Varca, Miles Azryel R.
JD 1-7
The Family (Art. 149-162)
1. The Family as an Institution
● Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect.
● Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
● Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject
of compromise under the Civil Code.
2. The Family Home
○ Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which
it is situated.
○ Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such
and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.
○ Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the
head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who
are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of
the family for legal support.
○ Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or
after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
● Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent. It
may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his
or her own property.
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on
installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as
a family home.
● Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed,
at the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand
pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may here- after be fixed
by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the
adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include
chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are
deemed to be rural areas.
● Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated,
assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the
written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter’s
spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case
of conflict, the court shall decide.
● Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
● Art. 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for
an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The
court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family
home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent
voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family
home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to
the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities
under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor.
● Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home
as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be
the beneficiary of, only one family home.
● Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
Cases:
Salazar v. Felias
Doctrine: Under Article 155, the family home shall be exempt from execution
but with exceptions. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set
up and proven.
Case Title: Felicitas L. Salazar v. Remedios Felias, on her own behalf and
representation of the other HEIRS OF CATALINO NIVERA (G.R. No.
213972, February 5, 2018)
Facts:
- On February 28, 1990, respondent Remedios Felias represented the
heirs of Catalino Nivera in filing a Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo
and Felisa Lastimosa, as they sought to recover the four parcels of
land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan from the latter. However,
during the trial of the case, on March 3, 1997, Romualdo died. Felisa
and their children (Heirs of Lastimosa) filed a Motion for Substitution
on July 6, 1998. The RTC Branch 55 rendered a decision on March 16,
2004, declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of the
parcels of land in question, and ordered the Heirs of Lastimosa to
vacate the lands and to surrender possession of the land. The Heirs of
Lastimosa did not file an appeal against the trial court's ruling.
Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar, daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto
and Rizalina (part of Heirs of Lastimosa) filed a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA. Felicitas sought the
nullification of the RTC Branch 55's Decision as well as the
corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant
thereto. In her Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Felicitas claimed
that she was deprived of due process when she was not impleaded in
the case for Recovery of Ownership, before the RTC Branch 55.
- On June 5, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment. The CA refused to give credence to the
contention that the Heirs of Nivera are at fault for failing to implead
Felicitas as a party defendant in the action for recovery of ownership.
Rather, the failure to include Felicitas in the proceedings was due to
the fault of the Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to include Felicitas
in their Motion to Substitute. Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed
with the RTC Branch 55 an Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist
from Making Demolition dated April 24, 2010. The Motion to Desist was
premised on the fact that the Sheriff cannot execute the lower court's
decision considering that Felicitas had an aliquot share over the
property, which had not yet been partitioned.
- At about the same time, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution
and Demolition dated May 28, 2010. The Motion for Execution was
anchored on the fact that the Decision dated March 16, 2004, in the
case for recovery of ownership, possession and damages had long
attained finality. On July 9, 2010, the RTC Branch 55 issued an Order
granting the Motion for Execution and Demolition, and denying the
Motion to Desist. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Heirs of Lastimosa
filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the Writ of Execution and
Demolition issued by the lower court.
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in ordering the execution of the Decision
dated March 16, 2004.
Held:
- The petition is lacking merit. The ruling of the CA was affirmed by this
Court in the Resolution dated June 3, 2009, and attained finality as per
Entry of Judgment. It was crystal clear that the issues regarding the
non-inclusion of Felicitas in the proceedings, and the consequent
validity of the lower court's judgment have long attained finality. This
Court reiterates that a judgment rendered as final and executory
cannot be altered, even by the highest court of the land. This final
judgment has become the law of the case, which is now immutable.
Additionally, as an heir of the original defendants in the action for
recovery of ownership, Felicitas is bound by the decision rendered
against her predecessors-in-interest. Thus, there is nothing that
exempts her from the enforcement of the Writ of Execution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and Resolution
dated August 7, 2014, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
97309 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
——
Ining v. Vega
Doctrine: Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis
for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Case Title: Antipolo Ining v. Leonardo R. Vega (G.R. No. 174727, August
12, 2013)
Facts:
- Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120square meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan. The spouses died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria
Roldan. When Romana died, she was survived by her daughter and
grandson — who are both also deceased — and Leonardo was
survived by his wife and children, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by his children. In short,
herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of
subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In
his Amended Complain, Leonardo alleged that on several occasions,
he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused
to heed his demands. In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora,
Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo
had no cause of action against them, and that they have suffered
damages and were forced to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious
suit.
- The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds
of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property
to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo
Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the
time of his death in 1962. However, the trial court held that Leonardo
had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within
which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition
suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription.
- Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. The appeal
questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of the case, its
application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s
heirs exclusively. The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity
of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled
by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. The CA did not agree with
the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for partition was
barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run
not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a
repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. On the
basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’
prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the
property shall be governed by the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch
and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which the parties did
not contest.
- Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the March 14, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and
its September 7, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the decision of the RTC on the ground that Lucimo Francisco
repudiated that co-ownership only on February 9, 1979; Whether or not the
CA erred in not upholding the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint
on the ground of prescription and laches.
Held:
The Court denies the Petition. The finding that Leon did not sell the property
to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s
and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Gregoria’s and
Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. Thus, having
succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and
respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the
property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest
of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights. From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial
court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may
seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it
may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as
a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the
property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s sonin-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under the Family
Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity. In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner
of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason,
prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a
partition of the property has not been lost.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing
co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006
Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
——
Romero v. Singson
Doctrine: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless
it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made.
Case Title: Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia
D. Singson (G.R. No. 200969, August 3, 2015)
Facts:
- The parties in this case are siblings. Their parents, Macario and
Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-square-meter of property, which is the
subject property of this case, (the subject property) located at 127 F.
Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila with the Transfer Certificate
of Title issued in 1953. It appears that petitioners and their other
siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual occupants of the
subject property, as they have stayed there with their parents since
birth, all the while respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City
after getting married. Macario passed away on February 22, 1981,
while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997. On June 7, 2006, a new
certificate of title was issued in respondent's name after being
cancelled, by virtue of a notarized “Absolute Deed of Sale” executed
on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad as sellers, and
respondent as the buyer despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad
were then already deceased. After that, respondent sent letters to her
siblings demanding that they vacate the subject property, under pain
of litigation. Petitioners and their other siblings immediately filed a
Complaint against respondent and the Register of Deeds of San Juan
City for annulment and cancellation of the TCT as well as the June 6,
2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, on the claim that the
deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario and Felicidad,
the true owners of the subject property, they were entitled to a
reconveyance of the same.
- On September 26, 2006, Engracia filed an unlawful detainer suit
against petitioners and her brothers Rafael and Ramon before the
MeTC of San Juan City. Engracia stated in her Complaint that she
sought to evict her siblings from the subject property on the claim that
she is the owner of the same, that her siblings’ stay in the property was
merely due to tolerance and that she now needed the premises to
serve as her daughters’ residence. So, she prayed for her siblings to
be ordered to vacate the premises and pay the monthly rent of
P2,000.00 from date of demand until they vacate the premises
- In an appeal before the RTC, petitioners and their codefendants
argued that the MeTC erred in not resolving the issue of ownership, in
ordering them to vacate the premises, in deciding issues which were
not framed by the parties, and in not granting them damages and
awarding the same instead to respondent. Respondent filed a Petition
for Review with the CA and on February 29, 2012, the CA rendered
judgment, the petition was granted and the assailed Orders of the RTC
Pasig City, are reversed and set aside.
Issue: Whether or not the CA obviously erred in failing to dismiss the
complaint because it did not comply with the jurisdictional element required
by law; Whether or not the decision gravely erred in not having ruled that
respondent’s cause of action in her ejectment complaint is indispensably
intertwined with the issue of ownership raised by petitioners’ defense, thus
rendering said complaint not an unlawful detainer case over which the MeTC
has jurisdiction; Whether or not the decision is seriously mistaken in not
having upheld the award of damages by Judge Myrna Y. LM-Verano in favor
of defendants and against respondent who obviously obtained her title using
an undisputably fraudulent deed of absolute sale; Whether or not the
decision incorrectly ruled that petitioners in raising ownership as their
defense constitute a collateral attack on the title of respondent obviously and
undeniably procured thru fraud.
Held:
The Court grants the petition. The procedural issue of lack of attempts at
compromise should be resolved in respondent's favor. True, no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with this precedent is
not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a
motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. The CA nonetheless
committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on
respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the
singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to possession
thereof- pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title
over a land is entitled to possession thereof." Such provisional determination
of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners' favor.
When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by
the parties thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that
the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad, were forged.
They could not have signed the same, because both were by then long
deceased. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so,
it is equivalent to nothing, produces no civil effect, and it does not create,
modify or extinguish a juridical relation. In sum, the fact that respondent has
in her favor a certificate of title is of no moment; her title cannot be used to
validate the forgery or cure the void sale. Since respondent acquired no right
over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original
registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners,
petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by
succession - of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all
attributes of ownership over the same, including possession - whether de
facto or de jure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right
through an action for ejectment.
There is likewise no merit to respondent's argument that since only two of
the defendants in the ejectment case filed the instant Petition, the same must
necessarily be dismissed. There is no rule which requires that all the parties
in the proceedings before the CA must jointly take recourse with this Court
or else such recourse would be dismissible.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114363 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 160 in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
——
Moreno v. Kahn
Doctrine: For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be
exclusively between or among “members of the same family.” Once a
stranger becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no
longer a condition precedent before the action can prosper.
Case Title: Jose Z. Moreno v. Rene M. Kahn (G.R. No. 217744, July 30,
2018)
Facts:
- Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he
and his family have been occupying 2 parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 181516 and 1815176 (subject
lands) co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo
Moreno Kahn-Haire and his nephews and nieces — Consuelo’s
children — respondents Rene, Luis, Philippe and Ma. Claudine.
Around April or May 2003, through numerous emails and letters,
aforementioned respondents offered to sell to their uncle Jose the
subject lands for the amount of US$200,000. — US$120,000 to be
received by Consuelo and US$20,000 each to be received by her
children — which Jose accepted. It is worth noting that the agreement
was made verbally and was not immediately reduced into writing,
although they had the intention to eventually memorialize the
agreement via a written document. Over the next few years, Jose
made partial payments to respondents by paying off the shares of
Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, leaving a remaining balance of
US$120,000 to be paid to Consuelo. However, in July 2010, Consuelo
decided to “cancel” their agreement, and informed Jose of her intent to
convert the earlier partial payments he made as rental payments
instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval of Consuelo's
plan and demanded the respondents to proceed with the sale, which
they ignored. He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without his
consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their shares over
the subject lands to Rene, consolidating full ownership of the subject
lands to him. Consequently, the old transfer certificate titles were
canceled and new TCTs were issued under Rene’s name. Jose sent a
demand letter to Rene, and later on to the other respondents as well
asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale agreed
upon. As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the
barangay lupon for conciliation proceedings between him and Rene
only. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose filed the complaint for
specific performance and cancellation of titles with damages and
application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction.
- On January 18, 2012, the RTC’s motu proprio ordered the dismissal of
Jose’s complaint for failure to allege compliance with the provision of
Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be
made first before suits may be filed between family members. Jose
moved for reconsideration, arguing that: (a) the RTC cannot motu
proprio order the dismissal of a case on the ground of failure to comply
with a condition precedent, i.e., noncompliance with Article 151 of the
Family Code; (b) Article 151 does not apply to the instant case,
contending that while Consuelo is indeed his full-blooded sister, her co
defendants are not considered members of the same family as him and
Consuelo and (c) assuming Article 151 of the Family Code applies, he
has complied with the earnest efforts requirement as he tried
convincing
Consuelo
correspondences,
and
to
change
even
her
underwent
mind
through
barangay
email
conciliation
proceedings with Rene. In an Order dated October 11, 2012, the RTC
denied Jose’s motion, ruling, inter alia, that Article 151 of the Family
Code applies, despite the fact that Consuelo had other co-defendants
in the suit, which led to the filing of the case, mainly due to the
disagreement between full-blooded siblings, Jose and Consuelo.
Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
- In a decision dated September 24, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. It held that the motu proprio dismissal of Jose’s complaint was
proper in light of Article 151 of the Family Code which mandates such
dismissal if it appears from the complaint/petition that no earnest
efforts were made between party-litigants who are members of the
same family. The CA likewise agreed with the RTC’s finding that Jose’s
main cause of action was against his full-blooded sister, Consuelo.
Issue: whether or not: (a) the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s motu proprio
dismissal of Jose’s complaint; and (b) Article 151 of the Family Code is
applicable to this case.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. Palpably, the wisdom behind the provision is to
maintain sacred ties among members of the same family. A party’s failure to
comply with this provision before filing a complaint against a family member
would render such complaint premature; hence, dismissible. This
notwithstanding, the Court held in Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales that
noncompliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts to
dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a
condition precedent such that the noncompliance therewith constitutes a
ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing
party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded
siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine, which make them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then
follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are considered “strangers’’
to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned. In this
relation, it is apt to clarify that while it was the disagreement between Jose
and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains
that Jose’s nephew and niece were rightfully impleaded as co-defendants in
Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In
view of the inclusion “strangers” to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who
are full-blooded siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond the
scope of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely
erred in dismissing Jose’s complaint due to noncompliance with the earnest
effort requirement therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September
24, 2014 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 129232 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 12-004 is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
——
Vitug v. Abuda
Doctrine: Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts
secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced
sale, or attachment of family home.
Case Title: Florante Vitug v. Evangeline A. Abuda (G.R. No. 201264, January
11, 2016)
Facts:
- On March 17, 1997, Abuda loaned P250,000 to Vitug and his wife,
Narcisa Vitug. As security for the loan, Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his
property in Tondo Foreshore, Tondo, Manila so the property is now the
subject of a conditional Contract to Sell between the National Housing
Authority and Vitug.
- On November 17, 1997, the parties executed a “restructured”
mortgage contract on the property to secure the amount of P600,000
representing the original P250,000 loan, additional loans, and
subsequent credit accommodations given by Abuda to Vitug with an
interest of 5% per month. By then, the property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 234246 under Vitug’s name. Spouses
Vitug failed to pay their loans despite Abuda’s demands.
- On November 21, 2003, Abuda filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of
Property before the RTC of Manila. On December 19, 2008, the RTC
ruled in favor of Abuda. Vitug appealed RTC’s Decision before the
Court of Appeals. He contended that the real estate contract that he
and Abuda entered into was void on the grounds of fraud and lack of
consent invoking the Articles 1318, 1319, and 1332 of the Civil Code.
He alleged that he was only tricked into signing the mortgage contract,
and that he did not really understand the terms enclosed in the
contract, hence, his consent to the mortgage contract was vitiated.
- On October 26, 2011, the Court of Appeals ruled the Decision partially
granting the RTC’s decision but with modification. The CA found that
Vitug failed to pay his obligation within the stipulated six-month period
under the March 17, 1997 mortgage contract and due to this failure,
the parties entered into a restructured mortgage contract. The new
mortgage contract was signed before a notary public by Vitug, his wife
Narcisa, and witnesses Rolando Vitug, Ferdinand Vitug, and Emily
Vitug. The CA also found all the elements of a valid mortgage contract
in the parties’ mortgage contract, and the contract was also clear in its
terms — that failure to pay the P600,000 loan amount, with a 5%
interest rate per month from November 17, 1997 to November 17,
1998, shall result in the foreclosure of Vitug's mortgaged property.
There were no evidence on record that showed Vitug was defrauded
when he entered into the agreement with Abuda. However, the Court
of Appeals found that the interest rates imposed on Vitug’s loan were
“iniquitous, unconscionable[,] and exorbitant.” so they modified the
legal interest to 1% per month or 12% per annum. The CA affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s December 19, 2008 Decision upholding the
validity of the mortgage contract executed by petitioner Florante Vitug
and respondent Evangeline A. Abuda.
- On November 23, 2011, Vitug moved for the reconsideration of the
CA’s Decision, however it was denied on March 8, 2012. Presented in
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
the CA’s Decision and its Resolution denying Vitug’s motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioner Florante Vitug may raise in this Petition
issues regarding the National Housing Authority’s alleged lack of consent to
the mortgage, as well as the exemption of his property from execution;
(2) Whether or not the restriction clause in petitioner’s title rendered invalid
the real estate mortgage he and respondent Evangeline Abuda executed;
(3) Whether or not petitioner’s property is a family home that is free from
execution, forced sale, or attachment under the Family Code.
Held:
1. Yes, Petitioner may raise in his Petition the issues of lack of the
National Housing Authority’s consent to the mortgage and his
property’s alleged exemption from execution. The records show that
petitioner mentioned these issues as early as in his Answer to
respondent’s
Complaint
and
Pretrial
Brief.
The
trial
court
acknowledged these issues, but found that his defenses were based
on grounds that could not be given credence. Whether these
arguments seasonably raised are valid is, however, a different matter.
2. No. The contract is valid because all the elements of a valid mortgage
contract were present. For a mortgage contract to be valid, the
absolute owner of a property must have free disposal of the property.
The restrictions made the contract entered into by the parties voidable
by the person in whose favor they were made — in this case, by the
National Housing Authority. Petitioner has no actionable right or cause
of action based on those restrictions. Having the right to assail the
validity of the mortgage contract based on violation of the restrictions,
the National Housing Authority may seek the annulment of the
mortgage contract. There is no showing that the National Housing
Authority assailed the validity of the mortgage contract on the ground
of violation of restrictions on petitioner’s title. The validity of the
mortgage contract based on the restrictions is not an issue between
the parties. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent based
on those restrictions. The mortgage contract remains binding upon
petitioner and respondent.
3. No. Although petitioner’s property was constituted as a family home, it
is not exempt from execution. Petitioner argues that the property
should be exempt from forced sale, attachment, and execution, based
on Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner and his family have been
neighbors with respondent since 1992, before the execution of the
mortgage contract. Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides
that debts secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against
execution, forced sale, or attachment of family home.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated October 26, 2011 and its Resolution dated March 8, 2012 are
AFFIRMED. The interest rate for the loan of P600,000.00 is further reduced
to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
——
Paternity and Filiation
(Art. 163-182, Family Code)
A. Legitimate Children
○ Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
○ Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of
the child.
○ Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
○ Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent
was
obtained
through
mistake,
fraud,
violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
○ Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
○ Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in
the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
○ Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three
hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
○ Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in
the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his
heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of
said birth, whichever is earlier.
B. Proof of Filiation
○ Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filia- tion of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only
in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having
desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
○ Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
○ Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
○ Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their as- cendants, and
in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the
provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights
granted to them by the Civil Code.
C. Illegitimate Children
○ Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
○ Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.
D. Legitimation
○ Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated.
○ Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable
marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
○ Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children.
○ Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of
the child’s birth.
○ Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
○ Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are
prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their
cause of action accrues.
Cases:
De Santos v. Angeles
Doctrine: Legitimate and legitimated children are entitled to use of surname,
succession and support.
Case Title: Maria Rosario de Santos v. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles (G.R. No.
105619, December 12, 1995)
Facts:
- On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, and
they were blessed with a daughter, Maria Rosario de Santos, the
petitioner. They marriage eventually turned sour and fell apart. Antonio
fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent
herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Being aware
that said decree was worthless in our jurisdiction which then, as now,
did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951
to marry Conchita, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
facto separation from Sofia. Their union produced eleven children. On
March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on
April 23, 1967, Antonio and Conchita contracted a marriage in
Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00.
- On May 15, 1981, Conchita went to court asking for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement
of her late husband’s estate. She alleged that the decedent was
survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and Maria Rosario. No one opposed so the petition was
granted. However, after six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
petitioner decided to intervene. In a motion she filed sometime in
November 1987, she argued inter alia that Conchita’s children were
illegitimate. Conchita challenged this claim although she admitted
during the hearing that all of her children were born prior to Sofia’s
death in 1967. On November 14, 1991, after approval of Conchita’s
account of her administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner’s
motion.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court mistakenly declared petitioner’s half
brothers and sisters as legitimated.
Held:
This argument is tenable. Article 269 of the Civil Code (search sa Family
Code: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside the
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent Conchita and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and
born when the latter’s valid marriage to petitioner’s mother was still
subsisting. The marriage that deceased Antonio and Conchita entered into
abroad is void since the divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this
jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, Antonio was aware of this fact, which is
why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of
the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he
hastily contracted another marriage with Conchita in Tagaytay. In this case,
the term “natural children by legal fiction” was invented, thus giving rise to
another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with
“natural children” as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated
with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status,
rights and obligations of the latter.
Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal
fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can
likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is involved here
than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the
petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving
half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully
entitled to only half of her share.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders
of the court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby
declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos
and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
——
SSS v. Aguas
Doctrine: Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate; Impugning the legitimacy
of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs; A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of
paternity.
Case Title: Social Security System v. Rosanna H. Aguas (G.R. No. 165546,
Feb. 27, 2006)
Facts:
- Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a
pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse, Rosanna
H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December
13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.
Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997.
- However, sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter
dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister,
contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that
Rosanna abandoned the family home approximately more than six
years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. She further alleged that Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna, but that Rosanna had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed
a notarized copy of the original birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela
Pena
̃ , showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to
Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two
were married on November 1, 1990.
- The SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly
pension in September 1997 and they conducted an investigation to
verify Leticia’s allegations. In a Memorandum dated November 18,
1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the investigation
reported that, based on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s
first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales, also a neighbor, Pablo
had no legal children with Rosanna. Jenelyn and Jefren were
Rosanna’s children with one Romeo C. dela Peña, and Rosanna left
Pablo six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was
still pregnant with Jenelyn. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not
capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
- On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr.
Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s
request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to
refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350.00
representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from
December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month. According to
Leticia, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn and after the latter’s
baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela
Pena
̃ was claiming that he was the father of the child and he got mad
because the child was named after Pablo. Romeo also got mad and
even attempted to shoot Rosanna and since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated. Leticia knew about this because at that time their mother
was sick, and she would often visit her at their ancestral home, where
Pablo and Rosanna were staying. She did not know where Rosanna
was staying after that but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela
Pena
̃ were still living together. Subsequently, Mariquita and Jessie
were also summoned for clarificatory questions. During the hearing,
Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal certificates:
that of Jeylnn Aguas, child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez
born on October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H. dela Pena
̃ , child of
Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January 29,
1992.
- The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision
but their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having
been filed out of time. The claimants then elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On
September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn
showing that they were the children of the deceased. According to the
appellate court, for judicial purposes, these records were binding upon
the parties, including the SSS.
- Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS
death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious. At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing
law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death
benefits which includes the dependents defined as the legitimate,
legitimated, or legally adopted children who are unmarried and not over 21
years of age, and beneficiaries defined as the dependent spouse until he
remarried. The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that
only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification
from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The
records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.
It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s
marriage.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a
primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was “the legitimate spouse
dependent for support from the employee.” The claimant-spouse must
therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this
case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of
Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the
civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently
established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death
remains to be resolved. Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the
statutory requirements
have
been
complied
with,
particularly her
dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death.
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. While Rosanna was the legitimate
wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.
SO ORDERED.
——
Miller v. Miller
Doctrine: Article 171 of the Family Code.
Case Title: Glenn M. Miller v. Joan Miller y Espenida (G.R. No. 200344,
August 28, 2019)
Facts:
- John Miller and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married and bore 4
children: Glenn M. Miller, Charles Miller, Betty Miller, and John Miller,
Jr. After John’s death, Joan Miller, through her mother Lennie
Espenida, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Partition
and Accounting of John’s estate with a prayer for preliminary
attachment, receivership, support, and damages. Alleging that she is
John’s illegitimate child with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of
Live Birth which showed John to be her registered father. Glenn filed a
separate Petition praying that Joan’s Certificate of Live Birth be
canceled. With it, he also prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat,
Sorsogon be directed to replace Joan’s surname, Miller, with
Espenida, and that Joan use Espenida instead of Miller in all official
documents.
- Glenn claimed that John did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child,
pointing out that John’s signature was not in her birth certificate. It was
also not shown that John knew and consented that his name would be
indicated in the certificate. Joan countered that from 1978 until John’s
death in 1990, her mother Lennie and John had an amorous
relationship, out of which she was born on June 25, 1982. While she
admitted that John did not sign her birth certificate, he “openly and
continuously recognized her as his child during his lifetime.” She
narrated that she grew up in his ranch and went to John Miller Primary
School with John financing her studies. John also mentioned her name
in his July 5, 1984 letter to Lennie. Moreover, in his holographic will,
he gave Joan a 1/8 share of his estate. Further, in a February 14, 1987
document, he assigned Betty to act as Joan’s guardian and her
inheritance’s administrator until she attains the age of majority. Also,
by his bidding, Betty obtained an educational plan for her. Joan further
claimed that Glenn knew that John recognized her as his child. She
alleged that his Petition was merely filed to harass her because she
filed the partition case. She prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages and litigation expenses as counterclaim.
- Glenn, however, countered that the authenticity of the July 5, 1984 and
February 14, 1987 documents and the July 1985 holographic will was
not proven. Since Joan failed to prove that John wrote and signed
these documents, Glenn claimed that they failed to establish Joan’s
filiation.
- On November 26, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued a Judgment
in favor of Joan. It held that the “due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any
authentic
writing
is,
in
itself,
a
consummated
act
of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required.”
- Glenn appealed the case before the Court of Appeals. On June 30,
2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision, denying Glenn’s
appeal. Applying Article 173 in relation to Article 172 of the Family
Code, it found that John’s holographic will, where he gave Joan 1/8 of
his estate, sufficiently established his paternity. The Court of Appeals
also held that Joan need not prove that the documents she presented
were authentic. It found that Glenn had the burden of proving his
allegations, which he failed to discharge.
- Glenn died and was substituted by his surviving legal heirs who filed
before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Joan and the
Local Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s Judgment allowing
private respondent Joan Miller y Espenida to continue using the surname
Miller.
Held:
No, the CA did not err in their ruling affirming RTC’s Judgment. This Court
stresses that petitioners sought the correction of Joan’s surname in her birth
certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use
her mother’s surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not
an acknowledged illegitimate child of John. What petitioners seek is not a
mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in
private respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private
respondent’s filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from
Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her
identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is
substantial. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental,60 this Court emphasized that “legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through collateral attack.”
In conclusion, the Court affirms the Decision rendered by the CA affirming
the RTC’s Judgment allowing Joan to continue the use of the surname Miller,
however, in the subject of the declarations of the CA and the RTC in regards
to the legitimacy and filiation of private respondent Joan nullified and set
aside.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ June 30, 2011 Decision and February 3,
2012 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 84826 are AFFIRMED insofar as they
affirm the November 26, 2004 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate City, Branch 48 in Spec. Proc. No. 4703, which dismissed the
Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller
y Espenida.
However, the declarations of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court as to the legitimacy and filiation of private respondent Joan Miller y
Espenida are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court’s other
pronouncements in its November 26, 2004 Judgment are also NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE.
This Decision is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the refiling of the appropriate
action before the proper court.
Finally, this Court resolves to treat the Memorandum of petitioners Evelyn L.
Miller, Jennifer Ann L. Miller, Leslie Ann L. Miller, Rachel Ann L. Miller, and
Valerie Ann L. Miller, who substituted Glenn M. Miller as his surviving legal
heirs, as a formal administrative complaint against Judge Jacinta B.
Tambago of Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Masbate City. The
administrative complaint is referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
for proper investigation, report, and recommendation.
SO ORDERED.
——
Braza v. City Civil Registrar
Doctrine: Art. 171 of the Family Code
Case Title: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza, Paolo Josef T. Braza and Janelle Ann
T. Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza, represented by Leon Titular, Cecilia Titular
and Lucille C. Titular (G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009)
Facts:
- Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr., also known
as “Pablito Sicad Braza,” were married on January 4, 1978. Their
marriage bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef and Janelle
Ann on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo
on June 4, 1980. Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident
in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake following the
repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza
as her and Pablo’s son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the
course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with remarks
that minor Patrick was acknowledged by the father Pablito Braza on
January 13, 1997 and was legitimated by virtue of subsequent
marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila.
- Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and
her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional
Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct
the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. They
contend that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo due the said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo. Petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last
name “Braza”; (2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed
Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of
nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo
as bigamous.
- Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct
entries in the civil registrar. they contend that even substantial errors,
such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the
subject of a petition under Rule 108.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 108 can be invoked in a special proceeding for
correction of entry.
Held:
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code
charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled
or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages
as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
——
Ara v. Pizarro
Doctrine: Article 172 of the Family Code
Case Title: Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and
Henry Rossi (G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017)
Facts:
- Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then
husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II. At some
point at the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American
soldier by the name of Darwin Gray and Romeo F. Ara was born from
this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia, and from
this relationship, she gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia and William A.
Garcia. Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24, 1952. After Alfredo
passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi,
who was the alleged father of Henry Rossi.
- Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child
of Josefa. Furthermore, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a
certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by his
Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950, and petitioner Ara is
recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced
by his Certificate of Live Birth.
- Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi,
verbally sought partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa,
which were in the possession of respondent Pizarro. Respondent
Pizarro refused to partition these properties, so, plaintiffs a quo
referred the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for settlement. The parties
were unable to reach an amicable settlement, thus, the Office of the
Barangay Captain issued a Certification to File Action dated April 3,
2003.
- Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003 for judicial partition
of properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the RTC of
Malaybalay City, Branch 9. In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred
that, to her knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of
Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings,
for her lack of knowledge or information to form a belief on that matter.
- Respondent Pizarro filed her Pretrial Brief dated July 28, 2003, which
contained a proposed stipulation that the Additional Properties also
form part of the estate of Josefa. Amenable to this proposal, plaintiffs
a quo moved that the Additional Properties be included in the partition,
in a Motion to Include in the Partition the Proposed Stipulation dated
August 31, 2003. At the pretrial, Ara, Garcia, and Ramon claimed a
property of respondent Rossi as part of the estate of Josefa. This
property was not alleged nor claimed in the original complaint. This
compelled respondent Rossi to engage the services of separate
counsel, as the claim of his property constituted a conflict of interest
among the plaintiffs a quo. After trial, on February 20, 2006, the Trial
Court, issued a Decision awarding the Baguio property to Henry Rossi,
the Valencia property to Fely S. Pizarro, and the rest to be equally
shared by plaintiffs and defendant.
- Respondent Pizarro appealed the Trial Court Decision, claiming it
erred in finding petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and
including them in the partition of properties. Petitioners Ara and Garcia,
as well as respondent Rossi, also filed their own respective appeals to
the Trial Court Decision. Respondent Rossi questioned the inclusion
of his property in the inventory of properties of the late Josefa. The CA
promulgated its Decision on August 1, 2008, and held that only
respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well as plaintiff a quo Ramon, were
the children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa’s estate.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa
through their open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate
children, found in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
Held:
The petition was denied. A person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation
after the death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation.
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate
filiation to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death as provided under
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. Although not raised by petitioners,
it may be argued that petitioner Garcia’s Certificate of Live Birth obtained in
2003 through a late registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in
the civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true that birth
certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the
presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high degree of proof is
needed. However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration
prevented the Court from giving it the same weight as any other birth
certificate. Generally, a delayed registration of birth made after the death of
the putative parent is tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, The Court was unable to accord petitioner Garcia’s delayed
registration of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a putative parent
through an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument, signed by the parent concerned. However, petitioners did not
present in evidence any admissions of filiation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August
1, 2008 Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
——
In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of
Yuhares v. Republic
Doctrine: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father
if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Case Title: In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live
Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote
Tinitigan. Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote v. Republic of the Philippines, Ricky
O. Tinitigan and Local Civil Registrar, Davao City (G.R. No. 222095, August
7, 2017)
Facts:
- On 24 June 2008, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcolete bore a child out of
wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan in her relative’s
residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to
register the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace
Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital. To hide her
relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur
while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would
only visit her. On August 24, 2011, she bore another child with
Tinitigan, whom she named Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did
not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal
charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned
to Davao City.
- When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school
admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both
children. She returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their
births and the Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late
registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel
Barcelote after submitting proof that the National Statistics Office
(NSO) has no record of both births on file. However, upon submission
of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote
was informed that there were two certificates of live birth with the same
name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.
- Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the
subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge
and participation, and for containing erroneous entries. After complying
with the jurisdictional requirements, Barcelote was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. In her testimony, Barcelote reiterated her
allegations in the petition and emphasized that the subject birth
certificates were registered by her children’s biological father, Tinitigan,
without her knowledge. She also testified that the subject birth
certificates reflected wrong entries, although she did not present any
other evidence.
- On February 28, 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered
the cancellation of the subject birth certificates. The RTC ruled that the
subject birth certificates are legally infirm, because they were
registered unilaterally by Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature
of Barcelote in violation of Section 5, Act No. 3753. Moreover, the RTC
found that it is not in the best interest of the children to use the surname
of their father, for there is always a possibility that the legitimate
children or wife may ask the illegitimate children to refrain from using
the surname of their father. The RTC further held that the subject birth
certificates are not reflective of the correct personal circumstances of
the children because of the glaring differences in the names and other
vital information entered in it.
- On March 5, 2015, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. The CA ruled that the registrations of the children’s births,
caused by Tinitigan and certified by a registered midwife, Erlinda
Padilla, were valid under Act No. 3753, and such registrations did not
require the consent of Barcelote. The CA further ruled that the children
can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan, since Republic Act
No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family Code, allows
illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if the latter had
expressly recognized them through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, such as in this case where Barcelote admitted that
Tinitigan personally registered the children’s births and affixed his
surname on the subject birth certificates. Moreover, the CA found that
Barcelote failed to discharge the burden of proving the falsity of the
entries in the subject birth certificates and to adduce evidence that the
information she provided in the late registration are the true personal
circumstances of her children.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live
birth for Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Barcelote
Tinitigan.
Held:
The Court grants the petition. The Court does not agree with the CA that the
subject birth certificates are the express recognition of the children’s filiation
by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered in accordance with the
law. In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father
refuses. It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father
recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an
illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who
conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Upon the effectivity of RA 9255,
the provision that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with an added
provision that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father. Since it appears on the face of
the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the documents, the
local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the
provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate
children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as
to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of
the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked
the signature of the mother.
Accordingly, the Court declares the subject birth certificates void and orders
their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of
the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate
children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her
children’s birth certificates. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be the primary consideration.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
5 March 2015 Decision and the 3 December 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN. We REINSTATE the 28 February
2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in SPC.
PROC. No. 12,007-12. The Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil
Registry of Davao City is ordered to CANCEL: (1) the Certificate of Live Birth
of Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2008-21709
and (2) the Certificate of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan under
Registry No. 2011-28329.
SO ORDERED.
——
Aguilar v. Siasat
Doctrine: Article 172 of the Family Code
Case Title: Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (G.R. No. 200169, January
28, 2015)
Facts:
- Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar
spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and
February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels
of land. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC
of Bacolod City a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat.
- The Complaint alleged that Rodolfo is the only son and sole surviving
heir of the Aguilar spouses and that he discovered that the subject titles
were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat
clan could have stolen the same. He further alleged that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the
Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago, and on June 22, 1996, he
filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second
owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896, which respondent
opposed. During the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented
the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner
thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be
ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject
titles in her possession and that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit be awarded to him.
- Respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving
heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart. Edna further
alleged that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar
spouses and that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife
Candelaria, she inherited the conjugal share of the former. Edna said
that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
- On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision in favor of
Edna and declaring that there is no solid evidence showing Rodolfo as
either a biological or legally adopted son of spouses Aguilar.
- On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the
trial court’s August 17, 1999 Decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20, 2011 Resolution, the CA
held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the SSS Form E-1 is considered a proper requirement
as proof of filiation and relationship under Article 172 par. 3 of the Family
Code in conjunction with Sec. 19 and 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
The Court grants the petition. Under the De Jesus jurisprudence, the filiation
of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. As
petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”)
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document
constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision
and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB
CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to
SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner’s duplicates of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
——
Fabillar v. Paller
Doctrine: Article 172
Case Title: Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar, as represented by Aureo Fabillar v.
Miguel M. Paller, Florentina P. Abayan and Demetria P. Sagales (G.R. No.
231459, January 21, 2019)
Facts:
- The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint for Recovery
of Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by respondents against
Spouses Custodio and Paula (The Custodios), before the 9th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar
(MCTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 273, involving a 3.1003-hectare
parcel of agricultural coconut land situated in Sitio Cabotjo-an, Brgy.
Parina, Giporlos, Eastern Samar, with an assessed value of P950.00.
Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger
parcel of land originally owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller,
and after his death, or sometime in 1929 or 1932, his children,
Ambrosio Paller, Isidra Paller and Ignacia Paller, along several others,
orally partitioned his properties and took possession of their respective
shares.
- From Marcelino’s estate, Ambrosio was given about 1 hectare of the
subject land, in addition to a smaller property situated in Sitio Dungon,
Brgy. 07, while Isidra was given 2 hectares as her rightful share. After
Isidra’s death, her son, Juan Duevo, sold the two land to Ambrosio’s
wife and respondents’ mother, Sabina Macawile. Through succession
upon their parents’ death, respondents alleged that the subject land
was passed on to them. On the other hand, the Custodios’
predecessor-in-interest and petitioners’ grandmother, Ignacia, was
assigned 2 parcels of land situated in Sitio Dungon, Brgy. 07 and Sitio
Bangalog, Brgy. Parina as her share. In 1995, respondent Demetria,
daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Alde with
right to repurchase. Upon her return from Manila in 2000, she
redeemed the same but discovered that the Custodios took possession
of the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands. In their
Answer, the Custodios claimed to be the legitimate and compulsory
heirs of Marcelino who can validly and legally possess the subject land
which has not been partitioned, and thus, commonly owned by his
heirs. They further averred that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino
and, as such, has no right to claim the subject land.
- In a Decision dated November 12, 2012, the MCTC declared
respondents as the lawful owners of the subject land, and ordered the
Custodios to surrender the ownership and physical possession of the
subject land, and to pay actual damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs
of suit. It gave weight to the baptismal certificate as sufficient and
competent proof of Ambrosio’s filiation with Marcelino which the
Custodios failed to successfully overthrow. It further ruled that: (a)
respondents’ claim of oral partition was effectively admitted by Paula,
who testified that her mother received her share of Marcelino’s
properties; and (b) respondents had duly established that they are the
prior possessors of the subject land who had exercised acts of
dominion over the same, and had paid the corresponding realty taxes
therefor.
- In a Decision on Appeal dated January 17, 2014, the RTC affirmed the
MCTC’s ruling, considering the Custodios’ failure to rebut: (a)
Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate indicating that his father is Marcelino,
concluding the same to be proof of his pedigree;30 and (b)
respondents’ possession in the concept of owner. Dissatisfied,
Spouses Custodio and herein petitioners, heirs of Paula, elevated the
matter to the CA, additionally raising34 the defense of failure to state
a cause of action for failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of
the complaint in accordance with the case of Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Hon. Del Rosario.
- In a Decision dated August 31, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
Decision, finding Marcelino to be the father of Ambrosio, thereby
declaring that respondents, as children of Ambrosio, have a right over
the subject land. It rejected the Custodios’ claim of lack of cause of
action for failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of the
complaint for having been raised only for the first time on appeal, and
considering further the parties’ active participation in presenting
evidence to establish or negate respondents’ filial relationship to
Marcelino.
Issue: Whether or not Marcelino’s baptismal certificate is sufficient proof of
his filial relationship with Ambrosio.
Held:
No, the baptismal certificate is not sufficient proof of Marcelino’s filial
relationship with Ambrosio. It is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal
certificate has evidentiary value to prove filiation only if considered alongside
other evidence of filiation. While it may be considered a public document, “it
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity.” As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a
disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence
instead of relying only on a canonical record.
In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other
material proof related to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would
establish his filiation with Marcelino, whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate
son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the burden of proof is on
respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is
Ambrosio’s father and not for petitioners to disprove the same,because a
baptismal certificate is neither conclusive proof of filiation/parentage nor of
the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person baptized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31,
2016 and the Resolution dated March 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City in C.A.- G.R. CEB-S.P. No. 08293 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint
for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by respondents
Miguel M. Paller, Florentina P. Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales before the
9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar,
docketed as Civil Case No. 273.
SO ORDERED.
——
Conti v. CA
Doctrine: Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children
shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of
such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the
parent.
Case Title: Heirs of Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998)
Facts:
- Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, is a co-owner of the property
in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora
and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, with Lourdes Sampayo. On
March 17, 1986, Sampayo died intestate without issue. Subsequently,
on April 1, 1987 private respondents, claiming to be collateral relatives
of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and
damages before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City. The spouses Ignacio Conti
and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were
the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. On August 30, 1987 Ignacio
Conti died and was substituted as party-defendant by his children, all
surnamed Conti. At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia
Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the
collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore
entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her
the original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father
was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia
Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes
Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living
sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister
named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers,
Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960,
respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were
siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a
photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in
evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like
Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.
- The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia
Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly
certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the church
records, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal
of the church with the notation as to where the documents were logged
in particular. The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the
birth certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two
separate occasions, thus all civil registration records were totally
burned.
- To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the
subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines
Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti
and Lourdes Sampayo and that Rosario’s family had been staying in
the subject property since 1937. In fact, she said that her late husband
Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the necessary
repairs and improvements thereon because by agreement, Lourdes
would leave her share of the property to them. However, as correctly
found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic, was
presented by petitioners to substantiate this claim.
- On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the
rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot for confirmation by the court. Petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
erred in finding that private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the lot and the
improvements thereon. On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals
affirmed the assailed RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of
the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter’s
estate and compliance with all legal requirements, especially publication;
whether or not private respondents were not able to prove by competent
evidence their relationship with the deceased.
Held:
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not
essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to
the deceased. Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with
Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her
rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any
time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs.
There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether
the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and
second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the
property. In this case, the Court must determine whether private
respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish
that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late
Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece.
These, private respondents were able to prove that, by preponderance of
evidence, they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the
late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be in the trial court as well as before
respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because:
(a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b)
certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c)
baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of
the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter
of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in- law of Josefina
and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events
which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely
narrated to her.
The Court is not persuaded with the petitioners’ claims. Altogether, the
documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent and
adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate
children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission
of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the
parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also
be utilized in the instant case. It may be argued that baptismal certificates
are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case,
there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together,
uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set
of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony
of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers
Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina
Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary
weight to prove filiation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30
March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
——
Abella v. Cabañero
Doctrine: An illegitimate child, “conceived and born outside a valid marriage,”
as is the admitted case with petitioner’s daughter, is entitled to support.
Case Title: Richelle P. Abella, for and in behalf of her minor daughter Marl
Jhorylle Abella v. Policarpio Cabañero (G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017)
Facts:
- In a complaint for support filed on April 22, 2005, petitioner Richelle
alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she
was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabane
̃ ro inside his
rest house at Barangay Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. As a result,
she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle added
that on February 27, 2002 she initiated a criminal case for rape against
Cabane
̃ ro but it was dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal
case, this time for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the
Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act which was also dismissed. Richelle prayed for the
child’s monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.
- In his Answer, Cabane
̃ ro denied sexually abusing Richelle, or
otherwise having any sexual relations with her. Thus, he asserted that
he could not have been the father of Richelle’s child. After two (2)
resettings, pretrial was held on February 21, 2007, and only Richelle’s
counsel appeared so her motion to present her evidence ex parte was
granted. In her testimony, Richelle noted that Cabañero was related to
her mother and that she treated him as her uncle. She narrated how
she was sexually abused by Cabañero on July 25, 2000, September
10, 2000, and February 8, 2002 and how Cabañero threatened her to
keep her silent. She added that during this period, Cabañero sent her
three (3) letters. She testified that she bore her and Cabañero’s child,
whom she named Marl Jhorylle Abella, on August 21, 2002. She
insisted on her certainty that Cabañero was the father of the child as
she supposedly had no sexual relations with any other man.
- In its March 19, 2007 Decision, the Regional Trial Court dismissed
Richelle’s Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to
implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. Richelle filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. In its
assailed August 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the
dismissal of the Complaint. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the Regional Trial Court’s basis for dismissing the Complaint. The
Court of Appeals still ruled that the dismissal of the Complaint was
proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not been previously
established. As the child’s birth certificate did not indicate that
Cabane
̃ ro was the father and as Cabañero had not done anything to
voluntarily recognize the child as his own, the Court of Appeals
asserted that Richelle “should have first instituted filiation proceedings
to adjudicate the minor child’s paternity.”
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that filiation
proceedings should have first been separately instituted to ascertain the
minor child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first been
resolved in favor of the child’s paternity claim.
Held:
The Court reverses the CA’s decision. While it is true that the grant of support
was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between respondent and
petitioner’s daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner’s action for
support to have been dismissed and terminated by the Court of Appeals in
the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals
should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner
and her daughter should have been enabled to present evidence to establish
their cause of action — inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations
— against respondent. In sustaining the lower courts’ decisions, this Court
noted that enabling the mother and her child to establish paternity and
filiation in the course of an action for support was merely a permission “to
prove their cause of action against [Agustin,] who had been denying the
authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement.”
It was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was
impossible to entertain petitioner’s child’s plea for support without her and
petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial
proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae of petitioner’s
claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of judicial proceedings have been
taxing enough for a mother and her daughter whose claim for support
amounts to a modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her
action, her daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well into her adolescence.
The primordial interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules
are to be “liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding”51
impel us to grant the present Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
assailed August 25, 2011 Decision and January 15, 2013 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02687 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San
Jose, Antique for it to settle in Civil Case No. 2005-4-3496 the matter of Marl
Jhorylle Abella’s purported paternal relation with respondent Policarpio
Cabañero and, in the event of a favorable determination on this, to later rule
on the matter of support.
SO ORDERED.
——
Alanis v. CA
Doctrine: Under the Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children shall
have the right: (1) to bear the surnames of the father and the mother in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames.
Case Title: Anacleto Ballaho Alanis v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 216425,
November 11, 2020)
Facts:
- Abdulhamid Ballaho was born and registered as Anacleto Ballaho
Alanis III. He is a legitimate child of Mario Alanis and Jarmila Ballaho.
However, he never used his registered name. In fact, in all his records
growing up, he had been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho. He filed
a petition in court seeking to change his name and surname so that he
may be officially known as Abdulhamid Ballaho.
- The Regional Trial Court denied his petition and the CA affirmed the
RTC. It was ruled that he cannot change his first name because doing
so will only create more confusion. He cannot change his last name
because according to Article 174 of the Family Code, the use of
surnames must be in accordance with the Civil Code. Article 364 of the
Civil Code provides that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. According to the trial court,
Abdulhamid’s remedy was to correct his other records to conform with
his birth certificate.
Issue: Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers’
surnames as their surnames.
Held:
Yes, legitimate children have the right to use their mothers’ surnames as
their surnames. The fundamental equality of women and men before the law
shall be ensured by the State. This is guaranteed by no less than Article II,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution which reiterated the State’s commitment
to ensure gender equality. Under the Article 174 of the Family Code,
“Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames.” Following this, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: “Legitimate
and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.”
Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the
surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." Given
these irrefutable premises, the Regional Trial Court patently erred in denying
petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname, based solely on the word
"principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code.
This Court fails to see how the change of name would create more confusion.
Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears
in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be
referred to in cases where paternity is relevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2014 Decision and
December 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
02619-MIN, as well as the April 9, 2008 and June 2, 2008 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 in Special Proceeding
No. 5528, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
As prayed for in his Petition for Change of Name, petitioner's name is
declared to be ABDULHAMID BALLAHO. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of
Cebu City is DIRECTED to make the corresponding corrections to
petitioner's name, from ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS III to ABDULHAMID
BALLAHO.
SO ORDERED.