Prior to explaining my argument that R2P will continue to be inefficient, I would like to demonstrate the criterion of a
successful R2P operation via the case of Libya. First, tantamount casualties were widely reported1. Second, there were
regional (the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League) and international (France, UK) calls for intervention2. Third, the
ruling regime itself proved a humanitarian crisis by addressing national unity as “worth more than a small number of
protesters” and openly calling the oppositions as “greasy rats, cockroaches”3. These had legitimized R2P with the right
intention4 and accelerated UNSC's actions.
Now, the lingering question is why R2P was successful in Libya but barely in other places. Theoretically, as realism is
still dominant in international relations, nations prioritise their interests. For crisis states, they resort to self-help to protect the
integrity and entirety of their sovereignty. For outsiders, they seek to profit through either action or inaction. Practically, there
is no guarantee that the consequences of action are not likely worse than that of inaction5. In the case of Libya, the R2P
operation succeeded in responsibility to react but failed in responsibility to rebuild because efforts toward regime change left
the country in chaos until now. However, inaction in Myanmar or Syria also bears a huge cost6.
A recent case that is potential for R2P is the crisis in Myanmar. However, based on the criterion above, R2P is not feasible.
Despite the fact that there are concerns in the international community over the humanitarian crisis and the proven escalation
of oppression against civilians and opposition side7, regional organizations, especially the ASEAN, have yet to advocate for
R2P. Instead, the ASEAN sought a more neutral and more ASEAN-exclusive option of sending a special envoy to initiate
political discussion between the military regime and the pro-democracy government8. Furthermore, as Myanmar’s neighbors,
both China and India would not risk their interests by internationalizing the situation, though they are not happy about the
coup. For China, despite the military’s suspicion towards Beijing, Myanmar can still be a hub for China’s influence as it is
still Myanmar’s largest arms seller and trading partner9, as well as advocator of Myanmar’s stance on Rakhine state10. For
India, New Delhi still has many initiatives in Myanmar as ways of countering China’s Belt and Road, and Myanmar is the
gateway to the ASEAN region11. Therefore, they are unlikely to show an aggressive stance toward the current government to
keep the situation “manageable”.
As can be seen from the two cases, the main reason why the prospect of R2P is bleak lies in the international and regional
approach to the situation. Despite its divine goal to realize the right of humanitarian intervention, R2P is controversial to
prioritize regional and international narratives over the voice of suffering citizens. Apparently, the international community
expect unambiguous criminal evidence so it becomes too late to intervene in many cases12 (news from Syria was once believed
to be exaggerated). Furthermore, while states are expected to uphold their responsibility in international community13, their
different interests can influence decisions to call for R2P. This is due to R2P nature of being “an merging norm and a political
principle”14 rather than a binding law. Related to human rights, R2P has not even been stated in the International Humanitarian
Law, not least assigning responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild to specific actors15. Therefore, the unwillingness
of international actors to act or not in accordance with their strategic interests threatens the effectiveness of the R2P and the
future of humanitarian intervention as a tool for global governance.
Gilman, W.D. (2017). "The Future of Intervention: Examining the Legacy of the Responsibility to Protect". Chancellor’s Honors Program
Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/2047
2 Genser, J. (2018). “The UN Security Council’s Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and
Recommendations for Improvement”. Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect Policy Brief.
3 Gilman, 2017.
4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). (2001). Report on Responsibility to Protect.
5 ICISS, 2001.
6 Simonovic, I. (2019), Conclusion: R2P at a crossroads: implementation or marginalization. In Jacob, C., & Mennecke, M (Eds), Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect: A Future Agenda (p.257). Routledge: London & New York.
7 UN. (2021, September 30). ‘Urgent’ international response needed in Myanmar: UN chief. UN News.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1101822
8 Allard, T. (2021, August 4). ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-appoints-bruneis-erywan-yusof-envoy-myanmar-sources-2021-08-04/
9
Sharma, K. (2021, Febuary 25). India's silence toward Myanmar shows its wariness of China. Nikkei Asia.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/India-s-silence-toward-Myanmar-shows-its-wariness-of-China
10
McLaughlin, T. (2021, Febuary 22).
China Is the Myanmar Coup’s ‘Biggest Loser’.
The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/what-myanmars-coup-means-china/618101/
11 Sharma, 2021.
12 Dembinski, M., & Reinold, T. (2011). “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect – African and European Perspectives”. Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt Report No.107.
13 Supplement to UN Charter in the 2005 World Summit.
14 Buskie, A. (2015, December 18). Understanding the Responsibility to Protect: an introduction. United Nations Association – UK.
https://una.org.uk/news/understanding-responsibility-protect-introduction
15 UNSC with responsibility to prevent is likely to predict potential conflict, check facts, execute political and economic measures (ICSS, 2001).
1