Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
Author(s): Turan Kayaoglu
Source: International Studies Review , June 2010, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 193-217
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International Studies Review (2010) 12, 193-217
Westphalian Eurocentrism in International
Relations Theory
Turan Kayaoglu
University of Washington
In the past 10-15 years, an increasing number of revisionist schola
have rejected the most significant elements of the argument about
centrality of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the evolution and st
ture of international society. At the same time, the prominence of
argument has grown in the English School and constructivist inter
tional relations scholarship. I deconstruct the function of the Westp
lian narrative to explain its pervasiveness and persistence. I argue th
was first developed by nineteenth century imperial international ju
and that the Westphalian narrative perpetuates a Eurocentric bias
international relations theory. This bias maintains that Westphalia
ated an international society, consolidating a normative diverg
between European international relations and the rest of the inter
tional system. This dualism is predicated on the assumption that w
Westphalia European states had solved the anarchy problem eit
through cultural or contractual evolution. Non-European states, lack
this European culture and social contract, remained in anarchy unt
the European states allowed them to join the international
society - upon their achievement of the "standards of civilization." This
Westphalian narrative distorts the emergence of the modern international system and leads to misdiagnoses of major problems of contemporary international relations. Furthermore, their commitment to the
Westphalian narrative prevents international relations scholars from
adequately theorizing about international interdependencies and
accommodating global pluralism.
The centrality of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the evolution and structure
of the international system is a familiar theme in international relations scholarship. Countless references to these treaties have led to the formation of a frame-
work for understanding international history and politics that I call the
Westphalian narrative.2 Among the chief elements of this narrative is the idea
that the Peace of Westphalia instituted, or at least embodied, the principles of
sovereignty and secularism. On sovereignty, the Peace is credited with limiting
the hegemonic aims of the Holy Roman Empire, thus allowing the newly sovereign rulers to establish exclusive territorial domains. Westphalian arrangements
*I would like to thank Katie Baird, Priya Chacko, Rob Farley, Michael Forman, Lucas Freire, Ahmet Kuru, Kate
Marshall, Jon Mercer, Chuck Rowling, Jason Scheideman, Mike Struasz, and Charles Williams for their criticisms
and suggestions on this essay. I would also like to express my gratitude to the journal's anonymous reviewers for
their comments. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 50th Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association, New York City, February 15-18, 2009.
2For a classical statement of the Peace of Westphalia's place in the development of the international system, see
Gross (1948).
© 2010 International Studies Association
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1 94 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
are said to enable the states to monopolize the means of violence within their
territories and their control of foreign policy instruments such as war and diplomacy. Moreover, the notion of respect for each other's sovereignty (political tol-
erance), out of which international law has emerged, has been traced back to
Westphalia. On secularism, the Peace allegedly curtailed the universalist claims
of the Catholic Church and made possible the separation of the public domain
of the state from that of the private domain of religion. Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention on religious issues together with a newly instituted spirit
of religious tolerance led to peaceful coexistence within and among states.
Taken together, these so-called Westphalian principles and institutions were idealized as engines responsible for transforming early modern Europe into a society of states. Once this "Westphalian" international society - shared ideas and
institutions grounded in political and religious tolerance - had consolidated itself
in Europe, European colonization then expanded this framework worldwide; this
process is described by Bull and Watson (1984).
This Westphalian narrative has its critics. In the past 10-15 years, an increasing
number of scholars have rejected significant parts of this narrative; Osiander
(2001), Beaulac (2004), and Teschke (2003) have even called it a myth. These
critiques have argued that many norms and institutions attributed to the Peace
of Westphalia emerged much later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
They have identified some Westphalian anachronisms. For one, "Westphalian
sovereignty" is a misnomer; Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel (1714-1776) was the
first to develop the idea that state sovereignty requires the exclusion of external
authority structures from domestic politics (Krasner 1999; Beaulac 2003, 2004).
Some major nonstate political entities, including the Holy Roman Empire, sur-
vived until the early nineteenth century (dissolved in 1806) (Krasner 1993,
1995/96; Osiander 2001). In addition, until the late nineteenth century states
continued to share the means of violence with a plethora of non state groups
such as privateers, pirates, and merchant companies (Thomson 1994). European
states often deviated from the norm of territorial jurisdiction and claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction in non-Western states and kept their consular courts there
well into twentieth century (Kayaoglu 2007, 2010). The constituent principles of
secularism - the separation of church and state and the acceptance of religious
tolerance - had little to do with the Peace of Westphalia and they materialized,
albeit imperfectly, in Europe in the nineteenth century (Kaplan 2007). High-
lighting the anachronisms associated with the Westphalian narrative, these scholars discounted the role of the Peace of Westphalia for the origins, evolution, and
structure of international system.
But the Westphalian narrative has been resilient. Among many others, Wendt
(1999), Jackson (2000), Philpott (2001), and Clark (2005) have presented arguments emphasizing the prominence of the Peace of Westphalia to understand
international relations. So far Westphalian critiques have not explained the persistence of the Westphalian narrative in and its implications for international
relations scholarship. To this end I deconstruct the Westphalian narrative to suggest that it in part substantiates a perspective of European exceptionalism. This
exceptionalism idealizes the European/Western order and elevates its ideas and
ideals in international relations scholarship. The Westphalian narrative allows
scholars to reinvent an framework of normative hierarchy depending on where
Western and non-Western societies placed in the narrative. Western states produce
norms, principles, and institutions of international society and non-Western states
lack these until they are socialized into the norms, principles, and institutions of
international society. In this perspective, international society is a normative hierarchy assumed to reflect the natural division of labor in international relations.
From its early sponsors to its present day supporters, there have been remarkable similarities in the use of the Westphalian narrative. These similarities could
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Turan
Kayaoglu
195
be grouped as practical, histor
that it has, albeit arguably, es
development of international
the origins of contemporary i
account of the international
classes. It is historical in tha
approaches to the study of i
century jurists used it against
it against behavioralist scholar
realist and neoliberal theorists)
lished an understanding of l
political and religious toleran
political vision. It is this thir
article.
Essentially, I argue that the Westphalian narrative was first developed by
German historians and usurped by international jurists in the nineteenth century. According to its earliest formulation by German historians, the Peace of
Westphalia allowed European states to establish an international order based on
mutual independence, political tolerance, and the balance of power. These
alleged Westphalian sovereign vision stood in stark contrast to the menacing
Napoleonic imperial vision. Nineteenth-century jurists added an external dimension to the Westphalian narrative: lacking a Westphalia-like arrangement, non-
European societies remained in political disorder and religious intolerance.
When these societies "fulfilled" the so-called "standards of civilization," the
European states then "admitted" them into "international society." English
School scholars in the 1960s-1980s revived the narrative of the centrality of
Westphalia. With the cultural turn in international relations scholarship in the
1980s and 1990s, constructivists brought the Westphalian narrative into the literature on international norms.
But it is time for international relations scholars to do away with the Westpha
lian narrative for four reasons: (i) it distorts our understanding of the eme
gence of the modern international system, (ii) it leads to misdiagnoses of majo
aspects of contemporary international relations, and (iii) it prevents intern
tional relations scholars from theorizing cross-civilizational and cross-regional
interdependencies and (iv) it thwarts the accommodation of pluralism in a
increasingly globalized world. First, by exaggerating some, down-playing other
and ignoring some other aspects of the development of international society, th
narrative has allowed the construction of an essentialized and over-generalized
history. In this stylized understanding, Western societies' achievement of reli-
gious and political tolerance originated with Westphalia and was furthered
subsequent treaties and conventions while non-Western societies' lack of
religious and political tolerance was shaped by their intolerant and despoti
past. This "historical" vision is often invoked to justify cultural and legal
arguments for guaranteeing the intellectual and political superiority of Europe
in international relations scholarship.
More perniciously this intellectual construct became an ideological tool t
excuse the coercion used by Western states over non-Western states as a necessary evil, required in order to get them to conform to the rules of internationa
society. For example, in the process of Europe's colonial and imperial expa
sion, policymakers and scholars invoked Westphalian-grounded principles to jus
tify acts of brutality and subjugation in the name of the privileged position of
states that were deemed "civilized" in spreading the rule of law, tolerance, and
civilization. Similar to other European-invented narratives (Hobsbawm an
Ranger 1992; Hodgson 1993; Patterson 1997; Goody 2006), the Westphalian
narrative allows for the continued imagination and invention of Europe'
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196 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
intellectual and political superiority, treating the West as a perennial source of
political and religious tolerance in international society.
Once different societies are placed in the Westphalian narrative, this slanted
history becomes a perspective and an interpretative technique that distorts our
understanding of contemporary issues. Starting with the assumption of the centrality and the normative value of the Peace of Westphalia in international society cause observations become what I call "narrative-laden" when analysts focus
on historical practices that either largely confirm, in few cases disconfirm, the
narrative. This problem of selection bias is similar to the problem of "theoryladen" observations when analysts focus on cases that confirm the theory rather
than falsify it. While international relations scholars are arguably alert for the
limitations of the theories and the methodologies they employ, they rarely pay
attention to the limitations and biases of the historical narratives they employ.
This omission is particularly troubling given the centrality of history to the study
of international relations (Elman and Elman 2001).
Moreover, the selection bias is confounded with an interpretative bias: behav-
iors are interpreted differently depending on a state's place in the narrative.
The Westphalian narrative produces an interpretive dualism analogous to different modes of explaining intergroup relations: an in-group's desirable behavior
is attributed to the in-group's character while an in-group's undesirable behavior is attributed to the external conditions. Similarly an out-group's undesirable
behavior is attributed to the out-group's character while out-group's desirable
behavior is attributed to external conditions (Mercer 1996: chapter 2). Mercer's
insight sheds some light onto the in-Westphalian and out-Westphalian interpre-
tative rationale the Westphalian narrative perpetuates: it creates a dualism
between Western and non-Western states akin to in-group and out-group identity in a normative hierarchy. Thus, Westphalia-confirming European practices,
for example, political and religious tolerance, are attributed to Europe's inher-
ent superiority; Westphalia-disconfirming European practices, for example,
lack of political and religious tolerance, are attributed to either conditions not-
inherent to Europe, conditions European states could not stop, or used as
evidence for the evolving practices of the Westphalian order. Conversely,
Westphalia-confirming non-Western practices are attributed to conditions external to non-Western states, such as their socialization by European states; Westphalia-disconfirming non-Western practices are attributed to non-Western states'
inherent inferiority and an example of the challenge thy pose the Westphalian
order.
This hierarchy has been used to justify the notion that Western states should
follow different norms and principles toward non-Western societies as these societies have different norms, principles, and institutions. While non-Western socie-
ties were gradually admitted into international society, international society
continues to expand its normative scope, reaching higher levels of religious and
political tolerance. Paradoxically, the Westphalian international society has deepened more rapidly than it has widened: the normative gap in the origins of the
emergence of international society between Western and non-Western societies
and the disparities of progress between them means that non-Western societies
must perpetually chase the progress of Western states and the European order.
The normative divergence will persist because Western societies continuously
evolve faster than the non-Western states are socialized by adopting the existing
norms, principles, and institutions. Perpetual progress of the Western normative
order will continue to sustain a normative hierarchy in which the non-Western
tortoise will never catch the European hare.
Three caveats are necessary before further elaborating my argument
that reducing the origins and structure of international society to the Peace of
Westphalia reflects a Eurocentric bias in international relations scholarship. To
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Turan
Kayaoglu
197
begin with, I do not offer an alt
the inconsistencies that I claim
offer a historiography of Westp
invention by nineteenth-centur
lish School scholars and some constructivist scholars. Furthermore, while refer-
ences to the Westphalian narrative also exist in other international relations
theories, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, I do discuss these theories.
Because the presumption of Westphalia does not occupy a central position in
these theories and they emphasize other aspects of the international system - like
anarchy and the distribution of power for neorealism and interdependence and
rational-choice for neoliberalism. Finally, I do not dispute the existence of inter-
national society - shared ideas and institutions based on political and religious
tolerance - or the importance of international society in achieving international
peace, development, or human rights. Rather, I argue that international relations scholars must move away from a Westphalian-based, and thus Eurocentric,
notion of international society to one that more thoroughly accommodates global diversity and plurality. This shift in narratives can bolster the legitimacy and
efficiency of international society.
I develop my argument regarding the Eurocentrism endemic to the Westphalian narrative in international relations scholarship in the following three sec-
tions. These sections offer a chronological view of the notion of Westphalian
international society. The chronological order also allows me to illustrate how
later generations of scholars inherited and re-invented the ethnocentrism of past
scholars. First, I examine the origins of the Westphalian narrative: nineteenthcentury international jurists' attempts to build a Westphalian narrative to support
their claims for the existence of international law. Second, I discuss the English
School's concept of international society and its relation to the Westphalian narrative. Third, I explore the current constructivist international relations litera-
ture, tracing the durability of the Westphalian myth to the presence of
Eurocentrism in current international relations theory.
The Construction of the Westphalian Narrative
The construction of the Westphalian narrative postdates the Peace of Westphalia
(1648): it was the product of nineteenth-century intellectual and political developments. The initial sponsors of this narrative were German historians and international jurists of the nineteenth century - not the rulers of the seventeenth
century. There is good reason why the Westphalian narrative did not emerge
until the nineteenth century: natural law, which had been the dominant international legal discourse until the late eighteenth century, did not need to rely on a
historical incident or treaty to justify the existence of international society and
law. Connecting law, justice, and morality, natural law posited that the content
of law is set by a transcendental source above states. Jurists of natural law pointed
to numerous sources for the law: religion, human nature, nature, and finally, in
the age the Enlightenment, natural reason. Since the transcendental quality of
law made it valid everywhere and for everyone at all times regardless of political
boundaries, any treaty, including the Peace of Westphalia, was insignificant for
the legal and political order envisioned by the natural law theorists envisioned.
The universalist assumptions of natural law allowed these scholars to assume the
existence of an international society, preventing them from clarifying discriminatory doctrines such as sovereign recognition and sovereign territoriality, and thus
making the issues central to the Westphalian narrative marginal to these
scholars' theories.
3Hodgson (1993) provides some preliminary ideas as to what such a history might look like.
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198 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
But in the nineteenth century, this was to change. The transformation from
natural law to legal positivism occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Nussbaum 1954:157-185). Emer de Vattel's The Law of Nations,
first published in 1758, was one of the important bridges from natural to positive
law. Deviating from the earlier naturalist "law of nations," Vattel made sover-
eignty central to his framework of international law by adding an external
dimension to the domestic sovereignty developed by Hobbes and Bodin. The
external dimension of sovereignty entails two qualities: the sovereign state's privi-
lege as the sole representative of a country's population, and the exclusion of
what the ruler considers "external" from domestic authority structures. With this
external dimension, now known as Westphalian sovereignty, sovereign states
became the sole representatives of their populations and the sole subjects of the
law of nations (Krasner 1999:20-21; Beaulac 2003). Like other Enlightenment
thinkers, Vattel (1916: Book 3, Chapter 3, §47) referred to the "societal" qualities of Europe using the term republic:
Europe forms a political system, an integral body, closely connected by the relations and different interests of the nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is
not, as formerly, a confused heap of detached pieces, each of which though herself very little concerned in the fate of the others, and seldom regarded things
which did not immediately concern her. The continual attention of sovereigns to
every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and the perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a kind of republic, of which the members - each
independent, but all linked together by the ties of common interest - unite for
the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of the
political balance, or the equilibrium of power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate,
and prescribe laws to the others.
Although Beaulac (2003, 2004) implicitly and Krasner (1999:20-1) explicitly
credit "Westphalian sovereignty" to Vattel, and as the quote suggests the parallels between the Vattel's argument for the uniqueness of Europe's political systems and the argument of Westphalian system are striking, surprisingly, Vattel
linked neither his argument of sovereignty nor the uniqueness of European
political order to the Peace of Westphalia. In The Law of Nations, he invokes
Westphalia only five times on issues such as the papal rejection of treaties (Vattel
1916: Book 2, Chapter 15, §223) and the rights of German states against the
Holy Roman Empire (Vattel 1916: Book 4, Chapter 6, §59). The incidental and
infrequent references to Westphalia in Vattel is striking compared with the treatment Westphalia receives by one of the most prominent international jurists of
the nineteenth century: Henry Wheaton. Wheaton starts his section on "The
History of the Modern Law of Nations" in the History by stating: "The Peace of
Westphalia, 1648, may be chosen as the epoch from which to deduce the history
of the modern science of international law. This great transaction marks an
important era in the progress of law of nations"; Wheaton then lists numerous
fundamental changes he attributes to Westphalia (Wheaton 1973 [1845] :70).
The Napoleonic Wars were mostly responsible for the emergence the Westphalian narrative. As Edward Keene has persuasively demonstrated, the earliest form
of the Westphalian narrative was product of early nineteenth-century German
historiography. The initial purpose of the Westphalian narrative was "to stigmatize the French Revolution, and especially the Napoleonic imperial system, as
unlawful interims of the traditional principles of European public law and
order" (Keene 2002:16). Elucidated by the German historians W.C. Koch and
A.H.L. Hareen, this historiography developed the idea that the Peace of Westphalia established a decentralized system of mutually independent sovereign
states and thus distinguished medieval Europe from modern European politics.
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Turan
Kayaoglu
199
The moniker attached to the
originating from the Peace of
The
counter-revolutionary
the Westphalian narrative. Th
anteeing the mutual independ
traditional liberties of Germa
now under a similar threat fr
like Vattel, also supported th
torians could not easily rely o
ral law, would find revolution
violated the fundamental p
than natural law, these Germ
European
systems.
legal
systems,
These
focus
scholars
arg
foundation of the European l
had been "constantly refresh
Revolution"
and
the
Peace
w
(Koch cited in Keene 2002:20).
half of the nineteenth centur
that the significance of the sy
of the German states' territor
German states as barriers bet
phalia secured both the mut
balance of power (Keene 200
Upon the foundation invente
the nineteenth century built
ical and legal order of Europe
tion of "Westphalian" intern
trend of nineteenth century,
spective, European societies an
past and to the rest of the w
teenth-century European un
A wide range of academic d
jurisprudence, and sociology
their own episteme of Euro
ism, what was "law" to John
Sir Henry Maine, "capitalism"
ics" to Max Weber, was "West
of European normative exclusi
with the creation of inferior
what was "custom" to John A
to Sir Henry Maine, "Asian M
Weber, was "anarchy" to inter
In addition to this intellectua
rative with its emphasis on tr
law was instrumental in the in
international law when legal n
natural reason, became unt
2005:40-52). The ascendance
phers such as J. Bentham, J.
teenth and early nineteenth
natural
tivists,
law
the
an
unacceptable
state
was
the
ju
ultima
ing authority to state legisl
adjudication, and the reductio
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200 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
denied the existence of any law outside and above the state. The rise of positivist
jurisprudence in international law was slow, incomplete, and contested; though
not every jurist was a positivist or equally committed to its principles (Koskenniemi
2001; Slyvest 2007), every Anglo-American jurist did take the positivist critique of
international law seriously. Since the late nineteenth century, all major international law texts have addressed the legal positivists' denial of international law, usually focusing on the critique offered by John Austin (2000 [1832]).
In response to the earlier positivist claims that international law is not proper
"law," nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurists, like Wheaton (1973 [1845]),
Twiss (1884), Hall (1894), Westlake (1894), and Holland (1898), developed two
lines of justification - a dualism, arguably, that still characterizes the major doctrinal and interpretative disagreements in international law (Koskenniemi 2005
[1989]). Despite the differences between these two justifications, both routinely
invoked Westphalia to ground international law in European thought and practices. The first justification was a historical one that attributed the origins of
international law to customary law. According to this perspective, law emerged
from the spontaneous functioning of a society, in addition to the enactments of
a sovereign. Much of European law was customary in that it had emerged spontaneously to regulate inter-European relations. Essentially, historical jurists reduced
law, including international law, to the product of a European consciousness
and culture. The second justification was an analytical argument with an emphasis on the positivist and contractual qualities of law. The analytical school justified international law based on the sovereigns' explicit consent to it. Convinced
of the necessity of sovereign will in the creation of law, these jurists argued that
international law is law because the collectivity of states enacted the international
law, and each states enforced it through its domestic courts. States act with their
sovereignty when they agree on treaties. The treaty ratifications, marking the sovereign legislative will, elevate treaties and conventions into a form of positive
law, thereby internationalizing positive law.
For both the historical and analytical schools, the Westphalian narrative was
indispensable. For the historical school, it represented the growth of a cultural
revolution triggered by Protestant religious ideas then combined with preWestphalian legal and political ideas. Philosophers like Grotius, Bodin, and
Hobbes offered robust theoretical justifications for sovereignty; theologians and
philosophers, like Luther, Costello, and Locke provided strong arguments for
religious tolerance, and both groups provided intellectual and cultural frameworks for customary international law. For the analytical school, the Westphalian
narrative represented the establishment of a clear break from the feudal system
of overlapping authority structures wherein rulers vied with the Holy Roman
Emperor and Catholic Church in a system of exclusive territorial sovereignty.
The narrative corresponded to a structure of contractual relationships, one
between the rulers and their subjects sanctifying religious tolerance, and another
among rulers for upholding political tolerance. It turned the political stalemate
among the political and religious groups unleashed by the Reformation into an
affirmation of political and religious live-and-let-live policies, ending the Thirty-
Year Wars. Once these Westphalian constitutional principles and institutions
became well-established in Europe, European rulers signed additional treaties
and conventions to further develop international law. Essentially, international
law of the late nineteenth century became a "Westphalian" international law
whose historical development and sources were closely linked to the Peace of
Westphalia and subsequent European treaties and conventions.
The writings of nineteenth-century jurists provide many examples of the
"Westphalian" international law. As mentioned earlier, Wheaton, possibly the
most prominent jurist of the first half of the nineteenth century, was particularly
influential in integrating a Westphalian narrative to explain the development of
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Turan
Kayaoglu
201
European legal and political o
Onuf observes: "Wheaton adop
actual international society" bu
as far as I have been able to
a specifically juridical basis
2000:6).
While
Christian
law,
Wheaton
heritage
Westphalia
regarding
in
was
the
the
international
tell
for
also
most
law.
lia, an avowed positivist, starts by citing legal positivist Austin (2000
[1832]:147-148): "It has been very justly observed that 'international law is
found only on the opinions generally received among civilized nations, and its
duties are enforced only by moral sanctions; by fear on the part of nations, or by
fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility and incurring its
probable evils, in case they should violate maxims generally received and
respected.'" Agreeing with the claim that international law could be seen as an
international morality, Wheaton moves on to explaining European distinctiveness regarding international law.
According to Wheaton (1973 [1845] :70) this uniqueness lays with the Peace of
Westphalia in creating the modern international law. The scope and substance
of the consequences that Wheaton (69-71) attributes to the Peace of Westphalia
is remarkable. According to him, the treaty established secularism and religious
tolerance, and thus ended the religious revolutions. It freed states from the religious authorities of the Church and from the secular authorities of the Holy
Roman Empire. It also established a right of resistance against oppressive rulers.
Wheaton furthermore claims that the peace secured Germany as a safe haven
from religious and political persecution and as a place for refugees to "appeal
to the public opinion of Europe" in case of oppression. The peace replaced
European customary law with the new law of Europe. The treaties also marked
the inauguration of modern diplomacy through which the European peace was
maintained. With all these distinctive qualities, Westphalia thus established a
European order based on public law. Wheaton's "Westphalian" international
law disqualified non-Western societies. In the Elements, he stats: "The Public
law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to civilized and
Christian people or to those of European origin" (Wheaton 1936 [1866]: 15).
Reducing international law to European history and culture in the form of
"Westphalian" international law became widespread as the nineteenth century
progressed. In the second part of the century, W.E. Hall, a prominent international jurist with a strong positivist orientation, justified the existence of international law based on the strength of European culture: "it is scarcely necessary to
point out that as international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the principle could not
be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries differently civilized,
such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization." States "outside European civilization," Hall continued, "must formally
enter into the circle of law-governed countries. They must do something with
the acquiescence of the latter, or of some of them, which amounts in its entirety
beyond all possibility of misconstruction" (Cited in Wight 1977:115).
Sir Travers Twiss, a counsel to the British Crown and to King Leopold of
Belgium (Koskenniemi 2001:33, 108; Hocshchild 1999:71), offered a more con-
tractual understanding of Westphalia. Twiss (1884:xvii) argued that Westphalia
had "laid the foundation of a new European State-System, by grouping for the
first time together the States of Central Europe after the fashion of a family, the
members of which were acknowledged to independent, and, although of
unequal power were recognized as an equality of Right." While his jurisprudence
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n
devel
In
202 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
combined positivist and naturalist elements, he emphasized that the consent of
states was necessary for international law (xli) and that Westphalia marked a
turning point for international law because it unambiguously showed that state
rulers consented to the creation of a positive international law, replacing natural
law (155).
The above arguments are but a sampling (and one can find plenty of other
international jurists making similar arguments Anghie (2005:32-114) and Keal
(2003:84-112), however they represented the jurisprudential consensus of the
late nineteenth century asserting European exceptionalism in establishing a distinctive legal and political order promoting mutual independence and tolerance.
According to the international jurists of the age of Empire, such as Wheaton,
Hall, Westlake, Twiss, Lawrance, Oppenheim, Europe had formed a superior
order composed of sovereign and secular states, an order significantly shaped by
the Peace of Westphalia and the increasing number of treaties and conventions
followed Westphalia, making international law, in essence "Westphalian."
With respect to the non-Western world, this argument meant that non-Western
societies did not have any place in "Westphalian" international law, because
these societies were not signatories to the treaties and conventions that made
international law. But the narrative included a vision in which non-Western socie-
ties could be part of the political and legal order marked by European progress
Once in place, the order was self-perpetuating: deepening within Europe and dif
fusing out of Europe. Deepening has occurred as the international laws, norms,
and institutions of Europe that Westphalia had inaugurated spilled over int
other issue areas. This led to further cooperation in Europe and to further dif
ferentiation between Europe and the rest of the international system. Diffusio
has occurred as "Westphalian" international law, norms, and institutions spread
to non-European areas. They spread first to the civilized American states, then t
the semi-civilized Asian states, and last to the then uncivilized African states (Bu
and Watson 1984).
Apart from a few marginalized voices opposing the discriminatory interpret
tion and application of international law and the removal of non-Western socie
ties from its realm (Pitts 2007), by the end of nineteenth century most
international jurists took the existence of a normative hierarchy as the natura
division in the international system. Combined with other nineteenth-century
hierarchical discriminations, like scientific racism, "scientific" international law
allowed jurists to argue that the unique combination of rationality and culture
that existed in Europe enabled the European political order to evolve toward
more efficient outcomes, fueled by the Peace of Westphalia and bolstered by subsequent treaties and conventions. In contrast, the narrative encapsulated that the
other societies were in disorder in terms of their political and legal system
(Turner 1978; Hodgson 1993:86). In other words, the construction of European
exceptionalism and Orientalism were codependent. While the former elevated
the European "order" as just and progressive, the latter denigrated the Oriental
system as corrupt and decaying. Jurists constructed "Westphalian" international
law and Oriental anarchy and despotism in the same crucible. This view offered
a stark image of the world; to paraphrase the seminal title of Eric Wolfs (1982)
book, this dichotomy can be understood as Westphalian Europe and people
without Westphalia - that is, a non-European political space lacking the crucial
dimension of international society, Westphalia, and the political and religious
tolerance it generated. To justify their version of what Laura Nader (2005)
labels "law and the theory of lack," jurists and scholars contrasted the law-based
Westphalian international order of mutual independence and tolerance with a
caricaturized image of, for example, a monolithic Islamic despotism under the
authority of the caliph with an ideology of constant warfare with non-Muslims.
Likewise, the Chinese Middle Kingdom was portrayed as a territory ruled by a
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Turan
Kayaoglu
203
self-important feudal-isolation
quently, constantly, and unfai
the qualities that enabled Euro
More
than
simply
an
intelle
had enormous political implica
society and the rights of indig
"political and legal thought a
served to justify the dispass
with
legal
the
development
positivism,
of
"Wes
internation
exclusive to European societies
the deterioration of the lega
law: while prior to the sevente
Grotius, and Pufendorff recog
teenth-century jurists like Va
like Phillimore and Bluntschil
peoples, most of the nineteen
Oppenheim
denied
sovereign
tury jurists, whose jurisprude
ism and whose political ideolog
2001), were often united in t
imperialism. In this sense, nin
European domination as it just
states against non-Western soc
The Westphalian narrative all
Westphalian religious and poli
and intolerance. Once this nar
tional problems like the Easter
of
Africa
expansion
became
of
easy
European
to
ide
order
t
nificant way, the perceived
European ability and willing
point of the Westphalian narr
sion of international society,
of political and religious toler
For example, John Westlake a
agued that even the laws of w
with uncivilized societies (Még
Compatible with the civilizing
ists' vision of global order, fr
imperialism. The economic, fi
Empire,
made
ment
in
courts
lyzed
China,
of
European
what
I
call
their
expansion
the
legal
sovere
imper
authority
through
states
(1825-1923),
and
Eur
companies
legal
came
non-Western
key
capitals.
compromised
expanded
Western citizens.
Thailand,
European
for
and
extr
examp
China
(1
Even though these states were not formal European colonies, these courts lim
iting and denying non-Western legal authority over Western foreigners turned
these states into, to use Mao's term, semi-colonies. During the mid-1880s, fo
example, a total of 44 Western extraterritorial courts operated in Japan's treat
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204 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
ports. In 1895, 32 British courts operated in the Ottoman Empire. Three dec-
ades later (circa 1926), 26 British, 18 American, and 18 French courts existed
China's ports and cities. Some of these courts like the British Her Majesty's
Supreme Court at Constantinople and the US Court for China had significant
legal authority. Legal positivism, by its categorical delegitimation of non-Western
law, and international jurists, by their legal tools like extraterritoriality, had a significant effect in motivating and justifying Western courts in non-Western societies. Western states imposed what is known as the standard of "civilization" to
end their extraterritorial claims, a standard established and articulated by
nineteenth-century jurists (Gong 1984; Kayaoglu 2010).
While the scramble for concessions from China and the Ottoman Empire
remained limited to "unequal treaties" of consular jurisdiction and tariff limitations, a new wave of imperial expansion from 1870 to 1914 brought all of Africa,
with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, under formal European imperialism
(Hobsbawm 1989; Doyle 1986; Abernethy 2000).
As legal scholars Anghie (2005:65-100) and Koskenniemi (2001:110-177)
argue despite the rhetoric of "the gentle civilizer of nations," the involvement
of European international jurists in the scramble for Africa epitomized by the
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, was anything but benign. Most of the interna-
tional jurists acted like ideologists of European colonialism through the doctrines like Westphalian sovereignty that dispossessed non-Western rights or
through extraterritoriality policies that limited non-Western legal authority, or
acted as apologists for Europe's excessive brutality in the name of its civilizing
mission and expansion of international society. In sum, international jurists were
often complicit in, and frequently ardent supporters of, European colonialism.
In addition, some current scholars of international society have offered insightful
analyses linking the nineteenth century discourse of international society with
imperialism and colonialism. For example, Real (2003) examines what he calls
the "moral backwardness of international society": the role of nineteenth-century
legal discourse in dispossessing the rights of individual peoples and facilitating
European conquest. Suzuki's (2009) interesting analysis shows how the emergence
of Japanese imperialism was rooted in Japan's socialization into what he labels as
the "dark side" of international society in the late nineteenth century.
The English School's Westphalian International Society
No group of international relations scholars has been more active in promoting
the Westphalian narrative than the English School. Since the early 1960s,
members of the English School have engaged in a sustained and collective effort
to articulate a historically informed and normatively progressive theory based
on the concept of international society. Working within the notion of the
Westphalian international society framework, English School scholars have produced studies exploring the historical foundations, expansion, and contemporary
implications of international society. Essentially, these scholars trace the idea of
a distinctively European civilization both to Ancient Greece and the Roman
Empire. The later is particularly important as under its reign a Christian community was created. Following the secularization of this community with the Peace
of Westphalia, Europe institutionalized common principles and institutions;
these took the form of international society. Following the admission of Russia
and the Americas, European imperialism expanded international society and
Europeans started to admit the non-colonized states of Asia (the Ottoman
Empire, Japan, Iran, Thailand, and China) into international society upon
these states' fulfillment of the "standards of civilization." According to first gen-
eration English School scholars (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Jackson
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Turan
Kayaoglu
205
1990), international society bec
lowing the Second World War
The existence of an interna
English School (Manning 196
nami 2000) have even suggeste
term for a multi-national gro
would be a better descriptor,
agenda.
Part
of
methodological:
the
reason
English
fo
School
philosophy in international
behavioral-positivist framew
relations scholarship. However
as scholars of The British Com
Rockefeller-funded committee, 1959-1984) established the core ideas and meth-
odologies of what would later come to be called the English School (Dunne
1998). Well-known English School scholars such as Herbert Butterfield, Martin
Wight, Adam Watson, and Hedley Bull, were consecutive chairs of the British
Committee. Over time, the number of scholars identifying themselves with the
English School has increased and diversified, however the emergence and evolution of international society has remained the focus of their scholarship, in the
words of Barry Buzan, its flagship idea (Buzan 2004:1).
The concept of international society is particularly central to Hedley Bull's
works. Often referred to as the classical definition of international society, Bull's
definition has certainly been the most influential (Bull 1977; Alderson and
Hurrell 2000; Bellamy 2005). The distinction between "international system"
and "international society" is key for Bull. States constitute an international system when their interactions influence each other's behavior mechanically, without the states sharing principles and institutions to regulate their interactions.
States constitute an international society when "conscious of certain common
interest and common values... they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of
common institutions." In Bull's dualist perspective, the international system corresponds to Hobbesian anarchy, and the international society corresponds to a
Lockean contractual society that features "order, regularity, predictability and
long periods of peace" (Cited in Alderson and Hurrell 2000:3).
On these parallel dichotomies of system/society, Hobbesian/Lockean, Bull successfully reinvents the nineteenth-century notion of the Westphalian narrative of
European/non-European normative orders using a legal and historical perspec-
tive. His legalism is compatible to the English School's Grotian approach to
international relations. As elaborated by Wight (1991) the Grotian legal-rational
approach offers a state-centric middle way between that of Hobbesian anarchy
and Kantian cosmopolitanism. Within this broader Grotian tradition, Bull further
refines his view of international society. Bull is particularly reliant upon nineteenth-century international jurists, especially Oppenheim (Bull 1966).
Bull substantiates the nineteenth century legalistic notion of international society with a Eurocentric history, following the German historian A.H.L. Hareen
(Keene 2002:22-29). As Alderson and Hurrell (2000:4) argue, for Bull, the European origins of international society are "a matter of historical fact." Westphalia
is key in this history because "[t]he idea of international society, which Grotius
propounded was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia" (Bull
1992:75). The Peace of Westphalia marked "the emergence of an international
society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of
rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and
of a common interest in maintaining them" (Bull 1992:75-76). According to
Bull (1992:77-78), Westphalia removed the problem of religious conflict and
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206 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
affirmed a "general commitment to peaceful coexistence." The treaties
advanced "external sovereignty," "internal sovereignty" and curtailed the
hegemonic efforts of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church.
Moreover, "the Westphalian treaties demonstrated... that the independence of
sovereignty of states was not incompatible with their subjection to law or their
recognition of the common bonds of society." In essence, Westphalia created
the European order by providing "a kind of constitutional foundation of international society" (Bull 1992:77).
The English School's Westphalian international society in general and Bull's
approach in particular have been criticized for their Eurocentrism (Keal 2003;
Suzuki 2009). Several scholars (Cutler 1991; Kingsbury 1997/1998; Bartelson
1996; and Keene 2002) note the problems with Bull's anachronistic interpreta-
tion of Grotius as the first theorist of international society. For example, Keene
(2002:35-38) argues that Bull's state-centric and positivist notion of international
society imposes a "peculiarly narrow and twisted perspective of order in modern
world politics" onto Grotius by squeezing "Grotius' extremely eclectic and wide
ranging account of the law of nations into a small box." Moreover, as critics like
Suzuki (2009), Keal (2003), and, more elaborately, Keene (2002) argue, the
Eurocentric conceptualization of international society allowed the English School
scholars to ignore the function of international society outside of Europe. In particular, international society discourse equated European international society
with political and religious tolerance and, conversely, equated non-European systems with political disorder and religious intolerance. With this dualism, the
Eurocentric notion of international society was invoked to promote the "standard of civilization." thereby legitimizing colonialism (Keene 2002: chapter 4),
dispossessing the rights of indigenous people (Keal 2003), and even socializing
Japan into an imperialist state (Suzuki 2009).
While Suzuki (2009) and Keene (2002) identify problems associated with the
normative divergence that the notion of international society presumes between
Europe and Europe's relations with those deemed outsiders and while these
scholars provide incisive critiques of the English School's notion of international
society, they fall short in theorizing the relationship between different aspects of
international society. For example, Keene largely treats dualism in the workings
of the international society's European and extra-European spheres as unrelated
to each other, neglecting to examine how the construction of the European
international society of tolerance may have presupposed the view of non-
European societies as intolerant. Similarly, Suzuki refers to imperialism as the
"dark side" of international society without elaborating how this "dark side"
and a presumably "good side" of international society have been related. The
analyses of Keal (2003) and Callahan (2004), however, rightly suggest that differ-
ent aspects of international society have been complementary. They argue
that European self-identification depended on various European other-identifica-
tions; the assertion of the complete superiority and exceptionalism of the
European political and legal order has necessitated the European willingness to
spread it, even if the process of civilizing non-European societies frequently
requires some evil.
The political impetus that gave rise to the first generation of English School
scholars was decolonization, namely the possibility of sustaining the international
order that European imperialism had created in the postcolonial world. This was
associated with an anxiety that a non-Western "revolt" could further challenge
Western dominance and values (Callahan 2004). Once the notion of international society was secured within European history and values, this perspective
facilitates a pessimistic scenario: any non-Western disagreement with the West
is potentially also a revolt against Western values. A revolt against Western
values can destroy the foundations of the international society. Bull believed
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Turan
Kayaoglu
207
international society and interna
non-Western revolt against West
The second generation of Engl
various aspects of international s
2006). One issue of scholarly deb
ety: so-called solidarists and plura
sis on state sovereignty allows
(Jackson 2000); the solidarists'
tions overriding state sovereignty
(Clark 2005; Wheeler 2005).
In the rest of this section, I dis
society
School
and
Jackson's
tradition.
pluralist
Although
they
r
ety, the Westphalian narrative
identifies the most important pr
(legitimacy to Clark and pluralis
back to the Peace of Westphali
"Westphalian" global covenant, e
tric account of international histo
According to Ian Clark, the mos
is legitimacy. Legitimacy shapes,
ship and conduct in internationa
Clark argues that legitimacy is a
bution of power as well as mor
cesses. While the definition of
international
of
society,
Westphalia
remains
(Clark
am
2005:51-70
society has evolved from Westph
temporary international society'
rules about the use of power in in
European/Western
evolves
solely
within
state
a
system
Western
s
macy, European powers were la
mentation of this legitimacy p
became the engine of legitimacy
post-Cold War era, democratic g
national society. Yet membersh
requires adherence to a new set o
with
human
ciples
rights
(173-90).
norms
and
th
Clark (2005:33, 36) states his con
rizing international relations. Yet
phalian narrative and the normat
essentially produces what can be
correspond international legitim
matic history, his analysis of the
marginalizes non-Western societi
European
societies
develop
conc
notions may be similar to or diff
the only time these societies are
non-Western societies violated th
membership in international soc
object of "Westphalian" legitim
international legitimacy is min
Western states that are the au
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208 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
Westphalia, core Western states, possessing an unquestioned claim on legitimacy,
have interpreted and applied the legitimacy principle in part in their encounters
with non-Western societies; whereas non-Western states, lacking this legitimacy,
have been subjected to Western interpretations and applications of the legitimacy
principle. Once the dichotomous normative framework was established in Clark's
theory of legitimacy, deviations among core European and Western states were
framed as instances of reinterpretation and contestation of the legitimacy principle while the deviations of non-Western states from Western-expected behaviors
have been framed as non-Western violations of the legitimacy principle.
In Robert Jackson's idea of international society, the most important element
is pluralism, and he traces this back to the Peace of Westphalia. For his pluralist
theory of international society, he takes international legal sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and non-intervention as givens and theorizes a thin transnational normative content from these basic principles (Jackson 2000:16-25). In his view, the
narrow scope of international society reduces the possibility of value conflicts
associated with the difficulty of building international consensus on issues where
cultural perspectives may vary. Jackson unequivocally rejects a thick understanding of international society because it fosters paternalism, the tendency of imposing one's preferred values onto others. For example he correctly notes that the
civilizing missions of the late nineteenth century and the articulation of "standards of civilization" illustrate this paternalism (412-416). Also figuring prominently in Jackson's arguments is the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and
state-centrism; this emphasizes the centrality of the great powers. This centrality
is not incompatible with his anti-paternalism because great power privileges are
limited to the organization of international security rather than to the organization of the cultures of the lesser powers, a view that accommodates some degree
of global pluralism.
While Jackson supports pluralism, his narrative of the emergence, spread, and
evolution of pluralism remains grounded in the Westphalian narrative (162-5,
419-26). He argues that the Peace of Westphalia has symbolized the emergence
of a pluralist ethos. Initially, this pluralism was a religious one, based on a rejection of Latin Christendom's universalist claims in order to accommodate reli-
gious pluralism. Eventually, however, this pluralism symbolized a more expa
political transformation: "as a reconstitution of European politics from th
universitas, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, to that of a
asy based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on political indepen
(164). In other words, Jackson equates the Westphalian narrative with the a
modation of global pluralism like a global covenant. Essentially he offers a n
tive and theory of "Westphalian" covenant advancing global pluralism.
Jackson's commitment to the Westphalian narrative makes even a pluralis
sion of international society Eurocentric. Some of this ethnocentric bias sur
when he, perhaps unwittingly, stereotypes Islam by pairing "democracy," a
of political tolerance, with "jihad," a form of political and religious intole
These are the examples in his argument against paternalism, where "d
racy" defines and represents Western political value and "jihad" defin
represents Islamic political values (182, 368). 4 Like other English School sc
ars, he recognizes the Eurocentric roots of his theory of pluralism, but d
believe its Eurocentrism invalidates his theory: "[AJlthough global covena
historically rooted in particular civilization, that of post-medieval Europe, i
longer associated with exclusively with Western civilization as it still
4Of course "Jihad" has many different meanings, and Jackson does not define which one he is using. H
the context in which he uses it suggests he defines it as "holy war," and not as spiritual striving, which is ho
Muslims would define it.
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Turan
Kayaoglu
209
recently as 1945. It now it serv
ilizations of the contemporary
Although Jackson's attempt t
right direction, it falls short.
tional
recognition,
accommo
confining these demands with
for cultural and civilizationa
invention of "global" covenant
cess of the interpreting and
diverse moral traditions, an
themselves in various UN agen
dialogues) are seeking a globa
tional society as equals (for m
see
Falk
2000:
chapter
8;
D
Kymlicka 2008).
In sum, the Westphalian nar
international society. Most ha
School scholars whose scholars
By acknowledging the impor
states share, and theorizing ho
tional relations, the English S
tional relations and created a v
system. However, the commit
narrative prevents them both
normative and historical sou
these contributions (Bull and W
cultural interactions in contem
Constructivist
Like
the
English
Westphal
School,
const
historical contingencies in e
2000:29-46; Reus-Smit 2002).
the European legal and philoso
is related to critical internatio
Critical theorists were united
and state interests as givens. R
state identitie and interests ar
state and nonstate actors. Thes
and shared ideas among thes
these interactions possible (Ru
domestic authority within sta
shared understanding among s
fundamental place in constitut
Although constructivists diff
ing the consolidation of the
whereby of the consolidatio
system-wide normative chan
of norms in Europe and then
ties through state socialization
secularism, and human rights
and then diffuse into the nor
use a variety of means (socia
non-Western states to comply
turn of circular logic, Wester
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210 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
to re-invent the Westphalian narrative, and then the narrative is used to justify
further dualism.
For example, this two-step approach - most visible in constructivist studies on
human rights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
1999) - limits the emergence of international norms geographically (Europe)
and normatively (the Enlightenment ideals) and results in several problems.
First this view leads them to either ignore the non-Western ideas and norms or
acknowledge them only to illustrate their incompatibility of the Western
Westphalian ones that embodies political and religious tolerance, like that of
Chinese suzerainty system or Ottoman Empire's alleged "house of war" versus
"house of peace" jihad-oriented Islamic worldview (Spruyt 1994:16-17, Philpott
2001:15-20). Second, the two-step approach allows scholars to ignore the sys-
tematic European practices that are incompatible with the Enlightenment ideals such as Western colonization and imperialism. Third, this two-step dualism
causes the constructivist scholars to discount the role of power asymmetry in
norm-construction by isolating norm-construction from the categories of normexclusion. Only after distancing themselves from the concerns of those who are
excluded and disempowered, can constructivists move to emphasize shared ideas
which in turn suggests that norm-construction is an empowering process lead-
ing to superior outcomes allegedly for all (Kurki-Sinclair 2010). As a result,
constructivist arguments for norm-construction may inadvertently - but
systematically - marginalize and stigmatize non-European norms, values, and
institutions.
These problems also appear in the constructivists' interpretation of the Peace
of Westphalia as pivotal in the construction of the international system. Among
constructivist scholars, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Philpott are most explicit in
their Eurocentrism. Unlike the English School scholars, who more or less share
common theoretical assumptions, institutional affiliations, and identification as a
group, constructivists are a more diverse group whose foundational assumptions
are disputed. For example, Reus-Smit (2001) divides constructivists into conventional and critical categories and further sub-divides the critical category into
modernist and postmodernist camps. These groups also differ regarding the nature of the international system and the centrality of the Westphalian narrative.
Both Wendt and Philpott can be called conventional as they try to construct a
grand theory of international relations. In addition, both of them adhere, to
varying degrees, to the Westphalian narrative, Wendt both metaphorically and
historically, and Philpott historically.
Wendt's social identity theory of international relations emphasizes the change
and evolution of international structures. According to Wendt, shared knowledge
about state identities is more important than the distribution of material capabilities enabling and constraining interstate interactions. Wendt's theory reinvents
the Westphalian narrative by creating ideal-type categories based on what he calls
"cultures of anarchy," a tripartite typology of international structures - Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. This typology invokes the English School's categories
and thus indirectly links Wendt to the nineteenth-century international jurists'
categories of European civilized/Asian barbarians/African savages. In Wendt's
typology, Hobbesian anarchy is a system in which states take on the role of
enemy with respect to each other; this system is identified with unmitigated violence. According to Wendt, Hobbesian anarchy describes significant portions of
international history, except for the post-Westphalian European/Western system.
Wendt's Hobbesian anarchy is therefore similar to Bull's international system.
What distinguishes Wendt's theory is his argument that this state of war is constituted by shared ideas of enmity, not by the logic of anarchy or human nature
(Wendt 1999:260).
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Turan
Kayaoglu
211
Wendt's argument elevates the
substantially. In Wendt's analys
the hierarchy of cultures of an
ing, Westphalia transformed a
(enmity) one to a Lockean (rival
Westphalia were important in
developed a capability of polit
started to treat other states lik
accepted a set of norms (like th
(like that of the "standards of
After establishing Lockean anar
Europe, Wendt minimizes elem
presumably has operated in Eur
he argues that despite the dom
states
occasionally
fell
back
i
Wars, the First World War, an
tion, he concedes that Europe
pursue colonization. But in Wendt's account these are treated as isolated
fallbacks that do not disqualify his conclusion of post-Westphalian Europe
dominated by a logic of Lockean anarchy and its self-restraint.
However, according to Wendt, it is Kantian anarchy, in which states have internalized the role of friend. Hence Kantian anarchy represents the highest stage of
the "culture of anarchy;" this is exemplified by the post-World World II behavior
of the North Atlantic states (Wendt 1999:297).
Three aspects of Wendt's theory are remarkably Eurocentric. First, While
Wendt (242-3) accepts the possibility that Kantian international culture is "mul-
tiply realizable" through, for example, "Islamic states," "socialist states," and
"Asian Way states," he exclusively focuses on Western states and explains the
evolution of the European international system from the Hobbesian state of nature into a Kantian peace. According to Wendt (354), values like self-restraint,
that "essence of civilization," is an enabling factor in the realization of other
important factors (homogeneity, interdependence, common fate). According to
Wendt, self-restraint, a form of political tolerance, is most likely to be found in
democratic states. Second, in addition to self-restraint, Wendt identifies homogeneity, common fate, and interdependence (most likely, to be found in capitalist
societies, he agues) as being necessary for states to develop what he calls "prosocial behavior" required for Kantian anarchy. Thus, it is difficult to see how his
theory allows for a diversity of political forms. Since states identities are formed,
Wendt (1999:366) claims, through imitation and social learning, and since the
"Western way" appears to be the preeminent model of behavior in Kantian anar-
chy, non-Western states needed to "socialize" into the Western international
order to realize Kantian anarchy. Third, Wendt also, in a Eurocentric blindness,
ignores imperialism. His references to the mechanisms of imitation and socialization through which units develop collective identities ignore the coercive nature
of the "expansion" of "international society." Somewhat unsurprisingly, his
Social Theory of International Relations does not even have an index entry for impe-
rialism or colonialism.
Compared to Wendt's structural-cultural approach and his metaphorical use of
the Westphalian narrative, Daniel Philpott offers a Weberian ideational account
that reconstructs the Westphalian narrative as a historical claim. Philpott (2001)
examines the role of social justice ideas in the emergence of the modern stat
system with a particular focus on two "revolutions" in international society. Th
'Chacko (2008) offers a critique of Wendt's use of "anarchy." Schmidt (1998) offers a similar critique for the
concept of anarchy in international relations theory.
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212 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
first revolution began with the Protestant Reformation and culminated with the
Peace of Westphalia, ending medieval Christendom and bringing about a system
of sovereign states in Europe. The second revolution sprang from the postwar
ideas of equality and colonial nationalism, ending the colonial empires and
bringing sovereignty to the rest of international system. In both cases, revolutions
in ideas about legitimate political authority profoundly altered the "constitution" that established basic authority in the international system. These revolutions stemmed from earlier understandings of justice and political authority.
In Philpott's theory of change, new ideas challenge the legitimacy of existing
order leading to crises, and thus trigger a revolution that creates a new order.
To show the autonomous influence of ideas apart from material factors in
his claims of "Westphalia as origin" and "no Reformation, no Westphalia," (8)
Philpott relies on scholarship concerning social movements and international
norms. In so doing, he delineates the dual role of ideas in politics (48-51). In
their first role, ideas create identities when people internalize new ideas and
form social movements, including interest groups, lobbies, and parties. In their
second role, when a significant number of people accept the new ideas, the ideas
turn into a form of social power, persuading rulers to change their policies
including forming a new international constitution, supporting new international
norms, values, and institutions. In the context of the Westphalian Revolution,
Philpott (108) holds that the Protestant ideas "lay the prescription for the new
Westphalian order." In an attempt to link Protestant theology and what can be
called as "Westphalian" freedom, he points to central Protestant tenets such as
justification by faith, salvation through grace, and the complete and unique
authority of scripture in creating a new understanding of political authority
(104-10).
On this alleged Westphalian foundation, Philpott interprets decolonization as
the second revolution in the creation of the modern international order. The
principle of freedom, which Westphalia symbolizes, establishes an ideation
between the Westphalian and decolonization revolutions. While the princip
"Westphalian" freedom did not prevent European states from denying this
ciple of freedom to non-European societies, according to Philpott, after ab
three-century interval, Western elites conceded the colonized peoples' righ
freedoms associated with Westphalia and thus Protestant religious prin
resulting in decolonization.
Philpott's commitment to the Westphalian narrative slants his accou
decolonization. For example, the most important elements of this nor
challenge to colonialism happen in the Western international system and i
domestic politics of imperial métropoles and only secondarily among c
populations themselves (chapter 9). In Philpott's view, even colonial de
for independence have European roots, such as the education the colonial e
received in the métropoles or the fact that the métropoles established the i
tions and the principles of equality that the Church had embraced (193). L
ideas, norms, and religions do not play any significant role in Philpott's stu
decolonization. Even if some (very few) of the actors of the decolonization
ment are non-Western, their ideas, inspirations, and models are markedly
tern and can be traced back to ideas propagated by theologians and
philosophers of the Reformation and Westphalia. In Philpott's international history, every freedom enhancing idea and incident is traced back to the Peace of
Westphalia and thus to the Protestant reformation. Conversely, the problems in
chronology, the undesirable behaviors of post-Westphalian Western societies, and
the contributions of non-Western ideas and events in the creation of interna-
tional society are explained away, if not totally neglected.
In conventional constructivist studies, the centrality of progress and civilizatio
appear in the form of the Westphalian narrative; with this assumed trut
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Turan
Kayaoglu
213
constructivist
phal image of
scholars like We
the West based
contemporary
structure
ety.
Using
the
Westphalian
of
foundational narrative assumes that the rest of the world has benefited from the
n
int
spread and imposition of Western values and civilization; this foundational narrative transforms itself into a constitutional argument when it posits that non-We
tern societies continue to benefit from the spread and imposition of Western
ideas such as modernization, state-building, and human rights. This commitmen
to the Westphalian narrative limits the usefulness of constructivist insights abou
the importance of "shared" values in international system and prevents the
constructivists acknowledging how these norms, like human rights, can b
affirmed and supported by non-liberal, non-Western traditions.
Conclusion
International relations scholarship is shaped both by the political and the id
logical affinities of international relations scholars (Oren 2003), but als
perhaps more significantly, by arguments about the superiority of Western v
and political systems. This presumption of superiority is embedded in the
dard historical reference points of the discipline's description of internatio
relations, descriptions which are drawn almost exclusively from Europe's int
history. This distortion influences theorizing about modern international r
tions because it presents European thought and practices as the engine o
international system and as the source of enlightenment, modernity, democ
sovereignty, and human rights. Contemporary international relations t
remains caught in the notion that the West sets the standard for civilized h
conduct; Western liberal democracies are constantly treated as the only ent
capable of bringing any sort of order to the system.
This ethnocentrism is most evident in the international relations scholars'
acceptance of the Westphalian narrative to explain the origins and develo
of international society. Nineteenth-century jurists and some contemporar
national relations scholars follow strikingly similar strategies. They identi
element associated with political and religious tolerance, broadly correspo
to the ideas of sovereignty and secularism, and they credit the Peace of We
as the origin of that particular value. This value is international law for th
teenth-century international jurists, legitimacy to Clark, pluralism to Jackson,
restraint to Wendt, and freedom to Philpott. Once these scholars have attr
these values to Westphalia, they then explicitly reconstruct an internationa
in which European societies are assumed to inherit these values from We
Progress is then defined in terms of progressive refinement of these value
scholars also reconstruct, explicitly or implicitly, a secondary history deali
non-Western societies without Westphalia, societies thereby lacking thes
Finally, for European societies, behaviors consistent with these values are
uted to the European political system and culture while behaviors incons
with them are presented as unimportant, caused by external and situatio
tors. The opposite is true for non-Western societies: behaviors consistent
these values (law, legitimacy, pluralism, self-restraint, freedom) are attrib
external and European influences in these societies while their behaviors in
tent with these values are attributed to their history, religion, and culture.
This skewed understanding of international history and relations is ind
of the Eurocentrism of international relations scholarship. This Euroc
prevents international relations scholars from envisioning the integr
non-Western societies in a way that does not involve coercion, dominatio
an assumption of Western superiority. There is a great need to broa
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214 Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory
deepen global values. The way forward is to investigate how non-Western traditions of political and religious tolerance, like those of the Ottoman millet system, the Chinese tributary systems, and Mughal Emperor Akhbar's religious
pluralism or contemporary calls for the coexistence of civilizations or interfaith
dialogue, can be appreciated and incorporated into international society. Such
refocus can facilitate the non-Western affirmation of international society, the
promotion of its fundamental values of peace, development, tolerance, and
human rights.
International relations theory without Westphalia may open new research
agendas for international relations scholars in three specific ways. First, moving
away from the Westphalian narrative allows a critical evaluation of the emergence
of sovereignty and norms in the international system. If the revisionist scholarship is correct that many of the so-called Westphalian norms are a product of
the nineteenth century, the age of empire (Hobsbawm 1989), then imperialism
should be integral, not incidental, to the emergence of norms in the international system. Yet the current norm and sovereignty literature emphasizes cultural and contractual evolution and ignores the role of power dynamics in norm
construction. Integrating non-European areas into a reexamination of the emergence of so-called Westphalian norms, such as sovereignty, may open new avenues for examining the nexus of power and ideas. For example, a norm analysis
should address not only how norms benefit the group members but also how
they weaken the ones excluded, rather than treating such exclusion as given.
Thinking beyond the Westphalian narrative will shift the attention from the largely functionalist and evolutionary understanding of international society which
emphasizes linear, steady progress to one that better integrates power and interest and which indicates the contested and politicized nature of the concept of
international society and its various incarnations.
Second, imperialism has been one of the most influential forces shaping world
politics. Yet, imperialism remains marginal for many English school scholars and
constructivists. This neglect that comes with emphasizing the Westphalian order,
misrepresents the current world order as one based on sovereign equality despite
the pervasiveness of imperial influences and the legacies present in many postcolonial states. Greater recognition and awareness of international society's imperial origins and its reproduction of the imperial world order can produce better
analyses of imperialism in the twenty-first century (Jones 2006).
Third, thinking beyond Westphalia offers historical picture of the development
of the international system that recognizes the interdependence among different
regional systems and acknowledges the need to accommodate global diversity
and pluralism. The idea of international society can be indispensable for
achieving the universal ideals of peace and the promotion of human rights. The
Westphalian narrative inhibits the legitimacy and efficacy of the notion of
international society because of its inherent dualism: it designates "the West" as
primary creator of the ideas of international society and identifies the other
states as those that must be coerced and coaxed into conforming and complying
with these ideas. Rather, a truly global international society needs to appeal to
and be affirmed by diverse ethical traditions, such as the Chinese, Indian, Jewish,
and Islamic (Mapel and Nardin 1998; Sullivan and Kymlicka 2008). Such appeal
and affirmation requires a prior understanding about what these traditions contributed to the development of international society and how they can provide
their own rationales for the necessity of and value in international society. A serious consideration of these diverse traditions could take the form of what John
Rawls (1996) calls an "overlapping consensus" over the substance of interna-
tional society. As it now stands, the Westphalian narrative prevents the emergence of a genuine cross-civilizational dialogue on how best to achieve political
and religious tolerance in international society.
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215
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