Sources Sheet # 3
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Compiled by Rabbi Yosef Sokol Ph.D.
Halachos of Psychotherapy With Potential Avrayonim
EXEMPLAR ISSUE: When providing therapy, if/when should a therapist consider the
mitzvah of hochiach tochiach, the Chiyuv Lehafrishum Meavairah/Aissura, Lefnai Eiver Lo
Sitain Michshol, Mesayaya L’dvar Aveira?
Multiple choice question
BACKGROUND: You are treating a frum married woman for depression. During a session
she mentions she is angry at her husband and intends to have an affair with a co-worker.
Which of the following is the halachically required course of action?
1. Try to stop her and, if you can’t stop her another way, you must inform her husband or
Rav of her intent. (halachic rationale: Lehafrishum Meavairah)
2. Be mochiach her and tell her this is forbidden but don’t need to stop her or tell her
husband/Rav. (halachic rationale: Hochiach Tochieach Es Chavercha; Kol Yisroel
Araivim).
3. Stop seeing her as a client if she doesn’t agree not to do this in order to avoid
supporting her in her avairah but do not need to be mochiach her or stop her by any
means needed (halachic rationale: Lefnai Eiver Lo Sitan Michshol, Issur Mesayaya
L’dvar Aveira).
4. Limit your therapy interactions to make sure you aren’t validating her emotions and
reasons for wanting to have the affair but don’t need to stop seeing her as a client or be
mochiach (Lefnai Eiver Lo Sitan Michshol, Mesayaya L’dvar Aveira).
5. Refrain from encouraging her to have an affair as an aid to her mental health but are
allowed to work with her to assess if her values support this decision and if it is in her
best long term interests (V’Rapi Yerapeh.)
6. Whatever you feel is in her best mental health interests including encouraging her to
have the affair if this might help her depression (V’Rapi Yerapeh.).
"בעניין "הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך
ויקרא יט יז
.שּׂ֥א ָע ָל֖יו ֵֽח ְטא
ַ ב ָך הוֹ ֵכ ַ֤ח תּוֹ ִכ
֑ ֶ ת־אָח֖י ָך ִבּ ְל ָב
ִ
שָׂנ֥א ֶא
ָ א־ת
ִ ֹית֔ ָך וְל
ִ ֹֽל
ֶ ֙יח֙ ֶאת־ ֲע ִמ
ְ א־ת
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You shall not hate your brother in your heart. Rebuke, you shall rebuke, your kinsman and do
not bear a sin due to him.
משלי ט ח
ֶא ָה ֶב ָךּ
ֱ ָא ָךּ הוֹ ַכח ְל ָח ָכם וְי
ֶ ִשׂנ
ְ אַל תּוֹ ַכח לֵץ ֶפּן י
Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you; Reprove a wise man, and he will love you.
:יבמות דף סה
ואמר רבי אילעא משום ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר
ח( אל תוכח לץ פן ישנאך הוכח לחכם ויאהבך,דבר שאינו נשמע רבי אבא אומר חובה שנאמר )משלי ט
And Rabbi Ile’a said in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: Just as it is a mitzva for
a person to say that which will be heeded, so is it a mitzva for a person not to say that which will
not be heeded. [One should not rebuke those who will be unreceptive.] Rabbi Abba says: It is a
halachic obligation [for him to refrain from rebuking], as it is stated: “Do not reprove a scorner
lest he hate you; reprove a wise man, and he will love you” (Proverbs 9:8).
:רש''י על יבמות דף סה
: דכתיב )ויקרא יט( הוכח תוכיח להוכיח מי שמקבל הימנו:לומר דבר הנשמע
To say that which will be heeded: as [the Torah] says (“ )ויקרא יטrebuke you shall rebuke” to
rebuke [one] who will accept from him [the rebuke].
:ריטב”א על יבמות דף סה
( פי' לרבים אבל לחבירו עד הכא' כדאמרי' בערכי' )דף ט"ז ע"ב:כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע
והא דאמרי' בפ' במה בהמה יוצאה )שבת דף נ"ה ע"א( לוכחינהו מר להני דבי ריש גלותא א"ל לא שמעי' מנאי א"ל
אע"ג דלא מקבלי לוכחינהו התם כשלא הוכיחם כלל אלא שמכיר בהם שלא ישמעו כי אולי ישמעו ועוד כדי שלא
יהא להם פתחון פה אבל אחר שהוכיח' פעם אחרת ולא שמעו ומכיר בהם שלא ישמעו עוד מצוה שלא לומר להם
:כלום
...So too it is a mitzva for a person not to say that which will not be heeded: to the public,
however to one's friend, untill [you] are hit. This is as it says in [Talmud] Erichin (page 15 side
2). And that which is stated in the chapter entitled “with what does the animal leave” ([Talmud]
Shabbos page 55 side 1) ...and [why didn’t] the Master reprove those of the house of the
exilarch? [Rav Simon] said to him: They will not listen [to rebuke] from me. [Rabbi Zeira] said to
him: Let my master reprimand them even if they do not accept [the reprimand]. That [story refers
to an instance] where he had not rebuked them at all but recognized that they would not listen,
as perhaps they might listen. Another [reason he could have rebuked them is] to prevent them
from having an ‘opening of the mouth’. However, after he rebukes another time, is not listened
to, and recognizes in them that they won’t listen any longer, it is a mitzvah to keep silent.
:ערכין דף ט"ז
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יז( הוכח תוכיח הוכיחו ולא קבל מנין שיחזור,מנין לרואה בחבירו דבר מגונה שחייב להוכיחו שנאמר )ויקרא יט
.ויוכיחנו תלמוד לומר תוכיח מכל מקום יכול אפי' משתנים פניו ת"ל לא תשא עליו חטא
תניא א"ר טרפון )תמיהני( אני אם יש בדור הזה שמקבל תוכחה אם אמר לו טול קיסם מבין עיניך אמר לו טול קורה
.מבין עיניך אמר רבי אלעזר בן עזריה תמיהני אם יש בדור הזה שיודע להוכיח
From where [is it derived] with regard to [one who] sees an unseemly matter in another that he
is obligated to rebuke him? As it is stated: “You shall rebuke [your neighbor].” [If one] rebuked
him but he did not accept [the rebuke], from where [is it derived] that he must rebuke him again?
The verse states: “Rebuke, you shall rebuke [hokhe’aḥ tokhiaḥ],” [and the double language
indicates he must rebuke] in any case. [One] might [have thought that one should continue
rebuking him] even if his face changes [due to humiliation]. [Therefore,] the verse states: “Do
not bear sin because of him” [; the one giving rebuke may not sin by embarrassing the other
person].
It is taught [in a baraita that] Rabbi Tarfon says: I would be surprised if there is anyone in this
generation who can receive rebuke. [Why? Because] if [the one rebuking] says to him: Remove
the splinter from between your eyes, [i.e., rid yourself of a minor infraction, the other] says to
him: Remove the beam from between your eyes[, i.e., you have committed far more severe
sins]. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria says: I would be surprised if there is anyone in this generation
who knows how to rebuke [correctly, without embarrassing the person he is rebuking.]
:ערכין דף ט"ז
עד היכן תוכחה רב אמר עד הכאה ושמואל אמר עד קללה ורבי יוחנן אמר עד נזיפה כתנאי רבי אליעזר אומר עד
הכאה רבי יהושע אומר עד קללה בן עזאי אומר עד נזיפה
[The Gemara asks:] Until where [does the obligation of] rebuke [extend]? Rav says: Until [his
rebuke is met by] hitting [, i.e., until the person being rebuked hits the person rebuking him] And
Shmuel says: Until [his rebuke is met by] cursing, [i.e., he curses the one rebuking him]. And
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until [his rebuke is met by] reprimand. [This dispute between these
amora’im is] like [a dispute between] tanna’im: Rabbi Eliezer says: Until [his rebuke is met by]
hitting; Rabbi Yehoshua says: Until [his rebuke is met by] cursing; ben Azzai says: Until [his
rebuke is met by] angry censure.
רמב"ם הל' דעות פ"ו הל' ז
שׂיו
ָ ַך ְבּ ֶד ֶר ְך לֹא
ָ חוֹטא ַעל ַע ְצמוֹ ְבּ ַמ ֲע
ֵ ַמּוּטב וּ ְלהוֹדִיעוֹ ֶשׁהוּא
ָ טוֹבה ִמ ְצוָה ְל ַה ֲחזִירוֹ ל
ֶ ז( ָה
ְ רוֹאה ֲח ֵברוֹ ֶשׁ ָח ָטא אוֹ ֶשׁ ָהל
ֵבּין ִבּ ְד ָברִים. ֵבּין ִבּ ְד ָברִים ֶשׁ ֵבּינוֹ ְל ֵבינוֹ.יח ֶאת ֲח ֵברוֹ
ַ ַהמּוֹ ִכ."ית ָך
מ
ִ
ע
ת
א
יח
ַ
כ
תּוֹ
ח
ַ
כ
"הוֹ
ר
מ
ַ
א
נּ
שׁ
(יז
יט
)ויקרא
ֶ
ִ
ֵ
ֱ
ֶ
ֶ ֲ
ֶ ָה ָר ִעים
טוֹבתוֹ
ָ אוֹמר לוֹ ֶאלָּא ְל
ֵ וּבלָשׁוֹן ַר ָכּה וְיוֹדִיעוֹ ֶשׁ ֵאינוֹ
ַ ַבּר לוֹ ְבּנ
ֵ וִיד.ִיך ְלהוֹ ִכיחוֹ ֵבּינוֹ ְל ֵבין ַע ְצמוֹ
ְ ַחת
ְ ָצר.ֶשׁ ֵבּינוֹ ְל ֵבין ַה ָמּקוֹם
וְֵכן ָתּ ִמיד ַחיָּב אָדָם ְלהוֹ ִכיחוֹ.ִישׁית
ִ וּשׁל
ֶ מוּטב וְ ִאם לָאו יוֹ ִכ
ָ ִאם ִק ֵבּל ִמ ֶמּנּוּ.ַה ִביאוֹ ְל ַחיֵּי ָהעוֹלָם ַה ָבּא
ֲל
ְ שִׁניָּה
ְ יחנּוּ ַפּ ַעם
ֹ
שׁר לוֹ
ֵ אמר לוֹ ֵאינִי
ַ חוֹטא וְי
ָ ִת ָפּשׂ ַבּ ֲעוֹן ֵאלּוּ ֵכּיוָן ֶשׁ ֶא ְפ
ֶ ִמחוֹת וְ ֵאינוֹ
ְ שׁר ְבּיָדוֹ ל
ָ וְָכל ֶשׁ ֶא ְפ.שׁוֹמ ַע
ֵ ַעד ֶשׁיֵַּכּהוּ ַה
ְ מוֹחה הוּא נ
:ִמחוֹת ָבּ ֶהם
ְל
He who beholds his fellow stooping to sin or following an unrighteous path, is obliged to return
him toward the good, and to let him know that he is actually sinning against himself in pursuing
wicked deeds for, it is said: "And thou shalt indeed rebuke thy neighbor" (Lev. 19.17). He who
rebukes his fellow, whether it be regarding a sin committed between man and man, or whether it
be regarding matters between man and God, it is essential that the rebuke be administered only
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between them both; and he shall speak to him calmly, employing soft language, telling him that
he does not speak of it to him, save for his own good, to bring him to a life in the world to come.
If he receives it attentively from him, it is well; if not, he should rebuke him a second, even a
third time. So is the constant duty of a man to continue to rebuke his fellow, even until the sinner
strikes him, and says unto him: "I will not listen". He in whose power it is to prevent sin and does
not take the means to prevent it, he himself is ultimately overtaken by their sin, since it was
possible for him to prevent them.
סימן יג ס"ק א- ' אורח חיים חלק ה- 'אגרות משה חלק ח
? מדין חיוב תוכחה, כשאינו מסכים לברך, אם צריך למנוע מהשותף שיאכל משלו:שאלה
והוא צריך לשותפות זו שנמצא שהוא לו הפסד ממון,ואם אפשר לצאת מזה פירוד וביטול השותפות... :תשובה
ליכא שוב, דלר' יוחנן בערכין דף טז ע"ב, דהפסד ממון הלא הוא גרע מנזיפה,מסתבר שאין עליו להחמיר בזה,
דכן, שלכן אף אם נפסוק הלכה עד הכאה כרב, ולא משמע שיפלגו בהפסד ממון רב ושמואל עליו.חיוב תוכחה
, ככללא דבכל הש"ס, וכ"ש לפוסקים עד נזיפה כר' יוחנן. אין עליו חיוב בהפסד ממון,פסק הרמב"ם פ"ו מדעות ה"ז
וכתב על הרמב"ם, וכדפסק הסמ"ג במ"ע י"א בפשיטות מהאי טעמא. הלכה כר' יוחנן,רב ור' יוחנן ושמואל ור' יוחנן
. על מה שפסק כרב נגד ר' יוחנן,שלא נתברר טעמו
Question: Is it required to withhold ones food from a [Jewish] business partner when they do not
agree to make a blessing on the food from the halachic requirement of rebuking?
Response: if it is possible to come from this [rebuke or withholding of food] a separation and/or
termination of the partnership and he needs this partnership, as it turns out that this will then
lead to loss of money, it it is logical that he need not be stringent on this [and rebuke or withhold
the food] as loss of money can be considered worse than ‘angry censure’ (nezifa) [from the one
getting rebuked] which according to Rav Yochanan in Erichin page 16 side 2 precludes the
obligation for rebuke. Also, it is not evident that Rav and Shmuel would disagree with him in a
case of loss of money, therefore even if we decide [that the halacha requires rebuke] until
striking as in accord with Rav as is decided by the Rambam chapter 6 (part 7) from ‘traits’ ()דעות
there would not be a requirement [for rebuke] in a case of [where the rebuke may lead to] loss
of money. All the more so [the requirement to rebuke doesn’t apply in a case of potential loss of
money] according to the halachic deciders who opined that the halacha is in accord with Rav
Yochanan ie until angry censure [from the one getting rebuked] as would be in line with the
general principals [of deciding amoraic disputes] in all the talmud where we say [in a dispute
between Rav and Rav Yochanan or Shmuel and Rav Yochanan the halacha is decided
according to Rav Yochanan. This is what the SM”G decides (in the positive commandments
section of his book, commandment 11) in simplicity [that the requirement to rebuke does not
extend to when it will lead to angry censure] from this reason [that we always decide like Rav
Yochanan when he argues with Rav or Shmuel] where he writes about the Rambam that his
halachic reasoning for deciding like Rav over Rav Yochanan isn’t clear.
'שו"ע ורמ"א אורח חיים ס' תר"ח סיף ב
נשים שאוכלו' ושותו' עד שחשכה והן אינן יודעו' שמצוה להוסיף מחול על הקודש אין ממחין בידם כדי שלא יבואו
הגה והוא הדין בכל דבר איסור אמרינן מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ולא יהיו מזידין ודוקא שאינו מפורש בתורה:לעשו' בזדון
ואם יודע.(אע"פ שהוא דאורייתא אבל אם מפורש בתורה מוחין בידו )ר"ן פרק ד' דביצה והרא"ש בשם העיטור
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שאין דבריו נשמעין לא יאמר ברבים להוכיחן רק פעם אחד אבל לא ירבה בתוכחות מאחר שיודע שלא ישמעו אליו
:(אבל ביחיד חייב להוכיחו עד שיכנו או יקללנו )ר"ן ס"פ הבע"י
Women who eat and drink until dark, and they do not know it is a command to add from the
weekday to the Holy day, we do not contest their actions in order that they do not so willingly.
Note (Rema): Similarly, every matter it is better a prohibition done negligently and not done
purposefully. This is specifically when it is not explicit in the Torah even though it is a Torah
command. But if it is explicit in the Torah, we do protest in the (transgressor's) action [Ran
Chapter 4 of Beitzah, and Rosh in the name of the Ittur]. And if it is known that his words will not
be listened to, do not say publically to rebuke except once, but don't increase rebuke since he
knows that they won't listen to him. But privately, a person is obligated to rebuke until hit or
cursed (by the transgressor) [Ran end of Chapter].
'משנה ברורה אורח חיים ס' תר"ח ס"ק ג
. ודוקא ביודע בודאי שלא יקבלו ממנו אבל בספק שמא יקבלו צריך למחות אפילו במידי דרבנן- )ג( אין ממחין בידן
. ובכל זה אין חילוק בין רבים ליחיד. ר"ל ג"כ בשברור לו שלא יקבלו ממנו וכנ"ל- ')ד( וה"ה בכל דבר איסור וכו
ר"ל ג"כ בברור לו שאם יאמר להם לא יקבלו ממנו וכנ"ל וכ"ז דוקא בשעכשיו- ')ה( אמרינן מוטב שיהיו שוגגין וכו
הם שוגגין אבל כשיודעין שהוא אסור ועוברין במזיד צריך להוכיחם אף כשברור לו שלא יקבלום ונהי דמי שאינו
.מוכיח אינו נענש עבור חטאם כיון שברור לו שלא יקבלום מ"מ מצוה להוכיחם
(3) you don’t protest: specifically when you are certain that they will not accept the (the rebuke)
from you. However, when you are uncertain whether they will accept [the rebuke] you need to
protest even in a rabbinic matter.
(4) similarly with all matters of halachic prohibition: this is to say even when it is clear to him that
they won’t accept [the rebuke] from him [similarly to that which was stated] before. Regarding all
this, there is no distinction between the public and an individual.
(5) [we] say better to be done negligently etc: this is to say it is also clear to him that if he
speaks to them they won’t accept [the rebuke] from him as before. All this is specifically when
they are currently negligent but when they know it is forbidden and transgress purposefully, it is
halachically required even when it is clear to him that they won’t accept [the rebuke]. However, it
is the case that he who doesn’t rebuke isn’t punished from their sin since it was clear to him that
they will not accept[ the repuke]. Regardless there is a commandment [Mitzvah] to rebuke them.
'ויקרא יט' יא
"מ ְכשֹׁ֑ל" ו"מסייע לעוברי עבירה
ִ תּ֖ן
ֵת
ִ ִפ ֵנ֣י ִעוֵּ֔ר לֹ֥א
ְ בעניין "ל
את ֵמּ ֱאלֹ ֶהי ָך ֲאנִי יְהוָה׃
ֵ ִפנֵי ִעוֵּר לֹא ִת ֵתּן ִמ ְכשֹׁל וְי
ָ ָר
ְ א־ת ַקלֵּל ֵח ֵרשׁ וְל
ְ ֹל
You shall not insult the deaf, or place a stumbling block before the blind. You shall fear your
God: I am your Lord.
:עבודה זרה ו
יד( ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול? למאי נפקא מינה דאית ליה,איבעיא להו משום הרווחה או דלמא משום )ויקרא יט
בהמה לדידיה אי אמרת משום הרווחה הא קא מרווח ליה אי אמרת משום עור לא תתן מכשול הא אית ליה לדידיה
וכי אית ליה לא עבר משום עור לא תתן מכשול והתניא אמר רבי נתן מנין שלא יושיט אדם כוס של יין לנזיר ואבר
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יד( ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול והא הכא דכי לא יהבינן ליה שקלי איהו וקעבר משום,מן החי לבני נח ת"ל )ויקרא יט
הב"ע דקאי בתרי עברי נהרא דיקא נמי דקתני לא יושיט ולא קתני לא יתן ש"מ.לפני עור לא תתן מכשול
They asked [the Sages: Is the reason for the prohibition against conducting business with
gentiles in the days preceding their festivals] because [the gentile might] profit, [which will bring
him joy, and he will subsequently give thanks to his idol on his festival?] Or perhaps [it is
because this is a violation of the prohibition:] “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the
blind” (Leviticus 19:14), [as one who sells an animal to a gentile thereby aids him in engaging in
prohibited idol worship.] The Gemara explains: [What is the practical difference] between the
two options? The practical difference is in a situation [where] the gentile already [has an animal
of his own. If you say] that the reason for the prohibition is [because] he might profit, [here too
the Jew] causes him to profit. [But] if you say [that the reason for the prohibition is] due to: “You
shall not put a stumbling block before the blind,” [since the gentile] has his own] animal, the Jew
is not helping him sin. The Gemara challenges: [And even if he already has] his own animal,
does [not] one who assists him [transgress due] “You shall not put a stumbling block before the
blind”? But isn’t it taught [in a baraita that] Rabbi Natan said: From where [is it derived] that a
person may not extend a cup of wine to a nazirite, [who is prohibited from drinking wine], and
[that he may not give] a limb [taken] from a living animal to descendants of Noah? The verse
states: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). But here, [in
both cases], if one does not give it to him, he can take it himself, and [yet the one who provides
it to him] transgresses due to: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind.” [The
Gemara answers:] Here we are dealing with [a case] where they are standing on two sides of a
river, [and therefore the recipient could not have taken it himself. Since his help was
instrumental, the one who conveyed the item has violated the prohibition of putting a stumbling
block before the blind. The Gemara adds: The language of the baraita] is also precise, as it
teaches: [A person] may not extend, and it does not teach: One may not give. Learn from this [ie
the usage of the term ‘extend’ that the baraita is referring to one located on one side of a river,
who extends the item to the one on the other side.]
שו"ע יורה דעה קנ״א ס"א
אוֹתן ֲעבוֹדוֹת כּוֹ ָכ ִבים ֶשׁ ְבּאוֹתוֹ
ָ ְדּ ָברִים ֶשׁ ֵהם ְמי
ָ עוֹב ֵדי
ְ ִמכֹּר ְל
ְ אָסוּר ל,ֻחדִים ְל ִמין ִמ ִמּינֵי ֲעבוֹדַת כּוֹ ָכ ִבים ֶשׁ ְבּאוֹתוֹ ָמקוֹם
מוֹ ֵכר ַהכֹּל,שׁחֹרָה
ָ ֻחדִים ִעם ְדּ ָברִים ֶשׁ ֵאינָם ְמי
ָ ָבים ְדּ ָברִים ַה ְמי
ִ ָמקוֹם… ָהיוּ ְמעֹר
ְ ְכּגוֹן ְלבוֹנָה ַז ָכּה ִבּ ְכלַל ְלבוֹנָה,ֻחדִים
בוֹדת כּוֹ ָכ ִבים( אוֹ
ַ )ע
ַ ו: ַהגָּה.יּוֹצא ָבֶּזה
ֵ וְֵכן ָכּל ַכּ.ַקּט ַה ַזּ ָכּה ְל ַבדָּהּ ַל ֲעבוֹדַת כּוֹ ָכ ִבים
ֲ ְקא לְכֵֹהן
ִ חוֹשׁ
ְ ְס ָתם וְ ֵאין
ָ ְדו
ֵ שׁין ֶשׁ ָמּא יְל
ֹ
ָהם ְדּ ָב ִרים
ֶ ִמכּר ל
ְ אוֹמ ִרים ָהא ְדּאָסוּר ל
ְ יֵשׁ. ָשׁ ֵרי,ִס ָתם גּוֹי
ַ ַע
ְ ֲא ָבל ל,בוֹדת כּוֹ ָכ ִבים
ֲ ַק ִטיר ַהלְּבוֹנָה ל
ְ ְקתוֹ ֶשׁיּ
ָ לְגּוֹי ֶשׁ ֶחז
ֹ
ֲא ָבל ִאם יְכוֹלִים,אַחר
ֵ ִקנוֹת ְבּ ָמקוֹם
ל
לוּ
כ
יוּ
א
לּ
שׁ
אוֹ
בוֹ
א
יּוֹצ
ֵ
כּ
ים
ר
ִ
ח
ֵ
א
ֲ
ם
ָה
ֶ
ל
ין
א
ֵ
ם
א
ִ
א
ְק
ו
דּ
ַ
ְנוּ
י
ה
ַ
,ם
ת
בוֹד
ָ
ַע
ַה ַשָּׁיּ ִכים ל
ְ
ֶ
ַ
ָ
ֲ
ְ
ָ
,ְה ֵקל ַכּ ְסּ ָב ָרא ָה ִראשׁוֹנָה
ָ ָהגוּ ל
ֲ וְנ.ירין
ִ וְיֵשׁ ַמ ְח ִמ.()מ ְר ְדּ ַכי דפ''ק דע''ז
ָ .ָהם ָכּל ָדּ ָבר
ֶ ִמכֹּר ל
ְ ֻמ ָתּר ל,אַחר
ֵ ִקנוֹת ְבּ ָמקוֹם
ְל
.(ְד ַעת ָה ַרב
ַ ַא ֵשׁ ִר''י והגמ''ר פ''ק ְדּ ַשׁ ָבּת ל
ֲ תוֹספוֹת ו
ְ )ר''ן ָשׁם.ְע ְצמוֹ
ְ ֶפשׁ י
ָ וּב
ַ ַח ִמיר ל
ֶ וְָכל ַבּ ַעל נ
Things that are specific to a single form of idolatry in that area are forbidden to be sold to
worshipers of that idolatry in that place…. If things specific [to that idolatry and place] were
mixed with things non-specific, like pure frankincense with black frankincense, all these can be
sold as regular without fear that the buyer will pick out the pure [frankincense] by itself for
idolatry usage. Similarly with all cases like this. Comment [from the Rama] this [prohibition] is
specific [to a case of selling to a] (idolatrous) priest or a non-Jew where it is assumed that he will
kindle the frankincense [to worship] the idol. However, [selling to a] non-specific non-Jew is not
Page 7
[prohibited]. There are those who say the prohibition to sell them things specific to the
[idolatrous] service is specifically when they don’t already have other [ingredients for the service
already] and in the case where they are unable to purchase it from another place. But if they are
able to purchase it from another place it is permitted to sell them anything (Mordechai in the first
chapter of tractate Avodah Zara). There are also those who are stringent [in such a case]. The
practise is to be lenient like the first opinion [ie the Mordechai] and each master of the soul can
be stringent for himself (Ran, loc. cited, and in the Tosfos and Ashri and the G”M in the first
chapter of tractate Shabbos according to the view of Rav)
'ש"ך על שו"ע יורה דעה קנ״א ס"ק ו
ְ יֵשׁ
דס"ל דכי היכי דאמרינן בש"ס גבי נזיר דאסור להושיט לו כוס יין דהיינו דוקא בדקאי בתרי עברי דנהרא:אוֹמ ִרים
ה"ה הכא ויש מחמירין וסוברין דמ"מ איסור מדרבנן איכא אפילו לא הוי כמו תרי עברי דנהרא וכל זה לדעת הרב
אבל לפעד"נ דלא פליגי דכ"ע מודים להמרדכי ותוס' בפ"ק דעבודת כוכבי' דבעובד כוכבי' או מומר שרי והגמ"ר
ותוס' והרא"ש בפ"ק דשבת והר"ן פ"ק דעבודת כוכבים מיירי בישראל שהוא חייב להפרישו מאיסור וכדכתב
'הרא"ש שם דלא גרע מישראל קטן אוכל נבילות שב"ד מצווים להפרישו כ"ש ישראל גדול משא"כ בעובד כוכבי
...וישראל מומר שאינו חייב להפרישו
There are those that say: as they opine that when the talmud states regarding a Nazir that it is
forbidden for him to to pass the cup of wine it is specifically when they are on two sides of the
river. That applies here as well. There are also those that [take the] stringent [view] and hold
that, regardless, there is a Rabbinic prohibition even if a case where it is not similar to the two
sides of the river [case in the Talmud]. All the above is according to the view of the Rav (ie. the
Rama). However, in my humble opinion there is no disagreement (between the Mordachai and
the Ran) as everybody agrees to the Mordachai and Tosfos in the first chapter of Tractate
Avodah Zara that by an gentile or Jewish apostate it is permissible (to sell them objects of
forbidden worship) and that the GM”R and Tosfos and the Rosh in the first chapter of Shabbos
and the Ran in the first chapter of Avodas Zara are referring to a case of a Jew whom
[therefore] you are required to separate him from the sin. This is as the Rosh states there that
they are not worse than a Jew who is a minor and is eating non-kosher food where Beis Din is
commanded to separate him. All the more so an adult Jew. This is in contradistinction with a
Gentile and a Jewish apostate where you are not obligated to separate him [from the sin].
דגול מרבבה על שו"ע יורה דעה קנ״א
הא ודאי שישראל מומר אע"פ שחטא ישראל הוא ואם כן מה.)ש"ך ס"ק ו'( משא"כ בעובד כוכבים וישראל מומר
בינו לשאר ישראל לענין להפרישו מעבירה אבל נראה לענ"ד כוונת הש"ך דאף בישראל אין מצווין להפרישו כי אם
אבל...כשעובר בשוגג ויש ביד איש אחר להפרישו חייב להפרישו וכמו בקטן אוכל נבילות שהקטן שוגג הוא
בישראל דרוצה לעבור במזיד על איזה עבירה אפילו אינו מומר גמור אין ישראל אחר מצווה להפרישו לדעת הש"ך
ומומר דנקט הש"ך הוא משום דהפוסקים במומר דברו ומומר מסתמא מזיד הוא ועוד דכל עובר עבירה במזיד יקרא
:מומר לאותו דבר
(Shach paragraph 6) In contrast with idolaters and apostate Jews: Certainly an apostate Jew
even though he sins is still a Jew and if so what is the difference between him and other Jews
regarding separating him from sin. However it appears, in my humble opinion, that the intention
of the Shach is that there is only commandment to separate a Jew from sin if he transgresses
Page 8
due to negligence. [In that case when] another person can keep him from the sin they are
required to do so. This is like the case where a minor [ie a child] eats non-kosher food where the
minor is negligent [and not intentionally violating a halacha]... but a Jew that willfully commits a
sin, even if they are not a complete apostate, other Jews are not commanded to separate him
[from the sin] according to the Shach. And the [reason the Shach selects the term] apostate is
due to the halachic deciders’ discussion of apostates and the general apostate is deliberate and
also all those that commit sins willfully are considered an apostate for that issue.
סימן כח ס"ק כב- ' אורח חיים חלק ה- 'אגרות משה חלק ח
? אם צריך להשתדל בתוקון עירובין כדי להציל מחללי שבת בפרהסיא מאיסור:שאלה
דהא, דלרשב''ג הא אין צורך. הרי פליגי תנאי בזה, והתיקון שיש בעירוב למחללי שבת במזיד בפרהסיא:תשובה
אמר בפ''ה דמעשר שני מי'א שאין מציינין על ערלה ונטע רבעי בשאר שני שבוע דהלעיטהו לרשע וימות )ב''ק סט
וגם הא רוב המחללין שבת הם כופרין בכל התורה. דהא הלכה כרשב'"ג במשנתינו,ומשמע שהלכה כן... ,(ע"א
אך שאולי בשביל אלו שאין. שאולי כו"ע מודו שליכא חיוב ואף לא מצווה להשתדל לתקן עירובין בשבילם,כולה
יש איזה מעלה ואולי גם, דרשעותן ואף הכפירה שלהן בא להם מצד שחנכום כן אבותיהם הרשעים,יודעין כלום
מאחר שיש לדונו, שלא יעברו גם על איסור הוצאה שבידינו למנוע אותו בתיקון העירובין,מצווה לתקן עירובין
, הא עכ''פ רואה ויודע משומרי תורה ומצוות, דאף שאביו חנכו לרשעותו ולכפירתו, אף שאינו שוגג ממש.כשוגג
ובפרט. שלכן נוטה יותר לומר שליכא חיוב למונעו מעבירה,ויודע שאיכא גדולים ובעלי דעת וחכמה יותר מאביו
דהא משמע שמתירין למכור, להדגמי"ר שביאר טעמו ומשמע שהסכים עמו לדינא,להש"ך יו""ד סימן קנ''א סק"ו
אך.(' אפילו לבן המומר כשיכול לקנות במקום אחר )ועי" לעיל סי יג' אותיות ז' וט,דברים אסורים לכל ישראל מומר
ובברוקלין הא,אינו נוגע זה לעובדא דידן דאף אם נימא שאיכא מצווה הוא דווקא לעשות עירובין כשהוא כדינא
.נתבאר במה שכתבתי שא"א לעשות
Question: Should we try to create/fix Eruvin in order to save the public Sabbath-breakers from
prohibition?
Response: There is a disagreement between Tanaim regarding the creation/fixing of Eruvin for
those who deliberately and publicly desecrate Shabbos. According to Rav Shimon ben Gamliel
this is not necessary, as he states in the 5th chapter of Maaser Sheni (10th mishna) that we
don’t [bother to] demarcate the [areas of the land with] Arlah and Neta Revai on non shmita
years as [since it would be stealing if they take it] ‘feed it to the wicked and [he will] die’ (Baba
Kamma 69.)... It seems that the Halacha is in line with this as [there is a general principle] the
halacha is like Rav Shimon ben Gamliel in our mishnah [except for specific enumerated
instances]. In addition, most Shabbos violators are heretics in the whole Torah, whom everyone
might agree there is no requirement or good deed to work to create/fix Eruvin on their behalf.
However, perhaps for those who are [generally] ignorant, whose sins and even their heresy
result from how their wicked ancestors raised them, there is some virtue and perhaps also a
mitzvah to create/fix Eruvin, that they will not violate the prohibition of carrying, which we can
prevent by creating/fixing Eruvin, as perhaps they can be considered like a negligent
transgressor [rather than a intentional transgressor]. However, they should not be considered
like actual negligent transgressors as even though their parents raised them to wickedness and
heresy, regardless, they saw and knew of those who kept the Torah and its commandments.
They also know that there are great men and those who are more knowledgeable and wise than
their fathers. Therefore [we should] lean [towards considering them intentional transgressors]
Page 9
and not to be required to separate them from sin. This is all the more so according to the Shach
in Yoreh Deah 151:6 and how the Dagul Merivavah that interprets his rationale and seems to
agree with him practically, that it is permissible to sell forbidden objects to all Jewish apostates,
even to the son of an apostate when he can purchase it elsewhere as well (see earlier section
13 paragraphs 7 and 9). However all this isn’t actually relevant to our scenario as even if there
would be an obligation [to prevent them from sinning] this would only be to create a eruv that is
according to the halacha but in Brooklyn we have made clear that it is impossible to do so.
סימן יג ס"ק ז- ' אורח חיים חלק ה- 'אגרות משה חלק ח
ואם מה שמאכילו בחינם, או שהוא כחד עברא דנהרא, האכלת מי שבותו בעיר אם נחשבת כלפני עיוור:שאלה
?מחשיב האכלה זו לאיסור
אם הנזיר זקן, דאף כשהוא בחד עברא דנהרא, … נלע''ד דבטירחא דווקא וודאי תלוי במדריגת כל אחד:תשובה
ורק כשהנזיר הוא צעיר. אפילו כשהוא בחד עברא איכא איסורא דלפני עיוור,או חלש שקשה לפניו להשיג היין
מאחר שהטירחא לא נחשב לו כלום להמנע מלעבור על האיסור בשביל,בימים ובריא ליכא איסור דלפני עיוור
ואף בעשירים אירע להם, דאיכא עניים שלא יעברו על האיסור כשיצטרכו לקנות בכסף, אבל לגבי ממון.הטירחא
דלא ניתן, אין לחלק למעשה, שאז וודאי איכא לפני עיוור כשיתן לו בחינם,שלא היה להן מעות בכיסם לקנות תיכף
אלא רק ליתן לו, וכשלא יצטרך ליתן לו... ועובר אלפני עיוור כשיתן לו בחינם היין האסור לו לשתות.לשיעורים
וכשיש לו חשש הפסד ממון מותרין אף להגיש לו. ליכא עליו אף איסורא דמסייע בעלמא,רשות כדרך כל השותפין
מותר בשחושש, שהאיסור רק מדין תוכחה, לעיל באות א' התבאר שליתן לו רשות ליקח, )לכאורה צ''ע.כדלעיל
אבל באמת לעיל היה החילוק בין נותן. שאז עובר באיסור מסייע, אבל לא נתבאר שמותר להגיש לו.להפסד ממון
ועיין. וכאן הנידון הוא איסור מסייע דרבנן, מצד איסור לפני עיוור דאורייתא, לבין מגיש לו אוכל,רשות ליקח
,' לפי מה שיבואר באיסור לפני עיוור להלן באות ט,בדברות משה שבת חלק א' סימן ב' ענף ה' שעניין איסור מסייע
. שלכן נאסר מדרבנן, והסיוע הוא עשיית מעשה לרצון הזה,הוא מצד הרצון שיש למסייע בעבירה שעובר חבירו
, אלא רק מצד שאינו רוצה להפסיד ממונו,ולפי זה י"ל שכאשר עושה את מעשה הסיוע לא מחמת רצון לעבירה
שאפשר לסמוך,פה- עוד י''ל כפי שהיה אומר מרן זצוק'"ל פעמים רבות על.יתכן שאין כאן איסור מסייע כלל ועיקר
שבמזיד לעבור את העבירה אין איסור, ונתבארו דבריו בדגול מרבבה שם,'על שיטת השך יו"ד סימן קנ''א ס''ק ו
עפ"י מה שנתבאר בדברות משה, אבל עיין להלן אות ט' אם אפשר להחשיב תינוק שנשבה למזיד לעניין זה.מסייע
.(שם ענף ור ועיין עוד בזה להלן סימן כ"ח אות כב
Question: Is it required to withhold one's food from a [Jewish] business partner when they do not
agree to make a blessing on the food from the halachic requirement of rebuking?
Response: ...in my humble opinion [whether it is considered ‘on one side of the river’ with
regards to lefnai eiver and thus permitted] is dependent on individual effort [rather than a
blanket rule]. As even if he is on ‘one side of the river’ [with the forbidden item], if the Nazir is
elderly or weak and it is difficult for him to obtain the wine, even if he is on the same side of the
river there is a prohibition of lefnai eiver [to give him the forbidden wine]. It is only when the
Nazir is young and healthy that there is no prohibition of lefnai eiver as the effort to obtain the
forbidden wine from another source wouldn’t be considered significant. However, with regard to
[expenditure of] money, as poor people may not transgress when they would need to pay [for
the forbidden object], and even the wealthy sometimes do not have money in their wallet to pay
immediately; in these cases there is certainly a prohibition of lefnai eiver to give it for free.
[However, it is hard] to distinguish between these cases practically as it [depends on individual]
measurements. [In general] one transgresses lefnai eiver if you would give forbidden wine for
Page 10
free… and [back to the original case] if you would not need to give it to him but rather just allow
him to take [the food which he won’t make the brocha on] as in the matter of usual [business]
partners, there wouldn’t even be the issur of Mesayaya and when there is the possibility of
lossage of money it would be permitted to hand [the food] to him as noted before.
(note from Rav Moshe Tendler: This seems problematic, above in the first paragraph of this
section it was explained that to give him permission to eat, where Tochacha was the relevant
prohibition, it was permitted when there was a possibility of loss of money; but, he never said it
was permitted to hand it to him where you may transgress the prohibition of mesayaiya.
However, in truth, the question above was related to a distinction between giving permission to
take and handing him the food regarding the prohibition of lefnai eiver, a biblical prohibition.
Here, on the other hand, the relevant prohibition is mesayeya, a rabbinic prohibition. See Dibros
Moshe Shabbos part 1 section 2:4 that the underlying issue of mesayaha , in accord with what
will be explained in teh prohibition of lefnai eiver later in 9 depends on the will of the helper for
the other to transgress the prohibition - and the help was intentionally done for this purpose. For
this reason it is prohibited rabbinically. According to this one can answer [the question raised
above] that when the action was not performed for the purpose of the other person’s
transgression but rather because the helper doesn’t want to lose money it makes sense that
there isn’t any prohibition of mesayaha at all. One can also explain this based on what our
master [Rav Moshe] said orally many times, that one can rely on the the position of the Shach
Y”D 151:6 as explained by the Dagul Merevava that in cases where [the potential] transgressor
intends to purposefully transgress the halacha there is no prohibition of mesayaha. However
see also later on in 9 if we should consider a ‘captured child’ to be purposeful with regards to
this question. See the explanation in the Dibros Moshe and later on regarding this in 28:22)
Rav Dovid Kaye (Chair of the Medical Ethics Department at the Parker Jewish institute of
Health Care and Rehabilitation) brought in Mental Health Psychotherapy and Judaism
(Hoffman, pp 88-89)
Question: Can a marriage counselor continue to treat a couple after he learns that the husband
is a kohen and the wife is a divorcée?
Response: Absolutely not! The Torah clearly and explicitly prohibits a kohen from marrying
several types of women, one of whom is a grushah (divorcée). Part of the biblical imperative of
v'kidashto (and you shall sanctify him) is that a kohen may not choose to forgo his sanctity and
marry such a woman. Furthermore, the Talmud (Yevamot 88b) understands that there is an
affirmative imperative upon others to see to it that a kohen maintains his sanctified status —v’
kidashto bal korho. Rashi (on Leviticus 21:8) thus says that a kohen who refuses to divorce his
prohibited wife is to be whipped until he complies. (See also Rivash responsum 348, Be’er
Moshe responsum 5:159.) There is no question that a Torah-observant therapist has the same
obligation as any other Jew and must do what he/she can to separate the couple.
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However, as a marriage therapist there may be cogent reasons (licensure reasons, malpractice
concerns) not to do so. But it is clear that the therapist cannot continue to counsel and assist the
couple. While there may be “professional” reasons not to take affirmative steps to “split them
up,” the therapist must explain to the clients that he/she can no longer assist them in solving
their marital problems/issues since they are in a prohibited relationship. This is no different from
other situations in which a therapist discovers conflicts and must end the therapeutic
relationship. Also, continuing to counsel the couple would violate the prohibition against placing
a stumbling block before the blind... (See Radvaz responsum 187.)
Rabbi Shabtai Rappoport, Rosh Yeshivah Shvut Yisrael and Beit Hamedrash, Machon
Hagavoha L Torah, Bar-Ilan University, brought in Mental Health Psychotherapy and
Judaism (Hoffman, pp 89-90)
Question: Can a marriage counselor continue to treat a couple after he learns that the husband
is a kohen and the wife is a divorcée?
Response: The question you raise should be examined from two aspects: the obligation of a
non-professional person in these circumstances, and the differences, if any, between a
non-professional and a professional. A non-professional is obligated by the mitzvah of tokhehah
(rebuke) to convince a kohen to divorce his forbidden wife. In case it proves impossible, one
must not show support to such a couple. Showing such support is a transgression against the
prohibition of aiding a transgression as explained by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, val.
5, Orah Hayyim, part 5, siman 13, paragraph 7). The person supporting the transgressors
becomes a sort of accessory whereas all members of the Jewish public should abhor and show
their abhorrence of the transgression of any commandment. Here, though, a professional
differs. In my opinion, the professional is bound to the command to rebuke transgressors only in
relevant ways. He should endeavor to show the couple that marriage against our Torah could
not come to a good end - as he should firmly and honestly believe.
However, when tochachah is not possible, his relationship with the couple is not social and
hence he does not relate to them as a member of the Jewish community. In the professional
context, accepting a situation as a given baseline does not constitute a personal opinion, and
thus it does not seem as if the professional condones the patient's behavior. A professional who
treats a child abuser does not express his opinion regarding this abuse That is why he is not
considered as aiding transgression. (Igrot Moshe, ibid.)
Rav Nochum Rabinovitch (Rosh Yeshivah of Birkat Moshe in Maaleh Adumim) in: Mental
health Psychotherapy and Judaism (Hoffman, pp 86-87)
Question: A woman confided to her psychologist in a treatment session that she had not been
attending the mikveh for the last several months and doesn't plan to in the future, without the
knowledge of her husband. Is the therapist obligated to betray professional confidence and
inform her husband that his wife is causing him to transgress a biblical prohibition? Does the
biblical prohibition "Thou shall not stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor” (Leviticus 19:16)
apply in this situation? On the other hand, betraying professional confidence will possibly 1.
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cause the client to discontinue vital psychological treatment; 2. discourage other people who are
in need of psychological treatment from going to religious psychotherapists; 3. significantly
reduce potential referrals, and thereby, the therapist's income.
Response: I wonder whether a patient's statement to her therapist is necessarily credible. Even
if there were no doubt at all about its truth, it still would not have the status of certain knowledge
for the therapist, and especially in view of the fact that patients are known to invent tales in
fulfillment of desires of one kind or another. In any case, it seems to me that a religious therapist
is duty-bound to find ways to try to convince his patient not to transgress. I realize that some
psychologists are opposed to a judgmental stance, but such opposition seems to me to be
against Torah law.
Comment from Dr. Seymour Hoffman on the above response in: Mental health
Psychotherapy and Judaism (Hoffman, p. 87)
A psychotherapist is obligated and has an unwritten contract with his client to help him cope
more effectively with problems, conflicts, and issues that are of concern to him and which are
causing him distress and difficulty in his everyday functioning and not issues that are of concern
to the religious practitioner. Furthermore, raising (no matter how sensitively) religious and moral
issues (such as mikveh and abortion), which are issues of no concern to the non-committed
client, will, in all probability, cause the patient to flee from vital psychological treatment, as
he/she will interpret the therapist's behavior as "missionary" and not therapeutic.
Psychotherapy With Potential Avrayonim and Confidentiality
Rabbi Alfred Cohen "Privacy: A Jewish Perspective" in the Journal of Halacha
Contemporary Society, vol. 82 (1981) pp 82-84 (see original for sources used)
Where must a doctor, or psychologist, or lawyer draw the line—may he reveal what was told to
him in his capacity as a professional counselor? To do so would be to violate the principle of
strict confidentiality which is the cornerstone of the trust upon which these relationships are
founded. On the other hand, the professional counselor is bidden, like any other Jew, ‘lo
ta-amod al dam re-acha’’—he may not fail to act to save his fellow Jew from harm. Thus if a
psychologist knows that one of his schizophrenic patients is dating another Jew, doesn’t he
have an obligation to warn the prospective spouse, in the same way that every Jew is obligated
to warn another Jew of a potential hazard? …It is quite obvious that if a lawyer reveals his
clients’ peccadilloes to others, he will shortly have no clients. Moreover, an individual whose
professional ethics demand strict confidentiality, such as a doctor or psychoanalyst, may lose
his job or even his license to practice if he does not hold his tongue. Would Jewish law then
require him to reveal detrimental information about his patients, even if in doing so he
endangered his own livelihood?
The rule of thumb followed by poskim is that a Jew is not required to spend more than 1/5 of his
income in the fulfilment of a mitzva. For example, if a man has $100, and an etrog costs $50, he
would not have to purchase one (Ramo). However, there is disagreement between the
authorities as to whether this rule applies only to positive com- mandments (mitzvot asai) or also
to negative ones (mitzvot lo-ta‘aseh). The Ramo cites the Rashbo and Raavad in his contention
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that it is forbidden to violate a negative commandment, no matter how much it costs him. For
example, even if a person would lose half his customers were he to close his store on Shabbos,
he is nevertheless forbidden to keep it open, But the Chasam Sofer, among others, does not
wholly accept this dictum. In his commentary on Shulchan Aruch, and also in his Responsa the
Chasam Sofer distinguishes between violating a mitzva through doing some action or violating it
by failure to act; for him, this is the criterion rather than whether there is a positive or negative
mitzva involved. For example, he states that it is absolutely forbidden to eat produce of Israel
which was grown in the Sabbatical year, since this is an act which violates the positive mitzva;
no matter what the financial loss incurred in order to buy produce which is not grown in the
Sabbatical year, a person may not do anything to violate the mitzva. Following the same line of
reasoning, the Vilna Gaon, relying upon a text in Sanhedrin 83a, maintains that one need not
incur an expense of more than 1/5 of his income in order to avoid transgressing a negative
commandment, provided that the person did no action, but merely failed to act to prevent the
violation. This view is shared by the Pischay Tshuva, Sefer HaChinuch, and Pri M’gadim.
The majority of Halachic authorities accept the position that a person whose livelihood depends
upon maintaining the confidentiality of revelations made to him, need not jeopardize his position
by telling those secrets. Although keeping silent might violate the negative mitzva of not
standing by and allowing another Jew to be harmed, yet as long as he is not violating the mitzva
by doing any action and, were he to act he would endanger his own livelihood, then he is
permitted to remain silent.
