Minimal Self and the Effect of the Social Environment
By: Nathan Brumble
Humanities and Arts Sequence: Philosophy
PY 1731
PY 2732
PY 2717
PY 2719
HU 2258
Introduction to Philosophy and Religion
E1 20
Suffering, Healing & Values
A 20
Philosophy and the Environment
D 20
Philosophy of Science
A 21
World Cinemas
C 21
HU 3900
Self and No-Self
Presented to: Prof, Jennifer McWeeny
Department of Humanities & Arts
D 2021
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Humanities & Arts Requirement
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Worcester, MA
D 21
Abstract
When defining the minimal self, there is an ongoing debate on whether the social environment
in which the minimal self exists in has an effect on defining the minimal self. Defining the minimal self
can give a basis for defining the self as a whole. I argue that the social environment in which the minimal
self exists plays a crucial role in defining the minimal self. I start by saying that across different social
settings, the minimal self is in fact different. I argue that social hindsight plays an important role in
defining the minimal self in the future. Each of these premises involve the minimal self being affected by
the environment in which it exists.
Throughout all of history the question of “What is self?” has occupied the minds of
philosophers. Constantly seeking answers to this existential question, many theories of the self
have arisen. The complex nature of the self has created a spectrum of theories regarding exactly
what constitutes selfhood. To best understand the self, it is important to first consider the self in
its most fundamental form, the minimal self. Understanding the minimal self is important, as it
becomes a basis for defining the self on a larger scale. If a clean, agreeable definition for the
minimal self can be attained, defining selfhood would become a lot easier. However, it begs the
question of how can the minimal self be defined? I argue that the minimal self can be viewed as
a combination of first personal experiences and the social environment in which these
experiences take place.
I argue that the minimal self is based on more than just experiences alone. I believe that
the environment of the experiential self has a direct influence on how the minimal self
contributes to the phenomenal consciousness of oneself. It is important to understand how
exactly the minimal self is defined through experiences, and Dan Zahavi’s “Thin, Thinner,
Thinnest: Defining Minimal Self” will be the main literature I use to explore this idea.
When speaking on the minimal self, Zahavi’s main idea is that all experiences in life have
a sense of subjectivity attached to them. He argues that “experiential episodes are neither
unconscious or anonymous; rather, they necessarily come with first personal givenness or
perspectival ownership” (Zahavi 194). Experiential episodes cannot be considered unconscious
because the subject inherently recognizes themselves within the context of the experience. For
this reason it is also not anonymous. Even for events that seem unconscious like driving a car or
reading a book, the subject is aware of themselves within the context of their experience. There
is always an “I” attached to the experience such as “I am driving the car” or “I am reading the
book. Also, this idea of perspectival ownership or “what-its-like-for-me-ness” exists only in the
prereflective consciousness. The prereflective consciousness is what experiences the world
before reflecting on the sensory input gained. In contrast the reflective consciousness is what
reflects on that which the prereflective consciousness absorbs. Zahavi argues that it is in this
prereflective state that our ideas of subjectivity are made. Before the subject has time to think
about the information collected through the senses, it already has an idea of mineness attached to
the information.
Zahavi argues that the minimal self is a necessary part of defining prereflective and
reflective experiences in everyday life. Consider the classic dichotomy of an introvert and an
extrovert and imagine that these two people both walk into a party with loud music, people
dancing, and flashing lights. When entering, the first personal “what-its-like-for-me-ness” for
both the introvert and the extrovert are extremely different. For the introvert, upon being
ambushed with different aggressive senses, their immediate response/attitude toward the
situation would be extremely negative. Zahavi would argue that in the immediate moment when
the introvert walked into the room, experiencing the party’s sensory input would have negative
subjectivity associated with it. In contrast, the extrovert would find a bombardment of senses like
this to be inviting, as it presents an opportunity to have fun in a social environment. In this case,
the same party sensory information would have the extrovert prereflectively have a welcoming
attitude towards it. Zahavi would argue that for each person, there exists a different prereflective
attitude towards the same sensory stimulus, and it is in this situation that the minimal self exists
differently for each self.
Zahavi then argues that this idea of prereflective consciousness is not interpersonally
constituted by any means. Zahavi explains that a baby with no language skills that is crying is
not absent of self because of its lack of interpersonal relations. The baby’s experience of feeling
distress has a sense of perspectival ownership in the sense that those feelings, when replicated
yield a similar response. Devoid of understanding of culture, the self of the baby is the perfect
representation of the minimal self as each experience is represented by the true perspective of the
baby, unaffected by culture. Zahavi continues to argue,
Denying that the minimal self is interpersonally constituted, denying that one only
becomes a subject of experience, that our experiential life is only imbued with its
prereflective self- presentational character, and that phenomenal episodes only acquire
for-me-ness, in virtue of one's relations to others, in no way entails that the minimal self
is a self-enclosed self (Zahavi 196).
Zahavi’s idea here can be broken down into two main components that support the same idea.
The first is that just because the minimal self is not defined through interpersonal relations, it
does not mean it is unable to communicate and interact with the world around it. The minimal
self exists on the basis of the mineness of experience. This mineness does not have to be a
“mineness compared to theirness”, as my experiences do not have to be compared to other
peoples experiences in order to be mine. I can still describe and communicate the mineness
associated with given experiences, therefore the minimal self is not self enclosed. The second is
that experiential life is not filled with prereflective self-presenting character, but that does not
mean that the minimal self is self enclosed. In other words, just because we are not constantly
thinking about how we look in the eyes of others, it does not mean that the minimal self is not
present in the world outside of the mind. In general, Zahavi argues that the minimal self is not
interpersonally constituted, but this does not mean that it is self contained.
The minimal self is not a far off, near theoretical concept, but it is what exists in the
world and absorbs the senses that the world emits. The minimal self is a product of the
experiences that a subject attains through immersion into the world. For example, think of the
introvert and extrovert that I had mentioned before. Their minimal selves, or their prereflective
dispositions toward their situation are both immersed in their environment. They are not separate
from the party; thus, it would be incorrect to say that their minimal selves are absent from their
environment as well. Each person has their own perspectival ownership associated with every
experience they have. It does not matter whether they are immersed in a social gathering like a
party, or isolated in solitary confinement. No matter what people do or where they are, there will
always be unique subjectivity associated with the experiences they have.
While Zahavi argues that the minimal self is constituted mostly through first personal
experiences stamped with perspectival ownership, I argue that the environment in which this
minimal self exists plays a significant role in defining the minimal self.
For the same self, unconscious responses to sensory inputs can be different across
different social settings. I argue this because people have predetermined (whether conscious or
not) attitudes towards everything in their world. Predetermined in this context means previously
established not by a divine force, but by sociocultural experiences. These attitudes are
unconsciously constructed through social interaction, but do not always present themselves in a
given sociocultural environment. Consider a student who is extremely comfortable using and
hearing profane language around his friends. In that specific social setting, the student’s attitude
towards those words is the same attitude he/she has for other words. However, if you were to put
that same student in a classroom, and he heard someone use a profane word to a teacher, his
attitude to said word would be completely different.
One’s attitude towards something defines the prereflective, reflexive response to an
experience involving that something. In the student’s case, when he hears his/her friends using
profanity in normal conversations, the student does not think anything of it. There is no reflexive
response, as there is no predetermined attitude towards those words for that specific social
setting that would create a noticeable response. However, in the classroom, if someone said the
same profane word to the teacher, the student would have a reflexive response different from that
of the social setting involving his/her friends.
For the same self, prereflective responses to sensory inputs can be different across
different social settings. I argue this because people have predetermined (whether conscious or
not) attitudes towards everything in their world. Whether these attitudes are toward experiences,
or the social setting they take place, everybody has them. It is important to note that
predetermined in this context means previously established not by a divine force, but by
sociocultural experiences. Attitudes are unconsciously constructed through social interaction, but
do not always present themselves in a given sociocultural environment. Often, the presences of
others allows these attitudes to be suppressed or shielded by said others. Consider a student who
is extremely comfortable using and hearing profane language around his friends. In that specific
social setting, the student’s attitude towards those words is the same attitude he/she has for other
words. However, if you were to put that same student in a classroom, and he heard someone use
a profane word to a teacher, his attitude to said word would be completely different.
One’s attitude towards something defines the prereflective response to an experience
involving that something. In the student’s case, when they hears their friends using profanity in
normal conversations, the student does not think anything of it. There is no reflexive response, as
there is no predetermined attitude towards those words for that specific social setting that would
create a noticeable response. However, in the classroom, if someone said the same profane word
to the teacher, the student would have a response different from that of the social setting
involving their friends. With the teacher present, most if not all experiences of the student are
seen from the perspective of the teacher before their own perspective. Even thought the student
thinks nothing of profanity around their friends, the teacher’s presence forces them to think in
terms of what the teacher thinks before their own thoughts. It is in these kinds of social settings
where the minimal self is affected.
The minimal self relies heavily on the “mineness” of each experience. If that mineness
becomes obstructed an outside force, the minimal self therefore is affected by that outside force.
This goes against Zahavi’s view of the minimal self, as he claims that subjectivity of experience
alone is what defines the minimal self. When that subjectivity is perceived through the eyes of
external selves in a social setting before your own eyes, the minimal self can no longer be
defined outside of its social context. Humans are inherently social beings, so defining selfhood
outside of a social context does not create a working, applicable definition of what is means to
have a self.
Another reason I argue that the minimal self is defined by the social environment in
which it exists is the fact that people have seemingly different selves across different social
settings. In order to meet the expectations of their environment, people act certain ways and
perceive things certain ways. No matter how serious it is to meet these expectations, doing so can
still alter the way in which people perceive the experiences in front of them.
Consider a celebrity living in Los Angeles who is a world renowned actor with multiple
contracts. Imagine that their friends who are also celebrities are getting backlash for making
inappropriate comments that were captured by paparazzi and posted on the internet. The
celebrity watched as their friends began to lose sponsorships and contracts as more and more
people started hearing about these awful comments. Seeing how these comments quickly started
to ruin their friend’s lives, the celebrity started deeply questioning the things that they were
putting on the internet and the things that they were saying to people in real life. Each thought
was consumed by the fear of losing their career and getting publicly exposed.
Imagine a few days later that this celebrity goes on a talk show to speak about their
friend’s behavior. While talking with the host, all they can think about is whether their next
sentence would be acceptable for the general audience to hear. The fear of facing the same
downfall of their friends completely takes over every thought during this interview. From this,
the celebrity is experiencing the view of the audience before their own view. The celebrity is
considering the perspective of the audience and the general public before they can actually have
their own perspective. Driven by fear in a high stakes social setting, the celebrity’s perspective
comes second to the perspective of their audience. When prereflectively considering the
experience of the audience before their own, the celebrity has an altered minimal self different
from when they are not in that social setting. In the interview setting, the celebrity’s first
thoughts do not come from their own experience and perspective, but from the perceived
experience and perspective of the audience, affecting the minimal self.
Now, imagine that the celebrity leaves Los Angeles to visit some hold family and friends
back home in rural Kansas. As we have seen with the interview, this celebrity has recently
become extremely self conscious about everything they say and do. Upon arriving home, the
celebrity meets their childhood friends and does not want to be known as the person who moved
to LA and became a terrible person. Through each conversation, the celebrity avoids saying
certain things that might lead their friends to believe that she is an entitled celebrity like some of
them. Every sentence that they say to their friends has them thinking whether or not they will
come off as entitled. The celebrity is conscious of everything they do and everything they are
wearing, as they want to present themselves a certain way to their friends. The celebrity
experiences everything through the perspective of their friends before their own perspective. Just
like the interview, the celebrity sees everything through the eyes of others to make sure that they
are not saying or doing anything that could jeopardize their future.
In this situation, the same self presents itself differently in each situation, no matter the
stakes. In the case of the interview, the stakes were pretty high, as saying something
inappropriate could cost the celebrity their career just like their friends. In contrast, when with
their friends, the celebrity could say whatever they wanted, and nothing would happen as the
stakes are relatively low. No matter the stakes, people want to present themselves in a certain
way in order to maintain their desired social identity. When hyper-focusing on their social
presentation, people tend to consider the feelings and perspective of those around them before
their own. It is here where the minimal self is affected by the social setting it exists in. The
minimal self is affected because one person can experience the perspective of people around
them. The unique subjective experience of someone can be experienced through feelings of fear,
driving people to act differently. Fear of losing a contract or social awkwardness can lead people
to suppress their feelings and experience other people’s perspective before their own, removing
the “mineness” attached to their experience. When that stamp of mineness is that of someone
else’s, the minimal self is constituted with that foreign stamp of mineness. This leads to a
minimal selfhood defined in context of the social environment it exists in, not just the first
personal experiences attached to them.
As suggested by its name, the minimal self aims to describe the most fundamental part
of the self. With any given experience, simply focusing on the subjective ownership or “whatits-like-for-me-ness” that comes with said experience allows the minimal self to be discovered.
Zahavi’s paper “Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self”attempts to find the
“thinnest” description of the minimal self. He does so by removing integral parts of human
existence and seeing what remains of the self. However, I believe that doing so can abstract the
view of the self and serves as a mere thought experiment instead of an actual definition.
In his 2009 article “Is Self a Social Construct?” Zahavi explains key details in defining the
subjectivity of the self. He argues that “Whatever their character, whatever their object, all of
the experiences are subjective in the sense that they feel like something for somebody” (Zahavi
2009 555). Zahavi explains here that no matter the form or senses stimulated in an experience,
there will always be a perspectival ownership associated with said experiences. This ownership
is specific to the experiencing person, and Zahavi argues that no matter what they do or what
they experience, a “stamp of mineness” will always be attached to their experience. While I
completely agree with this argument, I think it is an incomplete one, as it fails to recognize the
means through which a social environment can alter this perspectival ownership.
To explain this point, I am going to use he example that he gives in his “Is Self a Social
Construct?” paper. He describes climbing a cathedral and looking out on the Copenhagen
skyline, contemplating on the sensory information presented to him.
“My concentration is suddenly interrupted by a pull in my hand. My son asks me when
we are supposed to meet his mother and brother for cake and hot chocolate. I look at
my watch and shamefully realize that we are already too late for our appointment. I
decide to start the descent immediately, but when rushing down the stairways, I
stumble over an iron rod and feel pain blossom up my shin” (Zahavi 2009 555).
I left out some of his original descriptions of the scenery for the sake of brevity, but Zahavi
described how the scene was like for him, not just objective facts about the scene. He provides
an example of how his first personal pre reflective experiences came with a sense of mineness.
Each of his descriptions were his own, and were distinct from those of his son’s. However, the
part I want to focus on is the shame that he feels when looking at his watch and realizing that
he is late to meet his wife and son for food. Zahavi only mentions that feeling of shame once,
then continues to describe his subjective view of descending the cathedral steps and hurting
himself. It is in this idea of shame that the objection to my argument exists.
Zahavi generally argues that no matter what you experience or where you are, the
minimal self is constituted by the prereflective “what-its-like-for-me-ness”. There will always
exist a stamp of mineness, regardless of the environment that you experience that mineness in.
However, I argue that this is not the case. When talking about mineness in terms of the
cathedral example, all of his experiences are through the lens of Zahavi’s mind. However, when
he realizes that he is late for a meeting with his wife, he feels shame. Zahavi neglects of expand
on that feeling of shame, but it is that feeling which constitutes a change in the minimal self.
When an interpersonal feeling as strong as shame is present, this feeling becomes extremely
difficult to ignore.
People feeling shame can easily become controlled by shame. I am not going to
continue to use Zahavi’s example, as he neglected to share how this shame affected his
thoughts, but I will propose another situation. Consider a boy who is being constantly bullied
for being overweight by his classmates at school. Whenever he sits down in the cafeteria and
pulls out his lunch, everybody makes fun of him, and he therefore experiences shame. As the
bullying gets worse and worse, the feelings of shame begin to control him, making him second
guess what items he should or should not bring to school to eat for lunch. Once the boy arrives
at the cafeteria, before he takes out his lunch, he is firstly experiencing this moment through
the eyes of others. He can only think about what other people are thinking about him, and the
feelings of shame and anxiety exist before any other. It is in this moment that the minimal self
no longer is defined with the stamp of mineness as Zahavi would suggest. The boy does not
have the feeling of mineness attached to his experience in the cafeteria, as before he can have
mineness, he experiences the perspective of others first. Feelings like shame allow the
perspective of others to be considered before your own, altering the minimal self.
Zahavi’s definition of the minimal self relies on finding the most fundamental idea of the
self. Because all of his work agrees with my thesis, it cannot be seen as a complete objection to
my argument. Instead, my argument serves as a means to expand on the concepts that he has
presented and offer examples for how the minimal self is affected by its environment when
other’s perspective on an experience takes precedence over your own.