NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
NATO STANDARD
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Edition D Version 1
OCTOBER 2015
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
I
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NAVAL MINE WARFARE PRINCIPLES
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NATO NATIONS
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Each nation should replace this page with its own national letter of promulgation
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS
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CHAPTER
Note
The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at the time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardisation Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
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NATION
Note
The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at the time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardisation Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this
Contents List refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Naval Mine Warfare
0101
0102
0103
0104
0105
0106
0107
0108
0109
0110
0111
0112
0113
0114
Introduction ............................................................................................................1-1
General ..................................................................................................................1-1
Naval Mine Warfare Operations ............................................................................1-2
Command and Control in Naval Mine Warfare ......................................................1-4
Co-ordination .........................................................................................................1-8
Organisation of Naval Mine Warfare Staff ...........................................................1-10
Operational Tasking and Reporting of NMW Operations ....................................1-12
Naval Mine Warfare in Amphibious Operations...................................................1-12
Threat to Naval Mine Warfare Forces..................................................................1-13
Intelligence...........................................................................................................1-14
Logistic Support in Naval Mine Warfare ..............................................................1-14
Navigation Factors Affecting Naval Mine Warfare ...............................................1-15
Environmental Factors Affecting Naval Mine Warfare .........................................1-17
(NMP) Peacetime Exercises................................................................................1-18
Annex A: NMW Operational Tasking, Reports and Records
1A01
1A02
1A03
1A04
1A05
1A06
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1A-1
Formatted Messages .......................................................................................... 1A-1
Levels of Tasking, Reporting and Recording...................................................... 1A-2
Tactical Signals................................................................................................... 1A-2
Manuscript Reports and Records ....................................................................... 1A-2
Summary of Operational Tasking, Reports and Records ................................... 1A-2
Chapter 2: Use of Sea Mines
Section I - The Mine
0201
0202
0203
0204
0205
0206
0207
0208
0209
0210
0211
0212
0213
Definition of the Mine .............................................................................................2-1
Classification of Sea Mine Types...........................................................................2-1
Description of Sea Mine Types .............................................................................2-1
Technical Properties of Individual Mines ...............................................................2-5
Measures to Protect Mines and Minefields Against MCM .....................................2-8
Trends in Mine Technology .................................................................................2-13
Classification of Influence Firing Systems and Sensors ......................................2-13
Magnetic Mine Sensors .......................................................................................2-15
Acoustic Mine Sensors ........................................................................................2-16
Pressure Mine Sensors .......................................................................................2-17
Other Sensor Types.............................................................................................2-18
(NMP) Power Supplies ........................................................................................2-20
(NMP) Actuation Features ...................................................................................2-20
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(NMP) Mine Readiness........................................................................................2-23
(NMP) The ‘Modern Mine’....................................................................................2-24
(NMP) Evolution in Mine Technology ..................................................................2-24
0217
0218
0219
0220
(NMP) Ship-Made Influences...............................................................................2-25
(NMP) The Magnetic Field of a Ship....................................................................2-25
(NMP) The Acoustics of a Ship............................................................................2-27
(NMP) The Pressure Influence ............................................................................2-28
Section III- The Mine Threat
0230
0231
0232
0233
0234
0235
0236
0237
0238
0239
0240
0241
0242
0243
0244
Area Definitions ...................................................................................................2-32
Effect of an Underwater Explosion ......................................................................2-32
Explosive Effects of Moored and Ground Mines..................................................2-33
Damage Effect .....................................................................................................2-33
(NMP) Mine Damage to Super Tankers ..............................................................2-34
(NMP) Mine Danger to Helicopters and Hovercraft .............................................2-34
(NMP) Damage Levels and Criteria.....................................................................2-36
(NMP) Damage Radius........................................................................................2-36
(NMP) Damage Width..........................................................................................2-39
Enemy Mining Capability .....................................................................................2-46
Enemy Mining Objectives ....................................................................................2-48
The Mine Threat in Peacetime.............................................................................2-48
The Mine Threat During a Period of Tension.......................................................2-49
The Mine Threat During a Conflict.......................................................................2-49
The Mine Threat Post Conflict .............................................................................2-49
Chapter 3: Aim and Basic Operational Concept of Mine Countermeasures
0301
0302
0303
0304
0305
0306
0307
The Aim of Mine Countermeasures .......................................................................3-1
MCM Missions .......................................................................................................3-1
MCM Risk Directives .............................................................................................3-2
MCM Techniques...................................................................................................3-2
MCM Stages ..........................................................................................................3-2
MCM Tasks............................................................................................................3-2
Defensive MCM Operations...................................................................................3-2
Chapter 4: Mine Countermeasures Forces
0401
0402
0403
0404
0405
0406
0407
0408
0409
MCM Units .............................................................................................................4-1
Surface MCM Vehicles ..........................................................................................4-1
Airborne MCM Vehicles .........................................................................................4-2
Underwater MCM Vehicles ....................................................................................4-2
Auxiliary MCM Vehicles .........................................................................................4-3
Special MCM Vehicles...........................................................................................4-3
Mine Warfare Vehicle Designators ........................................................................4-3
MCM Command and Support Ships (MCCS) ........................................................4-5
Lead-through Vessels............................................................................................4-7
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Section II - The Target
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0503
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0506
0507
0508
0509
0510
0511
0512
Risk........................................................................................................................5-1
MCMV Safety Measures........................................................................................5-1
Safety Ranges .......................................................................................................5-1
(NMP) Damage Area .............................................................................................5-7
Self Protective Measures - General.......................................................................5-8
Application of Self Protective Measures ................................................................5-8
Degaussing............................................................................................................5-8
Acoustic Measures ..............................................................................................5-10
(NMP) Pressure Quieting.....................................................................................5-11
(NMP) General Material Measures ......................................................................5-13
Tactical Measures................................................................................................5-13
Self-Protective Measures - Underway .................................................................5-15
Chapter 6: (NC)(NMP) Aim and Basic Operational Concept of Mining
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0603
0604
0605
0606
0607
0608
0609
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0611
0612
0613
0614
0615
0616
(NMP) Definitions...................................................................................................6-1
(NMP) Mining as an Instrument of Sea Denial ......................................................6-1
(NMP) Further Aims of Mining ...............................................................................6-2
(NMP) The Minefield as a Weapon........................................................................6-3
(NMP) Mining Responsibilities...............................................................................6-3
(NMP) Mining Aims and Missions..........................................................................6-3
(NMP) Advantages and Disadvantages of Mining .................................................6-4
(NMP) Strategic Mining..........................................................................................6-4
(NMP) Tactical Mining ...........................................................................................6-6
(NMP) Types of Mining Operations .......................................................................6-6
(NMP) General Considerations for Minefield Planning ........................................6-12
(NMP) The Need for Minefield Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).....................6-15
(NMP) Minelaying Operation Orders ...................................................................6-16
(NMP) The Role of a Minelayer ...........................................................................6-16
(NMP) Selection of a Suitable Minelayer or Delivery System ..............................6-17
(NMP) The Safety of Shipping and Notification of Dangerous Areas ..................6-18
GLOSSARY OF MINE WARFARE TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS............................... GLOSS-1
AND ACRONYMS
INDEX
......................................................................................................................INDEX-1
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Chapter 5: Risk and Self Protective Measures
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Chapter 1:
Introduction to Naval Mine Warfare
Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-2
(NMP) The Naval Mine Warfare Family Tree...............................................1-2
SDNE - Example........................................................................................1-16
Chapter 2:
Use of Sea Mines
Section I - The Mine
Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-4.
Figure 2-5.
Figure 2-6.
Figure 2-7.
(NMP) Firing Systems and Warhead Types ................................................2-6
Methods of Self Protection for Mines ...........................................................2-9
Anti Sweep Wire Devices...........................................................................2-12
(NMP) Estimation of Upper Limit of Background Noise Level ...................2-14
Seismic and Acoustic Waves.....................................................................2-19
(NMP) Examples of Average Actuation Width Contours (a/b) ...................2-21
(NMP) Examples of Average Actuation Area.............................................2-22
Section II - The Target
Figure 2-8.
Figure 2-9.
Figure 2-10.
Figure 2-11.
(NMP) Magnetic Field of a 5000 T Merchant Vessel .................................2-26
(NMP) Examples of Acoustic Signature.....................................................2-28
(NMP) Main Features of Ships Pressure Signature...................................2-29
(NMP) Beam Pressure Field ......................................................................2-29
Section III - The Mine Threat
Figure 2-12.
Figure 2-13.
Figure 2-14.
Figure 2-15.
Figure 2-16.
Figure 2-17.
Figure 2-18.
Figure 2-19.
(NMP) Plume Safety Curve for Helicopters and Hovercraft.......................2-35
(NMP) Sample Curves of Damage to a Cast Iron Engined Vessel
by 800kg (1765 lb) TNT .............................................................................2-38
(NMP) Safe Distances for MCMVs (MSC and MSI) from Ground Mines
Containing 900 kg (2000 lb) TNT...............................................................2-38
(NMP) Non Circular Damage Contour .......................................................2-39
(NMP) Circular Damage Contour...............................................................2-40
(NMP) Probability of Actuation and Damage as a Function of
Lateral Range ............................................................................................2-40
(NMP) Shock Factor Definitions.................................................................2-41
(NMP) KSF Geometry................................................................................2-43
Chapter 5: Risk and Self Protective Measures
Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-4.
Sample Curve of Shock Wave Propagation.................................................5-2
(NMP) Pressure and Impulse Accepted by Surface Vessel and AUV .........5-3
(NMP) Maximum Bubble Radius Accepted by a Ship..................................5-4
(NMP) Shock Factor Equations ...................................................................5-5
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LIST OF FIGURES
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
LIST OF TABLES
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL MINE WARFARE
Table 1A-1.
Table 1A-2.
Table 1A-3.
Table 1A-4.
Types of Operational Tasking ................................................................... 1A-3
Types of Operational Reporting (OPREP) ................................................ 1A-3
Special NMW Reports............................................................................... 1A-4
FORMEXs................................................................................................. 1A-5
Chapter 2:
Use of Sea Mines
Section II - The Target
Table 2-1.
Table 2-2.
(NMP) Estimated Total Magnetic Moments for Different Types
of Vessel ....................................................................................................2-26
(NMP) Near Optimum Sensitivities of the Horizontal Component Field
(in nT) Against Target Ships ......................................................................2-27
Section III - The Mine Threat
Table 2-3.
Table 2-4.
Table 2-5.
Table 2-6.
(NMP) Damage Levels and Criteria ...........................................................2-36
(NMP) Explosive Equivalents.....................................................................2-37
(NMP) Effectiveness Factor F1 for Different Explosives ............................2-46
(NMP) Effectiveness Factor F2 for Different Sea Bottom Types ...............2-46
Chapter 4:
Mine Countermeasures Forces
Table 4-1.
NATO Designators for Mine Warfare Vessels .............................................4-4
Chapter 5: Risk and Self Protective Measures
Table 5-1.
Table 5-2.
Table 5-3.
(NMP) Equipment Shock Factors ................................................................5-6
(NMP) Example Minimum Safety Ranges ...................................................5-6
Average Safe Depths.................................................................................5-12
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ANNEX A: NMW OPERATIONAL TASKING, REPORTS AND RECORDS
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REFERENCES
1.
NATO STANDARDISATION COVERING DOCUMENTS
a. STANAG 1242 - Naval Mine Warfare Principles
2.
NATO POLICIES, DIRECTIVES AND GUIDANCE
3.
RELATED DOCUMENTS
a. (NU) Operations (Mine Warfare)
(1) (NU) ATP-01 Vol. I - Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
(STANAG 1173)
(2) (NU)(NMP) ATP-01 Vol. II - Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and
Manoeuvring Book (STANAG 1174)
(3) (NU)(NMP) ATP-06 Vol.II - Naval Mine Countermeasures Operations,
Planning and Evaluation (STANAG 1243)
(4) (NU)(NMP) ATP-24 Vol. I - Naval Mine Countermeasures - Tactics and
Execution (STANAG 1132)
(5) (NU)(NMP) ATP-24 Vol. II - Naval Mining - Planning, Evaluation, Tactics
and Execution (STANAG 1400)
(6) (NU)(NMP) AXP-5 MW SUPP - The Mine Warfare Supplement to NATO
Experimental Tactics and Amplifying Tactical Instructions (STANAG 1316).
(7)
(NU) APP-11 - NATO Message Catalogue (STANAG 7149 IERH)
(8)
(NU) ADivP-01 - Allied Guide to Diving Operations (STANAG 1372)
b. (NU) Hydrographic
(1) (NU) AHP-01 - The Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System
(AWNIS)(STANAG 1104)
(2) (NU)(NMP) AHP-01.1 - The Allied Worldwide Navigational Information
System (AWNIS) - Classified Supplement (STANAG 1104)
(3) (NU)(NMP) AHP-07 - Dormant Q-Message Publication (STANAG 1177)
Volumes as required.
(4) (NU)(NMP) AMP-11 - Mine Warfare Pilot (STANAG 1116) Volumes/levels
as required
(5) (NU) ATP-32 - NATO Handbook of Military Oceanographic Information and
Services (STANAG 1171)
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a. MC-362-2
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c. (NU)(NMP) Vehicles, Equipment etc
(1) (NU)(NMP) AMP-03 Vol. I - NATO MCM Vehicles and Equipment
(STANAG 1202)
(2) (NU)(NMP) AMP-03 Vol. II - NATO Mine Delivery Systems (STANAG
1257).
(NU)(NMP) AMP-07 - Helicopter MCM Manual (STANAG 1137)
(4) (NU)(NMP) AMP-12 - Catalogue of Mine Warfare Computer Programs
(STANAG 1164)
(5) (NU)(NMP) AMP-14 - Protection of Vessels from Electromagnetic Mines
(STANAG 1333)
(6) (NU)(NMP) AMP-14.1/AMP-15.1 - Underwater Signature Range
Information for NATO Mine Countermeasures Vessels (STANAG 1203 &
STANAG 1333)
(7) (NU)(NMP) AMP-18 - Risk in Naval Mine Countermeasures (STANAG 1467
NMW)
d. (NU)(NMP) Mine Intelligence.
(1) (NU)(NMP) AMP-13 Vol. I - Introduction and Definition of Terms for NATO
Sea Mines (STANAG 1161)
(2) (NU)(NMP) AMP-13 Vol.II - Characteristics of NATO Sea Mines (STANAG
1312)
(3) (NU)(NMP) AMP-13 Vol. III - Characteristics of NATO Exercise and
Training Mines (STANAG 1314)
e. (NU) Other Warfare Publications.
(1) (NU)ATP-08 Vols I & II - Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (STANAG
1149)
(2) (NU)(NMP) ATP-18 - Allied Manual of Submarine Operations (STANAG
1075)
f.
(NU) Navigation, Routing etc.
(1) (NU) ATP-02.1 - Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers (STANAG1040).
(2) (NU) ATP-02.2 - Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Organisation, Publications and Documents (STANAG1040).
(3) (NU)(NMP) AXP-05 - Experimental Tactics and Amplifying Tactical
Instructions (STANAG 1125)
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
g. (NU)(NMP) Other Warfare Operations.
(1)
(NU)(NMP) ATP-31 - NATO Above Water Warfare Manual (STANAG 1167)
h. (NU) Logistics.
i.
(NU) Additional.
(1) (NU) AAP-06 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and
French) (STANAG 3680)
(2)
j.
(NU) AAP-15 - Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents.
(NU) Multi-National Manuals
(1) (NU) MTP-01 Vol I - Multi-National Maritime Tactical Instructions and
Procedures
(2)
(NU) MTP-06 Vol I - Naval Mine Warfare Principles
(3) (NU) MTP-06 Vol II - Naval Mine Countermeasures Planning and
Evaluation
(4)
4.
(NU) MTP-24 Vol I - Naval Mine Countermeasures - Tactics and Execution
(NU)(NMP) Associated Multi-National Manuals
a. (NU)(NMP) The associated Multi-National manuals for this publication are MTP6(D) Volumes I and II and MTP-24(D) Volume I.
b. (NU)(NMP) Each article, paragraph, sub paragraph, figure and table throughout
this publication have been awarded a classification to enable the reader to determine
whether the text, figure or table is releasable and included in the associated MTP.
Additionally, any text that is not releasable to the MTP has been shaded and
includes the term (NMP) immediately after the classification. Any text, figure or table
that is preceded by the abbreviation (NMP) and is shaded is not to be released to
any non-NATO Nation. This paragraph is an example of text that is not releasable to
the MTP.
c. (NU)(NMP) Unreleased text in the associated MTP is simply replaced by the
term ‘Not Releasable’.
d. (NU)(NMP) Definitions of the terms used are as follows:
(NMP) - Not Multi-National Manual
(NU) - NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
(NR) - NATO-RESTRICTED
(NC) - NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
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(1) (NU) ALP-01 - Procedures for Logistic Support between NATO Navies and
Naval Port Information (STANAG 1200)
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
CONVENTIONS
Note: (NU) All reference to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this publication refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) Purpose.
The purpose of ATP-06(D), Volume I, is to provide guidance and common doctrine for Allied
and National Commands and for mine countermeasures forces in support of ATP-1. It is the
governing NATO mine warfare publication and covers mine countermeasures planning, mine
threat, minelaying and mine countermeasures operations. ATP-06(D), Volume I, is intended
for application at the operational level.
2.
(NU) Symbols
In some cases throughout ATP-06 the same symbol has one meaning for minefield planning
and another meaning for mine countermeasures. This has been found necessary because of
the limitations of available symbols. Care has been taken however to limit each symbol to no
more than one meaning for minefield planning and one meaning for mine countermeasures.
3.
(NU) The International Units System.
a. (NU) The international units system (Systeme International d'Unites - short title
`SI Units') is the standard NATO system of measurement. A conversion table is
included for convenience in converting from SI Units to Centimetre-Gram-Second
(CGS) and other units, and vice versa, since many equipments will be based on the
old systems until the turnover to SI Units has been completed. Where other units are
by necessity used, eg yards or fathoms, equivalent values in SI Units will be shown
in brackets ( ) alongside each other in the text, in figures and by showing both scales
together. Where sound levels are expressed in decibels, unless otherwise stated, the
reference is µPa. The relation of this level to a reference of 1 microbar is as follows:
(1) (NU) Value in dB (re 1 µPa) = value of dB (re 1 µbar) + 100dB. Spectrum
level shall be quoted in dB (re 1 µPa) for 1 Hz bandwidth.
(2) (NU) Unless otherwise stated the following units of measurement are used
in the Mine Warfare Publications ATP-06 and ATP-24:
Aircraft Altitude in Feet
Water depth in Metres
Distance in Nautical Miles (2025 Yards)
Land Height in Metres
Range in Metres
Speed in Knots
Weight in Newtons
Mass in Kilograms
Pressure in Pascal (Pa)
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(3) (NU) For intranational use, the units of measurement of the nation
concerned may be used. Some data has been devised and collected in Imperial
and/or Metric Units of measurement. Where this is so the NATO Agreed
Conversion Factors in the following conversion table are to be used.
CONVERSION TABLE - CGS UNITS TO SI UNITS
cgs units
SI units
Conversion factors
= 10-5N
= 105dyn
Force
dyne (dyn)
newton (N)
1 dyn
1N
Pressure
microbar (µbar)
1 µbar = 1 dyn/cm2
pascal (Pa)
1 Pa = 1 N/m2
1µbar = 10-1Pa
1 Pa
= 10 µbar
1 µbar = 105 µPa
1MPa = 145 psi
1 bar = 14.4 psi
Magnetic
field
oersted (Oe)
ampere/metre
(A/m)
= 103/4 π A/m
= 80 A/m
1 mOe = 0.08 A/m
1 A/m = 4π/103 Oe
= 12.6 mOe
Magnetic
moment
cgs
(equivalent unit
is erg/gauss)
ampere metre2
(A.m2)
(equivalent unit
is joule/tesia
(J/T))
1 cgs
Magnetic
flux
maxwell (Mx)
weber (Wb)
1 Mx
1 Wb
Magnetic
density
(magnetic
induction)
gauss (Gs)
1 Gs = 1 Mx/cm2
tesla (T)
1T = 1 Wb/m2
1 Gs
= 10-4T
1 mGs = 100nT
1 gamma
= 1 nT
1T
= 104Gs
1 Oe
= 1/103 A.m2
1 A.m2 = 103 cgs
= 10-8Wb
= 108Mx
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
4.
(NU) Notes
The following definitions apply to notes used throughout this publication.
Note
A note is used to highlight to the reader, any operating procedure, practice or
condition that requires emphasis.
5.
(NU) Change Symbols
Revised text in this document is indicated by a black vertical line in the outside margin of the
page. The change symbol indicates added or restated information. A change symbol
adjacent to the chapter number, annex number or appendices number and title indicates a
new or completely revised chapter, annex or appendices.
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6.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) Wording
Word usage and intended meaning throughout this publication is as follows:
'Shall' indicates the application of a procedure is mandatory.
'Should' indicates the application of a procedure is recommended.
'Will' indicates future time. It never indicates any degree of requirement for
application of a procedure.
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'May' and 'need not' indicates the application of a procedure is optional.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL MINE WARFARE
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) Introduction
This chapter discusses in general terms Naval Mine Warfare (NMW) operations, their
organisation, and interdependence. It aims to give a broad overall picture of NMW. The
follow-on chapters expand on details and factors constituting the doctrine and principles of
NMW.
0102
(NU) General
1.
(NU) Despite the apparently opposing nature of a weapon and the means to counter
it, this publication discloses the fact that many factors influence equally both means of
warfare, although some are opposed while others are complementary. ATP-06, Volume I,
presents these basic but sometimes divergent doctrines of Naval Mine Warfare. Its purpose
is to set forth fundamental policies and principles rather than to teach the Naval Mine
Warfare operations. In order to fulfil this purpose it is necessary to discuss the threat weapon
of Naval Mine Warfare, the mine, and the primarily defensive weapon, the Mine
Countermeasures (MCM) forces. The factors affecting these opposing concepts, such as
principles for the conduct of operations, logistic support, navigation, self-protective measures
and environmental influences are discussed in individual chapters. Only enough detail is
contained in this chapter to show the problem and issues bearing on the planning and
conduct of Naval Mine Warfare operations.
2.
(NU) However, by utilising the factors presented here, in conjunction with the
planning and evaluation methods presented in greater detail in Volume II of ATP-06 and the
tactics and methods of execution of MCM presented in Volume I of ATP-24, the MCM
planner will be able to prepare for, and conduct efficient and successful MCM Operations.
3.
(NU)(NMP) Minefield planning and evaluation methods and the methods of execution
presented in ATP-24 Volume II which will assist the Minefield Planner to prepare and conduct
efficient and successful mining operations.
4.
(NU) The responsible Operational Commanders must recognise that it may take
many days or even weeks to complete MCM operations in a well laid minefield, even with
modern methods and with complete knowledge of the characteristics of the mines laid.
Complete clearance may often be uneconomical in time and effort and naval forces and
shipping may have to accept the risk of operating in waters in which some mines remain. In
such a situation, it becomes the duty of the Operational Commander to determine the degree
of risk from mines which is to be accepted. In this he will be guided by the Operational
Control Authority (OCA) concerning the need for Allied ships to transit, or the necessity to
provide extra protection for specific ships and cargoes.
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0101
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0103
(NU) Naval Mine Warfare Operations
1.
(NU) The term Naval Mine Warfare includes all measures for mining and MCM.
(NU) The Naval Mine Warfare Family Tree:
Figure 1-1. (NMP) The Naval Mine Warfare Family Tree
NATO-RESTRICTED
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
a.
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b. (NR)(NMP) Mining Operations. This sub-paragraph contains brief definitions for
the different mining operations only. The aim and basic operational concept and
further details are discussed in Chapter 5.
(a) (NR)(NMP) Offensive Mining. An offensive minefield is laid in enemy
territorial waters or waters controlled by the enemy.
(b) (NR)(NMP) Defensive Mining. A defensive minefield is laid in
international waters or international straits which are normally under control
of a NATO Nation or the Alliance with the declared intention of controlling
shipping in defence of sea lines of communications.
(c) (NR)(NMP) Protective Mining. In Naval Mine Warfare, a minefield laid
in friendly territorial waters to protect ports, harbours, anchorages, coasts
and coastal routes.
(2) (NR)(NMP) Tactical Mining. Tactical maritime mining would be conducted
in support of a limited military objective, generally in a specific area of immediate
tactical interest. Integration of tactical mining into Anti-Submarine Warfare and
Amphibious Warfare is of special value and most effective.
c. (NU) Mine Countermeasures (MCM). This sub-paragraph contains a short
description of the different MCM Operations. Further details and the aim and basic
operational concept of MCM are discussed in Chapter 3.
(1) (NU) Offensive MCM. Offensive MCM are designed to prevent the enemy
from successfully laying sea mines.
(2) (NR)(NMP). Given the political will, the prevention of mining is always the
preferable option; this means the utilisation of Offensive MCM techniques to
prevent mining. In the absence of this, the most productive surveillance assets
available should be brought to bear on the enemy followed by Mine watching in
order that the success of Defensive MCM techniques might be more readily
achieved once commenced. Included under this heading are:
(a) (NR)(NMP) Strategic Bombing and Missile Attacks. The weight of
enemy attack may be considerably reduced by the infliction of damage
through long-range strategic bombing and missile attacks of industrial
potential, shipyards, storage depots and other facilities required for the
support of enemy minelaying.
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(1) (NR)(NMP) Strategic Mining. Strategic mining operations are those
calculated to reduce and impede the enemy's war potential by disrupting his
seaborne communications.
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(c) (NR)(NMP) Laying Own Minefields. Offensive minefields contribute to
the destruction of enemy surface and submarine minelayers (e.g. laid off
the enemy's harbours). Defensive minefields either laid shallow against
surface vessels, or deeper against submarines may well act to counter
these types of minelayers. This will be particularly effective if skill is
exercised in laying them where the enemy is likely to go, either on passage
to or from the minefield or when fixing the position before laying.
(3) (NU) Defensive MCM. Defensive MCM are designed to reduce the threat
from sea mines after they have been laid and include:
(a) (NU) Passive MCM. Passive MCM do not concern MCM forces only
but are generally supporting naval and merchant shipping.
(b) (NU) Active MCM. Active MCM operations are all activities of MCM
forces conducted with the aim of countering enemy mining. Active MCM is
described throughout this publication.
(c) (NU) Further information on Defensive MCM is contained in Chapter 3
of this publication.
0104
(NU) Command and Control in Naval Mine Warfare
1.
(NU) Allied and National Responsibility
a. (NU) Within any NATO operational area, the command and control of MW forces
may be divided between both NATO and National Authorities. However, as a general
rule National Authorities are responsible for Naval Mine Warfare operations carried
out in their own territorial waters, for example, ports, anchorage approaches, coastal
shipping routes, minefields, and searched channels; NATO Authorities are
responsible for ocean areas and for the overall co-ordination of Naval Mine Warfare
effort in their areas of operation. They may delegate operational control to a
subordinate command provided that consultation/agreement with the nation(s)
concerned has been reached.
b. (NU) A NATO Commander may also be a National Commander. NATO
geographical areas and area boundaries may not necessarily coincide, although one
commander may exercise authority over both NATO and national aspects. Where
differences exist the National Commander is responsible for keeping the appropriate
NATO Commander informed of the state of Naval Mine Warfare operations in the
latter's area.
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(b) (NR)(NMP) Attacks on Minelayers. Another effective offensive
countermeasure is the destruction of the enemy minelayer before it can lay
sea mines. This can be achieved through direct attack on the port or airfield
at which the minelayers are based or on the minelayer whilst on passage.
Effective surveillance and air defence are important to counter enemy
minelayers.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
d. (NU) Although clearly defined lines of command and control are essential the
changing pattern of Naval Mine Warfare also demands flexibility of organisation.
Intelligent initiatives should be employed to deal with unforeseen problems, which
should never be ignored on the grounds that the existing organisations do not assign
specific responsibilities for dealing with them. For example, Naval Mine Warfare
operations are normally the national responsibility of the country concerned and are
carried out using national command and support organisations. Exceptions may be
Naval Mine Warfare operations in specific areas by forces assigned to a NATO
command. In these circumstances administration and support remains a national
commitment of the country providing the MW forces. Another exception may be
Naval Mine Warfare operations carried out in support of amphibious operations (see
para 0108).
2.
(NU) Structure of the Command and Control of Naval Mine Warfare Forces.
Command and Control of Naval Mine Warfare forces involve the following functions, which
are defined in ATP-01, Volume I.
a. (NU) Full Command.
b. (NU) Operational Command.
c.
(NU) Operational Control.
d. (NU) Tactical Command.
e. (NU) Tactical Control.
3.
(NU) Responsibilities of Command Authorities Related to Naval Mine Warfare
a. (NU) The general warfare responsibilities are listed in ATP-01 Volume I. These
responsibilities may be applicable for operations in the NATO area. In accordance
with standing NATO agreements and documents, Nations will delegate Operational
Command (OPCOM) of MW forces to their SCs indicated or will retain OPCOM if
agreed so in their Special Military Agreements with NATO. The MW responsibilities
of the four Prime Command levels are listed below. Depending on the circumstances
these responsibilities may alter or increase and therefore the list of responsibilities
should not be regarded as exhaustive.
b. (NU) Operational Command
(1) (NU) Responsible for all MW operation in the assigned Area of
Responsibility (AOR).
(2) (NU) Co-ordinating MW effort and assignment of MW forces to subordinate
commands if required.
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c. (NU) The assignment of duties to Operational Commanders and their
subordinates is described in this and the following paragraphs. It must be realised,
however, that different NATO Commanders and nations may have variations in their
command structure and it is for individual NATO Commanders and Nations to
interpret the structure to best suit their needs. However, to avoid confusion, the
terms given are to be used within NATO between different commands and areas.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(3) (NU) Retaining or delegating Operational Control as may be deemed
necessary.
c.
(NU) Operational Control
(2) (NU) Despatching of periodical situation reports to the appropriate
authorities.
(3)
(NU) Forwarding ‘Q’ Requests to the appropriate ‘Q’ - Originating Authority.
(4)
(NU) If required, assigning of blocks of OPTASK NMW numbers.
(5) (NU) Providing protection forces and logistic support to the MW forces as
required.
(6) (NU) The collation and dissemination of intelligence and environmental
information.
(7)
(NU) Promulgating the Mine Threat Area (MTA).
(8) (NU) Establishing and managing Mine Danger Areas (MDAs) as deemed
necessary (see also AHP-01).
(9) (NU) Recommending to relevant national authorities, the partial, temporary
or total closure of ports.
(10) (NU) Retaining or delegating Tactical Command as may be deemed
necessary.
d. (NU) Tactical Command
(1) (NU) Providing NMW Operational direction and guidance using appropriate
signal messages when ordered.
(2)
(NU) Despatching of periodical situation reports to the OPCON authority.
(3)
(NU) Collating and analysing reports, records and intelligence.
(4) (NU) When so authorised by the OPCON authority, direct and control
shipping in the vicinity of mined areas, including the ordering of diversions.
(5) (NU)(NMP) Recommending to the OPCON authority the issue of classified
Q-Y Messages and, when authorised, issue local warnings in accordance with
AHP-01 procedures.
(6) (NU) Recommending to the OPCON authority, the temporary, partial or
total closure of mined ports and anchorages.
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(1) (NU) Providing NMW Operational direction and guidance using appropriate
signal messages.
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
(7) (NU) When so authorised by the OPCON authority, administrate the local
mine watching organisation.
(8) (NU) Retaining or delegating Tactical Control of MW forces as may be
deemed necessary.
(1)
(NU) Directing, co-ordinating and conducting MCM operations.
(2)
(NU) Issuing and updating MCM Task Orders.
(3) (NU) Compiling Reports and Records and despatching them to the
appropriate authorities.
(4) (NU) Requests the establishment of Mine Danger Areas (MDAs) to the
OPCON as required.
f. (NU) NMW Coordinator (NMWC) (See Note). (See also ATP-01 Vol I Chapter
13 para 1306 and 1312). The OTC is responsible for formulating and promulgating
NMW policy. NMW functions may be delegated to a designated Naval Mine Warfare
Coordinator (NMWC). The NMWC is the principal advisor to the OTC on matters
pertaining to MW. He is responsible for coordinating the laying of minefields in
support of the OTC and the efforts of supporting MCM forces, which are usually not
under the direct command or control of the OTC/CWC. Specific functions of the
NMWC include:
(1) (NU) Employment of tactical mining against targets of opportunity, using
force assets.
(2) (NU) Coordination with appropriate commanders for the laying of tactical
minefields and the execution of mining plans.
(3) (NU) Tasking of MCM forces assigned to the tactical command of the
OTC/CWC.
(4) (NU) Coordination with appropriate commanders for response to enemy
mining and for the execution of MCM plans.
(5) (NU) Maintaining and disseminating a plot of relevant MW information to
the force.
Note. The NMW Coordinator could be the NMW Commander and would fulfil both functions.
4.
(NU) Organisation of Naval Mine Warfare Forces
a. (NU) Naval Mine Warfare forces include both minelaying and MCM forces.
Minelaying forces consist of surface, sub-surface and aircraft minelayers with their
operating personnel and support facilities. MCM Forces also consist of surface, subsurface platforms and airborne systems. They may also include mine watching and
portable MCM equipment, together with their operating personnel and support
vessels.
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e. (NU) Tactical Control
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
b. (NU) The organisation of a task force, in which MCM is a consideration, should
where possible, include an MCM task group or unit. The task organisation for all
Naval Mine Warfare forces should be prescribed by the commander exercising
operational command.
d. (NU) For the purposes of administration and training, national MW forces maybe
grouped together by their type organisation into flotillas or squadrons. Operational
Commanders should consider retaining the type organisation of units which have
been trained together and assign them as a unit to the task for which they have been
prepared. Due consideration should also be given to other capabilities including the
efficiency of units.
e. (NU) The duties of the OTC in Naval Mine Warfare are described as follows:
(1)
(NU) For Mine Sweeping and Minehunting see ATP-24 Vol I.
(2)
(NR)(NMP) For Minelaying Operations see ATP-24 Vol II.
0105
(NU) Co-ordination
1.
(NU) General Requirements
a. (NU) Naval Mine Warfare operations may hamper, or even prevent operations of
other NATO or National naval units and sailing of own merchant ships, transiting
independently or in convoys. Timely co-ordination between all authorities concerned
and proper warning will minimise interference.
b. (NU) If minelaying or MCM operations have to be protected, in case opposition is
to be expected, this support has to be arranged in time and is to be co-ordinated with
ongoing operations, as normally no spare units will be available to protect Naval
Mine Warfare forces. When planning Naval Mine Warfare Force protection, it is
necessary to consider that the protecting forces may also be required to operate in
the Mine Threat Area.
c. (NU) When Naval Mine Warfare units are carrying out tasks independently near
each other, it becomes necessary to co-ordinate their actions to prevent the
destruction of these units by own or enemy sea mines and to avoid the loss of
effectiveness resulting from manoeuvres intended to prevent interference and also to
avoid interference between units. For this reason mining and MCM must be
controlled by one responsible officer in each headquarters and co-ordination with
adjacent command authorities is a requirement, particularly for operations which take
place across a NATO command which is at the operational level, or national
boundaries.
d. (NU) Co-ordinating instructions and safety regulations for different types of MCM
assets operating together are contained in ATP-24 Volume I.
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c. (NU) Task organisation designators should be used in all signals of an
operational nature, but it may be more convenient, in administrative signals, to use a
type organisation designator.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
e. (NU)(NMP) For minelaying units, co-ordinating and safety regulations are given
in ATP-24 Volume II.
2.
(NU) Waterspace Coordination & De-confliction
b. (NC)(NMP) Special attention is necessary for submarines. In particular special
communications procedures often hamper the timely passing of information to
submarines, especially when tactical mining is carried out at short notice. For this
reason mining is to be conducted only after preliminary coordination with the
appropriate Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH) has been carried out.
This is also valid for the conduct of MCM to a limited extent. This co-ordination must
not only be conducted for respective Submarine Patrol Areas (SPA) but also for
transit and safety lanes leading to and from other areas.
3.
(NU) Navigational Information in War. The Q-Message System serves as a
classified portion of the navigational information system of allied nations. The primary
function of the Q-Message System is the promulgation of information on minefields and the
channels through them.
a. (NR)(NMP) The system is arranged so that information is distributed as follows:
(1)
(NR)(NMP) Warships which require and receive full information.
(2)
(NR)(NMP) Warships which require and receive limited information.
(3) (NR)(NMP) Other ships which receive only sufficient information to enable
them to adhere to the channels, or where channels do not exist, which routes to
take to get them clear or as safe as possible of known mine dangers.
b. (NR)(NMP) The Q-Message System may be used to disseminate navigational
information which should be withheld from the enemy but which requires rapid
dissemination to allies. For further information, see AHP-01.
c. (NU) It should be remembered that some units may not be able to decrypt
classified information and therefore, must be warned of the presence of minefields
and channels by separate unclassified means. Whereas Naval Liaison Officers may
be able to cope with classified information, independent merchant ships cannot and
will be informed using the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS). For
details see AHP-01.
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a. (NU) To prevent mutual interference, it is necessary to coordinate & de-conflict
use of waterspace by Naval Mine Warfare Forces and other surface or sub surface
forces. Particular consideration should be given to the use of Variable Depth Sonars
(VDS) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).
0106
(NU) Organisation of Naval Mine Warfare Staff
1.
(NU) General Consideration
ATP-06 VOLUME I
a. (NU) Generally the chain of command establishes the interdependencies which
exist at various levels between the superior and his subordinates and is set out in
NATO and National Operations Plans for wartime and contingency situations, as well
as of Operation Orders and General Defence Plans (GDPs). By the specialist nature
of the units employed the organization for command and control of Naval Mine
Warfare forces may be automatically defined these chains of command. In all cases
any documents specific to appropriate area of operations are to be consulted.
b. (NU) A Command Naval Mine Warfare Operations Room should be the nucleus
for planning, conduct and evaluation of all types of Naval Mine Warfare operations.
There must be an adequate organisation within the headquarters of each
Commander to enable the duties outlined in earlier paragraphs of this chapter to be
effectively discharged.
c. (NU) Mining operations are normally prepared at a higher level than MCM
operations. However, all staffs must be prepared by proper manning to conduct their
part of command and control as required, including the necessary co-operation with
other warfare branches. It has to be considered that for aerial minelaying operations
the responsibility for minefield planning rests with the Maritime Commander
(MARCOM), but the detailed planning and execution of the minelay will be the
responsibility of Air Component Commander (ACC).
d. (NU) The extent of the organisation must depend upon the own intent to use sea
mines and upon the degree of mining attack expected and on the command level.
The specimen organisation described in Volume II of ATP-06 is designed for local
commander headquarters and may be adapted as necessary for larger or smaller
headquarters, afloat or shore.
e. (NU) Standardization of equipment and methods on the lines indicated will
simplify the passing of information and interchange of personnel. The use of Naval
Mine Warfare computer programs for MCM planning and risk evaluation will assist
the Mine Warfare Staff to optimise preparation and conduct of Naval Mine Warfare
operations.
2.
(NU) The Duties of Staff Mine Warfare Officers
a. (NU) The primary duty of the Mine Warfare Staff Officer (MWSO) is to provide
accurate and timely specialist Mine Warfare (MW) advice to the Command. This
information should be provided at all stages necessary for the successful
accomplishment of any mission, specifically:
(1)
(NU) Appreciation of the situation.
(2)
(NU) Selection of the aim.
(3)
(NU) Available (and recommended) courses of action.
(4)
(NU) Development of a plan.
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(NU) The operation order.
(6)
(NU) Execution.
(7)
(NU) Evaluation.
(NU) Initially this will include:
(1) (NU) Keeping informed of all technical progress in own and enemy warfare
material. During peace time this will include providing representation on various
NATO MW specialist committees and working groups.
(2) (NU) Analysis of prospective operations to anticipate requirement for MW
operations, including the necessary forces, background environmental
information and MW specific logistics.
(3) (NU) Advising Planning Staff on special uses, capabilities, limitations and
employment of own and enemy mine warfare material.
(4) (NU) Preparation of operations orders for mine counter measures in
accordance with the responsibilities assigned to the Command.
(5) (NU) Maintaining close liaison with the appropriate agencies for defence of
ports and anchorages, maritime trade and intelligence officers.
c. (NU) When enemy mining attack is known or suspected, MW Staff actions
should include recommending immediate counter measures such as diversion of
shipping, closure of ports and issuing of warnings via the AWNIS or Naval Cooperation and Guidance to Shipping (NCAGS) route.
d.
(NU) As the operation progresses the MWSO should:
(1) (NU) Advise on the employment and capabilities of MW forces and the
execution of Counter measures Plans.
(2) (NU) Supervises Mine Warfare Operations Room/Cell to ensure all
information of own and enemy minefields, established routes and progress of
operations is current.
(3)
(NU) Monitor logistic usage and upkeep factors on current operations.
(4) (NU) Analyse results of current operations and recommend changes if
necessary
e. (NU) On completion of any operation, or exercise the MWSO should review all
MW actions to identify any circumstances or lessons that may show that changes to
Allied Mine Warfare tactics, techniques and procedures or material may be
necessary.
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b
(5)
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3.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) The Mine Warfare Operations Room
b. (NU) By the nature of the tasks and the involvement of follow on traffic, there
should be a close co-operation between the Mine Warfare, NCAGS and AWNIS Cells
and where practicable these functional groups should be situated close to each other
to promote discussion.
c. (NU) The majority of operations co-ordinated by the Mine Warfare Operations
Room will be MCM. Further details of the Ops Room are contained in ATP-06,
Volume II.
0107
(NU) Operational Tasking and Reporting of NMW Operations
1.
(NU) The purpose of NMW operational tasking, reports and records is to allow
authorities controlling mine countermeasures or mining to display and evaluate the
effectiveness of MCM and/or Mining forces and operations. It also provides higher authorities
with information from which they can assess future operations. Reports and records are
described in Annex 1A and further detailed in ATP-24 Vol I and APP-11.
2.
(NU) Operational tasking, records and reports are required by the Operational
Control Authority and higher commands to evaluate current operations and tasks and to be
enabled to make decisions about sailing of own naval units and merchant shipping.
0108
(NU) Naval Mine Warfare in Amphibious Operations
1.
(NU) Amphibious operations are amongst the most complex and unpredictable of
military operations. Consequently tactics and methods must be flexible. Because amphibious
operations are so complex and the role of Naval Mine Warfare is so important it is essential
to the success of an operation that a dialogue between the amphibious planner and Naval
Mine Warfare specialists is established as early as possible in the planning process,
particularly with respect to the time allotted for Naval Mine Warfare operations.
2.
(NU) Naval Mine Warfare trained staff with local knowledge of the AOA should be
involved in the planning and execution of MCM operations ahead of the amphibious landing.
It is advised that Advance Force reconnaissance be conducted to assist in determining the
optimal size of the areas to be cleared as well as the resources required. Amphibious MCM
is generally a time constrained operation. Further details on Amphibious Operations can be
found in ATP-08 and ATP-24 Vol I.
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a. (NU) Task. The object of the Mine Warfare Operations Room, or Cell, is to
support the Command in achieving the Mining and Mine Counter Measures aims and
should include the means necessary to prepare and distribute orders as well collect,
evaluate, and disseminate information between all levels of the command chain,
vertically and laterally in an accurate, clear and timely manner.
0109
(NU) Threat to Naval Mine Warfare Forces
1.
(NR)(NMP) Minelaying Forces
ATP-06 VOLUME I
a. (NR)(NMP) Enemy Opposition. Minefields and mining operations will encounter
various types of enemy opposition. This requires that the minefield planner make a
value judgement of the probable enemy response. Own mine countermeasures
against enemy sea mines may initiate opposition, however, it must be anticipated
that MCM units normally will not be a priority target for attacks. Nevertheless, a
threat exists. He can assume that the enemy will employ such opposing measures
as:
(1)
(NR)(NMP) Destruction of sea mine stockpiles.
(2)
(NR)(NMP) Interference with the laying of sea mines.
(3)
(NR)(NMP) Reaction to the type of laying vehicles.
(4) (NR)(NMP) Passive and active countermeasures operations against sea
mines.
b. (NR)(NMP) Destruction of Sea Mine Stockpiles. Enemy attacks on NATO's or
Allied Nations' sea mine stockpiles are a defensive problem of concern to protective
forces only. In the context of minefield planning factors it is of concern to the
minefield planner only that he knows the number and types of weapons available for
use.
c. (NR)(NMP) Interference with the Laying of Sea Mines
(1) (NR)(NMP) This type of opposition is of primary concern to delivery forces,
and the overall planning of the minelaying operation must deal with means to
ensure an adequate delivery of sea mines at acceptable cost. Probability of
mission success is the primary criterion.
(2) (NR)(NMP) One of the important factors in planning and executing a mining
operation, particularly in offensive and defensive fields, is an estimate of
expected losses of delivery vehicles. The estimate is used to determine the best
locations for the minefields, compare alternative delivery vehicles, the degree of
mission success and to help the operational commander decide if the minefield
is worth the potential price to be paid.
(3) (NR)(NMP) Delivery aircraft may be threatened by early warning radar,
surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and enemy interceptors. Delivery
submarines may be threatened by moored and bottom sensors, protective and
defensive minefields, and submarine, surface and air ASW forces. Surface
delivery forces face the threat from submarines, minefields, surface-to-surface or
air-to surface missiles, anti-surface warfare forces and aircraft. Covering forces
will reduce the threat to the minelayer. Requirements are partially discussed in
Chapter 13 of ATP-01. Support for minelayers has to be part of planning their
operation.
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d. (NR)(NMP) Reaction to the Laying Vehicle. In addition to the defences to be
expected against the laying vehicle, enemy reaction to the type of laying vehicle is of
primary concern to higher echelons. The consideration may be that, while the
minelaying mission itself is a success, potential retaliatory reaction to the type of
delivery vehicle may be unacceptable. If a nation were to undertake a surprise
mining mission early in a wartime situation, the enemy reaction to the appearance of
a large number of strategic bombers, for instance, may be to unleash a nuclear
attack, unaware that the aircraft are carrying non-nuclear weapons. Therefore, this
potential reaction must be considered, even in the initial stages of planning, so that
alternative methods of sea mine delivery can be planned if this concern appears
valid.
e. (NR)(NMP) Threat to the Minefield from Enemy Countermeasures. This
enemy action is not threatening the minelaying forces directly and is discussed in
Volume II of ATP-24.
2.
(NU) Threat to MCM Forces. Historically, single MCM units or a group of MCMVs
were not considered to be an attractive target for enemy attacks. However in addition to the
conventional air, surface and sub-surface threats, the modern day increase in the
asymmetric threat, particularly in expeditionary or littoral operations, means that MCM units
are more exposed to attack from enemy forces. Protection by own forces in the event of
such a threat from enemy forces may not be possible due to the unavailability of assets.
Nevertheless, force protection of MCM units must be included at all levels of the operational
planning process.
0110.
(NU) Intelligence
1.
(NU) The necessity for accurate pre-operation and real-time intelligence cannot be
overstressed. It has a vital effect on all phases of planning, execution of operations and
evaluation of Naval Mine Warfare techniques. In particular the officers concerned with the
process of planning must have direct access to the best sources of intelligence available,
mainly to be able to accurately assess the threat to own naval forces.
2.
(NU) Of significant importance is the identification and recovery of enemy sea mines
for technical evaluation. This also serves to confirm the intelligence information already
available. In order to exploit available intelligence to the greatest advantage, officers
organising the Naval Mine Warfare Staff should appoint a Mine Intelligence Officer.
0111
(NU) Logistic Support in Naval Mine Warfare
1.
(NU) Philosophy. Generally logistic support of Naval Mine Warfare forces is a
national responsibility. In the logistic support of Naval Mine Warfare operations the task of
supporting MCM forces forms a very large part of the support organisation and the support
philosophy will require orientation towards that major task. Necessary details are given in
ATP-06 Volume II.
a. (NR)(NMP) Minelaying forces do not usually require so much specialist support.
Necessary details are given in ATP 24, Volume II.
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NATO CONFIDENTIAL
(NU) Special Aspects of Logistic Support
a. (NU) Logistic support is an integral part of the function of Naval Mine Warfare. To
fulfil the aim of Naval Mine Warfare, special logistic aspects have to be considered in
the planning and conduct of Naval Mine Warfare operations. Naval Mine Warfare
vehicles may be minelayers (air, surface or submarine), minesweepers (air or
surface) or minehunters (air or surface) as well as modular systems (surface or subsurface) employed on a dedicated or non-dedicated platform. These matters require
a great deal of external support particularly in forward operational areas. Some
assets (e.g. a Clearance Diving Team (CDT) or a VSW MCM Team) when employed
as an integral part of a Naval Mine Warfare task organisation may require
specialised logistic support.
b. (NU) Logistic support for Naval Mine Warfare units/assets is complicated by:
(1) (NU) Limited stowage for minelaying and MCM gear, machinery parts, fuel,
water, ammunition and provision capacity
(2) (NU) Large quantity of MCM gear expended through enemy and other
causes in MCM operations.
(3)
c. (NU)
Support.
0112
(NU) The mobility of the support vessel is hampered by the sea mine threat.
ATP-06 Volume II Chapter 9 details specific requirements for Logistic
(NU) Navigation Factors Affecting Naval Mine Warfare
1.
(NU) This paragraph contains general information valid for MCM. Further details on
navigation of special concern are to be found in the respective chapters of ATP-06, Volume
II.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Details on navigation of special concern to mining operations can be
found in ATP-24, Volume II.
3.
(NU) Navigational Error. This is the lateral deviation of the path of a ship from its
desired track. The navigational error is not the same as the error in fixing lateral positions,
but with very accurate steering, the navigational error will approach the error of fixing the
lateral positions from the intended track. The navigational error pertinent to sweeping and
hunting operations is the perpendicular distance between the actual track of the sweep or
detection gear and its intended track at any point along the track. This distance will vary from
point to point along the track because the MCMV will be attempting to compensate for the
causes of errors (eg wind, tide, plotting, and the usual errors obtained in reading the
navigational instruments and steering a course). The navigational error is assumed to be
normally (Gaussian) distributed about the intended track; a convenient measure of its
magnitude is the standard deviation.
4.
(NU) Prescribed Course (or Track). Also known as Desired or Intended Track or
Course. The geographically defined line on which a vessel is to move over the ground.
Because of plotting and chart discrepancies, a prescribed track is subject to inherent errors.
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2.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
ATP-06 VOLUME I
5.
(NU) Standard Deviation of Navigational Error (SDNE). This is the term applied to
the navigational error computed for use in statistical mine warfare operations. Numerically, it
is the square root of the average of the squares of the measurements between the intended
track and the actual track. Navigational accuracy is a variable, but in order to apply some
measure of the accuracy with which the ship follows a laid down track, some calculation is
necessary to obtain a figure based on a normal distribution of navigational errors. SDNE is a
measure of the spread of a set of values and must be clearly distinguished from mean (or
average) value. SDNE is not the standard deviation of a sample used in statistical analysis
as a measure of the spread about the sample mean. The SDNE will always be larger than
the statistical standard deviation. Figure 1-2 shows examples of three tracks; Prescribed
Track (or Course), Actual Track and Mean Track:
Figure 1-2. SDNE - Example
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
a. (NU) Example. If a ship's distance off prescribed track is measured at five points
along the track: A = 0, B = +70m, C = -40m, D = +40m, E = -70m, the SDNE is:
0 2  70 2  40 2  40 2  70 2
 51m
5
b. (NU) This example, however, is not truly representative, because a ship's actual
track does not follow a sinuous displacement about the mean track.
6.
(NU) Consideration of Accuracy. The greater the navigation and position-fixing
accuracy in Naval Mine Warfare, the greater the efficiency and safety of minelaying and
MCM vehicles. Accurate and repeatable navigation reduces the risk to vessels transiting a
swept channel and are particularly important when relocating contacts or when minehunters
are searching for partially buried sea mines and the detection range is very low. Accurate
navigation enables:
(a) (NU) An increase of overall efficiency in MCM operations. MCM efficiency is
directly related to navigation accuracy; greater accuracy generally results in fewer
passes over an operational segment of channel.
(b) (NR)(NMP) Greater accuracy, when laying sea mines in predetermined
positions. The positions of a minefield and of mines within the field are major
determinants of its success or failure. Channels with no or few sea mines are less
likely in a well-planned and accurately laid minefield.
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7.
(NU) In the event that GPS is not available for whatever reason, consideration must
be given to using other precise navigation systems paying particular attention to the
associated errors.
(NU) Environmental Factors Affecting Naval Mine Warfare
1.
(NU) General. Environmental considerations play a significant part in both the
planning and execution of Naval Mine Warfare operations. Sea mine cases, mine sensors,
target signals, and MCM sweeps, signals and operations are all affected in varying degrees
by a large number of environmental factors. Many of these are of major importance and may
have an impact on the mission and will determine the selection of countermeasures
equipment or procedures. In spite of the relative abundance of environmental data, there are
still some major deficiencies. For example, Mine Warfare Pilots are not available for many of
the strategically important areas and many of the existing Pilots are incomplete. In addition,
the full effect of the environment is not completely understood for all areas of Naval Mine
Warfare.
2.
(NU) Environmental Assessments
a. (NU) Environmental Assessments are conducted by various means such as
Rapid Environment Assessment (REA), Hydrographic Survey, Route Survey and
from commercial sources. Depending upon the time available, this information is
normally collated by national Mine Warfare Data Centres (MWDCs) or Underwater
Data Centres (UWDCs) to provide environmental information to Mine Warfare
Commanders in a timely manner for planning and conduct of operations. This data
can be issued directly to the Mine Warfare Commander and/or is contained in Mine
Warfare Pilots (see para 3).
b. (NU) Environmental effects can be considered from the point of view of the
designer of sea mines, the planner, the layer and from the point of view of the MCM
planner. In the same operating area, they will both encounter the same environment
but their problems are of a slightly different nature. Both will want to use peacetime
for gathering as much data as possible. For a minefield planner, these data will be
used to choose the type of sea mine firing system, number of sea mines, mine
sensitivity setting, replenishment of the minefield etc.
c. (NU) For the MCM planner, the choice and reliability of active and passive
countermeasures, the number and type of MCM vessels, etc, depend on it.
3.
(NU) Mine Warfare Pilots.
a. (NU) NATO nations are responsible for compiling Mine Warfare Pilots, Charts
and Atlases for their own operating area. Details are contained in STANAG
1116MW. Based on surveys Mine Warfare Pilots provide the environmental data
required for planning and the conduct of Naval Mine Warfare operations in the area.
that the pilot refers to. This data may be supplemented by in-situ measurements to
provide an up-to-date assessment of the environmental conditions governing a
particular MCM operation. Whenever possible the collection and dissemination of
environmental data should be by electronic means.
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0113
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0114
(1)
(NU) ATP-06 Volume II,.
(2)
(NU) MTP-24, Volume I.
(3)
(NU)(NMP) ATP-24, Volume II.
(NR)(NMP) Peacetime Exercises
To increase the realism and interest in Mine Warfare the use of exercise mines in every
major maritime exercise is strongly recommended. Additionally, wherever possible, a
controlled simulated mine detonation event should be considered to demonstrate the effects
of a mine explosion.
1-18
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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b. (NU) This environmental information may be used by operational commands,
OTCs and COs to determine appropriate tactics and procedures in accordance with
the instructions of the following publications:
NATO RESTRICTED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1 - NMW OPERATIONAL TASKING,
REPORTS AND RECORDS
(NU) Introduction
1.
(NU) The purpose of NMW operational tasking, reports and records is to allow
authorities controlling mine countermeasures or mining to display and evaluate the
effectiveness of MCM and/or Mining forces and operations. It also provides higher authorities
with information from which they can assess future operations. A full list of NMW tasking,
reports and records is given in para 1A06
2.
(NU) Operational tasking, records and reports are required by the Operational
Control Authority and higher commands to evaluate current operations and tasks and to be
enabled to make decisions about sailing of own naval units and merchant shipping.
3.
(NU) In MCM it is very important that complete and up-to-date records of enemy
mining and the progress made in dealing with them is maintained. The effectiveness of the
countermeasures taken can thus be determined and the pattern of enemy mining tactics
gauged. Proper use of this information will enable available MCM forces to be used in the
most effective way and the shipping casualties to be reduced to a minimum.
4.
(NU). The aim at all command levels should be to provide the maximum relevant
information, using the means of communication appropriate to its priority and classification,
whilst paying due regard to the need to minimize signal traffic.
5.
(NU) In the event that detailed analysis of MCM operations or mining is a
requirement, the responsible authority will order the application of manuscript reports from
the Maritime Analysis Handbook (MAH). The use of FORMEXs will meet most needs of
operational analysis.
1A02
(NU) Formatted Messages
1.
(NU) All NMW operational tasking and reports have been converted into a message
format that is man and machine manageable to simplify and speed up the handling and
transmission of signaled reports. These so-called Message Text Formats (MTFs) are
contained in the ADatP-3 database (Allied Data Processing Publication No 3) which
describes the NATO Message Text Formatting System (FORMETS). The signal formats are
published in APP-11 (The NATO Message Catalogue (NMC)). The range of NMW
operational tasking and reports is designed to cover every eventuality in NMW operations
and are in standard form to ensure that all relevant information is captured. To ensure
optimum use of formatted NMW messages, automated message handling systems should be
used by headquarters and/or tasking authorities and should be incorporated in the Command
and Control systems of MCM Command Ships (MCCS) and MCM units.
2.
(NU) The main objectives of formatting are;
a. (NU) Rationalisation and standardisation of message formats for interoperability of
data and information between automated and manual components of NATO
Command and Control Information Systems (NATO CCIS).
1A-1
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1A01
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
b. (NR)(NMP) ADatP-3 is the governing authority for formatted messages and the
standard method of formatting must fall within the guidelines of ADatP-3.
1A03
(NU) Levels of Tasking, Reporting and Recording
1.
(NU) Two main levels of tasking, reporting and recording are:
a. (NU) Tactical Level. The Operational Tasking NMW (OPTASK NMW) is used by
the appropriate authority to promulgate detailed tasks, instructions or information for
all aspect of NMW subordinate units (see APP-11). The Operational Report NMW
(OPREP NMW) is used by units to inform the OTC of the progress of a task as
detailed by the appropriate task orders (See APP-11). Reports and records required
to be sent are stated in the OPTASK NMW. Units also report those observations and
events which will affect their task. Details are contained in para 1A05.
b. (NU) Operational Level. OTCs keep their OPCON Authority informed on the
progress of MCM operations and the status of the enemy mine threat. The frequency
of these reports will be ordered in the appropriate OPTASK NMW/OPDIR
(Operational Directive) which provides operational directions on the conduct of NMW
operations.
1A04
(NU) NMW Tactical Signals
1.
(NU) This category of NMW tasking and reports are tactical signal formats which are
to be found in Chapter 26 of ATP-1 Volume II. They should only be used in signaling
(flashing and flag hoist) and on tactical voice circuits within an MCM task Group or CDT. The
only advantage of these MW Signals is that they are short compared with other MCM reports
as only the relevant letters and/or figures are transmitted and descriptive text is omitted
making them suitable for fast reporting. Furthermore they are contained in a publication used
by all warfare areas for tactical reporting.
2.
(NU) Security Classification of Reports. The security classification of reports is
given in Table 1A-3 or in the appropriate operation order.
1A05
(NU) Manuscript Reports and Records
1.
(NU) In order to allow proper analysis of NMW operations in detail with a certain time
delay, manuscript reports/records (FORMEXs) were developed to enable evaluation of the
effectiveness of single MCM units as well as MCM task groups.
2.
(NU) Instructions for the completion of manuscript reports/records are contained in
the MAH.
1A06
(NU) Summary of Operational Tasking, Reports and Records
1.
(NU) The following tables list the formatted NMW operational tasking, reports and
records.
1A-2
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c. (NU) To reduce the number of formats to the minimum essential for the task or
operation. This has been achieved by reducing the amount of all NMW MTFs to only
two; an OPTASK NMW used for all tasking of NMW operations and an OPREP
NMW used for all reports of NMW operations.
NATO RESTRICTED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
2.
(NU) OPTASK NMW. The purpose of the OPTASK NMW is to provide an
operational tasking message to enable the appropriate authority to promulgate detailed
tasks, instructions and/or information for all aspects of a NMW operation. The formats are
available in APP-11.
Table 1A-1. Types of Operational Tasking
Description
OPTASK NMW / STANDING
A Standing OPTASK NMW is used to disseminate standard
operational procedures with respect to the conduct of NMW
operations in general
OPTASK NMW / OPDIR
An OPDIR is the OPTASK NMW message, which orders the
general execution of MCM or Mine Laying operations by
subordinate tasking authorities
OPTASK NMW / TASK
A Task Order provides detailed instructions to units or elements on
execution of a NMW Task
OPTASK NMW / MLTASK
A Mine Laying Task Order provides detailed instructions to units or
elements on execution of a Mine Laying Task
OPTASK NMW / SUPP
Supplements a former OPTASK NMW message
OPTASK NMW / UPDATE
Updates or Amends an OPTASK NMW message
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
3.
(NU) OPREP NMW. The purpose of the OPREP NMW is to provide an operational
report on NMW operations and the areas impacted by present or future NMW Operations.
The formats are available in APP-11.
Table 1A-2. Types of Operational Reporting (OPREP)
Title
Description
OPREP NMW / SITREP
A situational report which provides information on the NMW progress
(includes consolidated periodical reports (PERREPs)) from the NMW
Tasking Authority or higher authorities.
OPREP NMW / PERREP
A periodical report which provides information on the NMW progress
from the NMW Unit or element to the NMW Tasking Authority.
OPREP NMW / TASKREP
A report which provides the status of an ongoing NMW task (Start,
Stop, Interrupt, resume, complete) by the NMW unit or element to the
NMW Tasking Authority.
OPREP NMW / MINEREP
A report which provides information on a mine, explosive ordnance or
a underwater IED found by a NMW unit or element.
OPREP NMW /
RELIEFREP
A report which hands over the parameters of an uncompleted task to
the relieving unit..
OPREP NMW / UPDATE
A report which provides an update or amendment to a former OPREP
message.
OPREP NMW / MLREP
A report which provides the status of an executed mine laying task
from the unit or element to the NMW Tasking Authority.
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
1A-3
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Title
NATO RESTRICTED
4.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) Special NMW Reports. Special NMW Reports are listed in Table 1A-3.
Title
APP11
ATP24
Vol 1
Occasion
Sent by
Sent to
(info)
Precedence
(Classification)
OPSTAT MCM
X
To provide MCM
planners with the
most accurate
and up to date
information on
the MCM units
capabilities
MCM
Units
OTC
R(CONF)
Q-M WARN
(NR)(NMP)
x
Situation report
on the status or
pre-planned
shipping routes
and associated
dangers to
shipping
QMessage
and
warning
drafting
authorities
NCAGS
Org
OTCs
COs
R (As Required)
As required by
ATP-24 Vol I
Annex 4A
UNIT
OTC
(none)
(As Required)
ROUTE SURVEY
REPORTS
(RS 1 to RS 7)
x
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
1A-4
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Table 1A-3. Special NMW Reports
NATO RESTRICTED
5.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) FORMEXs
Table 1A-4. FORMEXs
DETAILED ROUTE
SURVEY REPORT
(NR)(NMP)
ATP-24
Vol 1
MAH
x
Occasion
Sent
by
Sent to
(info)
Precedence
(Classification)
On completion of
each general route
survey. (see ATP24(D), Vol I Annex
4A, for details)
OTC
OTC
(none)
R (CONF)
COMMANDERS
COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(FORMEX 100)
x
Provides an
opportunity for
commanders to
express comments
and
recommendations of
personal interest.
OTC /
CTG
OPCON
R (As Required)
CHRONOLOGICAL
NARRATIVE OF
EVENTS
(FORMEX 101)
x
When ordered
CO
(OTC)
OPCON
R (CONF)
MCMV TRACK CHARTS
(FORMEX 109)
x
When detailed
information on MCM
effort in areas or
channels is required
CO
OTC
R (CONF)
DEGRADED
PERFORMANCE OF
MINEHUNTING SONAR
(FORMEX 186)
x
When a degraded
performance of a
minehunting sonar
has occurred
CO
OTC
(none)
R (CONF)
MINEHUNTING
EMPLOYMENT
RECORD
(FORMEX 187)
x
When evaluation of
Minehunting is
required
CO
OTC
R (CONF)
MINESWEEPING
EMPLOYMENT
RECORD
(FORMEX 188)
x
When evaluation of
Minesweeping is
required
CO
OTC
R (CONF)
MCM Equipment Loss
(FORMEX 189)
x
When ordered
CO
OTC
R (CONF)
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 2 - USE OF SEA MINES
SECTION I - THE SEA MINE
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) Definition of the Mine
1.
(NU) In Naval Mine Warfare a sea mine is defined as an explosive device laid in the
water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from entering an
area. The term does not include devices attached to the bottom of ships or to harbour
installations by personnel operating underwater, nor does it include devices which explode
immediately on expiration of a predetermined time after laying.
2.
(NU)(NMP) The aims and basic operational concepts of mining are contained in
Chapter 5. Tactical aspects of minefields are contained in ATP-24 Volume II.
0202
(NU) Classification of Sea Mine Types
1.
(NU) Sea mines can be classified in a variety of different categories. Common
categories include:
a
(NU) Position in the water
b
(NU) Method of Actuation or Firing System
c.
(NU) Intended Purpose
d
(NU) Intended Target
e. (NU) Delivery Method
2.
(NU) For example: In minefield planning, mines are most often categorized by their
intended purpose (e.g. harbour defence, SLOC Interdiction, etc.), their intended target (e.g.
anti-submarine, anti-MCMV, etc.) and / or their delivery method (e.g. air laid, surface laid,
submarine laid). Conversely, in MCM planning, mines are most often categorized by their
position in the water (e.g. ground, deep moored, etc) and / or their actuation / firing system
(e.g. contact, remote controlled, multiple influence, etc.).
0203
(NU) Description of Sea Mine Types
1.
(NU) Ground Mine (also known as Bottom Mine). A ground mine is negatively
buoyant; rests on, or can become buried in, the sea bed and is held there by its own mass.
Its firing system is usually of the influence type. (Some anti-invasion sea mines used in the
Very Shallow Water (VSW) are contact actuated.)
a. (NU) Stand-Off Delivered Mine. (See paragraph 0203.8.e(3) below.).
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b. (NU) Buried Mine. Ground mines may be buried in the seabed; sometimes they
become buried on impact and/or due to various oceanographic effects, sometimes
they bury themselves actively. Ground mines which are NOT buried are referred to
as ‘Proud’ of the seabed.
a. (NU) Close-Tethered Moored Mine. Moored mines with a very short scope
mooring which keeps the mine case close to the sinker(also known as ‘ShortTethered’ Moored Mines) . There are three typical types of short-tethered moored
mines:
(1)
(NU) Anti-Invasion Moored Contact Mines for use in the VSW.
(2) (NU) Anti-Submarine Deep Moored Mines (contact or influence actuated).
Most purpose-built deep moored mines are influence actuated; however, moored
contact mines laid at great depth which remain moored near the sinker can pose
a threat to submarines.
(3)
(NU) Rising Mines (see paragraph 0203.8.d below).
b. (NU) Bouquet Mine. A bouquet mine is a moored mine with a number of
buoyant mine cases attached to the same sinker. When the mooring of one mine
case is severed, another mine case rises from the sinker to its pre-set case depth.
Bouquet mines are used to counter mechanical mine sweeping operations.
c. (NU) Watching Mine. A moored mine, still connected to its sinker, whose case
breaks frequently or permanently the surface of the water. This normally occurs
when the scope of the mooring is too long for the prevailing water depth. (see also
Floating Mine in para 8.a below).
3.
(NU) Contact (Actuated) Mine. A mine which actuates due to physical contact
between the target and the mine case or one of its appendages (see paragraph 0204.2.a
below).
4.
(NU) Influence (Actuated) Mine. A mine which responds to and actuates on the
signature of a target. Influence actuated mines can employ a single influence sensor or
combination of a number of different sensors. These sensors can be passive, active or a
combination of both (see paragraph 0204.2.b below).
5.
(NU) Remote Controlled (RC) Mine. A mine which, after laying, can be controlled
by the user to the extent of making the mine safe or live, or to fire it. RC mines can be
controlled by means of cables attached to a shore installation or by a variety of non-cabled
communication methods, including: ELF, Explosive and Acoustic. A RC mine can be either a
ground or moored mine.
6.
(NU) Independent Mine. A mine which is not controlled by the user after laying. Can
be either a ground or moored mine and can be either contact or influence actuated.
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2.
(NU) Moored Mine. A mine of positive buoyancy held below the surface by a
mooring attached to a sinker on the bottom. Its firing system can be of either contact or
influence type. Some ‘Deep Moored Mines’ use very strong moorings (usually small gauge
wire) to permit use in water depth down to 1000 metres.
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7.
(NU) Stationary Mine. A stationary mine explodes in the same position as it was
deployed. Can be either a ground or moored mine and can be either contact actuated,
influence actuated or remotely controlled.
(NU) Moving Mine. A collective description of mine types which are not stationary.
a. (NU) Floating Mine. A mine visible on the surface of the water. It can be either
a Drifting Mine, a Free Mine or a Watching Mine. However, a watching mine is not
moving (see 0203.2.c above). If that information is known, floating mines should be
further reported as Drifting Mines, Free Mines or Watching Mines.
(1) (NU) Drifting Mine. An intentionally deployed buoyant or neutrally buoyant
mine, able to move under the influence of wind, waves, current or tide. Drifting
mines can be either purpose built mines or moored mine cases deployed without
sinker or mooring. Drifting mines are often used in riverine mine warfare.
(2)
(NU) Free Mine. A moored mine whose mooring has parted or been cut.
Note. It is possible for a Drifting Mine or Free Mine to be partially buoyant and
therefore not be visible from the surface and able to move with the current or
tide.
b. (NU) Oscillating Mine. A mine, hydrostatically controlled, which fluctuates within
a preset depth range below the surface of the water independently of the rise and fall
of the tide. Oscillating mines are often used in riverine mine warfare.
c. (NU) Creeping Mine. A buoyant mine held below the surface of the water by a
weight, usually in form of a chain, which is free to creep along the seabed under the
influence of tidal stream or current. Creeping mines can be intentionally deployed
drifting mines weighted to remain close to the seabed or free mines with sufficient
mooring chain still attached to the case to cause them to ‘creep’.
d. (NU) Rising Mine. A mine which rises from its deployed position, either using its
own positive buoyancy or by means of a propulsion system. Most rising mines are
short-tethered and can be straight rising, vectored by attached pre-set fins or
homing. The effector depth can be up to 200 -300 m. On larger depths pressure
resistance is likely to be a considerable cost-multiplier. Maximum anchor depth can
be more than 2000 m. Large effector depths will render this mine type much more
MCM resistant.
(1) (NU) Buoyant Rising Mine. A mine having positive buoyancy which is
released from a sinker by target influence.
(2) (NU) Rocket Propelled Rising Mine. A rising mine which is launched from
its deployed position by a propelling charge and continues in motion within a
cavitation bubble by virtue of its kinetic energy.
(3)
(NU) Close-Tethered Rising Mine. (see paragraph 0203.2.a above)
e. (NU) Propelled Mine. A mine which actively moves by means of any kind of
propulsion system. The propelled mine category includes all mine types which
feature a propulsion phase at any time from deployment to actuation.
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(2)
(NU) Rocket Propelled Rising Mine. (see paragraph 0203.8.d (2)).
(3)
(NU) Stand-Off/Stand-Off Delivered Mine.
(a) (NU) A mine designed to be launched from a stand-off position and
then navigate to its intended lay position. It is usually shaped like a torpedo,
with navigation, propulsion and payload sections. At the lay position, it sinks
and then functions as a ground or moored mine according to the type of
mine circuit carried in the payload section (formerly referred to as a ‘Mobile
Mine’).
(b) (NU) A special case is a mine delivered by an independent platform
(eg. UUV's) carrying an effector like that of the Stand-Off Delivered Mine.
After deployment of this mine type, mines can be individually repositioned
within the borders of the minefield. After deployment of this mine type, the
minefield can be repositioned by moving the mines collectively.
9.
(NU) Special Purpose Mine. Mine designed to counter a specific type of target.
Some examples include:
a. (NU) Anti-Surface Effect Vehicle Mine. A mine used against Surface Effect
Vehicles (SEV).
b. (NU) Anti-MCMV Mine. A mine which is laid, or whose firing system is
specifically designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging MCMVs.
These mines do NOT target specific features of the MCMV (see Anti-Sweeper Mine
and Anti-Hunter Mine below); they are anti-surface ship mines laid or adjusted to
counter MCMVs. Examples include shallow moored mines, snagline mines, highly
sensitive magnetic mines and medium actuation level acoustic mines.
c. (NU) Anti-Mine Sweeper Mine. A mine which is laid or whose mechanism is
specifically designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging Mine
Sweepers. Examples include moored mines fitted with grapnel devices, mediumactuation-level magnetic mines which a normally energized sweep will detonate
within the MCMV’s damage area, and coarse acoustic mines when the sweeper is
towing an acoustic sweep abeam.
d. (NU) Anti-Mine Hunter Mine. A mine which is laid or whose mechanism is
specifically designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging minehunters.
Actuation is normally caused by the Mine Hunters sonar beam.
e. (NU) Anti-Hovercraft / Anti-Helicopter Mine. A mine which is laid or whose
firing system is specifically designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or
damaging hovercraft or helicopters. The mines firing system is designed or adjusted
to discriminate signatures of helicopters (eg acoustic signature or rotor noise) and/or
hovercraft. The mines are normally designed to cause plume and fragmentation
damage.
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(1) (NU) Self-Propelled Mine. A mine which moves, driven by a motor, from its
deployed position to the place where it explodes.
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10.
(NU) Stealth Mine. Stealth Mines are mines that have been either manufactured or
treated to be difficult to detect. This is achieved by coating the mines with anechoic
material(s), manufactured from low target strength materials and into an irregular form or
shape.
(NU) Mines for Training Purposes.
a. (NU) Re-usable mines designed for exercise and training. They use inert-loaded
or empty mine cases fitted with special devices for training or exercises and
recovery.
b. (NU)(NMP) Descriptions of common exercise mine types are contained in
Chapter 2 of AMP-13 Volume III, ‘Characteristics of NATO Exercise and Training
Mines’.
12.
(NU)(NMP)
24 Volume II.
0204
Delivery Methods. Delivery methods of mines are described in ATP-
(NU) Technical Properties of Individual Mines
1.
(NR)(NMP) General As individual weapons, mines exhibit a broad spectrum of
warheads and firing systems. The firing systems can be very different and be activated by
different combinations of target signature, sensitivity and internal signal processing. In an
extreme case, a minefield can consist of mines of only one type, but each mine has different
firing system settings, so they react in different ways. Figure. 2-1 shows the various
combinations of firing systems and warheads, the designations used are explained overleaf.
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Figure 2-1. (NMP) Firing Systems and Warhead Types
2.
(NU) Firing Systems
a. (NU) Contact Firing System. Contact firing systems are the most simple firing
systems known. They use the physical contact between target and mine to detonate
the charge. The range is very limited.
(1) (NU) Horn/Tilt Rod/Plunger. A projection from the mine shell of some
contact mines which, when broken, bent or pushed by contact, causes the mine
to fire. It has a very limited range of between half and full target beam width.
(2) (NU) Snagline. A buoyant line attached to one of the horns or switches
which may be caught and pulled by the hull or propellers of a ship. The range
increases by the use of a long rod. The typical length is about 10m.
(3) (NU) Antenna / Floatwire. This is a device attached to a contact mine in
form of a special section in the mooring cable and/or a special cable suspended
above the mine by a float. When touched by a ferrous object, it sets up galvanic
action to fire the charge. The typical length is of some 40m.
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(1) (NU) Threshold Value. The target signature has to exceed a preset
threshold value. The procedure is limited by environmental background noise.
The firing system can be fooled by a strong constant-level signature simulation (if
no pressure sensor is present).
(2) (NU) Rate of Rise. This procedure analyses the gradient of the overall
value of the signature by calculating its 1st and, in some cases, 2nd derivative
with time. This firing principle is more sophisticated than the threshold criterion,
but can also be fooled by a strong modulated signature simulation (if no pressure
sensor is present).
(3) (NU) Range detecting. Range-detecting firing systems estimate the slant
range of the source of the signature to the sensor. The firing system reacts only
if the source is within the damage radius. In general, these firing systems do not
need a pressure component but one may be used. Technical solution: Gradient
systems (magnetic), runtime correlation (acoustic), amplitude differences
(acoustic).
(4) (NU) Target Tracking. Target tracking systems are used to estimate and
predict the track of a target over a distance greater than the conventional
activation distance of mines. The firing system reacts once the target comes
within the effective range of the warhead. These types of system are critical to
advanced mobile acting mines, projectile or rising types, but can also be applied
to ground mines. The possible sensors include: acoustic, seismo-acoustic, lowfrequency electromagnetic radiation (LER).
3.
(NR)(NMP) Warhead. The warhead is the acting body of the mine. In most cases it
consists of some high explosive (HE) which emits an undirected or omni-directional (OD)
shock wave. For some special purposes the mines will contain shaped charge warheads
(SC). The high explosive content of future mines will become more efficient and less
sensitive to secondary detonations as new insensitive explosives are developed. This will
make mine clearance more difficult.
a. (NR)(NMP) Stationary Charges. These warheads contain conventional HE with
an OD effect. The explosive weight is based on the TNT equivalent.
(1) (NR)(NMP) Farfield OD-Large (L). The action principle of large ground
mines is farfield detonation. The charge size OD-L exceeds 400kg HE; the action
range amounts to 50 - 100m. The maximum effective water depth against
surface targets is 60m. The damage is caused by the global response of the
target to a shock wave (vertical displacement of the total hull of about 10cm
within 100msec). Additional damage is caused by cavitational reloading. The
target has to be in contact with the water (displacement hull).
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b. (NU) Influence Firing System. Influence firing systems use the signature of a
target to determine the moment when to detonate the charge. Classical firing
systems use acoustics, magnetics and pressure or combinations of them. Other
suitable signatures are seismo-acoustics, low-frequency electromagnetic radiation,
and Underwater Electric Potential. The firing systems have four different basic types.
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(2) (NR)(NMP) Medium Range OD-Medium (M). The charge size OD-M is of
approximately 150 to 250kg HE. This is the application of anti-invasion mines in
shallow water. Due to limited charge size, shock damage aboard the target will
be limited, but other additional effects will become dominant. The shock front will
have a smaller radius of curvature and cause a more local loading of the
structure. This causes a strong bending of keel beam around the lateral axis.
Another action is whipping, this is the combined effect of shock, cavitational
reloading and bubble pulse. The target is driven into resonance. Future mines
(2015+) may have two or more small OD-charges with time-stepped detonations
to enhance whipping resonance. Furthermore causes the expansion of the gas
bubble convective flow towards the target thus inducing structural damage like
cracks or failure of welding.
(3) (NR)(NMP) Nearfield OD-Small (S). Nearfield detonation is the classical
detonation for contact mines. The charge size is < 150 kg HE. Damage due to
blast from the small charge size is limited. Structural damage is confined to 1 or
2 compartments. Hull rupture will cause flooding due to hull failure. This may not
impair the combat effectiveness of the vessel.
b. (NR)(NMP) Mobile Charge. The warhead is either a projectile or rising mine.
(1) (NR)(NMP) Nearfield OD-M/SC-S. The nearfield detonation of an OD-M
could cause significant damage and cause mission abort. A SC-S limits the
shock damage to one compartment. However hull rupture will cause flooding of 1
or 2 compartments. This may not impair the combat effectiveness of the vessel.
SC-S are a special application for warheads against submarines. They are
intended to destroy the pressure body.
(2) (NR)(NMP) Inboard OD-S. This is the action principle of projectiles. It is
specially aimed against targets which are not in contact with water, e.g.
hovercraft. Effects of blast may impair the lower decks of the compartment hit;
pipes and cables especially are extremely vulnerable. Fragments of the casing
may cause damage to adjacent compartments.
0205
(NU) Measure to Protect Mines and Minefields Against MCM
1.
(NU) General. This section discusses the specific techniques used to protect the
mine from mine counter-measures operations as distinct from the capabilities built into the
firing system of influence mines or the moorings of moored mines. Additionally mines may be
equipped with anti-recovery devices either to prevent the disclosure of mine settings or as
some kind of safety precaution. Various techniques are available to the mine designer some
are active and others passive, these are explained below.
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Figure 2-2. Methods of Self Protection for Mines
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(NU) Mine Counter-Counter Measures (MCCM) to Mine Hunting.
a. (NU) Active Mine Burial. Self burial of mines is quite easy to achieve with a
suitable bottom type and does not require much energy. This type of mine is
equipped with a device which pumps water into the sea bed causing liquefaction of
the sediment. This allows the mine to gradually settle into the bottom. On completion
of this process (typical time required is about 20 minutes) the mine is nearly invisible
to conventional mine hunters. These buried mines require the development of
special sonar systems. However, mine burial requires certain bottom types (sand,
mud) thus is not suitable for use in all locations.
b. (NU) Anti-MH-Devices. Modern acoustic minehunting devices are quite
expensive and available in limited numbers only. Thus they are valuable targets for
conventional mines whose firing systems work in a high-frequency range and have
range detecting or target tracking firing systems. The development of special antiminehunting mines is possible. These would consist of homing warheads which use
the sonar beam of the mine hunter for homing guidance. Anti-MH-devices represent
the modern counterpart of explosive floats.
c. (NU) Camouflage/Stealth. Mines may be obscured by several methods:
(1) (NU) Shape. Stealth technology gives the mine a reduced or distorted
sonar backscatter signal, thus inhibiting its classification as a ‘Minelike Contact’.
An alternative method is to split the main charge into several smaller and more
difficult to detect charges. These would be locally distributed and detonate either
simultaneously or in sequence to induce whipping in the target.
(2) (NU) Casing. A non-metallic material for the mine casing will reduce or
distort the typical minelike echo of sonar, thus inhibiting its classification as a
‘Minelike Contact’.
(3) (NU) Coating. By coating the mine casing with anechoic (sound-absorbing)
material the strength of the echo can be reduced significantly. Unfortunately,
these coatings are frequency dependant and would not be so effective at lower
sonar frequencies. Another possibility is for the casing to support the settlement
of marine vegetation (e.g. by using wooden racks or painting with fertiliser) but
this method requires a relatively long time after mine deployment (say 2-3
months) to get an effective camouflage.
d. (NU) Decoys. Another form of MCCM is to place decoys or dummies into the
minefield. These would either be small objects with a large sonar signal, or inert
minelike objects.
3.
(NU) Mine Counter-Counter Measures (MCCM) to Mine Sweeping.
a. (NU) Explosive Floats or Obstructors (see Fig 2-3). The explosive floats
consist of small charges which explode on contact with a minesweeper's cutting
cable. This would force the minesweeper to stop sweeping and change its sweeping
gear. Obstructors consist of floats or empty mine cases supporting either mine
moorings in which cutters are included or heavy chain moorings which present a
serious obstacle to the standard wire sweep.
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b. (NU) Grapnel (see Fig 2-3). These are special protective devices for moored
mines that grapple the mechanical sweep cable thus damaging it, or endangering the
sweeper when recovering the sweep.
d. (NU) Cutters (see Fig 2-3). Static or explosive cutters may be fitted to mine
moorings to cut the sweep wire.
e. (NU) Sensitive Tubing (see Fig 2-3). Designed to actuate the mine on pressure
from the sweep wire. Normally fitted to the upper end of the mine mooring.
f. (NU) Ship Counter. This is a counting mechanism included in the mine circuits.
The ship counter may be seen as tactical device. However it also serves as a self
protective measure against MCM operations. When the mine is ready to be fired by
the next suitable ship or sweep passing, it is said to be ‘poised’.
(1) (NU) Bouquet Mine. The bouquet mine is the ship counter version of a
moored contact mine. If the cable to the warhead of a moored contact mine is
cut, a second (or third, fourth, etc.) warhead is released and replaces the cut
one.
(2) (NU) Numerical Counter. This is the most common method for protecting
mines against influence sweeps. If the firing criterion is fulfilled (by a real or
simulated signature), the mine doesn't explode but registers a count. When the
preset number of counts have been worked off the mine detonates.
g. (NU) Arming Control
(1) (NU) Random On/Off. A similar system to the ship counter is a modern
method of a random on/off technique, also known as Intermittent Arming
Mechanism. This is more flexible and will always leave some residual risk after
mine sweeping.
(2) (NU) Arming Delay. It consists of a timing mechanism, usually a clock,
which keeps the mine circuits open for a preset time after laying. The time can
vary from a few hours to a year and of course, during this time, sweeping is
ineffective because the mine cannot be actuated. When the mine is no longer
under control of the arming delay mechanism, it is said to be ‘armed’. The arming
delay for moored mines is called Delayed Rising Mechanism. It enables the
release and rising of the mine to be delayed by means of a device fitted either to
the sinker or to the windings of the mooring cable. Release may be either also
after a preset time or as the result of an influence received from a passing ship
or sweep.
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c. (NU) Sprocket (see Fig 2-3). Another mechanical device for protecting the cable
of a moored mine against mechanical sweeps by allowing the sweep wire to pass
through the mine mooring without parting it from the sinker.
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h. (NU) Moorings of moored mines may be chains, piano wire, rubber-covered
manila line, canvas fire hose, etc. which may not be cut cleanly or not cut at all by
mechanical sweeps. These may cause the mine to hang up in the sweep wire,
endangering the ship during recovery operations. Sensitive Tubing may be fitted to
the upper end of the mine mooring, designed to actuate the mine on pressure from a
wire sweep or when the force exerted by the mooring on the mine case ceases.
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
4.
(NU) Anti-Recovery Devices. Anti-recovery devices may be fitted to mines to
prevent discovery of details of the firing systems of new types of mine. Some examples of
these devices are:
a. (NU) Anti-Recovery Switch. A hydrostatic switch may be incorporated in a
mine, usually in conjunction with a soluble plug to prevent actuation for a certain
period after laying and/or until the mine has reached a certain depth. Additional
contacts can be incorporated in the hydrostatic switch to fire the mine, keep it live or
to delete all tactical parameter data when it is lifted above its preset depth.
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Figure 2-3. Anti-Sweep-Wire Devices
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c. (NU) Prevention of Stripping Equipment. This is a booby trap included in a
mine to fire the main or an auxiliary charge when an attempt is made to open the
firing system chambers.
d. (NU) The Steriliser can be included in a mine to render it inoperative on
expiration of a predetermined period after laying. The steriliser may be a device to
short-out the mine's batteries, to fire the mine, or to flood the mine case.
e. (NU) The Flooder. This is a steriliser included in buoyant mines. It floods the
mine case after a preset time.
f. (NU) Anti-Watching Device. This is a device fitted in a moored mine, which
causes the mine to sink should it for any reason rise and break the surface (watch).
This prevents the position of the mine (or minefield) being disclosed.
0206
(NU) Trends in Mine Technology
As within all warfare disciplines the technology of mines, Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and
Mine Counter-Countermeasures (MCCM) will continue to develop. For all operational
planning, reference should be made to relevant intelligence data.
0207
(NU) Classification of Influence Firing Systems and Sensors
1.
(NU) A mine may be fired by a pressure influence, or by a magnetic or acoustic
influence generated by a ship. The sensitivity of an influence mine describes its liability to be
actuated by an influence field. The higher the sensitivity the less influence required for
actuation. The sensitivity of most influence mines can be adjusted to suit their purpose in a
minefield, however, adjustment can rarely be optimised, so that when choosing mines for a
particular minefield several types may have to be considered.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Mine Actuation Level (MAL). Describes the magnitude of the field, rate
of change of field, or other influence which might actuate a mine. Magnetic mines are rated
as:
a. (NR)(NMP) Very Sensitive = 200 nanotesla or less.
b. (NR)(NMP) Sensitive = 200 to 1600 nanotesla.
c.
(NR)(NMP) Coarse = 1600 nanotesla and above
3.
(NR)(NMP) Frequency must be taken into account when considering the sensitivity
of acoustic mines. Figure 2-4 indicates the estimation of the upper limit of background noise
level. A conversion table from dB to microbars is added.
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b. (NU) Mooring Lever Safety Cut-Out Switch. This is a switch which may be
fitted to cut out the mooring lever safety switch, (which normally renders a moored
mine safe on breaking adrift or being swept). Its purpose is to leave the mine fully
armed whilst drifting and hence liable to detonation during recovery or on being
washed ashore. The Hague Convention forbids the use of the drifting mine as a
weapon, except for very short-term use.
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Figure 2-4. (NMP) Estimation of Upper Limit of Background Noise Level
4.
(NU) Circuit Types:
a (NU) One-Look Circuit. The most simple circuit is the one-look (or single
contact) circuit. The mine fires as soon as a certain value of influence field (or rate of
change of influence field) is experienced. Such a circuit will often fire ahead of a ship.
b. (NU) One-Look Circuit with Delay. A time delay is introduced between the
receipt of the actuating influence and the firing of the detonator. This improves the
position of the mine relative to a large or slow ship but a fast ship with small influence
field may cause the mine to fire astern.
c. (NU) Two-look Random Circuit. A circuit in which the influence or `look' must
be detected twice before actuation occurs; the second look may follow consecutively
or within certain time limits; the mine may be dormant during the interlook period.
The need for the influence to be still present at the time of the second look prevents
the mine firing clear astern and thus overcomes the disadvantage of para 0205.4.b.
d. (NU) Two-Look Reversal Circuit. A circuit in which the influence must be
detected twice before actuation occurs, the sense of polarity of the influence during
the second look being opposite to that during the first. The second look may follow
consecutively or within certain time limits. The mine may be dormant during the
interlook period.
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f. (NU) Damping of Relays. For constructional reasons a degree of damping must
be introduced into the relay; damping can also be introduced intentionally. As a
result, a mine will actuate only if it experiences a certain minimum strength of rate of
change of field for a given time. This will have an effect on sweeping.
g. (NU) Combined Circuit. The firing of a mine may depend on the previous
simultaneous or subsequent reception of signals resulting from other influences,
such as acoustic and pressure.
h. (NU) Integrating Circuit. A circuit dependent for actuation on the time integral
function of the influence.
0208
(NU) Magnetic Mine Sensors
1.
(NU) Magnetic firing systems respond to either the vertical or horizontal components
of the magnetic field or the total magnetic field. There are two main categories of magnetic
firing systems, which are, those that depend on the amplitude of the magnetic field for
actuation, and those that are actuated by a certain rate of change of field either in time or
over a distance (ie magnetic gradiometer mine).
2.
(NR)(NMP) Rate of change of the field or component mines can be made sensitive to
either the vertical or horizontal components of the ship's field. Mines of this type usually
contain a coiled rod unit which consists of a rod of material of high magnetic permeability
wound with many thousands of turns of wire. When the magnetic field changes, current is
induced in the turns of the coiled rod. A relay or other device is operated by this current. The
greater the rate of change of field the greater will be the current induced, the actual field
strength at any distance being of no importance.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Ground induction mines usually work on the horizontal component
because the long coiled rod required to give high sensitivity can readily be fitted horizontally.
Modern developments in the design of amplifiers may, however, make the length of the rod
of less importance.
4.
(NR)(NMP) Buoyant magnetic mines fitted with simple detecting circuits cannot be
made sensitive as they would be actuated by the earth's magnetic field as they swung to and
fro on their moorings. However, the use of modern devices for measuring total field or field
gradients may make possible more sensitive assemblies, although modern devices such as
total field flux-gates may alter this.
5.
(NR)(NMP) The useful sensitivity of a magnetic mine sensor is limited by the
apparent magnetic field changes due to motion of the mine in the earth's magnetic field, the
magnetic field induced by motion of sea water in the earth's field, the geomagnetic noise due
to ionospheric currents, lightning discharges and the location relative to polar latitudes.
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e. (NU) Sequence Circuit. A circuit which requires actuation by a predetermined
sequence of influences of predetermined magnitude. For example, if it were a habit
to sail important ships preceded by a minesweeper, the minelayer could devise a
sequence circuit which would respond only to the strong signal produced by the
sweeper followed at some time later by the weaker signal of the specific target.
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7.
(NR)(NMP) Measurement of the 3 components of the magnetic field and 5
independent gradients, makes it possible to determine the distance from the mine to the
target and also to track the target throughout the range of influence. For very large ships in
water which is not too deep, this approach is possible using existing magnetometers with
additional logic and processing elements. The prospect of greater magnetometer sensitivity
can be rewarding only if techniques of signal processing can be devised to significantly
enhance the signal-to-noise ratio.
0209
(NU) Acoustic Mine Sensors
1.
(NU) A ship produces sound mainly in the 60-400 Hz band, so this has been the
band most used by the mine designer, since a considerable sensitivity is obtainable at these
frequencies. Earlier mine circuits contained a vibrator or microphone and were designed to
respond to a particular frequency or combination of frequencies. Counter-mining protection
was added to prevent the mine being actuated by a sudden peak of noise such as that
caused by a nearby explosion. Some modern mine sensors not only require a defined noise
level to be met but also have a rate-of-change requirement. This mine type can be used to
avoid sweeping by explosive sweeps, or it provides countermining protection against
acoustic sweeps being towed too slowly and/or not being pulsed or modulated in the right
way. It is possible for the designer to select any frequency range for his mines from virtually
the whole spectrum of the ship. For convenience the Acoustic Spectrum is divided as follows:
a. (NU) Low Frequency (LF) = Below 30Hz.
b. (NU) Medium Frequency(MF)/Audio Frequency (AF) = 30 to 15,000 Hz.
c.
(NU) High Frequency (HF) = 15,000 Hz and above.
2.
(NC)(NMP) Low Frequency Mines. The noise output of a ship at low frequencies is
appreciable as is the background noise of the sea. The lowest frequency that can be used
effectively in mines intended for laying in the open sea is probably about 2 Hz and the degree
of sensitivity available to the mine designer is small. On the other hand, the LF band has 2
major advantages from the point of view of the mine designer.
a. (NC)(NMP) It is difficult to produce low frequencies by means of a sweep without
the gear being heavy and cumbersome and severely restricted in the range of
frequencies produced.
b. (NC)(NMP) Under most conditions attenuation at frequencies below 40 Hz tends
to restrict sweep range. Also the low frequencies generated by the ship do not
spread so far as the audio frequencies and a plain LF mine is not so likely to explode
at a safe distance.
3.
(NC)(NMP) Medium/Audio Frequency Mines. The medium/audio frequency band
offers the greatest range of sensitivity for the purpose of mine design.
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6.
(NR)(NMP) A sensitive magnetic gradient mine may be developed that cannot easily
be swept, and can be very effectively used against degaussed ships similar to the MCMV.
Such a mine could be used in areas where mine or sea water movement at present inhibits
the sensitivity of magnetic mines.
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5.
(NC)(NMP) Multiple Frequency Mines. It can be arranged that sound must be
received at two or more different frequencies before the mine actuates. Further, it can be
arranged that the mine will only actuate if the volume of sound at each of the two frequencies
bears comparison with the shape of the sound spectrum of a ship; such a mine is termed a
multiple frequency mine.
6.
(NC)(NMP) Directional Transducer. The use of a directionally discriminating
transducer can, by relating the water depth to the target angle, ensure that mine actuation
only takes place at the closest point of approach and within a predetermined range. Such a
device ensures that the mine predetermines its firing range, which could well be the range at
which a target will be sunk or seriously damaged. The device could be adapted to ensure
that the mine would not be actuated by an acoustic sweep towed astern of an MCMV.
Similarly, the use of active transmissions from a directional transducer could, by relating the
target angle to its range, determine a submarine target's depth and programme a rising mine
to explode at the most effective depth.
7.
(NC)(NMP) Miniaturisation of electronic circuits have enabled the application of
spectrum analysis techniques in mine warfare. These techniques are well proven in antisubmarine warfare and enable a great increase in the ability of a mine to discriminate
between target and a submarine on the surface. The combination of such an initial detection
device with a homing weapon also ensures that, by exploiting the low attenuation of low
frequency sound, the weapon is not inhibited by low initial target detection ranges. In addition
the application of mine logic and modern signal-processing techniques have resulted in the
development of more sensitive acoustic mines capable of being actuated by modern
MCMVs.
0210
(NU) Pressure Mine Sensors
1.
(NU) Design. Compared with the hydrostatic pressure due to the depth of water, the
pressure change due to a passing ship is usually very small. The pressure mechanism must
be capable of detecting this small change while ignoring the larger, slower changes due to
tide. This is achieved by arranging that the mine automatically adjusts itself to the hydrostatic
pressure, subsequently sensing only fairly rapid changes. The hydrostatic pressure has
sometimes been used in mine design to increase the sensitivity with increase of depth, thus
compensating for the attenuation of ship's signatures. Consequently it is important when
expressing the characteristics of a mine to be clear as to whether a particular depth is implied
and whether any depth compensating feature is incorporated.
2.
(NC)(NMP) Swell.
a. (NC)(NMP) Swell may cause pressure actuation through swell effect, or it may
influence the response of the mine firing system so that the mine became more or
less prone to actuate outside its original design intent, or swell may have an
interference effect upon a ship's pressure signature.
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4.
(NC)(NMP) High Frequency Mines. A mine that would only receive HF signals from
one particular direction can be constructed. A possible operating frequency is from 20-50
kHz. It is therefore, possible to arrange that the mine responds only to HF noise originating
from within a restricted inverted cone above it and thus actuates when the ship (usually her
propellers) is immediately above it. The HF waves can also be generated in the mine, the
echo received from the hull of the ship being used to actuate the mine (inverted echosounder).
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
3.
(NC)(NMP) Effect of Mine Burial. The response of a pressure mine buried in the
seabed would depend very much on the particular design. In some firing systems a pressure
is established only as a result of a considerable flow in the surrounding medium, and
submersion in sediment would tend to prevent this. In other mechanisms (eg those
employing a liquid rather than a gas filling) pressure changes in the sea would be
communicated relatively easy through the sediment. Only in very special circumstances
could it be assumed that the nature of the seabed would diminish the danger from pressure
mines.
0211
(NU) Other Sensor Types
1.
(NU) Underwater Electrical Potential; UEP.
a. (NU) The electrostatic signature (SE) is purely an underwater signature caused
by electric currents flowing through the sea water surrounding the ship.
b. (NU) These electric currents result from the difference in the electro-chemical
potentials of the various materials, e.g. steel hull, shaft and bronze propeller, which
are electrically connected by the electrolyte sea water.
c. (NU) Of greater importance are the currents caused by the necessary measures
to prevent corrosion where dedicated electric currents are created by the means of
cathodic protection systems versus the naturally occurring anodic currents.
d. (NU) Sacrificial anodes use material where the anode is always more
electronegative than the ship’s materials.
e. (NU) Electrical corrosion protection systems directly inject the protective currents
via platinum electrodes into the electrolyte.
f. (NU) An electric field sensor is able to recognize the electrostatic signature and
the alternating field in a predefined frequency area (AMP 14 requires up to 3 kHz).
2.
(NU) Use of Geophones as Mine sensors
a. (NU) When used as a mine sensor, geophones measure a mixture of the
vibrations resulting from low frequency ship noise (waterborne sound, the acoustic
signature) and the even lower frequent oscillation of the seabed (seismic signature).
b. (NU) Geophones are electro-mechanical transducers, which convert oscillations
of the seabed and vibrations in the water into analogue electrical signals. They
consist basically of a coil and a permanent magnet, which are connected by a spring.
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b. (NC)(NMP) To counter the problem of actuation by swell, pressure mines would
commonly require an additional magnetic or acoustic influence. It might be feasible
to sweep pressure mines by applying the other influence by itself when swell is
present, especially if the interference effect of swell upon the sweeper's pressure
signature was favourable.
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c. (NU) The oscillation of the sea bed, or vibrations in the water, causes a relative
movement between the coil and the magnet. Proportional to the speed of this
relative movement, a potential is induced and measurement of this induced potential
provides the value of the strength of the vibration. The measurable frequency area
starts at about 4 Hz.
(NU) Seismic-Acoustics and Seismic
a. (NU) Physical Background. Seismic acoustic waves occurs for low frequencies
within the range of zero to approximately 250 Hz and occurs where the water and
seabed converge.
b. (NU) Measurements of these waves are carried out using geophones located on
or in the seabed which register not just the seismic wave, but also low acoustic
frequency waves (eg. The propeller frequency of a ship).
c. (NU) Evaluation of these two types of waves can principally provide information
concerning the class and heading of a ship and its range from the geophone,
provided the waves can be distinguished from each other.
d. (NU) The desired aim is to be able to determine the so-called 'seismic ship
signature' and the resulting damage width and damage depth contour.
Figure 2-5. Seismic and Acoustic Waves
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3.
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
e. (NU) Measures for Reducing and Monitoring the Seismic-Acoustic Fields of
a Ship. The material and tactical measures to reduce and monitor the low frequency
acoustic field of a ship are in line with the standard acoustic measures. Methods for
reducing and monitoring the seismic-acoustic field of a ship are not currently
available as the technical solutions are not yet known.
(NC)(NMP) Power Supplies
Modern day power supplies in the form of batteries (eg. Ni-Cad, lithium, etc.) are normally
used to power mine firing systems. The life of a mine will be determined by the type of firing
system, the use of arming devices, type of sensors, etc.
0213
(NC)(NMP) Actuation Features
1.
(NC)(NMP) Each type of independent mine is actuated by some physical
characteristics of the ship against which it is used as a weapon, and for its damage effect
depends on the construction and dimension of the ship. Mines will therefore be selected and
adjusted with reference to the characteristics of the ships expected as targets. The intelligent
use of mines requires a detailed knowledge of mining targets, both as regards their
capabilities for actuating the various type of mine and their vulnerability to them.
a. (NC)(NMP) Average Actuation (Influence Mines). To enable the number of
mines required in a minefield to achieve a given threat to be calculated, a theoretical
figure called ‘average actuation width’ is normally given in mine operational data
tables for particular mine/class ship combinations.
(1) (NC)(NMP) The average actuation width is a measure of the capability of
the mine to be actuated by the target ship and is derived as follows. When a ship
encounters a mine in a particular set of circumstances (a given type of ship at a
given type of mine etc) the probability P, that the mine will actuate depends on
the athwartship distance y, and the vertical distance z, between the target and
the mine. Figure 2-6 (a) shows an example of contours of P = 25, 50 and 75 per
cent. For a ground mine in a given depth of water, P can be plotted as a function
of y, as shown in Figure 2-6 (b). If it is assumed that all values of y are probable
for a passing ship, then the probability that the ship will actuate the mine is
proportional to the integral of P over all values of y. This integral is the average
actuation width W. W may be described, roughly speaking, as the area under the
curve of P plotted against y for the given depth.
(2) (NC)(NMP) There are a number of variables which must be catered for in
the mine data tables.
(a) (NC)(NMP) Average actuation widths for all influence mines depend on
the sensitivity and depth of the mine, ie the depth of water for ground
mines.
(b) (NC)(NMP) Average actuation widths for dip-needle magnetic mines
vary with the polarity of the mine, the magnetic latitude of the field and the
size and magnetic condition of the class of ship considered. For magnetic
induction mines the widths additionally depend on the speed of the ship
and, if they are ground mines, on the orientation of the mine on the bottom
relative to the course of the ship.
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0212
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(c) (NC)(NMP) Average actuation widths for acoustic mines vary with the
sensitivity setting and the age of the mine, temperature of water, bottom
conditions, speed of ship, type of engine and its revolutions, number and
state of propellers etc, and sometimes on the vibration of the ship's hull.
(3) (NC)(NMP) The expression ‘average’ is used here because the
performance of mines, even of the same nominal type and characteristics, will
vary due to manufacturing tolerances, orientation on the bottom etc. Ships of the
same class will produce very different magnitudes of influence because of
differing conditions experienced during building and in subsequent service,
varying state of propellers etc. Only an average figure can therefore be given for
any particular mine/class of target ship combination.
Figure 2-6. (NMP) Examples of Average Actuation Width Contours (a/b)
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b.
(NC)(NMP) Actuation Width (Contact Mines). For planning purposes, the
actuation width of a contact mine may be taken as the beam of the target ship at the
depth of the mine or its operating appendages (antennae, snagline etc). The word
‘average’ usually is omitted when quoting actuation width for contact mine/target ship
combinations as there are fewer variables.
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(d) (NC)(NMP) Average actuation widths for pressure mines are a function
of the size of the ship, its draught, trim, shape of the underwater portion of
the hull, ship's speed, and the amplitude and period of pressure changes at
the mine caused by wave or swell action.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
c. (NC)(NMP) Average Actuation Area (Moored Mines Versus Submerged
Submarines). In the case of a moored mine/submerged submarine combination, the
`average actuation area' denoted by the symbol a, is a measure of the actuation
capability of the mine and can be used to calculate the threat of a given number of
mines. The average actuation area of moored mines is analogous to the average
actuation width of ground mines and is found by integrating the probability of
actuation P (y, z), over the whole plane perpendicular to the centreline of the
submarine (See Figure 2-7). For a moored contact mine ‘a’ may be taken to be the
beam of the submarine times the vertical distance covered by the combined length of
the antenna(e) and the diameter of the mine case. For a ground mine used against
submerged submarines an appropriate average actuation area can be found by
integrating P over only that area above the mine through which the submarine can
be expected to pass.
d. (NC)(NMP) Probable Approximate Actuation Ranges. The probable
approximate actuation ranges for all-purpose ground mines are 10-100m, for coarse
mines 40m, and for anti-sweeper mines 60m.
Figure 2-7. (NMP) Examples of Average Actuation Area (Submarines)
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(NC)(NMP) Moving Mines.
(1) (NC)(NMP) Some moving mines can have detection ranges
considerably in excess of these figures (eg. Rocket Propelled Rising
Mine Actuation width, limited by the damage radius of the explosive
charge, may be 50 to 70 m.). When considering these mines, it should
be noted that the range at which the mine is actuated, the range at
which it can cause damage and the effective blast radius of the
warhead are three different considerations. The actuation width of
these types of mines increases the required MCM effort.
(2) (NC)(NMP) For Stand-Off Delivered Mines strong and stable
acoustic signatures of surface ships will give this mine type a large
engagement envelope. Actuation with may be well in excess of 1000 m
Weak acoustic signatures of submarines will give this mine type a
small engagement envelope.
0214
(NC)(NMP) Mine Readiness
1.
(NC)(NMP) In order to conduct effective mining when desired, plans must be
prepared in advance. Suitable mine stocks and the necessary laying assets must be
available. Supplementary forces available to conduct additional mining may be necessary
after initial offensive actions.
2.
(NC)(NMP) The following areas of mining readiness should be emphasised:
a. (NC)(NMP) Training should be conducted to ensure that selected forces remain
in a state of readiness.
b. (NC)(NMP) Personnel should be capable of rapid deployment to operate from
overseas bases with minimum supporting elements when assigned a minelaying
task.
c.
(NC)(NMP) Tactics must be developed for minelaying in a hostile environment.
d. (NC)(NMP) Mine stocks should be pre-positioned to support the approved mining
plans.
e. (NC)(NMP) Plans for mining operations to support approved strategic concepts
must be maintained. Intelligence information necessary to prepare these plans
should be gathered.
f. (NC)(NMP) Research and development should be continued on new mines and
components including, but not limited to, such features as improved capabilities
against submarines and surface targets, better resistance against mine-sweeping
and hunting, more flexibility, easier and cheaper maintenance, simpler and faster
preparation for laying, development of deep ocean mines, and mines for particular
environments such as that in Arctic regions.
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e.
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0215
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NR)(NMP) The ‘Modern Mine’
a. (NR)(NMP) The modern mine will use either range detection and/or target
tracking sensors and carry either a conventional omni-directional high explosive (HE)
warhead or an enhanced-lethality warhead (a projectile, a homing device or a
whipping detonation).
b. (NR)(NMP) The modern mine will be able to discriminate between sweeping
signatures and target signatures. After further improvement to the signal processing
unit it will be able to do target classification automatically.
c.
(NR)(NMP) A modern mine will have enhanced self protection.
d. (NR)(NMP) The HE content of the mine will have improved insensitivity to
sympathetic detonation.
2.
(NR)(NMP) When considering MCM to counter the modern mine threat it is important
to recognise that it is not the individual mine that is to be to countered but the minefield as a
whole. As stated earlier, a minefield is unlikely to consist of only one mine type; the minefield
planner will normally use a well balanced mix of the available mine types in a minefield.
Therefore the problem for future MCM forces will be to deal with a great variety of mines
ranging from World War I technology to the most modern and highly sophisticated mines.
3.
(NR)(NMP) When confronted with a asymmetric naval threat MCM Forces nowadays
may also be confronted with other underwater devices which includes maritime improvised
explosive devices (MIED) other than traditional sea mines as described previously and
therefore may not be immediately recognisable as mines.
0216
(NR)(NMP) Evolution in Mine Technology
1.
(NR)(NMP) Mine Warfare is a contest in which each potential antagonist tries to
develop mines which are immune to existing countermeasures as well as trying to neutralise
opponents mining innovations with the new defensive techniques. Thus a minelaying force
enjoys the advantage of being the initiator. A new mine may exact a heavy toll on enemy
shipping during the time it takes the opposing power to discover it, analyse it, and devise
successful countermeasures.
2.
(NR)(NMP) This competition in mine warfare has produced numerous mine types,
anti-sweep devices, and advanced mining and minelaying tactics. Mines of older types are
normally not abandoned but are used in combination with new varieties to complicate the
opponents problems. Mixed minefields force the enemy to maintain a cumbersome supply of
countermeasures equipment, particularly mine sweeping equipment, and to devote more
time and resources to the task of clearance.
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1.
(NR)(NMP) It is very difficult, if not impossible, to precisely define a ‘modern mine’.
As discussed above, there are a large variety of different firing systems, sensors, and
warheads that can be built into a mine to make it more or less effective, that it seems quite
futile to try. Nevertheless, some quite clear characteristics of modern mines can be seen,
these are:
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
SECTION II - THE TARGET
(NR)(NMP) Ship-made Influences
1.
(NR)(NMP) A ship generates a number of influences which can actuate a mine. The
three most common influences to be considered in mine design are the Magnetic Field of a
ship, its Acoustic Characteristic, and its Hydrodynamic Pressure. Advantage could be
taken of other ship-made influences, such as the Underwater Electric Potential (UEP),
Extreme Low Frequency Electric (ELFE), quantity of electro magnetic rays (eg. light or
cosmic rays) that a ship’s hull would obstruct from the seabed below it. Additionally, a ship’s
hull could be used to reflect an acoustic beam emitted from a mine.
2.
(NR)(NMP) The changing operational states (aircraft on deck, turrets rotating) or
changing machinery states (fuel transfer pumps on/off etc.) will affect ships signatures.
0218
(NR)(NMP) The Magnetic Field of a Ship
1.
(NR)(NMP) The magnetic field of a ship is made up of permanent and induced
magnetism. Permanent magnetism is a function of the structure of the ship and subsequent
alterations due to refits, explosive shock etc. Permanent Magnetism depends upon the
ship's construction and alteration. Induced Magnetism is caused by the instantaneous
magnetic effect of the earth's field on the soft iron onboard. Induced Magnetism varies with
ship's head, speed and position at any instant. Some materials have the property of SemiPermanent Magnetism, that is, of being magnetised and of slowly losing the magnetism
once the magnetic influence is removed. Such materials may become magnetised by the
earth's field if the ship remains on a steady course for some time, and lose it (or change it)
slowly after a change of course.
2.
(NR)(NMP) A ship's magnetic field can be resolved into vertical (Hz) and horizontal
(Hh) components. The horizontal component can be further divided into longitudinal (Hx) and
transverse (Hy) components. Thus the strength and direction of the magnetic field below a
ship varies according to ship structure and position on the earth's surface. Magnetic
characteristics of ships vary, with larger ships producing greater magnetic influence. Also,
long ships and ships at slow speed project their magnetic influence on the seabed for
relatively longer times. These three components for a typical merchant vessel are shown in
Figure 2-8:
3.
(NR)(NMP) The magnetic moment of ships and submarines (see Table 2-1) may be
reduced by magnetic treatment such as Deperming, Flashing or by shipboard degaussing
(See AMP-14). Degaussing can reduce the moment to one-tenth the un-degaussed state as
shown below. The use of non-magnetic materials wherever possible may also reduce the
moment. The magnetic fields of helicopters and hovercraft as detected by the mine are
normally less than those of an MCM Vessel and can be reduced still further by degaussing.
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0217
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
Figure 2-8. (NMP) Magnetic Field of a 5000 t Merchant Vessel
Table 2-1. (NMP) Estimated Total Magnetic Moments for Different Types of Vessel
Hull
Magnetic
Total Magnetic Moment (104 Am2)
Construction Treatment
Maximum
Minimum Average
Material
Submarines, 2400 tonnes
Magnetic
Undegaussed
33.1
15.6
24.3
Flashed
22.6
4.8
13.9
Degaussed
3.4
3.4
3.4
Non-magnetic Undegaussed
3.4
1.7
2.5
Degaussed
Degaussed
0.3
0.3
0.3
Super tanker, Length 325m, Magnetic
Undegaussed
1800
710
1250
Beam 50m, Draught 25m,
Degaussed
1400
70
700
Displacement 250 000
tonnes
Super tanker, Length 400m, Magnetic
Undegaussed
3420
135
2375
beam 65m, Draught 30m,
Degaussed
2660
133
1330
Displacement 500 000
tonnes
Hydrofoil, length 32m,
Magnetic
2.0
Beam 7m,
Struts
Max displacement 56
tonnes
MCM Vessel
Non-Magnetic Degaussed
0.1
0.03
0.06
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
Vessel
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4.
(NC)(NMP) Estimated magnetic sensitivity settings are based on the magnetic field
signatures of expected ship traffic in the area (see Table 2-2). This estimate depends on the
water depth, ship speed, target class (displacement tonnage) and estimating the near
optimum sensitivity of horizontal component magnetic mines used against traffic ships rated
at 2,000, 7,000 and 14,000 displacement tonnes.
Traffic Ship
Target Class
Displacement
in tonnes
2000
7000
14 000
Water Depth Range (Metres)
Degaussing
Coils Fitted
None
M
MFQ
None
M
MFQ
None
M
MFQ
Speed
(knots)
9-23
23-32
Nanotesla (nT)
5-10
110
5-10
40
5-10
20
5-10
260
5-10
90
5-10
60
5-10
430
5-10
130
5-10
90
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90
30
20
210
60
50
220
60
50
32-46
46-61
60
20
10
140
40
30
220
60
50
40
10
10
100
30
20
160
40
30
5.
(NC)(NMP) The earth's field to which the mine is solely exposed when no ship or
sweep is near can also be resolved into vertical and horizontal components relative to the
earth's surface. Both components will vary with latitude, Z being a maximum at the magnetic
poles and zero at the magnetic equator whilst the opposite holds good for H.
0219
(NR)(NMP) The Acoustics of a Ship (See Fig 2-9)
1.
(NR)(NMP) A ship contains many sources of noise of sufficient volume to operate
detecting devices at a considerable distance. As a ship moves forward and over a point on
the seabed the total volume of sound, experienced at that point will rise gradually to a
maximum, normally under the propellers and then fade away.
2.
(NR)(NMP) The sound emitted covers a wide band of frequencies ranging from the
sub-sonic, as low as 1 Hertz, to well into the supersonic region. The sound pressures are not
distributed evenly over the sound spectrum however and most merchant vessels produce a
peak in the vicinity of 60-400 Hertz. The character of the sound output (the spectrum of the
ship's noise) will vary with the type of ship, her machinery, propellers, speed etc.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Possible acoustic signatures of a merchant vessel and a destroyer are
shown at Figure 2-8. The background noise level of the sea is also shown and it will be seen
that this rises above the sound output of the ship at low frequencies. The very low
frequencies are produced by vibration of the hull, and very high frequencies by cavitation at
the propeller.
4.
(NR)(NMP) The acoustic signature of individual MCMVs can be used to establish a
reference signature for each of the different classes of ship in each of the operating
conditions appropriate to the class.
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Table 2-2. (NMP) Near Optimum Sensitivities of the Horizontal Component
Field (in nT) Against Target Ships
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5.
(NR)(NMP) Reference Acoustic Goal (AGO). The Reference Acoustic Goal (AGO)
is the Target Level, as seen by the mine, represented by the curve made up of a straight
segment joining the following points. See also AMP-15.
Frequency
Levels
1
140
25
101
1000
83
20,000
59
100,000
40
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0220
(NC)(NMP) The Pressure Influence
1.
(NC)(NMP) A mine on the seabed is subjected to the pressure of the atmosphere
plus that of the head of water above it. This pressure will alter slowly with changes in
atmospheric pressure and the rise and fall of the tide. It can be altered quickly by waves and
swell, or by the passage of a ship. The passage of a ship through the sea causes a
fluctuation, above and below the ambient pressure, of the pressure of the seabed. Typically,
there is an increase of pressure at the bow and stern and a decrease of pressure in between,
the particular variation at a point on the seabed constituting the pressure signature of a ship
at that point. An example is shown at Figures 2-10 and 2-11.
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Figure 2-9. (NMP) Examples of Acoustic Signature
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Figure 2-10. (NMP) Main Features of Ship's Pressure Signature
Figure 2-11. (NMP) Beam Pressure Field
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2.
(NC)(NMP) Pressure Mine Parameters. Pressure mines are sensitive to a
relatively rapid decrease of pressure below the ambient pressure such as that caused by the
passage of a ship, and are designed to actuate if the decrease fulfils certain conditions. A
mine which actuates if a certain minimum pressure reduction (suction) S is maintained for a
certain time T, is called a simple pressure mine. Mines can be made with more complicated
actuation rules and it is not possible to foresee the exact characteristics which an enemy
mine might possess. Very slow pressure decreases such as those resulting from a falling tide
will not actuate a mine. For a simple pressure mine S and T are termed the actuation level
and hold-on time respectively and they can be represented graphically by a rectangle, as
shown in Figure 2-10. If it is possible to fit the rectangle inside a ship's pressure signature
measured at the mine position, that ship will actuate the mine.
3.
(NC)(NMP) Pressure Fields of a Ship.
a. (NC)(NMP) The speed, shape and size of a ship, the depth of water and the
distance abeam all have an influence on the pressure signature produced at a
particular point on the seabed. Important features of the signature are the peak
suction and the time for which the suction lasts in transit (Figure 2-9). The shape of
the signature is also of importance but this is less easy to describe in quantitative
terms.
b. (NC)(NMP) A useful parameter is the quantity Pθ2 as this is substantially
independent of ships' speed and shape and is not greatly dependent on distance
abeam. This relative invariance makes it a useful measure of a ship's performance
for use in calculations such as the derivation of safe speeds against simple pressure
mines. Further information is available in ATP-06 Volume II Chapter 5.
c. (NC)(NMP) A useful quantity which may be of significance if mines with more
complicated sensing devices are encountered is the 'suction integral' which is the
integral of the square root of the suction with respect to time. It is of interest because
its use as a controlling factor governing mine actuation is, in principle, an obvious
way of denying to ships the use of a safe speed as a mine countermeasure. The
value of the suction integral is not greatly dependent on ship speed or hull shape,
and it is easily estimated for a given depth of water. Should the integral value for a
given ship be less than that needed to actuate a specified mine the ship can proceed
safely providing there is no swell. It does not follow, however, that if the ship integral
value exceeds that needed to actuate the mine that the mine will actuate, for it may
well be that some other condition has also to be satisfied.
4.
(NC)(NMP) These effects are discussed qualitatively here and in more detail in ATP06 Volume II, Chapter 10:
a. (NC)(NMP) Speed. The peak suction increases rapidly with speed.
b. (NC)(NMP) Hull Shape.
(1) (NC)(NMP) The shape of the hull has some effect on the peak suction but
more importantly it affects the shape of the pressure signature. A merchant ship
is likely to produce a signature beneath the keel which approximates to a
rectangle in the suction region, whereas the finer lines of a warship produce a
signature which is roughly parabolic in the suction region, and in which the larger
pressure reductions are maintained for relatively short times.
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(2) NC)(NMP) For a given peak suction the merchant ship type of signature is
the more likely to operate a mine. As depth of water or distance abeam
increases, the signature shapes of all ships tend to become similar with
characteristics akin to those of a warship signature.
d. (NC)(NMP) Depth of Water. Apart from the effect on signature shape already
mentioned, increasing depth of water results in lower peak and slightly increased
transit times.
e. (NC)(NMP) Distance Abeam. The effect on signature shape is discussed above
but in addition peak suctions decrease and transit times increase with increasing
distance abeam.
0221 to 0229.
Spare
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c. (NC)(NMP) Size. The larger the displacement of the ship the greater is the peak
suction. Also the longer the ship the longer is the transit time. For a given
displacement a relatively long ship will produce a lower peak suction than a relatively
short ship.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
SECTION III - THE MINE THREAT
(NU) Area Definitions
1.
(NU) Mine Threat Area (MTA). A Mine Threat Area is an area which is dangerous
because of the presence or suspected presence of mines. When enemy mining is confirmed
or suspected, an assessment must be made to identify the limits of all potentially minedwaters – the Mine Threat Area (MTA). This assessment is initially based solely on the
combined minimum and maximum plant depths for all sea mines known or estimated to be in
the enemy’s inventory. The boundaries of the MTA may be stated in terms of geographic
coordinates or as a general geographic region (e.g. ‘The Kattegat’). The boundaries of the
MTA can subsequently be refined as additional information is available. This refinement can
be based on a variety of factors, such as intelligence information, review of enemy mine
laying capability, recent operation areas by enemy mine-layers and indications that specific
areas within the MTA are not mined based on continued use of these areas (and lack of mine
explosions) by enemy naval ships and merchant ships.
2.
(NU) Mine Danger Area (MDA). An area established around the position of known
mines, suspected mines, mine lines and minefields to bound the limits of the danger. (See
also ATP-06 Vol II Chap 1). Further information on the management of MDAs is contained in
AHP-01.
3.
(NU) Former Mined Area (FMA). A former minefield in which the risk to shipping
has been reduced by achieving the highest acceptable level of clearance using 2 or more
techniques and where a detailed Military Hydrographic Survey has been completed. A FMA
is considered safe for surface navigation but could still present a hazard to seabed
operations (eg. fishing, dredging, etc.). Further information on the management of FMAs is
contained in AHP-01.
0231
(NU) Effect of an Underwater Explosion
1.
(NU) When a charge explodes in water, both a pressure wave and a quantity of gas
are produced. The speed of propagation of the pressure wave, great at first, decreases
rapidly to the speed of sound in water. The ship is subjected to the pressure wave directly
and also to its reflection off the surface and seabed.
2.
(NU) Shock Wave. The destructive effect of a mine detonation is mainly caused by
the shock wave, which propagates in all directions through the water.
3.
(NU) Surface Reflected Wave. On being reflected from the surface, the pressure
wave becomes out of phase with the direct wave. If therefore, it arrives at the ship at, or
nearly at, the same instant as the direct wave, it will detract from the force exerted on the
ship.
4.
(NU) Bottom Reflected Wave. The pressure wave is directly reflected from the
bottom. Therefore, the more nearly it reaches the ship at the same instant as the direct wave,
the greater will be the damage caused.
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0230
ATP-06 VOLUME I
5.
(NU) Gas Bubble. The gas produced by an explosion expands rapidly producing a
bubble in which the pressure quickly falls below the pressure in the surrounding water. The
bubble must then contract again, in fact, it will go on contracting and expanding in an
oscillatory manner whilst the bubble as a whole rises to the surface. As each contraction
occurs it is accompanied by a sharp increase in pressure in the bubble and a new pressure
wave is sent out to follow the original explosion pulse. Thus at a distance, an explosion
results in a shock pressure wave followed by a series of replicas which are rather less sharp
and of declining amplitude. Each of the bubble pulses takes energy from the gas bubble.
What energy is left in the bubble when it reaches the surface is expended in throwing water
into the air. When the mine is very shallow, more energy remains to throw the water about
and less will reach a target outside the immediate vicinity of the bubble.
6.
(NU) Optimum Size of Explosive Charge. Where there is a choice in the size of the
explosive charge to be used, the decision will usually depend more on the minelayer and the
circumstances of the lay than on the mine itself. If large mines can be laid as efficiently as
small mines, for example if the minelayer can carry nearly as many large mines as small the
largest mines should usually be used, because they are generally more effective, mine for
mine, than the smaller ones. However, if many more of the smaller ones can be laid, then the
choice of size depends on the circumstances. In this case, for ground mines, a smaller mine
will usually be more efficient in shallow depths and a larger mine will be more efficient in
deeper depths.
0232
(NU) Explosive Effects of Moored and Ground Mines
1.
(NU) The explosive effect of a buoyant mine is less when compared to that of a
ground mine because of the air space round the charge necessary to give the mine
buoyancy. Also the fact that moored mines rarely contain more than about 300 kg of
explosive due to the necessity for adequate buoyancy to support the mine and its mooring in
the water. Additionally, their overall size is limited by the requirements of transport, handling
and laying arrangements. Ground mines normally contain a much greater weight of explosive
with as much as 1,000 kg being used.
2.
(NU) The ground mine has a further advantage over the moored contact mine in that
its explosive effect is felt underneath the ship as a force tending to lift the ship bodily and
causing her to whip violently. The ship, therefore, tends to break her back and machinery and
equipment fixed rigidly to the hull becomes fractured. Gear aloft is torn loose and men
standing on deck, particularly at the ends of the ship, are sometimes flung violently upwards,
breaking limbs. A contact mine exploding against the ship's side will, although actually in
contact with the hull, have a much more localised effect.
3.
(NU) The moored influence mine has an advantage in that when it explodes it will
generally be closer to the bottom of the ship than the ground mine.
0233
(NU) Damage Effect
1.
(NU) For every ship there is a damage radius within which a mine containing a given
weight and type of explosive must explode if the ship is to receive appreciable damage.
Though a very large number of examples of damage to ships from underwater explosion
have been recorded, there are so many variables such as the weight of charge, its depth
below the surface, its position relative to the ship and the depth of water, that no simple rule
for damage effect can be deduced.
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3.
(NU) An explosion at some distance from a ship may cause vital damage. Although
not close enough to penetrate the hull the explosive pressures may cause the ship to flex or
move bodily in the water, resulting in shock damage to internal equipment, gross
misalignment of machinery, and in severe cases in permanent distortion of the hull.
4.
(NU) The damage effect of an explosion at a given distance from the side of the hull
is some what reduced compared to the effect of an explosion at the same distance directly
below the keel, especially if the explosion to the side of the hull is shallow enough so that the
bubble vents some of its energy into the air. If the ship incorporates a side protection system,
charges bursting alongside, unless they are very large indeed, are unlikely to inflict much
damage in vital parts.
0234
(NC)(NMP) Mine Damage to Super-Tankers
1.
(NC)(NMP) Super-tankers capable of carrying 500,000 tonnes of cargo pose a
problem to mine designers. The old tankers of smaller size were weak and highly susceptible
to breaking by whipping. The modern large ships are strong and have considerable girder
strength. Such ships are not readily defeated by the explosion of existing mines beneath
them. It is estimated that to break a super-tanker a 1136 kg HBX-1 charge exploding 18
metres below the keel in about 45 metres of water is needed. A sophisticated firing system is
required to achieve explosion beneath the midships section of the ship.
2.
(NC)(NMP) Fire, rather than breaking, may be a more effective way to defeat such
ships and a device that produces an oil spill and ignites it is a possibility. Since such ships
are double-hulled, a charge weight of about 365 kg HBX-1 is needed to produce a substantial
leak by contact explosion. War experience has shown that oxygen-deficient explosives have
an incendiary action if exploded near the water line. Incorporating buoyant igniters in the
mine is another possibility.
3.
(NC)(NMP) Immobilisation may be obtained by an explosion of 550 kg HBX-1 at a
slant range of about 40 metres from the centre of the engine room. Positioning is critical in
this case, since the engine room is aft and occupies only a small part of the length of the
ship. A special firing system would be needed to achieve a high probability of immobilisation.
0235
(NC)(NMP) Mine Danger to Helicopters and Hovercraft
1.
(NC)(NMP) Damage to helicopters due to underwater mines can be produced by the
water plume, fragmentation and air shock. Damage due to air shock will not be significant for
most cases of practical interest. The casings of mines detonated underwater break up into
large fragments and the possibility of damage due to fragments emerging from the plumes
decreases rapidly with increasing water depth.
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2.
(NU) There are other considerations such as, the influence of weather, distance from
base, morale and damage control organisation; all of which, although not amenable to
calculation, may have a profound effect on the ultimate results of an underwater explosion.
The general characteristics of underwater explosion are now fairly well understood, and from
a combination of actual experiences and scale trials and scientific modelling, specific figures
for damage radii have been produced. These figures are normally held by national
authorities.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
3.
(NC)(NMP) Shock trials carried out against commercially designed 50 tonne
hovercraft proved the hovercraft to be most resistant to the effect of underwater explosions. It
is estimated that 550 kg of TNT would have to be placed within 10 metres of such craft to
immobilize it. However, whenever its skirt is damaged, it will not be able to continue its task.
4.
(NC)(NMP) It has been proved during practical explosive shock trials that plume
heights and diameters vary enormously and even consecutive explosions of the same mine
type in the same position have given plume heights and diameters that vary considerably.
Plume heights and diameters depend upon the depth of water, the type of bottom, the type of
explosive and the type of mine.
Figure 2-12. (NMP) Plume Safety Curve for Helicopters and Hovercraft
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2.
(NC)(NMP) For a 250 kg mine, with a 150 kg casing, there are no emerging
fragments at water depths greater than 5 metres. However at shallow depths, bottom
material will be thrown out from the sea. As can be seen in the Plume Safety Curve for
Helicopters and Hovercraft in Fig 2-12, this will increase the effective damage of the radius of
the plume.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
0236
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NC)(NMP) Damage Levels and Criteria
The damage level is defined as the effects of underwater shock from mines against the
quoted target types. The distinctions of the different levels are shown in Table 2-3. Damage
criteria are defined as the specific effect of the explosion against various targets and are also
shown in Table 2-3.
DAMAGE LEVEL,
SYMBOL
CRITERIA
SUBMARINES
COMBATANT
SURFACE
VESSELS
CARGO VESSELS
Kill,
K
Hull rupture.
Hull rupture,
uncontrollable
flooding.
Hull rupture,
uncontrollable
flooding.
Imminent Loss Likely,
L
Failure at hull
penetrations.
Moderate flooding.
Extensive damage to
machinery may make
control impossible.
Moderate flooding.
Extensive damage to
machinery may make
control impossible.
Immobilisation,
I
Not significant.
Hull penetrations fail at
a lower shock level
than heavy machinery.
Severe damage to
heavy propulsion
machinery. (Almost
complete loss of
mobility).
Severe damage to
heavy propulsion
machinery. (Almost
complete loss of
mobility).
Mission Abort,
M
Almost complete loss
of weapon delivery
capability
Almost complete loss
of weapon delivery
capability
Not applicable, in most
cases.
Communication and
Navigation Impaired,
C
Not significant,
coincides with mission
abort zone.
Not significant,
coincides with mission
abort zone.
Serious damage to
electronic equipment.
On-Board Repairs
Possible,
R
Slight loss of weapon
delivery capability.
Repairable without
return to a docking
facility
Slight loss of weapon
delivery capability.
Repairable without
return to a docking
facility.
Slight damage to
electronic equipment.
Repairable without
return to a docking
facility.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
0237
(NR)(NMP) Damage Radius
1.
(NR)(NMP) For every ship there is a damage radius within which a mine containing a
given weight and type of explosive must explode if the ship is to receive appreciable damage
referred to according to the damage level eg. Mission Abort Radius (MAR). The damage
radius increases as the depth of the mine is increased up to a certain depth.
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Table 2-3. (NMP) Damage Levels and Criteria
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
3.
(NC)(NMP) Figure 2-13 shows samples of damage contours for 800 kg of TNT
against a cast-iron engine merchant vessel. These curves can be used as a guide for
average conditions but wide variations are to be expected. The nature of the bottom, exact
position of mine relative to the ship, peculiar weaknesses in the structure of the ship and
other variables will affect the result of the explosion. To compare the different types of
explosives, the equivalents shown in Table 2-4 should be used:
Table 2-4. (NMP) Explosive Equivalents
Explosive
Quantity
(Kg)
TNT Equivalent
(Kg)
Equivalent
Minol
1000
1.4
1400
Torpex
1000
1.85
1850
Hexanite
1000
1.4
1400
HBX-1
1000
1.76
1760
HBX-3
1000
1.85
1850
HBX-6
1000
1.35
1350
PBXN-109
1000
1.43
1430
PBXN-103
1000
1.31
1310
Remarks
See Note
See Note
Note. Use 1.4 for explosives not in EOD Tactical Decision Aid (TDA) or for unknown explosives
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
4.
(NC)(NMP) Figure 2-14 gives safe distances for MCMVs against ground mines
containing 900 kg of TNT. The Safe distance for a mine explosion is the horizontal range
from edge of the damage area to the centre of the MCMV. Note that safe distance refers to a
single explosion. A series of explosions at or about safe distance may cause cumulative
damage which will render the MCMV non-operational.
5.
(NC)(NMP) Little information is at present available on the likely damage to harbour
installations as the result of a mine explosion. Second World War experience suggests that a
450 kg (1000 lb) MINOL charge exploded on the bottom will cause no immediate apparent
damage to a jetty or dock side built on steel piles if at a distance greater than 30 metres.
6.
(NU) The damage area of any ship against mines is an area such that a mine
exploding anywhere outside the area will not do sufficient damage to interfere significantly
with the movement or mission of the ship.
a. (NU)(NMP) Chapter 5 further explains Damage Areas in detail.
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2.
(NR)(NMP) The damage likely to be suffered by a ship under particular
circumstances can be calculated with fair accuracy but, in practice at sea, the variables are
so many that it is not possible to give precise figures for damage radius (See AMP-13 Vol II
Annex K for calculation of MAR).
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Figure 2-13. (NMP) Sample Curves of Damage to a Cast-Iron Engined
Vessel by 800 kg (1765 lb) TNT
K = Kill
L = Imminent loss likely
I = Immobilisation
C = Comms and Nav impaired
R = On-board repairs possible.
(Note that in this example of
damage to an older type
merchant vessel, the
immobilisation curve is outside
that of the comms and nav
curve).
Figure 2-14. (NMP) Safe Distances for MCMVs (MSC and MSI) from
Ground Mines Containing 900 kg (2000 lb) TNT
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
A: Left Curve: Minimum ahead or astern that a mine could explode without reducing the
effectiveness of the sweeper.
B: Right Curve: The minimum distance abeam that a mine could explode without reducing
the effectiveness of the sweeper.
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0238
(NU)(NMP) Damage Width
1.
(NU)(NMP) Introduction.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
b. (NU)(NMP) Damage contours are calculated to depict the range at which a target
will sustain a given level of damage from a mine detonation. The damage contour is
based on the design shock factor of the ship, level of damage, and mine explosive
effect (charge weight and relative position).
(1) (NU)(NMP) Damage Contour. In its simplest form, the damage contour
can be non-circular or circular(see Figure 2-15 or Figure 2-16, respectively).
(a) (NU)(NMP) Non-Circular Damage Contour (See Figure 2-15). Noncircular damage contours are determined using the methods described in
AMP-13 Vol II Annex K. However, for the purposes of determining damage
width, the simplest form, a circular damage contour, will be used from this
point forward.
(b) (NU)(NMP) Circular Damage Contour (See Figure 2-16). For contact
mines the circular damage contour is equal to the beam of the ship plus the
length of the mine's snagline. For influence mines, both moored and
bottom, the calculation is more complicated as described in the following
sections.
Figure 2-15. (NU) Non-Circular Damage Contour
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
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a. (NU)(NMP) Ship vulnerability is based on the target actuating the mine and the
mine explosion damaging the target. Ships may actuate a mine by passing within its
influence range; if the mine is within the ship’s damage contour, the detonation can
damage the target.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Figure 2-16. (NU) Circular Damage Contour
2.
(NU)(NMP) Probability of Actuation and Damage, PD(y)
a. (NU)(NMP) Mathematically, ship vulnerability is based on the probability of
actuation and damage as a function of lateral range, PD(y). It is the probability that a
mine located at an athwart ship distance, Y, will be actuated by the transiting ship
and cause damage to that transiting ship.
b. (NU)(NMP) PD(y) can be approximated by a rectangular function. In this
situation, the width, F, is defined by the maximum width of the PD(y) curve and the
height, BD, is the average probability across the width, as seen in Figure 2-17. The
maximum width occurs between Y = ± y.
Figure 2-17. (NU)(NMP) Probability of Actuation and Damage as a Function of Lateral Range
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
c. (NU)(NMP) The damage width, WD, is the area under the PD(y) curve and is
given by the equations below.
F
WD 
2

F
PD  y dy
2
WD  F  BD ( Approximation )
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
d. (NU)(NMP) Since it is impossible to predict the probability of actuation for a mine
(with prior modelling and simulation), the mine is always assumed to actuate when it
is within the ship’s damage width. Therefore, probability of actuation is always 1.0
and consequently, BD is always 1.0. Then by definition, WD is equal to the width, F.
WD  F
WD  2y
3.
(NU)(NMP) Variations in Shock Factor Definitions. There have been variations in
the definition of shock factor and its reference point on the ship. When taken in reference to
ship hull plating, the term Hull Shock Factor (HSF) is used; when taken in reference to keel
damage, the term Keel Shock Factor (KSF) is used (see Figure 2-18). If the explosion is
directly underneath the keel, then HSF is equal to KSF; but explosions that are not directly
underneath the ship will have a lower value of KSF.
Figure 2-18. (NMP) Shock Factor Definitions
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
4.
(NU)(NMP) Damage Width Based on Hull Shock Factor
a. (NU)(NMP) HSF only considers the effective explosive weight (WTNT) and the
distance from some point on the ship to the mine (r). This point is usually at the
longitudinal midpoint of the ship on the keel, as seen in Figure 2-16. The following
equation is used to calculate the HSF equation.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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e. (NU)(NMP) Additionally, it is known that F = 2y (the horizontal distance from the
keel of the ship to the explosive) (see Figure 2-17). The damage width can then be
found using the following equation.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
HSF 
ATP-06 VOLUME I
WTNT
r
where,
=
WTNT
=
.
m
Charge mass of explosive in TNT equivalents, in kilograms
(see para 7).
r
=
Distance between the platform’s keel and the mine, in metres.
(1)
HSF Coefficient of platform, in
(NU)(NMP) Solving for Damage Width based on HSF
(a) (NU)(NMP) Solve for r in the HSF equation in para a, which results in
the following equation.
r
WTNT
HSF
(b) (NU)(NMP) From the Pythagorean theorem r 2   z '   y 2 , where z’ is
the vertical separation between the keel and the mine and y is horizontal
distance from the keel of the ship to the explosive (or ½ damage width).
2
(c) (NU)(NMP) Solve for y in the Pythagorean theorem and substitute the
equation in para (a) for r; these manipulations result in the following
equation.
 WTNT
y 
 HSF

2

2
   z '


(d) (NU)(NMP) Double the value of y to determine damage width based on
HSF. This calculation is shown in the following equation.
 WTNT
WD  2y  2  
 HSF

2

2
   z '


where,
WD =
Damage width, in metres.
y
Horizontal distance from the keel of the ship to the
explosive (or ½ damage width), in metres.
=
WTNT =
Charge mass of explosive in TNT equivalents, in
kilograms (see para 7).
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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kg
HSF
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
kg
.
HSF =
HSF Coefficient of platform,
z’
Vertical separation between the keel and the mine, in
metres.
=
m
KSF 
WTNT 1  sin  
r
2
where,
kg
.
KSF
=
KSF Coefficient of platform in
WTNT
=
Charge mass of explosive in TNT equivalents, in kilograms
(see para 7).
r
=
Stand-off distance from the mine to the platform, in metres.
θ
=
Angle between the seabed and a line extending from the mine to the
reference point on the platform’s keel.
m
Figure 2-19. (NU) KSF Geometry
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
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5.
(NU)(NMP) Damage Width Based on Keel Shock Factor (KSF). The KSF
incorporates the geometry of where the ship sits in relation to the mine (see Figure 2-19).
The following equation is used to calculate the KSF.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
a. (NU)(NMP) Solving for Damage Width Based on KSF
(1) (NU)(NMP) From geometry, it is seen in Figure 2-19 that
KSF equation becomes:
sinθ  
z
r ; so the
where z’ is defined as vertical separation between the keel and the mine, in
metres.
(2) (NU)(NMP) Manipulating the KSF equation to solve for r yields the following
equation.
r
1
 W

TNT  WTNT  8  KSF  z ' WTNT 

4  KSF  
(3) (NU)(NMP) A new variable, Quarter Maximum Depth (QMD), is introduced
to simplify the equation as follows.
r  QMD  QMD 2  2  QMD  z '
where,
QMD
=
WTNT
4  KSF 
= Quarter Maximum Depth since the variable is one-
fourth the value of z’ for which y is zero for a given KSF.
F
,
2
the previous equation at para (3) can be manipulated to yield the following
equation:
(4)
(NU)(NMP) From the Pythagorean theorem, r 2   z '   y 2 . Since y 
2

QMD  QMD 2  2  QMD   z '

2
2
F 
  z '   
2
2
(5) (NU)(NMP) Solving for F Yields. The damage width can be calculated
from the damage front, F, when damage probability, BD, is assumed equal to 1
(see the equation below).
2

z' 
2
WD  F  BD  F  2y  2  QMD   1  1  2
   z ' 

QMD 

2
2-44
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
z'

1 
WTNT 
r 
KSF 
2
r
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
6.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU)(NMP) Maximum Damage Width Based on FSF
a. (NU)(NMP) It can also be shown that the maximum WD (in metres), WDmax, is
given by the following equation
WD max  3  3  QMD  5.2  QMD
zmax W 
7.
3
 QMD
2
(NC)(NMP) TNT Equivalents
a. (NU)(NMP) The TNT equivalent mass of a particular explosive material is the
weight of TNT required to produce a shockwave of equal magnitude at a given
distance from the explosive. It is found by using the following calculation.
WTNT  Wexp  F1  F2
where,
WTNT
=
TNT charge mass needed to produce given shock wave energy
flux density at a given distance from the charge, in kilograms.
Wexp
=
Mass of the explosive type needed to yield same energy flux
density at the same distance, in kilograms.
F1
=
Effectiveness factor for the explosive type (See Table 2-5).
F2
=
Effectiveness factor for the bottom type (See Table 2-6).
b. (NU)(NMP) Once the TNT equivalent mass of the mine is known, the HSF and
KSF equations can be used to determine the damage widths of various platforms.
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b. (NC)(NMP) This maximum value of WD occurs at a depth of zmaxW (in metres) as
follows:
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Table 2-5. (NMP) Effectiveness Factor F1 for Different Explosives
Explosive
Effectiveness
Factor (F1)
1
HBX-1
1.5
HBX-3
1.3
H-6
1.5
Tritonal
1.1
Torpex II
1.5
Minol II
1.3
TR8870
1.3
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
Table 2-6. (NMP) Effectiveness Factor F2 for Different Sea Bottom Types
Effectiveness
Factor (F2)
Sediment
Fine Silt
1.08
Coarse Silt
1.09
Coarse Silt with Fine Sand
1.14
Coarse Silt with Medium Fine Sand
1.31
Fine Sand
1.34
Medium Fine Sand
1.4
Coarse Sand
1.46
Very Coarse Sand
1.49
Fine Gravel
1.47
Rocks
>1.5
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
0239
(NU) Enemy Mining Capability
1.
(NU) Enemy Mines. Information in national and NATO intelligence publications must
be studied to obtain an assessment of the types of mines available to the enemy and the size
of their stocks. Information may also be available on what type of vehicle may or must be
used to lay a particular mine. From this information it may be possible to narrow the mining
threat posed by an enemy. For example, they may possess only moored mines or only
certain types of ground mines.
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TNT
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
(NU) Enemy Mining Capability
a. (NU) Information in national and NATO intelligence publications will include
details of the enemy order of battle (ORBAT). This will include numbers of enemy
units, types, and where they are based. An indication of those units capable of laying
mines may also be given.
b. (NU) By examining the range of operation and minelaying sortie time and
comparing these with the number of minelaying units available together with the
types of mines capable of being laid by the units available, it is possible to estimate
the number of mines that can be laid in a particular area in a given period of time.
c. (NU) The likely threat can be further narrowed by considering the difficulties
facing the enemy when laying mines. The limitations imposed on submarine
minelaying and surface ship minelaying operations can be assessed and the
likelihood of minelaying by these means determined. The possibility of enemy aerial
minelaying can be related to the degree of available air defence capability. The
possibility of minelaying by merchant ship or fishing vessel can be determined by a
study of enemy merchant ship and fishing vessel activity. In all cases it may be
possible to discount one or more methods of minelaying. This in turn may discount
those types of mine which can only be laid by the laying vehicles discounted; for
example the discounting of the possibility of submarine or aerial minelaying in a
particular area will usually reduce the type of mines to be countered.
d. (NU) Other factors which the enemy must consider, and which therefore form
part of any assessment of the mining threat, include:
(1) (NU) Being too selective of the type of mine to lay against a specific type of
target may reduce the potential to hit other types of target.
(2) (NU) Complex mines are expensive. Laying them with the intention of
making countermeasures operations more difficult, could reduce the number of
mines suitable to threaten prime targets.
(3) (NU) Tides and tidal streams reduce the effectiveness of snagline mines
and complicate the laying of buoyant and very sensitive ground mines.
(4) (NU) A minefield in open waters has less probability of success than one in
confined waters.
(5) (NU) It is difficult to lay mines in confined waters close to defended enemy
territory, in shallow waters, in tidal streams, or against precise targets.
(6) (NU) Mines may be recovered to exploit the technology and develop
countermeasures.
(7) (NU) Unsweepable/undetectable mines could prove a problem to the layer
at a later time.
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2.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(8) (NU) The use of pressure sensors reduces significantly the average
actuation width of the mine (increases with depth). This will reduce the number of
wasted actuations but will also require a higher number of mines to establish a
perceived threat.
(9) (NU) Tidal, wave and swell action may hide the pressure signature of a ship
to a considerable extent.
(NU) Enemy Mining Objectives
1.
(NU) The political and strategic objectives behind an enemy mining campaign must
be considered as part of the overall planning process in order to assess the potential MCM
effort required. In addition to damaging ships, the aim of the minefield is to contribute to
shaping the battlespace and to apply political pressure by laying mines or simply from the
threat of laying mines.
a. (NU)(NMP) Further details on the Aim and Basic Operational Concept of Mining
can be found at Chapter 5.
2.
(NU) The characteristics of the target dictates the choice of mine types and the
choice of mine settings. The traffic flow of likely targets will also indicate likely mine settings.
Having determined the types of mines available and the likely means of laying them, the
threat must be viewed in relation to the targets the enemy is seeking to destroy. This in turn
must be related to the geography of the area of interest and the environmental limitations
imposed on mining.
3.
(NU) Geography will to a great extent dictate target movement. This in turn will
dictate where minelaying against those targets must be carried out eg port exits, narrow
channels, choke points or specific areas of operations. Environmental considerations,
particularly water depth, will restrict the enemy's freedom of action in terms of types of mines
he can use. If command arming/disarming is not available to the enemy, mines cannot be
controlled once laid. This can inhibit their use under certain military and political
circumstances.
4.
(NR)(NMP) The Asymmetric Threat may present planners with different and complex
considerations in countering any threat from mines or MIEDs that may not be related to
conventional military mining doctrine.
0241
(NU) The Mine Threat in Peacetime
1.
(NU) In peacetime there is the possibility that mines or MIEDs may be used by a
potential enemy force, a belligerent Nation or the asymmetric threat. The degree of the threat
can be assessed as described in paras 0241 to 0243.
2.
(NU) This threat is countered by maintaining an MCM capability in terms of numbers
and ability of units, in terms of producing equipment capable of countering known and
potential enemy mines, in perfecting the technique of using MCM equipment, and in
conducting realistic exercises which practice the control and conduct of MCM operations.
3.
(NU) A major task in peacetime is the conduct of Route Surveys (RTSV) on routes
and general surveys of ports and harbours by MCM assets to confirm suitability of routes for
shipping in the event of a real mine threat.
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0240
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
5
(NU) Historical Ordnance. A substantial number of mines from the world wars and
the time of the Cold War remain in European and other waters. Due to the fact that, while the
power supply of these mines has expired, most of the HE is still intact, these remnants of
former conflicts still present a potential threat especially to divers or fishing vessels and to
ships anchoring or conducting seabed operations. The reduction of this threat remains a
global responsibility and is a task to the peacetime MCM community providing the
opportunity for live operations under peacetime conditions.
0242
(NU) The Mine Threat During a Period of Tension
During a period of tension the political situation will be the predominant factor. As tension
rises the possibility of covert or overt mining by the enemy must be considered. The
countering of this threat consists of maintaining MCM forces at a high degree of readiness,
surveillance of likely mining areas and updating route surveys.
0243
(NU) The Mine Threat During a Conflict
Once mines have been laid or declared, or once tension has escalated to a level where
enemy mining is seen to be likely, then MCM operations must commence and continue until
all targets being protected have been assured a safe passage, or until the threat is assessed
as having been countered. Thus, once minelaying has occurred MCM operations must
continue at a level of intensity which is independent of military activity elsewhere.
0244
(NU) The Mine Threat Post Conflict
1.
(NU) During a post conflict period the mine threat posed is the requirement to clear
mines remaining. These may be own mines, or those laid by the enemy. The types, numbers
and location of the mines may be known. The most effective method of clearing the mines
can be determined and the most suitable MCM assets are used. In this type of operation the
safety of the MCM assets is a major consideration.
2.
(NU) For allied minelaying accurate charting of every mine laid together with details
of the settings is most important to ensure the safety of shipping in post conflict operations.
Reports of mining operations should provide the necessary information for warning mariners
and the authorities responsible for the safe passage of ships through the area, and also the
data necessary for eventual mine clearance.
3.
(NU) It is necessary to maintain Mine Clearance Diving and Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Teams in area to deal with mines washed ashore, recovered by fishermen, or
discovered during seabed operations.
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4.
(NR)(NMP) A secondary task is the gathering of information for incorporation in the
relevant volume of AMP -11, the Mine Warfare Pilot.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 3 - AIM AND BASIC OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF MINE
COUNTERMEASURES
Note. (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) The Aim of Mine Countermeasures
1.
(NU) The aim of mine countermeasures is to prevent, reduce or minimise the risk of
mines to shipping.
2.
(NU) This aim can be achieved by:
a. (NU) Preventing the opposing forces from laying mines.
b. (NU) Forcing or enticing the opposing forces to lay mines in waters which allied
shipping does not use.
c. (NU) Causing the mines to explode without loss, or with acceptable loss to allied
shipping, by the use of mine countermeasures forces.
d. (NU) Causing the mines to become ineffective by removing them to a safe place
or by preventing the firing system from operating.
e. (NU) Reducing the danger to allied shipping by confining ships to routes where
no mining has taken place or where the risk from mines has been reduced to an
acceptable level by the actions of mine countermeasures forces.
f. (NU) Altering the characteristics of ships signatures, either permanently or
temporarily, so that they are less liable to actuate mines.
0302
(NU) MCM Missions
1.
(NU) The achievement of an MCM mission may require that a number of specific
aims are identified. These aims are, but are not limited to:
a. (NU) Determining the presence or absence of mines.
b. (NU) Reducing danger presented by mines.
c. (NU) Defining the limits of mined areas to prevent the transit of traffic through
those areas or to initiate appropriate MCM operations.
d. (NU) Locating non-mined waters
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0301
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
0303
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) MCM Risk Directives
2.
(NU) In ordering MCM operations, except in those situations in which risk can be
quantified or estimated based on valid criteria, a Risk Directive Matrix (RDM) should be used.
RDMs are normally ordered by the Operational Commander. (See ATP-06 Vol II, Chapter 1,
Para 0106).
3.
(NU) The RDM may be applied whenever it is deemed necessary by the appropriate
command authority. However they are of most benefit to a Commander employing a
multinational MCM force.
0304
(NU) MCM Techniques
A MCM technique is the operation of a specific system or platform (ie. vessel, vehicle,
aircraft, diver or marine mammal) and its MCM equipment in a particular way.
0305
(NU) MCM Stages
An MCM stage is the use of a specific MCM technique. Different MCM stages, their choice
and their sequence are discussed in ATP-06, Volume II, Chapter 2 and are listed in ATP-24
Volume I, Chapter 1 para 0105.
0306
(NU) MCM Tasks
An MCM Task is a portion of the MCM mission consisting of a stage or combination of stages
related to a specific route, channel or area, time and technique. See ATP-24 Volume I,
Chapter 2 for detailed information and instructions.
0307
(NU) Defensive MCM Operations
1.
Defensive mine countermeasures are designed to reduce the threat from mines after
they have been laid. They are divided into passive and active defensive MCM operations.
2.
(NU) Passive MCM. (see also ATP-06 Vol II Chapter 1, para 0109) Passive MCM is
aimed at protecting Naval and merchant shipping against the threat from enemy mines.
These mine countermeasures are:
a. (NU) Localising the Threat. Localise the threat by:
(1) (NU) Concentrating shipping on routes and in channels by using convoys
where possible, so that less Active MCM is required. For more details on the
routing of shipping see ATP-02.
(2) (NU) Warn shipping by issuing Navigational Warnings about mined and
suspected mined areas (See AHP-01).
3-2
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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1.
(NU) When determining the required MCM tactics and techniques, the authority
planning, ordering or conducting the operation is usually constrained by the time allowed to
complete the operation and the risk to which he may subject the MCM unit(s). Generally the
shorter the time allowed for an operation, the greater becomes the risk to the MCM unit(s),
and vice versa.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(3) (NU) Determine the routes or diversions where it is assessed that no mining
has taken place taking into account operational requirements and geographical
constraints.
(4)
(NU) Closure of ports.
(1)
(NU) Establishing mine watching organisations
(2)
(NU) Gathering and assessing intelligence
(3)
(NU) Surveillance.
(4)
(NU) Reconnaissance.
c. (NU) Reducing the Risk. Reduce the risk to shipping by:
(1)
(NU) Applying Self-Protective Measures (SPMs).
(2)
(NU) Altering or adjusting navigational aids.
d. (NU) Preparing the Battlespace.
(1)
(NU) Conducting Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA).
(2)
(NU) Information held by National Mine Warfare Data Centres.
(3)
(NU) Conduct of Route Survey (RTSV).
(4)
(NU) Gathering and assessing intelligence.
3.
(NU) Active MCM. Active MCM is aimed at the detection, destruction, neutralisation,
removing, or recovery of mines. These countermeasures comprise of:
a. (NU) Minesweeping.
b. (NU) Minehunting.
c.
(NU) Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
4.
(NU) Detailed information on Defensive MCM Operations is available in Chapter 1 of
ATP-06, Volume II.
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b. (NU) Locating the Minefield. Locate the minefield by:
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 4 - MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCES
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) MCM Units
1.
(NU) MCM units are divided into surface vehicles, airborne vehicles and sub-surface
vehicles. These vehicles may be manned or unmanned, remotely controlled or autonomous
(full or semi), single or multi-role, specially designed and built or adapted or converted,
reusable or expendable, large or small.
2.
(NU) Whatever the type of MCM unit the MCM equipment fitted to it should be
designed and built to withstand repeated shocks from underwater explosions of a high order.
The unit may be just a carrier or an MCM system; it may be considered a part of the system
or the whole system itself.
0402
(NU) Surface MCM Vehicles
1.
(NU) The most widely used MCM unit at the present time is the Surface Vehicle and
the most numerous type is the Displacement Vessel. Other types of vessel may be used,
including Surface Effect Vehicles (SEV) and Semi-Submerged Vehicles (SSV) because of
their low underwater signatures.
a. (NU) Displacement Vessels. Current displacement vessels are typically
conventional monohull ships or craft. MCM vessels have been designed for low
operating speeds and moderate transit speeds. Past designs have incorporated
stringent signature requirements which have affected the type of materials used in
these vessels. Technological advances have allowed incorporation of features such
as optimum hull forms for attaining higher operating and transit speeds, efficient
lightweight propulsion systems, improved construction materials and increase
stability techniques. Sea-keeping of smaller displacement hulls in a seaway is
marginal and quickly becomes unacceptable as the sea state increases. Current hull
forms and propulsion systems have increased manoeuvrability. Improved
construction materials and design techniques have reduced magnetic and acoustic
signatures to STANAG specifications. It is anticipated that displacement vessels will
continue to be threatened by missiles, gunfire and torpedoes and that they should
also be capable of operating in an NBC environment.
b. (NU) Surface Effect Vehicles (SEV). Surface effect vehicles may be of two
basic forms; one of which is an amphibian such as the hovercraft, the other a nonamphibian characterised by rigid side walls which enter the water. As a result of the
air cushion construction, SEVs are less affected by underwater explosions than
normal displacement hull forms; however plume and fragmentation damage may still
occur. The combination of a low-ferrous hull and machinery results in an essentially
low magnetic signature. SEVs generate a low in-water acoustic signature and a
weak pressure signature as long as the craft is in the hover mode.
4-1
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0401
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d. (NU) Semi-Submerged Vehicle. The semi-submerged vehicle is a high
endurance, remotely operated, unmanned system that provides a low observable
minehunting capability in deep and shallow water regimes. Depending on the mode
selected, the system is capable of detection, classification and localisation of bottom,
close-tethered and in-volume mines as well as identification of bottom mines. The
system is comprised of acoustic and optical sensors housed in an underwater body
which can maintain operator selected depths below the surface or heights above the
seabed.
0403
(NU) Airborne MCM Vehicles
1.
(NU) Specialised MCM helicopters are capable of minehunting (detection,
classification and plotting of minelike contacts) and sweeping moored and influence mines.
High sea states will not directly impede the helicopter performance, however, the effects on
towed equipment and the accompanying high winds may limit operations. Helicopter
operations will not be possible in sea state 4 or higher. Helicopters are relatively invulnerable
to damage from underwater weapons with the possible exceptions of damage caused by the
plume of a detonating mine or by mine fragmentation in extremely shallow water. When
operating in a hostile area vulnerability to missiles and gunfire must be given serious
consideration. Helicopters allow rapid Out of Area (OOA) deployment of MCM effort and are
ideally suited for precursor operations. See also AMP-07.
2.
(NU) Presently there are no dedicated MCM Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
however current UAVs can be used for visual search.
0404
(NU) Underwater MCM Vehicles
1.
(NU) Introduction. Underwater MCM Vehicles can be utilised as submersibles or
small submarines, torpedo or drone type vehicles or bottom crawlers. As this type of vehicle
is very vulnerable to underwater shock, its primary task is likely to be limited to
reconnaissance or minehunting. The envisaged manoeuvrability and control are likely to be
within the requirements for this role.
2.
(NU) Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). Encompasses the entire spectrum of
UUVs, including AUV and ROV.
a. (NU) Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV). AUVs are UUVs that are
capable of executing their mission without external positive control. Following launch,
AUVs perform their mission, either based on a pre-planned or programmed
sequence or a decision algorithm and own sensor information. AUVs may still have
an occasional ability to be operated under positive operator control (see also Annex
4A).
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c. (NU) Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV). USVs are defined as vehicles which
derive their commands from a mother vehicle or a self-contained programme system.
Principally these vehicles are used for influence sweeping and minehunting. The
advantage of these vehicles is that MCM tasks can be performed without directly
endangering personnel.
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b. (NU) Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV). ROVs are unmanned underwater
vehicles that are operated under positive operator control. This control can be
exercised by a physical tether (eg. Fibre optic cable), or a telemetry tether (eg.
acoustic communications link).
(NU) Auxiliary MCM Vehicles
1.
(NU) In an emergency, craft of opportunity (COOP) can be employed as auxiliary
MCM vehicles. Vessels such as civilian fishing vessels or other light naval craft may be
converted for MCM tasks such as AUV operations, mine disposal, danlaying, support or
command and control. In such circumstances consideration should be given to the
underwater signature of the COOP prior to operating in the MTA.
2.
(NU) UUVs from civilian sources, eg. from hydrographic institutes, manned or
operated by trained naval personnel may be used for route survey or minehunting. Support
by clearance divers for disposal of mines is to be considered.
3.
(NU) Hydrographic vessels can be utilised to gather environmental information and
to conduct RTSV.
0406
(NU) Special MCM Vehicles
1.
(NU) Guinea Pig. A vehicle known as a ‘Guinea Pig’ is a ship converted or designed
to sweep mines by its own characteristics or to transit an already swept channel before or
ahead of the passage of follow-on shipping. It is usually made very resistant to underwater
shock and damage and may be manned or unmanned and remotely controlled.
2.
(NU) MCM Vessel Diving (MCD). The MCD is designed to accommodate and
support clearance divers. Capability considerations should include endurance, precise
navigational accuracy and seaworthiness. In addition, the MCD should be equipped with a
recompression chamber, mixed gas/compressed air refilling capability, medical personnel
trained to treat diving casualties and facilities to maintain and repair MCD diving equipment
including signature hygiene of the equipment. Special consideration should be given to the
suitability of the MCD to operate in a hostile environment.
3.
(NU) Mine Disposal Vessel
a. (NU) Any MCMV, but preferably a COOP is suited to act as mine disposal
vessel.
b. (NR)(NMP) The primary methods of disposing of Moored Mine cases which have
been separated from their anchor by mechanical sweeping and are drifting on the
surface are described in Appendix 2 to Annex 3A in ATP-24 Vol I.
0407
(NU) Mine Warfare Vessels Designators
Table 4-1 overleaf lists the NATO designators for mine countermeasures vessels and their
support vehicles as listed in APP-20. A full list of all ship designators is contained in APP-20 Standard Ship Designator System. A designator for a MCM Helicopter is not assigned.
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0405
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Table 4-1. NATO Designators for Mine Warfare Vessels
Designator
MINE COUNTERMEASURES VESSEL, UNSPECIFIED
MC
MINE COUNTERMEASURES VESSEL, GENERAL
MCMV
MINE COUNTERMEASURES COMMAND & SUPPORT SHIP
MCCS
MINE COUNTERMEASURES VESSEL, DIVING
MCD
MINE COUNTERMEASURES VESSEL, HOVERCRAFT
MCJ
MINE COUNTERMEASURES SUPPORT SHIP
MCS
MINE COUNTERMEASURES SUPPORT SHIP, SMALL
MCSL
MINE COUNTERMEASURES CRAFT, TRAINING
MCT
MINEHUNTER
MH
MINEHUNTER, AUXILIARY
MHA
MINEHUNTER, COASTAL
MHC
MINEHUNTER, COASTAL WITH DRONE
MHCD
MINEHUNTER, INSHORE
MHI
MINEHUNTER, OCEAN
MHO
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, GENERAL
MHS
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, COASTAL
MHSC
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER W/DRONE
MHSD
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, OCEAN
MHSO
MINELAYER, GENERAL
ML
MINELAYER, AUXILIARY
MLA
MINELAYER, COASTAL
MLC
MINELAYER, INSHORE
MLI
MINELAYER, OCEAN
MLO
MINELAYER, RIVER
MLR
MINELAYER, SUPPORT
MLS
MINE WARFARE VESSEL, GENERAL
MM
MINESWEEPER, GENERAL
MS
MINESWEEPER, AUXILIARY
MSA
MINESWEEPER, BOAT
MSB
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL
MSC
MINESWEEPER, COASTALW/DRONE(S)
MSCD
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL, AIR CUSHION
MSCJ
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
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Table 4-1 (Cont). NATO Designators for Mine Warfare Vessels
Designator
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL, HYDROFOIL
MSCK
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL, TRAINING
MSCT
MINESWEEPER, DRONE UNMANNED
MSD
MINESWEEPER, FLEET
MSF
MINESWEEPER, FLEET, AIR CUSHION
MSFJ
MINESWEEPER, FLEET, HYDROFOIL
MSFK
MINESWEEPER, INSHORE
MSI
MINESWEEPER, INSHORE, AIR CUSHION
MSIJ
MINESWEEPER, LIGHT
MSL
MINESWEEPER, OCEAN
MSO
MINESWEEPER, RIVER
MSR
MINESWEEPER, SPECIAL DEVICE
MSS
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL, SPECIAL
MSCS
NATO-UNCLASSIFED
0408
(NU) MCM Command and Support Ships (MCCS)
1.
(NU) The OTC of a MCM Task Group at sea is best supported by a MCM Command
and Support Ship (MCCS). The requirements for such a unit are laid down in the NATO
Defence Capability Survey Document (AC/281-N(2010)0014-FINAL (EWG (R)) and are as
follows:
a. (NU) General Capabilities;
(1)
(NU) Worldwide open ocean deployment if resupplied.
(2) (NU) A minimum of 30 days self sustained operations or longer if
resupplied.
(3) (NU) Speeds in excess of 12 knots and of maintaining 12 knots in waters
up to sea state 5.
(4)
(NU) Underway abeam replenishment of stores, fuel and other liquids.
(5)
(NU) Astern refuelling.
b. (NU) Command and Control Capabilities.
(1)
(NU) Command and Control support for an MCM Task Group.
(2) (NU) Real time data exchange and integration with other allied vessels and
appropriate shore facilities such as NATO Mine Warfare Data Centres through
the use of systems such as MCCIS.
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(3) Providing communications and intelligence necessary for the conduct and
coordination of MCM Operations.
c. (NU) ISR Capabilities.
(2) (NU) Onboard processing of sensor data and imagery, and
exploitation/dissemination of this information as part of the overall ISR picture to
meet end user information/intelligence requirements.
(3)
(NU) Receiving and exploiting information from external sources.
(4) (NU) Capable of receiving/contributing to the recognised environmental
picture and underwater picture, and integrating own information into the
Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP).
(5)
(NU) Disseminating the RMP to subordinate MCM Units.
(6)
(NU) Receiving and exploiting AIS merchant shipping information.
d. (NU) MCM Support Capabilities.
(1)
(NU) Provision of logistic and maintenance support to an MCM Task Group.
(2) (NU) Conducting underway replenishment of fuel and other liquids by the
abeam and/or astern method, specifically to act both as receiving unit and
supplying unit for fuel and other liquids.
(3)
(NU) Replenishment or stores at sea.
(4) (NU) Supporting diving operations, including multi-person decompression
chamber and a doctor trained in diving medicine.
(5) (NU) Operating an organic/non organic helicopter (providing a landing
deck) for reconnaissance, VERTREP and MEDEVAC.
(6)
(NU) Storing Mine Disposal Weapons.
(7)
(NU) Laying and recovering dummy/exercise mines.
e. (NU) Survivability & Self Protection Capabilities.
(1) (NU) Operating under CBRN threat conditions and protecting and
decontaminating exposed equipment and personnel as necessary.
(2) (NU) Taking appropriate measures, through design, to ensure low magnetic
and acoustic signature.
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(1) (NU) Integration into the wider JISR (using real-time data links and/or any
other systems required to achieve NATO Network Enabled Capability).
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(3) (NU) Naval Mine Avoidance capability against all types of mines, including
self propelled mines, by day and night and in all weather conditions. The
capability must also provide a safe-stand off detection that gives the ship time
and space to react.
(5) (NU) Torpedo Avoidance capability including the ability of detecting and
countering at a safe distance active and passive homing torpedoes including
those which home in on the wake of surface ships and omni-directionally from
the target.
(6) (NU) Countering the terrorism/insurgent threat in anchorages and choke
points.
0409
(NU) Lead-through Vessels
Details of Lead-through vessels (LTV) are contained in ATP-01 Vol I and ATP-02.1
4-7
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(4) (NU) Self defence (hard and soft kill) against incoming surface and air
threats (point defence).
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 5 - RISK AND SELF PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
(NU) Risk
(NU) All vessels in mined waters are at risk from mines, and units conducting MCM
operations are in greater danger because they are positively seeking to locate or actuate
mines. Thus, risk to vessels can be considered from two points of view; from that of ship
traffic and that of the mine countermeasures vehicle.
a. (NU) Risk to Transitors. The Risk to Transitors applies to all ships in mined
waters. It is the probability of a mine being exploded by a transiting ship and can be
calculated as a function of the assumed number of poised mines, the damage width
and the channel width. This chapter contains a number of self-protective measures
which can be taken by any vessel to avoid or reduce the risk from mines. Procedures
for calculation of risk can be found in Chapter 10 of ATP-06, Volume II.
b. (NU) Risk to MCM Units. This risk is more commonly known as MCMV Risk and
is defined as the probability that a mine of given characteristics,
actuated/countermined by the sweeping or hunting technique in use, will explode
within the damage area of the MCMV. Details on MCMV Risk for surfaces vessels
are contained in Chapter 10 of ATP-06, Volume II. The planner must be aware that
clearance divers incur an additional element of risk whatever technique they use and
these risks are highest when sensitive acoustic and/or magnetic mines are present
and when the environmental conditions are unfavourable.
0502
(NU) MCMV Safety Measures
Safety of the MCMV is one of the most important factors to be considered when choosing
appropriate techniques. Protection of the MCMV from mine explosion damage is always
important, even when the urgency of the operation demands that the rate of sweeping or
searching be considered foremost. Details are to be found in Chapter 10 of ATP-06, Volume
II.
0503
(NU) Safety Ranges
1.
(NU) An underwater explosion is a chemical reaction. This reaction converts the
explosive material rapidly into a gas form at high temperature and pressure. This gas form
interacts with the surrounding water in two phases “shock wave” and “gas bubble”.
2.
(NU) The safety ranges of a surface vessel, a submerged vessel (submarine, AUV,
ROV, variable depth sonar, etc.) or a diver against the shock wave and the gas bubble
effects of an underwater explosion can be approximated by using safety distance equations
(see note)
Note. The symbols and terms used in the following equations pertain to the definitions given
in this article.
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Figure 5-1. (NU) Sample Curve of Shock Wave Propagation
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
b.
(NU) Initial Peak Pressure and Impulse
(1) (NU) The Initial Peak Pressure (Pmax) is the pressure value when the shock
wave subjected to a vessel. Impulse (I) is the rate of the pressure change for a
unit area. Pmax and Impulse of a shock wave can be approximated by the
equations below according to charge weight (W) (TNT equivalent in kilograms
(kg)) and distance (R) in metres (m) from the mine.
1.18
 W 0.33 
Pmax  52.12 

 R 
I  6.52W
0.33
 W 0.33 


 R 
(MPa )
0.98
(MPa  sec)
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a. (NU) Shock Wave. A shock wave consists of a sudden rise in pressure followed
by an exponential decay. Approximately 60 percent of the energy of an underwater
explosion creates the shock wave. If we consider a point in water where the shock
front hits initially, the pressure measured at that point is “Initial Peak Pressure (Pmax)”.
After this first hit the pressure decays to the value of hydrostatic pressure. The
velocity of a shock wave is proportional to this initial peak pressure value. The
velocity is very high at the beginning, but within a few metres from the explosion
point, it drops to velocity of sound (1500 m/s). The pressure-time curve falls linearly
until the point of the time constant θ, after which the decay slows and is non-linear.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(2) (NU) As an example, the pressure and impulse experienced by a surface
ship from a 1000 kg TNT equivalent mine at 100 m slant range are:
Pmax
I  6.52 W
0.33
 W 0.33 


 R 
1.18
 10000.33 
 52.12 

 100 
0.98
 6.52 1000
0.33
 3.443 MPa
 10000.33 


 100 
0.98
 6.827 MPa  sec
c. (NU) Maximum Bubble Radius
(1) (NU) Approximately 40 per cent of the energy of an underwater explosion
creates an expanding gas bubble. The maximum radius of gas bubble can be
approximated by the equation below according to charge weight (TNT equivalent
in kg) and depth of mine case (in metres).
Rbubble max 
3.383W 0.33
 D  9.8 
0.33
(metres )
(2) (NU) As an example, the maximum gas bubble radius of a 1000 kgs. of
TNT mine at 30m case depth is:
Rbubble max 
3.383W 0.33
 D  9.8 
0.33


3.383 10000.33
 30  9.8 
0.33
  10.03 metres
d. (NR)(NMP) Shock Factor
(1) (NR)(NMP) Shock Factor (SF) is a term to define shock resistance of a
material against an underwater explosion. According to shock factor values of
equipments (ship hull, machinery systems, gunnery systems, electronic systems
etc.) the safety range of a unit can be approximated by the equations below (see
Fig 5-2).
w  1  Sin

0.5
SFsurface ships
R
2
W 

0.5
SFunderwater
R
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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1.18
 W 0.33 
 52.12 

 R 
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
Figure 5-2. Shock Factor Equations
(2) (NU)(NMP) As an example, calculate the safety range for an MCMV
according to SF values of shipboard equipments in Table 5-1 at 30° for a ground
mine loaded with 855 kg amatol charge.
Table 5-1. (NMP) Example Equipment Shock Factors
Ship Board Equipment
SF Values of Equipment
Ship hull
0.8
VDS sonar
0.6
Sonar and C&C Consoles
0.3
ROV Console
0.3
Machinery System
0.9
Echo Sounder Probe
2.5
Electric System
0.8
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w  1  Sin

0.5
SFsurface ships
2
R
TNT equivalent of amatol is 1.17
855 kg of amatol = 1000 kg of TNT.
1000  1  Sin30  0.8
0.5
R
2
SF
Then R = 29.9m
(3) (NU)(NMP) This formula can be used to approximate the other equipments
as shown in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2. Example Ranges
Ship Board Equipments
R for θ = 30° (metres)
Ship hull
29.9
VDS sonar
39.5
Sonar and C&C Consoles
79
ROV Console
79
Machinery System
26.3
Echo Sounder Probe
9.48
Electric System
29.9
NATO-RESTRICTED
(4) (NU)(NMP) As shown in this example, at a distance of 50m from a mine,
although ship hull is in safety range (29.9m), the ship board equipments such as
the Sonar, C&C and ROV consoles (79m) can be damaged by an explosion.
Note: (NU)(NMP) SF formula is not useful for a good approximation at distances
less than 10 times of charge radius. At any distance less than 10 times of charge
radius from a mine, local effect is occurred so the explosion causes a hull rupture
at the surface of the material.
e. (NU) Theoretical Safety Range for Divers
(1) (NU) The following paragraphs provide a theoretical method of calculating
safety ranges for divers. It should be noted that national safety rules will normally
be observed.
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Using a SF value of ship hull 0.8 and θ then the calculation for θ = 30° is;
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Rdiver  103 W 0.33 (metres )
(3) (NU) However, the safety range in water is affected by the surrounding
habitat, e.g. The relative disposition of the diver and the charge and the bottom
type.
(4) (NU) As an example, the minimum safety range for fatal raptures of a diver
in water against 1000 kg. of TNT mine is:
Rdiver  103 x10000.33  1030m
0504
(NC)(NMP) Damage Area
1.
(NC)(NMP) The damage area ad, which is similar to the damage width Wd can be
used to find the probability that a ship will not only actuate a mine but also will receive at
least a specified level of damage. Wd can be used in place of ‘ad’ which is equal to the
integral of P(y,z) over only those values of y and z which are small enough so that at least ‘d’
damage is done when the mine explodes.
2.
(NC)(NMP) It should be noted that this method of finding Wd involves an assumption
that the mine explodes neither too far ahead of the ship nor too far astern to affect the
distance abeam at which a specific level of damage is achieved; this assumption is not
always justified, particularly in the case of acoustic mines. The level of damage involved is
usually prefixed to the term ‘damage width’; for example one may use a ‘critical damage
width’ or a ‘shock damage width’.
0505
(NU) Self Protective Measures - General
1.
(NU) Ships can take a number of measures to protect themselves against the risk of
mine damage. These include tactical measures such as taking advantage of tide, current,
water depth and safe speeds. They also include material measures such as acoustic and
magnetic hygiene (silencing, quiet states), degaussing measures, shock hardening,
increasing Damage Control states and Personal Protection measures. Commanding
Officers/Masters of ships transiting a minefield/mine danger area should raise crew
awareness in the measures to be taken to protect ships transiting through the mine danger
area.
2.
(NU) Ship Signatures Modifications. A ship signature modification is any
modification to the ship during or after construction that modifies its normal influence
characteristics. The basic influence characteristics of ships which can be altered are the
magnetic, the acoustic and the pressure influence characteristics.
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(2) (NU) The ear is the most sensitive organ of the human body to an
underwater explosion. An overpressure of 0.0345 MPa is needed to cause
damage to the middle ear membrane. The lung is the second organ most
commonly injured by overpressure. A human body in water can be subjected to a
maximum 0.0276 MPa for full safety and 0.345 MPa for fatality. Pressures of
0.386 to 0.524 MPa will cause damage to all body organs. The safety range
against fatal injuries except in the case of middle ear membrane casualty can be
approximated by the following equation.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
0506
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NU) Application of Self-Protective Measures
1.
(NU) It is the OPCON authorities responsibility to initiate the application of selfprotective measures by all units other than MCMVS, because in many cases their availability
is not known sufficiently.
0507
(NU) Degaussing
1.
(NU) Magnetic ship quieting is accomplished by periodic ship deperming (flashing),
by installing degaussing coil systems which compensate for the normal magnetic ship
influence fields by the generation of opposing fields, or by non-magnetic construction.
Degaussing (DG) is the most widely used technique for intentional magnetic quieting.
Although non-magnetic construction reduces the degaussing requirement, it will not eliminate
its need entirely, since the machinery and cargo will most likely have magnetic influence
fields associated with them. The currents are varied according to the ship's movements,
position on the earth's surface and residual magnetic signatures as found by running over a
degaussing range. Complete protection against modern sensitive ground mines cannot be
achieved by these methods, but they do force the enemy to use the more sensitive magnetic
mines which in turn may be easier to sweep.
2.
(NU) The magnetic signature of a ship can be represented by a graph showing how
the magnetic field (or a component of it) at a point varies as the ship passes over or near the
point. Normally only the vertical component of the ship's normal field on the worst heading is
used as a measure of the effectiveness of degaussing (the lower the peak value the better
the degaussing) and in a specified depth (DG Code Depth) is termed the DG Code Number.
The normal field is the algebraic sum of the field due to all ferromagnetic material in the ship
and the field due to those electric service circuits central to moving the ship across a
degaussing range.
3.
(NR)(NMP) See AMP-14.1/15.1 for noise ranging and degaussing information on
NATO MCMVs.
4.
(NR)(NMP) The DG Code Depths below full load waterline (normal surface waterline
for submarines) for various ship types are as follows:
a. (NR)(NMP) MSO and similar hunters - 9m
b. (NR)(NMP) MSC and similar hunters - 9m
c.
(NR)(NMP) MSI and similar hunters - 5m
d. (NR)(NMP) Harbour sweepers - 3m
e. (NR)(NMP) All other hunters and sweepers. To be specified nationally as 3, 5 or
9m.
f.
(NR)(NMP) MCM helicopters 9m (altitude plus depth)
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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2.
(NU) Some of these self-protective measures may affect other forces, or may conflict
with other aims or missions. So most of these measures may only be ordered by the OTC
and will depend upon the intelligence gained about the mines being countered.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
g. (NR)(NMP) Non-nuclear submarines - 13m
h. (NR)(NMP) Special submarine class (ie non-magnetic. To be specified or
midget).
(NR)(NMP) All other vessels. Beam Depth.
5.
(NR)(NMP) For vessels other than MCM vessels the DG Code Number is a sufficient
measure of degaussing effectiveness but for MCM vessels, which are designed to have a low
DG Code Number, contributions to the magnetic signature from sources other than the
normal field must be considered. For MCMVs the standard code combined vertical field is the
significant quantity, it is the algebraic sum of:
a. (NR)(NMP) The normal field.
b. (NR)(NMP) The field of electric service circuits not included in the normal field.
c. (NR)(NMP) The field caused by rolling of the ship at standard roll angle on the
worst heading.
d. (NR)(NMP) The sweep generator stray field.
6.
(NR)(NMP) A ‘combined’ field is the algebraic sum of fields or components of fields
from various sources and is not necessarily the ‘total’ field to which some mines respond.
7.
(NR)(NMP) If it is known that magnetic mines discriminate against sweeps, it may be
safer to use reverse degaussing, manipulating it manually if possible, so that the ship's
magnetic signature appears to be a pulsing sweep. Executing this method can damage the
degaussing system and the ship must be re-degaussed as soon as possible.
0508
(NU) Acoustic Measures
1.
(NU) Acoustic ship quieting is regarded as especially important for MCMVs. Effective
ship quieting appears to be very difficult to achieve. Through the use of bubble screens on
the hull exterior, it is possible to shift the frequency range of the acoustic energy emitted by
the ship's hull and machinery. Acoustic absorbing material on the hull and shock mounting of
noisy machinery reduces the level of vibrations transferred to and from the ship's hull into the
water and thereby reduces the waterborne acoustic levels in the vicinity of the ship. Special
propellers will reduce acoustic output. In general, it is impossible to reduce the noise level to
the extent that it is safe from all present day acoustic mines.
2.
(NU) National guidance is required by all ships on their acoustic safe depth when
entering waters where acoustically operated ground mines may have been laid, so that
passive acoustic countermeasures may be taken. The acoustic signature of a ship can
extend over a wide frequency range from 1 Hz to some hundreds of kHz (See also para
0219)
3.
(NU) The only measure of noise reduction that can be taken to decrease the risk of
AF mines is to reduce speed to the operational minimum, preferably 5-7 knots.
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i
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5.
(NR)(NMP) A method of performing the necessary calculations is contained in
Chapter 10 of ATP-06, Volume II, for the guidance of commands and mine countermeasures
authorities.
6.
(NC)(NMP) An indication of the safe depth for various classes of ship is given in
Table 5-3. These safe depths have been calculated using the average acoustic levels for
each class or type of ship. The depths calculated are ‘class average safe depths’. A second
column is added showing the safe depths plus one standard deviation, this is in order to
include most of deviations within a class of ship, and is termed ‘the most probable safe
depths’. This means that mathematically 84% of ships of the class could expect to be safe in
the depth listed, whilst 16% could be expected to cause a circuit actuation (mine fire, ship
count reduction etc).
7.
(NR)(NMP) For the best guarantee of ship's safety the computations must be made
with reference to the specific sound range data rather than add extra safety factors and in
consequence, overestimate for the majority of the class. The Safe Depth tables are for
guidance in general planning only. For risk to specific ships, reference must be made to the
relevant Sound Range Report.
8.
(NR)(NMP) The safe depths shown in Table 5-3 are calculated for two typical audio
frequency mines:
a. (NC)(NMP). A UK AF mine of average sensitivity, where the Normal Actuation
Level (NAL) = 116 dB ref: 1 Pa mean spectrum level at a dominant frequency of 200
Hz (NAL = A).
b. (NC)(NMP). A sensitive AF mine of NAL = 100 dB ref: 1 Pa (NAL = B).
9.
(NR)(NMP) For mines with different actuation frequencies, references must be made
to the specific Sound Range Report for the relevant noise levels.
0509
(NR) (NMP) Pressure Quieting
It is very difficult to alter the pressure signature of a ship by modifying the hull. However, the
pressure signature of a ship can be altered through the use of a tactic such as reduced
speed.
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4.
(NU) At these lower speeds, the low frequency machinery noise (generally below
100 Hz) may become more significant, it is then desirable to close down as many auxiliary
machines as possible e.g. generators, pumps, fans, refrigerators etc. In particular,
consideration should be given to closing down machinery specifically mentioned in the Sound
Range Report as being noisy; also in this quietened state, the ship's company should keep
as quiet as possible, avoiding noisy activities. The Sound Range Report for the ship must be
consulted to determine how the safe depth of a ship varies with speed.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Table 5-3 (NMP). Average Safe Depths
SAFE DEPTH (metres)
CLASS AVERAGE
NAL A
NAL B
CLASS AVERAGE + 1SD
NAL A
NAL B
78
34
20
16
15
470
200
103
88
73
78
63
11
500
360
140
Frigate, 2450 tons, twin screw
21
18
15
12
6
53
25
13
12
11
320
145
68
63
53
Fleet auxiliary over 20,000 tons
15
12
6
68
43
20
360
230
88
Frigate, 2300 tons, single screw, steam
15
12
6
24
12
9
130
54
35
38
17
10
230
84
54
Frigate, 2300 tons, single screw, gas turbine
15
12
6
25
13
12
145
64
54
40
20
16
250
100
84
95
85
41
530
480
210
Major Naval vessels over 20,000 tons
15
12
6
70
50
26
360
260
110
Major Naval vessels under 20,000 tons
15
12
9
6
44
24
22
18
220
110
97
82
71
37
30
26
400
210
160
130
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SPEED
(kts)
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(NR)(NMP) General Material Measures
2.
(NR)(NMP) Noisemakers. Acoustic mines normally contain an anti-countermining
device which responds to an explosive sound or rapid acoustic build-up in such a way that
the mine does not fire, but is made passive for a certain period of time. Advantage can be
taken of this requirement of design by fitting ships with a sound source capable of producing
a rapid increase in sound level (such as the explosive sweep at certain ranges). In addition it
is possible for certain mines to be actuated by the pipe noisemaker but this should not be a
standard tactic. Against some sophisticated modern mines the use of the towed acoustic
torpedo decoy may give some protection.
3.
(NU)(NMP) Shock Hardening. All equipment installed in a ship that can be
damaged by shock must be mounted in such a way that the accelerations resulting from an
underwater explosion (or any other type of explosion or shock) are reduced to a level that will
not cause damage to the equipment. The fitting of shock mounts to equipment stowages,
seats and in some cases whole decks has resulted in a great measure of protection to
personnel and equipment. Experience has shown however that shock mounts do deteriorate
and require maintenance. Also the filling-in of shock clearances around shock mounted
equipment reduces their effectiveness. Appreciation of shock in every day shipboard life from
explosion, collision or grounding should be a continuous training programme for everyone on
board.
4.
(NU)(NMP) Damage Protection and Control. The protection from damage by shock
caused by a mine explosion is the same as for any other underwater explosion and the same
preparations and procedures are adopted. The ability of any ship to combat damage
depends upon its state of readiness and training of the ships company.
0511
(NU) Tactical Measures
1.
(NU) By routing ships in deep water and at slow speed the chance of detonating
mines is lessened. For surface vessels the deeper the water under the keel the safer the
vessel is likely to be.
2.
(NU) If ships sail through a mined area at high water the distance between the keel
or hull and a mine is increased. This may enable a ship to sail over a buoyant moored
contact mine or reduce the influence detected at the influence mine, moored or ground, to a
level below that required to actuate it.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Tidal stream or current will cause a moored mine to dip. Passage
therefore through an area of strong tidal stream or current may result in the ship passing over
a moored contact mine or reduce the danger from acoustic or pressure mines (see sub para
4 & 5 below). Use may be made of the current or tidal stream to increase the speed made
good over the ground without increasing the afore mentioned influences detected by the
mine.
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1.
(NR)(NMP) Sonar. Ships can be fitted with a dedicated sonar or can use their antisubmarine sonar to detect moored mines. However, complete protection cannot be assured
due to a number of factors including the small size of the target, variable environmental
conditions the state of training of the operators.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
5.
(NC)(NMP) Reducing speed lowers a ship's pressure signature, and usually the
acoustic signature also. This lessens the chance of detonating mines by these influences. A
ship may avoid actuating a simple pressure mine by either travelling too slow to actuate the
pressure mechanism, or too fast to actuate the time mechanism. Usually there is a range of
dangerous intermediate speeds. In practice only speeds below this range would normally be
safe and a margin should be allowed for the uncertainties of mine parameters. The curves in
Chapter 10 of ATP-06, Volume II should be used for calculation of safe speeds. The rate of
change of the magnetic field at a mine decreases as the speed of a given ship decreases,
thus magnetic induction mines are less likely to be actuated by slow ships than by fast ones.
In general, however, no speed can be recommended as a safe defence against magnetic
mines.
6.
(NR)(NMP) To determine the minimum distance between a platform and the
boundaries of a known minefield (locations, types, and settings of mines are known) the
following equation is utilised by Minelaying Planners as well as by MCM Planners. Gaps in
own minefields may be determined in the same way. This also limits the MTA (see also
Chapter 2 para 0230) in MCM Operations to the minimum when the boundaries of the
opponent's minefields are known. The knowledge of the Sigma (Mine Laying Error due to
laying procedure etc.) of the mines is essential. Similar to minimum channel width, it is a
function of mine localization error (σMINE), track-keeping error (σSHIP), and damage width (Wd)
or actuation width (Wa) for a given confidence level (CL) = 99.85%
Minimum DistanceCL  99.85%  3 
 MINE 2   SHIP 2

MAX Wd ,W a 
2
Where;
The platform has a normal distribution about its mean track made good.
68% of the distribution lies within ±1σ of the mean.
95% of the distribution lies within ±2σ of the mean.
99.7% of the distribution lies within ±3σ (+ 0.15% lies to the right of +3σ).
So confidence level is 99.7% + 0.15% = 99.85%.
Add Max (Wd, Wa)/2 in case the mine is located at edge of the minefield
boundary.
0512
(NU) Self-Protective Measures - Underway
1.
(NU) General. The following self-protective measures below are intended for use by
warships when the Mine Warning is YELLOW or RED. General precautions and measures
for warships are listed in ATP-01, Vol I and for Merchant ships see ATP-02.1.
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4.
(NU) The magnetic field of a ship is attenuated with depth, thus the chance of
actuating a magnetic ground mine becomes less as the water deepens. A safe depth is
reached where the ship's magnetic field is too weak to actuate the mine. This safe depth
varies with the ship's magnetic field strength, the sensitivity of the mine and also with the
speed of the ship.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
a. (NU) No personnel should be allowed to remain in a compartment below the
water-line unless essential.
b. (NU) Assume an increased Damage Control state.
c.
(NU) Impose a silent routine.
e. (NU) It is not advised to anchor in the MTA but if absolutely necessary be aware
of the change to the ships magnetic and acoustic signatures that this would entail.
f.
(NU) Prepare for lead-through operations.
g. (NU) Take advantage of every opportunity to range the ship, both magnetically
and acoustically.
2.
(NU) Precautions Against Specific Types of Mines. The following precautions are
designed for use against certain types of mine however they should be enforced when
transiting a MTA.
a. (NU) Moored Mines.
(1)
(NU) Follow directly over the same ground as the ship ahead.
(2) (NU) Avoid all unnecessary alterations of course, in order to present as
small a target area as possible.
(3)
(NU) Post mine lookouts (buoyant mine cases).
(4) (NU) If a helicopter is available carry out a aerial visual mine search ahead
of the ship(s).
b. (NU) Magnetic Mines. Energise degaussing system prior to entering the MTA
and keep it adjusted for the correct heading.
c. (NU) Acoustic Mines.
(1) (NU) Ships should proceed at their best noise/speed ratio. They should be
noise ranged frequently so that this speed is known.
(2) (NU) The noise from the propellers should be kept as low as possible.
Propeller vibration is a major source of noise.
(3)
(NU) Avoid violent changes of revolutions, particularly reversing engines.
(4)
(NU) Do not operate auxiliary machinery if it can be avoided.
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d. (NU) Endeavour to pass through the Mine Threat Area (MTA) at high tide and in
the deepest possible water.
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
d. (NU) Pressure Mines.
(1)
(NU) Proceed at a slow speed.
(2) (NU) Transit in deep water and at high tide. A high swell, when present, is
also an advantage.
(NU) Maintain the ordered or calculated speed through the water.
3.
(NU) Disposal of Drifting Mines. If a drifting mine is seen, whether during a
mechanical sweeping operation or at other times, they must be reported to the OTC. Further
detailed information is contained in ATP-24 Volume I, Chapter 3. Annex A, Appendix 1.
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(3)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
CHAPTER 6 - (NR)(NMP) AIM AND BASIC OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
OF MINING
Note: (NU)(NMP) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’
throughout this chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and
‘sea mines’ respectively.
(NR)(NMP) Definitions
1.
(NR)(NMP) Mining. Mining is that portion of mine warfare defined as the strategic
and tactical use of sea mines. It includes all offensive, defensive, and protective measures
for laying sea mines. Mining operations embrace all methods whereby damage may be
inflicted or enemy sea operations hindered by the use of sea mines.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Minefield. A number of sea mines laid, or declared to be laid, in a
maritime area for any purpose.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Minefield Plan. A minefield plan is a listing of the mines and methods of
their employment to meet a specified objective. Specifically, a minefield plan consists of a
charted minefield, a listing of the proper mine mix, a preferred minelayer and a delivery
schedule. Planning the proper mine mix is determining, inter alia, the types of mines
(including the Mark and Mod), the sensitivity settings, ship counts or probability actuator
settings, arming delay (or delayed rising) and the number of each combination.
0602
(NR) (NMP) Mining as an Instrument of Sea Denial
1.
(NR)(NMP) Mining is essentially an instrument of sea denial. Used on its own, mining
represents a considerable capability of inflicting losses, tying up forces, delaying operations
and changing the geography of the operation area. When integrated into other types of sea
denial operations, mining will also act as a significant force multiplier. Mining should therefore
not be considered in isolation from other warfare areas. Rather than that, mining should be
considered as a type of operation that can be included as an integral part of most submarine,
air and surface operations.
a. (NR)(NMP) At more specific levels the general objective of sea denial can be
related to the fundamental factors force, time and space.
(1) (NR) (NMP) Force. This factor can be influenced by the minefield’s ability
to inflict losses or contain forces. Infliction of losses can be achieved to various
degrees ranging from destruction to harassment. Containment of forces can be
achieved by imposing MCM operations on the enemy.
(2) (NR) (NMP) Time. This factor can be influenced by the minefield’s ability to
delay operations. Such delays can further be related to short-term or long-term
perspectives.
(3) (NR) (NMP) Space. This factor can be influenced by the minefield’s ability
to change the geography of the operation area. Such change can be related to
area, coast, port, strait, choke point or sea-lines of communication (SLOCs),
where traffic may be blocked or diverted.
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0601
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c. (NR)(NMP) Tying up forces, delaying operations and shaping the battlefield in
the operation area can be attributed to the minefield’s indirect and psychological
effects, where deterrence generally leads to reduced freedom of action. Although the
direct effect has proved to be considerable, the indirect effects have, in fact, been the
dominating ones by a wide margin. An accurate assessment of these effects is, on
the other hand, rather difficult as they are based on more complex and vague
parameters which will have to be derived from the minefield’s real or perceived ability
to inflict the desired level of damage. In this respect the direct and the indirect effects
of the minefield can be compared with the visible tip of an iceberg and its
considerably larger bulk hidden below the surface.
0603
(NR) (NMP) Further Aims of Mining
1.
(NR)(NMP) In a general operational context further aims of mining will include
assistance in the dislocation of the enemy war effort to the maximum possible extent, and
contribution to the security of our sea communications by the destruction or threat of
destruction of the naval forces of the enemy.
a. (NR) (NMP) Disruption of Enemy Plans. The threat of mines restricts the use
of certain waters by the enemy. It may cause closure of ports needed for the supply
of military forces or the maintenance of the economic system. It may force the enemy
to re-route sea shipping into deeper water where it is subject to other forms of attack.
It may prevent enemy interference with our own sea traffic and ports and it may
restrict his warship movements. Additionally, the threat of mines forces the enemy to
develop and maintain expensive countermeasures, the cost of which is much greater
than the cost of the mining campaign.
b. (NR) (NMP) Effect on Enemy Morale. Bomb, missile and gun attacks can
usually be anticipated. Mines on the other hand strike without warning, causing the
crew of a vessel passing through mineable waters to be under continual tension, with
consequent lowering of morale.
c. (NR) (NMP) Contribution to Own Plans. Mining operations are complementary
to those of other forces and should not be regarded as an end in themselves.
Minefields can be used to support own maritime operations, to contribute to the
security of own sea communications and to protect own ports, harbours, anchorages,
coasts and shipping routes.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Legal Aspects of Mining. Sea mines are lawful weapons subject to
special rules associated with their use. All means and methods of war are governed by rules
designed to limit inter alia indiscriminate effect, unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury.
These general and specific rules are applicable to naval mining and shall be respected by
authorities recommending the use of sea-mines.
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b. (NR)(NMP) Infliction of losses can be attributed to the minefield’s direct and
physical effect. This effect can be determined quite accurately on the basis of few
and measurable quantities.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
0604
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NR)(NMP) The Minefield as a Weapon
The minefield, rather than the mine, is the weapon. Minefields are categorised according to
location and purpose: offensive, defensive, protective and tactical. They are defined basically
in terms of the amount of control exercised over the area of interest.
(NR)(NMP) Mining Responsibilities
1.
(NR)(NMP) The assignment of duties to Operational Commanders and their
subordinate is described in Chapter 1. It must be realised that different NATO Commanders
and nations may have variations in their command structure and it is up to the individual
NATO Commanders and Nations to interpret the structure to best suit their needs. However,
to avoid confusion, the terms given are to be used within NATO between different commands
and areas.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Although clearly defined lines of command and control are essential the
changing pattern of mine warfare also demands flexibility of organisation. Intelligent initiative
should be employed to deal with unforeseen problems, which should never be ignored on the
grounds that the existing organisations do not assign specific responsibilities for dealing with
them.
3.
(NR)(NMP) NMW operations are normally the national responsibility of the country
concerned and are carried out using national command, control and support organisations.
Exceptions may be:
a. (NR)(NMP) NMW operations in specific areas by forces assigned to a NATO
Command. In these circumstances administration and support remains a national
commitment of the country providing the NMW forces.
b. (NR)(NMP) NMW operations carried out in support of amphibious operations.
(See Chapter 1).
0606
(NR)(NMP) Mining Aims and Missions
a. (NR)(NMP) Aim.. The choice of field type is an application of the capability of
available mines to the particular situation. Every minefield is planted for an offensive,
defensive or protective purpose, with an underlying strategic or tactical objective.
Enemy reaction or a change in situation may enable the minefield to achieve a
combination of purposes such as early interruption of traffic and later sustained
attrition, or immediate tactical and subsequent strategic effects. Therefore, the fields
differ in purpose as well as in the likely degree of enemy opposition. This greatly
affects the selection of laying agents.
b. (NR)(NMP) Missions.
(1) (NR)(NMP) NMW operations support the broad task of establishing and
maintaining control of essential sea areas. In any conflict or operation, the ability
of naval forces to carry out their mission may be seriously threatened by enemy
submarine warfare. Mining operations can contribute substantially to reducing
this submarine threat. In addition, mining operations are effective offensive
measures against combatant and merchant ships, and they may be used for
blocking certain passages to all shipping.
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0605
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c. (NR)(NMP) For these reasons mining comprises an important part of warfare
operations. In comparison with other weapon systems, mines are particularly
effective in shallow water because they can deny a shallow water haven for hostile
submarine operations.
d. (NR)(NMP) Mines, or the threat of sinking by mines, may deny to the enemy the
free and safe use of vital sea areas, or they may be used to protect friendly harbours,
channels and shores against seaborne attack. Delays and interruptions in shipping
traffic may deprive the enemy of more offensive attack capability and shipping than
losses through actual sinking caused by mines. Enemy ships kept at their bases or
deferred in transit by mining operations may be as useless to the immediate war
effort as if they had been sunk, and delays in shipping may be as costly as actual
losses.
0607
(NR)(NMP) Advantages and Disadvantages of Mining
1.
(NR)(NMP) Advantages. Mining is distinguished from other naval operations in that
it frequently offers an opportunity to inflict severe damage on the enemy while affording him
little or no chance for retaliatory action against attacking forces. Furthermore, minefields offer
the unique possibility of delivering a defensive attack; one in which the aggressor must take
full responsibility for the casualties suffered. Mining permits enemy shipping to be attacked
without the necessity for minelaying craft to engage or even to locate the target, so that the
smallest minelayer may indirectly destroy the most powerful capital ships, merchantmen, or
elusive enemy submarines. As a covert weapon the mine provides no visible warning of
danger. Moreover, from the time it is armed until its designed life expires, a mine threatens
enemy shipping 24 hours a day. Barring environmental limitations, a well laid minefield can
perform functions which would otherwise require strong patrol or combat forces for many
months. A minefield may merely, by its presence and without inflicting any damage, prevent
the enemy from controlling or using certain areas.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Disadvantages. The primary weakness of a minefield is that weeks or
months may pass after it is laid before an enemy ship enters the area that is mined. This
disadvantage is more marked in attrition fields where such a delay may allow the enemy time
to detect the mines and adopt countermeasures. The mine must wait for its target instead of
seeking it. It also may be countered by relatively light vessels and unless proper precautions
are maintained it may become hazardous to friendly shipping. With certain exceptions control
over the mine is lost after laying. Legal aspects and public opinion/perception of mining may
also be a disadvantage that should be considered (see para 0616).
0608
(NR)(NMP) Strategic Mining
1.
(NR)(NMP) A strategic maritime mining campaign would be conducted with the
broad long-term aim of denying the enemy free access to or use of sea areas and SLOCs.
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(2) (NR)(NMP) However, sea mines may not be used to deny transit passage
of international straits or archipelagic waters by neutral shipping. A corollary
benefit of offensive mining is the high cost of subsequent mine countermeasures
effort required by the enemy, which has in the past proved to be greatly out of
proportion to the cost of mining effort. Keep in mind that following the conflict the
mines will need to be cleared and such clearing may be detrimental to post
conflict rebuilding.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
2.
(NR)(NMP) The kind and extent of mining initiated is dependent on the situation.
When enemy submarines are the primary threat to SLOCs, anti-submarine mining in support
of the overall anti-submarine effort is the primary mining task. When enemy surface naval
forces are a significant threat, mining against such forces becomes high priority. Enemy
shipping can be expected to be required to support the enemy national economy and
logistics, therefore destruction and harassment of this shipping is a major mining objective.
Measures for forward defence against enemy naval forces require the prompt and effective
mining of selected narrow passages leading from the sources of enemy naval strength. The
value of this capability lies not only in its potential as an instrument of attrition, but in the
deterrent effect upon the enemy's will to use his submarine and surface forces. Plans should
provide for the interdiction of vital enemy sea routes and for mining of opportunity. Even if the
enemy pre-deploys most of his naval forces before the outbreak of hostilities, mining can be
used to interrupt returns to port for maintenance and resupply.
3.
(NC)(NMP)
Campaign.
Considerations
for
Planning
a
Strategic
Offensive
Mining
a. (NC)(NMP) The form and purpose of a plan depends more or less on whether it
is prepared in peacetime or in time of conflict . Currently, no strategic mining plans
are in existence within NATO and to this end it is important that planning procedures
are well documented. At the start of a conflict, events rarely occur as they were
postulated in peacetime plans or procedures, and radical changes to plans are
usually necessary at once. Furthermore, the emphasis in planning shifts from the
equilibrium conditions studied in peacetime to attempts, not only to keep up with a
fluid situation, but to take advantage of the enemy's mistakes and even to entice the
enemy into making mistakes. In spite of the inadequacy of peacetime planning, the
retention of the knowledge on the production of such plans is essential.
b. (NR)(NMP) Sustained attrition mining is essentially strategic in nature; therefore,
plans for such mining are usually based on, and guided by, strategic rather than
tactical considerations. One of the most basic strategic considerations is the question
of the amount of effort which should be expended in sustained attrition mining. The
answer depends on the forces available, the strategic situation and many other
factors. However, it is suggested that sufficient mining should be carried out to cause
the enemy to undertake mine countermeasures operations. Such operations are very
costly to the enemy, and if they are not undertaken the mining will usually be
extremely effective.
c. (NR)(NMP) The basic assumption and purpose of a plan will usually be specified
by the command directing preparation of the plan. It should be noted that casualties
may not always be the primary purpose of a sustained attrition mining campaign. For
example in planning anti-submarine mining it may become clear that the enemy can
keep his submarine casualty rate low by shifting his submarines to less mineable
bases. If these bases are disadvantageous in distance and facilities then causing the
enemy to shift to them may be worth the mining effort, even though submarines are
not sunk after the shift is made. In this case, the casualty rate used in calculating the
necessary mining effort is the rate believed to be necessary to cause the enemy to
relocate its assets.
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d. (NR)(NMP) Since sustained attrition mining is strategic in nature, a sustained
attrition campaign must be planned at a staff level responsible for the area. The
numbers and types of mines to be laid in each channel segment, the sensitivities of
the firing systems, the arming delays and the steriliser settings should all be
specified by the area planner. However, the way in which the mines shall be laid; the
delivery vehicle tracks and speeds, the altitudes of mine release, the type of flight
gear on the mines, the exact times of laying; and similar tactical questions are
determined by the minelaying command. It is obvious that there must be much
collaboration among various commands before a good detailed plan is finally
developed.
e. (NR)(NMP) Since the conflict will probably not proceed exactly as planned, plans
should include reasonable reserve of various types of mines so that a change in the
situation can be met without a shortage of mines.
0609
(NR)(NMP) Tactical Mining
Tactical mining would be conducted in support of a limited military objective, generally in a
specified area of immediate tactical interest. Integration of mining into other areas of warfare,
particularly into ASW and Amphibious Warfare, is of special value and most effective.
Historically the mine has not been considered a good tactical weapon because of the
requirement for detailed and lengthy preparation and that there have been more suitable
weapons for tactical use. However, with the advent of improved fabrication and computer
technology, mines are useful as tactical weapons. The capability to transform a general
purpose bomb into a mine in a matter of minutes eg. the US Destructor, is an excellent
example. Therefore, the mine can legitimately be considered a tactical, as well as strategic
weapon.
0610
(NR)(NMP) Types of Mining Operations
1.
(NR)(NMP) Fundamental Considerations. It is difficult to formulate a clear-cut
classification of the different types of mining operations owing to the variety of factors
involved and in practice types will tend to overlap. Operations may be split up, however,
according to seven fundamental considerations:
a. (NR)(NMP) Relation of the operation to other military operations; strategic mining
and tactical mining. (See paras 0608 & 0609).
b. (NR)(NMP) Response type; proactive or reactive mining.
c. (NR)(NMP) Physical position of the minefield; offensive, defensive and
protective.
d. (NR)(NMP) Type and purpose of the minefield; nuisance, closure, attrition, etc.
e. (NR)(NMP) Duration of the minefield; unsustained or sustained field.
f.
(NR)(NMP) Scale of countermeasures expected; countered or uncountered field.
g. (NR)(NMP) Method of laying; aircraft-laid fields, submarine-laid fields and
surface-laid fields.
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2.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NR) (NMP) Response Type
b. (NR) (NMP) Reactive Mining. Mining will be reactive if it is carried out in
response to the opponent’s dispositions with the aim of exploiting any opportunities
thereby presented. Since reactive mining can be expected to be carried out more or
less in presence of opposing forces, the minelaying role will normally be limited to
tactical units. Of these, covert units, such as submarines and, perhaps in the future,
AUVs will be the most suitable in view of survivability and surprise. Aircraft may offer
a more suitable method for reactive mining with respect to speed and delivery.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Physical Position.
a. (NR)(NMP) Offensive Mining.
(1) (NR)(NMP) An offensive minefield is one laid in waters controlled by the
opponent. Since the purpose of a minefield is to threaten or inflict damage on the
opposition, this type offers the greatest potential. It is the most aggressive and
poses the most direct threat to opponents, yet poses the least threat to friendly
forces. However, since the opposition controls the water as well as the
surrounding air space and land areas, the offensive minefield is designed with
the certainty that the field must be its own protector. Therefore, it must contain
the most countermeasures-resistant mines, and these mines must incorporate
settings and combinations tailored to resist the opposition’s MCM operations,
particularly if the re defences are such that, after the initial laying operation,
replenishment may not be feasible. This potential of opponents to defend the
area makes selection of the delivery vehicle also of major importance.
(2) (NR)(NMP) The delivery agent, usually submarine or high performance
aircraft, must be the one best able to penetrate the defences and accomplish the
mission most efficiently and safely. Since friendly forces will not be passing
through the minefield, selection of the location may be based partially on the
criterion that no forces will be allowed to pass without damage.
b.
(NR)(NMP) Defensive Mining.
(1) (NR)(NMP) A defensive minefield is one laid in international waters. Since it
is in waters which may be used by both belligerents as well as by nonbelligerents, safe passage of friendly and neutral forces must be a criterion.
Opposition to the minelaying operation, while still possible, is likely to be less
than that in offensive mining operations. Replenishment may be feasible. Greater
latitude in the selection of the mine types is possible; the field is subject to less
MCM, thus less sophisticated mines and settings may be used, depending on
the purpose of the minefield. Greater latitude in the selection of minelaying
vehicles is also possible. For example, it may be feasible for surface craft or
more vulnerable laying agents, such as cargo aircraft, to lay the field. This offers
the potential of greater payloads per vehicle and use of more readily available
craft.
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a. (NR)(NMP) Proactive Mining. Mining will be proactive if the aim is to establish a
position from which control or initiative can be exercised by forcing the opponent to
respond on unfavourable terms. This will normally be achieved by laying mines in
pre-planned positions in an operation area before arrival of opposing forces.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(3) (NR)(NMP) The location of the field may mean that it is in waters which are
difficult to mine due to the depth, requiring mines with long moorings or mobile
mines and a distribution of mines in depth in order to prevent the passage of
submerged submarines. If the minefield is in an international strait or passage or
waters which are characterised by fast currents, the problem to the minefield
planner may be further complicated.
c. (NR)(NMP) Protective Mining.
(1) (NR)(NMP) A protective minefield is one laid in one's own territorial waters
or in waters controlled by friendly forces to protect ports, harbours, anchorages,
coasts and coastal routes. It is simplest to plan and the safest to lay. Since it is
subject to little or no MCM operations, it may be composed of older and less
sophisticated mines. Since mining is likely to be unopposed, the most readily
available minelayer may be selected with little concern for its vulnerability. On
the negative side, a protective field may tend to cause more damage to own or
friendly forces than to those of the enemy. One reason is that friendly forces,
including merchant shipping, operate near and through the field on a routine
basis. Accordingly, its boundaries and channels must be plotted and laid with
greatest precision, and they must be adequately documented and made known
to all concerned. Similar to a defensive field, but to a lesser degree, there is also
the possibility that the area may be subjected to enemy offensive mining
operations. After observation, the enemy may be able to locate and lay mines in
the safe channels. By using this tactic the enemy can create the greatest threat
with the fewest mines and at the same time make the field a threat to both sides.
(2) (NR)(NMP) Uses of Protective Minefields. There are many reasons for
which a protective minefield may be laid and some examples are given in the
following paragraphs:
(a) (NR)(NMP) Protection of Harbours and Anchorages. Where
minefields are used to protect harbours and anchorages it is necessary that
a high degree of threat be achieved. Replenishment is simplified by the fact
that the minefield is in waters controlled by friendly forces. Controlled
minefields are particularly suited to the close protection of harbours.
(b) (NR)(NMP) Expeditionary Operations Anchorages/Areas. The
speed at which mines can be laid makes them particularly valuable to be
used in stride with Expeditionary Operations. Expeditionary Operations
Anchorage/area mining should be carried out in such a way that it will not
interfere with, but strengthen future potential defence installations.
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(2) (NR)(NMP) The use of the area by neutral shipping and forces of both
belligerents does, however, present potential complications in the design and
maintenance of the minefield. Accordingly, the boundaries of the field and safe
channels must be strictly enforced and made known to all friendly and neutral
ships needing passage. The sanctity of Q routes must be observed. On the other
hand, because the area is also used (or available for use) by the opposition, it is
susceptible to their mining operations. Passages and operating areas must,
therefore be closely monitored to prevent them from becoming traps for friendly
forces.
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(d) (NR)(NMP) Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).
Where SLOCs pass through or across narrow waters or close along a
friendly coast, minefields can be used to give protection against attacks by
surface craft and submarines. As a high degree of threat is desirable, this
will probably entail the expenditure of a large amount of material and
labour. Careful considerations must therefore be given to whether the
degree of protection afforded will repay the expenditure of effort entailed.
(e) (NR)(NMP) Supplementary to ASW Operations. The laying of deep
minefields in territorial inshore waters and other waters, in which
submarines would have to remain submerged, will materially reduce the
area in which they are likely to operate and thus ease the burden of antisubmarine forces. It may be possible to achieve the aim by laying an area
minefield adjacent to the shipping routes and whilst the threat to a single
submarine carrying out an attack may be small, the cumulative effect on
many attacks may be sufficient to deter any submarine from entering the
area.
d. (NR)(NMP) Other Types of Mining Operations. Mining can also be conducted
in international waters which may not be included in the above definitions. For
example, in the open ocean, seas or in international straits to destroy or impede
enemy shipping, warships and submarines transiting or operating in these areas.
Tactical mining, described in paragraph 0609, is one type of such a mining operation.
Mining may also be employed in these areas to narrow the breadth of SLOCs for the
passage of enemy forces in un-mined waters and thus facilitate concentration of
NATO naval and maritime air forces for the purpose of effectively opposing
transits/operations of enemy shipping, warships and submarines.
4.
(NR)(NMP) Types and Purposes of Minefields
a. (NR)(NMP) Closure Minefield.
(1) (NR)(NMP) Purpose. The purpose of closure minefield is to prevent ships
from passing through a given area. They may be sustained or un-sustained,
countered or un-countered. The Simple Initial Threat (SIT) would normally be
30% or more although in isolated instances it would be considerably lower. It
should be noted that the decision to stop using certain waters is the enemy’s, not
the minelayers, so the term closure field is not an absolute aim of the minelayer.
Closure minefields are related to close projection operations (amphibious landing
and sea transport) where the ships involved essentially will have a onedimensional movement pattern by moving on a more or less straight course
through the minefield. This type of minefield is generally characterized by limited
geographical extent, high mine density and a more or less immediate effect
when transit attempts take place. (See ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 5).
6-9
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
(c) (NR)(NMP) Protection of Coastlines. In this case the aim may be to
destroy or delay ships attempting amphibious operations, offensive mining
operations or to prevent opposing or raiding forces reaching positions from
which they can land.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(2) (NR)(NMP) Tactical Co-operation. Tactical co-operation with closure fields
takes place on a stationary basis and will require weapon systems with both
endurance and survivability eg. Land based fortified artillery. In addition, the
weapon system will normally have to be deployed in the vicinity of the minefield
in order to ensure adequate coverage and exploit its presence. Surface ships in
this role will generally be more exposed, and may also have insufficient
endurance. Submarines, on the other hand, will have both invisibility and
endurance. Both surface ships and submarines will be more or less
geographically tied to a confined area, and thus forced to give up a substantial
part of their mobility.
b. (NR)(NMP) Area Minefield.
(1) (NR)(NMP) Purpose. The area minefield is established by scattering mines
over a large area with the aim of causing attrition to ships moving within that
area. Area minefields are related to sea control and distant projection operations
where the ships involved essentially will have a two-dimensional movement
pattern by sailing on more or less random courses or non-overlapping tracks
within the operation area. This type of minefield is further characterized by large
geographical extent, very low mine density and accumulated effect as the
minefield functions through exploitation of movement as a threat multiplier. For
further planning details on an Area Minefield see ATP-24 Volume II Chapter 5.
(2) (NR)(NMP) Tactical Co-operation. Tactical co-operation with area fields
take place on a mobile basis, where surface units, aircraft and submarines can
exploit the minefield effectively without being hampered by it. Surface units and
aircraft can base their operations on threat projection into the minefield by means
of long weapon range and mobility. Submarines can operate inside or close to
the minefield on a common basis of invisibility and endurance. In both cases it
will then be possible to impose movement intensive sea control operations within
the minefield where enemy forces involved will be decimated at a continuous
rate. This form of tactical co-operation will allow own units to operate with a low
degree of self-exposure, thus enabling them to preserve their strength until the
effect of the minefield renders a strike both possible and decisive.
c. (NR)(NMP) Attrition Minefield. Attrition minefields are defined as those
intended primarily to cause damage to enemy ships and maintain a constant level of
threat over an extended period of time. They may either be sustained or unsustained. Attrition minefields will generally be related to a one-dimensional
movement pattern (primarily sea transport).
d. (NR)(NMP) Nuisance Minefield. A minefield which is planned to force the
opponent into taking countermeasures which adversely affect his operational effort.
The SIT would normally be 10% or less. Nuisance minefields will generally be related
to a one-dimensional movement pattern (primarily sea transport).
6-10
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Closure Field
Area Field
Purpose
Prevent Passage Through an Area
Prevent Operations Within an Area
Movement Pattern
One-Dimensional
Two-Dimensional
Operations
Close Projection
Sea Control, Distant Projection
Geographical Extent
Limited
Very Large
Mine Density
High
Very Low
Time Factor
More or Less Immediate Effect
Effect Accumulated Over Time
Tactical Co-operation
On Stationary Basis - Primarily with
Land Based Artillery
On Mobile Basis - With Surface
Units, Aircraft or Submarines.
Threat
≥ 30% SIT
Increase over time, locally variable
Nuisance Field
Attrition Field
Purpose
Force opponent to conduct MCM
Cause Damage to ships
Movement Pattern
One Dimensional
One Dimensional
Operations
N/A
N/A
Geographical Extent
Variable
Small
Mine Density
Low
High
Time Factor
Immediate
Over an extended period of time
Tactical Co-operation
On Mobile Basis - With Surface
Units, Aircraft or Submarines.
On Stationary Basis
Threat
≤10% SIT
High – Arming Delays and/or Ship
Counts required
NATO-RESTRICTED
e. (NR)(NMP) Anti-Submarine Minefield. A field laid especially against
submarines It may be laid shallow and be unsafe for all craft, including submarines,
or laid as a Deep Water Minefield with the aim of being safe for surface ships.
f.
(NR)(NMP) Dummy Minefield.
(1) (NR)(NMP) A minefield containing no live mines and presenting only a
psychological threat. Dummy minefields may include declared or assumed
minefields. A declared minefield refers to a declaration of mining, which may be
true or false. An assumed minefield refers to an idea in the enemy’s mind about
possible mining, which may be true or false. Dummy minefields thus offer a
considerable potential for deception, where the enemy may be deceived or
deceive himself.
6-11
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
Table 6-1. (NMP) Comparison of Minefields
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
g. (NR)(NMP) Stealth Minefield. A minefield consisting of stealth type mines to
counter modern sonar technology, in particular, Sidescan Sonars.
i. (NR)(NMP) Controlled and Independent Minefields. A controlled minefield can
be controlled to the extent of making the mines safe or live or to fire them. These
mines are controlled by remote means (via a cable or by wireless network/link). An
independent minefield cannot be controlled once the mines have been laid.
j. (NR)(NMP) Table 6-1 summarises and compares parameters of the four main
types of minefield.
k. (NR)(NMP) Decoys might be incorporated into any minefield to increase the
required minehunting effort.
0611
(NR)(NMP) General Considerations for Minefield Planning
1.
(NR)(NMP) The following are some of the general points which should be considered
when deciding upon a mining policy:
a. (NR)(NMP) The independent mine may not achieve its objective until some time
after it has passed out of human control and it is equally dangerous to friend, enemy
and neutral. As a result it can be assumed that haphazard mining is unlikely in a
major conflict and one can be expected to plan minefields with care, using arming
delays, sterilizers and other devices to control the period during which the field is
effective. However, in the event of a non-conventional threat (terrorist, rogue nation,
criminal activists, organised crime, etc.), haphazard mining could be expected.
b. (NR)(NMP) In a defensive field, where resistance to countermeasures is not the
primary requirement, simple mines are often best because they can be cheap,
reliable, long-lived and can be used in large numbers. In an offensive field where
resistance to countermeasures is important, more complex mines should be laid.
Depending on circumstances, in both cases, mixtures of various types of mines
including both ground and moored may be useful and anti-sweep devices may be
used primarily in offensive minefields.
c. (NR)(NMP) Broadly, mining should achieve its object by making an area unsafe
for the passage of shipping. The minefield should be regarded as the weapon rather
than the mine but no minefield must ever be held to constitute an impenetrable
barrier. As a result it may be assumed that subsequent harassing of mine
countermeasure vessels, reconnaissance of the mined area, replenishment of the
field and modification of future plans consequent on the results obtained, should all
be expected.
6-12
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
h. (NR)(NMP) Countered and Uncountered Minefield. Countered minefields are
defined as those which the opponent is expected to counter by minesweeping,
minehunting or clearance diving. Uncountered fields are those which the opponent is
expected not to counter.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
2.
ATP-06 VOLUME I
(NR)(NMP) Environmental Considerations.
b. (NR)(NMP) Information from the Mine Warfare Data Centres (MWDC), the Mine
Warfare Pilots (MWP) and additional information obtained from REA should be
sought when planning a minefield. Bottom topography, likely mine burial and other
factors that may influence effectiveness of the field are also essential considerations.
c. (NR)(NMP) Environmental factors and their effects for planning minefields are
listed in ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 3.
3.
(NR)(NMP) Use of Ship Counts.
a. (NR)(NMP) In order to sustain the desired threat over a longer period of time or
to present a threat over the highest number of transitors, the use of ship counts
should be considered. Using ship-counts will increase the amount of influence
minesweeping effort required in order to achieve an acceptable level of clearance,
which implies a higher resistance of the minefield to minesweeping. The use of shipcounts also allows the minefield planner to use simpler and more reliable mine firing
systems. The opponents statistical calculations will be more difficult and the effect of
the minefield less predictable.
b. (NR)(NMP) Minehunting operations are not affected by ship counters. This
implies that the use of ship counts is more efficient when used in areas with
challenging minehunting conditions.
c. (NR)(NMP) The aim and purpose of the minefield largely influences the choice of
high or low ship count setting. Typically Closure minefields have high ship counts
whereas Area minefields and Nuisance minefields have lower ship counts. Equally,
in order to sustain an effective attrition minefield, high ship counts should be used.
d. (NR)(NMP) The ship count distribution across the individual mines within a
minefield can be uniformly or randomly distributed (eg. All mines on the same ship
count, all ship counts uniformly distributed or any other combination.). Choice of ship
count distribution should be based on simulations by minefield modelling.
4.
(NR)(NMP) Use of Arming Delays.
a. (NR)(NMP) Arming delays are used in order to postpone the effects of mining for
a given period. Arming delays should generally be co-ordinated with the schedule of
minelaying sorties so that the rate at which mines arm in any channel remains
reasonably steady, but variations in the arming rate are not harmful so long as they
cannot be predicted by the enemy. Also, the delays may be used to achieve
operational deception as they only allow the mines to pose a threat at a time chosen
by the minefield planner.
6-13
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
a. (NR)(NMP) In mining operations a thorough knowledge of the area environment
is essential from the very outset. The minefield planner must study all relevant
factors and, should need arise, recommend to higher authority that the area be
readjusted or re-sited to enable objectives to be achieved. Should environmental
changes occur while operations are being carried out, they must be taken into
consideration.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
b. (NR)(NMP) Arming delays are also used to ensure the safety of the minelaying
force (see ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 6 & Chapter 8).
d. (NR)(NMP) Minehunting operations are not affected by arming delays. This
implies that the use of arming delays is more efficient when used in areas with
challenging minehunting conditions.
5.
(NR)(NMP) Use of Sterilisers. Sterilisation mechanisms are used in order to cancel
the effects of minelaying after a given period. They can be used in conjunction with a self
destruction device to overcome the legal requirement for the owner to remove the mines post
conflict.
6.
(NR)(NMP) Using a combination of Ship Counts, Arming Delays and Sterilisers offers
the minefield planner a wider range of options to increase the tactical effectiveness of the
minefield. The use of other MCCM techniques and devices is detailed in ATP-06 Vol I
Chapter 2 & ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 5.
7.
(NR)(NMP) Use of Types of Mines. The MCM capabilities of opponents must be
considered when selecting the types of mines and their influence. In areas of challenging
minehunting conditions, a variety of each type of mine is recommended to force the opponent
to use a wide variety of MCM techniques thereby increasing the required MCM effort. The
choice of mine types will apply to any one or a combination of the following factors:
a. (NR)(NMP) Ensure correct and reliable functionality of the mines taking into
account the selected targets and the environmental conditions.
b. (NR)(NMP) Resistance to influence sweeping and minehunting techniques.
c. (NR)(NMP) Take advantage of the sensor range of Mobile or Self Propelled
Mines.
8.
(NR)(NMP) Mine Sweeps and MCMVs as Targets. It should be kept in mind that
under some circumstances, mine sweeps or MCMVs may be valuable targets, because their
destruction alters the number of effective MCMVs, or the effective rate of sweeping, enough
to increase the casualty rate of follow-on shipping significantly. To increase the probability of
MCM system casualties, sensitivity, dormant periods, and other settings of the mines and
MCCM devices might be utilised.
9.
(NC)(NMP) Spacing of Mines. Minimum mine spacing is determined by mine type,
bottom type and water depth to prevent mutual interference (eg. sympathetic detonations,
sensor damage). Manoeuvring requirements and the safety of minelaying necessitate the
distance apart of additional lines laid by surface craft and submarines being greater than the
minimum permissible spacing between mines in any one line. This restriction does not of
course apply to mines laid by aircraft.
6-14
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
c. (NR)(NMP) Arming delays can also be used as a means of achieving operational
deception by keeping an established minefield unnoticed, thereby possibly inducing
the opponent to allow his traffic to transit that minefield.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
10.
(NR)(NMP) Mine Reliability. The likelihood of a mine functioning exactly as
designed after it has been laid depends upon its complexity, preparation and handling both
before and during laying, and the severity of the laying operation. Any figures for reliability
must, therefore, be considered as no more than a likely average and the results obtained in
different minefields may differ widely. Some of the factors of mine reliability are:
b. (NR)(NMP) The following are the percentages of single influence mines with
arming delays and/or ship counters which can be expected to function within
reasonable limits of their sensitivity when manufactured, or last adjusted:
(1)
(NR)(NMP) Mines laid by surface craft or submarine 90-95 per cent.
(2) (NR)(NMP) Mines laid by aircraft from high altitude with parachute 85-90
percent.
c. (NR)(NMP) The percentages are based on historical aircraft performance. Mines
laid by modern jet bombers flying at high altitude can be expected to be less reliable
and a figure of 75-80 per cent may be used.
d. (NR)(NMP) In a rough sea the risk of mine damage at water entry is increased,
particularly if the trajectory angle is small. In these conditions, the percentages given
above may be considerably reduced if the aircraft release their mines below an
altitude of about 2000 ft.
0612
(NC)(NMP) The Need for Minefield Measures of Effectiveness (MMOEs)
1.
(NC)(NMP) In attempting to evolve quantitative measures of effectiveness of mines,
difficulties are encountered that demonstrate the unique character of sea mines as a military
weapon. Noteworthy is the fact that minefields with completely contradictory goals may be
desired. On the one hand a minefield is laid whose success is judged exclusively by the
number and value of the ships sunk or damaged. On the other hand, fields have been laid
where the goal was to deter ship traffic and where the sinking of ships would seriously
jeopardise the success of the strategy. It should be obvious that it would be most difficult to
design a common MOE that could properly assess the worth of both fields.
2.
(NC)(NMP) It is relatively simple to establish as a goal, ideal general MMOEs which
measure the ‘contribution to the successful mission accomplishment’. Such measures, if
credible, would invoke less dispute, but, in view of the wide range of factors contributing to a
successful campaign. The prospect of developing a balanced roster of such measures is
small. A possible listing of the military resources of a Nation might be:
a. (NC)(NMP) The quantity and quality of weapons, communications, combatant
ships, submarines, aircraft etc.
b. (NC)(NMP) The number and training of military force personnel.
c. (NC)(NMP) The extent and responsiveness of the supporting civilian economic
structure; industry, transportation, food etc.
6-15
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
a. (NR)(NMP) The mine which contains the least complicated firing system and is
laid under the least severe conditions is the most likely to function correctly.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
d. (NC)(NMP) The public perception of the conflict.
3.
(NR)(NMP) The priority of listing and relative weighting of importance are essentially
indeterminable. History produces examples where limitations in one or more of the above
categories have been off-set by strengths in others.
5.
(NR)(NMP) It is seen that MMOEs which total the number of ships sunk or damaged,
the value of cargo destroyed, the number of personnel killed or injured are measures which
are readily understood and accepted as valid. Measures however which attempt to assess
the impact of delay by the concept of ‘virtual attrition’ or the contribution to winning the
campaign by reduction or elimination of ship traffic to a port are less acceptable.
6.
(NR)(NMP) The MMOEs are discussed in ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 5:
a. (NR)(NMP) Simple Initial Threat (SIT).
b. (NR)(NMP) Threat Profile.
c.
(NR)(NMP) Sustained Threat.
d. (NR)(NMP) Expected Casualties.
e. (NR)(NMP) Casualty Rate.
f.
(NR)(NMP) Casualty Probability Distribution.
g. (NR)(NMP) Stopped Penetrator Probability Density.
h. (NR)(NMP) Psychological Deterrence.
0613
(NR)(NMP) Minelaying Operation Orders
Minelaying Operation Orders are described in ATP-24, Volume II Chapter 10 Section II.
0614
(NR)(NMP) The Role of a Minelayer
1.
(NR)(NMP) The maximum effectiveness of mines is achieved only when they are
accurately positioned in their selected areas in time to be armed and ready for the transit of
the first target. This requirement for timely laying places the burden upon the operational
forces to employ delivery vehicles with acceptable capabilities.
2.
(NR)(NMP) Each of the three general types of vehicles (aircraft, surface craft and
submarines) has certain unique attributes that commend it for carrying out mining missions in
differing situations. However, there are few active vehicles that are specifically configured for
the primary mission of minelaying. Therefore, should a mining operation be ordered, the
choice of vehicle would be highly dependent on availability of suitable craft.
6-16
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
4.
(NR)(NMP) Mines and minefields have been effective in diminishing a nation's
strength in each of the categories above, but seldom has their success been identified with
future plans or has significantly influenced such plans.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
3.
(NR)(NMP) The role of a minelayer is to lay mines accurately in predetermined
positions with a minimum expenditure of lives and equipment. The choice of the minelayer
will depend on the type of minefield to be laid, and in the case of offensive fields, on the
enemy's strength and the degree of secrecy required. The choice also depends on the types
of mines and minelayers or delivery systems available.
(NR)(NMP) Selection of a Suitable Minelayer or Delivery System
1.
(NR)(NMP) In waters under friendly control, large surface minelayers are the most
suitable. It is desirable that their carrying capacity should be as high as possible in order to
reduce the number of separate minelaying operations, with their consequent call on covering
forces. Furthermore, the larger the number of separate lays, the larger and more frequent will
be the gaps in the field.
2.
(NR)(NMP) In waters not under friendly control, the requirements in probable order of
priority are:
a. (NR)(NMP) Ability to lay mines unobserved.
b. (NR)(NMP) Ability to lay mines expediently (Aircraft).
c.
(NR)(NMP) Power of evasion (e.g. high speed, low silhouette).
d. (NR)(NMP) A good measure of self defence or appropriate covering forces.
e. (NR)(NMP) Mine carrying capacity.
3.
(NR)(NMP) If a large mine carrying capacity is required to lay mines in waters not
under friendly control, a merchant ship would be the best option so as to deceive the
opposition. Otherwise the following should be considered.
a. (NR)(NMP) Fast minelayers.
b. (NR)(NMP) Converted destroyers and frigates.
c.
(NR)(NMP) Coastal Forces.
d. (NR)(NMP) Submarines.
e. (NR)(NMP) Aircraft.
4.
(NR)(NMP) The advantages and disadvantages of each type of minelayer are
discussed in ATP-24 Vol II Chapter 2.
5.
(NR)(NMP) Because of the above factors, which vary from one situation to another,
there will continue to be a requirement for the stockpiles to contain both aircraft and
submarine laid mines. In addition there will be a continuing requirement for mines laid from
surface ships, particularly for defensive fields. Hence the minefield planner will continue to
require all three types of minelaying vehicles in order to maintain a balanced mining threat.
Aircraft, submarines and selected surface ships will have minelaying as a secondary role. It
follows then that such factors as mine design, personnel training and logistics should be
emphasised in order to overcome the disadvantage of not having minelaying as the primary
role.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
0615
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ATP-06 VOLUME I
6.
(NR)(NMP) Future development of reliable arm/disarm mechanisms could enable
surface vessels and submarines to re-enter previously mined areas for operational reasons
and to replenish minefields. This would require a high degree of confidence that each mine is
disarmed or temporarily rendered safe. This might be achieved by interrogating the mine by
acoustic or other means to receive a positive response from each mine.
(NR)(NMP) The Safety of Shipping and Notification of Dangerous Areas
1.
(NR)(NMP) The only international rules regarding the use of mines are contained in
the Hague Convention of 1907, which has been signed by a limited number of nations only.
2.
(NR)(NMP) One of the most serious obligations in connection with mining is that of
promulgating timely and proper information to interested parties. This will be done by the
appropriate authority. It is therefore important that other authorities to whom discretion to
undertake local mining has been delegated shall make complete reports, preferably in
advance of laying, to the appropriate authority.
3.
(NR)(NMP) The obligations of signatories to the Hague Convention have in the past
been liberally interpreted. In both world wars, whole areas were declared mined, although the
actual minefields were confined to a smaller zone within the declared area and replenishment
operations were not individually declared. Although some degree of strategic surprise may be
lost by the declaration of a dangerous area, the effect of the minefield will be more
immediate, even if the casualties are less when a minefield is declared. Also, the declaration
of a dangerous area which in fact contains only a few mines may cause the enemy to waste
countermeasures effort and delay shipping. Generally speaking in the early stages of a
mining campaign, and particularly when operations are limited in scope, there is great
advantage in declaring minelays, taking account of the safety of the layer, providing such
minefields are known to be credible.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
0616
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
LEXICON OF MINE WARFARE ABBREVIATIONS, TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS
SECTION I - NAVAL MINE WARFARE ABBREVIATIONS
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this lexicon refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
0-9
7QMTE
7 Question Maritime Tactical Estimate
A
AAA
AAM
AAP
AAW
ACC
ACP
AD
ADivP
AEODP
AF
AGO
AHP
ALP
AMCM
AMNS
AMP
AOA
AOR
AP
APP
APPS
ASW
ATL
ATP
AUV
AWNIS
AWW
AXP
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Air to Air Missile(s)
Allied Administrative Publication
Anti-Air Warfare
Air Component Commander
Allied Communications Publication
Actual Depth
Allied Diving Publication
Allied Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication
Audio Frequency/Advance Force
Reference Acoustic Goal
Allied Hydrographic Publication
Allied Logistic Publication
Airborne Mine Countermeasures
Airborne Mine Neutralization System
Allied Mine Warfare Publication
Amphibious Objective Area
Area of Responsibility
Allied Publication
Allied Procedural Publication
Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Allowable Transmission Loss
Allied Tactical Publication
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System
Above Water Warfare
Allied Exercise Publication
B
BAE
BSP
Battlespace Area Evaluation
Battle Space Profiler
LEX-1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
Abbreviations and Definitions from AAP-15 are in italics
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
C2I
C3
C4I
CATF
CBRN
CC
CCIR
CCIS
CCTV
CDT
CGS
CL
CLF
CO
COA
COE
COMOMAG
COMPLAN
COMSEC
CONOPS
COOP
COPD
CPG
CRN
CRRC
CRS
CSAR
CSM
CTE
CTF
CTG
CTU
CTW
CWC
Command, Control and Intelligence
Command, Control and Communications
Command, Control, Computers, Communications & Intelligence
Commander Amphibious Task Force
Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear
Component Commander
Commanders Critical Information Requirements
Command and Control Information System
Closed Circuit Television
Clearance Diving Team
Centimetre-Gram-Second
Confidence Level
Commander Landing Force
Commanding Officer
Course(s) of Action
Centre of Excellence
Commander, Mobile Mine Assembly Group
Communications Plan
Communications Security
Concept of Operations
Craft of Opportunity
Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
Command Planning Group
Contact Reference Number
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft
Crisis Response Shipping
Combat Search and Rescue
Continental Shelf Mine
Commander Task Element
Commander Task Force
Commander Task Group
Commander Task Unit
Course Made Good Through the Water
Composite Warfare Commander
D
DARE
DC
DDA
DG
DGPS
DP
DR
DSO
DSOM
Decision Aid for Risk Evaluation
Damage Control or Direct Current
Disk Drive Assembly
Degaussing
Differential Global Positioning System
Decision Point(s)
Dead Reckoning
Decision Support Overlay
Decision Support Overlay Matrix
LEX-2
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
C
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
E&R
ECCM
ECM
EEFI
ELFE
ELF
EMCON
EOD
EODMU
ES
ESPRESSO
EW
EXOPORD
Evasion and Recovery
Electronic Counter Countermeasures
Electronic Countermeasures
Essential Elements of Friendly Information
Extreme Low Frequency Electric
Extreme Low Frequency
Emission Control
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit
End State(s)
Extensible Performance and Evaluation Suite for Sonar
Electronic Warfare
Exercise Operation Order
F
FACES
FFIR
FIC
FLS
FMA
FOL
FORMEX
FORMETS
FP
FS
Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness, Exclusivity, Suitability
Friendly Forces Information Requirements
Fast Insertion Craft
Forward Logistic Site or Forward Logistic Support
Former Mined Area
Fraction of Losses
Formalised Exchange
Message Text Formatting System
Force Protection
Fire Support
G
GDP
GPGM
GPS
GRT
GSM
GUI
General Defence Plans
General Purpose Ground Mine
Global Positioning System
Gross Registered Tonnage
Global System for Mobile Communications
Graphical User Interface
H
HE
HF
HOD
HQ
HSA
HUMINT
HVU
HWM
High Explosive
High Frequency
Head of Delegation
Headquarters
Horizontal Sextant Angle
Human Intelligence
High Value Unit
High Water Mark
LEX-3
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I&W
ICDP
IED
IFF
ILDP
INCOPE
INS
INTERCO
IP
IPB
IPOE
IR
IRPCS
ISR
ISTAR
Indicators and Warnings
Inter-Count Dormant Period
Improvised Explosive Device
Identification Friend or Foe
Inter Look Dormant Period
Improved Non-uniform Coverage Operation and Evaluation
Inertial Navigation System
International Code of Signals
Initial Point
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Infra-Red
International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
J
JABS
JCS
JISR
JOPG
Joint Direct Attack Munition Assault Breaching System
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
Joint Operational Planning Group
K
KSF
Keel Shock Factor
L
LBL
LER
LF
LOP
LRN
LTO
LTV
LWM
Long Baseline
Low Frequency Electro-magnetic Radiation
Low Frequency
Line of Position
Lay Reference Number
Lead Through Operation
Lead Through Vessel
Low Water Mark
M
MAD
MAH
MAL
MARCOM
MAROPS
MAS
MATL
MC
Magnetic Anomaly Detector
Maritime Analysis Handbook
Mine Actuation Level
Maritime Commander
Maritime Operations
Mine Avoidance Sonar
Maximum Allowable Transmission Loss
Military Committee
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I
MCCIS
MCCM
MCCS
MCD
MCM
MCM EXPERT
MCMOPDIR
MCMOPORD
MCMR
MCM RDM
MCMTA
MCMV
MDA
MDCOA
MDR
ME
MEDEVAC
MEDS
MF
MH
MHC
MIE
MIED
MLCOA
MILCO
MILEC
MLREP
MLTASK
MMS
MMOE
MNC
MNV
MOC
MOE
MOP
MOU
MPA
MPO
MPP
MPRA
MREPREQR
MRN
MS
MSA
MSC
MSCD
MSD
MSI
MSM
MSO
MSS
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Maritime Command & Control Information System
Mine Counter Countermeasures
Mine Countermeasures Command and Support Ship
Mine Countermeasure Vessel, Diving
Mine Countermeasures
Mine Countermeasures Exclusive Planning, Evaluation Risk Assessment
Tool
MCM Operations Directive
Mine Countermeasures Operation Orders
Mine Countermeasures Reports
MCM Risk Directive Matrix
Mine Countermeasures Tasking Authority
Mine Countermeasures Vessel
Mine Danger Area
Most Dangerous Course of Action
Mine Damage Radius
Main Efforts
Medical Evacuation
MCM EXPERT Data Sheet(s)
Medium Frequency
Mine Hunting
Minehunter Coastal
Mine Investigation and Exploitation
Maritime Improvised Explosive Device
Most likely Course of Action
Minelike Contact
Minelike Echo
Minelaying Report
Minelaying Task
Marine Mammal System
Minefield Measures of Effectiveness
Major NATO Commander
Mine Neutralisation Vehicle
Maritime Operations Centre
Measure of Effectiveness
Magnetic Orange Pipe
Memorandum of Understanding
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Minefield Performance Objective
Minefield Planning Programme
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
Mine Warfare Reporting Requirement
Mine Reference Number
Mine Sweeping
Maritime Situational Awareness
Minesweeper Coastal
Minesweeper Coastal, Drone Guide Unit
Minesweeper Drone
Minesweeper Inshore
Mine Setting Mode
Minesweeper Ocean
Mine Setting Sheet
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MTA
MTF
MTMS
MW
MWDC
MWP
MWSO
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Mine Threat Area
Message Text Format
Maritime Tactical Message System
Mine Warfare
Mine Warfare Data Centre
Mine Warfare Pilot
Mine Warfare Staff Officer
NAC
NAI
NAL
NAVAID
NAVSTAR
NCAGS
NCIA
NEPS
NEQ
NFB
NFO
NMCM
NMFPF
NMFPG
NMW
NMWC
NMWTTEP
NMWWG
NOMBO
NSA
NTM
NUCEVL
NATO FORACS
North Atlantic Council
Named Area of Interest
Normal Actuation Level
Navigational Aid
Navigation System Using Timing and Range
Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping
NATO Communications & Information Agency
NATO EOD Publication Set
Net Explosive Quantity
Nominal Frequency Band
NATO FORACS Office
Naval Mine Countermeasures
NATO Minefield Planning Folder
NATO Minefield Planning Guidance
Naval Mine Warfare
Naval Mine Warfare Coordinator
Naval Mine Warfare Tools, Tactics & Evaluation Procedures
Naval Mine Warfare Working Group
Non Mine Minelike Bottom Object
NATO Standardisation Agency
Notice to Move
Non-Uniform Coverage Evaluation
NATO Naval Forces Sensors and Weapons Accuracy Check Site
O
OAP
OCA
OCE
OD
OFFTASK
OIC
ONTASK
OOA
OPAREA
OPCOM
OPCON
OPDIR
OPGEN
OPLAN
OPORD
OPP
Offset Aim Point
Operational Control Authority
Officer Conducting the Exercise
Omni-Directional
Off-Task Cycle
Officer-in-Charge
On-Task Cycle
Out of Area
Operational Area
Operational Command
Operational Control
Operational Directive
Operational General Matters
Operation Plan
Operation Order
Operational Planning Process
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N
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OPREP
Operational Reporting
OPSTAT
Operational Status
OPTASK
Operational Tasking
ORBAT
Order of Battle
ORBATTOASEA
Order of Battle Transfer of Authority Sea
OSE
Officer Scheduling the Exercise
OTC
Officer in Tactical Command
OTH
Over the Horizon
OTT
On Task Time
P
PERREP
PIR
PMA
PMI
POC
PPI
PPS
PSYOPS
Periodic Report
Priority Information Requirements
Post Mission Analysis
Prevention of Mutual Interference
Point of Contact
Political Policy Indicator
Precise Positioning System
Psychological Operations
R
RC
RDM
REA
RFI
RHIB
RID
RMP
ROA
ROE
ROV
RPC
RSP
RTSV
RV
Remote Control
Risk Directive Matrix
Rapid Environmental Assessment
Request for Information
Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
Reacquisition and Identification
Recognized Maritime Picture
Radius/Radii of Action
Rules of Engagement
Remote Operated Vehicle
Recommended Pulse Cycle
Render Safe Procedure
Route Survey
Rendezvous Point
S
SAL
SAM
SAR
SATCOM
SAS
SC
SCC
SCCL
SCUBA
SDNE
SECDEF
SEV
SF
Sweeping Actuation Level
Surface to Air Missile
Search and Rescue
Satellite Communications
Synthetic Aperture Sonar
Strategic Command(er) or Shaped Charge
Sonar Confidence Check
Sonar Contact Confidence Level
Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus
Standard Deviation of Navigational Error
Secretary of Defense
Surface Effect Vehicle
Special Forces
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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Simple Initial Threat
Sea Lines of Communication
Standard Letter Suffix or Side Look Sonar
Surface Mine Countermeasures
Sending Nation
Speed of Advance
Speed Over the Ground
Scheme of Manoeuvre
Standard Operating Procedures
Submarine Patrol Areas
Standard Pulse Cycle
Self Protection Measure(s)
Sea Port of Debarkation
Stopped Penetrator Probability Density
Self-Propelled Variable Depth Sonar
Self-Rotating Cavitation Disks
Single Sideband
Side Scan Sonar
Semi-Submerged Vehicle
Standardisation Agreement
Starboard
Standard Track Turn Method
Ships Taken Up From Trade
Speed Made Good Through the Water
Submarine Operating Authority
Sound Velocity Profile
Surf Zone
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
SHAPE
SIT
SLOC
SLS
SMCM
SN
SOA
SOG
SOM
SOP
SPA
SPC
SPM
SPOD
SPPD
SPVDS
SRCD
SSB
SSS
SSV
STANAG
STBD
STTM
STUFT
STW
SUBOPAUTH
SVP
SZ
ATP-06 VOLUME I
T
TA
TACOM
TACON
TACSIT
TAI
TAS
TASKORG
TE
TF
TG
TI
TL
TNT
TSM
TTEP
TTP
TTW
TU
Tasking Authority
Tactical Commander
Tactical Control
Tactical Situation
Target Area of Interest
True Air Speed
Task Organization
Task Element or Threat Evaluation
Task Force
Task Group
Threat Integration
Transmission Loss
Trinitrotoluene
Target Simulation Mode
Tactics and Tools Evaluation Panel
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
Territorial Waters
Task Unit
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U
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Uniform Coverage Planning
Underwater Electric Potential
Ultra-High Frequency
Underwater Mine Countermeasures
Underwater Reference Mark
United States Air Force
Ultra Short Baseline
Unmanned Surface Vehicle
Universal Transverse Mercator
Universal Transverse Mercator Grid
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
Underwater Data Centre
Underwater Improvised Explosive Device
Underwater Warfare
Unexploded Explosive Ordnance
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
UAV
UCPLN
UEP
UHF
UMCM
URM
USAF
USBL
USV
UTM
UTMG
UUV
UWDC
UWIED
UWW
UXO
V
VDDS
VDS
VERTREP
VHF
VSS
VSW
VTM
VTMS
Very Deep Draught Ship
Variable Depth Sonar
Vertical Replenishment
Very High Frequency
Volume Search Sonar
Very Shallow Water
Vehicle Transiting the Minefield
Vessel Traffic Management System
W
WGS
Wi Fi
WNGO
WSM
WWNWS
World Geodetic System
Wireless Fidelity
Warning Order
Water Space Management
World-Wide Navigation Warning Service
LEX-9
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SECTION II - NAVAL MINE WARFARE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Terms and Definitions from AAP-6 are in italics
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout
this Glossary refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
Acoustic Circuit. In Mine Warfare, an influence mine circuit which responds to the change
of noise level caused by an approaching ship, submarine or sweep.
Acoustic Goal (AGO). The reference acoustic level corresponding to the actuation level of
the existing potential sea mine
Acoustic Goal Line. (NMM) The estimate for the upper limit of the background noise in the
ocean taken as the criteria of the noise generated by a ship
Acoustic Merit Index. Parameter used to qualitatively compare the acoustic measurements
of individual ships or ships of different classes.
Acoustic Mine. A mine with an acoustic circuit which responds to the acoustic field of a
ship, submarine or sweep.
Acoustic Minehunting. The use of sonar to detect and classify mine-like objects which may
be in the water volume, on or protruding from the seabed, or buried in the seabed.
Active Mine. A mine actuated by the reflection from a target of a signal emitted by the mine.
Active Defensive Mine Countermeasures. Actions taken to counter the mine after it has
been laid.
Actuate. To operate a mine firing system by an influence or a series of influences in such a
way that all the requirements of the mechanism for firing, or for registering a target [In
NMW; ship] count, are met.
Actuation Level. See ‘Mine Actuation Level’ and ‘Normal Actuation Level’
Aggregate Width (W). The cumulative area under the lateral range curve, plotting the
probability (P) as a function of the athwartship distance (y) also called the P(y) Curve.
a.
Aggregate Actuation Width. For influence sweeping, P(y) is the probability of
actuating a mine at least once (or registering a ship count) at the lateral offset y
from the sweep during a single pass of the sweep.
b.
Aggregate Detection Width. For minehunting, P(y) is the probability of
detecting (and/or classifying) a mine at lateral offset y from the sonar during a
single pass of the sonar.
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Aggregate Sweep Width. For mechanical sweeping, P(y) is the probability of
cutting a mine mooring at lateral offset y from the sweep during a single pass of
the sweep. It should be noted that P(y) curves are not normally developed for
mechanical sweeps.
Aggregate Danger Width. See Dangerous Front
All Poised Risk. After MCM Operations the probability of damage to the first transitor where
all remaining mines are considered to be on ship count 1.
Allowable Transmission Loss (ATL). See Maximum Allowable Transmission Loss
Antenna Mine. A contact mine fitted with antenna which, when touched by a ferrous object,
set up galvanic action to fire the mine
Antenna-Sweep.
A Sweep System to counter antenna fitted mines.
Anti-Air Warfare. Measures taken to defend maritime force against attacks by airborne
weapons launched from aircraft, ships submarines and land based sites
Anti-Countermining Device. A device fitted in a mine to prevent its actuation by shock.
Anti-Hovercraft / Anti-Helicopter Mine. A mine which is laid or whose mechanism is
specifically designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging hovercraft or
helicopters.
Anti-Mine Hunter Mine. A mine which is laid or whose mechanism is specifically designed
or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging Mine Hunters.
Anti-MCMV Mine. A mine which is laid or whose firing system is designed or adjusted, with
the specific object of damaging MCM vessels.
Anti-Mine Sweeper Mine. A mine which is laid or whose firing system is specifically
designed or adjusted with the object of sinking or damaging Mine Sweepers.
Anti-Recovery Device. Any device in a mine designed to prevent an enemy discovering
details of the working of the mine firing system.
Anti-Surface Effect Vehicle Mine (ASEVM) A mine used against Surface Effect Vehicles
(SEV).
Anti-Submarine Minefield. A field laid specifically against submarines. It may be laid
shallow and be unsafe for all craft, including submarines, or laid deep with the aim of
being safe for surface ships.
Anti-Sweep Device. Any device incorporated in the mooring of a mine or obstructor, or in
the mine circuits to make the sweeping of the mine more difficult.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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Aggregate Damage Width. The integral of the probability of actuation of a mine under
specified conditions, integrated only over those values of athwartship distance for
which the explosion of the mine is likely to inflict at least a specified amount of
damage.
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Anti-Watching Device. A device fitted in a moored mine which causes it to sink should it
watch, so as to prevent the position of the mine or minefield being disclosed. See
also Watching Mine.
Approach Lane. An extension of a boat lane from the line of departure toward the transport
area. It may be terminated by marker ships, boats or buoys.
Area Minefield. A type of minefield which is established by scattering mines over a large
area with the aim of causing attrition to ships moving within that area
Armed Mine. A mine from which all safety devices have been withdrawn and, after laying,
all automatic safety features and/or arming delay devices have operated. Such a
mine is ready to receive a target signal, influence or contact.
Armed Sweep. A sweep fitted with cutters or other devices to increase its ability to cut mine
moorings.
Arming Delay Device. A device fitted in a mine or any autonomous munition designed to
prevent it from being armed for a pre-set time after laying or delivery.
Arming Lanyard. A line or tape attached to a safety device which enables removal of the
device prior to mine lay.
Asymmetrical Sweep. A sweep whose swept path under conditions of no wind or cross
tide is not equally spaced either side of the sweeper’s track.
Aspect Change. The different appearance of the reflecting object viewed by sonar from
varying directions
Attenuation.
a. Decrease in density of a signal, beam, wave or influence as a result of
absorption of energy and of scattering out of the path of a detector, but not including
the reduction due to geometric spreading, ie. the inverse square of distance effect
b. In Mine Warfare, the reduction in the intensity of an influence as distance from
the source increases.
Attrition Minefield. A minefield intended primarily to cause damage to enemy ships and
maintain a constant level of threat over an extended period of time. The minefield
may either be sustained or un-sustained.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. Type of unmanned underwater vehicle capable of
executing its mission without external positive control
Average Characteristic Actuation Area. The integral, over a plane perpendicular to the
centre line of the target ship, of the probability P(y, z) of actuation of a mine under the
specified conditions.
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Approach Route. A route which joins a port to a coastal or a transit route.
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Average Characteristic Actuation Width.
The integral, over athwart ship distance
between the mine and the keel of the target ship, of the probability P(y) of actuation
of a mine at a given depth and under specified conditions.
B
Bottom Composition. Composition of the seabed (ie Mud, Sand, Shingle etc.)
Bottom Mine. A mine that is negatively buoyant; rests on, or can become buried in, the sea
bed and is held there by its own mass. (See Ground Mine and Mine).
Bottom Profile. In Naval Mine Warfare bottom profile includes descriptions of the gradient
and roughness (ie, Ripples, holes, bumps, ridges and folds).
Bottom Sweep. Two ship wire or chain sweeps used either to sweep mines close to the
bottom and to sweep heavy obstructers or to remove such mines and obstructers
from a channel by dragging them to a designated area and releasing them.
Bottom Type. Characterisation of the seabed based on Bottom Profile, Bottom Composition
and mine burial.
Bouquet Mine. A mine in which a number of buoyant mine cases are attached to the same
sinker so that when the mooring of one mine case is cut, another mine rises from the
sinker to its set depth.
Breaching. An operation specifically designed to overcome anti-landing defences in order to
conduct an amphibious assault.
C
Casualty. (See Loss)
Change Detection. The detection of any new object in an area, channel or route which has
been surveyed previously.
Channel. The whole or part of a route specified by a width in which MCM operations will be
or have been conducted.
Channel Conditioning. Channel conditioning is the operation of removing minelike objects
from channels, harbour approaches and Q-Routes to reduce the Non-Mine Minelike
Bottom Objects (NOMBOs) detected by minehunting systems.
Characteristic Width. The width of the trapezoid measured at one-half the characteristic
probability or the width of the rectangle.
a.
Characteristic Actuation Width. In influence minesweeping, the width of path
over which mines can be actuated by a single run of the sweep gear.
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Boat Lane. A lane for amphibious assault landing craft, which extends seaward from the
landing beaches to the line of departure.
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ATP-06 VOLUME I
b.
Characteristic Cutting Width. In mechanical minesweeping, the width of path
over which mines can be cut by a single run of the sweep gear.
c.
Characteristic Detection Width. In minehunting, the width of path over which
mines can be detected on a single run.
a.
Characteristic Actuation Probability.
(1)
In influence minesweeping, the average probability of a mine of a given
type being actuated by one run of the sweep within the characteristic
actuation width
(2)
In mining, the average probability of a mine of a given type being actuated
by a target in one single pass
b.
Characteristic Cutting Probability. In mechanical minesweeping, the average
probability of a mine of a given type being cut by one run of the sweep within
the characteristic cutting width.
c.
Characteristic Detection Probability. In minehunting, the ratio of the number of
mines detected on a single run to the number of mines which could have been
detected within the characteristic detection width.
Characteristic Disposal Probability. The probability of disposing of a mine by applying a
specific disposal technique
Check Operation. An MCM operation to confirm no mines are left after a previous MCM
operation or that re-mining has not taken place.
Chemical Horn. A mine horn containing an electric battery, the electrolyte for which is in a
glass tube protected by a thin metal sheet.
Circular Error Probable. A radius of a circle within which the location of half of the
detections of a single contact are expected to fall.
Circular Snagline Search. A diver dragging a lightly weighted line in a circle around a
sinker/anchor so that it is caught or ‘snagged’ by objects which are protruding from or
laying on the seabed.
Classification. In Minehunting, the process of evaluating a detected contact as minelike or
non-minelike.
Classification Range. The range at which a contact is classified.
Clearance Diver. Diver who is qualified to carry out tasks in mine/ordnance search,
investigation, disposal, render safe, recovery and removal, underwater and ashore.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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Characteristic Probability. Height of a trapezoid or rectangle that most closely fits the curve
of P(y).
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Clearance Diving. The process involving the use of divers for locating, identifying and
disposing of mines
Clearance Diving Team (CDT). Group of clearance divers established to conduct clearance
diving tasks.
Clearance Rate. The rate at which an area would be cleared with a stated minimum
percentage clearance, using specified MCM procedures.
Closed Mine Danger Area. A Mine Danger Area declared closed by the appropriate
authority after an acceptable level of clearance has been achieved.
Closure Minefield. In naval mine warfare a minefield which is planned to present such a
threat that waterborne shipping is prevented from moving.
Cluster Mining. In naval mine warfare a number of mines laid in close proximity to each
other as a pattern or coherent unit.
Close Projection. Operations constitute the traditional and principal tasks of power
projection with the general and positive aim of establishing and/or maintaining control
of a given land area through the ability to deploy own military sources and sustain the
operations.
Clutter. All echoes detected by a minehunting sonar system which are repeatedly above the
noise or the average reverberation background.
Coastal Route. A route, normally following the coastline, which joins adjacent approach
routes.
Cocking Circuit. A subsidiary circuit which requires actuation before the main circuits are
enabled.
Combination Influence Mine. A mine designed to actuate only when two or more different
influences or different types of the same influence are received simultaneously or in/at
a pre-ordained order or interval. Also known as a ‘Combined Influence Mine’.
Combination Sweep. An influence sweeping system generating the required signature to
actuate combination influence mines.
Complex Threat. The threat posed by an armed mine of a given type to the first or
subsequent targets transiting a channel taking into account the initial ship count
distribution, the MCM effort expended and the likely location with respect to the
channel centreline of the transits.
Confidence Level. The probability that the conclusion drawn about the number of mines
remaining in the channel after a negative result of an exploratory operation (ie no
mines countered) is correct.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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Clearance Operations. An MCM operation intended to achieve a high probability of
countering any mine in a given area, route or channel.
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Contact. Any discrete airborne, surface or sub-surface object detected by electronic,
acoustic, and/or visual sensors
Contact Mine. A mine which is designed to fire by physical contact between the target and
the mine case or its appendages.
Corrected Maximum Allowable Transmission Loss.
The maximum allowable
transmission loss adjusted for length of time the mine has been in the water.
Countermine. The process of detonating the main charge in a mine by the shock of a
nearby explosion of an independent explosive charge or another mine.
Creeping Mine. A buoyant mine held below the surface by a weight usually in the form of a
chain which is free to creep along the seabed under the influence of the stream or
current.
Cutter. In naval mine warfare a device fitted to a sweep wire to cut or part the mooring of
mines or obstructors; it may also be fitted in, or to, the mooring of a mine or
obstructors to part a sweep.
D
Damage Area. The plan area around a vessel inside which a mine explosion is likely to
interrupt operations.
Damage Criteria. The specified effects on a vessel of an explosion
Damage Level. The effects of underwater shock from mines.
Damage Probability. The probability that a vessel sustains damage if it actuates a mine
within its Dangerous Front.
Damage Radius. The average distance from a vessel within which a mine containing a
given mass and type of explosive must detonate if it is to inflict a specified amount of
damage.
Damage Width. See Aggregate Damage Width
Dangerous Front. The width of the intersection of two circles defined by the vessel’s
damage area and the mine’s firing area
Decoy. An imitation of a person, object or phenomenon which is intended to deceive hostile
surveillance or detection systems or mislead the adversary. A device designed to
mimick a mine or the acoustic properties of a mine to increase the opponents
required Minehunting effort
Deep Water Minefield. An anti-submarine minefield which is safe for surface vessels to
cross.
Deep Water.
Water having a depth greater than 200 metres.
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EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
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Contact Reference Number. A reference number assigned to mine-like contacts (MILCOs)
for reporting purposes.
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Defensive MCM. Countermeasures intended to reduce the effect of enemy minelaying.
Defensive Mining. A minefield laid in international waters or international straits with the
declared intention of controlling shipping in defence of sea communications.
Degaussing. The process whereby a vessel’s magnetic field is reduced by the use of
electromagnetic coils, permanent magnets or other means.
Detection. The discovery by any means of the presence of a person, object or phenomenon
of potential military significance. In NMW the action of operating minehunting sensors
to find objects on or in the seabed which distinguish themselves from the general
structure of the bottom, or to find objects in the water volume.
Detecting Circuit. That part of a mine circuit which responds to a change in the physical
conditions at the mine.
Detonator. A device containing a sensitive explosive intended to produce a detonation
wave.
Degaussing Code Number & Code Depth. The peak vertical component of the magnetic
field in nanotesla is the Degaussing Code Number and measured under a ship on the
worst heading at the specified Degaussing Code Depth.
Dip. The amount by which a moored mine is carried beneath its set depth by a current or
tidal stream acting on the mine casing and mooring.
Dip Needle. In naval mine warfare the device within a firing system which responds to a
change in the magnitude of the vertical component of the total magnetic field.
Discriminating Circuit. That part of the operating circuit of a sea mine which distinguishes
between the response of the detecting circuit to the passage of a vessel and the
response to other disturbances, (eg influence sweep, countermining etc).
Distant Projection. TBD
Diversion Route. A route which bypasses a section or the whole of a transit, coastal, or
approach route or link.
Dormant Mine. A mine whose firing system is, by design, prevented temporarily from
operating thus preventing actuation.
Drifting Mine. A buoyant or neutrally buoyant mine that is not tethered to the seabed
intentionally laid to be free to move under the influence of wind, waves, current or
tide.
Drill Mine. An inert-filled mine, or mine-like body, used in loading, laying or discharge
practice and trials.
Drone. A vehicle used in mine sweeping or mine hunting, normally unmanned, which is
remotely or automatically controlled.
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Depressor. See ‘Kite’.
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Dummy Minefield. A minefield containing no live mines and presenting only a psychological
threat.
E
Electrode Sweep. A magnetic sweep cable in which the salt water and the seabed form
part of the electric circuit.
Exercise Mine. A mine containing an inert filling and an indicating device.
Exercise and Training Mine. A reusable inert mine configuration designed for exercise,
training and/or evaluation. This can include drill and practice mines
Exercise Route. A route used solely for exercise purposes or to maintain the integrity of
dormant wartime routes.
Exploratory Operations. An operation to determine the presence or absence of mines in a
sample of a route or area and to assess whether portions of the routes / anchorages
/ areas are mined.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The detection, identification, onsite evaluation, rendering
safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.
F
Fire. To detonate the main explosive charge by means of the firing system.
Firing. Actuation of the firing system (see also Firing System).
Firing Area. For any influence sweep system, it is the horizontal area at the depth of a
particular mine in which the mine will detonate.
Firing System. A system designed to initiate an explosive, electric or other train in order to
cause the explosion of a charge. (see also Firing).
Floating Mine. A mine visible on the surface. Whenever possible it should be more exactly
defined by the term, Drifting Mine, Free Mine or Watching Mine.
Flooder. A device fitted to a buoyant mine which, on operation after a preset time, floods
the mine case and causes it to sink to the bottom.
Former Mined Area. A former minefield in which the risk to shipping has been reduced.
Free Mine. A moored mine whose mooring has parted or been cut.
G
Gap. An area within a minefield or obstacle belt, free of live mines or obstacles whose width
or direction will allow a friendly force to pass through in tactical formation.
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Edge Runs. Extra runs made on the outer most tracks of the plan in order to increase the
percentage clearance at the edges of a channel or area.
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Grapnel. A device fitted to a mine mooring designed to grapple the sweep wire.
Ground Mine. (See Bottom Mine and Mine).
Guinea-Pig. A ship converted or designed to sweep mines by its own characteristics or to
transit an already swept channel before or ahead of the passage of follow-on shipping.
Holding Area. A geographically defined location used in stationing vessels in a predetermined pattern or order.
Holiday. A gap in MCM coverage left unintentionally during MCM operations due to errors in
navigation, station keeping, buoy laying, breakdowns or other causes.
Homing Mine. A mine fitted with propulsion equipment which homes onto a target.
Horizontal Component. That component of the total magnetic field in the horizontal plane.
Horn. A projection from the mine shell of some contact mines which, when broken, or bent
or by contact, causes the mine to fire.
Hostile Environment. An environment in which an adversary has the capability and intent
to oppose or disrupt operations of friendly forces.
Hull Shock Factor. Figure of Merit for estimating the amount of shock experienced by a
naval vessel from an underwater explosion as a function of explosive charge mass,
slant range between the vessel and explosive charge.
Hunting Rate. The area cleared per unit time with a stated minimum percentage clearance,
using minehunting procedures
I
Identification. The determination of the exact nature of a Mine-like contact (MILCO).
Igniter. A device designed to produce a flame or spark to initiate an explosive train.
Induction Circuit. A circuit actuated by the rate of change of a magnetic field due to the
movement of a vessel or the changing current in the sweep.
Inert Filling. A prepared non-explosive filling ideally of the same mass and density as the
explosive filling of the mine.
Inertial Navigation System. A self contained navigation system using inertial detectors
which automatically provides vehicle position, heading and velocity.
Influence Field. The distribution of the underwater signatures of a surface vessel,
submarine or minesweeping equipment in the volume.
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H
Historic Ordnance. Ordnance relating to a previous conflict, operation or event.
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Influence Mine. A mine actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition in the
vicinity of the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine.
Influence Sweep. A sweep designed to produce influence(s) to actuate mines.
In-Stride. An MCM stage that utilizes multiple successive MCM systems.
Integrated Minehunting Operations. Operations that apply the combination of different
MCM assets to complete an MCM task.
Intermittent Arming Device. A device included in a mine so that it will be armed only at set
times.
Intermittent Arming Mechanism. (See Intermittent Arming Device)
J
Jackstay Search. A method employed by divers using a wire or rope secured firmly
between two points to systematically cover an area.
Jettisoned Mines. Mines which are laid as quickly as possible in order to empty the
minelayer of mines..
K
Keel Shock Factor. Figure of Merit for estimating the amount of shock experienced by a
naval vessel from an underwater explosion as a function of explosive charge mass,
slant range and angle between the vessel and explosive charge.
Kite. A device which when towed submerges and planes at a predetermined depth without
sideways displacement (see Depressor).
L
Landing Site. In amphibious operations, a continuous segment of coastline over which
troops, equipment and supplies can be landed by surface means
Lateral Range Curve. A P(y) curve as a function of the athwartship distance from the ship,
which combines the characteristic detection/actuation/cutting performance of the
MCMV with its SDNE.
Lateral Separation.
(1) The perpendicular distance between the tracks of the ship and the reference ship
or float .
(2) The perpendicular distance between two adjacent tracks. (See Track Spacing).
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Integrating Circuit. A circuit whose actuation is dependent on the time integral of a function
of the influence.
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Lay Reference Number. A number allocated to an individual mine by the minefield planning
authority to provide a simple means of referring to it.
Lead Through Operations. .A maritime (not an MCM) operation in which a guide ship
(Lead-through Vessel (LTV)) leads other ships or submarines (VTMs) in their
passage through channels established in a mined area.
Link Route. A route, other than a coastal route, transit route or local route which links two or
more routes.
Live Mine. A mine with an explosive filling and a means of firing the explosive charge.
Live Period. The maximum time after the first look to satisfy all the subsequent looks and
mine logic to cause an actuation.
Local Route. A route that connects the Fairway Buoy to the harbour.
Localization Error. The difference between the coordinates generated for a target and the
actual location of the target.
Look. A period during which a mine circuit is receptive of an influence.
Loop Sweep. A magnetic cable sweep in which the current carrying conductors are
insulated from the water throughout.
Closed Loop.
The sweep current is carried entirely by insulated electrical
conductors.
Open Loop. The sweep current uses the sea water to complete the circuit.
Loss. A target which is damaged to a specified level when transiting a minefield. (Also
known as Casualty).
M
Magnetic Anomaly Detector. A magnetometer used to detect the variations in the earths
magnetic field caused by ferro-magnetic material.
Magnetic Mine. A mine with a magnetic influence circuit which responds to the magnetic
field of a ship, submarine or sweep.
Magnetic Induction Mine. A mine actuated by the rate of change of a magnetic field due to
the movement of a vessel or the changing current in the sweep.
Magnetic Minehunting. The process of using magnetic detectors to determine the
presence of mines or minelike objects which may be either on, or protruding from, the
seabed, or buried.
Mark. To deposit a marker next to a classified or identified contact.
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Limited Clearance Operations. An MCM Operation intended to achieve a high probability
of countering specific mine types in a given route/anchorage/area.
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Married Failure. A moored mine laying on the seabed connected to its sinker from which it
has failed to release owing to a defective mechanism.
Maximum Allowable Transmission Loss. In the nominal frequency band, the maximum
loss in sound pressure level from the sweep to the mine that still permits mine
actuation.
Maximum Current. Magnetic sweep set to utilize the maximum possible sweep current.
Sweeping carried out employing the full output of the generating
Maximum Towing Speed. The speed through the water which may not be exceeded
without causing damage to the MCM gear or the towing vehicle.
MCM Commander. The officer delegated command of all assigned MCM Forces.
MCM Risk Directive Matrix. A series of tables listing specific measures or actions allowed
by MCM Forces in an operation taking into account the acceptable exposure to risk.
MCM Objective. A clearly defined goal for an MCM operation that supports the maritime
commander’s plan.
MCM Stage. An MCM Stage is the use of a specific MCM technique to counter a particular
or several types of mine.
MCM Tasking Authority The Mine Countermeasures Tasking Authority is the entity within
the MCM Commander/Coordinator function that directs and tasks the assigned MCM
forces in the execution of the Operational Commander’s MCM plan.
Measure of Effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour,
capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an
end state, achievement of an objective or creation of an effect.
Mechanical Sweep. Any sweep used with the object of physically contacting the mine or its
appendages.
MILEC Density. The number of Mine-like Echoes (MILECs) per square nautical mile of
seabed. By convention MILEC Densities are categorized in five classes 0 to 4, 0
having the lowest and 4 the highest density.
Mine. An explosive device laid in the water with the intention of damaging or sinking vessels
or deterring them from entering an area. The term does not include devices
attached to the bottoms of vessels or to harbour installations by personnel operating
underwater nor does it include devices which explode immediately on expiration of a
predetermined time after laying.
Mineable Waters. Waters where mines of a given type may be effective against a given
target.
Mine Actuation Level. The level at which the received influence equals that necessary to
actuate the mine.
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Maximum Output.
source(s).
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Mine Actuation Width.
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See Aggregate Actuation Width
Mine Avoidance Sonar. A sonar designed to detect and classify contacts in the water
column. (See also Obstacle Avoidance Sonar)
Mine Clearance Depth. The depth to which moored mines are to be swept or cleared and
must be corrected for dip.
Mine Cluster. A group of mines laid or jettisoned closely together
Mine Countermeasures (MCM). All methods for preventing or reducing damage or danger
from mines
Mine Countermeasures Pouncer Procedure. The delivery of explosive ordnance disposal
divers, by helicopters or, occasionally, small surface vessels, to previously swept
drifting mines or shallow.
Mine Countermeasures Stage. The use of a specific MCM technique to counter a
particular or several types of mines.
Mine Countermeasures Task. An MCM Task is a portion of the MCM mission consisting of
a stage or combination of stages related to a specific route, channel or area, time and
technique.
Mine Countermeasures Tasking Authority. The Mine Countermeasures Tasking Authority
is the entity, normally the MCM Commander/MW Coordinator, that directs and tasks
the assigned MCM forces in the execution of the Operational Commander’s MCM plan
Mine Countermeasures Technique. the operation of a specific system or platform (ie.
vessel, vehicle,aircraft, diver or marine mammal) and its MCM equipment in a
particular way.
Mine Damage Radius. The horizontal range from a specified mine within which a specified
level of damage will be sustained by a specified vessel
Mine Danger Area (MDA). An area established around the position of suspected or known
mines, mine lines and minefields to bound the limits of the danger.
Mine Density. The number of mines per square nautical mile.
Mine Disposal. The process of rendering safe, neutralizing, recovering, removing or
countermining mines.
Minefield. A number of mines laid, or declared to be laid, in a maritime area.
Minefield Measure of Effectiveness (MMOE). In minefield planning a quantitative
statement defining a specific effectiveness level towards which the mining effort can
be planned. In evaluation the MMOE is a qualitative statement for a given mining
effort.
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Mine Burial. The process of a mine sinking into the sediment of the seabed the result of
which is expressed as a percentage (see also Plastic Flow and Scour)
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Minefield Performance Objective (MPO) A qualitative statement defining the aim of a
minefield.
Minehunting. The employment of ships, airborne equipment, unmanned vehicles/systems,
marine mammals and/or divers to locate and dispose of mines.
Mine Investigation and Exploitation (MIE). The process of recovering and rendering safe
and analysing the mine, its sensors and system to determine the MCM necessary to
sweep or hunt mines. (see Recovery and Removal).
Mine Jamming. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration or reflection of underwater
energy with the aim of impairing the effectiveness of mines.
Mine Lifting Bags. Remotely operated gas filled bags attached to mines in order to lift them
from the seabed for subsequent removal to another location.
Mine Reference Number (MRN). A four to seven character alpha-numeric allocated to an
individual mine by the MCM unit responsible for identifying, actuating or cutting the
mine.
Mine Row. A single row of mines or clusters.
Mine Setting Mode (MSM). The transmission of underwater energy by influence sweeps
with the aim of actuating mines with a specific or known logic algorithm.
Mine Spacing. The distance between mines in Minelaying
Minesweeping. The technique of countering mines by minesweeping systems using
mechanical, explosive or influence gear, which physically removes, destroys or
actuates the mine.
Mine Threat Area (MTA). An area declared dangerous due to the presence or suspected
presence of mines.
Mine Warfare. The strategic and tactical use of mines and their countermeasures.
Mine Watching. The mine countermeasures procedures to detect, record and, if possible,
track potential minelayers and to detect, find the position of, and/or identify mines
during the actual minelaying.
Mining. The strategic and/or tactical use of sea mines.
Mission Abort Damage. Damage to a target vessel such that it is incapable of performing
or completing its primary mission.
Mixed Minefield. A minefield containing mines of various types, firing systems, sensitivities,
arming delays and ship counter settings.
Mobile Mine. See Stand Off/Stand Off Delivered mine.
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Minehunting Phases. Includes detection, classification, identification, and disposal.
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Moored Mine. A mine of positive buoyancy held below the surface by a mooring attached to
a sinker or anchor on the bottom.
Moving Mines. The collective description of mines that are not stationary, such as floating,
oscillating, creeping, rising and propelled mines.
N
Nadir Region. The area directly below a side scan imaging sonar where no useful imaging
occurs.
Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ).
compounds.
The mass of TNT equivalent of explosive mixtures or
Net Sweep. A two ship sweep designed to collect mines and either detonate them by
contact or dispose of them by dumping
Neutralisation. A mine is said to be neutralised when it has been rendered, by external
means, permanently incapable of firing on passage of a target, although it may
remain dangerous to handle
Nominal Frequency Band (NFB). Specified band of frequencies in which most of the
acoustic energy is transmitted from the sweep to the mine.
Non-Uniform Coverage. A plan developed where the effort is concentrated on the most
likely track(s) of the follow-on traffic.
Normal Actuation Level (NAL). The sensitivity of a mine in relation to the general run of
shipping, measured with reference to a representative ship-like signature and is
applicable to all influences.
Nuisance Minefield. A minefield which is planned to force the opponent into taking
countermeasures which adversely affect their operational effort.
O
Obstructor. A device laid with the sole object of obstructing or damaging mechanical
minesweeping equipment.
Offensive Mine Countermeasures.
successfully laying mines.
Offensive Mining.
control.
Measures intended to prevent the enemy from
A minefield laid in enemy territorial waters or waters under enemy
Offset (h). The perpendicular distance between the centre of the characteristic width ‘A’ (the
sweep/hunting gear track) and the track of the MCMV.
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Multiple Coverage. MCM effort applied to the same channel, area or segment more than
once during a single operation.
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One-Look Circuit. A mine firing system which requires actuation by a given influence once
only.
Optical Minehunting. The use of an optical system (eg electro optical device or towed
diver) to detect classify and identify mines or minelike objects on or protruding from
the seabed, or in the water column.
Oropesa Sweep. A form of mechanical sweep towed by a single ship.
Oscillating Mine. A mine hydrostatically controlled, which fluctuates within a preset depth
range below the surface of the water independently of the rise and fall of tide.
Otter. A device used in minesweeps which, when towed, displaces itself sideways to a
predetermined distance.
Overlap. The width of that part of a swept or hunted area which is also covered by an
adjacent swept or hunted area.
P
Passive Defensive MCM. Measures intended to localise the threat, locate the minefield and
reduce the risk to shipping without actively countering the threat.
Pattern Mining . The laying of mines in a fixed relationship to each other.
Percentage Clearance. The estimated percentage of mines of specified characteristics
which have been cleared from an area or channel
Average Percentage Clearance (P). The average percentage clearance is the
average value across the whole channel width.
Required Percentage Clearance (Preq). The required percentage clearance is the
value necessary for planning an MCM operation as ordered by a higher authority.
Weighted Percentage Clearance (F). The average percentage clearance across the
channel, weighted according to the probability density function of shipping.
Maximum Percentage Clearance (Pmax). The maximum achievable percentage
clearance due to undetectable and unsweepable mines.
Desired Percentage Clearance (Pdes). The mathematical expectation of the fraction
of sweepable or detectable mines that can be cleared.
Permissive Environment.
An environment in which friendly forces anticipate no
obstructions to, or interference with, operations. Note: A permissive environment does
not necessarily imply absence of threat.
Plastic Flow. Penetration of a mine into the seabed when sediments are forced from under
the mine by the weight of the mine.
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Optimum MCM Speed. The speed over the ground for a given set of conditions which
provides the greatest sweeping/hunting rate.
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Plot. In NMW the construction of a record by which the result of detection, classification,
and/or identification can be operationally exploited.
Poised Mine. A mine which is ready to detonate at the next actuation.
Practice Mine. An inert filled mine but complete with assembly, suitable for instruction and
for practice in preparation.
Precursor Operations. MCM in an area by relatively safe means in order to reduce the risk
to MCM Units in subsequent operations in the same area.
Pressure Mine. A mine whose circuit responds to the hydrodynamic pressure signature of a
target.
Prevention of Stripping Equipment. A device included in a mine to fire the main or an
auxiliary charge when an attempt is made to open the mechanism chambers.
Propelled Mine. A mine which once laid actively moves by any means of propulsion
system. See Moving Mine, Stand-off Mine or Stand-off Delivered Mine.
Protective Mining. A minefield laid in friendly territorial waters to protect ports, harbours,
anchorages, coasts and coastal routes.
Pulse Cycle. The time interval between the beginning of one pulse and the beginning of the
next similar pulse in the same direction.
Pulsing. A method of operating magnetic and acoustic sweeps in which the sweep is
energised by current which varies or is intermittent in accordance with a
predetermined schedule.
Q
Q-Anchorage. A wartime anchorage which is designated as a Q-Anchorage for use by QRoute shipping.
Q-Message. A classified message relating to navigational dangers, navigational aids, mined
areas, and searched or swept channels.
Q-Route. A pre-planned, dormant channel or route, surveyed during peacetime, for use by
allied shipping during tension or conflict.
Q-Zone. A geographical sea area with boundaries agreed by NATO with the aim of
identifying sea areas of navigational safety responsibility.
R
Random Mining. A minefield of practically uniform density but with no recognizable pattern
of mine distribution.
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Post Mission Analysis (PMA). The processing and analysis of sensor data after a mission
is completed.
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Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA). The collection of data to provide environmental
information to Mine Warfare Commanders in a timely manner for planning and
conduct of operations
Reacquire. In NMW a process to revisit a reported contact for the purpose of subsequent
prosecution.
Recovery. In NMW those actions taken to recover unexploded mines.
Remote Controlled Mine. A mine which after laying can be controlled by the user.
Removal. The relocation of a mine to a position where exploitation or disposal can be safely
affected.
Render Safe Procedure (RSP). The action to make a mine inoperative by direct
interference with its firing system or explosive train.
Rising Mine. A mine which rises from its deployed position, either using its own positive
buoyancy or by means of a propulsion system.
Risk.
a.
Transitors. The probability of a mine being exploded by a transiting ship
b. MCM Systems. The probability that a mine of given characteristics,
actuated/countermined by the system in use, will explode within the damage area of
the MCM system.
Risk Directive.
The authorised levels of risk to which units can be exposed, when
conducting NMCM operations (see MCM Risk Directive Matrix)
Route Survey (RTSV). The collection of contact and environmental data for use in future
MCM operations.
Run. A single transit of MCM systems operating MCM equipment along a track.
S
Safe Current. The maximum current that can be supplied to a sweep in a given waveform
and pulse cycle that does not produce a danger area to the MCMV with respect to the
mines being swept for.
Safe Depth. The shallowest depth of water in which a specified vessel travelling at a
specified speed will not actuate a given specific influence mine. Also referred to as
Safe Operating Depth.
Safe Distance. (NMM) The minimum distance ahead, astern or abeam that a mine could
explode without reducing the effectiveness of the sweeper.
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Reconnaissance Operation. An MCM operation designed to assess the limits of a mined
area.
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Safe Speed. The speed at which a specified vessel operating in a given depth can proceed
without actuating a specified influence mine.
Safety Range. The distance at which a specific vessel is unaffected by an underwater
explosion of a specified magnitude. Also referred to as Safety Distance.
Searched Channel. The whole or part of a route or a path which has been searched, swept
or hunted, the width of the channel being specified.
Segmentation. The sub division of an MCM Area based on capabilities and performance
parameters of MCM units and/or environmental conditions and/or tactical
considerations.
Self Protection Depth. The depth where there is no overlap between the firing area and the
sweeper damage area (Dangerous Front).
Self Protective Measures. Passive Defensive Measures taken by vessels and divers to
reduce the risk from mines.
Sensitivity. The liability, which is varied, of an influence mine circuit to actuation by an
influence field.
Sequence Circuit. A circuit which requires actuation by a predetermined sequence of
influences of predetermined magnitudes.
Shallow Water. Water having a depth between 10 metres and 200 metres.
Ship Count. The number of times the mine mechanism must be actuated in order to
detonate.
Ship Count Distribution. The fraction of mines initially set on a certain ship count.
Ship Counter. A device in a mine which prevents the mine from detonating until a preset
number of actuations has taken place.
Ship Influence. The electro-magnetic, acoustic, pressure or other effects of a vessel, or a
minesweep simulating a vessel, which is detectable by a mine or other sensing
devices.
Shock Factor (SF)
A figure of merit that defines the shock resistance of a material
against an underwater explosion.
Simple Initial Threat (SIT). The threat posed to the first ship to transit a minefield
Single Coverage.
segment
One application of a single MCM technique to a channel, area or
Sinker. A heavy weight to which a mine is moored.
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Scour. The removal of bottom sediment from the vicinity of the mine by wave and/or current
action.
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Snagline Mine. A contact mine with a buoyant line attached to one of the horns or switches
which may be caught up and pulled by the hull or propellers of ship.
Snagline Search. Two divers dragging a weighted line along the bottom so that it is caught
or ‘snagged’ by objects which are protruding from or laying on the seabed.
Snagline Sweep. Mechanical MCM gear especially fitted to counter Snagline Mines.
Sonar Contact Confidence Level (SCCL).
A value assigned to a minelike contact
(MILCO) based on attributes from a list of key criteria.
Sprocket. An anti-sweep device included in a mine mooring to allow a sweep wire to pass
through the mooring without parting the mine from its sinker.
Stand-Off or Stand-Off Delivered Mine. A mine designed to be launched from a stand-off
position and then navigate to its intended lay position. (see also Moving Mine) (
Sterilise. To permanently render a mine incapable of firing, by means of a device (e.g.
steriliser) within the mine.
Steriliser. A device included in mines to render the mine permanently inoperative on
expiration of a predetermined time after laying.
Strategic Mining.
potential.
Mining operations intended to reduce and impede the enemy's war
Surf Zone. Area at sea from where waves begin to break, up to the high water mark
Sustained Minefield. A minefield which is replenished to maintain the threat to the enemy
in the face of countermeasures.
Surveillance Operations. MCM Operations intended to detect any new object in an area,
channel or route which has been previously subjected to Route Survey. Also known
as Change Detection.
Sweeping Rate. The area cleared per unit time with a stated minimum percentage
clearance, using minesweeping procedures.
Swept Channel. See Searched Channel
Swept Path. The width of the lane swept down to the sweep depth.
T
Tactical Mining. Mining conducted in support of a limited military objective generally in a
specified area of immediate tactical interest.
Target Simulation Mode. The radiation of underwater energy by influence sweeps with the
aim of actuating influence mines constituting a threat against a given ship or class of
ships
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Solenoid Sweep. A magnetic sweep consisting of horizontal axis coils.
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Task Cycle. Timeframe of an individual unit in a MCM Operation (On-Task / Off-Task)
available for the Tasking Authority to pre-plan the different MCM tasks.
Team Sweep. Two or more sweepers linked together by a mechanical sweep.
Time Constrained Operation. An MCM operation designed to achieve the maximum
reduction in risk to follow-on traffic using as much MCM effort as possible. Two types
of Time Constrained operations are possible:
Time Limit Known: An operation where the estimated number of runs can be
executed in the time available.
Time Limit Unknown: An operation carried out on a run-by-run basis until no further
time is available.
TNT Equivalent. A measure of the energy released from the explosion of a given quantity of
fissionable material, in terms of the amount of TNT (Trinitrotoluene) which could
release the same amount of energy when exploded.
Track (N). The planned line over the ground along which the centre of the MCM effect is
applied throughout the desired area. Also known as MCMV Track.
Track Course. The true course of the track.
Track Runs (J). The number of times the countermeasures gear must follow a track.
Track Spacing (D). The lateral separation between two adjacent tracks.
Track Turn. The method of completing the end of a run on one track and preparing to
commence the next run.
Two-Look Circuit. A firing system in which the influence must be detected twice before
actuation occurs.
U
Ultra-Short Baseline (USBL). An Acoustic tracking technique which may be used to
provide positional information of underwater assets for C2, and/or for in-water
navigation.
Undetectable Mine. A mine which cannot be detected using mine hunting techniques.
Uniform Clearance. Achieving the same level of clearance across the entire width of the
channel by the addition of edge runs.
Uniform Coverage. A plan where the effort is distributed evenly across the channel and the
required percentage clearance is only achieved or exceeded in the ‘central part’ of
the channel. (See also Non-Uniform Coverage)
LEX-31
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
Threat Profile. A MMOE describing the average threat to the m-th transitor in a sequence of
τ transits.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Uniform Pattern. A series of tracks equally spaced across a channel or throughout an area.
Unsustained Minefield. A minefield which is not replenished.
V
Very Shallow Water MCM (VSWMCM). Searching for, detecting, locating, neutralizing
and/or disposing of explosive ordnance and/or obstructions in very shallow water.
W
Watching Mine. A mine secured to its mooring but showing on the surface, possibly only in
certain tidal conditions.
LEX-32
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
Very Shallow Water. Water having a depth between 10 metres and the Surf Zone
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
INDEX
Accuracy:............................................................................................................................0112
Acoustic Measures: ..................................................................................................0508, 0211
Acoustic Mine Sensors .......................................................................................................0209
Acoustic safe depth: .......................................................................................................... 0508
Acoustics of a ship: ........................................................................................................... 0218
Active MCM: ............................................................................................................ 0103, 0307
Actuation: ....................................................................... 0202, 0203, 0207, (NMP) 0213, 0511
Actuation features .................................................................................................. (NMP) 0213
Actuation width (contact mines) ............................................................................. (NMP) 0213
Advantages of mining:........................................................................................... (NMP) 0607
Aggregate Actuation Width:..................................................................... 0213, 0511, Glossary
Aim of MCM:...................................................................................................................... 0301
Aims of mining..............................................................(NMP) 0602, (NMP) 0603, (NMP) 0605
Airborne MCM Vehicles......................................................................................................0403
Allied and National responsibilities.....................................................................................0104
Amphibious operations:........................................................................................... 0108, 0609
Antenna ..............................................................................................................................0204
Anti-helicopter mine:.......................................................................................................... 0203
Anti-hovercraft mine: ......................................................................................................... 0203
Anti-MCMV mine: .............................................................................................................. 0203
Anti-mine hunter mine: ...................................................................................................... 0203
Anti-Mine Sweeper mine ....................................................................................................0203
Anti-recovery devices: ....................................................................................... 0205, Glossary
Anti-submarine minefield: .................................................................. (NMP) 0608, (NMP) 0610
Anti-surface effect vehicle mine (ASEVM):........................................................................ 0203
Anti-sweep wire devices:................................................................................................... 0205
Anti-watching device: ........................................................................................ 0205, Glossary
Application of Self Protective Measures .............................................................................0506
Area Definitions ..................................................................................................................0230
Arming delay: .............................................................................................. 0205, 0601 (NMP)
Attrition minefield:.................................................................................................. 0610 (NMP)
Audio Frequency ...............................................................................................Glossary, 0209,
Audio frequency mines:......................................................................................... 0508 (NMP)
Automated data processing:............................................................................................. 1A02
Autonomous underwater vehicle ........................................................................................0404
Auxiliary MCM Vehicles......................................................................................................0405
Average actuation area .......................................................................................... (NMP) 0213
Average actuation width: ........................................................................................ (NMP) 0213
B
Booby trap: ........................................................................................................................ 0205
Bottom reflected wave ........................................................................................................0231
Bouquet mine: ......................................................................................... 0203, 0205, Glossary
Buoyant rising mine............................................................................................................0203
Buried Mine ..............................................................................................................0202, 0205
INDEX-1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
A
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Casualty rate: ...............................................................(NMP) 0608, (NMP) 0611, (NMP) 0612
Chain moorings: ................................................................................................................ 0205
Chain of command: ........................................................................................................... 0106
Circuit types:...................................................................................................................... 0207
Classification of Sea Mine Types: ..................................................................................... 0202
Classification of Influence Firing Systems and Sensors.....................................................0207
(NMP) Close Projection.....................................................................................................0610
Close Tethered Rising Mine ...............................................................................................0203
Closure minefield:.................................................................................. (NMP) 0610, Glossary
Closure of ports: ............................................................................................ 0104, 0307, 0603
Combination Circuit ............................................................................................................0203
Command and Control: ................................................................................. 0104, 0405, 0408
Command and support ships: ........................................................................................... 0408
Concept of mining ....................................................................................................0240, 0301
Contact mine: .................................................................................0204, 0213, 0232, Glossary
Contact firing system ..........................................................................................................0204
Contact Reference Number (CRN) ..............................................................................Glossary
Co-operation:........................................................................................................... 0106, 0610
Co-ordination:..................................................................................... 0104, 0105, (NMP) 0505
Creeping mine: .................................................................................................................. 0203
Cutters:.............................................................................................................................. 0205
D
Damage area:.......................................................... 0203, 0237, 0501, (NMM) 0504, Glossary
Damage criteria: .................................................................................................... (NMP) 0236
Damage contours: ................................................................................................ (NMP) 0237
Damage effect: ............................................................................................ 0233, (NMP) 0213
Damage levels:...................................................................................................... (NMP) 0236
Damage protection and control: ............................................................................ (NMM) 0510
Damage radius: ...................................................................................... (NMP) 0237, Glossary
Damage Width........................................................................................................ (NMP) 0238
Damping of relays: ............................................................................................................ 0207
Deep moored mines: ......................................................................................................... 0203
Defensive MCM Operations: ............................................................................. 0307, Glossary
Defensive mining:........................................................................................ 0103, (NMP) 0610
Definition of the mine..........................................................................................................0201
Degaussing: ................................................. (NMP) 0218, 0505, 0507, (NMP) 0512, Glossary
Delivery system: .................................................................................................... (NMP) 0615
Description of Sea Mine Types ..........................................................................................0203
Destruction of sea mine stockpiles ......................................................................... (NMP) 0109
DG code: ........................................................................................................... 0507, Glossary
Directional Transducer: ......................................................................................... (NMP) 0209
Disadvantages of mining: ....................................................................................... (NMP) 0607
Displacement vessels.........................................................................................................0402
Disposal of drifting mines ...................................................................................................0512
Distant Projection .................................................................................................. (NMP) 0610
Diversion route: ................................................................................................. 0106, Glossary
Drifting mine: ................................................................................. 0203, 0205, 0512, Glossary
INDEX-2
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
C
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Dummy minefields:............................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
Duties of Operational Commanders: ........................................................... 0104, (NMP) 0605
Duties of Staff Mine Warfare Officer:................................................................................. 0106
Effect of an underwater explosion: .......................................................................... 0231, 0233
Efficiency: .......................................................................................................................... 0112
Enemy mining capability:................................................................................................... 0239
Enemy mining objectives:.................................................................................................. 0240
Enemy opposition...............................................................................................................0109
Environment: ............................................................................................... 0113, (NMP) 0611
Environmental assessments ..............................................................................................0113
Error, Navigational:............................................................................................................ 0112
Exercise mine:................................................................................................................... 0203
Expected casualties: ............................................................................................. (NMP) 0612
Explosive effects of moored and ground mines ................................................................0232
Explosive charge: .............................................................................................................. 0231
F
Family tree, Naval Mine Warfare ....................................................................................... 0103
Farfield OD Large................................................................................................... (NMP) 0204
Firing systems: .................................................................................................................. 0204
Floating mine......................................................................................................0203, Glossary
Flooder: ............................................................................................................................. 0205
Forces, MCM: .................................................................................................................... 0401
Formatted messages......................................................................................................... 1A02
Former mined area.............................................................................................................0230
FORMEXs ......................................................................................................................... 1A06
Frequency: ................................................ 0204, 0207, 0209, 0211, 0217, (NMP) 0219, 0508
Further aims of mining............................................................................................ (NMP) 0603
G
Gas bubble: ........................................................................................ (NMP) 0204, 0231, 0503
Geophones.........................................................................................................................0211
Grapnel:................................................................................................... 0203, 0205, Glossary
Ground mine:..................................................................... 0203, (NMP) 0213, 0232, Glossary
Guinea pig .........................................................................................................................0406
H
Hague Convention of 1907:......................................................................... 0205, (NMP) 0616
High frequency mines:........................................................................................... (NMP) 0209
High frequency ...................................................................................................................0209
Historical ordnance.............................................................................................................0241
Horn....................................................................................................................................0204
I
Independent mine:............................................................. 0203. 0213, (NMP) 0611, Glossary
Influence firing systems: .................................................................... 0204, 0207, (NMP) 0516
INDEX-3
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
E
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Influence mine: .............................................................................. 0207, 0232, 0511, Glossary
Initial peak pressure ...........................................................................................................0503
Interference with laying of sea mines ..................................................................... (NMP) 0109
Integrating circuit: .............................................................................................................. 0207
Integration of mining:.............................................................................................. (NMP) 0609
Intelligence: ....................................................................................................................... 0110
K
L
Lead-through vessels .........................................................................................................0409
Legal Aspects of Mining ...............................................(NMP) 0603, (NMP) 0607, (NMP) 0611
Levels of Tasking, Reporting and Recording .................................................................... 1A03
Local Commander: ............................................................................................................ 0106
Localising the threat: ......................................................................................................... 0307
Local warnings: .................................................................................................... (NMP) 0104
Locating the minefield: ...................................................................................................... 0307
Logistic support: ............................................................................................ 0102, 0104, 0111
Low frequency mines: ........................................................................................... (NMP) 0209
M
Magnetic field: ................................................... 0208, (NMP) 0217, (NMP) 0218, 0507, 0511,
Magnetic moment:.................................................................................................. (NMP) 0218
Magnetic quieting: ............................................................................................................. 0507
Magnetic mine sensors ......................................................................................................0208
Magnetic treatment:................................................................................................ (NMP) 0218
Manuscript Reports and Records ...................................................................................... 1A05
Material measures for risk reduction: .................................................................... (NMP) 0510
Maximum bubble radius .....................................................................................................0503
MCM Command and Support Ships (MCCS).....................................................................0408
MCM Missions:.................................................................................................................. 0302
MCM Risk Directives ..........................................................................................................0303
MCM stages .......................................................................................................................0305
MCM tasks .........................................................................................................................0306
MCM units ..........................................................................................................................0401
MCM Task Orders: ............................................................................................................ 0104
MCM techniques ................................................................................................................0304
MCM vessel diving .............................................................................................................0406
MCMV risk:........................................................................................................................ 0501
MCMV safety measures: ................................................................................................... 0502
Measures to protect mines and minefields against MCM...................................................0205
Medium range OD-Medium .................................................................................... (NMP) 0204
Mine actuation level (MAL): ............................................................................................... 0207
Mine burial:......................................................................................... 0205, 0210, (NMP) 0611
Mine countermeasures:.......................................................................................... 0103, 0301
Mine counter countermeasures ..........................................................................................0205
Mine damage to super tankers ............................................................................... (NMP) 0234
INDEX-4
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
J
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Mine damage to helicopters and hovercraft ........................................................... (NMP) 0235
Mine danger area ...............................................................................................................0230
Mine disposal vessel ..........................................................................................................0406
Mine readiness ....................................................................................................... (NMP) 0214
Mine threat: .............................................................................. 0111, (NMP) 0215, 0242-0244
Mine threat area .................................................................................................................0230
Mine Warfare in Amphibious operations ...........................................................................0108
Mine Warfare operations room: ......................................................................................... 0106
Mine Warfare pilots: .................................................................................... 0113, (NMP) 0611
Mine Warfare vehicle designators ......................................................................................0407
Mine watching: .............................................................................................. 0103, 0104, 0307
Minefield: .....................................................................(NMP) 0601, (NMP) 0604, (NMP) 0606,
Minefield Measures of Effectiveness ...................................................................... (NMP) 0612
Minefield planning: ............................................... 0102, 0106, 0109, (NMP) 0601 (NMP) 0611
Minelayer:...........................................................(NMP) 0103, 0407 (NMP) 0614, (NMP) 0615
Minelaying operation orders ................................................................................... (NMP) 0613
Mining:.................................................................................................................... (NMP) 0602
Mining aims and missions ...................................................................................... (NMP) 0606
Mining campaign: ................................................................... 0240, (NMP) 0603, (NMP) 0608
Mining - Legal Aspects ...................................................................... (NMP) 0603, (NMP) 0607
Mining operations: .............................................. 0103 (NMP) 0603, (NMP) 0606, (NMP) 0610
Mining responsibilities ............................................................................................ (NMP) 0605
Mobile charge.....................................................................................................................0204
Modern mine ......................................................................................................... (NMP) 0215
Moored mines:............................................... 0203, 0205, (NMP) 0213, 0232, 0512, Glossary
Mooring lever safety cut-out switch: .................................................................................. 0205
Moving mine: ..................................................................................................................... 0203
Multiple frequency mines:...................................................................................... (NMP) 0209
N
Naval Mine Warfare Operations .........................................................................................0103
Navigation: ........................................................................................................................ 0112
Navigational accuracy: ...................................................................................................... 0112
Navigational error: ............................................................................................................. 0112
Navigational information/warning: ..................................................................................... 0105
Nearfield OD-Small ................................................................................................ (NMP) 0204
NMW Coordinator...............................................................................................................0104
Noise reduction: ................................................................................................................ 0508
Notification of dangerous areas:............................................................................ (NMP) 0616
Nuisance minefield: ................................................................................ (NMP) 0610, Glossary
O
Obstructors:....................................................................................................................... 0205
Offensive MCM:................................................................................................. 0103, Glossary
Offensive mining:............................................... 0103, (NMP) 0606, (NMP) 0608, (NMP) 0610
One-look circuit: ................................................................................................................ 0207
Operational command: ...................................................................................................... 0104
Operational control: .................................................................. 0102, 0104, 0106 0107, 1A01,
Operational tasking and reporting ......................................................................................0107
INDEX-5
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
OPREPNMW..................................................................................................................... 1A06
OPTASK NMW .................................................................................................................. 1A06
Organisation of Naval Mine Warfare staff:......................................................................... 0106
Oscillating mine: ................................................................................................................ 0203
Passive MCM: ......................................................................................... 0103. 0307, Glossary
Peacetime exercises: ............................................................................................. (NMP) 0114
Plunger ..............................................................................................................................0204
Positions:........................................................................................................................... 0112
Power supplies: ..................................................................................................... (NMP) 0212
Precautions, SPMs: ........................................................................................................... 0512
Prescribed course ..............................................................................................................0112
Pressure fields........................................................................................................ (NMP) 0220
Pressure influence:............................................................................. 0207, (NMP) 0220, 0505
Pressure quieting: .................................................................................................. (NMP) 0509
Pressure mine parameters ..................................................................................... (NMP) 0220
Pressure mine sensor:s.......................................................................................... 0204, 0210
Proactive Mining..................................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
Probable approximate actuation ranges................................................................. (NMP) 0213
Propelled mine ...................................................................................................................0203
Protection of mine warfare forces:........................................................................... 0104, 0109
Protective mining:........................................................................................ 0103, (NMP) 0610
Purpose of a minefield:.......................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
Q
Q-M WARN ....................................................................................................................... 1A06
R
Rate of rise .........................................................................................................................0204
Range detecting .................................................................................................................0204
Reactive Mining...................................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
Readiness, mine:.................................................................................................... (NMP) 0214
Reduction of risk:............................................................................................................... 0307
Reliability, mine: ................................................................................................................ 0611
Remote controlled mine .....................................................................................................0203
Remote operated vehicle ...................................................................................................0404
Responsibilities for mining:..................................................................................... (NMP) 0605
Responsibilities of commanders:....................................................................................... 0104
Responsibilities of command authorities related to mine warfare: .................................... 0104
Rising mine:....................................................................................................................... 0203
Risk: .................................................................................................................................. 0501
Risks to clearance divers: ................................................................................................. 0503
Risk to MCM units ..............................................................................................................0501
Risk to transitors.................................................................................................................0501
Rocket propelled rising mine ..............................................................................................0203
INDEX-6
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
P
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Safe distance:......................................................................................................... (NMP) 0237
Safe speed: ................................................................................. 0505, (NMP) 0511, Glossary
Safety: .................................................................................................................... (NMP) 0502
Safety ranges .....................................................................................................................0503
Sea Control in Mining ............................................................................................ (NMP) 0610
Sea Denial.............................................................................................................. (NMP) 0602
Seismic...............................................................................................................................0211
Self propelled mine.............................................................................................................0203
Self protective measures:.......................................... 0307, 0501. 0505, 0506, 0512, Glossary
Semi-submerged vehicle....................................................................................................0402
Sensitivity: ........... 0113, 0207, 0204, 0207, 0208, 0209, 0210, 0213, 0218, 0508, 0511, 0601
Sensors: ................................................................................... 0207, 0208, 0209, 0210, 0211
Sequence circuit:............................................................................................................... 0207
Ship counter: ......................................................................................... (NMP) 0611, Glossary
Ship-made influences:............................................................................................ (NMP) 0217
Ship signature modification: ...............................................................................................0505
Shock factor .......................................................................................................................0503
Shock hardening: ........................................................................................ 0505, (NMP) 0510
Shock wave ..............................................................................................................0231, 0503
Signal processing: ............................................. 0204, (NMP) 0208, (NMP) 0209, (NMP) 0215
Simple initial threat: ..................................................................... 0610, (NMP) 0612, Glossary
Snagline .............................................................................................................................0204
Snagline mine:......................................................................................................... 0203, 0239
Spacing of mines:.............................................................................................................. 0611
Special MCM Vehicles .......................................................................................................0406
Special NMW reports ........................................................................................................ 1A06
Special purpose mine.........................................................................................................0203
Sprocket: ........................................................................................................... 0205, Glossary
Staff Mine Warfare Officer: ................................................................................................ 0106
Stages: .............................................................................................................................. 0305
Standard deviation: ........................................................................................... 0112, Glossary
Stand-off Delivered Mine: .................................................................................................. 0203
Stationary mine ..................................................................................................................0203
Stationary charge ................................................................................................... (NMP) 0204
Stealth mine .......................................................................................................................0203
Steriliser: ........................................................................................................................... 0205
Stockpiles of sea mines.......................................................................................... (NMP) 0109
Stopped Penetrator Probability Density: ............................................................... (NMP) 0612
Strategic mining:............................................................... (NMP) 0608, (NMP) 0610, Glossary
Structure for the C2 of Mine Warfare Forces: .....................................................................0104
Support:....................................................................................................... 0104, (NMP) 0111
Surface MCM Vehicles .......................................................................................................0402
Surface reflected wave .......................................................................................................0231
Sustained attrition mining: ........................................... (NMP) 0606, (NMP) 0608, (NMP) 0610
Sustained threat: ................................................................................................... (NMP) 0612
Swell:...................................................... (NMP) 0210, (NMP) 0213, (NMP) 0220, 0239, 0512,
INDEX-7
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
S
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-06 VOLUME I
Tactical measures to reduce the risk:............................................................ 0211, 0505, 0511
Tactical mining: ............................................. 0103, 0105, (NMP) 0609, (NMP) 0610, Glossary
Tactical command: ............................................................................................................ 0104
Tactical control: ................................................................................................................. 0104
Tactical signals.................................................................................................................. 1A04
Target tracking ...................................................................................................................0204
Tasks:.................................................................................................................... 1A03, 0306,
Techniques:....................................................................................................................... 0304
Technical Properties of Individual Mines ............................................................................0204
Threat profile: ......................................................................................................... (NMP) 0612
Threat to Naval Mine Warfare Forces: .............................................................................. 0109
Threshold value..................................................................................................................0204
Tilt Rod ...............................................................................................................................0204
Trends in mine technology .................................................................................................0206
Two-look circuits:............................................................................................... 0207, Glossary
Type organisation:............................................................................................................. 0104
Types of mining operations: ................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
U
Uncountered minefield: ......................................................................................... (NMP) 0610
Underwater Electrical Potetial (UEP) .................................................................................0211
Underwater explosion:........................................ 0231, 0233, (NMP) 0235, 0503, (NMP) 0510
Underwater MCM Vehicles.................................................................................................0404
Unmanned surface vehicle................................................................................................ 0402
Unmanned underwater vehicle...........................................................................................0404
Use of noisemakers:............................................................................................... (NMP) 0510
V
W
Waterspace management: ................................................................................................ 0105
Watching Mine....................................................................................................................0203
X
Y
Z
INDEX-8
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
EDITION (D) VERSION (1)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED
T