.
II.1.3 All other dispositions are null and void.
II.2 Well-settled is the rule that "purchaser of real estate with
knowledge of any defect or lack to title of the vendor cannot claim
that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true
owner of the land or interest therein."
II.3 Not one of the purchasers of the respective portions of the
subject property protected their rights by registering their
documents of sale or having them duly annotated upon the
issuance of title.
III.1 NO. The essential elements of laches are namely: III.1.1
Conduct of the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;
III.1.2 Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an
opportunity to sue;
III.1.3 Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and
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III.1.4 Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant.
III.2 The acts of petitioners belie the claim that they slept on their
rights.
III.2.1 Amlayon and Quezon were prevented from going
into the subject property because of Inacara's threats.
III.2.2 However, upon Inacara's death, petitioners gradually
prepared the documents needed to recover the subject
property and asked advice from certain individuals and
institution.
III.2.3 Although they did not immediately file a case in court,
this does not mean that laches already set in against their
favor.
III.2.4 Laches does not imply the case in court must be filed
in order that it may not be successfully invoked.
III.3 Also, acquisitive prescription or adverse possession, no
matter how long, is unavailing even to the registered owner's
hereditary heirs as the latter simply steps into his or her shoes by
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. We
DECLARE petitioners Amlayon Ende and Quezon Ende to be the
legal heirs of Butas Ende and are each ENTITLED to an inchoate
share of 5.5 hectares and 95.1925 square meters of the subject
property covered by OCT No. P-46114 while Damagi Arog, as the
legal wife of Butas Ende, is ENTITLED to an inchoate share of 11
hectares and 190.385 square meters.
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