Company Commander’s Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
PREFACE
One of the serious problems in planning the fight against American doctrine,
is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any
obligation to follow their doctrine...
Purportedly from a Soviet Junior Lt's Notebook
This guide book is produced by Company Commander’s Wing, PULADA and is issued
by Head of Wing for use throughout the courses. It is a supplement to the information
gap between doctrine and SOP in Malaysian Army Doctrines. This guide book is not
to replace the existing doctrine; its function to provide a common narrative and
understanding among students and directing staffs, to clarify certain areas of doctrines
and to provide students instance information that extracted from numerous doctrines.
This guide book is invaluable precis for students and directing staffs in the direction to
understand how to command, manage, lead and train the soldiers in the infantry rifle
company.
In the future, this guide book will be updated continuously to reflect changes in
doctrines and any suggestions or requests for changes should be referred to Head of
Wing.
UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander’s Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
THE CONTENTS OF A GUIDE BOOK
SER
CHAPTER
(a)
1.
(b)
1
2
3.
SUBJECTS
(c)
COMMAND COMPANY
1.1
APPLY LEADERSHIP COMMAND
Character Development
Roles, Tasks & Responsibilities of Company Commander
Leadership in Combat
Company Combat Stress Management
Integrity in Command
Battle Command
Power of Subordinate Commanders
Disciplinary Offenses (Drugs)
1.2
APPLY MISSION COMMAND
Understand of Mission Command
Philosophy of Mission Command
Develop of Mission Orders
Application of Mission Command
2
2.1
MANAGE COMPANY
CONDUCT COMPANY TRAINING
MATS
ARTEP
Introduction to Battalion Training
Manage Company Collective Training
Manage Company Individual Competency Training
2.2
ADMINISTER RESOURCES
Store Management
Combat Service Support (CSS)
3
3.1
EMPLOY COMPANY
CONDUCT OPERATION PLANNING
Manoeuvre Warfare
Battle Organization & Operation Framework
Combined Arms
Element of Tactics
LANUN
Intelligence Preparation of Operational Environment (IPOE)
Defensive Manoeuvre
Offensive Manoeuvre
Battlespace Operating System (BOS)
Military Appreciation Process (MAP) - IMAP
Law of Arms Conflict (LOAC) - ROE
Operation Briefs
Presenting of Solutions
KESBAN
Counter Insurgency Operation (CIO)
Insurgents – MRA
3.2
APPLY OPERATION TECHNIQUE
Company Battle Procedure
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Deployment of Infantry Support Weapon
Assault River Crossing
Passage of Line
Link Up Procedure
Relief in Place Procedure
Reserve Demolition Guard
Night Operation
Cordon & Search
Ambush
Attack on CT Camp
CTT & BCT
4
4
4.1
CONDUCT OPERATION
CONDUCT CW
Company in Defence
Company in Withdrawal
Company in Advance
Company in Attack
OBUA
SUO
Air Assault
4.2
CONDUCT CIW
Framework Operation
Border Operation
Strike Operation
4.3
MOOTW
Introduction to Aid to Civil Authority
Introduction to Peace Support Operation
Introduction to Limited Intervention
Introduction to Internal Security
Introduction to Counter Terrorism
4.4
EXECUTE HADR OPERATION
Level of Disaster Management
Operational Environment
Characteristics of HADR Operation
Types of Disaster
Assistance from Army
Command & Control
Planning & Execution
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
CHAPTER 1
COMMAND COMPANY
APPLY LEADERSHIP COMMAND
SECTION 1
CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT
“A good leader must be totally committed to his men, his unit and his profession”
- General Tan Sri Md Hashim bin Hussein (Retired)
101. As we restructure and develop the Malaysian Army to meet future challenges,
young leaders need to be developed to comprehend and exploit the full potential of
Army doctrine. The Army must be well trained and able to fulfil its’ roles in all aspects
of our national defense and security. A trained army requires leaders who are experts
in the profession of arms and the art of war. Developing quality leaders with good
leadership qualities is a major part of training and education for the Army. “The leaders
we develop must fulfill the Army’s leadership goal to be a total army whose leaders at
all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission
accomplishment and well-being of subordinates.” (Citation required).
102. The army leaders we develop must possess the highest ethical and
professional standards, be committed to mission accomplishment and, the well-being
of their subordinates. They must be loyal to the nation (King and country) and the units
in which they serve. They must demonstrate selfless service; perform to the best of
their ability with unquestionable loyalty. In developing leaders, it is important to realise
the attributes of the professional leader that the Malaysian Army needs. The qualities
required of an army officer have been outlined in Army doctrine.
103. The leaders that are developed must be professional, competent, dedicated to
the profession of arms and experts in the art of war. They must be committed to
upholding the dignity and respect of all soldiers and their subordinates. They must
demonstrate physical and moral courage and must be forthright and candid in all their
dealings. They must willingly embrace responsibility for and accountability of their
subordinates or units that are entrusted to their care.
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FUNDAMENTALS OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
104.
The concept of leadership development is based on the following fundamentals:
a.
Leaders must be appropriately developed before assuming leadership
positions.
b.
Leaders must be competent and confident in their ability to lead at the
level that they are posted.
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
105. The functions of a Leader. Apart from developing the qualities of a leader, we
must also learn the practical aspect of leadership functions. An understanding of this
function will help leaders to train themselves, increase personal confidence and the
ability to observe other leaders critically. Any group of people with a common aim or
task has various needs of which must be met. These needs can be broken down into
three separate areas that the leader must satisfy as follows:
a.
Achieving the Task. If a group is to undertake a task successfully, it must
work to a common plan, which must be controlled carefully. As leaders, task
functions will cover the following aspects:
(1)
Defining the task.
(2)
Making a plan.
(3)
Briefing the group.
(4)
Allocating work and resources.
(5)
Supervising the quality of work.
(6)
Being informed of progress.
(7)
Evaluating the performance.
(8)
Adjusting the plan.
(9)
Ensuring that the aim has been achieved.
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b.
Building and Maintaining the Team. To achieve the task, all groups must
be synergised into a team. Through intensive training, soldiers will develop
pride within the team as well as towards their fellow colleagues. They must be
accustomed to working with each other, to use each other’s skill and to
communicate among themselves. Some of the team functions that leaders
need to stress are as follows:
(1)
Involve the team in planning.
(2)
Ensure team members know each other’s tasks.
(3)
Set standards and priorities.
(4)
Appoint sub leaders.
(5)
Coordinate subgroups.
(6)
Maintain team spirit.
(7)
Ensure communication with the team.
(8)
Encourage and keep team informed of progress.
(9)
Training and developing the team.
c.
Individual Functions. The team will perform well if individuals within the
team work to their fullest potentials. This in turn depends on how well their
individuals are satisfied. The Maslow’s Needs Theory is one of the well-known
theories of motivation for individuals. The basis of Maslow's Needs Theory is
that human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, and that certain lower
needs to be satisfied before higher needs can be addressed. As per the
teachings of Abraham Maslow, there are general needs (physiological, safety,
love, and esteem) which must be fulfilled before a person is able to act
unselfishly. These needs were dubbed ‘deficiency needs.’ While a person is
motivated to fulfill these basic desires, they continue to move toward growth,
and eventually self-actualization. The satisfaction of these needs is quite
healthy.
106. Responsibility. The Army ranges from the smallest level, which is the section,
right up to the highest level which is at Army level, and each level is fully designated
with leaders and commanders. As commanders and leaders, they have been
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entrusted with certain responsibilities to be fulfilled. Of course, leaders may delegate,
however the overall responsibility still rests upon the leader himself. To succeed, the
leader must be able to perform well. Some of the good indicators of performance are
as follows:
a.
Taking Responsibility. Leaders must take responsibility for their actions
and for the action of their subordinates. It is therefore prudent that commanders
think of the consequence of their actions and be concerned about what their
subordinates do whether it is during duty or off duty.
b.
Decision Making. Commanders at all levels are required to make
decisions in conjunction with the attainment of certain objectives. While such
decisions made should be timely and sound, it is vital that leaders take full
responsibility for the decisions made.
c.
Planning. It is the responsibility of leaders to ensure that their tasks are
accomplished. As such, they should plan with attention to detail and supervise
each task undertaken at all times.
d.
Knowledge. Leaders should broaden their knowledge which can be
divided into two areas, first, practical knowledge and skills, second, knowledge
of events and situation through experience.
e.
Care. Leaders should care about subordinates and individual members
of the team and the team as a whole. An uncaring attitude of leaders will
become apparent leading to the non-responsiveness of the team.
f.
Training. Leaders are responsible for the training of subordinates under
their command. Subordinates should not only be trained to undertake certain
tasks but also to work as a highly motivated team. Building esprit de corps or
team spirit is therefore essential for the team to sustain as a homogenous entity.
g.
Desire to Lead. One can easily motivate others and lead the team
effectively if the leader himself is highly motivated towards achieving the tasks.
For leaders who are not fully committed, this lack in their enthusiasm will be
evident when they communicate with their subordinates. This would ultimately
lead to problems in command, especially during crisis.
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SECTION 2
ROLES, TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPANY COMMANDER
107. The company commander leads by personal example and is responsible for
everything the company does or fails to do. His duties include the key areas of tactical
employment, training, administration, personnel management, maintenance, force
protection, and the sustainment of his company. Given the asymmetrical,
noncontiguous environment, he must now integrate and synchronise a greater mix of
forces for full spectrum operations including other combined arms and combat support
elements, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), interpreters, media,
unmanned aerial system (UAS) and robotics teams. Among other things, he:
a.
Commands and controls through his subordinate leaders.
b.
Employs his company to accomplish its’ mission according to the
battalion commander's intent and concept.
c.
Selects the best location to maneuver the platoons and other elements.
d.
Conducts mission analysis and troop-leading procedures (TLP) and
issues operation orders for company tactical operations.
e.
Maintains and expresses situation awareness and understanding.
f.
Resources the platoons and other elements and requests battalion
support when needed.
g.
Ensures that the company command post (CP) effectively battle tracks
the situation and status.
h.
Provides a timely and accurate tactical picture to the battalion
commander and subordinate units.
i.
Implements effective measures for force protection, security, and
accountability of forces and systems.
j.
Develops the leadership and tactical skill of his platoon leaders.
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SECTION 3
LEADERSHIP IN COMBAT
108. It is just as normal for a leader to experience fear as it is for young soldiers, so
a leader should not feel that he must hide it from his subordinates. He should tell his
subordinates that he also experiences fear when he thinks about what he may see or
have to do, but he should not let fear keep him from carrying out his duties. He must
discipline himself and set an example of what to do when one is afraid. Leaders who
cannot control themselves or become indecisive cause their soldiers to lose
confidence. Soldiers must be confident in their leadership to succeed in combat.
109. Stress in Combat. The intensity of war is so demanding that stress in combat
requires special attention from all leaders. As a leader, one should know that stress in
combat will affect him and his soldiers. Therefore, he should know what to prepare
and how to treat it when it really happens. Stress is usually thought of as a destructive
force that harms performance. This is only partially correct. If the level of stress is not
too high, it can motivate soldiers to act selflessly and heroically in combat. Stress can
also reduce soldier performance if its’ intensity is great enough. For the leaders, stress
is only a problem when it adversely affects performance. High stress reduces combat
strength by lowering soldier performance and increasing battlefield stress casualties.
110. Battle Fatigue. Battle fatigue is a psychoneurotic reaction that can develop in
an individual from stress in a combat environment. Every individual has a different
capacity to cope personally with traumatic stress, whether it is a result of an external
physical factor such as an enemy threat or an internal factor such as guilt. Mental and
physical fitness help soldiers endure stress, but fear and other unpleasant feelings will
naturally be present before, during, and after combat. It is impossible for the leader to
determine in advance either his personal resistance or that of his soldiers to succumb
to battle fatigue. There are indicators of battle fatigue that a leader must recognise.
111. Protection from Battle Fatigue. There are actions a leader can take to protect
himself and his soldiers from battle fatigue. A leader should know what his soldiers are
capable of doing. Tough, demanding, realistic training will increase their confidence in
themselves, their unit, their leadership, and equipment. Leaders should keep their
subordinates informed on the situation on enemy’s capabilities or the difficulty of
upcoming missions. Use and analyses the after-action review process after every
mission to learn things that will help the unit in the future and to help soldiers talk
through their problems when things are tough at home or in the unit. A leader should
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develop and enforce rest so that they can make sound, timely decisions. The
sustained stress of fighting and waiting physically can lead to battle fatigue.
112. Treating Battle Fatigue. Perhaps the most powerful thing a leader can do for
his soldiers in tough situations is to look calm and controlled. Soldiers will key in on
the leaders’ behaviors and focus on the unit’s immediate mission. Soldiers should be
expected to continue their duties. A leader should remember that battle fatigue is
normal. He should talk about it, make sure his soldiers understand it and is able to
recognize it in themselves and others. He should stay in touch with his soldiers and
keep talking to them. When there are rumors, he should get the facts instead of
jumping to conclusions. The leader should reduce his soldiers’ anxiety and increase
their peace of mind by keeping them informed. When the tactical situation and safety
permits, the leader should ensure the following:
a.
Have sufficient sleep and rest.
b.
Drink plenty of fluids.
c.
Continue to eat normal portions of food.
d.
Continue to conduct training.
e.
Maintain hygiene.
f.
Talk about what happened and put things in perspective, clear up
misunderstandings, talk about lessons learned.
g.
Share grief, talk out personal worries and consult with the Religious
Officer.
h.
Keep busy when not resting (do recreational activities, equipment
maintenance and motivational talks).
113. The leader needs all the traits and skills in influencing his followers to achieve
success and avoid all negative behavior that may cause problems to the organization.
The leader must not only function as a leader but must also be a good manager,
especially when handling all assets and human resource during peace time. The
knowledge and skills of all leaders need to be sharpened using all available avenues
in the Army because only knowledgeable leaders will be respected and able to perform
their tasks successfully.
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SECTION 4
COMPANY COMBAT STRESS MANAGEMENT
114. Stress is defined as the physical and psychological process of reacting to cope
with any situations (especially war) that place extraordinary pressure upon soldier.
Early recognition of stress among soldier as follows:
Serial
(a)
1.
2.
Physical
(b)
Emotional
(c)
Mild Stress
a.
Trembling
a.
Anxiety, indecisiveness
b.
Jumpiness
b.
Irritability, complaining
c.
Cold sweats, dry mouth
c.
Forgetfulness, inability to
d.
Insomnia
concentrate
e.
Pounding heart
d.
Nightmares
f.
Dizziness
e.
Easily startled by noise.
g.
Nausea, vomiting or diarrhea Movement and light
h.
Fatigue
f.
Tears, crying
i.
“Thousand-yard” stare
g.
Anger, loss of confidence in
j.
Difficulty
in
thinking, self and unit.
speaking and communicating
Severe Stress
a.
Constantly moves around
a.
Talks
rapidly
and/or
b.
Flinches or ducks at sudden inappropriately
sound and movement
b.
Argumentative,
acts
c.
Shakes, trembles
recklessly
d.
Cannot use part of body c.
Indifferent to danger
(hand, arm, leg) for no apparent d.
Memory loss
physical reason
e.
Stutters severely, mumbles
e.
Inability to see, hear or feel
or cannot speak at all
f.
Is physically exhausted, cries f.
Insomnia,
severely
g.
Freezes under fire or it totally nightmares
immobile
g.
Sees or hear things not exist
h.
States vacantly, staggers or h.
Has rapid emotional shifts
sways when standing
i.
Apathetic
i.
Panics, run under fire
j.
Hysterical outbursts
k.
Frantic or strange behavior
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115.
Types of Stress as follows:
a.
Physical stress – fatigue, exhaustion, illness.
b.
Physiological stress – hormone change (menopause)
c.
Psychosocial stress – life events) problem on marital, financial,
occupation.
116. The effect of over stress can affect a soldier’s personality, well-being,
performance, health and later create social problems in the Coy. A Soldier/Individual’s
response to pressure is determined by his:
117.
a.
Character (personality)
b.
Past experiences/lifestyle
c.
Coping mechanism
d.
Perception to stress
e.
His own moral background
Classes of stress and their causes as follows:
Micro stresses
(b)
Macro stresses
(c)
Day to day worries relating to a
soldier’s routine
Soldier’s family life
Relationships with others eg:
higher commanders, friends, family
members, spouse and others
Living in urbanised area
Death of spouses/son/daughter
Divorce
Marriage problems
Marital separation
Financial problems
Conflict with a commander
118. In order to cope with this problem, a commander take action through physical
and emotion consideration. An example of a physical reaction is to not place excessive
pressure on a soldier, delegate tasking based on their capabilities, organise
recreational activities regularly in the company, conduct physical training/take part in
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games or sports and encourage soldiers to eat a healthy and balanced diet. An
example of an emotional reaction is motivating soldiers to be positive, conduct
religious activities, read soldier’s gestured, anticipate the situation during execute task,
praise or reward when a task is completed correctly, and seek counselor for guidance
to dealing with psychology problem.
119. The Malaysian Army’s prowess as a fighting force is dependent on a leadership
traits that maintain a balanced focus between mission accomplishment and troop
welfare. The small-unit leader is the key to building and maintaining high unit morale
and peak efficiency. He achieves this by knowing his troops and understanding their
strengths and weaknesses. To maintain that same level of morale and efficiency in
combat, the small-unit leader must understand how to recognise, prevent, and even
personally contend to combat stress when it occurs in his unit. If a condition accounted
for as many casualties in combat and the condition was at least partially preventable,
the prudent combat leader would be interested in knowing more about it. Combat
stress reaction(s), also called battle fatigue, is that condition. It has the potential to
disable the most courageous service member and influence the success or failure of
a unit in accomplishing its mission.
SECTION 5
INTEGRITY IN COMMAND
120. Integrity is, quite simply, doing the right thing. A person of integrity is enduringly
honest and driven by ethical principles. Openness and honesty are essential to trust
and the functioning of the chain of command. Officers and soldiers must have
complete trust in each other; their lives may ultimately depend on it. Any lapse in
integrity calls into question whether an individual can be relied upon and thus trusted.
121. Integrity also sets the tone of relationships beyond the Army. It is a significant
factor in our relationship with other armies and beyond the immediate military
environment including with civil society and family members. Integrity, and the public
trust that comes with it, is a hard-won quality which is easily lost.
122. Integrity also defines as the authority vested in an individual of the armed (?)
for the direction, coordination and control of military forces, or an order given by a
commander, that is the will the commander expresses for the purpose of bringing
about a particular action.
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SECTION 6
BATTLE COMMAND
123. Battle Command. Battle command is the art and science of applying leadership
and decision making to achieve mission success. Battle command encompasses the
functions of leadership (providing purpose, motivation, and direction) and decision
making. Enabled by command, control, communications, and computers (C4) and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), battle command enhances the
commander's ability to gain information and decision-making advantages over any
adversary.
Figure 1 – 1: Battle Command
124. A key function of command is the provision of leadership. This is an essential
quality if a commander is to govern, persuade, animate and inspire confidence. As
commanders become more senior, their span of command becomes larger and their
command more complex. As such, contact between leaders and followers through the
command levels become increasingly indirect. At these higher levels, the role of the
commander competes for time and attention among the many roles demanded. The
skill of exercising command, therefore, requires training and it is learnt through the
experience of commanding, which must be practiced at all levels in peace to prepare
for command in war.
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125. Command may be exercised through the issue of directives, instructions and
orders to control and influence all actions in fulfilment of the commander’s aims.
Depending on the complexity of the operation, the commander may exercise
centralised or decentralised control. Decentralised control, effected through the
philosophy of mission command, allows subordinates that degree of initiative
necessary to exploit situations.
126. The art of commanding military units is one of the few human endeavours that
cannot be learned by taking courses leading to a degree in “Commandership”. This
good fortune can be attributed to the fact that command is very personal. It is so much
an intermeshing of personality and circumstances that the best teachers renounce the
thought of finding generalisations or rules that can be applied to all commanders in all
situations. There is no one solution to solve every problem that command brings to
leaders. They must find their own styles and techniques to overcome the obstacles to
command.
127. At every level of command from a platoon in a battalion to an Army, leaders will
face different demanding command environments. To command at any level is to do
more than just manage military forces. Just as commanders change their methods as
they move from junior to senior to very senior levels of command, so the manager
adopts new ways on the path from supervisory to middle to top management levels.
The commander will not find in management theory the insights and values that can
explain to soldiers why their organisation is more important than they are, why the
organisation can be sacrificed to national need and whether they may live or die in the
process.
128. In summary, to command is to manage well when management is called for, to
lead well when leadership is necessary and to carry out orders and enforce regulations
when “going by the book” is all that is required. On the other hand, one will know when
a commander has failed or is failing by the following conditions:
a.
When their decision-making squanders the available time, manpower
and resources.
b.
When they are not accomplishing their many missions, even though they
have adequate resources.
c.
When they are not training their forces to a high level of technical and
tactical competence.
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d.
When they arenot establishing a moral climate that provides for
responsible behaviour of their troops and for justice for both their people and
the Army.
e.
When they are not in control of their people and their organisation, as
evidenced by their failure to carry out their own orders.
SECTION 7
POWER OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS
COMPANY SECOND IN COMMAND (2IC)
129. The 2ICs’ primary role is to assist the commander in mission planning and
accomplishment. They assume command of the company as required and ensures
that tactical reports from the platoons are forwarded to the Battalion Tactical
Operations Headquarters. They locates where he can maintain communications with
the company commander and the battalion. The 2IC also:
a.
Plans and Supervises. Before the battle along with the CSM, the
company's sustainment operations ensures that precombat inspections are
complete. They plan and coordinate logistical support with agencies outside the
company while the CSM does the same internally. They prepare or aid in
preparing paragraph 4 of the company operation’s order which is the Command
and Signal paragraph. They may also help the company commander plan the
mission.
b.
Coordinates With Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units. Theymay
aid in control of critical events of the battle such as a passage of lines, bridging
a gap, or breaching an obstacle; or, they may assume control of a platoon
attached to the company during movement.
c.
Performs As Landing Zone or Pickup Zone Control Officer. This
may include straggler control, casualty evacuation, resupply operations, or airground liaison.
d.
Leads Quartering Party or Detachment. They may lead a quartering
party which consists of an element of representatives of various company
elements. Their purpose is to precede the company and reconnaissance,
secure, and mark an assembly area. They may also:
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(1)
Lead a detachment with other tactical tasks including shaping or
sustaining force.
(2)
Leader in a company raid or attack, control company machine
guns, or mortar section.
(3)
Lead the reserve.
(4)
Lead the detachment left in contact during a withdrawal.
(5)
Control attachments to the company.
(6)
Serve as movement control officer.
COMPANY SERGEANT MAJOR (CSM)
130. The CSM is the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) and normally the most
experienced soldier in the company. They are the commander's primary tactical
advisor and the expert on individual and NCO skills. They help the commander plan,
coordinate, and supervise all activities that support the unit mission. They operate
where the commander directs or where they can best influence a critical point or what
is viewed as the unit's decisive point. The CSM also:
a.
Supervises routine operations. This can include enforcing the tactical
standing operating procedures, planning and coordinating both training and full
spectrum operations; and administering replacement operations, logistics,
maintenance, communications, field hygiene, and casualty evacuation
operations.
b.
Supervises, inspects, and influences matters designated by the
commander as well as areas that depend on his expertise such as soldier care,
force protection, security, and accountability.
c.
Assists the 2IC and keeps themselves prepared to assume the 2IC’s
duties, if needed.
d.
Leads task-organised elements or subunits for the company's shaping
effort or other designated missions.
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PLATOON COMMANDER (Pl Comd)
131. The Platoon Commander (Pl Comd) leads their soldiers by personal example.
They are responsible for everything that the platoon does or fails to do and has
complete authority over their subordinates. This centralised authority enables the Pl
Comd to maintain unit discipline, unity, and to act decisively. The demands of modern
combat or full spectrum operations require the Pl Comd to exercise initiative without
continuous guidance from higher commands. They must know their Soldiers; and how
to employ the platoon, its’ weapons, and its’ systems. They rely on the expertise of the
Platoon Sergeant and regularly consult with them on all platoon matters. As part of
their key tactical responsibilities, the Pl Comd;
a.
Leads the platoon in accomplishing its mission according to the company
and battalion commanders’ intent and concept.
b.
Performs troop-leading procedure for missions assigned to the platoon.
c.
Locates where they can best manoeuvre the sections and the fighting
elements, and then synchronises their efforts.
d.
Anticipates the platoon's next tactical move.
e.
Requests and controls assets.
f.
Ensures force-protection measures are implemented.
g.
Maintains all-round, three-dimensional security.
h.
Controls the emplacement of key weapon systems.
i.
Ensures security measures are implemented at the limit of advance
(LOA).
j.
Provides a timely and accurate tactical picture to the commander.
PLATOON SERGEANT (Pl Sgt)
132. The Pl Sgt is the platoon's most experienced NCO and second in command.
They are accountable to the Pl Comd for the leadership, discipline, training, and
welfare of the platoon's soldiers. They set the example in everything. Their expertise
includes tactical manoeuvre, employment of weapons and systems, logistics,
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
administration, security, accountability, force protection, and soldier care. As the
second in command, the Pl Sgt assumes no formal duties except those prescribed by
the Pl Comd. As part of their traditional tactical responsibilities, The Pl Sgt:
a.
Locates and acts where best to help control the fight or other platoon
operations; may lead either the shaping or sustaining operation.
b.
Assures that the platoon is prepared to accomplish its mission by
supervising precombat checks and inspections.
c.
Helps develop the section commander’s tactical and leadership skills.
d.
Supervises platoon sustainment operations:
(1)
Receives the section commander’s administrative, logistical, and
sustainment reports and requests for rations, water, fuel, and
ammunition.
(2)
Coordinates with the CSM or 2IC for resupply.
(3)
Runs the platoon casualty collection point (CCP); directs the
medic and aid and litter teams; forwards casualty reports; manages
personnel strength levels, receives and orients replacements.
STAFF SERGEANT SUPPORT SECTION
133. Staff Sergeant Support helps plan, coordinate, and execute the company's fire
support. During planning, he develops a fire support plan based on the company
commander's concept and guidance. He also:
a.
Advises the commander of the capabilities and statuses of all available
fire support assets.
b.
Helps the commander develop the OP O to ensure full integration of fires
into the concept.
c.
Refines field artillery and mortar targets to support the maneuver plan.
d.
Designates targets and fire control measures and determines method of
engagement and firing responsibility.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
e.
Determines the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and
control the fire plan.
f.
Briefs the fire support plan as part of the company OP O, and
coordinates with PLs to ensure they understand their fire support
responsibilities.
g.
Integrates platoon targets into the company target overlay and target
worksheet, and sends the resulting products to the Battalion Headquarters.
h.
During the battle, normally locates near the commander. This allows
greater flexibility in conducting or adjusting the fire support plan. At times,
locates away from the commander to better control supporting fires. Informs the
commander of key information on the radio net.
i.
Understands Infantry tactics in order to integrate fires effectively, and if
the company commander becomes a casualty, may assume temporary control
of the company until the 2IC Coy can do so.
j.
Ensures the indirect fire plan is part of each company rehearsal.
COMPANY QUARTERMASTER SERGEANT (CQMS)
134. The CQMS requests, receives, issues, stores, maintains, and returns supplies
and equipment for the company. He coordinates requirements with the Logistics
Officer and Regimental Quartermaster.
a.
Controls the vehicles that are organic to the company.
b.
Monitors the tactical situation.
c.
Anticipates logistical requirements.
d.
If located in the Infantry battalion support area, CQMS may provide
guidance and assistance to Regiment Quartermaster.
e.
Communicates using the battalion administrative/logistical (A/L) radio.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
SECTION 8
DISCIPLINARY OFFENSES (DRUGS)
135. Dadah ialah apa-apa jua bahan kimia samada asli atau tiruan apabila
digunakan samada cara disuntik, dihisap atau dimakan, ia boleh mengubah fungsi
tubuh badan seseorang secara psikologi, emosional, ataupun pertukaran perlakuan.
136. Menurut Kamus Dewan Melayu - Inggeris, makna perkataan "Drug" bermaksud
ubat-ubatan. Walaupun demikian, untuk memberi takrif penyalahgunaan kepada
“Drug", perkataan "use", "misuse" atau "abuse" perlu digunakan bersama-sama
dengan perkataan “Drug". Contohnya "drug abuse" atau "misuse of drug" yang
membawa maksud penyalahgunaan dadah.
137. Manakala dalam pengertian Bahasa Malaysia, definisi dadah berdasarkan
Kamus Dewan Edisi Keempat pula adalah seperti berikut
(a)
ubat-ubatan.
(b)
bahan (spt ganja, heroin, marijuana, dsb) yg merosakkan atau
membinasakan orang yg menggunakannya berlanjutan (merosakkan
kesihatan, membawa maut, dll); pendadah tempat menyimpan dadah (ubatubatan).
138. Dalam hal ini, perkataan penyalahgunaan atau penagihan adalah perkataan
yang sesuai digunakan bagi menggambarkan masalah penggunaan dan juga
masalah-masalah yang lain berkaitan dadah.
139.
Seseorang dikatakan ketagih kepada dadah apabila:
a.
Penggunaan dadah menjadi bahagian penting dalam kehidupan
seharian.
b.
Penggunaan dadah mengatasi lain-lain keperluan hidup seperti makan
dan minum.
c.
Toleransi atau daya tahan kepada dadah meningkat.
d.
Mengalami gejala tarikan apabila tidak mengambil dadah
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UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
e.
Merasa terdesak atau gian untuk mengguna dadah,lebi-lebih lagi
apabila cuba mengurangkan atau berhenti menggunakan dadah dan tidak
dapat mengawal jumlah dan kekerapan penggunaan.
f.
Terdapat tarikan atau kecenderungan menagih semula setelah berhenti
mengguna dadah untuk beberapa waktu.
140.
Dadah boleh dikategorikan kepada beberapa jenis seperti berikut:
Figure 1.2: Jenis – jenis dadah
141.
Ciri – ciri penyalahgunaan dadah seperti berikut:
a.
Mempuyai kesan paling ketara di atas sistem saraf pusat (otak dan
saraf tunjang).
b.
Digunakan bukan untuk tujuan perubatan dan pengunaannya adalah
dilarang.
c.
Diperolehi secara haram.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
d.
Membawa kepada pengantungan fizikal dan psikologi dan
meningkatkan daya tahan terhadap dadah.
e.
Mendatangkan kesan-kesan buruk dan bahaya ke atas kesihatan dan
fungsi sosial seseorang.
142. Profil penagihan di Malaysia menunjukkan bahawa sebahagian besar penagih
dadah adalah di dalam lingkungan umur antara 15-25 tahun. Sebahagian besarnya
adalah belia-belia yang masih bersekolah sama ada di sekolah kerajaan, swasta
ataupun di pusat-pusat pengajian tinggi. Di antara faktor-faktor yang mendorongkan
mereka mengguna dadah ialah kerana:
a.
Keseronokan.
b.
Perasaan ingin tahu.
c.
Pengaruh rakan sebaya.
d.
Meningkatkan keseronokan seksual.
e.
Rawatan perubatan.
f.
Secara tidak sengaja.
g.
Mengatasi tekanan jiwa.
143. Masalah penagihan dadah memerlukan kerjasama semua pihak bagi
membantu mereka yang telah terlibat dalam masalah ini. Oleh itu, kita perl
mengenalpasti penagih dadah bagi memberikan bantuan sewajarnya kepada mereka.
a.
Perubatan dan kemerosotan disiplin, tahap kerja, hasil kerja dan
kedatangannya sudah tidak tetap.
b.
Meradang dengan tidak tentu sebab, selalu menguap dan tidak
bermaya.
c.
Mengelakkan diri dari tanggungjawab.
d.
Perubahan sikap dan tabiat harian pada keseluruhannya.
e.
Kemerosotan rupa dan kebersihan diri.
f.
Bertabiat suka menyembunyikan perbuatan dan apa yg dimiliki.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
g.
Hilang selera makan, kurang berat badan, mata berair, anak mata juga
jadi layu.
h.
Parut atau bekas suntikan di lengan hujung jari bertukar warna akibat
kesan menghisap dadah.
i.
Berdampingan dengan mereka yang di kenali sebagai penagih.
j.
Mengasingkan diri dan suka memencilkan diri.
k.
Memerlukan wang secara berlebihan.
l.
Perbuatan asyik meminjam wang atau mencuri barang-barang yang
mudah dijual.
144. Masyarakat umumnya berpendapat penagih dadah tidak dapat dipulihkan dan
dirawat, buktinya banyak penagih yang telah mendapat rawatan dan pemulihan
kembali menagih selepas tamat program. Masalahnya bukan program rawatan yang
tidak berjaya dan tidak berkesan. Ia sebenarnya terletak pada diri individu itu sendiri
untuk membuat keputusan mahu berubah atau tidak.
145. Sekiranya seseorang penagih dadah itu mengambil keputusan untuk berhenti
mengambil dadah, tanpa menjalani rawatan pemulihan sebenarnya ia boleh pulih.
Namun hakikatnya seseorang penagih dadah yang mahu berhenti mengguna dadah
amat sukar untuk membuang subbudaya penagihan yang telah mereka lalui. Penagihpenagih ini perlu diberi pemulihan yang berkesan supaya mereka mendapat satu
kehidupan baru dan berfungsi sebagai manusia yang normal.
146. Faktor pengaruh rakan sebaya memang telah diketahui umum merupakan
penyebab utama seseorang individu terlibat dalam penagihan dadah. Oleh itu, dalam
usaha memecahkan subbudaya penagihan faktor rakan sebaya adalah sangat
penting untuk mendesak penagih dadah berubah. Dari segi penerimaan, penagih
dadah akan lebih bersikap terbuka untuk menerima teguran, ajakan dan nasihat rakan
sebaya. Begitu juga Terapi Terapeutik Komuniti penggunaan faktor rakan sebaya
merupakan alat yang paling berkesan dalam rawatan pemulihan penagihan. Dengan
kata lain rakan-rakan sebaya akan menjadi cermin kepada penagih itu untuk
membetulkan tingkah lakunya. Jika tiada rakan yang menegur, besar kemungkinan
seseorang itu tidak mengetahui bahawa perbuatan itu menjadi kesalahan.
147. Manakala dari segi aspek pemikiran, emosi dan kepercayaan, penagih dadah
juga perlu dirawat, ini kerana penagih mempunyai emosi yang sensitif dan sub-budaya
penagihan telah membentuk kepercayaan yang negatif. Penagih dadah akan
merasakan dirinya unik dan berbeza daripada orang lain, menganggap semua yang
dilakukannya adalah betul, seorang yang berani mencuba dan pelbagai lagi
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
kepercayaan yang negatif. Pemikiran dan kepercayaan yang negatif penagih dadah
akan mempengaruhi tingkah laku, emosi, dari segi fizikal dan mentaliti.
148. Selain itu, pengawalan emosi juga turut dilakukan melalui pembentukan
beberapa kumpulan yang akan berperanan untuk mereka melepaskan perasaan
seperti marah, kecewa dan tidak puas hati.
149. Untuk mengubah pemikiran negatif kepada pemikiran yang positif seseorang
penagih dadah perlu mempunyai kepercayaan bahawa rawatan yang dijalani
sekarang ini mampu untuk membentuk sahsiah diri serta mampu untuk membuang
subbudaya seorang penagih dadah yang sekian lama dibawa.
150. Dalam konteks Tentera Darat khasnya, arahan – arahan berikut telah
dikeluarkan bagi memaklumkan dan menerangkan berkaitan penyalahgunaan dadah
dan tindakan tatatertib yang boleh dikenakan kepada pegawai dan anggota yang
terlibat.
a.
Pengisytiharan Larangan Dalam Perintah Tetap Pasukan Berkaitan
Kesalahan Penyalahgunaan Dadah Berbahaya - (MK TD/G1/3359/(UG)
BERTARIKH 14 APR 2006).
b.
Pengisytiharan Larangan Berkaitan Daun Ketum Dan Pil Kuda Di Dalam
Perintah Tetap Bahagian Pertama Pasukan - (MK TD/G1/3359/(UG)
BERTARIKH 11 JUL 2007).
c.
Larangan Berkaitan Pil Nospan Dan Daun Ketum Di Dalam Perintah
Tetap Pasukan - (MK TD/G1/3359/(UG) BERTARIKH 21 APR 2011)
d.
Larangan Berkaitan Diphenhydramine Dan Chloroquine Di Dalam
Perintah Tetap Pasukan - (MK TD/G1/3359/(UG) BERTARIKH 8 2015)
151. Sebagai kesimpulannya dapat kita katakan bahawa bukan sahaja merosakkan
diri sendiri bahkan adalah musuh utama Negara dan menjadi tanggungjawab kita
bersama untuk membenterasnya kerana para perajurit yang penting yang akan
memerintahkan Negara untuk mencapai matlamat wawasan 2020. Dengan
mengetahui kesan fizikal dan psikologi mengenal seorang penagih dadah dapatlah
anda sama-sama membantu mengatasi masalah-masalah penyalahgunaan dadah di
pasukan agar kita mempunyai satu angkatan bersenjata yang sihat, kuat dan
berdedikasi untuk menjamin keselamatan Negara.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
APPLY MISSION COMMAND
SECTION 1
UNDERSTAND MISSION COMMAND
“If orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame”
Sun Tzu
152. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralised
execution based upon mission-type orders. Mission command exploits the human
element emphasising trust, force of will, initiative, judgment, and creativity. Successful
mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise
disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the
mission. They focus their orders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the
details of how to perform assigned tasks. Essential to mission command is the
thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command and a
command climate of mutual trust and understanding.
153. Mission command is a philosophy cantered on the art of command. The art of
command is the creative and skilful use of authority, instincts, intuition, and experience
in decision-making and leadership to enhance operational effectiveness. The art of
command is supported by the science of control, the systems and procedures that
improve a commander’s understanding and support the execution of missions.
Effective joint commanders leverage both art and science. While we leverage
technology to advance our science of control, that aspect may not always be robust
(e.g., in contested environments) and may be vulnerable to attack. This further
reinforces the need to understand and practice mission command.
154. Mission command provides the means through commander’s intent, mission
type orders, and decentralised execution to operate at the speed of the problem. It
permits the horizontal coordination at echelon with mission partners to achieve
complementary, versus merely additive, employment of capabilities. The attributes of
mission command apply to our interaction with partners. We operate as one team with
our mission partners either in joint or combined arms. We depend on each other to
succeed in today’s complex security environment. This is the dependence on access
to each other’s capabilities to succeed in assigned tasks (even when we do not own
them).
155. The exercise of mission command is based on mutual trust, shared
understanding, and purpose. Commanders understand that some decisions must be
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
made quickly at the point of action. Therefore, they concentrate on the objectives of
an operation, not how to achieve it. Commanders provide subordinates with their
intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and
resources. Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to
unanticipated problems. Every Soldier must be prepared to assume responsibility,
maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the
commander’s intent.
156. Effective commanders understand that their leadership guides the development
of teams and helps to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the
force. Commanders allocate resources and provide a clear intent that guides
subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates,
by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then
able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. When
given sufficient latitude, they can accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that fits the
situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize
their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation
and provide direction, guidance, and resources while synchronising operations. They
encourage subordinates to take bold action, and they accept prudent risks to create
opportunity and to seize the initiative.
SECTION 2
PHILOSOPHY OF MISSION COMMAND
“In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are,
if you cannot create harmony, even vicious harmony, on the battlefield
based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines,
and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home,
because your leadership is obsolete.
We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines”
General James Mattis, USMC
157. People are the basis of all military organisations, and military operations occur
as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to
exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission
command through the balancing of the art of command with the science of control.
158. Command defined as the authority that a commander in the armed forces
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and
for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating, and controlling
military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes
responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Art of
command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decision
making and leadership. As an art, command requires exercising judgment.
Commanders constantly use their judgment for such things as delegating authority,
making decisions, determining the appropriate degree of control, and allocating
resources. Although certain facts such as troop-to-task ratios may influence a
commander, they do not account for the human aspects of command. A commander’s
experience and training also influence decision making skills. Proficiency in the art of
command stems from years of schooling, self-development, and operational and
training experiences.
159. As an art, command also requires providing leadership. Leadership is the
process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to
accomplish the mission and improve the organisation. Humans communicate to
convey information and thoughts. Although various formats exist to communicate
information, successful commanders understand the immeasurable value of
collaboration and dialogue. Collaboration and dialogue help commanders obtain
human information not collected by their mission command system. Based on the
situation and the audience (Soldiers, subordinate commanders, or unified action
partners), commanders determine the appropriate communication and leadership
style. Commanders then organise their mission command system to support their
decision making and facilitate communication.
a.
Authority. Authority is the delegated power to judge, act, or command.
Commanders have a legal authority to enforce orders under the AKTA 1972
.Commanders understand that operations affect and are affected by human
interactions. As such, they seek to establish personal authority. Personal
authority ultimately arises from the actions of the commander and the trust and
confidence generated by those actions. Commanders earn respect and trust by
upholding laws and Army values, applying Army leadership principles, and
demonstrating tactical and technical expertise. In this way, commanders
enhance their authority. Commanders are legally responsible for their decisions
and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. All
commanders have a responsibility to act within their higher commander’s intent
to achieve the desired end state. However, humans sometimes make mistakes.
Commanders realise that subordinates may not accomplish all tasks initially
and that errors may occur. Successful commanders allow subordinates to learn
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
through their mistakes and develop experience. With such acceptance in the
command climate, subordinates gain the experience required to operate on
their own. However, commanders do not continually underwrite subordinates’
mistakes resulting from a critical lack of judgment. Nor do they tolerate repeated
errors of omission when subordinates fail to exercise initiative. The art of
command lies in discriminating between mistakes to underwrite as teaching
points from those that are unacceptable in a military leader.
b.
Decisionmaking. Decisionmaking requires knowing if, when, and what
to decide and understanding the consequences of any decision. Commanders
first seek to understand the situation. As commanders and staffs receive
information, they process it to develop meaning. Commanders and staffs then
apply judgment to gain understanding. This understanding helps commanders
and staffs develop effective plans, assess operations and make quality
decisions. Commanders use experience, training, and study to inform their
decisions. They consider the impact of leadership, operational complexity, and
human factors when determining how to best use available resources to
accomplish the mission. Success in operations demands timely and effective
decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge.
They use their judgment to assess information, situations, or circumstances
shrewdly and to draw feasible conclusions.
c.
Leadership. Through leadership, commanders influence their
organisations to accomplish missions. They develop mutual trust, create
shared understanding, and build cohesive teams. Successful commanders act
decisively, within the higher commander’s intent, and in the best interest of the
organisation. Commanders use their presence to lead their forces effectively.
They recognise that military operations take a toll on the moral, physical, and
mental stamina of soldiers. They seek to maintain a constant understanding of
the status of their forces and adjust their leadership appropriately. They gather
and communicate information and knowledge about the command’s purpose,
goals, and status. Establishing command presence makes the commander’s
knowledge and experience available to subordinates. Skilled commanders
communicate tactical and technical knowledge that goes beyond plans and
procedures. Command presence establishes a background for all plans and
procedures so that subordinates can understand how and when to adapt them
to achieve the commander’s intent. In many instances, a leader’s physical
presence is necessary to lead effectively. Commanders position themselves
where they can command effectively without losing the ability to respond to
changing situations. They seek to establish a positive command climate that
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
facilitates team building, encourages initiative, and fosters collaboration,
dialogue and mutual trust and understanding. Commanders understand the
importance of human relationships in overcoming uncertainty and chaos and
maintaining the focus of their forces. The art of command includes exploiting
the dynamics of human relationships to the advantage of friendly forces and to
the disadvantage of an enemy. Success depends at least as much on
understanding the human aspects as it does on any numerical and
technological superiority.
d.
Science Of Control. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting
functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent.
Aided by staffs, commanders exercise control over assigned forces in their area
of operations. Staffs coordinate, synchronise and integrate actions; inform the
commander; and exercise control for the commander. The science of control
consists of systems and procedures used to improve the commander’s
understanding and support accomplishing missions. The science of control is
based on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. Commanders and
staffs use the science of control to overcome the physical and procedural
constraints under which units operate. Units are bound by such factors as
movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement, and
legal considerations. Commanders and staffs use the science of control to
understand aspects of operations that can be analysed and measured. These
include the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy
organisations and systems. Control also requires a realistic appreciation for
time-distance factors and the time required to initiate certain actions. The
science of control supports the art of command. Commanders exercise control
to account for changing circumstances and direct the changes necessary to
address the new situation. Commanders impose enough control to mass the
effect of combat power at the decisive point in time while allowing subordinates
the maximum freedom of action to accomplish assigned tasks. They provide
subordinates as much leeway for initiative as possible while keeping operations
synchronised. Control relies on the continuous flow of information between the
commander, staff, subordinates, and unified action partners about the unfolding
situation. Commanders and staff maintain a continuous information flow to
update their understanding. The science of control depends on information,
communication, structure, and degree of control.
e.
Information. Commanders make and implement decisions based on
information. Information imparts structure and shape to military operations. It
fuels understanding and fosters initiative. Commanders determine information
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
requirements and set information priorities by establishing commander’s critical
information requirements. Commanders and staff interpret information received
to gain understanding and to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to
developing threats, modify plans, or reallocate resources. Staffs use
information and knowledge management practices to assist commanders in
collecting, analysing, and disseminating information. This cycle of information
exchange provides the basis for creating and maintaining understanding.
f.
Communication. Communication is the means through which
commanders exercise immediate and personal control over their forces. Units
and other organisations disseminate and share information among people,
elements, and places. Communication links information to decisions and
decisions to action. No decision during operations can be executed without
clear communication between commanders and subordinates. Because
military operations require collective efforts, effective communication is
imperative. Effective communication is intensive and unconstrained, within a
culture of collaboration. Effective communication is characterised by the free
and unhindered sharing of meaningful information and knowledge across all
echelons. Communication has an importance far beyond simply exchanging
information. Commanders use communication to strengthen bonds within a
command. Communication builds trust, cooperation, cohesion, and shared
understanding. The traditional view of communication within military
organisations is that subordinates send commanders information, and
commanders provide subordinates with decisions and instructions. Mission
command requires interactive communications characterised by continuous
vertical and horizontal feedback. Feedback provides the means to improve and
confirm situational understanding.
g.
Structure. Organisational structure helps commanders exercise control.
Structure refers to a defined organisation that establishes relationships and
guides interactions among elements. It also includes procedures that facilitate
coordination among an organisation’s groups and activities. Structure is both
internal (such as a command post) and external (such as command and support
relationships among subordinate forces). Commanders apply Army doctrine for
organising Army command posts and command and support relationships.
h.
Degree of Control. A key aspect of mission command is determining
the appropriate degree of control to impose on subordinates. Commanders
concentrate and synchronise multiple units to mass effects, and they centralise
or decentralise control of operations as needed to ensure units can adapt to
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
changing situations. The appropriate degree of control varies with each
situation and is not easy to determine. Effective commanders impose enough
control to maximize total combat power while allowing subordinates freedom of
action. Commanders strive to provide subordinates the resources and the
freedom to take action to develop the situation. Commanders and subordinates
understand what risks the higher commander will accept and what risks will
remain with the subordinate commander. The appropriate degree of control
affords subordinates sufficient latitude to exploit opportunities to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative.
SECTION 3
DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION ORDERS
160. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander
using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent:
a.
Follow the five-paragraph format and are as brief and simple as possible.
b.
Clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent.
c.
Summarise the situation (current or anticipated starting conditions),
describe the operation’s objectives and end state (desired conditions), and
provide a simple concept of operations to accomplish the unit‘s mission.
SECTION 4
APPLICATION OF MISSION ORDERS
161.
The six principles of mission command are:
a.
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
b.
Create shared understanding.
c.
Provide a clear commander’s intent.
d.
Exercise disciplined initiative.
e.
Use mission orders.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
f.
Accept prudent risk.
162. Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust. Mutual trust is shared
confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners. Effective commanders
build cohesive teams in an environment of mutual trust. There are few shortcuts to
gaining the trust of others. Trust takes time and must be earned. Commanders earn
trust by upholding the Army values and exercising leadership, consistent with the
Army’s leadership principles. Trust is gained or lost through everyday actions more
than grand or occasional gestures. It comes from successful shared experiences and
training, usually gained incidental to operations but also deliberately developed by the
commander. While sharing experiences, the interaction of the commander,
subordinates, and Soldiers through two-way communication reinforces trust. Soldiers
expect to see the chain of command accomplish the mission while taking care of their
welfare and sharing hardships and danger.
163. Effective commanders build teams within their own organisations and with
unified action partners through interpersonal relationships. Unified action partners are
those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, and
elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronise,
and integrate during the conduct of operations. Uniting all the diverse capabilities
necessary to achieve success in operations requires collaborative and cooperative
efforts that focus those capabilities on a common goal. Where military forces typically
demand unity of command, a challenge for building teams with unified action partners
is to forge unity of effort. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common
objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command.
164. Create Shared Understanding. A defining challenge for commanders and
staffs is creating shared understanding of their operational environment, their
operation’s purpose, its’ problems, and approaches to solving them. Shared
understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust. Commanders
and staffs actively build and maintain shared understanding within the force and with
unified action partners by maintaining collaboration and dialogue throughout the
operations process (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment).
165. Commanders use collaboration to establish human connections, build trust,
and create and maintain shared understanding and purpose. Collaborative exchange
helps commanders increase their situational understanding, resolve potential
misunderstandings, and assess the progress of operations. Effective collaboration
provides a forum. It allows dialogue in which participants exchange information, learn
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
from one another, and create joint solutions. Establishing a culture of collaboration is
difficult but necessary. Creating shared understanding of the issues, concerns, and
abilities of commanders, subordinates, and unified action partners takes an investment
of time and effort. Successful commanders talk with soldiers, subordinate leaders, and
unified action partners. Through collaboration and dialogue, participants share
information and perspectives, question assumptions, and exchange ideas to help
create and maintain a shared understanding and purpose.
166. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and
concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state
that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without
further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. Commanders
establish their own commander’s intent within the intent of their higher commander.
The higher commander’s intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the
larger force.
167. Commanders articulate the overall reason for the operation, so subordinates
understand why it is being conducted. A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a
clear image of the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the desired outcome. It
expresses the broader purpose of the operation—beyond that of the mission
statement. This helps subordinate commanders and Soldiers to gain insight into what
is expected of them, what constraints apply, and, most important, why the mission is
being undertaken. A clear commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can understand
is key to maintaining unity of effort.
168. Successful commanders understand they cannot provide guidance or direction
for all conceivable contingencies. They formulate and communicate their
commander’s intent to describe the boundaries within which subordinates may
exercise disciplined initiative while maintaining unity of effort. Commanders
collaborate and dialogue with subordinates to ensure they understand the
commander’s intent. Subordinates aware of the commander’s intent are far more likely
to exercise initiative in unexpected situations. Successful mission command demands
subordinates to exercise their initiative to make decisions that further their higher
commander’s intent.
169. Exercise Disciplined Initiative. Disciplined initiative is action in the absence
of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen
opportunities or threats arise. Leaders and subordinates exercise disciplined initiative
to create opportunities. Commanders rely on subordinates to act, and subordinates
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
take action to develop the situation. This willingness to act helps develop and maintain
operational initiative that sets or dictates the terms of action throughout an operation.
170. The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may
exercise initiative. It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in
ambiguous and urgent situations because they know the mission’s purpose, key task,
and desired end state. They can take actions they think will best accomplish the
mission. Using disciplined initiative, subordinates strive to solve many unanticipated
problems. They perform the necessary coordination and take appropriate action when
existing orders no longer fit the situation.
171. Commanders and subordinates are obligated to follow lawful orders.
Commanders deviate from orders only when they are unlawful, needlessly risk the
lives of Soldiers, or no longer fit the situation. Subordinates inform their superiors as
soon as possible when they have deviated from orders. Adhering to applicable laws
and regulations when exercising disciplined initiative builds credibility and legitimacy.
Straying beyond legal boundaries undermines trust and jeopardises tactical,
operational, and strategic success.
172. Use Mission Orders. Mission orders are directives that emphasise to
subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.
Commanders use mission orders to provide direction and guidance that focus the
forces’ activities on the achievement of the main objective, set priorities, allocate
resources, and influence the situation. They provide subordinates the maximum
freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish missions. Mission orders
seek to maximise individual initiative, while relying on lateral coordination between
units and vertical coordination up and down the chain of command. The mission orders
technique does not mean commanders do not supervise subordinates in execution.
However, they do not micromanage. They intervene during execution only to direct
changes, when necessary, to the concept of operations.
173. Accept Prudent Risk. Commanders accept prudent risk when making
decisions because uncertainty exists in all military operations. Prudent risk is a
deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the
outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. Opportunities come
with risks. The willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy
weaknesses. Making reasonable estimates and intentionally accepting prudent risk
are fundamental to mission command. Commanders focus on creating opportunities
rather than simply preventing defeat even when preventing defeat appears safer.
Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling, in
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
contrast to prudent risk taking, is staking success on a single event without considering
the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned. Therefore,
commanders avoid taking gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyse
and minimise as many hazards as possible, and then take prudent risks to exploit
opportunities.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
CHAPTER 2
MANAGE COMPANY
SECTION 1
CONDUCT COMPANY TRAINING
MALAYSIAN ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM (MATS)
INTRODUCTION
2001. Training has always been recognised as an important activity during peacetime.
The purpose for managing training effectively is to prepare soldiers and units for job
performance in peacetime responsibilities and war. It is also essential because it
develops and sustains the state of readiness to defend the country’s sovereignty from
any forms of threat. In the words of Sun Tzu, “As water has no form, there is in war no
constant conditions”; a conflict in the new era has no recognition for border, territory,
mutual understanding or respect to declare aggression. Although the Southeast Asian
region has developed minimal understanding among its defence forces, one should
be ready to meet any eventualities. A balanced, effective and credible force is the
expectation of the Malaysian Army in his future plan that called Army4NextG.
2002. In line with this, the Army has also its’ vision, Army4NextG. That illustrates the
vision of our Chief of Army, for the Army to be more versatile, able to operate in a
variety of environment, and more lethal, reminder to would be aggressors the heavy
price of aggression. To meet this vision, training must be developed to enhance the
competency of combat forces. Combat operations have slowly transformed from
counter insurgency to conventional warfare, with the emphasis now on playing a more
significant role to maintaining world peace under the United Nation’s flag. Bearing this
in mind, combat units must constantly keep abreast with the current concept of
operations. The expectations of soldiers to play multi-role functions in the future begins
today through appropriate training in various skills and expertise.
a.
Transnational Crime. Transnational crime includes narcotics
trafficking, human smuggling, credit card fraud and cybercrime. International
crime syndicates are taking advantage of globalisation and loose border control
arrangements to commit these crimes. In the context of the Malaysian
environment, the emphasis is on illegal entries, piracy and illegal logging.
b.
Infectious Diseases. Infectious diseases are too becoming a major
threat in the region due to poor living conditions, poor water quality or increase
in urbanisation and travel. Common diseases include AIDS, malaria, cholera,
dengue fever, tuberculosis and others. An outbreak of such diseases could
cause national alarm and be very hazardous.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
c.
Terrorism. Since the September 11th incident in New York, USA,
terrorism has become a prime issue in any military discussion. Fighting
terrorism without knowing whom the enemy really is has become a complex
operation. The methods used to gag communist terrorism may be of less
assistance in modern day terrorist fighting. Terrorism may emerge front external
factors as well as from internal issues.
d.
Maritime Crime. These include piracy, drug trafficking by sea, illegal
entry, smuggling and illegal fishing. The adducting of Malaysian and foreign
tourist from by the Abu Sayyaf group further express the importance of sealane security and national safety. Such crimes could affect the economy state
of a country if one depends on tourism for investment.
2003. Matters discussed above are only the tips of' the iceberg, there is no end to
possible crimes in the new millennium. The reason it was brought up was to highlight
how multifaceted training could be in preparing soldiers or the future. Commanders
should not be content with general training but make the effort to programme training
to suit the possible operations that the unit would undergo in the present epoch. The
familiar cries, "No support" and "No facilities" must be erased from commander’s mind
in order to ensure that his unit achieves the expected performance based on the
Army's vision.
TRAINING SYSTEM
1004. The Malaysian Army Training System (MATS) is an existing tool that could be
utilised to develop training programmes according to the needs. MATS is a set of
procedures designed to ensure that training is conducted effectively and
efficiently. The system is applicable to individual and collective training. It consists
of five phases, which are interdependent, emphasising on results, and has the
ability to accommodate changes. The MATS model is illustrated at Figure 1.1.
The model in Figure 1.1 illustrates that each phase is interrelated and should be dealt
with in turn. Briefly, the various phases are explained in Table 1.1.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
PHASE 5
Validate
Training
PHASE 1
Analyse
Training Needs
MALAYSIAN ARMY
TRAINING SYSTEM
PHASE 4
Conduct
Training
PHASE 2
Design Training
PHASE 3
Develop
Training
Figure 1.1 : Malaysian Army Training System (MATS)
Ser
Phase
(a)
(b)
1. Phase 1: Analyse
Training Needs
Explanation
(c)
The primary purpose is to determine the training needs
of the unit. However, it must be aligned to the Army’s
requirements. Analysis also involves identifying
knowledge, skills and attitude necessary to perform the
tasks. In this phase, the nature and extent of the training
is established in the following manner:
a.
Individual Training. A job or trade is examined
to identify all the tasks a proficient soldier could be
required to perform. The conditions under which a
soldier must do all these tasks and the standards
required wh en doing them.
2.
Phase 2: Design
Training
b.
Collective Training. The
analysis
involves
determining the tasks a unit is expected to perform.
The conditions and the required standards are similarly
identified.
The purpose is to ensure that training is directed
towards a clearly stated objective and accurate tests
are designed to measure achievement of the objectives.
In this phase, tasks that require training are used to derive
training objectives and the tests. These objectives are
then placed in a logical sequence for learning.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
(a)
3.
(b)
Phase 3: Develop
Training
4.
Phase 4: Conduct
Training
5.
Phase 5: Validate
Training
UNCLASSIFIED
(c)
This phase determines the methods by which training is
accomplished. It involves the preparation of instruction,
instructional materials, mode of exercises or practices,
resources required and the assignment of responsibilities
for the training.
This phase involves the conduct of training that has
been determined in the previous phase. The conduct
of training may vary from classroom to field exercises
that are deemed appropriate for the subject.
Validate training is to ensure that the aim and the
objectives of training are achieved. It includes
revision of training after the following:
a.
Internal Validation. It assesses if the training
objective was conducted with adequate resources in
the most efficient manner.
b.
External Validation. It compares the qualified
training performance to the requirements of the job.
Table 1.1 : MATS Phase Explanation
1005. MATS is a tool that analyses and identifies the knowledge and skills that are
continuously required to upgrade the military professionalism. MATS inculcate
“KAEZEN” that enhances professionalism in its’ personnel by training and the
development process. The Training Management Plan which is the end product of
MATS is a document that is continuously upgraded to ensure peak performance in
one’s job function. To achieve professionalism, the Army takes a two-pronged
approach as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Professionalism as termed by Samuel P.
Huttingon, Laswell and Morris Janowitz, is a combination of 'Expertise, Responsibility,
and Corporateness'. Expertise relates to an individual who is a professional in the
performance of their job. Knowledge of the job function must be kept current through
continuous learning. Responsibility is an in-built mechanism that enables one to react
and take charge to see the completion of a task successfully. Corporateness is the
willingness to work as a team and keep up the military values and ethics on an ongoing basis.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
Career
Development
Courses
Professional
Enhancement
Emphasis on
Leadership and
Management Skills
Tertiary Education
Seminar Workshop
Professional
Soldier
Responsibility
Expertise
Corporateness
Figure 1.2 : Training and Development Toward a Knowledge-Based
Organisation
2006. Unlike other organisations, the Army must strike a balance between combat
professionalism and general professionalism. It intends to improve the ability of its’
personnel without compromising the combat professionalism. Like a product in the
market that undergoes vigorous research and development to add value to its
existence, the Army too wishes to add value to a professional soldier by providing
tertiary education opportunities. The need for a paradigm shift for a knowledge-based
soldier who can think analytically and react proactively is much desired. Therefore,
knowledge management is essential and should be given high priority by unit
commanders in meeting the demands of the new millennium. Knowledge empowers
a person to think. It provides an avenue to view things clearly, to distinguish the
essential and the trivial and provide a system in the thinking process. It opens a
person's mind to overcome barriers and go beyond of what is known.
GAUGING UNIT PERFORMANCE
2007. There is no exact tool for measuring unit performance; however, one can be
imaginative in creating a model that could provide information in identifying the
probable weaknesses, areas that requires urgent emphasis or where to begin
improving the unit. The statement: "With knowledge we gain confidence and with
confidence we will gain motivation, and these will breed competence and commitment
among our personnel" by the Chief of Army, General Tan Sri Md Hashim bin Hussein
could be translated in a framework as indicated at Figure 1.3.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
Individual Training
Knowledge
Skill
UNCLASSIFIED
Confidence
Building
Enhance
Motivation
Collective Training
Competence
Training Goal
Commitment
Figure 1.3: Training Development Framework
CURRENT POLICIES
2008. With reference to instruction Army Field Command Training Instructions dated
18th January 2010, the 12 month training cycle will be reviewed and the prime-time
unit training is annulled. However, higher formations are required to ensure training
effectiveness in the unit. A Unit's performance in collective training will be tested
through field exercises planned at Army or Army Field Command levels. Respective
Corps ARTEP’s are to be used to evaluate unit collective training. Without the primetime training period, unit commanders have a leeway to plan their progressive training
to meet the higher echelon requirement during the administration or training cycle in
that year. The same principle applies to units to prepare themselves for the exercises
they will be involved in. Prior to a field exercise, units should be evaluated in the
following manner:
a.
Army Field Command using ARTEP will evaluate unit Headquarters and
equivalent. This could be in a form of Command Post Exercise or Tactical
Exercise Without Troops.
b.
Sub-units to be evaluated using respective Corp ARTEP and results are
to be recorded. This is conducted concurrently by the Formation Headquarters
while Unit Headquarters is being evaluated.
2009. With reference to Army Field Command Training Instructions Number 23 "Latihan/Ujian Jalan Laju" dated 18th January 2010; the new requirements include a 5
km, 8 km, 12 km and 15 km Speed March. Unit commanders are required to plan a
progressive training for each Speed March test. A progressive training guide is
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
indicated at Army Field Command Training Instructions Number 23 - " Latihan/Ujian
Jalan Laju ". It must be clearly understood that the progressive speed march- training
guide, leading to every Speed March test is the unit commander's prerogative. Units
may refer to any other methods in preparing their men for every Speed March. In a
diagrammatic form, unit training could be viewed as in Figure 1.4.
Individual Skill
Professional Intellectualism
• Individual Skills ProficiencyINDIVIDUAL
Test
• Individual military
TRAINING
(UKKI)
professionalism through Officers
or Senior NCO’s Day
• Speed March.
• Leadership Training
• Basic Fitness Test (BFT)
• Spiritual Training
• Unarmed Combat Training (TTS)
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
LMIT (Stage 3)
LSB
Weapon Skill Camp (KKS)
FIELD EXERCISES
Figure 1.4 : Unit Training Plan
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
2010. The chapter illustrates a method that could be of assistance to unit
commanders in measuring their unit performance level in training. Unit performance
could be measured through three aspects, which are individual training, professional
intellectualism, and collective training.
2011. The Army Training Directive requires every individual to undergo the following
physical tests to ensure individual professional skills are at the peak of performance.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
a.
UNCLASSIFIED
Basic Fitness Test (BFE 1 / BFE 2).
b.
Individual Skills Proficiency Test (Ujian Kelayakan Kernahiran Individu UKKI). Individual Skills Proficiency Test is sub-divided into the following
aspects:
(1)
Weapon Handling.
(2)
Fieldcraft Knowledge (IMP).
(3)
Map Reading.
(4)
Radio Communication.
(5)
First Aid.
(6)
Drill.
(7)
Fardhu Ain.
c.
Weapon Firing Accuracy (LMIT).
d.
Combat Skill Test (UKT).
e.
Unarmed Combat Training (TTS).
f.
Speed March (UJL)
2012. The Individual Training Test results are recorded in " BAT B 118", which are
attached to Personnel Record - "BAT D 45". These forms are available from the
Ordnance Depot. The returns on these tests are also submitted to higher headquarters
on a quarterly basis to indicate the unit's individual training progression. More often
than not, the returns are just for filing. Analyses to identify a trend or weakness in a
specific area in individual training are not conducted to establish means for
improvement. Unit Commanders should convert the returns into graphics to have a
holistic view on their unit's performance in individual training. From these graphics,
they should be able to analyse further to identify weaknesses and chart means for
improvement. A suggested guide that enables unit commanders to examine their unit’s
performance in individual training is illustrated below:
No of Passes
Unit Strength – BE / LE
X
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100 %
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
a.
UNCLASSIFIED
Step 1. Calculate the percentage of passes for the following:
(1)
Basic Fitness Test 1 and 2 using the chart in Figure 1.5.
(2)
Combat Skill Test using the chart in Figure 1.6.
(3)
Speed March using the chart in Figure 1.7.
(4)
1.8.
Weapon Firing Accuracy (Stage 1 and 2) using the chart in Figure
(5)
Unarmed Combat Test using the chart in Figure 1.9.
(6)
Transfer the results in Figures 1.5 to 1.9 into the respective
columns of Figure 1.10 - Individual Skills and Proficiency Training.
(7)
Calculate the average performance in percentage of passes for
the eight qualifying tests in the Individual Skills and Proficiency Training
using the chart in Figure 1.10.
Training
Unit Str
(a)
BFT 1
BFT 2
(b)
BE / LE Untested
(c)
Tested
Pass
Fail
(e)
(f)
(g)
(d)
%
Pass
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
%
Pass
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
%
Pass
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
Figure 1.5 : Basic Fitness Test
Training
Unit Str
(a)
UKT
(b)
BE / LE Untested
(c)
Tested
Pass
Fail
(e)
(f)
(g)
(d)
Figure 1.6 : Combat Skills Test
Training
(a)
UJL 5 km
UJL 8 km
UJL 12 km
UJL 15 km
Unit
Str
(b)
BE / LE Untested
(c)
Tested
Pass
Fail
(e)
(f)
(g)
(d)
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
Figure 1.7 : Speed March Test
Training
(a)
Stage 1
Stage 2
Unit
Str
(b)
BE / LE Untested
(c)
(d)
Tested
Pass
Fail
(e)
(f)
(g)
%
Pass
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
%
Pass
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
Average Performance
Figure 1.8 : Weapon Firing Accuracy (LMIT)
Training
(a)
Officer
WO
SSgt/Sgt
Cpl
Lcpl
Pte
Unit
Str
(b)
BE / LE Untested Tested
(c)
(d)
(e)
Pass
Fail
(f)
(g)
Average Performance
Figure 1.9 : Unarmed Combat Test (TTS)
Training
(a)
Unit
Str
(b)
BE /
LE
(c)
(b)
(c)
Untested Tested
Pass
Fail
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
%
Pass
(h)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
%
Fail
(i)
(i)
Weapon
Handling
• UKKI -Wpn
Handling
• LMIT
(a)
Physical
Endurance/Agility
• BFT 1
• BFT 2
• UKT
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
Fieldcraft
Knowledge
Map Reading
Radio
Communication
First Aid
Basic Drill
Fardhu Ain
Average Performance
Figure 1.10: Individual Skill and Proficiency Test
b.
Step 2. Insert the average performance score into the chart in Figure
1.11 to identify the overall unit performance level for the specific years. Conduct
a similar process for past years to establish a trend for individual training. An
example of a five-year unit individual training performance table is shown in
Figure 1.12.
Year :
Unit :
Training
(a)
UJL 15 km
Unit
Str
BE / LE
Untested
Tested
Pass
Fail
%
Pass
%
Fail
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
UKT
UKKI
TTS
Average Performance
Figure 1.11 : Unit Individual Training Performance Chart
Unit :
Training
(a)
UJL 15 km
UKT
TTS
UKKI
2016
(b)
80%
61.5%
38%
40%
2017
(c)
91.95
63.6%
30.7%
45.2%
2018
(d)
89%
57.3%
34.8%
34.3%
2 - 11
UNCLASSIFIED
2019
(e)
58.3%
66.2%
32%
50.6%
2020
(f)
90%
55.7%
31.9%
65.7%
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
Note: Individual training is recorded in percentage of passes Performance for LMIT
is measured from stage 1 and Stage 2 only. Further stages are conducted
collectively at open range.
Figure 1.12 : A Five Year Unit Individual Training Performance Table
c.
Step 3. Chart a five-year graph diagram. An example is shown in Figure
1.13. Analyse the trend to identify the progress of each state of training. Identify
specific training that indicates a decline and scrutinise its’ data further to
determine which area contributes to the fall. Using the example in Figure 1.13,
you would notice a decline in Combat Skills Test of about 15.7 % in 2020 as
compared to 2016. Further analysis of the same comparison would also
enlighten the following:
(1)
A decline in Unarmed Combat Training (TTS) by 0.3 % in the year
2020.
(2)
An improvement in 15 km Speed March and Unarmed Combat
Test.
(3)
Have all FE personnel participated?
(4)
Which group category i.e., sub-unit, rank, age etc. has contributed
to the decline?
(5)
Has an external factor i.e., unplanned activities influenced the
decline?
(6)
Was the training properly planned and managed?
A similar chart could also be done for Individual Proficiency Test (UKKI) and
trends identified for each performance. List out the weaknesses identified and
rectify them in the following training season.
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander Wing, PULADA
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
UJL 15 KM
UKT
TTS
UKKI
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
80
61.5
28
40
91.9
63.6
30.7
45.2
89
57.3
34.8
34.3
58.3
66.2
32
50.6
90
55.7
31.9
65.7
Figure 1.13 : A Five Year Unit Individual Training Performance Chart
PROFESSIONAL INTELLECTUALISM
2013. Apart from physical fitness and endurance ability, a soldier must also have
professional intellectualism in process of upgrading his performance. The Army
Training Directive is clear that the following aspects are included:
a.
Officers/Senior Non-Commissioned Officers Day.
b.
Study Day.
c.
Leadership Training.
d.
Spiritual Training.
2014. It is needless to say that training on these aspects should include subject
matters on the current training issues such as combined arms, conventional warfare,
counterinsurgency or terrorism which seems to be the hot topic. Leadership may
include exercising leadership qualities at junior leaders’ level or Coup D' Oeil
perspective at commanders' echelon. Leadership training is often exercised in
collective training. Spiritual training should consist of Al - Quran competitions, religious
classes and other religious camps to improve one's state of knowledge mentally and
spiritually. Most units are organised in this aspect with the assistance and advise of
religious officers in the unit.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
2015. A primary concern for any unit commander is his unit's status of proficiency.
Although there are several evaluation techniques, the most effective method is to
study and analyse unit exercises and umpire reports. Collective training is an
extension from individual training where individual skills are blended together to
produce a collective performance. A thorough analysis of past exercise reports would
indicate a "collective weakness" accumulated from inefficient emphasis during
individual training. Taking into consideration the latest policy mentioned earlier;
collective training encompasses the following:
a.
Weapon Firing Accuracy Stages 3 and 4 (LMIT).
b. Unit Collective Training planned by the Unit Commander. This was
previously conducted in the form of "Exercise Gonzales Tempatan". A
recommended guide that enables unit commanders to examine their unit’s
performance in collective training is illustrated below:
(1)
Step 1.
(a)
The weaknesses and the strength of a unit's performance
could be obtained from past unit training and exercise reports
over a span of three to five years. Identify weaknesses from the
exercises conducted in:
i.Unit Collective Training.
ii.
Exercise " Gabungan".
iii.
Command Post Exercises.
iv.
Unit Tutorial Exercises.
v.
Weapon Skills Camp.
(b)
Arrange the weaknesses identified in a table for each
exercise. An example is shown in Figure 1.14.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
Unit Collective Training Exercise
Ser.
Weakness Identified
2018
2019
2020
√
√
1.
Poor passing of information
√
2.
Lack of Field discipline
√
3.
Poor command and control by JNCOs’
4.
Poor communication link
5.
Lack in logistic support
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
Figure 1.14 : General Weakness in Exercise
(2)
Step 2. Using the excel programme, convert the frequency of
weaknesses in the table above into a graphical chart as shown in Figure
1.15.
Poor
passing of
information
24%
Lack in logictic
support
17%
Poor
communication
link
25%
Poor command
and control by
JNCOs'
17%
Lack of field
discipline
17%
Figure 1.15 : Frequency of Weakness in Unit Collective Training Exercise
2018 – 2020
(3)
Step 3.
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(a)
From the above figure, one would be able to identify the
priority of weakness that must be addressed.
(b)
The above figure indicates that "poor communication link"
has the highest frequency, which should be addressed.
Subsequently, a programme could be developed to rectify the
weakness.
(c)
A similar process could be conducted for the other
exercises for a particular year. Once again, a pie chart of the
overall weaknesses could be derived based on the exercises
conducted by the unit. A more precise training programme could
be established to improve the unit performance.
(d)
One aspect unit commanders' need to emphasise
seriously in training is the validation phase of MATS. Although
training returns are promptly submitted to higher echelon, the use
of information is seldom optimised. Again, the use of knowledge
management plays an important role to ensure further
improvement in the unit's performance. Combat readiness begins
with individual professionalism, which in tum depends on the
management of training by the unit commander. If soldiers are
considered as the ultimate weapon in war, measures must be
taken to ensure they are trained both mentally and physically to
sustain readiness level for any eventualities.
(e)
The importance of training requires no emphasis, as it is
the primary function of the Army during peacetime. While the
awareness for the need for training is ever present, it is the
seriousness in the approach to training that is important. In the
continuous changing environment, commanders must juggle the
roles from managers to administrators to commanders to
maintain peak performance of their unit. It is not an easy task but
"where there is a will, there is a way. "
(f)
The focus of training in logistic aspects too plays an
important role. Although it has nothing to do with mindless number
crunching, commanders must emphasise on how to determine
the logistic support required by his force, and then how to plan the
logistic system to provide that support. Beyond this purely
mechanical but nonetheless critical factor, the fundamentals of
planning is an issue of logistic risk. Logistic risk is a crucial feature
in any successful operation and commanders will have to decide
the logistic risks that he is willing to take. For him to do this
sensibly, the basic principles of logistic system that are based on
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simplicity and flexibility, must be clearly understood so that the
degree of risks involved, or the implications of the risk, is fully
appreciated. In summary, commanders must take in cognisance
the Army's emphasis on enhancing its’ human resource capability
to meet combat readiness and professionalism. Apart from
periodic
review
of training, educational programmes for
personnel knowledge development should also be encouraged in
the unit to meet the challenges of the new millennium. The future
of an organisation is dependent on how it is steered today.
SECTION 2
ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAMME
INTRODUCTION
2016. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is designed to provide
guidance for each corps in the Malaysian Army to conduct training based on each of
their roles and responsibilities.
2017. Contains details comprising systematic procedure that provide guidance for
each level of command in order to plan, manage, conduct and evaluate the training.
CHARACTERISTICS
2018. ARTEP characteristics are:
a.
Emphasises on basic task and needs for a unit to conduct its’ duty.
b.
The unit’s effectiveness and ability in performing tasks based on the
standard set by the HQ in completing the tasks.
c.
Evaluation will be done simultaneously at each level of command
(Battalion, company, platoon, section or detachment).
LIMITATION
2019. ARTEP offers part of a solution to training difficulties and is used with other
references, guidelines, rules and regulations to fulfill the training requirements. ARTEP
only stress basic and critical tasks. It should not be a measure or a test to compare
the achievement of individual groups, sub-unit or units.
AIDS FROM ARTEP
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2020. In each ARTEP’s chapter, is contained sections that can guide commanders in
planning, managing, performing, and evaluating the training. The sections are:
a.
Introduction. Contains brief statement related to individual groups,
subunit or unit task.
b.
Objective. The training objectives are the basic guidelines to achieve
the training goals.
c.
Logic Diagram. This diagram is for each task or operation performed, it
is to assist in checking and ensures that all actions are carried out in order.
d.
Task Elements. Based on the logic diagram described above, the tasks
in an operation are broken down by rank or arrangement as required in doctrine.
e.
Suggested Training Aids. This requirement is to fulfill all the
requirements that can be provided in line with the training requirements. Notes
for the Staff Training Officer – As a guideline for the staff to make the training
in order.
DECIDING TRAINING NEEDS
2021. Unit Commanders must decide on the training needs as below:
a.
Identify weakness in the training conducted.
b.
Check and review training objectives and defining standards that can be
achieved by individual groups, sub-unit or units.
c.
Conduct initial training to enhance the training objectives.
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TASK EVALUATION PROCESS
2022. As per Figure 1.16 :
Figure 1.16 : Task Evaluation Process
DESIGN TRAINING SCHEDULE
2023. THe Training Schedule must be designed from training objectives contained in
the ARTEP or from higher command. The training manager must have full authority in
the design and to shape their training programs to achieve its’ objectives and
standards.
TRAINING FEEDBACK
2024. All training assessments by training staff should be given feedback. All
feedback about the training must be considered for future improvements. The training
manager and commander must act on the feedback in order to improve the training
and for future references.
TRAINING EVALUATION FORMAT
2025. Designed to guide the evaluator, commander or training manager in training
execution to achieve minimum standards by individual groups, sub-unit or units in
performing their tasks and responsibilities. Example of Format as below in Table 1.2.
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ACHIEVEMENT
SER
TASK
STANDARD
N/C
YES
NO
REMARK
S
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
1. Execution of battle procedure:
(a) Orders.
(1) Occupy Concentration
Area.
(2) Administration.
(3) Move to Start Line
1.
Battle
procedure
2. Task to do during order:
(a) Issue Wng O.
(b) Map recce.
(c) Establish Recce Group.
(d) Issue orders to Security Group.
(e) Recce execution
(f) Orders preparation
(g) O group
(h) Delivering Orders
(i) Comms Security
(j) Administration
Table 1.2 : Example of Training Evaluation Format
SECTION 3
INTRODUCTION TO BATTALION TRAINING
INTRODUCTION
2026. War and armed conflict appear to be unavoidable throughout history. With the
impact of technology brought through the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the
nature of war evolves from one form to another. Despite the changes, certain
fundamental characteristics of war such as an instrument policy, an act of violence, a
province of uncertainty, is of the people and places the importance leadership endure.
For these and other reasons, nations prepare themselves for war. Preparing for war
hence has become the most important task of all armed forces. The best insurance in
preparing for war is to conduct training.
2027. Training is a planned process to modify attitude, knowledge or skills through
learning experiences to achieve effective performance in an activity or a range of
activities. It is the provision of the opportunity to learn in order to be able to act in new
ways, that is, to improve job performance. Training helps the individual make the shift
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from the present situation to the desired situation through the process of intentional
learning.
2028. Military training focuses on developing and enhancing performance within its
particular environment. The performance may be of an individual or a group. The
environment may be general or specific i.e., the Army, or a particular arm or service,
or appointment. The effect of the training should be assessed against pre-determined
standards, and the outcome of training can usually be measured in terms of
competence.
TRAINING ENVIRONMENT
2029. The Army in the 21st Century needs to align to the requirements, which are
very dynamic, and continuously evolving seeking new frontiers. The army needs to
focus its’ training from a primary focus on teaching soldiers’ specific skills to a broader
focus on creating and sharing wealth. The broadening of training is illustrated in Figure
1.17. Traditionally, training was viewed as a means to teach soldiers specific skills and
behaviours. This role will continue in the future. As the battlefield environment
changes, unpredictability in the external environment, which the Army will operate, is
likely to continue. This means that because problems cannot be predicted in advance,
training needs to be delivered on an as-needed basis to help soldiers deal with specific
operational requirements. There is a requirement for the Army to change its’ role of
training and focus on developing intellectual capital. Intellectual capital includes
cognitive knowledge (know what), advance skills (know how), systems understanding
and creativity (know why) and self-motivated creativity (care why).
Figure 1.17 : The Broadening of Training’s Role
2030. The evolving nature of training is influenced by the environment, which would
include the following conditions:
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a.
Technology.
b.
Training Management (Outsourcing).
c.
Evolution of Facilities.
d.
Changes in training approaches.
TRAINING IN THE BATTALION
2031. In other professions, training can be a minor activity to which relatively little time
is allocated. In the Army on the other hand, the core business, fighting wars or keeping
the peace usually occupies only a small fraction of total time. The main pre-occupation
is the preparation for the possibility of real operations and anticipate their outcomes.
2032. Training in the army is very important, as the army will fight the way it is trained.
Unlike war, training allows room for mistakes and time for corrections with no
penalties. Training is also fundamental to the three inter-related components of
Fighting Power; intellectual, moral and physical. It contributes and enhances the
knowledge, the will and the means to fight. At the outbreak of a war, soldiers will fight
as well, skilful and confident as they were trained. Therefore, training for war must take
the highest priority and the biggest portion of peacetime soldering and be conducted
realistically according to approved doctrine and standard.
2033. In discussing Training in the Army, the practises, and norms in conducting
training in the Army needs to be considered, as well as the shortcomings and
weaknesses in the current practises or systems. Army Field Command Training
Instructions will be the guideline for Unit Commanders to conduct training in the unit.
Table 1.3 show the list of field training standard procedure from Army Field Command
Training Instructions.
NO
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
PROTAP
(b)
Latihan Masa Perdana
Kebabasan Kawasan Latihan
Peperiksaan Kenaikan Pangkat
Ujian Kecergasan Asas (UKA) dan Ujian Kecergasan Tempur (UKT)
Tempur Tanpa Senjata (TTS)
Simpanan
Pasukan Kadet Bersatu Malaysia (PKBM)
Sukan
Eksesais Bersama
Eksesais Gabungan
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11
12
13
14
14A
15
16
17
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Eksesais Gonzales Tempatan
Eksesais Pasak Bumi
Latihan Kembaraduga
Latihan Menembak Individu dan Tim (LMIT)
Kem Kemahiran Senjata (KKS)
Permainan Perang Dalam Latihan TD
Penilaian Doktrin TD
Latihan Membaling Grened
Table 1.3 : List of Field Training Standard Procedure from Army Field
Command Training Instructions
AIM OF TRAINING
2034. The ultimate aim of training in the Army is to prepare land forces to execute the
Army’s likely tasks effectively and efficiently under all operational conditions in order
to achieve the Army’s mission. The likely tasks cover a wide range of operations
across the conflict spectrum. They are not limited to warlike operations but also include
operations other than war.
2035. Training provides the means to develop, practise and validate, within
constraints; the practical application of a common doctrine. It also provides avenues
and opportunities for preparing commanders, leaders and staffs in the exercise of
command and control. Training should be stimulating, rewarding and inspire
subordinates to achieve greater heights. A valuable by-product of good training is the
fostering of teamwork and the generation of the force’s confidence in commanders,
organisations and doctrine, a necessary prerequisite of achieving high morale before
troops are committed to operations.
2036. The overall training efforts in the army are geared towards improvement of job
performance and to ensure that each soldier required to perform a job is equipped with
the necessary attitude, skill and knowledge (ASK) to do so. The quality assurance
feature in the training doctrine assures that the design, development and delivery of
training, education and development programme in the Army remains consistent,
relevant and leads to improve performance.
OBJECTIVE OF TRAINING
2037. Training in the Army should be able to achieve the following objectives:
a.
Military Discipline. The aim of military discipline is to train soldiers to
overcome fear and to instil confidence while ensuring coordinated actions and
reactions in the battlefield. Discipline is necessary since soldiers need to work
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together and be united through the obedience to the orders of their leaders.
Good discipline will invariably produce better trained and motivated soldiers.
b.
Health, Strength and Endurance. A soldier’s health, strength and
endurance have direct impact on his combat worthiness. The many operations
in which soldiers were directly or indirectly involved in, shows that individual
health, strength and endurance contributes to the collective effort in operational
areas.
c.
Technical Proficiency. Commanders and leaders must be able to
grasp and understand the latest technology and their influence on the
battlefield. They must be able to use these technologies to their advantage in
planning and conducting operations and to hinder the enemy from using such
technologies in the battlefield.
d.
Teamwork. Soldiers in whatever organisation they are in (unit,
formation) need to work as a team. Teamwork is the ability to work together
towards a common vision. It is the ability to direct individual accomplishment
toward organisational objectives. It is the fuel that allows soldiers to attain
uncommon results.
e.
Tactical Proficiency. Commanders and leaders must possess the
tactical proficiency to plan, coordinate and conduct operations and achieve
success by making decisions decisively. Commanders must possess
leadership skills; demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgement and
responsibility; operate in a complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing
environment; build effective teams amid continuous organisational change and
solve problems creatively.
TRAINING PHILOSOPHY
2038. The philosophy of training provides the guidelines that give flexibility in planning
and conduct of training. They are not static but dynamic in nature. Soldiers who join
the Army must be equipped with the skills, knowledge and attitude, which will enable
them to perform their roles and tasks effectively and efficiently. With the acquired
competencies, these soldiers will perform very professionally in any assigned tasks
given to them, hence, this will enhance the credibility and level of professionalism in
the Army.
2039. The fundamentals of training in the Army are as follows:
a.
Train as Combined Arms and Service Team. Army Training should be
developed on a combined arms concept. This will enable combined arms and
service teamwork to develop, and units can be committed to battle without
lengthy adjustment periods. Leaders must regularly practise cross attachments
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of the full wartime spectrum of combat, combat support and combat service
support units.
b.
Train as You Fight. The goal of combat level training is to achieve
combat-level standards. Within the confines of safety and common sense,
leaders must be willing to accept less than perfect results initially and demand
realism in training. They must seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of
the classroom into the field, fire weapons, manoeuvre as a combined arms
team, incorporate protective measures against enemy actions and include joint
and combined operations.
c.
Use Appropriate Doctrine. Training must conform to Army Doctrine.
Operations and supporting doctrinal manuals describe common procedures
and uniform operational methods that permit commanders and organisations to
adjust rapidly to changing situations. At higher echelons, standardised doctrinal
principles provide a basis for a common vocabulary and for military literacy
across the force.
d.
Use Performance Oriented Training. Units become proficient in the
performance of critical tasks and missions by practising the tasks and missions.
Soldiers learn best by doing, using a hands-on approach. Leaders are
responsible to plan training that will provide these opportunities. All training
assets and resources, to include simulators, simulations and training devices
must be included.
e.
Train to Challenge. Tough realistic, intellectually, and physically
challenging training both excites and motivates soldiers and leaders. It builds
not only confidence but also competence. Challenging training inspires
excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn.
Successful completion of each training phase increases the capacity and
motivation of the individuals and units for more sophisticated and challenging
achievement.
f.
Train to Sustain Proficiency. This can also be term as “Sustain
Training” whereby once individuals and units have trained to a required level of
proficiency; leaders must structure collective and individual training plans to
repeat critical task training at the minimum frequency necessary to sustain that
level. “Sustain Training” is therefore aiming to sustain the achieved high
standard skill and to prevent skill decay and to train new people. Army units
must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions by frequent sustain
training on critical tasks. They cannot rely on infrequent “peaking” to achieve
the appropriate level of wartime proficiency.
g.
Train Using Multi-Echelon Techniques. To use available time and
resources most effectively, commanders must simultaneously train individuals,
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leaders and units at each level of the organisation during training events. Multiechelon training is the most efficient way of training and sustaining a diverse
number of military training objectives within a limited period of time.
h.
Train to Maintain Equipment. Maintenance is a vital part of every
training programme. Maintenance training is designed to keep equipment in
fighting order and also to develop soldiers to become experts in their use.
Soldiers and leaders are responsible for maintaining all assigned equipment in
a high state of readiness in support of training and combat employment.
2040.
Aspects of Training. The demands of a modern battle space require a
physically, intellectually and spiritually fit soldier and officer in order to be able to fight
and survive victoriously. Therefore, conduct of training in the army training system
must cover all aspects mentioned; physical, intellectual and spiritual.
a.
Physical Training. Physical training is conducted to ensure that all
soldiers and officers achieve and maintain a standard level of fitness.
Guidelines for the conduct of physical training in the army is outlined in MD 7.1
TD – Physical Training. All soldiers and officers are also required to undertake
an annual basic fitness test (BFT) and those of the combat units are to
undertake a combat fitness test (CFT). To regulate a soldierly posture, a bodymass index (BMI) scale is enforced. Both the fitness and the BMI status form
important criteria and consideration in the Army.
b.
Intellectual Training. Intellectual training involves the acquiring and the
development of knowledge on soldiering. This knowledge is not necessarily
confined to weapons and tactics but is all-encompassing of other fields that may
be acquired in military establishments or institutional of higher learning.
However, the basic measurement of soldiering is done through an individual
skills proficiency test (Ujian Kelayakan Kemahiran Individu – MK Medan TD
Arahan ke 25).
c.
Spiritual Training. Spiritual training to strengthen religious beliefs and
faith is conducted by both formal and informal means. This can be done by
holding compulsory or voluntary religious parades, summons and lectures
according to respective religions. The spiritual aspect of a soldier forms the
pillar of the army ethos upon which other aspects are built.
2041. Phases of Training. Formal training in the army consists of the following
phases:
a.
Basic Combat Training. This is the training phase that transforms the
civilian into a basic soldier. The objective is to develop a disciplined, highly
motivated soldier, who is qualified in basic weapons, physically conditioned and
drilled in the fundamentals of soldiering.
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b.
Advanced Individual Training. This teaches the individual the specific
skills which result in the award of military occupational speciality or skill. This
form of training is normally carried out at various corps schools of the army.
c.
Basic Unit Training. This phase of training involves the soldier learning
the value of teamwork. He also learns to practise his skills learned during
advanced individual training.
d.
Advanced Unit Training. This phase provides small units with training
to work as a team at a higher level. Here emphasis is placed on the further
development of tactical and technical proficiency, unit SOPs and combined
arms training.
e.
Field Exercise and Manoeuvre Training. This phase provides
opportunities for brigades and larger units including supporting arms and
services to exercise as a fully integrated combined arms team.
f.
Operational Readiness Training. This training is conducted by all
combat ready regular units of the army. Units are assigned responsibility for
continuous readiness in support for operational plans and missions. The
objectives of operational readiness training are firstly, to correct deficiencies in
previously training; secondly, to develop and maintain a satisfactory state of
readiness for operational missions; and thirdly, to prepare units for extended
combat operations on short notice.
2042. Types of Training. The Army has vast experience and expertise in conducting
various types of exercises. The types of training that can be conducted are as follows:
a.
Exercises Without Troops.
(1)
Model Exercises. A model exercise is ideal for teaching battle
procedure, deployment drills, new techniques, and the stage
management of battle, but it is NOT suitable for teaching low level
tactics. A model exercise should always be designed to allow more than
one sensible solution. Only in this way will the desired lessons be
brought out.
(2)
Study Periods. Study periods are training activities usually
command-directed to bring together commanders at several levels
within a unit or formation to discuss aspects such as forthcoming training
or operation, current tactical thinking or particular issues that have been
raised. Study periods may be based on a model exercise and can
usefully contain elements conducted in syndicates as well as
organisation sessions.
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(3)
Tactical Exercises without Troops (TEWT). TEWTs should be
used to relate to the ground the theory, which has been taught indoors.
It is suitable for officers and some senior NCOs. It enables officers of all
Arms to study problems together to their mutual advantage. In order to
get the best tactical value from an exercise with troops, it can be used
previously over the same piece of ground. It is thus particularly valuable
when studying battle procedure or complicated techniques such as
village clearing or river crossing.
(4)
Command Post Exercises (CPXs). CPXs involve the
deployment of headquarters, normally in the field, in order to practice
commanders and their staffs in command-and-control procedures and
to rehearse the operation of a full headquarters. CPXs may be designed
to exercise two or more levels, although the focus should be on a
particular level of command. To be effective, CPXs require the
deployment of lower and higher headquarter’s controllers to generate
the exercise, and a representative enemy, although in both instances
they may be represented or supported by simulation. A CPX may be
driven by a war game simulation system to exercise procedures and
control with some degree of realism. CPXs are an important precursor
to FTXs, or to a higher level CPX.
b.
Skeleton Exercises. A skeleton exercise may be conducted as a
prelude to a CPX or a field exercise involving the deployment of complete units
and sub-units. This form of exercise may be conducted as an Indoor Telephone
Battle, a Signal Exercise or an Intelligence Exercise in order to train respective
functions.
c.
War Games. A war game is any form of two-sided exercise without
troops. In a skeleton exercise enemy action is largely predetermined by the
director and his control staff. In a war game on the other hand, opposing
commanders are allotted their roles and the exercise proceeds, as far as
possible, according to the plans and orders of each side. There is, therefore,
no guarantee that particular lessons can be brought out. But this disadvantage
is offset by the feeling that the enemy is “live”, which gives a greater air of
reality. War games may take the form of “token” exercises, two-sided TEWTs,
or two-sided telephone battles in which the full operational HQs of formations
are employed. It must be remembered however that war games are primarily
used to practice battle procedure of formation staff, although they may also be
used:
(1)
To give commanders practice in independent command and in
pitting their brains against those of an “enemy” commander.
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(2)
To practice commanders and staff not only in manoeuvring units
but also in the appreciation of electronic countermeasures.
(3)
To study specific aspects of a forthcoming operation; strategic,
tactical, or administrative, or a combination of all three.
d. Exercises with Troops.
(1)
Battle Procedure and Battle Craft. Once the mechanics of
deployment have been taught on the model they can be carried out in
an exercise on the ground. The drills for deployment, harbouring,
occupation of positions, movement of vehicles and HQ and cooperation
between all Arms must be practiced endlessly if a unit or formation is to
be really battle worthy. The routine tactical manoeuvres of the infantry
on their own and with tanks must also be practiced until they become
second nature so that sub-units in close contact with the ‘enemy’ may
co-operate and be easily controlled by command or signals. The
principles of training in minor tactics, field craft and concealment are all
aspects of battle craft which, in turn, is the goal of this training.
(2)
Field Firing Exercises. A field exercise with live ammunition may
range from a section attack over a few hundred meters to a battalion
group/battle group exercise. It can be the most rewarding of all exercises
and is especially valuable as a means of training troops to advance
under cover of their own small arms fire, mortars and artillery, and also
of teaching co-operation between Arms and Services. Troops cannot be
exercised in field firing until the standard of their weapon training is high
enough to enable them not only to obtain practical value from it but also
to ensure that their own safety is not jeopardised. Strict attention must
therefore always be paid to fire control and safety precautions. Detailed
particulars on individual shooting are mentioned in Panduan Sistem
Latihan Tembak Tempur (MP 0.3.6A TD).
(3)
Command Field Exercises (CFX). CFX is conducted when there
is reduced troops and vehicle density but with full deployment of
command-and-control elements and combat service support units. It is
normal for a single, light vehicle to represent a sub-unit, thus minimising
the environmental impact and cost of an exercise, which is designed to
practice command and control and give commanders a better feel for
moving units and formations around a battlefield than can be gained on
a CPX.
(4)
Field Training Exercises (FTX). FTX are exercises conducted
under simulated combat conditions in the field. They cater for all levels
of training from section to formation level, and include, at times, other
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services. Whilst it is necessary to FTX at the higher levels in order to
practice the complete operational system under deployment conditions
it should be appreciated that at formation level the value to sub-units in
particular may be limited unless detailed planning is undertaken to
ensure a high level of activity for all participating troops. FTX may be
one-sided or two-sided (including the use of a controlled enemy).
(5)
Joint/Combine/Interagency (JCI). JCI training requires different
considerations. Joint training is conducted using approved joint doctrines
and must be consistent with assigned joint missions and priorities. When
assigned as a JFC, Army commanders establish joint training objectives
and plans, execute, and evaluate joint training, and assess training
proficiency. Combine training optimises contributions of member forces
by matching their missions with their capabilities and uses available
training assistance programs. When Army missions will likely involve
other government agencies, if possible, training should be conducted
with the organisations and the people likely to be involved in the
assigned mission. JCI training is as rigorous as any other training the
Army conducts. This training also results in mutual appreciation for other
capabilities, and the development of valuable personal and professional
relationships among those who will operate together.
2043. Categories of Training. Training in the army is divided into individual, team,
collective, operational specific and command training. This classification of training is
more for convenience than substance. Training should be regarded as a cohesive
whole and in practice there is a considerable overlap, and in some cases integration
between categories.
a.
Individual Training. Individual training is the training of individual
officers or soldiers either in institutions or units that prepares the individual to
perform specified duties and tasks related to their position. The purpose of
individual training (including recruit training) is to produce a self-confident and
disciplined soldier who is physically fit, well-motivated, and equipped with the
basic skills and fighting qualities needed to survive on the battlefield and to
operate as a member of a team or crew.
b.
Team Training. Team or crew training provides an immediate context
for most individual skills training. During team or crew training the specialist and
complementary skills of the individual members of the team or crew are brought
together. The output is team skills and proficiency, which no individual alone
can achieve. The team or crew is the basic unit in all low-level operations.
Hence training at this level should be revisited regularly, and particularly when
there has been a change in team composition. It should also feature at the
appropriate level on career courses.
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c.
Collective Training. Collective training is the training either in
institutions or units that involves the preparation of two or more personnel or
detachments, sub-units, units, and formations in the conduct of tactical
operations to accomplish tasks required of the group as an entity. There is in
theory no limit to the size of the group, which may engage in collective training.
Collective training can be further divided into three types:
(1)
Special to Arm Training. Special to arm training is collective
training on a single arm or functional basis. It provides the immediate
context for detachment or crew training.
(2)
Combined Arms Training. Combined arms training is the
collective training of several arms together such as infantry, armour,
artillery, engineer, and aviation. Such training will normally be at subunit
level and above and involve more than one arm. It provides the
immediate context for special to arm collective training.
(3)
Joint/Combine/Interagency (JCI) Training. JCI training will
normally take place at unit level and above and involve two or more
services or nations.
d.
Operational Specific Training. The Army is a capability-based force
trained in general war fighting skills. Hence, there may be a requirement for
some additional training for specific operations to reflect the circumstances of
that deployment. Such training may take place before deployment or when the
force has been deployed, or both.
e.
Command Training. The purpose of command training is to develop
effective commanders within the context of the Army’s doctrine. The doctrine
requires a style of command which promotes decentralised command, freedom
and speed of action and initiative. It requires development of mutual trust and
understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of
command, and effective and timely decision making together with initiative at
all levels. The training of commanders at all levels must therefore be matched
to the requirements of operations and the philosophy of command.
SECTION 4
MANAGE COMPANY COLLECTIVE TRAINING
ROLES OF COMMANDERS IN TRAINING
2044. The roles of Commanders in training is as follow:
a.
Develop and communicate a Clear Vision.
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b.
Require Subordinates to Understand and Perform Their Roles in
Training.
c.
Centralise Training Planning and Decentralise Training Executions.
d.
Establish Effective Communication Between Platoons.
e.
Develop Your Subordinates.
f.
Involve Them Personally in Training.
g.
Demand That Training Standards are Achieved.
h.
Eliminate Training Distractions.
DIRECTION OF TRAINING
1045. Direction of training in the Army show below in the Figure 1.18.
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Figure 1.18: Direction of Training in Army
PLANNING GUIDELINES
2046. Planning guidelines for commanders shown in Figure 1.19.
TYPE OF TRAINING
DURATION
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION
FREQUENCY OF TRAINING
RELEVANCY OF TRAINING
PROGRESSION OF TRAINING
REALISM IN TRAINING
Figure 1.19: Planning Guidelines
CONDUCT OF TRAINING
2047. Tactical Drill Exercise (TDX).
a.
Crossing danger area.
b.
Breaching obstacle.
c.
Section battle drill.
d.
Break contact.
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e.
Anti-ambush.
f.
Handling personal injury.
g.
Clearing trenches.
h.
Comm line clearing.
i.
Vehicle clearing.
j.
Search party.
k.
Handling POW.
2048. OBUA Drill Exercise (ODX).
a.
OBUA – Basic.
b.
OBUA – Intermediate.
c.
OBUA – Advance.
SECTION 5
MANAGE COMPANY INDIVIDUAL COMPETENCY TRAINING
2049. At Coy level, commanders have to plan and prepare their subordinates for
training in other to prepare them to execute the Army’s likely tasks effectively and
efficiently under all operational conditions in order to achieve the Army’s mission. The
likely tasks cover a wide range of operations across the conflict spectrum. They are
not limited to warlike operations but also include operations other than war. Training
also to produce a self-confident and disciplined soldier who is physically fit, wellmotivated, and equipped with the basic skills and fighting qualities needed to survive
on the battlefield and to operate as a member of a team or crew.
2050. Commanders must decide training needs as below:
a.
Identify weakness in the training conducted.
b.
Check and review training objectives and defining standards that can be
achieved by individual groups, sub-units, or units.
c.
Conduct initial training to enhance the training objectives.
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2051. Individual training that can be conducted at coy level as below:
a.
Individual Basic Proficiency Test (IBPT @ UKKI).
b.
Basic Fitness Test (BFT @ UKA).
c.
Speed March (UJL).
d.
Combat Skill Test (UKT).
2052. Training is implemented by adopting the crawl-walk-run approach. This allows
and promotes an objective, standards-based approach to training. Training starts at
the basic level. Crawl events are relatively simple to conduct and require minimum
support from the unit. After the crawl stage, training becomes more difficult, requiring
more resources for the unit and formations, and increasing the level of realism. At the
run stage, the level of difficulty for the training events intensifies. Run stage requires
optimum resources and ideally approaches the level of realism expected in combat.
Progression from the walk to the run stage for a particular task may occur during a
one-day training exercise or may require a succession of training period over time.
Achievement of the required standard determines progression between stages.
2053. In crawl-walk-run training, the tasks and standards remain the same, however,
the conditions under which they are trained change. Commanders may change the
conditions for example, by increasing the difficulty of the conditions under which the
tasks is performed, increasing the tempo of the task training, increasing the number
of tasks being trained, or by increasing the number of personnel involved in the
training. Whichever approach is used, it is important that all leaders and soldiers
involved understand which stage they are currently training and understand the Army
standard.
2054. An After-Action-Review is conducted immediately after training and may
indicate that additional training is needed. Any task that was not conducted to standard
should be retrained. Retraining should be conducted at the earliest opportunity.
Commanders should program time and other resources for retraining as an integral
part of their long term and short-term planning cycle. Training is incomplete until the
task is trained to standard. Soldiers will remember the standard enforced, not the one
discussed.
2055. The success of a properly planned, presented and executed training program
depends on the following factors:
a.
Realistic. It requires organisations to train the way they will fight or
support within all dimensions of the battlefield/space. Realistic training includes
all available elements of combined arms team and, as appropriate, joint
operations.
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b.
Safe. Safe training is the predictable result of performing to established
tactical and technical standards. Through the risk management process,
leaders at all echelons ensure that the safety requirements are integral and not
add-on-considerations to all aspects of planning, executing, and evaluating
training.
c.
Accurate. It implies that training complies with Army operational and
training doctrine and is technically correct. Existing manuals and other training
publications provide information to trainers to facilitate the conduct of training,
coach subordinate trainers, and to evaluate training results.
d.
Well-Structured. Well-structured training contains a mixture of initial
and sustainment training. It also consists of a mix of individual and leader tasks
that are integrated into collective tasks. Soldiers and leaders increase
proficiency in individual tasks while training on collective tasks.
e.
Efficient. Training that is conducted efficiently ensures that training
resources are expended properly. Efficiently executed training makes full use
of every participant’s time. Commanders monitor physical and financial
resource execution through training conferences, post-exercise conferences,
range conferences and other similar conferences. They use the feedback
received during these forums to adjust resources within their commands to
sustain organisational proficiency. Continuous advances in training technology
enhance the commander’s ability to hone war fighting skills and are increasingly
required to balance constraints to training, such as environmental protection
considerations and availability of training areas and ranges.
f.
Effective. Effective training builds proficiency, teamwork, confidence,
and cohesiveness. Effective training is competitive. Although individuals and
organisations may sometimes compete against one another, they should
always compete to achieve the prescribed standard. If they do not initially
achieve the standard, trainers take corrective actions so that the proper
performance level results.
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SECTION 5
ADMINISTER RESOURCES
STORE MANAGEMENT
DEFINITION
2056. Assets are resources controlled by entities, as a result of past events, and
provide future economic benefits, or their services potential flow into entities Pekeliling Perbendaharaan 2018.
2057. Assets mean properties belonging to or possessed by or under the control of
the government, purchased or rented/bought with government money, received
through donations or gifts or obtained through the legislative process - PATM JILID 3
Chapter 15.
2058. Asset Management is a systematic process to guide the planning, acquisition,
operation, maintenance, and disposal of assets. Its’ objective is to maximise the asset
service potential and manage related risks and costs over their entire life.
2059. Asset Management involves the following steps:
a.
Acceptance & Rejection.
b.
Registration.
c.
Usage, Storage, Supervision & Inspection.
d.
Maintenance.
e.
Transfer.
f.
Disposal.
g.
Lost & Write-off.
h.
Reporting.
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ASSETS
2060. There are two type of Government Assets which are:
a.
Current Assets (Aset Semasa). Assets that can be converted into cash
within a short period of time.
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b.
Non-Current Assets (Aset Bukan Semasa). Assets that can only be
converted into cash after a one-year period. There are two classifications of
non-current assets.
(1)
Visible Assets (Aset Ketara). Assets that physically exist and are
tangible, used during the distribution or the supply of goods or services,
rented by certain quarters, or utilised for management purposes, and
expected to be used for a duration longer than a reporting period.
(2)
Invisible Assets (Aset Tak Ketara). Non-financial assets that can
be identified without their physical appearances. This covers the patent,
copyright, data base, licensing agreement and so forth.
2061. Summarisation of types of Government Assets are shown in Figure 1.20.
Figure 1.20 : Summarisation of Government Assets
STOCK
2062. Stores are the places to conduct the reception, recording, storage,
maintenance, handling, and issuance of stocks.
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2063. Stock are goods that have not been used and should be kept for the operation
and maintenance purposes.
2064. There are three categories of stores which are:
a.
Central Stores. Stores that provide, manage, and supply the stocks to
Main Stores and Unit Stores. (Example 91 DPOD & 91 DBP).
b.
Main Stores. Stores that provide, manage, and supply the goods to Unit
Stores and end customers. (Example: 74 BOD, Komp Bek 74 Bn KPD, 5 KOD,
5 Pl Bek KPD and so forth).
c.
Unit Stores. Stores that stockpile and distribute stocks to end customers
for short-term needs. The Unit Stores receive supplies from Central Stores and
Main Stores. (Example: Quartermaster Stores, KSOD and so forth).
TASK AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER
2065. Task and responsibilities of commanders are:
a.
Registration of Assets.
b.
Storing of Assets.
c.
Inspection of Assets.
d.
Establishment of JKPAK.
e.
Nominate Asset Officer.
f.
Nominate Receiving Officer.
g.
Quarterly Assets Report.
h.
Initial Lost Report.
i.
Maintenance of Assets.
j.
Planning for Disposal.
SECTION 6
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)
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INTRODUCTION
2066. CSS is a part of Logistics System. CSS functions includes supply, maintenance,
transportation, field service, health service, personnel, and other service. The purpose
is to generate and sustain the combat power and expand the commander’s operational
reach.
THE FUNDAMENTALS
2067. The Malaysian Army Doctrine is based upon out-manoeuvring the enemy; a
doctrine known as the Manoeuverist Approach. It applies to both defensive and
offensive operations and Operations Other Than War. Out-manoeuvring (or applying
‘manoeuvre theory’), in its purest sense, is not just a physical concept (moving in
relation to the enemy, in order to gain advantage), but also a morale or philosophical
concept; that of out-thinking the enemy.
THE MANOEUVERIST APPROACH
2068. The Manoeuverist Approach presents three problems to Combat Service
Support (CSS) planners. First, such warfare can demand high rates of fire, great
mobility, and endurance, all of which are demanding in terms of the volume of support
and speed of reaction required. Second, it is not only assuming confusion on the
battlefield to be inevitable but also encourages commanders actively to create it,
where such action enhances the possibility of ‘wrong-footing’ the enemy. Third, the
CSS staffs are less likely to be able to produce a comprehensive plan from the outset
and allocate resources to it. Thus, CSS priorities must be established from the outset
notwithstanding the need for change thereafter as the battle develops.
2069. The overall requirement for CSS is to effectively support a commander who will
be trying to create non-liner conditions, and opportunities to conduct high tempo
operations. In seeking the advantage, the commander may well be facing an enemy
with similar systems and doctrinal principles and an integrated land/air capability. Such
an enemy will concentrate much effort on interdicting our CSS activity, and this will
require command decisions on the degree to which CSS units and installations will
require combat unit to protect them.
2070. CSS in the Operational Framework. The three core functions are find, fix and
strike; each requires different force elements, which in turn have different CSS needs.
Finding and assessing the enemy is essentially a function of reconnaissance forces.
However, it will not always be performed by reconnaissance forces alone and may
involve significant numbers of manoeuvre forces, at times. Fixing the enemy is
conducted in order to deny their goals, to distract them, and thereby deprive their
freedom of action. This in turn gives us the freedom of action to strike the enemy. One
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strikes the enemy by manoeuvring into a position of advantage relative to the enemy
to hit them and defeat them. Relative timing of the actions of fixing and striking will be
important and it may be necessary to switch resources, including CSS from one to the
other. The three functions will be carried out at both operational and tactical levels and
CSS will have to take account of needs of both levels. The switching of CSS can only
be achieved if control of assets is exercised at every level. The ability to switch CSS
assets rapidly is fundamental to being able to sustain combat power.
2071. Operational Framework. The core functions are organised within a framework
of deep, close and rear operations. Deep operations are primarily aimed at finding and
fixing the enemy, keeping them from their objectives, and constraining their freedom
of action. They are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted time scale;
a significant challenge for CSS, leading to the need to produce ‘task organised’
groupings, at short notice, capable of sustaining units and formations over long
distances from extended periods, and without creating unnecessary slowing of the
operational tempo or vulnerability to enemy action. They will frequently be
characterised by high mileages leading to above average fuel consumption and a
potentially a high incidence of equipment failures. Close operations strike the enemy
to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power (through attrition). They are usually
conducted at short range and on a relatively short time scale. Frequently they involve
heavy consumption of ammunition and substantial battle damage. The ability to
recover, repair and returns equipment to the battle is vital to the maintenance of tempo.
Rear operations are conducted at all levels to ensure freedom of action by a protecting
force, sustaining combat operations and retaining the freedom of maneuverer of
uncommitted forces. The major CSS implications are:
a.
Synchronisation of CSS. The CSS challenge is to synchronise the
support provided to the force elements as to maximise the opportunities for the
forces to keep the initiative and unbalance the enemy. The synchronisation
required is likely to involve several lines of support and should be based on the
overall CSS concept.
b.
Support to the Operation Plan. Advantage and account may have to
be taken of any phasing of the operation in order to make the most efficient use
of CSS assets. For example, it may be possible to dump ammunition to the
artillery fire plan for the close operation in advance, and release CSS units for
the mobile support of the deep operation and subsequent exploitation. It is also
possible to use dumping to assist with the deception plan (it may convince the
enemy that the main effort is to be in the vicinity of the close operation). This is
an example of the manner in which CSS considerations may make both to
serve the aims and to enhance the execution of the operational plan.
c.
Planning. The lead-times for CSS require planning to be focused upon
operations that are to be undertaken in the future. The operational plan, and its’
phases, can form the basis for this planning, but it will frequently not be
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developed in sufficient detail. Assumptions will frequently have to be made on
the requirements for subsequent phases and action taken in the current time
frame to set events in train to meet the needs of the future. For example, it may
not be possible to estimate accurately the assets required for the rehabilitation
of a force after operations. However, a plan will have to be made and some
preparations undertaken, if rehabilitation is to be accomplished in a timely
manner. Likewise, the ability to be in a position to replenish a formation or unit
after mobile operations will depend upon proactive planning having been
carried out in advance. Foresight, Flexibility and Economy. All principles of
Combat Service Support have particular application in the process of forward
planning.
d.
Survivability. The survivability of the CSS infrastructure, including its
command-and-control systems, must be assured through a combination of:
careful sitting of operating locations; concealment; allocation of; and training
on, appropriate weapon systems for self-defence; training and procedures; and
protection by combat forces where necessary. The enemy will present a range
of threats to the survivability of the CSS infrastructure, its personnel, stocks,
and equipment; these will include the effect of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) both in the form of casualties and damage and in the inefficiencies
imposed by the prolonged application of defensive measures. An enemy that
practices manoeuvre warfare may seek to target CSS in order to undermine the
ability to conduct operations and to deny freedom of action. It is essential;
therefore, the vulnerabilities are understood, and that action is taken to reduce
them, using combat elements of the force for protection if available.
e.
Friction. The manoeuverist approach seeks to create greater confusion
for the enemy than those hindering friendly forces. Nevertheless, confusion and
dislocation, or frictions, will frequently threaten to undermine activity.
Experience and sound leadership reduce the effects of friction. The necessary
tools are effective and robust command and control and asset visibility systems,
good training and drills, and well-understood doctrine.
PRINCIPLE OF CSS
2072. Principles of CSS are below:
a.
Mission. To ensure the greatest value is obtained from commander
resources properly prepared and correctly balanced.
b.
Foresight. The ability to see & plan for future log activities.
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c.
Economy. Provision of support at the least cost in terms of the
resources, e.g., manpower, equipment and finance to accomplish the mission.
Must consider economy when prioritising and allocating resources.
.
d.
Flexibility. Ability to adapt log structures and procedures in changing
situation, mission and concept of operations.
e.
Simplicity. Ability to foster efficiency in both the planning and execution
of log support operations through standardised order and procedures,
establishment of priority and pre-allocation of support and services.
f.
Co-operation. Close cooperation between all staff and units must be
established to achieved common goal.
g.
Security. Log system must be protected from enemy interference,
sabotage and attack.
APPLICATION OF CSS PRINCIPLE
2073. Sustainability. Embraces both physical and moral components and influences
the tempo and duration of battle.
2074. Survivability. survivability measures such as duplication of holdings between
groups of CSS units and/or installations. Decide between concentration and dispersal.
2075. Planning. Scarcity of resource and lead time needs foresight. CSS advisors
must be included at start of estimate. Adjustment and planning must be continuous to
offer flexibility.
CONCEPT OF CSS OP
2076. The concept of logistics support in CSS in the field is based on the following
philosophies:
a.
The ‘push forward’ concept is exercised in every stage of logistics
support’s organisation.
b.
The logistics units are integrated under one command channel to ease
the command and control.
c.
Centralised control is implemented to all logistics resources to optimise
the utilization of all the limited resources.
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2077. Logistics encompasses a wide range of support activities. The logistics
elements can be broken down into six groups of related activities known as functional
areas Logistics systems and plans are usually developed for each functional area.
These six functional areas are as shown in Figure 1.21.
Figure 1.21: Logistic Functional Area
2078. Tactical level supplies are items provided to support divisions and brigades to
sustain operational endurance and those supplies are held by the ALC. The supplies
are grouped into ten classes to facilitate supply management and planning. Figure
1.22 shows the ten classes of supply.
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Figure 1.22: Classes of Supply
2079. Logistics and the Level Of Wars. All logistics is relative to time, place, and
circumstances. Preparedness can never be absolute, but only relative to possible or
actual operations and the military capabilities of potential enemies. Rarely can all
logistic requirements be satisfied. As long as this is true, some aspect of logistics is
certain to be a limiting factor affecting strategy or operations as illustrated bellows.
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a.
Strategic Level. Concerned with the art and science of applying national
power. Involve comprehensive array of resources to achieve military outcomesnational obj.
b.
Operational Level. Concerned with planning and conduct of campaigns
– controlled series of simultaneous or sequential tactical op to achieve military
strategic obj.
c.
Tactical Level. Concerned with planning and conduct of battle – needs
a short planning horizon – not focus on future battle but upon sp arg nec to
achieve immediate tactical mission.
2080. Concept of CSS Op show in Figure 1.23.
Figure 1.23: Concept of CSS Op
2081. Figure 1.24 show the CSS and level of war.
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Figure 1.24: CSS and Level of War
2082. The Distribution Systems consists of bases and procedures that are designed
to process resources from the time they entered the military system at the strategic
level until they are issued at the tactical level. In order to accomplish its objective, the
logistics system must have a base to provide resources and procedures for
distribution. It is done by moving the required resources from a base to the tactical
forces which need them as shown in Figure 1.25.
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Figure 1.25: The Distribution System
2083. In describing the Logistics Support System in CSS, the following logistics
support bases, areas, and service support units of the system are discussed:
a.
The communication zone (COMM Z) will have established HQ Logistics
Command (Main Base - MB).
b.
The Combat Zone (CZ) will have established:
(1)
Field Maintenance Area (FMA).
(2)
Divisional Administrative Areas (DAA).
(3)
Divisional Maintenance Areas (DMA).
(4)
Brigade Administrative Areas (BAA).
(5)
Brigade Maintenance Areas (BMA).
(6)
Delivery Point (DP).
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2084. Logistics Process. Logistics links the resource capability of a nation’s
economy to its’ fighting forces. The logistics process is how the transition is made. The
elements of the process describe how resources are used to equip, transport, and
maintain forces. There are four steps of the logistics process as follows:
a.
Acquisition is the procurement of weapons, equipment, facilities,
ordnance, and commodities such as food, clothing, fuel, and repair parts.
Though usually a strategic responsibility, acquisition can be accomplished at
the operational and tactical level through purchasing or securing material and
supplies that are locally available.
b.
Distribution means the logistics support (material and support services)
and personnel given to the operational commander. The means employed is
predicated upon what is being moved, its’ place of origin, lift assets available
and urgency assigned. Distribution is a diverse process that incorporates not
only transportation means but also encompasses an entire distribution system.
c.
Sustainment is the provision of resources necessary to support
operations until a mission is completed. Sustainment facilitates uninterrupted
operations through adequate logistics support. It is accomplished through
supply systems, maintenance and other services which ensures continuity of
support through the duration of an operation.
d.
Disposition is the consumption and/or return and disposal of weapons,
equipment, and supplies. The logistics process is complete when supplies and
services are used by the supported unit are returned to the supporting unit for
redistribution, repair, salvage, or disposal. Disposition makes a significant
contribution to the ability to sustain forces over long period and an essential
part of the fiscal and environmental responsibilities. It involves the following and
as shown in Figure 1.26.
(1)
Repair Policy.
(2)
Reserve Stocks.
(3)
Operation Stocks.
(4)
Dispersion.
(5)
Lines of Communication.
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Figure 1.26: Logistics Process
2085. Brigade Maintenance Areas (BMA). Similarly brigade logistic units may not
be able to support the brigade efficiently from the BAA. Therefore, the mobile elements
of these logistic units will have to be deployed forward to effectively provide the
necessary logistics support. The mobile elements of the logistic units in the brigade
will then form a brigade maintenance area (BMA) to provide close intimate support to
the brigade. The BMA is and area established on a temporary basis, where stocks are
held either on the ground or on wheels to maintain a brigade on operations. BMAs
supplement or replace certain functions of administrative areas depending on the
tactical situation. The normal units in the BMA are the mobile elements of the brigade
logistic support units, i.e., the transport company, OFP, mobile wksp and the medical
company. The actual level of development will depend on the prevailing situation. BMA
layout show in Figure 1.27.
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Figure 1.27: Possible Layout for BMA
CSS CAPABILITY
2086. CSS capability may be:
a.
Able to facilitate logistics support using pushed forward system within a
time frame.
b.
Provide mobile elements from the DMA or BMA and static organisations
to the DAA or BAA and operating forces.
c.
Mobile stock can support within certain period.
d.
For low intensity operations, combat forces can be supported directly
from administrative areas i.e. from peacetime locations.
e.
For high intensity operations, the DMA or BMA may be required to be
established forward of the administrative areas from the mobile elements.
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EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENT
2087. The application of the principles of logistic when formulating any support system
and its’ logistic development must, like in tactics or any profession of arms, consider
certain factors with could be used to the best advantage or overcome any limitations
imposed. The areas of concern are the internal threat, the superpower rivalry in South
East Asia and our commitment to the United Nations. Hence, the Army must be
adequately supported for the conduct of operations as follows:
a. To operate in a limited war.
b. To undertake counter-insurgency operations.
2088. The effects of the environment can be describe as follows:
a.
Enemy. Unit capable own local protection. Air and gnd defense. Convoy
and key point vuln.
b.
Terrain. Integrate movt, altn movt, max use local resource.
c.
Port and Beaches. Port subjected to blockage & mining. Hy lift as A veh
restricted at beaches.
d.
Railways. Economical long distance.
e.
Air Field. Overcomes restriction of terrain, climate.
f.
Inland Waterways. Rivers together with their tributaries give wide
coverage of useable waterways. Such waterways can provide a means of
transport and local watercraft is generally available.
g.
Road. Primary means.
h.
Joint and Multinational Op. Future operation are likely to ease
expeditionary will joint (involving elements of more than one service) and
possibly multinational nature. This has implications for the provision of CSS.
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CHAPTER 3
CONDUCT OPERATION PLANNING
SECTION 1
MANOEUVRE WARFARE
INTRODUCTION
3001. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement
in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect
to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Manoeuvre creates and exposes enemy
vulnerabilities to the mass effects of friendly combat power. A commander employs
his elements of combat power in symmetrical and asymmetrical ways to attain
positional advantage over an enemy and be capable of applying those mass effects.
3002. Manoeuvre Theory. As a concept, the Army will primarily adopt the
manoeuvrist approach to war fighting. It is defined as an approach to operations in
which shattering the enemy overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for
an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking
originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. Relying on speed,
deception, surprise, firepower and movement, the Army’s aim is to defeat the enemy’s
will to fight rather than his ability to fight. Commanders at all levels must take initiatives
and focus to exploit enemy weaknesses, avoid enemy strengths, and protect friendly
vulnerabilities, within their higher commander’s intent. At all times, commanders must
seek to undermine the enemy’s centre of gravity.
3003. Manoeuvre Warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy
by shattering his moral and physical cohesion – his ability to fight as an effective,
coordinated whole – rather than by destroying him physically through incremental
attrition.
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TENETS OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE
3004. In a manoeuvrist approach we seek to shatter the enemy’s cohesion and will to
fight rather than their means to fight. This is done by physically and psychologically
shaping the enemy and targeting weakness rather than strengths. The following five
tenets of manoeuvre warfare provide a framework within which to focus the application
of fighting power to achieve these required effects on the enemy.
a.
Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity relative to the adversary. It is
derived from three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution and speed
of transition from one activity to the next. Possessing an understanding of
‘Tempo’ is a must to those attempting to utilise manoeuvre theory. The speed
of decision, execution and transition can be affected by the following:
(1)
Physical mobility.
(2)
Tactical rate of advance.
(3)
Quantity and reliability of information together with the capacity to
process effectively.
(4)
Time taken in command, control, and communication
(5)
Efficiency at battle drills.
(6)
The combat support plan.
(7)
The logistic support plan.
All of these elements will be subject to the friction of war. Reducing the friction
will enable a force to move quickly. The resultant increase in tempo will ensure
that a force is able to get inside and remain inside the enemy’s decision cycle.
Once inside the enemy’s cycle a commander must ensure that he is able to
transition from one activity to another and pose the enemy with multiple
problems. The aim is to saturate and therefore paralyse his command structure.
Ultimately this paralysis will lead to defeat. Commanders at all levels should be
prepared to allow their subordinates to use their initiative, to act decisively and
allow them to take calculated risks. C3 procedures should be established so
that information can be passed rapidly up and down the chain of command.
Training in battle procedure and the implementation of parallel planning will
increase tempo for any force. Equipment that allows a force to gain information,
communicate the information, together with the ability to act on the information,
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is vital for the force. This does not mean that manoeuvre warfare, and tempo,
is only for those units that have integral mobility and firepower. A dismounted
infantry platoon commander, who applies the tools discussed in this chapter,
can generate a tempo of operations that allows him to get inside and stay inside
the enemy’s decision action cycle.
b.
Tempo has three main components: speed of decision, speed of
execution and speed of transition from one activity to the next. Physical speed
of a military unit is, therefore, only one component of tempo. How fast the
headquarters can analyse missions, make decisions, and process orders,
becomes critical in determining the potential tempo a unit can generate and
sustain. These components are complementary: an armoured formation has
the potential to generate great speed, however the potential of the force will not
be realised if the commander is not able to quickly analyse the battlespace and
impose his direction upon his subordinates. When a commander can utilise
quick processing of information through his headquarters, and react to that
information, he is likely to be able to get inside, and remain inside, the enemy’s
decision cycle. Once inside, a commander can increase his tempo by
presenting the enemy with multiple problems to saturate and ultimately paralyse
his ability to react. Therefore, tempo is not just speed but a series of
synchronised activities designed to achieve a specific purpose.
c.
Tempo is what will be achieved when all the aspects, discussed in this
chapter, are considered and applied. A force will be able to transition from one
action to another more quickly than the enemy can respond. The enemy’s
command will be paralysed and his response will become increasingly
irrelevant until his force is dislocated and ultimately defeated.
d.
Surprise is a key element of manoeuvre theory. A commander who is
attempting to paralyse the decision/action cycle of his opponent must set the
conditions to achieve surprise; both physical and psychological. In its purest
sense, surprise implies doing the unexpected but it can be achieved in some
situations by doing the expected at a speed that confounds the adversary.
Surprise has both a physical and psychological effect. If a force is caught
unaware or is overwhelmed by more troops and firepower than it had expected
then it is physically shaped for defeat. This is compounded by the psychological
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impact. The commander of the force that has been surprised must make an
instant decision to initiate his counter move. It is here that the benefits of
psychological shaping can be seen. The opportunities to overload the
adversary’s decision cycle, mislead him as to the real threat or to trigger a
predicted response abound for those who apply ingenuity and cunning on the
battlefield.
e.
Surprise can be achieved by concealing the timing, location or main
effort of activities as well as by deliberately misleading the enemy through
deception. Deception is achieved by manipulating, distorting or falsifying
evidence to induce the threat to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
Deception operations seek to set the conditions for surprise and directly target
the mind of the opposing enemy commander. In a manoeuvrist approach,
deception and the resulting surprise should be fundamental to plans rather than
as a bonus to them.
f.
Simultaneity is the bringing together of battlespace effects across time,
space, and purpose to present the enemy commander with multiple
simultaneous problems. Simultaneity in time overwhelms enemy commanders
by presenting them with a wide range of immediate decision requirements.
Simultaneity in space presents opposing forces with devastating consequences
throughout the depth of the battlespace. Simultaneity in purpose orchestrates
the linkage between all activities in the operational framework, ensuring that
close, deep, rear, reserve, and reconnaissance and security operations are all
directed to the ultimate end state. To conduct a simultaneous operation against
all the objectives along a line of operation a force must possess the means to
bring together combat effects throughout the depth of the battlespace. If the
force lacks the feasible means to overwhelm an adversary through a single,
simultaneous operation, then it must plan for a sequential operation. Even then,
however, each phase of that sequential operation should strive for simultaneity
in time, space, and purpose. In this way, commanders can combine
simultaneous and sequential operations to disguise main effort and achieve
success by conducting attacks on multiple fronts and coordinating the deep and
close battle.
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SECTION 2
BATTLE ORGANIZATION & OPERATION FRAMEWORK
BATTLE ORGANIZATION
3005. Battlefield organisation is the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose. It
consists of three categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining. Decisive
Operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher
headquarters that conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles,
and engagements. Shaping Operations are those lethal and non-lethal activities
throughout the AO that create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive
operation. Sustaining Operations are those that generates and maintain combat power
to enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear
area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure
development.
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
3006. At both the operational and tactical levels, operations are conducted to find and
fix the enemy, thus depriving him of his freedom of action and to attack him in order to
bring about his defeat. In order to accomplish this, operations may well be
simultaneous and should be closely integrated. They are also conducted within a
framework of deep, close and rear operations.
a.
General. The terms deep, close and rear are used to describe how these
three operations relate to each other primarily by function, by what they are to
achieve and secondarily, by geography or where they are to achieve it. These
three operations must be considered together and fought as a whole at each
level of command from brigade level upwards. They require continuous and
careful synchronisation and ideally are conducted simultaneously because
each will influence the other. Deep, close and rear operations also need to be
integrated between levels of command because of the differences in scale and
emphasis between formations of varying sizes and resources. While finding the
enemy is a function common to all operations, fixing and attacking him may be
achieved by either deep or close operations, according to the overall design for
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battle. In order to achieve concentration of force, one of them will be the main
effort at any time. Rear operations will invariably protect and sustain the force
while ensuring that freedom of action for future operations is maintained.
b.
Deep Operations. The purpose of deep operations is primarily to find
and fix the enemy, keeping him from his objectives and constraining his
freedom of action, thereby creating favourable conditions for close operations.
They are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted timescale.
Deep operations are essentially offensive in nature and may themselves lead
to close combat. They are a means of restricting the enemy’s ability to
manoeuvre by focusing on his key vulnerabilities so that he is unable to bring
his combat power to bear. It may be sufficient to delay him or to divert him from
his main effort through such means as barriers and deception measures,
although, increasingly, the range and lethality of modern weapons, tied to
accurate and responsive acquisition systems, allow deep operations to
contribute directly to attacking the enemy in addition to fixing him.
c.
Close Operations. The purpose of close operations is primarily to
engage the enemy, using a variety of means producing results ranging from
destruction to arrest, in order to eliminate a vital part of his combat power. Close
operations will usually be conducted at short range and in an immediate
timescale and therefore concerned with the winning of current battles and
engagements by forces in direct contact with the enemy. Through the
employment of direct action against enemy combat power their effect is likely
to be both immediate and tangible. They are not merely carried out by combat
forces but include the activities of combat support and CSS units operating in
their support.
d.
Rear Operations. The purpose of rear operations is to ensure freedom
of action by protecting the force, sustaining combat operations and retaining
freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. They both increase the overall
depth of operations and provide the resources to vary the tempo of operations.
Although CSS activities are an important component, rear operations are much
wider in scope and include such types of activity as:
(1)
Assembly, movement and security of reserves or echelon forces.
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(2)
Redeployment of forces out of contact.
(3)
Establishment and protection of secure operating bases.
(4)
Establishment of lines of communications (L of C).
(5)
Support for and protection of civilians and civilian installations.
(6)
Local and national support.
(7)
Civil-Military Cooperation, including cooperation with local and
national authorities.
e.
Summary. Deep, close and rear is principally a means of visualising
operations by function. Forces deployed forward may equally be engaged in
deep, close and rear operations. Similarly, they may be operating at both long
and short-range depending on the activity occurring and the means being
employed to carry it out. Close operations may, for example, be narrowly
focused in a confined space and may span a considerable area in depth, width
and height. The determining factor is the function that a force is fulfilling.
Usually, deep operations involve finding and fixing and close operations are
intended to attack the enemy. Rear operations are concerned with supporting,
sustaining and protecting the forces fulfilling these functions. All categories of
forces can be involved in any of these operations. CSS units, for example, can
conduct deep or close operations if the task they are performing supports and
sustains combat and combat support forces in carrying out their role.
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SECTION 3
COMBINED ARMS
INTRODUCTION
3007. Combined Arms is the integration of all arms and services to enhance combat
power by synchronising all battlefield functions and capabilities to support unity of
effort to achieve mission.
UNDERSTANDING THE TERM ‘COMBINED ARMS’
3008. Combined arms are more than the combat arms working together. Each combat
arm of the Army provides unique capabilities that complement each other. A combined
arms team consists of two or more arms supporting one another. The commander
takes his available combat, combat support and combat service support (CSS)
elements and forms them into a combined arms team focused on mission
accomplishment.
3009. The very term ‘combined arms’ often means different things to different people
or is left undefined and vague. As a minimum, however, this term can be categorised
into three parts as follows:
a.
Concept. The combined arms concept is the basic idea that different
arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximise the survival
and combat effectiveness of each other. The strengths of one system must be
used to compensate for the weaknesses of others.
b.
Organisation. Combined arms organisation, at whatever level
(company, battalion/regiment, brigade, etc), brings these different arms and
weapons systems together for combat.
c.
Tactics and Operations. Combined arms tactics and operations are the
actual roles performed and techniques applied by these different arms and
weapons in supporting each other once they have been organised into
integrated teams.
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PRINCIPLES OF COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
3010. Generally, all principles of war can be applied to combined arms operations.
Over and above them, the following deserve special considerations:
a.
Integration.
b.
Mobility.
c.
Balance.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS ROLES AND EMPLOYMENT
3011. The roles and employment of a combined arms force are as follows:
a.
Operate independently in an operation or AO for a limited period without
any external assistance.
b.
Contain any intrusion on our vital areas and repulse any threat for a
limited period.
c.
Suppress all forms of internal threat.
d.
Operate jointly with sister services or other friendly forces serving
common security interests.
COMBINED ARMS CONCEPT
3012. The combined arms concept is based on a platform of centralised planning of
the highest command. Nevertheless, it also requires decentralisation at the execution
level to achieve an optimum positive outcome. The concept covers two levels as
follow:
a.
Operational Level. This level comprises effective integration of all
components including air to form a strong mobile combined arms force, which
will enable it to launch offensive/defensive operations to retain, seize or defend
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strategic objectives. The important components in this level are the
mechanised, tanks, armour, engineers, artillery, aviation supported by the
formation's logistic units.
b.
Tactical Level. This level comprises the integration of all weapon
systems, equipment and units in an offensive manner, consistent with the level
of command. The weapon system and tactical element should be
complementary and as such the integration system should be able to seize and
maintain the initiative with rapid manoeuvres to take advantage of battlefield
opportunities for tactical victory.
CHARACTERISTICS
3013. A combined arms force should ideally have the following characteristics:
a.
Fire Power.
b.
Manoeuvre.
c.
Mobility.
d.
Command and Control.
e.
Intelligence.
f.
Information Warfare (IW).
g.
Interoperability.
h.
Combat Service Support (CSS).
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MAINTENANCE OF COMBINED ARMS ASSETS
3014. Factors to be considered in the maintenance of assets are as follows:
a.
Disposition of Assets. Assets of a combined arms force must be
placed for ready and quick deployment in order to maintain the initiative from
the outset. Such assets should be held at formation groupings. If task
organised, it should not be lower than that of a brigade. The use of intelligence
and IW assets must be well coordinated at all levels of command within the
combined arms force.
b.
Compatibility. To ensure a combined arms force is able to function as
a cohesive force, all components of the force where possible must have
capabilities compatible to each other.
c.
Command and Control. The commander must ensure the existence of
effective command and control systems to enable him to monitor and ensure
all his assets are efficiently maintained and are battle worthy.
b.
Rapid Maintenance. The combined arms force must have the ability to
rapidly maintain and repair unserviceable asset so as to keep abreast with the
fluidity of the battle. Rapid maintenance, with other factors being equal could
give the edge in a future battle. In essence, rapid maintenance is directly related
to superior survivability and advanced mobility.
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SECTION 4
ELEMENT OF TACTICS
INTRODUCTION
3015. The tactician must understand the common tactical concepts and definitions
used by the military profession in the conduct of offensive and defensive operations.
This chapter introduces the concepts and terms that forms the framework by which
this manual is organised. The concepts and terms in this chapter are common to most
operations.
a.
Tactics are the employment of units in combat. It includes the
ordered, arrangement and manoeuvre of units in relation to each other, the
ground or terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into
victorious battles and engagements.
b.
The tactics and supporting techniques and procedures described
in this manual are only starting points for the tactician, who must understand
the difference between tactics, techniques, and procedures. Tactics always
require judgement and adaptation to the unique circumstances of a specific
situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns that can be
applied repeatedly with little or no judgement in a variety of circumstances.
Tactics, techniques and procedures provide the tactician with a set of tools to
use in developing the solution to a tactical problem. The solution to any specific
problem is a unique combination of these tactics, techniques and procedures
or the creation of new ones based on critical evaluation of the situation. The
tactician determines his solution by a thorough mastery of doctrine and existing
tactics, techniques, and procedures, tempered and honed by experience
gained through training and operations. He uses his creativity to develop
solutions for which the enemy is neither prepared nor able to cope.
3016. The differences between tactics, techniques and procedures are as follows:
a.
Tactics are the employment of units in combat.
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b.
Techniques are the general and detailed methods used by troops and
commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically the
methods of using equipment and personnel.
c.
Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe
how to perform tasks.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
3017. The ten principles of war provides general guidance for conducting war and
military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They
are fundamental truths governing combat operations. The principles are shown in
Figure 3.1.1.
Figure 3.1.1: Principles of War
ARMY OPERATIONS
3018. The other considerations for Army operations – anticipation, initiative, depth,
versatility, synchronisation and legitimacy - build on the principles of war. While they
do not guarantee success, their absence risks failure. See Figure 3.1.2: Other
Consideration of Army Operation.
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Figure 3.1.2: Other Considerations for Army Operations
a.
Anticipation. Anticipation is the ability and quality of staff, leaders and
commanders to visualise and calculate the unexpected. Anticipation in planning
opens courses for conduct of operations. Anticipation in operations provides
opportunities to act rather than react, to prepare and activate contingencies and
alternatives. Anticipation is made through informed judgement, sound
knowledge and experience and well prepared and continuously updated IPB.
b.
Initiative. The Army instils and encourages initiative in leaders and
commanders at all levels. In operations, initiative is made possible through
directive control that allows junior leaders and commanders freedoms of
actions. Initiative seeks to set own terms aimed at reducing an enemy’s
flexibility. Initiative is also the ability to seek and exploit opportunities within the
higher commander’s intent.
c.
Depth. The Army places particular emphasis in the depth of planning. In
this regard, clear understanding of higher commander’s intent, conduct of
Mission Analysis, followed by thorough planning in Task Organisation as well
as updated IPB would be of great significance. These processes provide clear
mission, lists of essential and implied tasks, well thought Task Organisation and
eventually the end state of the intended operations. Depth in the conduct of
offence provides momentum for success and depth in defence limits the
attacker’s ability to manoeuvre. Depth in resources management enhances
flexibility and sustainability.
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d.
Versatility. The Army requires the ability of its forces; men and
machines, to be able to engage and accomplish missions across the spectrum
of conflict, with the highest competency. Versatility depends on adaptive
leaders, competent and dedicated soldiers, and well-equipped units. Effective
training and depth in planning provides useful contribution to versatility.
e.
Synchronisation. The Army synchronises all available resources in
time, space, and purpose, in order to mass the effects of combat power, at the
chosen time and place, to overwhelm the enemy or dominate the situation.
Synchronisation requires depth in planning and versatility of employed forces
in order to ensure the success of all missions. In this regard, correct selection
of Decision Points would be crucial.
f.
Legitimacy. The Army serves the nation and its people professionally
and legitimately. Legitimacy is attained through the Army’s loyalty to the
Government and the people, and the unbending support by the Government
and the people in return; either morally or physically. In the present era, there
is no place for an army that has no legitimacy, or that does not act legitimately.
International legitimacy is attained by respecting the Rules of Engagement
(ROE), UN Resolutions and compliance to Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The
subject of LOAC is addressed in PPB (MAL) 37 – International and
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict.
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SECTION 5
LANUN
OFFENSIVE OPERATION
3019. The Lanun doctrine stresses offensive operations as a decisive form of combat.
Mobility, rapid movement, firepower and shock actions are the characteristics of the
Lanun’s offensive actions.
3020. Lanun commanders believe that victory will be more easily achieved by striking
in selected areas with overwhelming fire power and numerical superiority. This
concentration of force occurs in the area of assault, with the intention of breaking
through the front-line defences and punching into the rear of the enemy force to
destroy reserves, command centres and support echelons.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3021. Lanun recognises four major types of offensive operations as follows:
a.
Advance to contact.
b.
Attack of which the main types are:
(1)
The quick attack.
(2)
The deliberate attack.
c.
Exploitation.
d.
Pursuit.
ADVANCE TO CONTACT
3022. The advance to contact is the cornerstone of LA tactical operations. Surprise,
organisation of the force for battle and speed of execution are the characteristics of
the LA doctrine in the advance to contact.
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3023. Wherever possible, the advance to contact is on a broad route (front) with a
strong mobile reserve employed to add depth. Movement by night as well as by day
is a normal practice. Night-driving aids ensure minimum dislocation and there is a
significant reduction of speed in the advance after dark.
3024. Although LA doctrine allows for the advance to contact of a corps, the details
of such an advance are not readily available. However, it could well be presumed that
the advance will encompass with one and possibly two divisions up during the march,
depending on the mobility corridors in the AO.
DIVISIONAL TACTICAL GUIDELINES
3025. Routes. A division will have at least two and perhaps three or four main march
routes, and these may extend across a front 20 to 30 km wide. The number of columns
in the advance is determined largely by the number of usable column roads and the
suitability of the ground for cross-country movement. The distance between major
columns is determined largely by the effective range of weapons, ground, and the
enemy situation. When an encounter is expected, there is at least one route for each
first echelon regiment. It is normal for a formation to select and prepare reserve and
lateral routes for use in an emergency.
3026. Road Movement Speeds. Normal speeds which are guidelines only and do
not include halts are shown in Table 3.1.1.
Average March Speed (km/h)
Ser
Surface
Time
Motor and Armoured
Foot
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
1.
Road
Day
20-30
15-20
4
2.
Road
Night
15-20
3.5
3.
Cross-country
Day
10-15
2
4.
Cross-country
Night
5-10
1.5
Table 3.1.1: Road Movement Speeds
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3027. When opposed, LA mechanised and armoured forces are able to move
approximately 50 to 70 km in 24 hours, provided the opposition can be bypassed or
quickly overcome in an encounter battle or quick attack.
3028. Halts. Normal tactical march procedures call for halts as follows:
a.
Foot March. Ten minutes halt each hour and twenty minutes rest period
every 4 hours.
b.
Motorised and Armoured March. Twenty to thirty minutes after every
3 to 4 hours in a move taking longer than 24 hours.
3029. Foot Marches. LA troops conduct a normal march over an eight-hour period,
with hourly and four hourly halts. A forced march is conducted over 12 hours, with
halts. For marches in excess of 12 hours, breaks for meals and rest (sleep) are usually
made at the commander's discretion.
3030. Length of Tactical March Columns. The length of a tactical march column
varies greatly between infantry and other formations. Table provides the length of
tactical march columns.
Ser
Type
Division (km)
Regiment (km)
(a)
1.
2.
(b)
Armour
Motorised
(c)
50 – 80
50 – 100
(d)
25 – 40
25 – 50
3.
Rifle
25 – 50
12 – 25
Table 3.1.2: Length of Tactical March Column
Note:
Distance between vehicles is 20 to 50 meters.
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CONDUCT OF ADVANCE
3031. Regardless of the type and size of the formation in the advance to contact, the
components of the force are similar and are encountered in the following order:
a.
Reconnaissance elements.
b.
Forward detachment, except in rifle formations.
c.
Advance guard or advance detachment.
d.
Main body.
e.
Flank and rear guards.
3032. Reconnaissance Elements. Reconnaissance elements are employed on each
of the route. Reconnaissance elements vary widely in composition but typically include
motorised units, light amphibious tanks, scout cars and motorcycle combinations.
a.
Bn
(1)
Own (up to a pl strength).
(2)
Forward Detachment.
b.
Usually only found at Div level.
c.
Usually consists of reinforced Tk or Mech Bn.
d.
May operate 30-50 km ahead of main force.
e.
To seize important lines and hold till arrival main body.
f.
If deployed by gnd hold approx 48 hrs, if by air 24 hrs.
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3033. Advance Guard or
a.
Advance
Detachment.
Adv Gd.
(1)
1st Echelon in adv.
(2)
Normally combined arms group of Inf, Armour, Artillery,
(3)
Tasks.
Engineers.
(c)
(a)
Clear minor opposition, particularly Anti-Armd weapons,
(b)
Locate the forward edge of positions.
Cover deployment of Main Body for an attack preferably from
flank.
b.
Main Body. 2nd Echelon, HQ, AD and Anti-Armd well fwd.
c.
Rear/Flank Gds. From Coy to Squad strength.
3034. Main Body. The main body is the second echelon in the advance. The main
body advances with its headquarters, air defence and anti-armour elements well
forward. Its principal task in the advance is to be correctly grouped so that it may be
launched to capture objectives which are too strong for the advance guard to
overcome.
3035. Flank and Rear Guards. Flank and rear guards are mounted by the division
as a whole and by each march echelon. They may vary from section to company
strength.
3036. Armour.
a.
Armour is considered important due to its’ firepower, mobility, and shock
action.
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b.
Deployment dictated by terrain.
c.
Normally allotted to the advance guard and / or to the reserve.
COMBAT SUPPORT
3037. Artillery Support.
a.
Normally deployed 3/4 of the effective range forward of the line of
contact.
b.
Regiment Mortar element normally deployed in the 1st echelon.
c.
Divisional Artillery Regimental element normally deployed forward either
in the advance guard or at the front of the main body.
3038. Engineer Support.
a.
Engineer allocated to the advance guard.
b.
Movement support detachments allotted to each main route.
c.
River Crossing equipment located at the head of Divisional columns.
d.
Mine plough/rollers positioned well forward.
TYPES OF ATTACK
3039. LA doctrine recognises three different types of attack which affect their tactics
at formation level and below. These are summarised as follows:
a.
The Quick Attack. When encountering a lightly prepared position.
(1)
May be Company, Unit or Formation size force.
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b.
(2)
Can be made off the line of march.
(3)
Timings: Bn is 2 - 4 hrs.
(4)
Little difference in tactics to the deliberate attack.
(5)
Shorter time, less recon, smaller forces and less prep fire.
The Deliberate Attack.
(1)
Against well prepared defensive position or when a quick attack
has been repulsed.
(2)
At Battalion, Regiment and higher.
(3)
Timings:
(a)
Bn - 3 - 5 hrs.
(b)
Regt - 5 - 9 hrs.
(4)
Characterised by careful planning, increased recon and
deployment of numerically superior forces.
(5)
Generally, employ an envelopment or turning manoeuvre,
combined if necessary, with a frontal penetration.
(6)
Preparations include:
(a)
Detailed recon: In a number of places as part of deception.
Mostly occurs at night.
(b)
Deployment: Div Assy area 5 -10 km from FEBA. May be
occupied one or two days before the attack. Night before the
attack, the formation moves into attack positions.
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(7)
Deception both passive and active.
EXPLOITATION
3040. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful
attack and is designed to disorganise the enemy in depth. The LA conducts
exploitation in order to seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have
no alternative but surrender or fight. The various indicators to this are summarised as
follows:
a.
Large numbers of prisoners and the surrender of entire enemy units.
b.
Enemy units disintegrating after initial contact.
c.
A lack of an organised defence.
d.
The capture or absence of enemy leaders.
3041. LA Commanders plan to exploit every attack unless restricted by higher
headquarters or exceptional circumstances. Exploitation pressures the enemy,
compounds his disorganisation, and erodes his will to resist. Upon shattering the
enemy’s coherence, attacking forces strike targets that defeat the enemy attempts to
regroup.
3042. Exploiting success is especially important after a deliberate attack in which the
commander accepts risk elsewhere to concentrate combat power for the decisive
operation. Failure to exploit the success of the decisive operation aggressively may
allow the enemy to detect and exploit a friendly weakness and regain the initiative.
3043. When possible, lead forces transition directly into an exploitation. If that is not
feasible, commanders pass fresh forces into the lead. Exploitations require the
physical and mental aggressiveness to combat the friction of night, bad weather,
possible fratricide, and extended operations. Successful exploitations demoralise the
enemy and disintegrate his formations. Commanders of exploiting units anticipate this
situation and prepare to transition to a pursuit. They remain alert for opportunities that
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develop as enemy cohesion and resistance break down. The LA will also posture CSS
forces to support exploitation opportunities.
PURSUIT
3044. The LA doctrine stresses that the decisive defeat of an enemy force can only
be achieved by rigorous and continuous exploitation of tactical advantages. The
pursuit phase begins when the enemy is routed or attempts to break contact in a
planned withdrawal. LA Commanders have a duty to maintain contact and are
expected to take up pursuit without further orders.
3045. The pursuit may be directed to the following situations:
a.
Along the same axis as withdrawing troops.
b.
Along parallel axis attempting to overtake or outflank the withdrawing
troops.
c.
A combination of both and within a division, one regiment engages in
direct pursuit and others along outflanking routes immediately after a
breakthrough.
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DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
GENERAL
3046. The LA doctrine recognises the importance of tactical defence but stresses that
it is only a temporary expedient, which is adapted in the following circumstances:
a.
The Initial Period of War. At the beginning of a war, superior enemy
forces probably aided by surprise, may have to be met at least initially, by
strategic defensive actions to prevent the enemy seizure of important
economic, administrative, and political centres; and to gain time for the
mobilisation, concentration and deployment of strategic groupings or forces.
Such a defence is merely a prelude to a decisive counter-offensive that would
be the ultimate goal of the LA.
b.
Defeat. Either at the beginning of a war or during operations, an army
group may be in transition to the defence after defeat in a meeting, engagement
or an offensive.
c.
Counter-Offensive. During offensive operations, an army group may be
forced to transition to defence to repulse a counter-offensive, which is too
strong to be met in a meeting engagement.
d.
Completion of the Mission. At the conclusion of an offensive operation,
a formation may assume the defensive posture because it has taken the
designated strategic objective; because there is a need to regroup and resupply before offensive operations can be resumed on its axis, or to cover the
exposed flank of another group conducting an offensive manoeuvre.
e.
Deliberate. It is possible for a formation to assume the defensive option
even when superior in strength to the enemy. This could be either because it is
deemed politically expedient or in a deliberate attempt to wear down and
unbalance an enemy determined on the offensive. In the latter case, defence
is only a prelude to a decisive counter-offensive. A deliberate defence may also
be adopted as an economy of force measure to make possible the achievement
of a decisive superiority on another axis.
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3047. In spite of the emphasis on offensive operations, LA forces are well equipped
for defensive operations. Lanun formations and units hold impressive scales of antiarmour and air defence weapons and their allocation of engineer equipment at
regimental level and above including trenchers, dozers and minelayers, is well
balanced between offensive and defensive requirements.
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3048. The LA purpose of defence is to gain time, to prepare for the counter- offensive
while preserving their own forces. In order to achieve this, the LA employs three broad
types of defensive operations, namely area defence, mobile defence and retrograde
operations.
3049. Area Defence. Area defence is organised in depth and is designed to deny
vital areas to the enemy or to halt attacks while inflicting significant losses in men and
material. Forward defence positions engage the enemy decisively and defend their
locations with no thought of withdrawal to successive positions. LA forces drawn from
second echelon formations and units counterattack on the enemy offensive that has
been blunted or halted. Area defence is based on the following:
a.
Firmly holding areas of tactical importance with troops well dug in.
b.
Retaining the second echelon anti-armour reserve to block penetration
and strong armoured force to counterattack.
c.
The use of all available firepower.
d.
Maximum use of both natural and artificial obstacles.
3050. Mobile Defence. Mobile defence was developed from the LA experience in
mobile insurgency warfare. It is a ‘hit and run' tactic cum defence based on a war of
movement. Mobile defence is used as follows:
a.
A situation where distances and frontages are large and the holding of
terrain is not critical, the LA attempts to cover these by strong mobile forces
trading ground for time, while other forces prepare for a counter-offensive.
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b.
A series of defence/withdrawal actions by hard-hitting mobile forces
which take advantage of every opportunity to inflict casualties on the enemy
without undue losses to themselves.
c.
Retaining ground for only as long as delay or casualties are imposed
and continuing their rearward movement until the purpose of the mobile
defence is achieved or until they have withdrawn to where the bulk of their
forces are deployed in an area defence role.
d.
Organisation of forces to allow them to break contact at will and continue
their rearward movement until the purpose of the mobile defence is achieved
or until they have withdrawn to where the bulk of their forces are deployed
in an area defence role.
3051. Retrograde Operations. Retrograde or rearward moving operations are
conducted by LA forces to create a more favourable situation for the initiation or
resumption of the offensive. Retrograde operations, although essentially defensive,
are employed in both the offence and defence phases of war to preserve forces and to
gain or maintain the initiative. There are three types of retrograde operations which the LA
forces employ as follows:
a.
Delaying Action. Delaying action is an operation in which a force under
enemy pressure trades space for time.
b.
Withdrawal. The withdrawal is an operation in which a force in contact
disengages from the enemy, either voluntarily or as a result of enemy pressure.
c.
Consolidation.
Consolidation is a voluntary movement to the rear
by forces not in contact with the enemy.
3052. Retrograde operations are carried out at night where possible and are
supported by artillery. They are often preceded by local counterattacks. Retrograde
operations areundertaken with the aim of accomplishing one or more of the following:
a.
Maintaining the integrity of one's own forces.
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b.
Harassing, exhausting, resisting, delaying, and inflicting casualties on the
enemy.
c.
Drawing the enemy into an unfavourable situation.
d.
Disengaging from combat.
e.
Gaining time without becoming decisively engaged.
f.
Permitting the use of elements of a force elsewhere.
g.
Avoiding combat under undesirable conditions.
DEFENCE ZONES
3053. Combat Zone. The combat area is divided into two zones, the security zone
and the main defence zone. These zones are further organised into successive belts
designed to provide depth to the defended area.
3054. The Security Zone. Screening force, predominantly reconnaissance units will
be deployed well forward of the main defence zone. When a corps is deployed, it
provides the main screening force which operates in a similar fashion to cover troops.
Security forces are deployed to the front of the main defence zone. They provide
security from hostile reconnaissance, observation, and surprise attack. Where
possible they engage the enemy at long range and force him to deploy prematurely.
At divisional level, security forces may be located up to 15 km forward of the main
defence zone.
3055. The Main Defence Zone. The main defence zone is divided into main defence
and second defence positions. These positions consist of a series of mutually
supporting self-sufficient strong points or localities. The positions from stable pivots
from which anti-armour reserves and counter-attack forces may manoeuvre supported
by massed fire power. Obstacles are constructed forward, between and within
positions, to form defensive belts which hinders on enemy advance, canalising and
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causing him to concentrate and provide lucrative targets. Figure 3.1.3 depicts the
schematic layout of the LA defence zone.
Figure 3.1.3: Lanun Defence Zone
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Main defence position contains first echelon forces.
Second defence position contains second echelon forces.
Distance not to scale.
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AREA DEFENCE
3056. In area defence the combat zone consists of a security and main defence
zone. These in turn comprise of the following:
a.
The Security Zone.
(1)
(2)
b.
Screening Forces.
Security Forces.
The Main Defence Zone.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Main Defence Position.
Second Defence Position.
Headquarters.
3057. The security zone is patrolled by reconnaissance elements and other forces
drawn from second echelon troops who fight delaying actions on the important axes.
Within the security zone, the forces operate in the following manner:
a.
Screening Forces. Screening forces are primarily reconnaissance units
deployed well forward of the main defence. At corps level, they may be
deployed 200 km forward, at divisional level 50 km. Screening force tasks
include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Provision of early warning.
Maintenance of liaison with security forces.
Determining enemy strengths and main axes of advance.
b.
Part of the screening force may be given a stay behind role in likely
enemy assembly areas, the remainder fall back under pressure into the main
defence zone where they cover gaps, protect flanks, and maintain security in
rear areas, particularly against airborne attack.
c.
Security Forces. Security forces are deployed in front of the main
defence zone in relation to their mobility. Each level of command down to and
including companies, deploy security forces forward of the FEBA. A corps may
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deploy a reinforced regiment 20 to 30 km out from the Main Defence Zone,
where alas a division will deploy a reinforced battalion 5 to 15 km out. Security
forces which are normally drawn from second echelon forces are tasked for the
following:
(1)
Defend if the situation permits.
(2)
Engage the enemy at long range to force him to deploy and
thus slow down his advance.
(3)
Deceive the enemy as to the strength, dispositions, and
intentions of the forces in the main defence zone.
(4)
Maintain contact with the advancing enemy force.
(5)
Protect the main defence position from surprise attack.
3058. The Main Defence Zone. The zone's main position is the bulwark of the
defence and occupied by first echelon troops who are expected to hold out even if
bypassed or encircled. The second defence position is occupied by second echelon
troops. The second defence position also provide forces for the security zone. At
corps level, the main defence zone normally consists of a main defence position of
two reinforced divisions and a second defence position containing most of the third
division: including additional armour and artillery. At divisional level, two thirdregiments
are deployed as first echelon troops in the main defence position and at battalion level
two companies.
3059. In area defence, emphasis is placed on the protection of troops and material, and
a major consideration in selecting area defence positions is the terrain; inclusive of all
other national features that may influence the overall defence of the said area.
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Figure 3.1.4: Infantry/Motorised Infantry Division Area Defence
Notes:
1.
Main defence position contains first echelon.
2.
Second defence position contains second echelon forces.
3.
Distance not to scale.
4.
Gaps between elements within a defence position are not shown.
3060. Artillery Support in Area Defence.
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a.
Artillery support is centralised until the main attack starts.
b.
Once the attack starts artillery support may become decentralised.
c.
Superior commanders are likely to allocate additional artillery to
subordinates - 1st Echelon Regiment gets 1 Gun Battalion in support from the
Division.
d.
Artillery is sited to provide support at max range (up to ¾ effective range
forward) consistent with security of the guns.
e.
Artillery is organised as for offensive operations.
3061. Tank Participation in the Defensive Fire Plan. Tanks are used in both the
indirect and direct fire roles as follows:
a.
Indirect Fire. It is common practice to use indirect tank fire to augment
the fire plan. Tank units form the division second echelon and are deployed in
the gun area. They are also considered as reinforcing artillery since they
contribute to the overall fire plan.
b.
Direct Fire. Tanks are employed to fire from hull down positions in
the main defence position against tanks supporting enemy infantry.
3062. Anti-Armour Support in Area Defence.
a.
Anti-Armd fire interlocks along the front of def area.
b.
Artillery in direct role considered Anti-Armd weapon.
c.
Anti-Armd reserve located in hides to cover most likely Armour
approaches.
d.
Unit Anti-Armd support Regiment and Divisional Anti-Armd Reserve.
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e.
Destroy enemy AFV / Tk.
3063. Air Defence.
a.
AC and surface-to-air guns and missiles.
b.
Dispersion and concealment along with deception are important.
c.
Priority tasks:
(1)
HQ.
(2)
Artillery assets.
(3)
Mobile elments of 2nd Echelon and reserve.
(4)
Routes forward and rear areas.
3064. Engineers.
a.
Mobility and Counter Mobility. Tasks incl:
(1)
Field Defenses.
(2)
Obstacles.
(3)
Counterattack route preparation.
(4)
Deception.
MOBILE DEFENCE
3065. Mobile Defence. The mobile defence is a type of defensive operation that
concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a
striking force.
a.
Trading ground for time.
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b.
Mobile forces.
c.
Pre-designated lines of resistance.
d.
MDP organised as a series of defensive belts.
e.
Never becoming decisively engaged and withdrawing through 2nd
defensive position to next intercept line.
f.
Small scale defensive battles involving surprise attack, rear and lateral
withdrawal are to delay, fragment and exhaust attacking forces.
g.
At Regiment and below - 1/3 of strength is the 1st echelon, while 2/3 in
2nd echelon.
h.
Conversely 2/3 of firepower deployed forward.
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SECTION 6
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPOE)
3066. Definition on IPOE.
a.
A systematic, continuous process of analysing and visualizing the threat
& operational environment in a specific geographic area.
b.
A rigorous analytical methodology.
c.
Focussing on providing intelligence estimate for use in planning &
executing ops.
3067. Purpose of preparing IPOE.
a.
Designed to support staff estimates & the conduct of the military
appreciation process (MAP):
(1)
Understand the Operational Environment.
(2)
Determine Threat capabilities & COA.
(3)
Identify Information Requirements (IRs).
(4)
Drive information collection management (RSI Planning) &
targeting effort (target value analysis).
(5)
Plan the Battle – Reduces uncertainty & provides preferred
alternatives in decision making for the exec of battle.
(6)
Synchronise BOS.
(7)
Allow Commanders to selectively apply and maximise his combat
power at critical points in time and space on the operational environment.
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3068. Step 1 Define the Operational Environment:
a.
Acty 1: Identify Availability Of Time.
(1)
Developed using reverse planning to determine:
(a)
The time available for the IPOE process.
(b)
The details req in the period of time.
(c)
Time is always a limiting factor.
(d)
Time available for IPOE is dependent on the requirement
for Intelligence input into the MAP.
(e)
The MAP method chosen will determine how much time is
available for IPOE.
(f)
The time available will determine the way the IPOE is
conducted.
(g)
Must seek commander’s guidance IOT determine how
detailed IPOE products are required.
(h)
It is stressed that IPOE is an ongoing process & will
continue throughout as IR’s are determined.
b.
Acty 2: Identify Key Environmental Characteristic. Identify factors
that will influence threat or friendly courses of action are as follow:
(1)
Physical Terrain.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
Geography.
Elevation data.
Soil Composition.
Hydrological data.
Vegetation.
Infrastructure.
Government Centers.
Agricultural/mining regions.
Trade routes and commercial zones.
Industrial zones.
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(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(2)
Weather.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(3)
Displace civilian sites.
Communications towers.
Power plants.
Dams.
Religious/historical building.
Hospitals & Clinic.
Gaols.
Airport & Seaport.
TV and Radio Stations.
Tunnels/Bridges.
Street and urban patterns.
Transportation.
Fuel.
Health Services.
Visibility.
Wind.
Precipitation.
Cloud cover/ceiling.
Temperature.
Humidity.
Low tide and High tide.
Human Terrain.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Population.
Education.
Religion.
Health.
Legal.
Political.
Economics.
Society.
NGOs.
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(j)
(4)
Local Authorities.
Information Terrain. Flow of information throughout the AO:
(a)
Is an understanding of the information domain and the flow
of information throughout the AO.
(b)
Civilian systems.
(c)
Threat systems.
(d)
Flow of information.
(e)
Comms HF/VHF.
(f)
Transportation systems.
c.
Acty 3: Identify AO & AI.
(1)
Area of Operations (AO). The geographical area over which the
commander has been assigned the responsibility and authority to
conduct military operations.
(2)
Area of Interest (AI). Area of concern to the commander, including
the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy
territory the objective of current or planned operations. If occupied by the
enemy, could jeopardise the accomplishment of the mission.
(3)
Geographic area from which information and intelligence are
required to execute successful operations (focus Intelligence assets to
provide Idications & Warnings).
d.
Acty 4: Determined IR & Assumptions.
(1)
IR expressed as a specific question about:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Deployment.
Intention.
Local environment cond.
ORBAT.
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(e)
Disseminated to subunit & formation in the form of RSI
plan.
e.
Assumption.
(1)
In reality – some IR may not be able to be completely answered.
(2)
Assumptions should be made on the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Enemy.
Environment.
Other factors.
i.
Must be listed & briefed to the commander for
verification.
ii.
Must be continually reassessed as IRs are fulfilled.
3069. Step 2: Describe The Operation Environment Effect.
a.
Acty 1. Terrain Analysis.
(1)
Determine how the terrain can be used most effectively & exploit
it to interfere with the enemy.
(2)
Military aspects of the battlefield’s terrain.
(3)
Observation & fields of fire.
(4)
Cover &/or Concealment.
(5)
Obstacles.
(6)
Key Terrain (KT)(Vital Ground (VG)).
(7)
Avenue of Approach (AA).
b.
Acty 2. Weather Analysis.
(1)
(2)
c.
Elm 1 - Identify the effect of weather.
Elm 2 - Produce the weather effect matrix.
Acty 3. Analyse Other Operational Environment Characteristic.
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d.
Acty 4. Combine The Operation Environment Effect.
e.
Acty 5. Analysis Other Operation Environment Characteristic.
f.
Acty 6. Combine The Operation Environment Effects
3070. Step 3: Evaluate the Threat.
a.
Acty 1. Identify Level of Enemy Command.
(1)
Identify the level of enemy command likely to be opposed.
(2)
Look at the level appropriate for the friendly HQ mission – neither
too high or low.
(3)
Provide a focus for further analysis of the designated enemy –
avoid wasted intelligence effort.
(4)
To decide the level of enemy commander, requires:
(a)
Guidance from Higher Commander’s Intent, mission &
task.
(b)
Clear understanding of the Big Picture at all levels.
b.
Acty 2. Establish Enemy Model & Templates.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
c.
Sub Acty A. Produce Doctrinal Overlays
Sub Acty B. Describe Preferred Tactics & Options
Sub Acty C. Produce High Value Target (HVT) Matrix
Sub Acty D. Produce ORBAT File
Acty 3. Identify Enemy Capabilities.
(1)
The broad enemy’s defensive or offensive Course Of Actions
(COAs) & supporting operations which can influence our
misssion/operations.
(2)
4 broads tactical COAs:
(a)
A – Attack.
(b)
D – Defend.
(c)
R – Reinforce.
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(d)
R – Retrograde.
d.
Supporting operations include enemy capabilities that are providing
support to the broad COA or may be a specific type of operation; i.e. as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
NBC.
Supporting Air Assets.
Int Collection/EW.
3071. Step 4: Determine Threat COA.
a.
Acty 1. Identify Threat Obj & End States.
(1)
Analyse threat’s intent, obj & endstates two level down of their
comd.
(2)
Rarely be able to confirm.
(3)
Assumptions is to be made but must be agreed to by the comd –
to keep the process moving.
(4)
Ensure that each subordinate level of en comd’s obj must meet
the likely obj of its parent comd.
(5)
Define how the threat perceives our COG.
(6)
Analyse own CVs that are open to exploitation by the threat.
b.
Acty 2. Develop Full Range of Threat COAs.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
c.
Sub Acty A: Develop Threat COAs.
Sub Acty B: Develop Threat COA Description and Options.
Sub Acty C: Test COA Against Criteria.
Sub Acty D: Produce the Situation Overlay.
Sub Acty E: Constructing a Situation Overlay.
Sub Acty F: Produce an Event Overlay.
Sub Acty G: Named Areas of Interest (NAI).
Sub Acty H: Targeted Areas of Interest (TAI).
Sub Acty I: Event and RSI Matrix.
Acty 3. Analyse COG & Build Construct.
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(1)
Characteristic or entities from which the enemy draws physical
strength, will to fight, or freedom of action. ~ Source of Power
(2)
4 Elm of COG Construct:
(a)
COG.
(b)
CC. Inherent abilities enabling the COG function (Base
need/what gives strength to COG).
(c)
CR. Essential conditions, resources & means for CC to be
fully operative.
(d)
CV. Any inherent vulnerabilities to CR.
d.
Acty 4. Evaluate and Prioritise Threat COA
(1)
Identify each COAs Strength & Weakness by:
(a)
Evaluate impact of OE's effect on COA.
(b)
Identify degree of risk.
(c)
Identify each COAs potential to be use as deception.
(d)
Identify each COAs potential to surprise.
(e)
Evaluate enemy current disposition & activity to determine
if one COA can already be preferred against another.
(f)
Comparing the info of COAs & rank them in order of
likelihood – MLCOA & MDCOA.
(2)
Most Likely COA is that which most likely replicates enemy
preferred tactics and doctrine. It may include aspects relative to the most
likely approach direction to capture designated objectives.
(3)
Most Dangerous COA is that which stands to have the greatest
impact on friendly force mission and cause it to fail.
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SECTION 7
DEFENSIVE MANOEUVRE
3072. The commander’s intent is to defeat the enemy forces attack by overwhelming
it with repeated, unexpected blows before it conducts its’ final assault on friendly
defensive positions. As the enemy attack fails, the enemy must attempt to withdraw or
transition to a defence in the face of friendly counterattacks. If the enemy succeeds in
overrunning a VG, the defending force counterattacks to overwhelm the enemy before
he can either organise that position for defence or exploit his success. The planning
considerations for manoeuvre are as follows:
Exploit the Advantages of Ground.
a.
The defending commander exploits the defending force’s advantages of
occupying the ground where the fight will occur. The defending force engages
the attacker from locations that give the defending force an advantage over the
attacking enemy. These locations include defiles, rivers, thick woods, swamps,
cliffs, canals, built-up areas, and reverse slopes. The commander may choose
to shape the battlefield by defending one area to deny ground to the enemy
while delaying in another area to deceive the enemy commander into believing
he has achieved success.
b.
The defending commander plans how to use key terrain to impede the
enemy’s movement. He seeks out ground that allows him to mass the effects
of his fires but forces the enemy to commit his force piecemeal into friendly
killing areas. This exposes portions of the enemy force for destruction without
giving up the advantages of fighting from protected positions. Examples of key
terrain include ground that permits the defending force to cover a major
obstacle system by fire, important road junctions and choke points that impact
troop movements, such as the movement of reserves and the L of C.
c.
The commander determines the probable force ratios he will face and
arrays his forces accordingly. The ground impacts how fast the enemy can
close on his positions and how much time is available to employ combat
multipliers, such as indirect fires. Once the commander arrives at acceptable
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force ratios or the degree of risk, he must identify what is the level of risk that
can be accepted then he allocates his available forces and begins planning his
Engagement Area (EA).
d.
On each enemy avenue of approach, the commander determines where
he wants to destroy the enemy. He arrays forces allocated to that avenue of
approach around this point to establish a EA. He uses obstacles and fires to
canalise enemy forces into this EA. The commander takes actions to increase
the kill probabilities of his various weapon systems at different ranges.
e.
Ground features that favour defensive operations include:
(1)
A series of parallel ridges across the line of hostile advance.
(2)
Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes and other obstacles on the
front and flanks.
(3)
High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire.
(4)
Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive
positions.
(5)
Limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine the
enemy to predictable avenues of approach.
(6)
Good road networks behind the line of contact that allows the
commander to reposition his forces as the battle progresses.
f.
The opposite of the ground conditions listed above degrades a force’s
ability to conduct defensive operations. For example, ground with a limited road
net that canalises the defending force allows the enemy to predict its movement
and take steps to interdict that movement.
3073. Maintain Security. Security operations seek to confuse the enemy about the
location of the commander’s Command Post prevent enemy observation of
preparations and positions, and keep the enemy from delivering observed fire on the
positions. They also try to force the attacking enemy to deploy prematurely. They can
offset the attacker’s inherent advantage of initiative regarding the time, place, plan,
direction, strength, and the composition of his attack by forcing him to attack blind into
prepared defences. The commander must not permit enemy reconnaissance and
surveillance assets to determine the precise location and strength of defensive
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positions, obstacles, engagement areas and reserves. First, the defending force
conducts reconnaissance to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Second, each
echelon normally establishes a security area forward of its MBA. All units conduct
aggressive security operations within their AO, including the rear area, to seek out and
repel or kill the enemy reconnaissance and other forces. Units implement OPSEC
measures and other defensive information operations to deny the enemy information
about friendly dispositions.
3074. Disrupt the Enemy Attack at Every Opportunity. The defending force
conducts operations throughout the depth of the enemy’s formation in time and space
to destroy his key units and assets, particularly his artillery and reserves, or disrupt
their timely introduction into battle at the point of engagement. This allows the
defending force to regain the initiative. It conducts spoiling attacks to disrupt the
enemy’s troop concentrations and attack preparations. The defending force
counterattacks enemy successes rapidly with its reserve, the forces at hand or a
striking force before the enemy can exploit success. It conducts offensive information
operations to assist this process.
3075. Mass the Effects of Combat Power. The defending force must mass the
effects of its combat power to overwhelm the enemy and regain the initiative. The
commander uses economy of force measures in areas that do not involve his decisive
operation to mass the effects of his forces in the area where a decision is sought. This
decisive point can be a geographical objective or an enemy force. In an area defence,
defending units use engagement areas to concentrate the effects of overwhelming
combat power from mutually supporting positions. In a mobile defence, the
commander uses the striking force to generate overwhelming combat power at the
decisive point. Another way he can generate the effects of mass is through committing
his reserve.
3076. Ensure Mutual Support. Mutual support exists when positions and units
support each other by direct, indirect, lethal, and non-lethal fire, thus preventing the
enemy from attacking one position without being subjected to fire from one or more
adjacent positions. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions,
prevents defeat in detail and helps prevent infiltration between positions. Tactical
positions achieve the maximum degree of mutual support between them when they
are located to observe or monitor the ground between them or conduct patrols to
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prevent any enemy infiltration. At night or during periods of limited visibility, the
commander may position small tactical units closer together to retain the advantages
of mutual support. Unit leaders must coordinate the nature and extent of their mutual
support.
3077. Heavy Battle Group. When the battle group of a defending force is armour
heavy, the commander can conduct a defence designed to take advantage of the
tactical mobility and protection offered by organic combat vehicles. The battle group
can manoeuvre to delay the advance of a strong enemy force and then immediately
change from a mobile to a static form of defence or counterattack. Such forces are
well suited for use as security and MBA forces. They are more suited for operations
within an NBC contaminated environment than light forces because of their built-in
protection.
3078. Light Battle Group.
a.
When facing enemy light forces, the commander deploys and uses a
light battle group which consists of heavy infantry, in the same manner as a
heavy battle group is used against other heavy forces. A light battle group
facing a heavy enemy is primarily used in static roles within the MBA or in
security roles within the rear area. When facing heavy enemy forces, light
infantry forces are most effective when fighting from prepared defences or in
close terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly and mountainous areas, and urban
areas where they can take advantage of their foot mobility and short-range
infantry and anti-armour weapons.
b.
The commander uses an air assault unit in the same manner as other
light forces once it deploys into its Landing Zone (LZ). However, there may be
more problems in extracting such a force, particularly if it is in direct contact
with the enemy. Because of its mobility and potential reaction speed, an air
assault force is often well-suited for a reserve role during defensive operations.
Its tasks might include:
(1)
Rapid reinforcement of a threatened position.
(2)
Occupation of a blocking position, possibly in conjunction with
existing defensive positions.
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(3)
Rear area security operations, such as containment of an enemy
airborne or helicopter assault.
(4)
Reinforcement of encircled friendly forces.
(5)
Flank protection.
3079. Rotary and Fixed-Wing Aviation. Aviation assets from Army Aviation Units
and the Air Force are particularly valuable in the defence because of their speed,
mobility and versatility. Their tasks can include:
a.
Conducting reconnaissance and security operations.
b.
Conducting shaping operations to establish the necessary conditions for
decisive operations by other forces through attritting, disrupting and delaying
the enemy.
c.
Conducting counterattacks and spoiling attacks.
d.
Controlling ground for limited periods where a commander does not wish
to irrevocably commit ground forces, for example, forward of an executed
obstacle.
e.
Blocking enemy penetrations.
f.
Closing gaps in a defence plan before the arrival of ground manoeuvre
forces.
g.
Facilitating the disengagement of ground forces.
h.
Countering enemy activities in the rear area, in particular enemy airborne
or air assault forces.
i.
Using available utility and cargo helicopters in their normal roles to
support the defensive effort, such as resupplying the defending force with
barrier material or facilitating casualty evacuation.
j.
Assisting in the counter mobility effort.
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SECTION 8
OFFENSIVE MANOEUVRE
3080. In offensive operations there is also offensive manoeuvre which is the means
that an advancing formation commander will endeavour to place his force in such a
way as to gain control of the battle. In offensive manoeuvre, there are three
techniques, which are commonly associated with more complex form of manoeuvre:
envelopment, penetration, and infiltration.
FORM OF MANOEUVRE
3081. The forms of manoeuvre are envelopment, penetration, and infiltration.
Combined arms organisations seeking to accomplish their assigned mission
synchronise the contributions of all battlespace operating systems (BOS) to execute
these forms of manoeuvre. The commander generally chooses one form on which he
builds a COA. The higher commander rarely specifies the specific form of offensive
manoeuvre. However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes
implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security and direction of attack
that narrow the forms of offensive manoeuvre to one alternative.
3082. Additionally, the AO’s characteristics and the enemy’s dispositions also help
determine the form of offensive manoeuvre selected. A single operation may contain
several forms of offensive manoeuvre, such as an infiltration to clear a security area
followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy defences. Envelopment would
follow to destroy the enemy’s first line of defence.
ENVELOPMENT
3083. An envelopment is a form of manoeuvre in which an attacking force seeks to
avoid the principal enemy defences by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy
the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing
terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes.
Also, at the tactical level, airborne and air assault operations are vertical
envelopments. The commander’s decisive operation focuses on attacking an
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assailable flank. It avoids the enemy’s strength - his front - where the effects of his
fires and obstacles are the greatest.
Figure 3.1.5: Single Envelopment
Figure 3.2.6: Double Envelopment
3084. Single and double envelopments force the enemy to fight in two or more
directions simultaneously to meet the converging efforts of the attack. A double
envelopment generally requires a preponderance of force and can be difficult to
control. A force seeking to execute a double envelopment must also have a substantial
mobility advantage over the defender. A unit performs a double envelopment by
conducting an attack as a shaping operation in the centre to fix the enemy in place
while enveloping both hostile flanks. Because of the forces required, normally only
divisions and larger organisations have the resources to execute a double
envelopment.
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3085. The factors to be taken into consideration for envelopments are as follows:
a.
Organisation of Forces. The commander envisioning a single
envelopment organises his forces into the enveloping force and the fixing force.
He also allocates forces to conduct reconnaissance, security, reserve and
sustaining operations. The enveloping force, conducting the decisive operation,
attacks an assailable enemy flank and avoids this main strength en route to the
objective. The fixing force conducts a frontal attack as a shaping operation to
fix the enemy in his current positions to prevent his escape and reduce his
capability to react against the enveloping force. A commander executing a
double envelopment organises his forces into two enveloping forces and a
fixing force in addition to reconnaissance, security, reserve and sustaining
forces. The commander typically designates the more important of the two
enveloping forces as the main effort for resources. That enveloping force will
also be the commander’s decisive operation if its action accomplishes the
mission.
b.
Control Measures. The commander, at a minimum, designates AO for
each unit participating in the envelopment by using boundaries. He also
designates Phase Lines (PL), Direct Fire Support Base (DFSB) and appropriate
fire coordination measures, such as a restricted fire line or boundary between
converging forces, and any other control measures he feels are necessary to
control the envelopment. Figure 3.1.7 is an example of control measures used
when conducting a single envelopment.
Figure 3.1.7: Control Measures for Conducting an Envelopment
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c.
Planning Envelopment. As follows:
(1)
Successful planning for envelopment depends on knowing and
understanding the enemy and his capabilities. The commander wants to
manoeuvre his enveloping force around or over the enemy’s main
defences to secure objectives on the enemy’s flank or rear. From those
objectives the enveloping force can use its positional advantage to
employ superior combat power against a defending enemy oriented in
the wrong direction. The commander uses his intelligence assets and
personnel to determine the disposition and capabilities of enemy forces
to detect and react to their operations.
(2)
The commander plans for the force conducting the envelopment
to remain within supporting distance of the fixing force.
(3)
Sustaining the enveloping force requires deliberate planning
because only intermittent ground lines of communication (L of C)
between the rear area and the enveloping force may exist. A L of C is a
route, land, water and /or air that connect an operating military force with
a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.
(4)
The commander plans how he will exploit the success of his
envelopment as he encircles the enemy or transitions to a pursuit to
complete the destruction of the enemy force. These plans are developed
as phases to the envelopment operation.
d.
Executing Envelopment. As follows:
(1)
A successful envelopment depends largely on the degree of
surprise the commander achieves against his opponent or the presence
of overwhelming combat power. The envelopment’s probability of
success also increases when the commander’s forces have superior
tactical mobility, possess air and information superiority and his shaping
operations fix the bulk of the enemy’s forces in their current positions.
The commander uses his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems to provide continuous intelligence and combat information
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to identify changes in enemy COA throughout the execution of the
envelopment.
(2)
Normally, a unit orients the majority of its combat power towards
where it expects to engage enemy forces, while placing less combat
power on its own flanks. Thus, the flanks of most units are more
vulnerable to attack. The commander creates an assailable flank using
whatever means necessary. The enveloping force then moves rapidly to
exploit the situation before the enemy strengthens its’ assailable flank by
preparing positions in depth and by holding mobile forces in reserve.
When faced with the threat of envelopment, the enemy commander
might move his reserves to meet the enveloping force. Thus, rapid
movement around the enemy’s flank is essential to prevent him from
occupying previously prepared positions. Vigorous shaping operations
conducted by ground and air assets aim to prevent him from
reconstituting reserves from other portions of his front.
(3)
The enemy may attempt to cut off the enveloping force and
extend his flank beyond the area that the enveloping force is attempting
to attack through. If the encircling force attempts to outflank such hostile
extension, it may become overextended by moving outside of supporting
distance from the fixing force. Therefore, it is usually better for the
encircling force to take advantage of the enemy’s extension and
subsequent weakness by penetrating a thinly held area of the enemy’s
front rather than overextending itself in an attempt to completely outflank
the enemy’s position.
(4)
The enemy may attempt a counterattack in response to an
attempted envelopment. In this case, the fixing force defends itself or
conducts a delay while the enveloping force continues the envelopment.
(5)
After the initial envelopment of one flank, which places the enemy
at a disadvantage, the commander has many options. He may choose
to establish favourable conditions for passing to a double envelopment
by using reserves or exploit success by generating additional combat
power along the same axis. Alternatively, he can destroy or defeat the
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enveloped enemy force in place, or transition to another type of
operation, such as a pursuit.
PENETRATION
3086. A penetration is a form of manoeuvre in which an attacking force seeks to
rupture enemy defences on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. Destroying
the continuity of that defence allows the enemy’s subsequent isolation by exploiting
friendly forces. The penetration extends from the enemy’s security area through his
main defensive positions into his rear area. A commander employs a penetration when
there is no assailable flank, enemy defences are overextended and weak spots are
detected in the enemy’s positions or time pressures do not permit envelopment.
3087. The factors to be taken into consideration for penetration as follows:
a.
Organisation of Forces. As follows:
(1)
Penetrating a well-organised position requires overwhelming
combat power in the area of penetration and combat superiority to
continue the momentum of the attack (Figure 3.1.8). The commander
designates a breach, support, and assault force. He can designate these
elements for each defensive position that he is required to penetrate. He
should not withhold combat power from the initial penetration to conduct
additional penetration unless he has so much combat power that the
success of the initial penetration is assured.
Figure 3.1.8: Penetration: Relative Combat Power
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(2)
The commander resources a reserve to deal with expected or
unexpected contingencies, such as an enemy counterattack, to avoid
diverting the assault element from attacking the final objective of the
penetration. He designates additional units to follow-and-support or
follow-and-assume missions to ensure rapid exploitation of initial
success. He designates forces to fix enemy reserves in their current
locations and isolate enemy forces within the area selected for
penetration.
(3)
A commander assigns, as a minimum, an AO to every manoeuvre
unit, a LD; H-hour; PL; objective; and a LOE to control and synchronise
the attack. (A commander can use a battle handover line instead of a
LOE if he knows where he would like to commit a follow-and-assume
force.) The lateral boundaries of the unit making the decisive operation
are narrowly drawn to help establish the overwhelming combat power
necessary at the area of penetration. The commander locates the LOE
beyond the enemy’s main defensive position to ensure completing the
breach. If the operation results in opportunities to exploit success and
pursue a beaten enemy, the commander adjusts existing boundaries to
accommodate the new situation (Figure 3.1.9).
Figure 3.1.9: Penetration Graphic Control Measures
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(4)
A commander uses the graphics associated with a breach site,
such as gaps and lanes, on the small-scale maps used to control the
manoeuvre of his forces at each point where he penetrates the enemy’s
defences.
(5)
Other control measures available to the commander include
Check Points, fire support coordinating measures, FUP, and H-hour.
Within the unit’s AO, a commander can use either an axis of advance or
a direction of attack to further control manoeuvre.
b.
Planning a Penetration. As follows:
(1)
The success of the penetration depends primarily on a
coordinated and synchronised plan - aggressively executed at a high
tempo to achieve surprise against comparatively weak enemy defences.
However, the terrain behind the area selected to penetrate must allow
the penetration to proceed from the breach to a decisive objective.
(2)
The depth of the enemy position and the relative strength of
attacking echelons determine the width of the penetration. The
availability of artillery, air support and other combat multipliers for the
attacking force helps the commander determine relative combat power.
A wider gap allows friendly forces to drive deeper, making it more difficult
for the enemy to close the gap. The deeper the penetration, the easier it
is for a unit to seize its objective and roll up the enemy’s flanks exposed
by the breach and the less likely it is that the enemy will be in a position
to restore his front by falling back.
(3)
Plans for penetrating a defensive position include isolating,
suppressing, and destroying by fire, to include offensive information
operations, enemy forces in the area selected for the penetration. These
plans should also address how to isolate the area of penetration from
support or reinforcement by enemy forces located outside the area. This
consideration includes how to fix enemy reserves and long-range
weapons in their current locations. Positioning friendly assets so that the
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commander can mass the effects of their combat power to accomplish
these results without giving away the location of the penetration is also
a critical part of the plan.
(4)
The commander plans to place the majority of his forces and
assets in positions where the effects of their combat power can be felt in
the area selected for penetration. The commander’s plan for the
penetration normally has three phases:
(a)
Breaching the enemy’s main defensive positions.
(b)
Widening the gap created to secure the flanks by
enveloping one or both of the newly exposed flanks.
(c)
Seizing the objective with its associated subsequent
exploitation.
(5)
Planning the sequence of these phases depends on the specific
situation. In some situations, if there are weaknesses or gaps in the
enemy’s front, it is possible for heavy forces to breach the enemy’s
defences and proceed straight to the objective. Simultaneously, light
units could conduct local envelopment and exploitation operations. In
other situations, the commander uses his light forces to create the
breach, holding his heavy forces initially in reserve to exploit gaps in the
enemy’s defences created by light forces.
3088. The commander plans shaping operations outside the area of penetration to
contain the enemy on the flanks of the penetration and fix his reserves in their current
locations. Synchronising the effects of rotary and fixedwing aircraft, artillery fires and
obscuration smoke to delay or disrupt repositioning forces is an example of such
shaping operations. These shaping operations will involve the maintenance of
operational security and the conduct of deception operations. The commander usually
attempts to penetrate the enemy’s defensive positions along unit boundaries because
defences tend to be less effective along a boundary.
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3089. The commander plans for the penetration to break through the enemy’s
defences, so he is unable to re-establish his defence on more rearward positions. Until
this event takes place, the commander does not want to divert the strength of his
attacking units to widening the gap to secure the flanks of the penetration. However,
he must develop plans that address contingencies, such as hostile counterattacks
against the flanks of the penetration. The plan should support attacking elements as
they close with the enemy and support the attack until the enemy’s power of resistance
is broken.
a.
Executing a Penetration. After the initial breach of the enemy’s main
line of resistance, the sequence of the remaining two phases is determined by
the factors of the MAP. If the enemy is in a weak defensive position, it may be
possible for the lead attacking force to seize the penetration’s final objective
while simultaneously widening the initial breach. In other situations, the
commander must wait to seize the final objective until the breach is wide
enough for other forces, such as reserves and follow-and-assume forces, to be
committed. Commanders at all levels must take advantage of success within
the commander’s intent throughout the penetration.
b.
Breaching the Enemy’s Main Defensive Positions. As follows:
(1)
The commander launches the actual penetration on a relatively
narrow front (Figure 3.1.10). He narrows the AO of the unit or units
conducting his decisive operation - the penetration - by adjusting unit
lateral boundaries to the exact point or points where he wants to
penetrate the enemy’s defences. This allows the force conducting the
penetration to focus overwhelming combat power. The commander
assigns his assault force a close-in objective. His support force locates
where it can support by fire both the breach and the assault forces. Local
reserves are held in readiness to conduct a forward passage through or
around units whose attacks have slowed or stopped.
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Figure 3.1.10: Penetration: The Breach
(2)
Shaping operations on the remainder of the hostile front fix the
enemy in his current positions and prevents him from disengaging to
reinforce enemy units opposing the decisive operation. The commander
tracks the battle’s progress to ensure that his forces penetrate entirely
through the enemy’s main defensive positions and not just the enemy’s
security area.
(3)
The enemy normally tries to slow down or stop the breach to gain
time to react to the changing situation. Therefore, the attacking
commander rapidly exploits and reinforces success. He piles on
resources and additional units as necessary to ensure completing the
penetration through the enemy’s defensive positions. He also conducts
offensive information operations to desynchronise the enemy’s reaction.
c.
Widening the Breach to Secure the Flanks. Once the attacking force
penetrates the main defences, it begins to widen the penetration of the enemy’s
defensive positions by conducting a series of shallow envelopments to roll back
its shoulders (Figure 3.1.11). The task of widening the initial gap of the
penetration is normally assigned to a follow-and-support force. That task can
also be assigned to the reserve as a contingency mission. If the commander
commits his reserve to accomplish that task, he must reconstitute his reserve
from another part of his force. Alternatively, he may assume the risk of not
having a reserve for the time necessary to accomplish this task. The
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commander makes plans to meet enemy counterattacks by shifting fires or
committing his reserves or follow-and-assume forces. Units can use obstacles
on the flanks of the penetration as a combat multiplier to assist in defeating any
local enemy counterattack and to provide additional security for the force.
Figure 3.1.11: Expanding The Penetration
d.
Seizing the Objective and Subsequent Exploitation. As follows:
(1)
The mission of seizing the objective, which may be a specific
enemy force, to destroy the continuity of the enemy’s defensive position
is normally the decisive operation after completing the penetration.
Frequently that objective is so far from the area of penetration that the
unit or units initially conducting the penetration cannot seize it without a
pause. In that case, the commander plans to pass his reserve or follow
and assume forces through the initial attacking force early, leaving
exploitation beyond the objective to higher echelons. While the exact
force mix is MAP-dependent, armoured, mechanised and aviation forces
are generally suited for subsequent exploitation.
(2)
In large commands, forces may initiate an attack by
simultaneously launching two or more convergent penetrations against
weak localities on the hostile front. Often this method of attack helps
isolate an extremely strong, hostile defence. The commander assigns
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shaping operations to initially contain any strong localities. When the
multiple attacks have advanced sufficiently, the force reduces bypassed
enemy forces and unites the penetrating attacks into a single decisive
operation.
INFILTRATION
3090. An infiltration is a form of manoeuvre in which an attacking force conducts
undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a
position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy
defensive fires. Infiltration is also a manoeuvre technique used within friendly territory
to move forces in small groups at extended or irregular intervals
3091. Infiltration occurs by land, water, air, or a combination of means. Moving and
assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable amount of
time. To successfully infiltrate, the force must avoid detection and engagement. Since
this requirement limits the size and strength of the infiltrating force and infiltrated forces
alone can rarely defeat an enemy force, infiltration is normally used in conjunction with
and in support of the other forms of offensive manoeuvre. Normally, the scope of the
mission for the infiltrating force is limited.
3092. The commander orders an infiltration to move all or a portion of a unit through
gaps in the enemy’s defences to:
a.
Investigate known or template enemy position and conduct surveillance
of named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest.
b.
Attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction.
c.
Occupy a DFSB to support the decisive operation.
d.
Secure key terrain.
e.
Conduct ambushes and raids to destroy vital facilities and disrupt the
enemy’s defensive structure by attacking his reserves, fire support and air
defence systems, communication nodes and logistic support.
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f.
Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle or obstacle complex.
3093. Special operations forces and light infantry units up to brigade size are best
suited to conduct an infiltration. In some circumstances, heavy forces operating in
small units can conduct an infiltration. However, as the proliferation of technology
leads to increased situational understanding, this should increase the ability of heavy
forces to avoid enemy contact and move undetected through enemy positions. In the
future a commander may conduct an infiltration with heavy forces in coordination with
precision fires as a prelude to an attack.
3094. The factors to be taken into consideration for infiltrationas follows:
a.
Organisation of Forces. As follows:
(1)
Normally, to be successful, the infiltrating force must avoid
detection at least until it reaches its objective rally point (ORP). Thus, the
infiltrating force’s size, strength and composition are usually limited. The
infiltrating unit commander organises his main body into one or more
infiltrating elements. The largest size element possible, compatible with
the requirement for stealth and ease of movement, conducts the
infiltration. This increases the commander’s control, speeds the
execution of the infiltration and provides responsive combat power. The
exact size and number of infiltrating elements are situationally
dependent.
(2)
The commander considers the following factors when
determining how to organise his forces. Smaller infiltrating elements are
not as easy to detect and can get through smaller defensive gaps. Even
the detection of one or two small elements by the enemy will not prevent
the unit from accomplishing its mission in most cases. Larger infiltrating
elements are easier to detect and their discovery is more apt to endanger
the success of the mission. Also, they require larger gaps to move
through. A unit with many smaller infiltrating elements requires more time
to complete the infiltration and needs more linkup points than a similar
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size unit with only a few infiltrating elements. Many infiltrating elements
are also harder to control than fewer, larger elements.
(3)
The commander resources a security force that moves ahead of,
to the flanks of and to the rear of each infiltrating element’s main body.
These security forces can be given either a screen or a guard mission.
The sizes and orientations of security elements are also situationally
dependent. Each infiltrating element is responsible for its own
reconnaissance effort.
(4)
Sustainment of an infiltrating force normally depends on the
force’s basic load of supplies and those medical and maintenance assets
accompanying the infiltrating force. After completing the mission, the
commander reopens L of C to conduct normal sustaining operations.
(5)
Control measures for an infiltration include, as a minimum:
(a)
An AO for the infiltrating unit.
(b)
One or more infiltration lanes.
(c)
A LD or point of departure.
(d)
Movement routes with their associated start and release
points or a direction or axis of attack.
(e)
Linkup or RV, including ORP.
(f)
Forming-up place.
(g)
One or more objectives.
(h)
A limit of exploitation (LOE).
(6)
The commander can impose other measures to control the
infiltration including checkpoints, PL and forming-up place on the flank
or rear of enemy positions. If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating
unit to reassemble to accomplish its mission, the objective may be
broken into smaller objectives. Each infiltrating element would then
move directly to its objective to conduct operations. (Most of these
control measures have been previously described.) Figure 3.1.12
describes using an infiltration lane and a linkup point.
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Figure 3.1.12: Infiltration Graphic Control Measures
(7)
An infiltration lane is a control measure that coordinates forward
and lateral movement of infiltrating units and fixes fire planning
responsibilities. The commander selects infiltration lanes that avoid the
enemy, provide cover and concealment, and facilitate navigation. Figure
3.1.13 depicts the graphic for an infiltration lane. Each unit assigned an
infiltration lane picks its own routes within the lane and switches routes
as necessary. The left and right limits of the infiltration lane act as lateral
boundaries for the unit conducting the infiltration. Attacks by rotary- or
fixed-wing aircraft, indirect fires or munitions effects that impact the lane
must be coordinated with the infiltrating unit. Units leaving their assigned
lane run the risk of being hit by friendly fires. Company-size units are
normally assigned a single infiltration lane, although they can use more
than one lane. Larger organisations, battalion and above, are always
assigned more than one infiltration lane.
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Figure 3.1.13 : Infiltration Lane
(8)
A linkup point is where two infiltrating elements in the same or
different infiltration lanes are scheduled to meet to consolidate before
proceeding on with their missions. Figure 3.1.14 depicts Linkup Point 8.
A linkup point is normally positioned in the enemy’s rear or along one of
his flanks. It should be large enough for all infiltrating elements to
assemble and should offer cover and concealment for these elements.
It should be an easily identifiable point on the ground. The commander
should position his linkup points on defensible terrain located away from
normal enemy troop movement routes.
Figure 3.1.14: Linkup Point Number 8
b.
Planning an Infiltration. As follows:
(1)
The activities and functions associated with the process of
planning an infiltration are the same as with any other combat operation.
That planning takes advantage of that unit’s stealth capabilities to
surprise the enemy. The planning process synchronizes the BOS that
support the infiltrating unit, especially precise, high- resolution
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intelligence. Without precise, detailed intelligence, infiltration
manoeuvres become high-risk probing operations that can be costly and
time-consuming. Careful planning, full ISR integration, detailed analysis
and aggressive operations security can permit an infiltrating force to
avoid an enemy force, minimize direct contact and maximize surprise
according to the commander’s intent.
(2)
After identifying gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive
positions, the commander assigns infiltration lanes, contact points and
objectives to subordinate units. These objectives afford the infiltrating
force positions of greatest advantage over the enemy and are not
required to be to the geographic rear of the targeted enemy force. Each
subordinate unit commander picks one or more routes within his
assigned lane and establishes additional contact points, rendezvous,
assault points and other control measures as required. The commander
wants each of the routes within an infiltration lane to be far enough apart
to prevent an infiltrating element on one route from seeing other
infiltrating elements, but close enough so that an infiltrating element
could switch quickly to another route if required by the situation. The
commander wants each route to provide his infiltrating elements cover
and concealment while avoiding known enemy and civilian locations and
movement routes to the maximum extent possible. If possible, the
subordinate unit commander selects his exact routes during the
preparation phase after reconnoitring each infiltration lane. He decides
whether his unit will infiltrate as a unit, in smaller elements, or even as
two-man buddy teams, depending on the density and strength of the
enemy.
(3)
The commander may use single or multiple infiltration lanes
depending on the infiltrating force’s size, the amount of detailed
information on enemy dispositions and terrain accessible, time allowed
and number of lanes available. A single infiltration lane:
(a)
Facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly.
(b)
Requires the existence or creation of only one gap in the
enemy’s position.
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(c)
Reduces the area for which detailed intelligence is
required.
(4)
Multiple infiltration lanes:
(a)
Require the existence or creation of more gaps in the
enemy’s security area.
(b)
Reduce the possibility of compromising the entire force.
(c)
Increase difficulty with maintaining control.
(5)
The sizes and numbers of infiltrating elements are major
considerations for the commander when he decides whether to use a
single lane or multiple infiltration lanes. If the infiltration takes place using
multiple elements, contingency plans must address the following
situations:
(a)
A lead element, possibly the advance guard, makes
contact, but the trail elements have not started infiltrating.
(b)
A lead element infiltrates successfully but compromises
one or more trailing elements.
(c)
A compromised linkup points.
(6)
The commander uses available technology to assist in planning
the infiltration and avoiding unintended enemy and civilian contact during
the infiltration. This can be as simple as all units using the same
infiltrating lane being on the same frequency to facilitate the avoidance
of enemy contact. An accurate description of enemy systems and
locations, tied to rapid terrain analysis, can graphically portray dead
spots in the enemy’s battlefield surveillance. The commander can then
plan how to expand those existing dead spots into infiltration lanes
through a precision attack of selected enemy elements and systems.
(7)
The plan also addresses the following considerations:
(a)
Availability of supporting fires, including rotary- and fixedwing aircraft and offensive information operations - especially
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electronic attack, throughout the operation, during infiltration and
the attack on the objective.
(b)
Linkup or extraction of the infiltrating unit after mission
completion.
(c)
Sustainment of the infiltrating force during the operation, to
include casualty evacuation.
(d)
Deception operations, such as actions by other units
designed to divert enemy attention from the area selected for the
infiltration.
(e)
Linkup of the various infiltrating elements.
(f)
Command and control (C2), to include recognition signals.
(g)
Positioning of combat vehicles to support the infiltrating
elements.
(h)
Using limited visibility and rough terrain to mask movement
and reduce the chance of detection.
(i)
Infiltration of the largest elements possible to maintain
control.
(j)
Rehearsals.
(k)
Specially required preparations, such as modifying the
unit’s SOP regarding the soldier’s combat load for the mission.
When infiltrating on foot, units carry only required equipment. For
example, in close terrain and in the absence of an armour threat,
heavy anti-armour missile systems may be a liability.
(l)
Abort criteria.
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(m)
Critical friendly zones.
(8)
Planned recognition signals and linkup procedures for the
infiltration should be simple and quick. If there has not been any firing or
any other noises, signals should not violate noise and light discipline.
However, if there have already been assaults, artillery and small-arms
fire, signals, such as whistles and flares, can be used as linkup aids. A
lack of time and the short distance involved in many infiltration
operations may make conducting formal linkup procedures
unnecessary.
c.
Preparing an Infiltration. Once the commander selects the objective,
infiltration lanes and linkup or rendezvous, he directs ISR operations to update
and confirm the details on which he bases his plan. He identifies enemy sensors
and surveillance systems. He then revises the plan to reflect current conditions
within the AO.
d.
Executing an Infiltration. As follows:
(1)
Moving undetected during an infiltration requires a considerable
amount of time. The infiltrating unit moves from its Assy A or current
position through the start point and then continues moving along the
infiltration route to a release point. If buddy teams or small elements are
conducting the infiltration, the unit uses a series of linkup points to
reassemble into a coherent unit. Units can use a variety of navigation
aids, such as GPS, to remain within the planned infiltration lane, which
minimises their chances of detection by the enemy. At the same time,
they report their progress and status using communication systems that
provide this information automatically to all command nodes which
require this information.
(2)
If the complete unit is conducting the infiltration, the forward
security force begins its movement first, followed by the main body. The
distance between the forward security force and the main body depends
on the factors of MAP. The advance guard must be far enough ahead of
the main body so that it can either deploy or move to another route if the
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forward security force discovers the enemy. The forward security force
in an infiltration must have enough time to move in a stealthy and secure
manner. Enemy units should not be able to move undetected in the gap
between the forward security force and the main body.
(3)
As the infiltrating unit moves, the advance guard reports to the
commander regarding the cover and concealment of each route, enemy
activity, location of danger areas and linkup points, enemy activity on the
objective and other combat information. The unit attempts to avoid
enemy and civilian contact; however, contact does not always mean the
mission is compromised. The infiltrating unit engages targets first with
indirect fires to avoid revealing its presence and exact location. These
fires include the conduct of offensive information operations designed to
blind enemy ISR assets and prevent the enemy from coordinating an
effective response to the infiltration.
(4)
If necessary, the forward security force conducts actions on
contact while the main body moves to another route, reconstitutes a
forward security force, and continues the mission. If the main body
makes contact unexpectedly, it either overruns the enemy force, if the
enemy has little combat power or bypasses him and continues the
mission. During the infiltration, the unit ignores ineffective enemy fire and
continues to move. The commander may use suppressive fires against
the enemy to cover the sounds of the infiltration or to divert the enemy’s
attention to areas other than where the infiltration lanes are located.
(5)
The infiltrating unit’s elements move to an Assy A or an ORP to
consolidate its combat power, refine the plan and conduct any lastminute coordination prior to continuing the mission. The unit then
conducts those tasks needed to accomplish its assigned mission, which
could be an attack, raid, ambush, seizing key terrain, capturing
prisoners, or collecting specific combat information.
(6)
A commander may need to abort an infiltration operation if the
factors of MAP change so drastically during the infiltration that the
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infiltrating force is no longer capable of accomplishing its’ mission.
Examples of changes that might trigger such an action include:
(a)
Significant portions of the infiltrating force’s combat power
are lost through navigation errors, enemy action, accidents, or
maintenance failures.
(b)
Movement or significant reinforcement of a force- oriented
objective.
(c)
Detection of the infiltration by the enemy.
(d)
Changes in the tactical situation that make the mission no
longer appropriate, such as the initiation of an enemy attack.
(7)
The criteria for aborting the operation are developed in the
planning process. The decision to abort the infiltration is transmitted to
all appropriate headquarters for their action and information.
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SECTION 9
BATTLESPACE OPERATING SYSTEMS
3095. There are eight Battlespace Operating Systems (BOS) and are defines as
follow:
a.
The manoeuvre system is the movement of forces to achieve a position
of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the
employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with direct fire or fire
potential. This system also includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated
with force projection.
b.
The fire support system encompasses the collective and coordinated
use of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft,
offensive information operations, and other lethal and non-lethal means against
targets located throughout an AO.
c.
The information operations system is the operational and
management functions and capabilities that contribute towards a commander’s
decision-making process and is an essential part of operational planning for all
activities across the full spectrum of military operations.
d.
The reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence system are the
activities to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the
environmental features required by a command planning, preparing and
executing operations.
e.
The mobility, countermobility and survivability system.
(1)
Mobility operations preserve the freedom of manoeuvre of friendly
forces.
(2)
Countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces.
(3)
Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of
enemy weapon systems.
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f.
The air defence system is the employment of all active measures
designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft and
missiles after they are airborne.
g.
The command and control system includes all collective tasks
associated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and available forces in the
accomplishment of the mission.
h.
The combat service support system is the support and services
provided to sustain forces during war and military operations other than war.
3096. The BOS provide the Army a common classification of critical tactical activities.
They provide the commander and his staff a mean of assessing the planning,
preparation, and execution of an operation in discrete subsets.
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SECTION 10
INDIVIDUAL MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS (IMAP)
3097. Defence Factors Guide and Deductions.
SECTION 1: DEFENCE
Point for Consideration
(a)
a. Ground:
Deductions
(b)
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) Dominating Ground consider the
fol:
(1) The ground feature vital or of tac
importance which must be denied and
around which the defs should be built.
(2) Addl ground to be held.
(3) Tps req to hold ground from
consideration of area and nature of
ground only.
(4) Fire plan for the def area ie, tasks
for arty, inf mors, atk gun and MMGS.
(5) Loc of Ops.
(6) Employment of your own armour.
(7) Layout of your Atk defs.
(8) Constr of Atk obs.
(a) What is the ground feature the
capture of which by the en will
make your posn untenable?
(b) What other ground must be held
to prevent the en from getting to it?
(c) What ground must be physically
held and what can be held by fire?
(d) What tps wil be
req to hold that
ground?
(e) What type of fire will be best
suited for the ground which must
be held by fire?
(f) From where you get the best
obsn over the whole area?
(g) Is the area to be def tank able?
b. En App to Ground of Tac Importance:
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) What are the en app leading up to
the ground of tac importance for tanks
and inf by days as well as by ni?
(2) What is the cover avail along each
app.
(3) What is the ‘going’ like for tks and
inf?
(4) What tps can be deployed along
each app and what will be the likely
obj for the en around that app?
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(1) Which is the best en app for tks as
well as inf by day and night.
(2) How should you deploy your Atk
resources and MMGs to meet Tk and
Inf threat along each approach?
(3) What ground must be held by ni
and by day?
(4) What ground must you hold and in
what str?
(5) Allocations of tps pl/coy locs.
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c. Obs:
(a)
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) Nature of the existing obs and their
effectiveness against tks and inf.
(2) Are they continuous or there any
gaps?
(3) Where are they loc in relation to the
ground of tac importance?
(4) If there is no natural obs, what must
you do?
(b)
(1) How best the existing obs can be
used. Timed and effort required to
improve them.
(2) How can the gaps be covered or can
you put them to any use, e.g, to push
your armour through for a spoiling
attack?
(3) Is any subsidiary obs necessary and
what should it be. eg, wire AP mines?
(4) How can it be covered by day and by
ni Fire sp req for that purpose.
(5) Will it entail any change in disposn?
(6) In case you decide to put up a
minefd:
(a) Extent and depth.
(b) Time and effort required.
(c) Fire sp req to cover the minefd.
d. Rel Str:
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) What is the max threat the en can
develop against your def area both in
armour and inf on any of the app?
(1) How must I dispose my tps incl sp
wpns to meet the en threat. What must
be right fwd and what must be in depth?
(2) Str and composition of screen?
(3) Have I adequate str tks and sp wpn tp
perform tasks. If not, can I get some
more. If that is not available, how can
adjust my plan, or what pri must I allot,
especially for the fire eg, counter bty
mortar fire.
(4) How can I minimize the effect of the
en sp fire, eg, counter bty mortar fire.
(5) Can and concealment plan and track
plan.
(6) Restriction on mov by day.
(7) Loc of the res, particularly armour
when air sit is very unfavourable.
(8) How can I minimize the effect of en
superiority in armour and inf, eg, by
separating tks and inf, by denying obsn,
by reccs and by EW.
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(a)
e. What fire sp the en is likely to have?
a. Deduce the fol:
(b)
(1) Time schedule for prep of defs and pri
or work.
(2) In case it is not possible to complete
the defs in the time avail, what addl
resources will be req.
(3) Mov plan to bring the tp to the area to
be def.
(4) Pri for various units.
(5) How will the weather conditions effect
preps of def and how to overcome them.
(6) Time by which def must be
completed.
(7) In case the attack comes in before I
am ready, what must I do to gain extra
times eg, use of screen, its str and
composition use of air and armour to
harass and disrupt the en prep for
attacks.
f. What is the air sit like?
g. Has the enemy got superiority in
armour and inf?
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3098. Withdraw Factors Guide and Deductions.
SECTION 2: WITHDRAW
Point for Consideration
(a)
a. Ground:
Deduction
(b)
a. Route of wdr:
(1) Gen Consider ground behind own
main posn:
(a) Dominating features (extent
and tps required to occupy them).
(b) Prominent landmarks.
(c) Cover.
b. Likely En App:
(1) Likely en app and going for tks
and inf.
(2) How much force en can employ
on each of them.
(3) Area which can give en obsn into
own posn.
c. Obs:
(1) Dmls to be blown to slow down en
adv.
(2) Natural obs – extent and how
much
delay they can impose.
d. Rel Str:
(1) Comparison of own and en forces
and how much en can put in for
attack.
(2) En employment armour and air.
e. Time and Space:
(1) Time required to prepare new
main/intermediate posn.
(1) Intermediate/layback posns.
(2) Check points.
(3) RV.
(4) Embussing point.
(5) Co-ordinating line.
(1) Composition and disposition of
Rear
parties.
(2) Flank protection.
(3) DF tasks.
(4) Use of own armour.
(5) Ptl Policy.
(1) What dmls to be blown.
(2) Delay by natural obs.
(3) Time for closing safe lanes in the
minefield.
(1) Composition of Rear Parties
(2) Mov by day or ni
(3) Air and arty sp
(4) Employment of own armour
(1) Time for recce parties to leave.
(2) Timing of tactical redeployment.
(3) Start thinning out at … hr.
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(a)
(2) Timing laid down by higher
commander:
(a) Time before which there will be
no reaward mov except normal mov
and that of recce parties – Time at
which non-essential may be
withdrawn.
(b) Time at which inf units I contact
may begin to thin out.
(c) Posn to be denied upto.
(d) Time at which posn, will finally be
abandoned.
(e) Time at which all tps will be clear of
a line in rear of the posn to abandoned
(co-ordinating line).
(b)
(4) Rear parties will start thinning out
at… hr.
(5) Patrol to be tactically redeployed by
…. hr
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3099. Advance Factors Guide and Deductions.
SECTION 3: ADVANCE
Point for Consideration
(a)
a. Ground:
Deductions
(b)
a. Effect on conduct of tasks:
(1) Gen. Major characteristic incl
obsn, cover, obs, dominant features
etc.
(1) Mobility.
(2) Rate of adv.
(3) Restriction of mov.
b. Final obj(s).
a. Number of possible routes to obj(s).
c. Routes (app):
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) SP/LD.
(2) Distance.
(3) Going.
(4) Obs.
(5) Critical pts.
(6) Obs on route.
(7) Bounds.
(8) Report Lines.
(9) Security.
(10) Mortar and gun posn.
(1) Viable routes in time frame.
(2) Sy req.
(3) Gp and Order of March.
(4) Control Measures.
(5) Move of HQ and Echs.
(6) Phases.
(7) Req to hold criticals pts.
(8) Obs crossing req.
d. Relatives Strength:
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) En:
(1) Possible en delay posn.
(2) Likely en gp.
(3) Order of march eg tk or inf
leading, need for engrs fwd etc.
(4) Degree of acceptable risk.
(5) Degree of search and rate of adv.
(a) Gen Sit.
(b) Likely intentions.
(c) Sp Arms, Armour, arty etc.
(d) Air.
(e) Admin Sit.
(f) Insurgent Threat.
e. Own:
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) Present Gp.
(2) Armour, arty engrs etc avail.
(3) Air Sit.
(4) Admin Sit.
(5) Flanking Forces.
(1) Gen Gp for:
(a) Adv Gd.
(b) Flank Gd.
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(2) Order of march.
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(a)
(b)
(3) Acceptable Risk.
(4) Capacity to:
f. Other. In Particular civs and refuges.
(a) Recce.
(b) Interdict.
(c) Use more than are route ie
multiples Axes.
(5) Need for flank sy.
a. Employment of TC resources.
b. Clearance of routes.
g. Time and Space:
a. Deduce the fol:
(1) Any given time restrictions.
(1) Rate of adv.
(2) Mobility req.
(3) Possible influence on gp.
(4) Earliset and latest start time.
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3100. Attack Factors Guide and Deductions.
SECTION 4: ATTACK
Point for Consideration
(a)
a. Ground and Disposns:
Deductions
(b)
a. Phasing and pri of capture.
(1) Obs. Under each discuss the
follow:
b. Tps req for capture of each obj.
c. Neutralisation of other objs when
attacking on obj.
(a) Extent.
(b) Held by (observed and
assessed facts).
(c) Domination/dominated by.
(d) Proximity to other objs.
(e) Mutual sp with other objs.
(f) Tank ability.
d. Quartum of arty/mor fire on each obj
based on its extent.
e. Employment of armour ie asl or fire
sp role.
b. Apps:
a. Along each app deduce thre fol:
(1) Gen description from AA to final
obj and distance.
(2) Suitable FUP.
(3) Cover.
(4) Going.
(5) Deploy ability from FUP onwards.
(6) Interference during to obj, aslt and
reorg.
(7) Flank protection.
(1) Sequence of capture of obj and
phasing.
(2) Tps for each phase.
(3) FUP.
(4) Neutralisation during mov, aslt
and reorg.
(5) Flank protection.
(6) Rate of adv.
(7) Any special measures to
negotiate obs.
b. Day or Ni attack.
c. Preferable approach.
c. Ground beyond objs. Consider the fol
where relevant:
(1) Likely en edr/counter attack routes.
(2) Ground dominating these routes.
(3) Str req to effect blocks.
(4) Likely gun posn/mor base plate
posn.
a. Loc of blocks and str.
b. Pri of areas for reorg.
c. Raids on gun/mors if considered.
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d. Rel Str:
(a)
(b)
a. Along each app deduce the fol:
(1) En:
(1) Phases and tp req for each.
(2) Fire plan plan incl all fire sp
resources avail.
(a) State str at each posn:
(i) Inf.
(ii) Armour.
(iii) Arty.
b. Decide on app preferably adopted.
c. Day or ni attack based on en str.
(b) Likely reactions.
e. Own:
(1) List what we have in inf, armour, arty
etc.
(2) Assess what tasks are req under
each app:
(a) Inf. FUP, aslt, res, blocks. Total
Requirement.
(b) Armour. Aslt or fire sp role, flank
Protection, countering en reactions.
(c) Arty. Fire unit for neutralization of
Various objs and different phase of
aslt and reorg.
(d) Inf Mors. As per arty.
(e) MMGs. For fire sp on aslt and
reorg LDC.
(f) Close air sp. Tgts and timings.
f. Time and Space:
1. Decide on the H hr.
(1) If attack to completed by specified
time:
2. Day or ni attack based on timings.
(a) Task completed by …hr.
(b) Time Taken:
3. Produce mov timings.
4. K Hr for ph 2 if applicable.
(i) LD to Obj … mins.
(ii) Fighting through obj … mins
Total … mins.
5. Preference of app based on timings.
(c) Therefore, latest H hr is …hr.
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(a)
(d) Time now is …hr.
(e) Therefore, time avail for battle
procedure and mov to LD is … hrs. …
mins.
(f) Time allotted:
(b)
(i) Mov of aslt tp to FUP and LD …
Mins.
(ii) Subordinate comds recce,
planning and orders … mins.
g. If attack to be completed as soon as
possible:
(1) Time now is … hrs.
(2) Time taken:
(a) Own recce, planning and orders
… Mins.
(b) Subordinate comds recce,
planning and orders … mins.
(c) Mov of aslt tp to FUP and LD …
Mins Total … mins.
(3) Therefore earliest H hr is … hr.
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SECTION 11
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
3101. Meaning of Armed Conflict.
a.
The core treaties of the law of armed conflict do not give a
comprehensive definition of ‘armed conflict’.
b.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in an
important judgment in the case of Prosecutor v Tadić described armed conflict
in terms that have since been widely accepted, namely:
“An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”
c.
Article 1(4) of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
a treaty that dates from 1977 (Additional Protocol I), defines armed conflicts in
which ‘peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’(International/Non-international armed conflict) with 3 conditions:
(1)
There must be an armed conflict.
(2) The people concerned must genuinely be fighting against colonial
domination, alien occupation or against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination.
(3) The authority representing the people must undertake to apply
Additional Protocol I and the Geneva Conventions.
3102. Classification of Armed Conflict.
a.
International Armed Conflict (IAC). Common Article 2 of the GCs
applies the Conventions to all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict
between two or more states, even if the state of war is not recognized by one
of them.
b.
Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). NIAC exists when there is
protracted armed violence within the territory of a state between regular
(governmental) armed forces and an organised armed group, or between such
groups. (LOAC, however does not apply to internal disturbances and tensions
such as civil unrest, demonstrations, riots, or acts of banditry).
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3103. The Law of Armed Conflict as Part of Public International Law.
a.
It consists of a set of rules defining the conduct and responsibilities of
belligerent states, neutral states and individuals engaged in warfare both, in
relation to each other and towards the persons and objects that the law protects.
b.
The LOAC is the body of international law that regulates behaviour
during armed conflict (jus in bello). The law applies only in times of armed
conflict (once an armed conflict has begun) and seeks to limit the effects of
armed conflict. To protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in the
hostilities and to restrict the means and methods of warfare that the parties to
the conflict are permitted to employ.
c.
LOAC applies not only to governments and their armed forces, but also
to armed opposition groups. LOAC can be seen as taking the essentially
realistic approach by subjecting warfare to certain humanitarian restrictions. To
limit human suffering in times of armed conflict. Every state in the world,
including Malaysia, has agreed to be bound by the four Geneva Conventions of
1949.
3104. Requirement to Comply with The Law of Armed Conflict
a.
Regardless of the justification for or the legitimacy of any resort to force,
individual members of the armed forces must act in accordance with the LOAC.
If they fail to do so, they will be acting illegally and may be committing war
crimes. The responsibility to obey LOAC is accordingly both a collective
responsibility and a personal responsibility.
b.
The Purposes of LOAC:
(1)
To seek to limit the effects of warfare on protected people and
objects, such as civilians by integrating notions of humanity into the
conduct of warfare.
(2)
To seek to restrain the parties to an armed conflict from want on
cruelty and ruthlessness.
(3)
To provide essential protection to all those most directly affected
by the conflict by ensuring that different categories of person, such as
civilians and object receive the most fitting and relevant kind of
protection.
(4)
To guard against acts that violate basic tenets of civilization, to
protects those involved in the fight against unnecessary injury and
suffering and to protect the basic welfare and fundamental rights of
persons who fall into the hands of the enemy.
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(5)
By restraining the worst excesses of brutality and cruelty in an
armed conflict, to retain the necessary conditions for a resumption of
peace.
c.
Military Assistance in Law Enforcement. When the armed forces are
called upon to deploy in aid of the civil authorities in Malaysia, the military
personnel involved may be granted powers and are required to adhere to
responsibilities, both of which are stipulated in the National Security Act 2016,
Part V. States are required not to apply LOAC rules when using domestic law
enforcement tools to respond to ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism.
3105. Historical Background
a.
In 1864, the first international Convention was adopted, known as the
“Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field”. The Convention was revised first in 1906, then in 1929. The most
important revisions took place after the Second World War in 1949 when four
Geneva Conventions were adopted.
b.
Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict
(1)
Geneva Conventions. Mainly concerned with the protection of
victims of armed conflict. In 1864, the first Geneva Convention was
adopted. Four Conventions were adopted in Geneva in 1949, usually
referred to as the Geneva Conventions of 1949. They are:
(a)
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I).
(b)
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea (GC II).
(c)
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (GC III).
(d)
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (GC IV).
3106. Principles of The Law of Armed Conflict.
a.
Military Necessity. Military necessity has been described as a basic
principle of the law of armed conflict, so basic, indeed, that without it there could
be no law of armed conflict at all. The term military necessity also has been
defined as the principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any
measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of
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military operations and which are not forbidden by the laws of armed conflict.
Military necessity as a principle is not absolute. Although a state that engages
in war is doing its best to win, that does not justify the resort to inhumane
methods of warfare.
b.
Proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that the losses
resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the
expected military advantage. This principle, concerned as it is with the overall
losses arising from a military action, including those inflicted on military
objectives and combatants, is fundamentally different from and should
therefore be contrasted with the proportionality rule.
c.
Humanity. The principle of humanity is reflected in the notion of humane
treatment and respects the sanctity of human life. It is important as all the rules
of international law must be interpreted in conformity with the standard of
humanity and the demands of the public conscience. Covered in the AP I, article
1(2) and in the preamble to AP II. The law of armed conflict strikes a balance
between military necessity and humanity:
(1)
If military necessity were to prevail completely, no limitation of any
kind would have been imposed on the freedom of action of a belligerent.
(2)
If humanity were the only guiding principle for belligerents, the
effective conduct of an armed conflict would be rendered impossible.
d.
Distinction. The principle of distinction is designed to protect civilians
not taking a direct part in the hostilities and civilian objects, while considering
the military necessities and the exigencies of the situation. Distinguish between:
(1)
Civilians and Combatants.
(2)
Civilian Objects and Military Objectives.
e.
Article 48 of Additional Protocol 1: “In order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”.
(1)
Armed Forces.
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(2)
Combatant And Non-Combatant.
(3)
Protection of Children (Protocol I – Article 77). Children shall
be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form
of indecent assault. Children who have not attained the age of 18 years
do not take part in hostilities and they shall refrain from recruiting them
into their armed forces. If arrested for reasons related to armed conflict,
children shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults
and send back to their family.
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(4)
Medical & Religious Personnel.
(5)
Civilians Accompanying Armed Forces.
(a)
War correspondents, supply contractors labour, and
welfare services are not combatants
(6)
(b)
Are to be issued an id card
(c)
If captured they can become POWs
Civilians.
(a)
Do not belong to the Armed Forces and do not take part in
a levee en masse.
(b)
Are protected from attack under LOAC.
(c)
Lose protection if they take direct part in hostilities
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f.
Military Objective.
g.
Civilian Object.
(1)
Not a military objective (example house, bridge, etc).
(2)
Becomes military target if used by military as defender.
h.
Victim of Armed Conflict.
i.
Prisoners of War and Captured Combatants.
(1)
Protected under the third Geneva convention (g3).
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j.
Civil Defence
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k.
Cultural Property.
j.
Occupants of Aircraft (Protocol I – Article 42).
(1)
No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made
the object of attack during descent.
(2)
Upon reaching the ground in territory controlled by an adverse
Party, a person who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be
given an opportunity to surrender before being made the object of attack,
unless it is apparent that he is engaging in a hostile act.
(3)
Airborne troops are not protected by this Article.
3107. Application of The Law of Armed Conflict.
a.
Universal Application of The Law of Armed Conflict.
(1)
One of the most important characteristics of the law of armed
conflict is its universal application.
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(2)
It applies with equal force to all parties engaged in an armed
conflict, whether or not any party is considered to be ‘an aggressor’ or ‘a
victim of aggression’.
(3)
Equally, every victim of armed conflict is entitled to the protection
afforded by the law.
b.
Parties To Whom Law of Armed Conflict Applies.
(1)
States are bound by the LOAC either by way of an international
agreement to which the state has agreed to be bound or under
customary international law.
(2)
Not only binding on states but also on individuals, and in particular
on the individual members of the armed forces of the states participating
in the armed conflict.
(3)
Shall be applied without discrimination irrespective of which
country is the aggressor and without any adverse distinction founded on
race, nationality, colour, political, philosophical or religious opinions, sex,
language, birth, social standing, wealth or any other criteria.
c.
Situations To Which the Law of Armed Conflict Applies.
(1)
Although the LOAC is commonly understood as applying to the
conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims, the LOAC
addresses other situations as well. The LOAC establishes:
(a)
Rules between enemies for the conduct of hostilities and
the protection of war victims in international and non-international
armed conflict.
(b)
Rules between belligerents and neutrals.
(c)
Rules for military occupation.
(d)
Duties during peacetime that help implement the above
rules.
d.
Beginning And End of Application.
(1)
Period of Application.
(a)
The law of armed conflict applies from the beginning of an
armed conflict until the general close of military operations.
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(b)
In the case of occupied territories, its application continues
until the termination of the occupation, even if military operations,
if any, ceased at an earlier date.
(c)
Persons in the power of the adversary continue to benefit
from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and Protocol until
their final release, and repatriation or re-establishment.
(2)
Denunciation.
(a)
Party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
I have the right to denounce those treaties, denunciation does not
take effect immediately.
(b)
For parties not at the time involved in an armed conflict,
denunciation takes effect one year after the receipt by the
depositary of the written notification of denunciation.
(c)
For parties engaged in an armed conflict, denunciation of
the Conventions does not take effect until peace has been
concluded and until protected persons have been released or
repatriated.
(3)
LOAC Duties Also Applicable in Peace. LOAC obligations also
apply in peacetime, even when a State is not engaged in an armed
conflict. States must:
(a)
Disseminate information regarding the law of war.
(b)
Train their armed forces in accordance with the law of war.
(c)
Issue instructions and regulations for their armed forces in
conformity with the law of war.
(d)
Review the legality of new weapons.
(e)
Take appropriate measures
safeguarding of cultural property.
for
the
(f)
Take other appropriate measures to ensure
implementation and enforcement of LOAC treaties.
the
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SECTION 12
OPERATIONAL BRIEF
3108. The aim of a brief is to provide information that the higher commander can
assimilate easily and quickly. Senior officers rely on briefs to acquaint themselves with
a subject and their preparation is one of the most frequent duties of a commander on
the ground.
3109. The contents of a brief will usually depend upon the wishes of the officer
concerned. The brief could contain:
a.
An outline history of the establishment being visited.
b.
Details of current work, training and other details being carried out.
c.
Short biographies of the hosts and chief personalities likely to be met,
with photographs if available.
d.
A list of questions the hosts might be asked during the tour of the
establishment.
e.
A list of questions that might be asked by the hosts with recommended
answers.
f.
Any special information that might be of value during the visit, such as
similar work being carried out in equivalent local units or establishment, and
any security restrictions affecting its disclosure.
g.
A timetable showing all the administrative arrangements for the visit.
3110. Technique.
a.
Communication.
b.
Experience.
c.
Knowledge.
3111. Preparation.
a.
Analysing Situation.
(1)
(2)
Audience.
Purpose.
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(3)
(4)
(5)
Time Allocated.
Facilities.
Preparatory Effort.
b.
Rehearsal.
c.
Deliver.
d.
Follow Up.
3112. Sequence of An Operational Briefing.
a.
Salutation.
b.
Orientation.
c.
Enemy.
d.
Mission.
e.
Outline Plan.
f.
Relevant Command, Control and Administrative Detail.
3113. The example of sequence for Visitor Brief at Op Area that can be used is as
follow:
a.
Salutation.
(1)
Ex Time.
(2)
Real Time.
b.
Map & Sketch Orientation.
c.
Review Of Situation.
d.
(1)
Enemy.
(2)
Friendly Forces.
(a)
Commander Intent
(b)
Mission
Daily Event
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e.
Log Sp
f.
Future Plan
3114. Used of Aids.
a.
Charts.
b.
Model.
c.
PowerPoint.
d.
Photographs.
e.
Exhibition Of Captured/Display Item.
3115. Guidelines.
a.
Be Sure Audience Can See Everything You Indicate.
b.
Point To the Part on Which You Want the Audience to Concentrate.
c.
Size Of Visuals Is Big Enough.
d.
Use The Right Colour.
3116. Arrangement of Briefing Area.
a.
Seats For Audience.
b.
Board, Screen, Maps, Charts and Other Aids.
c.
Lecture Stand.
d.
Pointer.
e.
Exhibition Area.
f.
Refreshment Area.
g.
Table For Visitors.
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3117. Common Fault.
a.
The “Errr…” Or “And…… Hmm…Errr”.
b.
Apologetic Opening and Tone.
c.
Copycat.
d.
Giggling.
e.
Lack Of Audience Contact.
f.
Selection Of Words and Simple Language.
g.
Meaningless Words.
3118. Make Yourself Heard By.
a.
Keeping Your Head Up and Addressing Yourself to The Last Row of
Audience.
b.
Do Not Shout but Pitch Your Voice to Suit the Audience.
c.
Speak Clearly.
d.
Take A Deep Breath.
e.
Capture The Audience by Varying the Pitch and Rhythm.
3119. Conclusion.
a.
Rehearsal.
b.
Be Confident.
c.
Take All Comment Positively.
d.
Adapt and enhance for Future Benefit.
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SECTION 13
PRESENTING OF A SOLUTION
3120. Aim. To specify how to present a solution to a tactical problem.
3121. Requirement of a Problem.
a.
Prepare an appreciation and outline plan.
b.
Individually or sub-synd.
3122. Sequence of Presentation.
a.
Orientation.
b.
Statement of assumptions.
c.
Preliminary analysis.
d.
Mission analysis brief.
e.
Ground assessment (IPOE).
f.
Enemy course of action (IPOE).
g.
Decision and execution
3123. Ground Orientation (indoor TEWT).
a.
Grid north relate it to the map and sketch.
b.
Present loc on the map.
c.
Identify area of op and area of interest.
d.
Identify key terrain (analysis).
3124. Ground Orientation (outdoor TEWT).
a.
Show grid north, relate it to the map, sketch, and gnd.
b.
Present location on the map.
Ident reference point to describe the ground.
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Identify ground essential as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Boundary/Boundaries (AO/AI).
Key terrain.
Enemy and own location.
Ident road/river/prominent point in the map and relate it to the gnd.
3125. Other additional information
a.
Explanation on Topography – It is essential that the topography details
are issued the OCOKA headings analysed during the IMAP. It is essential that
you relate all topography details considering their effect on the conduct of the
task. You should describe the following points but not limited to:
(1)
Boundaries.
(2)
Vegetation – type, density and visibility, movement.
(3)
Landmarks – prominent man made/natural features movement.
(4)
Rivers and streams – currents, direction of flow, depth, width,
potability.
(5)
Nature of roads/tracks in the area.
(6)
Tactical obstacles that will affect the conduct of your task.
(7)
Terrain.
(8)
Summarize the topography issues in relation to their effect on
you and the enemy use OCOKA.
(9)
Weather/Meteorological
–
Explain
the
effects
of
weather/meteorological factors on the conduct of the task. It is essential
that you describe each effect in relation to its effect on the conduct of
the task. You should describe the following points but not limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Sunrise and sunset, first light and last light.
Moonrise and moonset (% of moon).
Cloud cover (%).
Likelihood of rain, fog, frost, snow etc.
Temperatures by day and night.
(f)
Summarize the effect of the weather/meteorological
factors on the conduct of your task.
3126. Statement of Assumption.
a.
Not in the white.
b.
Must be reasonable, logical, and essential to the development of the
plan.
c.
Clear with your ds before employing.
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3127. Preliminary analysis
a.
Review the situation.
b.
Timeline.
1)
2)
3)
Operational timeline.
Planning timeline.
Enemy timeline.
3128. Mission Analysis Brief.
a.
Ident and analyse superior commander’s intent.
b.
Ident and analyse commander’s intent.
1)
2)
c.
Ident and analyse tasks.
1)
2)
3)
d.
limitation (constraint and restriction).
Analyse own troop.
1)
2)
3)
f.
Specified.
Implied.
Essential.
Ident and analyse freedom of action.
1)
e.
2 up in outline.
1 up in detail.
deduction on own troop capabilities.
Own strength and weakness (cog construct).
List of Decisive Points.
Mission statement.
1)
5 w – who, what, when, where & why.
3129. Ground Assessment.
a.
Summary of deductions. It must justify the plan not the detail description
of the gnd.
b.
Relate the ground (OCOKA) how it will affect the plan.
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c.
How the same ground/terrain give advantage to both forces.
d.
Mobility Corridor, Avenu of Approac, TAI, NAI, DE and CE (in graphic).
3130. Enemy Assessment. Extract from Enemy Assessment from IMAP (remember
to describe the enemy in relation to you and your task). You should describe the
following points but limited to:
a.
Size.
b.
Activities.
c.
Locations (known/suspected, direction, movements).
d.
Units (fire support available to them).
e.
Tactics (standard of training, reactions, method of operations, order of
march).
f.
Equipment.
g.
Habits.
h.
Intentions (mission and their intent).
i.
Morale.
j.
The enemy’s MLCOA to you.
k.
The enemy’s MDCOA to you and your mission.
3131. The Outline Plan
a.
Exec.
(1)
Commander’s Intent
(a)
Purpose. The why of the mission and its link to the higher
commander’s intent. This is derived from the last part of the
mission statement (WHY).
(b)
Method. An articulation of your effect/shaping on the
enemy. It details how the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities will be
targeted during the conduct of the task – thereby undermining the
enemy’s centre of gravity. For example: ‘By targeting the enemy’s
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use of the East approach through AO WOLF as infiltration by day
and night through aggressive Platoon strength patrolling and
ambushing, we will deny their ability to transit through from the
border region’.
(c)
Endstate. A simple statement of where and how forces will
be arrayed at the end of the task.
(2)
Scheme of Manoeuvre. The how of the mission. A succinct
articulation of how the Platoon sections and assets will be
employed and what they will do in each phase, as applicable. The
commander must detail the scheme of manoeuvre for each phase.
(3)
Coord instr.
(4)
BOS concept (arty fire planning concept), engr, avn, armd).
(5)
CSS BOS concept.
(a)
Supply system / demand.
(b)
Medic.
(c)
Repair and recovery.
(d)
Admin arg.
(e)
Loc for BMA, DP, AP, PP.
(f)
Other sp plans (related to the op).
3132. Overlay
a.
Must be neat (use a ruler).
b.
Use correct mil symbols and colour coding (should be of a consistent
size and shape).
c.
Show correct as at ……. hr.
d.
Should have security classification.
e.
Indicate direction of North.
f.
Show your plan and grouping clearly.
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g.
Use permanent marker pens.
h.
Should be large enough and avoid unnecessary details.
3133. Presentation Technique.
a.
Prior to presentation.
1)
2)
4)
b.
Check overlay and map board.
Rehearsal.
Clear any assumptions made during preparation with your DS.
During presentation.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Express your ideas clearly.
Speak slowly.
Speak confidently.
Use of gnd.
Answering questions.
3134. Rules of presentation.
a.
The don’t.
1)
Don’t deliver a set of operational orders.
2)
Don’t waffle, stammer, or lose voice.
3)
Can use grids.
4)
Don’t prep a plan based on assumptions that additional resources
will be available.
b.
The do’s.
1)
Do prep your sketch/overlay and carry out rehearsal.
2)
Do be confident, concise, and accurate when you present your
solution.
3)
Do maintain eye contact.
3135. Assessment
intent.
a.
Workability of the plan to achieve the desired mission/commander’s
b.
Tactically sound and practical.
c.
No violation of basic considerations.
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d.
Clarity and confidence in delivery and answering questions.
e.
Workability of enemy COA that will lead to your plan.
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SECTION 14
KESBAN TACTICAL CONCEPT
3136. Definition. (Keselamatan dan Pembangunan) The full range of measures taken
by the Police, the civil agencies, the para-military forces, and the military to create an
atmosphere of tranquillity and related peace to free and protect the society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency.
3137. To create an atmosphere of tranquillity and peace to free and protect the society
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
3138. Two prong - conducted through balanced development and with the conduct of
tactical operation to eliminate the insurgent movement.
3139. Tactical operations - planned and conducted systematically to regain control by
expansion of control areas to separate the insurgents from supporters, gaining support
from the population and destruction of the insurgents. (See Fig 3.1.15)
3140. Tactical concept:
a.
Tactical operation is generally carried out by the security forces.
b.
The purpose is to destroy the insurgent’s threat that exist in the country.
c.
Tactical concept is to achieve the re-establishment of control throughout
the country so that the legal government can exercise its proper function.
d.
The method employed to achieve this aim is as follows:
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Fig 3.1.15: CIO Tactical Concept
3141. Principle of War In KESBAN.
a.
Selection and Maintenance of Aim.
(1)
The military operates under government objectives and at lower
level be directed by joint civil/military committees.
(2)
The military aim may become subordinate to political or
psychological requirements.
(3)
The aim must be maintained be it political or psychological.
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b.
Offensive Action.
(1)
Offensive military action necessary to restrict the enemy’s
freedom of action in territory surrounding controlled and to seize the
initiative
(2)
Domination of the area designed to provide security and deny the
insurgent’s local civilian support.
c.
Surprise.
(1)
Main ingredient of success in CIW ops.
(2)
Difficult to achieve when every military movement is reported to
enemy.
(3)
To achieve surprise:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
d.
Use of originality and speed of execution.
Deception
Skill and secrecy in movement
Strict security measures.
Security.
(1)
(2)
Major security problem is counterintelligence.
Security of equipment.
e.
Flexibility. The capacity for quick decision and prompt action to take
advantage of fresh intelligence or changed situation.
f.
Concentration.
(1)
Must be carried out secretly
(2)
Deployment and moving on foot in dispersed groups preferably at
night.
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g.
Economy of Effort.
(1)
Many tasks to be carried out in CIW e.g. Border control ops,
manning of check points, protection of installations, bases and air fields,
military civic action, etc.
(2)
Employment of forces should be considered in accordance with
their capabilities and priority of tasks.
h.
Cooperation.
(1)
Cooperation among all government agencies.
(2)
Closely integrated planning between military, civilian and police
agencies.
(3)
Cooperation ans support of local people also important for
success.
i.
Maintenance Of Morale.
(1)
High morale very important in CIW ops where normal exercise of
command is difficult.
(2)
Dangerous aspect of ops where enemy is uncertain.
(3)
Boredom and monotony.
j.
Administration.
(1)
(2)
Good administration enhances morale of troops.
Admin plans must be flexible to cater for any situation
(3)
Admin matters incl CASEVAC, Resup.
3142. Conclusion. Command and control are an important aspect of KESBAN ops. An
effective command and control organisation must be established to coordinate all activities of
various agencies and KESBAN programmes.
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SECTION 15
COUNTER INSURGENCY WARFARE (CIO)
FUNDAMENTAL
3143. Insurgency. A protracted and organized rebellion in which a dissident faction
that has the support of a substantial part of the population instigates the commission
of widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism and wages guerrilla
warfare to overthrow a government. It also shows a condition resulting from a revolt
or insurrection against a constituted government which fall short of a civil war.
3144. A State of Insurgency. Insurgents have control of sizeable areas of the
country and that it will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war on the
communist pattern.
3145. Counter Insurgency. A multi-faceted measure to counter insurgency. It can
be done militarily, psychologically, and socio-economically by a government
simultaneously.
3146. Communist Insurgency. Armed action against the establish government of a
country by organized bands or groups under conditions which do not permit such
action to be identified as overt and direct external aggression, but subject to such
degree of foreign control, direction, or support as to amount to indirect external
aggression.
3147. Method. There are two basic methods of communist insurgency war:
a.
Destructive:
(1)
Attacking the established order and its supporters.
(2)
Anti-government propaganda and demoralization.
(3)
Subversion and penetration of the security force, government
department and established trade unions.
(4)
Intimidation, blackmail, terrorism, and assassination.
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(5)
(6)
b.
Sabotage and destruction of economic framework.
Guerrilla op and full-scale mil op.
Constructive:
(1)
Building up the will to fight, the means of fighting and the
alternative government structure and organization.
(2)
Expansion of a live political organization.
(3)
Creating of movements, organisations, and fronts such as new
trade unions, youth movements and ex- service group with a view to
fostering popular support.
(4)
Creation of police and military forces in prep for the take over and
control of areas.
(5)
Creation of an alternative administration parallel at all levels to the
existing government.
(6)
Building up of insurgent training cadre.
3148. Phase of Insurgency War. There are 3 phases of insurgency war as per follow:
a.
The passive resistance. Established party and front structure,
penetration, subversion, coercion, blackmail, sabotage, riots, strikes and
assassination.
b.
The active resistance. Gain wide popular support. Propaganda,
indoctrination, parallel government, increasing military activity. Base areas
established, sniping, ambush, raids dispersion of security forces.
c.
The counter offensive. Escalating mil activity, attacks by regular units,
area dominated, liberated areas expanded, destruction of government and
security forces to gain victory.
3149. Factors Led CPM to Lay Down Their Arms.
a.
Lack of support from the people.
b.
Communist ideology did not appeal to the people especially malays.
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c.
Joint Border Committee (JBC) agreement between Malaysia and
Thailand - Combined Op.
d.
Country’s development programs that were comprehensive & consistent
with the country’s security policy (KESBAN).
(1)
(2)
e.
Internal development.
Military and psychological operation.
Withdrawal of support from world community to the communist ideology.
f.
Radical change in People Republic of Chinaforeign & security policy with
the restoration of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China.
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SECTION 16
PAREMA AND MRA
PAREMA
3150. Background.
a.
Establishment of PAREMA.
(1)
Established in Kajang, Selangor on 16 Sep 1961 by a group of
professional individuals.
(2)
Intends to establish a government with the concept of the
Parliamentary Republic System and reject the monarchical system.
(3)
Leadership.
(a)
(b)
Founded by Rahman bin Sahari.
The latest Secretary General is Boo Har Sim.
(4)
Ideology. The ideology of left -wing nationalism which tries to
realize is as the following:
(a)
Pragmatism-a stance that prioritizes the real effect of
something over theoretical features.
(b)
Meritocracy - a social system that values a person's
position because of his or her abilities (not because of lineage or
wealth).
(c)
Racial Diversity - all races have the same privileges.
(5)
The idea of establishing a republic arose when the idea for the
establishment of Malaysia arose on 27 May 1961.
(6)
This radical ideology has been accepted by some of the
individuals in the societies.
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(7)
Rebellion.
(a) In July 1968, a group of militants carried out a reckless
intrusion on a PK Camp in Terengganu and fled with gunfire and
subsequently engaged in clashes with the PK.
(b) PAREMA was banned after being charged with waging war
against SPB YDP Agong by the government.
(c) His leadership line became the most wanted and continued to
be hunted.
(d) Other incidents such as sabotage and murder of civil servants
also occurred.
(e) The threat of insurgents increased, especially around 1968 to
1999.
(f) The government increased the capacity of PK causing
PAREMA to retreat to the Western Sector, Lanunland.
(g) This withdrawal has given PAREMA time to prepare and
strategize.
(h) PAREMA continued to intensify the MRA, the Front and
underground groups to revive the atmosphere of revolution in the
armed insurgency.
3151. PAREMA Structure and Organization.
a.
There are several main components in the PAREMA organization, the
component in the organization is divided as follow:
(1)
Sel Parti (SP)
(2)
Jawatankuasa Cawangan (JKC).
(3)
Jawatankuasa Daerah (JKD).
(4)
Jawatankuasa Negeri (JKN).
(5)
Biro Wilayah.
(6)
Jawatankuasa Pusat (JKP).
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(7)
Barisan Hadapan.
(8)
Kumpulan Bawah Tanah.
MALAYAN REVOLUTION ARMY (MRA)
3152. Organisational structure. The entire structure of the insurgent military
organization is divided into three group:
a.
Main Team. Consists of a Main Force regiment placed under the control
of JKP.
b.
Local Team. At the JKD and JKN level, there are insurgent teams which
are District and State Troop units with Platoon, Company and Battalion size.
c.
Guerrilla forces. The basis of the structure which is the detachment and
the insurgent section - operates under the control of SP and JKC. These
insurgent squads is also known as Guerrilla Forces.
3153. Roles and Duties.
a.
Guerrilla forces. Responsible for implementing all aspects of the
military in the Passive and Active Resistance Phases. The team will also be
instructed to assist in the implementation of the campaign by the Main Team in
the next phase (Counter Offensive Phase).
b.
The main roles of the Guerrilla Force are as follows:
(1)
To be the eyes and ears of the revolutionary movement by
performing the task of collecting information in the locality, especially
related to the PK movement or other necessary information.
(2)
Act as a workforce in a flexible logistics system to transport or
carry food supplies and equipment.
c.
Local Team. Assist in the implementation of the campaign by the Main
Team in the next phase (Offensive Response Phase).
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(1)
Deployed to assist JKD activities.
(2)
Provide base defence to JKD in the forest. These troops will
defend the base aggressively to enable JKD members to escape from
PK attacks.
(3)
Join with cadres and form an Armed Task Force (PKB) to carry
out propaganda missions in villages or small town.
(4)
Carry out offensive operations such as ambush small convoys
and attacks on PK posts as well as force PK to split into small groups in
its operations.
d.
Main Team. This team is a team equipped with better equipment will
carry out a campaign in the last stage of mobile warfare to destroy the remnants
of the PK.
(1)
Active Resistance Phase.
(a)
A Task Force may be mobilized as an element to assist the
Local Force insurgent activities.
(b) The element is usually from a battalion known as a Combat
Unit.
(c) The status of this battalion is equivalent to PKB and cells in
JKC and JKD.
(2)
Counter Offensive Phase. Implement and enhance military
operations to destroy the existing government.
INSURGENCY WARFARE
3154. Purpose of Insurgency.
a.
A protracted and organized rebellion in which a dissident faction that has
the support of a substantial part of the population instigates the commission of
widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism and wages
guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government.
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b.
A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted
government which fall short of a civil war.
c.
The need to create urgent insurgency and revolutionary situations will
only be taken up when circumstances have allowed them to do so, and other
methods previously used have failed to achieve the goal.
3155. Method. There are two basic methods of Communist Insurgency war:
a.
Destructive. Attacking the established order and its supporters.
(1)
Anti-government propaganda and demoralization.
(2)
Subversion and penetration of the security force, government
department and established trade unions.
(3)
Intimidation, blackmail, terrorism, and assassination.
(4)
Sabotage and destruction of economic framework.
(5)
Guerrilla op and full-scale mil op.
b.
Constructive. Building up the will to fight, the means of fighting and the
alternative government structure and organization.
(1)
Expansion of a live political organization.
(2)
Creating of movements, organisations, and fronts such as new
trade unions, youth movements and ex- service group with a view to
fostering popular support.
(3)
Creation of police and military forces in prep for the take over and
control of areas.
(4)
Creation of an alternative administration parallel at all levels to the
existing government.
(5)
Building up of insurgent training cadre.
3156. Phases. There are three phases in insurgency war.
a.
The Passive Resistance. Established party and front structure,
penetration, subversion, coercion, blackmail, sabotage, riots, strikes and
assassination.
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b.
The Active Resistance. Gain wide popular support. Propaganda,
indoctrination, parallel government, increasing military activity. Base areas
established, sniping, ambush, raids dispersion of Security Forces.
c.
The Counter Offensive. Escalating mil activity, attacks by regular units,
area dominated, liberated areas expanded, destruction of government and
Security Forces to gain victory.
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CHAPTER 3
APPLY CONDUCT OPERATION PLANNING
SECTION 1
COMPANY BATTLE PROCEDURE
DEFINITION OF COMPANY BATTLE PROCEDURE
3157. Battle procedure is a series of activities that ensures a force is properly
prepared and deployed for battle, within prescribed time frames.
PURPOSE OF COMPANY BATTLE PROCEDURE
3158. The purpose is to ensure the force is properly prepared and deployed for battle
within prescribed time frames. It is designed to make the most efficient use, and
saving, of time through sound orders and concurrent preparation.
REQUIREMENT
3159. Need to give early warning then conduct through recce. It must be efficient use
of time during this battle procedure. Prepare the competent sub-unit action and drills.
Then, need to conduct concurrent preparation by F and A Echelons.
3160. Grouping. F Echelon consists of:
a.
R group.
b.
O group.
c.
Main body.
3161. Warning Orders. This is the start point. The aim of a warning order is to save
time and allow concurrent activity. A warning order normally includes brief statement
of situation and task, notice regarding movement, time & place for O group, prelim
activities, limitations on reconnaissance and admin instructions.
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3162. Concurrent Activity. Issue warning orders. Detail all routine procedures in
sops. Conduct recce and O gp while main body prepares. Ensure staff and
subordinates know what to do and train them well.
3163. Time. Two systems can be used which is work backwards from H hour or work
forward from time now. Ensure an appropriate distribution of time. Remember your
troops need time as well.
3164. Reconnaissance. Plan for your recce. If time is short, take your subordinates
with you. Be aware of breaching security because too much of recce activity will alert
the enemy. Need a concurrent activity.
3165. SOPs. SOPs should detail basic routines, groupings, immediate actions, and
command. All command elements must have them. SOPs and training will make an
effective unit.
CONCLUSION
3166. Battle procedure will save time. It needs to be practiced to be effective.
Remember that the more time you waste, the less time your soldiers have for
preparation.
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SECTION 2
DEPLOYMENT OF INF SP WPN
CHARACTERISTIC OF SP WPN
3167. Characteristic of HMG.
a.
Use of various ammo and purpose.
(1)
(2)
(3)
APIHC (Armd Pen Impact Hard Core).
MP (Multi-Purpose).
API (Alloy Pen Impact).
b.
Highly Accurate.
c.
Deep penetration of armoured vehicle depend on range, ammo and
armour thickness.
d.
AA role, destroy en def posn, bunker and trench.
e.
Ability to fire from Weapon
3168. Characteristic of AGL.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Various ammo like HE, HEDP.
Huge impact area.
High Rate of fire.
Usefull to dest en pers, incoming en tp and lt veh.
Pen armour 500 mm at 90 degree angle with HEDP round.
Mob on Wpn Tpt.
3169. Characteristic of METIS-M Guided Missile.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Pen all type of armour incld ERA.
Pen armour for moving tgt fm 80m to 1500m.
High speed of missile below than 8 second up to 1500m.
Portable device, day and ni.
Destroy inf tp, sp wpn bunker and trench.
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3170. Characteristic of 81mm Mortar.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Various ammo
Large impact area
High Rate of fire
Useful to destroy enemy personnel, en tank light vehicles and trenches
Portable Gun, day and ni.
Destroy inf tp, sp wpn bunker and trench.
Longest weapon’s range of support company weapons systems.
3171. Type of fire for automatic sp wpn. Each type of fire will produce different
shape of beaten zone. Depending on how the weapon being deployed based on:
a.
Ground.
(1)
Grazing Fire. This occurs when the centre of the cone of fire does
not rise more than 1 meter above the ground. When firing on level or
uniformly sloping terrain, the automatic rifleman can obtain a maximum
of 600 meters of grazing fire.
(2)
Plunging Fire. This occurs when the danger space is confined to
the beaten zone. Plunging fire occurs when firing at long ranges, from
high ground to low ground, into abruptly rising ground, or across uneven
terrain, resulting in a loss of grazing fire at any point along the trajectory.
b.
Target.
(1)
Flanking Fire – This is firing at the side of a target.
(2)
Oblique Fire - This is when the long axis of the beaten zone is at
an angle other than a right angle to the front of the target.
(3)
Frontal Fire - This is when the long axis of the beaten zone is at
a right angle to the front of the target. An example is when firing at the
front of a target.
(4)
Enfilade Fire - This is when the long axis of the beaten zone
coincides or nearly coincides with the long axis of the target. This type
of fire is either frontal or flanking. It is the most desirable type of fire with
respect to a target because it makes maximum use of the beaten zone.
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c.
Use of weapon.
(1)
Fixed Fire - This fire delivered against a point target when the
depth and width of the beaten zone will cover the target. This means
only one aiming point is necessary to provide coverage of the target.
(2)
Traversing Fire - This fire distributed in width by successive
changes in direction. The automatic rifleman selects successive aiming
points throughout the width of the target. These aiming points must be
close enough to ensure adequate coverage but not so close to waste
ammunition.
(3)
Searching Fire - This fire distributed in depth by successive
changes in elevation. The automatic rifleman selects successive aiming
points in depth. The change in each aiming point depends on the range
and slope of the ground.
(4)
Traverse and Searching Fire - This fire distributed in width and
depth by successive changes in direction and elevation. Combining
traversing and searching fires provides good coverage of the target.
Adjustments are made in the same manner as described for traversing
and searching fire.
(5)
Swing Fire – Weapon is not locked by the windage and elevation
lock. The firer will fire on various distances and directions.
3172. Defilade Position. Sp wpn is concealed fm enemy observation but the weapon
still can fire on their location. The weapon cannot be engaged with enemy direct fire.
The observer will be located near the MG. He must clearly see the target and bullet
strike. The observer provides a correction for the firer.
3173. AA Role for HMG. This wpn can be used for Anti Air role but it is limited for low
altitude and to slow mov AC and helicopter with effective range up to 800 m.
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3174. Weapon Sighting. There is basic consideration of sighting support weapons
that need to be considered as follow:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Mutual support.
All-round defence.
Depth.
Fire plan.
Security.
Use of ground.
3175. Principle in sighting of sp wpn. Principle that need to be follow:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Dominate enemy axis of advance
Fire at max range
Cover obstacles in killing area.
Coordination of indirect fire and direct fire assets in killing area.
Employ weapon max range and their capability to engage the enemy.
Priority of targets
Coordination of all support weapons to achieve max effect.
3176. Types of Tasks.
a. Primary Task
b. Secondary Task
3177. Types of loc.
a.
Primary Loc. Location of weapon that achieves the primary task.
b.
Alternative Loc. Location where when the weapon’s primary location
becomes ineffective or is being attacked, suppressed or otherwise neutralised
can be used to achieve the primary task.
c.
Secondary Task. Loc where the sp wpn can deliver an additional task
depending on change of threat and axis of en attk to achieve addl or secondary
task.
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SECTION 3
ASSAULT RIVER CROSSING
GENERAL
3177. An assault across a river normally begins with an attack to secure terrain on the
far-bank. This may involve an air assault, but the brhd force normally conducts an
assault by using pneumatic boats or by swimming amphibious vehicles. The assault
force normally crosses in waves, as sufficient boats are seldom available to carry the
entire force across at once. It is a very complex operation, requiring synchronisation
and skilled application of technical procedures. Success requires training and
extensive rehearsals. Forces normally conduct an assault at night or during limited
visibility due to the vulnerability of forces in small boats on open water. If an assault
must be conducted during daylight, the assault site must be isolated by fires and
smoke to reduce the force's vulnerability.
SEQUENCE OF ASSAULT CROSSING
3178. The suggested sequences for assault crossing are as follows:
a.
Reconnaissance Party conducts far-bank reconnaissance.
b.
Assault and support forces conduct home-bank reconnaissance.
c.
The assault force conducts a rehearsal (day).
d.
The assault force conducts a rehearsal (night).
e.
The assault force moves into the Assy A.
f.
The company guides link up with the Assault Pioneer platoon.
g.
The Assault Pioneer Platoon moves into the attack position.
h.
The Direct Fire Support Base (DFSB) group occupies the position to
provide direct fire support.
i.
The Assault Pioneer/Engineer Squadron distributes and prepares the
boats.
j.
The company guides bring the assault forces to the attack position.
k.
The Assault Pioneers man the boats.
l.
The preparation teams prepare the far-bank.
m.
The boat groups carry the boats to the river and launch the boats.
n.
The company flotillas cross the river.
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o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
u.
v.
w.
x.
y.
The support forces provide suppressive fires, if required.
The assault forces places smoke on the river, if required.
The assault force disembarks, deploys and attacks.
The second wave force moves to the river.
The boat groups returns to the home-bank.
The engineer mounts the outboard motor (OBM), if required.
The second wave force and cargo are loaded into the boats.
The second wave force crosses the river.
The far-bank aid station is established.
The assault force seizes the objectives.
The assault force establishes the hasty defence.
TYPES OF ASSAULT
3179. Each Lead Battalion in the ground assault should have at least one fording or
assault boat site big enough to accommodate two companies abreast. Fording
vehicles are more likely to be used in a hasty crossing than in a deliberate crossing
because they allow the force to continue across the river without pausing to acquire
other crossing means. A ford site should have 300m along the home-bank at the entry
point for deploying the support force. The types of assault river crossing can be divided
into two which are the Assault Boat Crossing and Vehicle-Swim Crossing.
3180. Assault Boat Crossing. The factors to be considered when using assault boats
in a river crossing are as follows:
a.
Offers greater opportunity for surprise in a silent-paddle crossing.
b.
Are a relatively fast means of crossing, especially when using OBM.
c.
Manoeuvre well in the water.
d.
Require limited, if any, home-bank preparation and none is required on
the far-bank.
e.
Require the separation of mechanised troops from their vehicle and
equipment.
f.
Assault boat has limited carrying capacity, particularly Atk weapons.
g.
Provide limited protection, mobility, firepower and communications on
the far-bank.
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3182. The unit protects itself during boats crossing by moving silently, during periods
of limited visibility and crossing at a location where the enemy does not expect a
crossing attempt. For an assault using boats each rifle company requires at least 200m
along the river to disperse the boats and ideally 300m between companies. This is a
total of 700m for a battalion assaulting with two companies abreast. Control is very
important, particularly at night when boats can easily become separated or lose their
direction, therefore it is vital that engineer and infantry conducts rehearsals before
executing the crossing attempt. The rehearsals should begin as soon as the unit
receives the WngO without waiting for the detailed crossing plan.
3183. Vehicle-Swim Crossing. Crossing of the fighting vehicle may be practical in the
assault stage, whether the crossing is against little or no resistance. Factors affecting
the vehicle-swim crossing are as follows:
a.
Has minimal effect on troop organization and control.
b.
Provides troop protection, mobility and firepower on the far-bank.
c.
Provides early anti-tank (Atk) capability on the far-bank.
d.
Reduces the number of vehicles to be rafted.
e.
It is a slow operation.
f.
Is considered risky because the vehicle manoeuvres poorly in the water
and are extremely vulnerable to anti-armour weapons.
g.
Requires suitable entry and exit points.
h.
Requires vehicle preparation.
i.
Requires training in vehicle-swim operations.
3184. Rapid reinforcement of dismounted assault troops with armoured (armd) vehicle
is so critical that it justifies using any expeditious method when swimming the first few
fighting vehicle across. This includes winching, towing or pushing the first ones across
normally unsuitable places, while engineers prepare better entry and exit points for the
rest. The space required to swim vehicles on-line is 200m frontage per company with
300m between companies. Less is required if they cross in a column. Commanders
plan entry and exit sites to account for downstream drift when swimming the fighting
vehicle.
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ORGANISATION
3185. In conducting River Crossing Operations, there will be various groupings/
organization that will have to be formed up prior to launching the operations. The
specific groupings/organisation used will depend on the mission, enemy, terrain,
troops and time factors, particularly the size of the bridgehead, the distance to farbank objectives and the nature of the enemy's defences. Regardless of these factors,
the assault groupings/organisations or Battalion's Combat Teams will have to be
organized into support and assault forces and are assisted in the assault by other
formations/brigade units.
3186. Bank Group. Each assault grouping/company will be supported by the Bank
Group. This force covertly establishes a DFSB along the friendly bank before the
assault. It uses night vision and thermal sights to locate enemy positions. It also
develops a fire plan to engage these positions and to provide suppressive fires on all
suspected positions. When directed to engage, the Bank Group destroys all known
and suspected positions. They must be positioned early enough to develop a detailed
fire plan. The assault force commander directs the Bank Group Commander to lift or
shift suppressive fires as necessary according to the ongoing crossing.
a.
The Bank Group normally consists of armoured tanks and infantry
fighting vehicles from an Infantry Battalion of the dismounted infantry
conducting the assault. If an attached light Infantry Battalion is conducting the
assault, tripod-mounted heavy machine guns and Atk missile systems
(augmented by infantry fighting vehicles and tanks) provide supporting fires.
The DFSB Commander controls these direct fire weapon systems however, the
Company Commander gives the firing commands.
b.
Supporting Artillery Regiments and Mortar Platoons provide indirect fire
support. The assault force has priority of fires from at least one Artillery
Regiment during the assault. The Artillery Regiment does not normally fire a
preparatory fire mission for covert assaults. The assault force assigns the
batteries priority targets that they fire on upon request. This normally occurs
after the initial wave is ashore or upon discovery. If the assault is not covert, the
regiment fires covering fire that continues during the crossing of the first wave,
lifting on command when the boats approach the far-bank.
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c.
Fire Plan control measures are essential because of the danger of firing
on friendly forces. Boundaries between companies should run along terrain
features that are easily visible in the dark to help control indirect fire during the
dismounted assault. Counter battery fire is imperative to the success of the river
crossing. The Locating Artillery is deployed to cover the area before the assault
begins.
d.
Smoke may not be used to support the first wave of a covert crossing
because of the risk of losing surprise but should be used to hide later waves as
they cross. If the crossing is opposed, a smoke haze should cover the first wave
before it enters the water to reduce direct fire effectiveness. The Assault Force
Commander initiates smoke obscuration. Additional smoke along multiple sites
on the river conceals the true crossing area.
e.
If units must fire smoke onto the far-bank to cover the crossing area, they
fire it on the command of the assault force commander after surprise is lost.
Mortars are the primary means of indirect-fire smoke. Direct support artillery is
generally reserved for supporting fires.
f.
The AD teams deploy along the home-bank of the river to cover the
crossing. Once in place, they remain until the brigade releases them. They can
move across the river and link up with the assault force only after other AD
systems have taken position to cover the river. The crossing sites remain the
priority AD area throughout the crossing.
3187. Assault Force. The first assault wave moves the bulk of the dismounted force
across covertly. This force attempts to provide sufficient security on the far-bank so
that the second and later assault waves can cross after surprise is lost. The first
assault wave consists of the following troops:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Rifle Platoons.
Assault Pioneers.
Forward Observation Officer (FOO).
The Command Group.
(1)
The organization of the first wave permits rapid deployment of the
force into a tactical formation on the far-bank. Individual boatload retains
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unit integrity at the lowest level. The two-basic boat-loads configurations
are the rifle section boat and the Rifle Platoon HQ boat (See Figure
3.2.1).
Figure 3.2.1: Boat-load Configuration
(2)
Each boat contains a rifle section. The section boat also carries
an Assault Pioneer, while the platoon boat carries the Platoon HQ. The
Boat Force Commander is the senior occupant and commands the force
up to the attack position and after it disembarks on the far-bank. The
coxswain is the "pilot in command" and commands the force from the
point that positions the boat in the attack position until it disembarks on
the far-bank. First-wave boats carry only critical cargo, such as Atk
weapons, machine-gun ammunition, demolitions, and pioneer tools that
are required for reducing obstacles.
(3)
Platoon boats form a boat group of three boats that are spaced
20m apart on the water. The boat group forms into a "V" with the platoon
leader's boat acting as the guide boat in the centre. The two Assault
Pioneer sections are from an Infantry Battalion, with a Section
Commander commanding the team in the right boat and an Assistant
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Section Commander commanding the team in the left boat. The assault
teams re-form into a section upon disembarking. Platoon boat groups
form into company flotillas (See Figure 3.2.2). The Company
Commander commands the guide boat in the centre platoon. The
company command group disperses between boats, filling in vacant
boat positions. The distances between boats (three boats) in a platoon
will be 20m apart and the distances between boat from each platoon in
a company is 40m.
Figure 3.2.2: Company Flotilla
(4)
The first wave of the assault may consist of three company flotillas
crossing on line. Battalions do not have a prescribed crossing formation.
Each company crosses in its own zone and attacks its own objectives.
All undamaged boats return to the home-bank after carrying the first
wave. The senior coxswain of the group will consolidate the boats and
stroke paddlers into one (or more) boat and daisy-chain the other boats
to the lead boat to expedite the time required for the boats to return to
the home-bank. The second and later waves carry across the remaining
troops and materials that are necessary to seize the far bank objective.
(5)
The second wave carries company aid stations and may include
the battalion command group. Since sufficient AD systems are in place
to cover the crossing area, the division may release some or all of the
battery AD teams to cross in the second wave. The second wave also
transports additional material and ammunition not required for the initial
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assault but necessary to establish a defence. This may include antiarmour weapons, mortars, and other infantry support weapons. If
secrecy is not required for the second wave because the first wave is in
combat, or if the enemy has begun to fire on the crossing area, then
outboard engines are used to propel the boats.
(6)
The immediate movement of some heavy Atk weapons across to
support the dismounted assault battalion is essential. This is critical
enough to justify extraordinary actions. As vehicle carry all heavy Atk
weapons, engineer concentrate on forcing a few critical vehicles carrying
heavy weapons across immediately after the second wave. They hand
carry heavy weapons, if necessary, even before direct fire and indirect
fire removed from the crossing area. The CAE execute bank
preparations on both the home and far-bank, using hand tools and
equipment where possible. They then ferry Engineer C Vehicles to the
far-bank. If absolutely necessary, rafting can be used but this risk
destroying equipment that will be critical later in the crossing.
3188. Engineer. Engineer supporting the assault are attached to the assault unit in
order to help it to fight through obstacles and prepared defences. The engineer helps
the assault force establish hasty defences after it has seized its objectives. Engineer
normally comes from the Engineer Squadron that supports the brigade. The tasks of
engineer are as follows:
a.
Assist to operate the boats and cross the assault force.
b.
‘In Support’ of the assault battalion until it has secured its objectives.
c.
Assist the assault force in crossing.
d.
Improve home and far-banks for rafts and boats, and assist with the
crossing of initial heavy weapons.
e.
The engineer will remain on the home and far-bank, operating the
crossing area.
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PREPARATION FOR THE ASSAULT
3189. Similar to conducting a deliberate breach of a complex obstacle, River Crossing
Operations require intelligence collection, detailed planning and preparation. These
must all be synchronised to allow the force to maintain its momentum and to surprise
the defender at the point of penetration.
a.
Far-Bank Reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance of the far-bank
must cover a broad front to a significant depth to determine the details of the
terrain and the enemy's defences. This should occur early and cover sufficient
terrain to disguise the actual crossing area. Engineer conducts a technical
reconnaissance of the far-bank, focusing on the immediate crossing area. An
Engineer Light Diving Team conducts a reconnaissance at night. If a Diving team
is unavailable, then a swimming reconnaissance team is made up from the
Engineer unit supporting the crossing. Strong swimmers from the Engineer
supporting the crossing make up the reconnaissance party if divers are not
available. Two swimmers make up a reconnaissance team to scout a company
crossing area. The reconnaissance team checks potential areas identified from
the home-bank and evaluate each, based on its ability to support assault boats
and disembark troops. The reconnaissance party also checks areas where raft
and bridge centrelines can be installed. Far-bank reconnaissance is conducted
early and at multiple sites along the bank to generate information necessary for
planning and selecting the most suitable areas. Manoeuvre units, with support
from the engineer conducts far-bank reconnaissance. Critical information
requirements during far-bank reconnaissance include the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The characteristics of the bank at assault boat landing areas.
The depth of the water to a distance of 4.6m off bank.
Any obstacles along the bank.
The locations of enemy observation posts.
b.
Far-Bank Preparation. The far-bank is prepared immediately before the
assault crossing. The preparation team consists of a two-man reconnaissance
team and a two-man cargo team with an inflatable reconnaissance boat whereby
both teams are from the supporting engineer. The process are as follows:
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(1)
The reconnaissance team that conducted the far-bank
reconnaissance is normally best suited to do the far-bank preparation.
The preparation team installs landing markers for the flotillas. A separate
team normally marks each company zone to speed up preparation.
(2)
The reconnaissance team and the cargo team are equipped the
same as the reconnaissance party and use the same techniques. The
reconnaissance team crosses first, floating downstream to the landing
site with the current. Upon landing, they move to the correct landing site
for the assault landing and signal for the cargo team to cross. The
reconnaissance team installs transit lights to guide the cargo team as it
crosses.
(3)
Signalling is accomplished by sending a prearranged Morse Code
letter using a flashlight equipped with an opaque filter. The transit lights
consist of either two flashlights with opaque filters an directional cones
or two chemical lights in their foil wrappers with small areas torn open to
release light. The team installs the lights so that one is about one meter
above the water and the other is about two meters above the water and
two meters behind it, facing 45° upstream.
(4)
The cargo team waits until it is signalled to cross. It uses a threeman reconnaissance boat as a flotation device to carry marking
materials, mine detectors, night-vision goggles and a radio. The
reconnaissance boat is covered with a camouflage net section and is
partially deflated after loading, so that it floats low in the water to reduce
its signature. The camouflage net is secured to the lifelines to aid in
holding the cargo in the partially submerged boat. The cargo team
crosses oriented on and swimming slightly upstream of the transit lights
so that it can drift into the bank with the current, limiting the noise and
the splash.
(5)
The preparation team installs landing markers as its first priority.
These are the same types of markers used to guide the cargo team.
They must be adequately visible to the assault force but dim enough not
to harm night vision. If flashlights are available, they have opaque or
coloured filters installed to limit the light output. All landing markers are
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transit lights that mark the position and help the boats set the proper
course relative to the current. Normally, if the current is less than 0.5
m/s, the lights are set perpendicular to the river. If the current exceeds
0.5 m/s, the lights are set at a 45° angle to the river, facing upstream.
Double transit lights mark the centre boat group's landing area, and
single transit lights mark the flank group's. If coloured lights are
available, green lights mark the right boat group's landing area; white the
centre, and red the left (See Figure 3.2.3).
Figure 3.2.3: Landing Marker Light
(6) The preparation team also makes a final examination of the landing
areas for mines or obstacles. If it discovers isolated mines, it marks them
and the routes around them. If the team finds a major minefield that will
significantly hinder the landing at a site, it either notifies the assault force
or moves the site upstream or downstream to avoid the mines or
attempts to reduce the minefield. Once the preparation is complete, the
team signals the assault force to begin crossing, initiating the movement
of the first wave carrying the boats from the attack position. The
preparation team then finds cover near the landing area for the centre
boat of a pre-designated boat group (generally the centre boat group)
and awaits its arrival. This boat group is especially alert for linkup with
the preparation team. While waiting, the team continues to watch for
enemy activity and alerts the assault force of any significant changes.
c.
Home-Bank Reconnaissance. Units must be extremely careful to hide
reconnaissance elements conducting home-bank reconnaissance in the
crossing area or to deceive the enemy about what they are doing. Battalion and
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company command groups must conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the
crossing area. They must see the embarkation and debarkation points and key
landmarks to help guide the force when crossing. They must also see the
FUP/LD and the routes from it to the river. Company guides must walk the
routes from the dismounted points to the boat-group positions within the
company's attack position. Engineer boat coxswains must see the routes they
will traverse from the attack position to the water. Support Force leaders and
vehicle commanders must covertly select firing positions and locate concealed
routes into the positions for their vehicle during daylight. They should identify
sectors of fire and conduct extensive observation within the sectors to acquire
specific targets.
d.
Assault Force Rehearsal. An assault boat crossing cannot be
conducted effectively in the face of opposition without thorough rehearsal. If
possible, the force should conduct two rehearsals. One should be during
daylight to learn the procedures and one should be at night under actual assault
conditions. The rehearsal area should be similar to the actual crossing area but
away from the river to preserve secrecy.
(1)
Before rehearsal, the boat crews and Infantry train together in the
actual boat teams assigned for the crossing. Soldiers receive their boat
assignments and practice in their assigned positions until the boats can
move effectively on the water. The training must include carrying and
launching the boat, embarking, watermanship, emergency actions,
disembarking and hasty defence preparations. After the rehearsal, boat
assignments must not be changed.
(2)
During training, the coxswain forms the boat team. He forms the
crew members in a column of twos in the relative positions that they will
occupy in the boat, with passengers at the rear of the two columns. He
then numbers the crew. The right-side paddlers are one, three, five,
seven and nine and the left-side paddlers are two, four, six, eight and
ten (both sides from bow to stern). The breast line man is always number
11 and the coxswain is always number 12, regardless of the number of
paddlers used. Passengers are numbered consecutively from bow to
stern starting with number 11, who is always the bow gunner. The
coxswain addresses all crew members by number. When the coxswain
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wishes to address a command to a pair of paddlers, he uses their
numbers together, as in "one and two" and "three and four."
(3)
The boat can carry 12 soldiers as shown in Figure 3.2.4. If fully
loaded, the boat requires 10 paddlers. Boat-position numbers do not
change.
Figure 3.2.4: Boat Numbering
(4)
All forces participating in the assault crossing rehearse together.
The support force moves into position, and the assault force crosses in
the same waves it will use for the actual crossing. The rehearsal should
cover the Assy A through to the seizure of the assault force objectives.
EXECUTION FOR THE ASSAULT
3190. The objective of an assault river crossing is to project combat firepower to the
far-bank without being detected by the enemy or once detected, projects it at a faster
rate than the enemy can concentrate forces for a counterattack. The use of air assets
is desired, however, there are normally not enough assets available, or the risk of
being detected is too great. To maintain momentum and allow maximum combat
power across quickly, the manoeuvre force negotiates the river on a broad front.
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Detailed planning and specific responsibilities allow units to cross and quickly establish
a tactical foothold on the far side to achieve the following:
a.
Prevent the enemy from indirect fire observation.
b.
Allow rafting and bridging operations to begin.
3191. Attack Position Procedures. The attack positions must be large enough to
accept dismounted infantry. It should cater the following:
a.
Be accessible to vehicles or carrying parties bringing the assault boats.
b.
Be concealed from hostile ground and aerial observation.
c.
Be connected with defined foot routes to the river.
d.
Be within 100m to 200m of the river.
e.
Be in defilade positions from hostile flat-trajectory fire.
3192. Vehicle carrying assault boats and life jackets are moved as far forward as
possible without compromising secrecy. They are met at the designated unloading
position by the engineer guides from each attack position, who will unload the vehicle
and carry the boats into place. The vehicle can carry two boats at a time, so this will
require five trips. If possible, B Vehicles are to move at low speeds to minimise noise
and carry several boats at a time into the attack positions. Within the attack position,
boat crews disperse assault boats and life jackets along the boat-group routes to the
river. The safety boat is positioned as the last boat in the downstream boat group. The
remaining life jackets for passengers and the coxswain are arrayed behind the boat.
3193. After the boats are prepared, each engineer section provides a guide to bring
each platoon from its Assy A to the home-bank crossing site. The platoon leader sends
the guide party to the Assy A, where each guide links up with his boat group. The
remaining engineer establishes local security around the attack position and awaits
the boat groups. Soldiers arrive in the attack position with their weapons cocked on an
empty chamber, selector switch on ‘SAFE’ and magazines removed. Section
Commanders must verify this in the Assy A before moving to the attack position. The
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soldiers are organized, without the boat engineer, into boat teams and boat groups in
the Assy A. They then travel as boat groups and when they arrive at the attack position;
their guide leads them directly to their boats.
3194. When the boat team arrives at its boat, the coxswain commands, “Crew, boat
stations”. Each team member takes his proper boat position, with passengers lining
up to the rear. The coxswain then directs the team to load and check weapons. The
team inserts the rifles' magazines and verifies that they are seated. However, the team
does not chamber the rounds. All weapons remain on ‘SAFE’. Section Commanders
verify that all weapons are on ‘SAFE’, whilst the coxswain then directs the team
members to sling their weapons and don their life jackets. Paddlers sling their rifles
diagonally so that the barrel extends up over the shoulder which will be away from the
boat when standing alongside and facing forward. Odd-numbered paddlers sling their
rifles over their right shoulder, even numbered over their left. This allows carrying the
boat at high carry and reduces interference with paddling. Muzzles must be up-right
during all boat operations to prevent punctures. The teams then await the command
to proceed to the water.
3195. Embarking Procedures. On order of the Company Commander, the paddlers
carry the boats to the river. They make no unnecessary stops from the time of
departure until the boat reaches the bank. The coxswain directs either "Low carry" or
"High carry." In low carry, crew members lift the boat to about knee height, by the
carrying handles while facing forward, and carry the boat at arm’s length. In high carry,
crew members lift the boat to about head height, place it on their inboard shoulders,
and carry it while gripping the carrying handles with their outboard hands. Normally,
high carry is used for long distances, and the boat is shifted to low carry when
approaching the bank. Paddles remain in the boat during carry procedures. Remaining
crew members follow the boat to the water. The boat crew may launch the boat either
bows first or stern first. However, bow first method is the preferred method used and
boat is launched as follows:
a.
Bow-First Method. Bow first whenever the water is shallow enough for
the team to wade in carrying the boat at low carry. On the coxswain's command,
"Launch boat," team members perform a low carry and move into the water at
a fast walk. When the depth of the water is such that the boat floats free of the
bottom, all hands continue pushing it into the river, remaining at their relative
positions alongside the boat. As the water reaches the knees of the first pair of
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paddlers, the coxswain commands, "One and two in." The first pair of paddlers’
climbs into the boat un-stow their paddles and give way together. The coxswain
orders each pair of paddlers into the boat in succession by commanding, "Three
and four in," "Five and six in," and "Seven and eight in." The pairs climb into the
boat on command, break out their paddles, and pick up the stroke of the stroke
paddlers. The coxswain orders the passengers into the boat by commanding,
"nine in", "ten in" and so forth. The passengers board over the stern and moves
forward in the boat to their position. The coxswain enters the boat last and
sounds off, "Coxswain in, hold water”.
b.
Stern-First Method. Stern first when the water is too deep for wading or
when the launch point has steep slope banks. On the coxswain's command,
"Launch boat," team members perform a low carry and carry the boat stern
(rear) first to the water's edge. They launch the boat by passing it back along
the line of team members. When the stroke paddler can no longer help pass
the boat back, he moves to the bow of the boat and handles the towing bridle.
Other team members follow suit, taking their places along the towing bridle
between the stroke paddlers and the boat. When the boat is in the water, the
coxswain enters the boat and takes his station. He orders the boat team to load,
starting with the rearmost left-hand paddler, by commanding "Ten in," "Nine in,"
"Eight in," "Seven in," "Six in," "Five in," and so forth. When the coxswain is
ready to cast off, he allows the boat to drift back and turns it to face across the
river. If outboard motor (OBM) are to be mounted before the first-wave crossing,
the coxswain brings the boat in to bank stern first after the boat is manned and
holds it in place either by a line to bank or by holding bottom. Two engineer
wades to the boat carrying its OBM and mount it on the transom.
3196. Tactical Control Afloat. The coxswain navigates the boat and directs the
paddlers. He controls the movement of the boat in the water as well as embarkation
and disembarkation from it. He ensures that the guide boat maintains the proper
station. The boat commander sits in front of the coxswain and directs the boat in an
emergency. He also commands the boat occupants upon landing until the unit has
reformed. The boat commander also directs fires from the boat, if necessary.
3197. Each platoon has a platoon guide boat, which contains the Platoon HQ. Other
platoon boats position themselves to either side of the platoon guide boat as wingmen,
to maintain a 20m interval for protection against fires and to allow dispersion on
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landing. They follow the guide boat and land when it does. They also open fire from
the boat when the guide boat does the same action. Each company has a C2 boat,
which carries the Company Commander and leads his flotilla. Platoon guide boats
position themselves at double-boat intervals from the C2 boat, maintaining 40m
spacing between boat groups. The C2 boat is normally the lead boat of the centre
platoon.
3198. The battalion command group remains on the home-bank until the assault wave
has landed. The commander controls the home-bank direct fires and directs changes
in landing points if elements of the first wave encounter difficulties. He also directs
changes for the following wave. The commander has his own boat and crosses on his
own schedule, but he normally crosses with the second wave. The command group
normally does not cross in a single boat but is distributed among several boats. Guide
boats in all boat groups are responsible for ensuring that their group lands at the proper
place. Landing marker lights are installed as transit lights to assist navigation on the
water. The coxswain will see two lights, one above the other. If the boat is moving
straight to the landing, the lights will be straight in vertical alignment. If not, the lower
light points in the direction the boat must go to be exactly headed for the landing. The
boat will not head directly for the transit lights except when the river has no current.
The boat heads for the far-bank so that the boat's true course is directly for the transit
lights (See Figure 3.2.5).
Figure 3.2.5: Boat Course
3199. Normally, the boats will cross slightly upstream from the landing so that they
can drift in with the current. To do this, they align themselves so that the lower transit
light points slightly upstream. If the force is conducting a crossing where smoke is
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necessary on the water and it obscures the far-bank, other navigation methods it could
use include stringing ferry lines across the river for the boats to follow, using floating
markers or travelling on a compass heading.
3200. Watermanship. It includes all the skills that the boat crew must exhibit to
properly control their boat in the water. It includes individual paddling skills,
responsiveness to commands and the skill of the coxswain. Individual paddlers use a
paddling technique where they push the paddle vertically into the water, roughly one
meter to their front, and then power it back through the water by pushing with the upper
hand, while using the lower (guide) hand for control. At the end of the power stroke,
they remove the paddle from the water, turn it outboard and parallel with the water's
surface (feathering), and move it forward for the next stroke. The stroke is silent, with
the paddlers careful not to strike the side of the boat or to splash.
3201. The stroke paddler sets the pace to control the paddlers. He receives oral
commands from the coxswain and establishes and maintains the paddling pace. All
paddlers match the stroke of the paddler in front of them except for the number two
man, who matches his stroke with the stroke paddler. If the boat crew has difficulty
paddling in unison, the coxswain can exercise oral control by calling cadence. The
normal paddling speed is 10 strokes per minute for stealth and 30 strokes per minute
for speed. The words of command used by the coxswain to control the boats are as
follows:
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Table 3.2.1: Command to Control the Boat
3202. The coxswain can make minor adjustments in the boat's speed by directing,
"Slow the paddle" or "Speed the paddle”. The coxswain must take the current's velocity
into account when trying to hold a course. In low-velocity current, the boat can travel
a relatively straight course across the river by crabbing slightly upstream. To do this,
the coxswain aims the bow of the boat slightly upstream while sighting on the
landmark. If the mark remains on a constant bearing (it does not drift upstream or
downstream), the boat is crabbing correctly and is headed directly for the landing.
3036. If the current's velocity is too high for successful crabbing (over 0.5m/s), either
the boat must start upstream, or the coxswain must steer a figure-eight pattern. In both
cases, the boat should approach the landing heading into the current to avoid the
danger of broaching. If the boat is launched from far upstream, it generally follows a
course similar to the dotted course as shown in Figure 6.6. If the coxswain follows a
figure-eight course, he steers upstream until aligned with the transit lights, then lets
the bow drop downstream and guides by using the lights until he reaches the landing
point at the far-bank. He then steers upstream to the landing marks (See Figure 3.2.6).
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These techniques minimise the amount of time the boat will be travelling slowly against
the current, while near the enemy bank.
Figure 3.2.6: Figure Eight Course
3203. The need for a figure-eight course is determined during the reconnaissance.
The flotilla command boat sets the figure-eight course, completing the downstream
turn in alignment with the transit lights. Remaining boats simply maintain station until
the last turn upstream towards the landing area. Boat groups then head directly for the
transit lights. Eddy currents (eddies) occur at channel bends, near points of land and
at places where the bottom is uneven. Eddies can be dangerous to small boats. The
coxswain must be alert for them.
3204. Obscuring with Smoke. The purpose of smoking the crossing site is to achieve
a haze over the water that can render direct and indirect fires from the far-bank to be
less effective. Some of the reasons for smoke may be used during River Crossing
Operations are as follows:
a.
Conceal the movement of the initial assault force.
b.
Isolate the far-bank of the river for rapid occupation by manoeuvre
forces.
c.
Conceal emplacement of crossing means, such as engineer bridges.
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3205. During River Crossing Operations, smoke may be used for the following
reasons:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Obscuration.
Screening.
Marking.
Deception.
3206. It is particularly important not to produce a column of smoke above the water
that can pinpoint the crossing location. For this reason, smoke is not used if conditions
will not hold it close to the surface. Smoke production depends on wind direction. If
the wind is blowing from the home-bank toward the far-bank, smoke generators or
support force vehicles can effectively smoke the crossing. If the wind tends to blow
parallel to the river, home-bank smoke should not be used, as it will make a smoke
wall that will silhouette boats on the river. In this case, floating smoke pots anchored
across the width of the river can produce effective smoke. If the wind is blowing from
far-bank to the home-bank, smoke pots or mortar smoke on the far-bank can be
effective.
3207. Indirect Fire Reaction. If the boat is subjected to heavy artillery fire while
crossing and the boat commander directs, the coxswain turns the boat downstream
and propels it at a fast stroke with the current out of the artillery impact area. If the
boat is equipped with an Out Board Motor (OBM), it is started and the paddlers stow
their paddles and maintain a low posture.
3208. Disembarking Procedures. The manner in which the coxswain orders the boat
team to land the boat depends on the depth of the water at the landing point.
3209. Shallow Water. As the boat nears the landing point, the coxswain directs the
boat towards the landing and orders, "Land boat." As the boat grounds, paddlers stow
paddles and disembark over the side into the water. They then hold the boat for the
passengers to disembark. The stroke paddler secures the boat and waits to return it.
3210. Deep Water. As the boat comes along the bank, the coxswain orders, "Stroke
out." The stroke paddler stows his paddle and, with the towing bridle in hand, gets out
of the boat onto the bank. He then pulls the boat up close to the bank and secures it if
he can. Otherwise, crew members will have difficulty disembarking. The other crew
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members stow their paddles. The coxswain then directs disembarking by number,
beginning with the passengers, then the bank side paddlers, and disembarking finally
the riverside paddlers. The coxswain is the last to leave the boat. He and the stroke
paddler secure the boat and wait to return it. Immediately upon leaving the boat, the
boat team forms a hasty perimeter. The bow gunner moves directly forward, roughly
10m, and drops prone, observing to his front. The left-side section members move up
and form a prone semicircle to his left. The Section Commander takes charge of his
section and directs all soldiers to drop their life jackets. He then awaits orders from his
Platoon Commander.
3211. Boat Return. As soon as the boat team has formed a hasty perimeter and
dropped their life jackets, the stroke paddler recovers them and returns them to the
boat.
3212. The boat Engineer Section Commander (the senior engineer with the boat
group) takes charge of all three boats in the boat group. He supervises the tying off of
all three boats in a trail and loads all six engineers into the front boat. They then paddle
the boat back to the home-bank, towing the other two boats (See Figure 3.2.7).
Figure 3.2.7: Boat Return
3213. On the return, the boat group travels in a relatively straight line to gain distance
from the enemy bank as rapidly as possible. This will cause the group to drift
downstream. Upon reaching the home-bank, the boat group turns upstream and
travels close in bank until it reaches its original departure point (See Figure 3.2.8). A
guide from the engineer Troop HQ guides them in for the next wave.
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Figure 3.2.8: Operation of Boat Group
3214. If the boats have outboard motor OBM, all three boat crews start their OBM on
command of the boat Engineer Section Commander and return independently to the
home-bank.
3215. Outboard Motor Procedure. Normally, the first wave uses paddles to cross
covertly. After the boats return from carrying the first wave, the OBM are mounted. If
the boats can be placed in the water without enemy observation (in a lagoon or barge
basin, for example), the OBM are mounted on the boats before the first wave crosses.
In this situation, the OBM can be started immediately if the crossing is discovered. The
OBM are also available for returning the boats after the first wave.
3216. If a covert crossing cannot be achieved, the first wave may cross the river
powered by OBM. In this case, the OBM is mounted before the boat crew and
passengers carry the boat to the bank. Two additional engineers are provided to help
carry the stern of the boat to the bank. The crew paddles the boat while the coxswain
starts the OBM in order to reduce exposure time on the river. This technique must be
practiced during the rehearsal. If time permits or the distance to the water is great, the
two-man team of engineer from the crossing area engineer carries the OBM to the
water and mounts it on the boat. The boat is manned and held with the bow towards
the river and the stern to the bank. If the bottom is shallow, the paddlers hold bottom.
If the water is too deep or the current is too strong, a line is fastened to the boat stern
to hold it against the bank. The mounting team wades out to place the OBM on the
stern and fastens it in place. The coxswain directs the paddlers to give way together
after the OBM is mounted. He then starts the OBM with the boat under way. If the boat
has too few occupants to move effectively by paddles (for example, during the second
wave), the boat remains at the bank until the coxswain starts the OBM.
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3217. Preparation is critical for success with OBM. The primary problem is hard
starting. All OBM are started and run up to operating temperature during preparation.
If any are difficult to start, replacement OBM are substituted (the hard-starting OBM
become backups). After mechanical checks and warm-ups, the fuel tanks are
completely filled with the correct fuel and oil mixture to eliminate condensation. In cool
or cold weather, the OBM are kept warm until needed, using a warming tent, a heated
building, sealed wrapping or other means.
3218. Cargo Procedures. Porters detailed from the assault force bring the cargo
forward. They carry it to the waterline at the boat launch point to await the return of
the boats. When the boats return, the porters load and secure the cargo to the boat. If
the cargo includes heavy or pointed items, a temporary plywood floor is placed in the
boat before loading. Porters accompany the cargo to the far-bank to unload it. The
cargo is unloaded until carrying parties are sent back from the assault force to collect
them.
3219. Casualty Procedures. Platoon medics accompany assault forces in the first
wave. They carry their medical bags and night-vision goggles but do not have litters.
They treat wounded where they fall, sending walking wounded back to the landing
areas and leaving more severely wounded so that they can be treated as soon as
possible.
3220. The second wave carries senior aid men with equipment to establish a far-bank
casualty collection point in each company zone. The aid station should provide a
blackout shelter, such as a tarpaulin or small tent, for patient examination along with
emergency medical supplies and quantities of intravenous fluids. The second wave
also carries litter teams, formed from the HQ elements of the assault force. The litter
teams carry wounded back to the collection point. The senior aid man at the collection
point performs triage and treats patients. Priority patients are evacuated by assault
boats as they become available. All other patients wait until rafts are available.
SUMMARY
3221. The aim of the attack is to secure the terrain on the far-bank which precedes all
other stages during the assault crossing phase. It is recognised as a very complex
phase that requires detailed synchronisation and skilled application of the various
technical procedures. Extensive training and rehearsals must occur at every level of
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the assaulting forces, particularly between the Assault Pioneer and Engineer Troop,
as both have the roles to play in supporting the crossing. Detailed reconnaissance and
specific organization for the assault crossing will always depend on the mission,
enemy, terrain, troops and time. Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb, the assault force
will be tasked and organized into support and assault forces, which must be assisted
by the division direct and indirect fire assets. This is to ensure that the assault force is
constantly isolated and protected from enemy direct observation and fire.
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SECTION 4
PASSAGE OF LINE
3222. Passage of lines is a tactical enabling operation in which one unit moves through
another unit’s positions with the intent of moving into or out of enemy contact. A
commander conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a
counterattack, withdrawal or main battle forces, and anytime one unit cannot bypass
another unit’s position. The conduct of a passage of lines potentially involves close
combat. It involves transferring the responsibility for an area of operations (AO)
between two commanders. That transfer of responsibility usually occurs when roughly
two-thirds of the passing force has moved through the passage point. If not directed
by higher authority, the unit commanders determine - by mutual agreement - the time
to pass command. They disseminate this information to the lowest levels of both
organisations.
3223. The commander’s reasons for conducting a passage of lines are to:
a.
Sustain the tempo of an offensive operation.
b.
Maintain the viability of the defence by transferring responsibility from
one unit to another.
c.
Transition from a delay or security operation by one force to a defence.
d.
Free a unit for another mission or task.
The headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining when
the passage starts and finishes.
3224. A passage of lines occurs under two basic conditions. A forward passage of
lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward
the enemy. A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another
unit’s positions while moving away from the enemy. Ideally, a passage of lines does
not interfere with conducting the stationary unit’s operations.
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ORGANISATION OF FORCES
3225. A unit may participate in a passage of lines as either the passing or stationary
force. Except for co-locating command posts and providing for guides by the stationary
force, conducting a passage of lines does not require a special task organisation. Both
the passing force and the stationary force maintain their previous combat organisation
during the passage. Usually, if the stationary unit has the capability, it is responsible
for conducting operations against uncommitted enemy forces. However, operations
directed against uncommitted enemy forces may be the responsibility of a higher
formation, depending on the formation at which the passage takes place.
3226. A forward passing unit’s order of march is generally reconnaissance and
security elements first. The ground combat force move next, followed by combat
support and combat service support (CSS) units. The commander integrates his
artillery, air defence and engineers into the order of march in accordance with the
factors of MAP. The passing unit reverses this order of march in a rearward passage
of lines. The stationary unit normally provides the moving unit with guides to speed up
the passage. When Army Aviation Unit is used to provide security, the ground force
should be the augment force.
CONTROL MEASURES
3227. Control measures associated with a passage of lines are generally restrictive to
prevent inflicting casualty on own forces by friendly fire. As a minimum, they include
the AO, Assy A, forming-up place, battle handover line (BHL), contact points, passage
points, passage lanes, routes, gaps, phase lines and recognition signals. The
headquarters directing the passage designates or recommends contact points,
passage lanes, Assy A, routes, and start and end times for the passage. The
commander may also use start points, release points, fire support coordinating
measures, such as Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL) and other control
measures as necessary to conduct this task (Figure 3.2.9). Unless the higher
headquarters of the two units establishes the necessary graphic control measures, the
stationary unit establishes them for the passage. However, the stationary unit
commander must coordinate them with the passing unit commander. The stationary
unit establishes these measures because it owns the terrain, it knows where the
obstacles are and it knows the tactical plan. If the control measures dictated by the
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higher headquarters are not sufficient - because they do not contain enough passage
points, lanes and so forth - the two units can agree to add the necessary measures.
Figure 3.2.9: Control Measures Associated with a Forward Passage of Lines
3228. A passage point is a specifically designated place where the passing units pass
through the stationary unit. The location of this point is where the commander wants
subordinate units to physically execute a passage of lines. In a forward passage of
lines, the passage point marks the location where the passing unit is no longer bound
by the restrictions placed on it by the stationary force. On the other hand, in a rearward
passage of lines, the passage point marks the location where the stationary unit can
restrict the movement and manoeuvre of the passing force. Between the contact point
and the passage point, the stationary unit controls the passing force’s movement.
Figure 3.2.10 depicts the graphic control measure for passage point 8.
Figure 3.2.10: Passage Point Number 8
Figure 3.2.11: Lane
3229. A passage lane is a lane through an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides
safe passage for a passing force. The lane may be cleared, including being reduced
and proofed, as part of a breach operation or it may be included as part of the design
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of a friendly obstacle. It is a clear route all the way through an obstacle. Passage lanes
normally end where a route begins. That route should allow the passing unit to move
rapidly through the stationary unit’s area. Figure 3.2.11 depicts the graphic control
measure for a lane.
3230. A gap is an area free of armed mines or obstacles whose width and direction
allow a friendly force to pass through the area containing obstacles while dispersed in
a tactical formation. The presence of gaps prevents inadvertent concentrations of
soldiers and equipment around the entry points of lanes. Figure 3.2.12 depicts the
graphic control measure for a gap.
Figure 3.2.12: Gap
PLANNING A PASSAGE OF LINES
3231. As with any activity involving transferring combat responsibility from one unit to
another, the complex nature of a passage of lines involves risk. As with other
operations, a passage of lines may be categorized as deliberate or hasty. During a
passage of lines, the commander normally maintains the established tempo.
Sustaining that established tempo requires detailed planning and preparations for a
deliberate passage of lines. In this case, both the stationary and moving force have
time to:
a.
Publish written orders.
b.
Exchange plans, intelligence information, data bases and liaison
personnel.
c.
Conduct briefings and detailed reconnaissance.
d.
Conduct rehearsals.
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The commander normally uses oral orders to conduct a hasty passage of lines.
3222. In a passage of lines, the headquarters directing the passage is responsible for
designating:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Subsequent missions for both forces.
When and under what conditions passage of command takes place.
Start and finish times for the passage.
Contact points between the units involved.
Common manoeuvre control measures and graphics.
The directing headquarters normally establishes this information in either the warning
order or the order directing the passage. In the absence of higher-formation guidance,
close coordination and understanding between the commanders and staffs of the two
units are essential to a smooth passage.
3223. The unit commanders plan the passage of lines to maintain enemy contact and
provide constant fires on the enemy. Commanders reduce risk and ensure
synchronization through detailed planning and decentralized execution. With forces
intermingling during the passage, the need for positive control increases. The passage
requires close coordination, clearly understood control measures, liaison between all
headquarters and echelons involved in the passage, and clear identification of the
moment or event that causes one force to assume responsibility for the AO from
another.
3224. After receiving the warning order that directs a passage of lines, the passing
unit’s commander and key staff representatives generally co-locate with the command
post of the stationary unit to facilitate in planning the passage and establishing
common situational understanding. If the passing unit cannot co-locate one of its
command posts to help plan the passage, it conducts extensive liaison with the
stationary unit. The planning focus for both the passing unit and the stationary unit is
on operations following the passage. While this occurs, the two units involved
coordinate the following:
a.
The exchange of intelligence and combat information.
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b.
Current friendly dispositions and tactical plans, especially deception and
obstacle plans.
c.
Direct and indirect fires and close air support plans.
d.
Any necessary manoeuvre control measures and graphics not directed
by the higher headquarters, such as boundary changes, the BHL, emergency
CSS points, Assy A, firing positions for artillery, air defence and other units.
e.
Long-range and short-range recognition symbols and vehicle markings
to reduce the probability of inflicting casualty on own forces by friendly fire.
f.
When and under what conditions control of the AO transfers from one
headquarters to the other, if not previously established.
g.
Provisions for movement control, including contact points, start and
release points, primary and alternate routes, route selection, priorities for using
routes and facilities, passage points, and provision for guides.
h.
Reconnaissance by elements of the passing unit.
i.
Signal operating instruction details, such as call signs, frequencies and
recognition signals.
j.
Security measures during the passage, including nuclear, biological and
chemical reconnaissance or biological detection systems.
k.
Fires, obscurants and any other combat, combat support and CSS
provided by the stationary unit.
l.
Measures to reduce both units’ vulnerability to attack by enemy weapons
of mass destruction.
m.
Operations security measures required before or during the passage.
n.
Allocation of terrain for use by the passing force.
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o.
Air defence cover - up to and forward of the BHL.
p.
Logistics support for the passing unit provided by the stationary unit,
especially fuel, maintenance and medical treatment.
3225. The fire support elements of both the stationary and the passing unit must agree
on allocating firing positions. The AO commander controls the allocation of firing
positions in case of disagreement. These positions must be far enough forward to
support the operation without having to redeploy during critical stages of the battle.
The fire support elements normally position in areas not identified by the enemy.
3226. Detailed air defence planning is essential for a passage of lines. Moving units
tend to move slowly and often in some type of column formation during the passage.
Vehicle congestion presents lucrative targets to enemy aircraft. In most cases, the
stationary air defence elements can protect the passing force, allowing the air defence
units supporting the passing force to move with the passing force. Dissemination of
early warning and Air Defence Control Centre (ADCC) reduces the risk of inflicting
casualty on own forces by friendly fire to friendly aviation assets while increasing the
probability of the timely detection of enemy air. Strict adherence to identification,
friend-or-foe (IFF) procedures among pilots and air defence fire units is critical,
especially during periods of limited visibility. Local air superiority also reduces the
vulnerability of the two forces when congestion cannot be avoided on the ground.
3227. Once a passage of lines begins, it occurs quickly. Where possible, the operation
takes place when the enemy has the least capability to detect it, such as at night or
during periods of reduced visibility. In any passage of lines, the commander considers
using smoke to screen friendly movement, even at night.
3228. The passing unit prefers to conduct the passage through a gap in the stationary
unit’s positions rather than through a lane or a route that traverses those positions.
This reduces the vulnerability that results from concentrating forces when one unit
passes directly through the occupied positions of another unit. It also avoids the
danger of concentrating the passing unit into passage lanes.
3229. In a forward passage of lines, when there are no gaps through the stationary
unit’s positions, each battle group normally needs at least two passage lanes. In a
rearward passage of lines, each battalion needs at least one passage lane. In both
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cases, a brigade needs at least one additional lane for its tactical vehicles. The routes
and lanes provide cover, concealment and rapid movement of the passing force. The
commander may designate alternative routes and lanes for elements of the moving
force that are contaminated. They should not disrupt the combat capability of the
stationary unit. The commander seeks additional lanes to speed the process if the
terrain and enemy situation allow.
3230. The passing unit normally has priority of route use to and within the stationary
unit’s AO. Clearing and maintaining passage routes up to the BHL are the
responsibility of the stationary force. The stationary force must provide an obstacle
overlay of its obstacles. The passing unit must be prepared to help maintain these
routes and it positions its engineer equipment accordingly. The stationary unit is
responsible for traffic control within its AO until the passing unit assumes control.
During the passage, the passing unit augments the traffic-control capability of the
stationary unit as required.
3231. Based on the commander’s concept and intent, the passing force focuses its
planning effort on two general areas: coordination with the stationary force and
guidance to subordinate units conducting the passage. These planning efforts occur
simultaneously. If the enemy attacks during the passage, the plan probably requires
modification to prevent hampering friendly manoeuvre.
3232. Executing a passage of lines successfully requires effective communication
between the two units. The commanders build redundancy of communication signals
and means into their passage plans, such as using combat net radios. The
commanders also designate contact points to ensure effective communication
between the two forces at the lowest tactical level.
FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
3233. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to conduct
operations. It ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allowing the relief of
previously committed forces. The stationary force must control and secure the AO far
enough to its front that the moving force can pass through the stationary force and
reform into a combat formation prior to contact with an enemy force. Generally, the
stationary unit supports the passing unit until the passing unit masks the stationary
unit’s direct fires. The stationary unit continues to support the passing force with its fire
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support systems until the passing unit moves beyond the supporting range of the
stationary force. The stationary unit is also responsible for the security of the line of
departure of the forward passing unit until it is able to assume that responsibility. The
boundaries of the forward passing force after it completes its passage do not have to
coincide with the boundaries of the stationary force (Figure 3.2.13).
PREPARING A FORWARD PASSAGE
3234. The passing unit conducts reconnaissance from its current location to its
designated Assy A, which are generally located to the rear of the stationary unit. After
completing its reconnaissance, the passing unit occupies these Assy A.
3235. The commander should organize the passing force for its subsequent mission
before initiating the forward passage of lines. The passing force avoids regrouping in
forward Assy A or forming-up place.
Figure 3.2.13: Forward Passage of Lines
EXECUTING A FORWARD PASSAGE
3236. When the passing force moves forward, it should move without a halt through
the stationary unit while deployed in a combat formation. That minimizes the time the
two forces are concentrated in the forward area, making them less vulnerable to
enemy attack.
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3237. Support by the stationary force ends when the combat elements of the moving
force, including the reserve, have moved beyond direct-fire range. However, artillery,
air defence and other long-range systems may remain to support the passing unit until
a previously designated event occurs or a higher headquarters directs another
mission.
3238. When executing the forward passage, the passing unit’s reconnaissance
elements operate forward of the release points and establish a screen in front of the
passing unit. The stationary unit continues to conduct aggressive security operations
throughout the passage of lines. The movement of main body forces begins from their
Assy A to forming-up place, where the passing unit conducts its final preparations for
the passage of lines and the attack. The passing unit moves to and occupies formingup place when observation by the enemy is unlikely. The stationary unit clears any
obstacles from designated passage gaps, lanes or routes and guides elements of the
passing unit from the contact point through the passage points.
3239. The direct and indirect-fire assets of the stationary unit normally support the
movement of the passing unit. Offensive information operations - especially electronic
attack - directed against enemy command and control (C2) nodes disrupt his
dissemination of information and his reaction to friendly operations. Any preparatory
or covering fires should coincide with the passing unit’s movement from the formingup place to the passage lanes. After the forward moving unit commander assumes
responsibility for the AO, he coordinates all fire support. Depending on the situation at
the time, the passing commander may continue to use only the fire support assets of
the stationary force until the passage of lines is complete. This allows the passing
unit’s fire support assets to move forward, in the case of artillery, or remain available
to support the passing unit’s forward movement, in the case of attack helicopters and
close air support. On passage of command, the passing commander also assumes
control of fires forward of the BHL. For example, he moves the FSCL forward to
conform to the movement of his forward security elements.
3240. The superior headquarters of the forces involved should exercise overall C2 of
the passage. In a forward passage, the commander of the passing force normally
assumes responsibility for conducting operations beyond the BHL once the attack
begins. In practice, however, it is useful to complete the transfer of responsibility,
including fire support, just before starting the operation. During the passage, two
parallel chains of command are operating in one area simultaneously, and the
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possibility of confusion exists. A successful passage of lines requires clear C2
responsibilities. The passing unit’s command post passes through the lines as soon
as possible after the lead elements complete their passage and locates where it can
best control operations.
3241. The stationary unit furnishes the passing unit with any previously coordinated
or emergency logistics assistance within its capabilities. These typically include:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Evacuating casualties and enemy prisoners of war.
Controlling dislocated civilians.
Using areas and facilities such as water points and medical facilities.
Controlling routes and traffic management.
Recovering disabled vehicles and equipment.
The passing force normally assumes full responsibility for its CSS support forward of
the BHL.
3242. When dissimilar units, such as light infantry and mounted forces, are involved
in a passage of lines, the principles involved are the same; however, the execution is
different. For example, the type and amount of support provided by the stationary unit
will change. In some cases, the higher headquarters ordering the passage needs to
provide assets to support the passage.
REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
3243. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage of lines.
It continues the defence or withdrawal operation, maintaining enemy contact while
allowing for recovery of security or other forward forces. This operation may or may
not be conducted under enemy pressure. Counter-intelligence analysis provides an
assessment of enemy collection against friendly forces, specified by gaps and
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to enemy collection. Additionally, that analysis
provides the commander with a view into the enemy’s decision making and intelligence
cycles and the time period in which the enemy may discover the movement.
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PLANNING A REARWARD PASSAGE
3244. Planning procedures for a rearward passage of lines closely resemble the
planning procedures for a forward passage of lines. However, rearward movement is
likely to be more difficult because of the following:
a.
The enemy probably has the initiative, which tends to reduce the time
available to conduct liaison and reconnaissance and make detailed plans.
b.
If the rearward moving force has been in action, its soldiers are tired
and possibly disorganized to some degree.
c.
The enemy may be applying pressure on the passing force.
d.
Friendly forces may be more difficult to recognize because enemy forces
may be intermixed with them.
3245. Close coordination between the two commanders is crucial to successfully
executing the rearward passage and subsequent transfer of responsibility. This
requirement for close coordination is even more critical when the tactical situation
results in a staggered or incremental rearward passage across an AO. The passing
commander relinquishes control of his elements remaining in contact at the time of the
transfer of responsibility to the stationary commander. Generally, the stationary unit
assumes control of the AO forward of the BHL after two-thirds of the passing force’s
combat elements move through the passage points.
3246. After receiving the warning order, the passing unit begins coordination and
establishes communication with the stationary unit. The commanders of these units
coordinate the same details as those outlined for a forward passage of lines. For
example, the stationary commander coordinates for fires to support the rearward
passing force. The two staffs coordinate those control measures necessary to support
withdrawal operations and their associated rearward passage of lines. The
commanders establish a probable time to initiate passage. The stationary commander
assigns responsibility for closing and executing obstacles.
3247. The stationary unit identifies multiple routes through its AO and across its rear
boundary to Assy A. The passing unit begins reconnaissance of these routes as soon
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as possible. The stationary unit must physically show all obstacles and routes and
gaps through them to the passing unit. It provides guides for the passing unit especially through obstacles - and mans contact points and passage points. The
passing unit begins to investigate its routes to the established contact points with the
stationary unit’s troops. The stationary unit establishes a security area in which
responsibility transitions from the moving force to the stationary force. Normally, a BHL
designates the forward edge of this area. The BHL is within direct-fire range and
observed indirect-fire range of the stationary force.
PREPARING A REARWARD PASSAGE
3248. The command posts of both units involved should move to a position where they
can co-locate as part of the preparations for the rearward passage. This colocation
reduces the risk associated with a passage because it makes it easier to coordinate
between the two units. If circumstances prevent the units’ command posts from colocating, they must exchange liaison teams to ensure thorough coordination. If
necessary, fire support assets from the stationary force occupy positions forward of
their primary positions to give maximum coverage of forces of rearward moving unit.
EXECUTING A REARWARD PASSAGE
3249. The passing unit maintains command of its subordinate elements throughout
the withdrawal and rearward passage. The normal order of march in a rearward
passage of lines is CSS elements, main command post, combat support elements,
tactical command post and combat units. The passage point marks the location where
the passing unit comes under the control of restrictions placed by the stationary unit
(Figure 3.2.14). Note that the unit on the far right does not have a passage point
because of the gap existing at that location. If the enemy continues to press his attack
during the passage, the passing unit controls the battle from co-located command
posts while the stationary unit monitors and controls the passage of lines until battle
handover occurs. The passing unit’s command post passes through the lines as soon
as possible after the lead elements complete their passage. On passage of command,
the stationary unit assumes the defence of the AO.
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Figure 3.2.14: Rearward Passage of Lines
3250. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with as much assistance as
possible. Pivotal to the success of the rearward passage of lines is providing indirect
and direct fire support by the stationary unit to the passing unit. This is especially
important in covering the withdrawal of elements left in contact during a delay. The
stationary unit’s fire support assets answer calls for fire from the passing unit until
battle handover occurs. The passing unit’s fire support assets echelon rearward to
provide continuous fire support for the passing unit until it successfully disengages.
Once the passing unit hands over control of the battle to the stationary unit, the
stationary unit initiates and clears calls for all fires forward of its location. The same
procedure applies to the dedicated air defence assets of the passing and stationary
units.
3251. The stationary unit’s engineer assets provide support to prepare the defence
and execute the passage. Priority of effort initially ensures that the passing unit is able
to move through passage lanes around the stationary unit’s defensive positions. It
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shifts to close these passage lanes once the passing unit and any security elements
disengage and withdraw through the security area and obstacles.
3252. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with the previously coordinated
CSS as far forward as possible. The stationary unit concentrates on providing the
passing unit with emergency medical, recovery, and fuel supplies to enable the
passing unit to rapidly move through the stationary unit’s positions.
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SECTION 5
LINK-UP OPERATIONS
3253. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of
circumstances. It happens when an advancing force reaches an objective area
previously seized by an airborne or air assault; when an encircled element breaks out
to rejoin friendly forces or a force comes to the relief of an encircled force and when
converging manoeuvre forces meet. Both forces may be moving toward each other,
or one may be stationary. Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much
information as possible before starting an operation.
3254. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes:
a.
A common operational picture.
b.
Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during
and after linkup.
c.
Coordination of fire support before, during and after linkup, including
control measures.
d.
Linkup method.
e.
Recognition signals and communication procedures to use, including
pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, panels, coloured smoke, lights,
challenge, and passwords.
f.
Operations to conduct following linkup.
CONTROL MEASURES
3255. The commander establishes minimum control measures for units conducting a
linkup. He assigns each unit an AO defined by lateral boundaries and a RFL that also
acts as a LOA. The commander establishes a no-fire area around one or both forces
and establishes a Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) beyond the area where the
forces linkup. The linkup forces use the linkup points established by the commander
to initiate physical contact. The commander designates alternate linkup points since
enemy action may interfere with the primary linkup points. He adjusts such control
measures during the operation to provide for freedom of action as well as positive
control.
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EXECUTION
3256. There are two methods of conducting a linkup. The preferred method is when
the moving force has an assigned LOA near the other force and conducts the linkup
at predetermined contact points. Units then coordinate further operations. The
commander uses the other method during highly fluid mobile operations when the
enemy force escapes from a potential encirclement or when one of the linkup forces
is at risk and requires immediate reinforcement. In this method, the moving force
continues to move and conduct long-range recognition via radio or other measures,
stopping only when it makes physical contact with the other force.
3257. When one of the units involved is stationary, the commander usually locates the
linkup points near the RFL/LOA (Figure 3.2.15). The linkup points are also located
near the stationary force’s security elements. Stationary forces assist in the linkup by
opening lanes in minefields, breaching, or removing selected obstacles, furnishing
guides and designating Assy A. When a moving force is coming to relieve an encircled
force, it brings additional logistics assets to restore the encircled unit’s combat
effectiveness to the desired level.
3258. Linkup between moving units is one of the most difficult operations. The
commander establishes a LOA to prevent inflicting casualty on own forces by friendly
fire. He establishes primary and alternate linkup points for the moving forces near the
LOA. Fire support considerations are similar to when a stationary and moving force
linkup. Leading elements of each force should exchange liaison teams and be on a
common radio net (Figure 3.2.16).
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Figure 3.2.15: Linkup of a Moving Force and a Stationary Force
Figure 3.2.16: Linkup of Two Moving Forces
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SECTION 6
RELIEF IN PLACE
3259. A relief in place is a tactical operation in which, by the direction of higher
authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The
higher authority transfers the responsibilities for the mission and the assigned AO from
the replaced elements to the incoming unit. A commander conducts a relief in place
as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of
committed units. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief
and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally, the unit relieved is
defending. However, a relief may set the stage for resuming offensive operations. A
relief may also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination,
reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance or specialized training. Sometimes,
as part of a larger operation, a commander wants the enemy force to discover the
relief, because that discovery might cause it to do something in response that is
prejudicial to its interest, such as move reserves from an area where the friendly
commander wants to conduct a penetration.
3260. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously,
or staggered. A sequential relief occurs when each element within the relieved unit is
relieved in succession, from right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed.
A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. A
staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence
determined by the tactical situation, not its geographical orientation. Simultaneous
relief takes the least time to execute but is more easily detected by the enemy.
Sequential or staggered reliefs can take place over a significant amount of time.
3261. A relief is either deliberate or quick/hasty, depending on the amount of planning
and preparations. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning and
potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally facilitates shorter execution
time by determining exactly what the commander believes he needs to do and the
resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate planning allows him and his
staff to identify, develop and coordinate solutions to most potential problems before
they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where they are
needed.
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ORGANISATION OF FORCES
3262. Both units involved in a relief in place should be of similar type - such as
mounted or dismounted - and task organised to help maintain OPSEC. The relieving
unit usually assumes as closely as possible the same task organisation as the unit
being relieved. It assigns responsibilities and deploys in a configuration similar to the
relieved unit.
3263. The relieving unit establishes advance parties to conduct detailed coordination
and preparations for the operation, down to the company level and possibly to the
platoon level. These advance parties infiltrate forward to avoid detection. They
normally include the unit’s tactical command post, which co-locates with the main
headquarters of the unit being relieved. The commander may also attach additional
liaison personnel to subordinate units to ensure a smooth changeover between
subordinate units.
CONTROL MEASURES
3264. Control measures associated with a relief in place are generally restrictive to
prevent casualties incurred from friendly fire. As a minimum, these control measures
include the AO with its associated boundaries, battle positions, contact points, start
points, routes, release points, Assy A, fire support coordinating measures and
defensive fire coordination measures, such as TRP and EA (Figure 3.2.17). Expanded
discussions of all these control measures appear elsewhere in this manual. A
commander may use any control measure he feels is necessary to conduct a relief in
place.
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Figure 3.2.17: A Brigade Relief in Place Control Measures
PLANNING A RELIEF IN PLACE
3265. Once ordered to conduct a relief in place, the commander of the relieving unit
contacts the commander of the unit to be relieved. The co-location of unit command
posts also helps achieve the level of coordination required. If the relieved unit’s forward
elements can defend the AO, the relieving unit executes the relief in place from the
rear to the front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.
3266. In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and liaison personnel, conduct
briefings, perform detailed reconnaissance and publish orders with detailed
instructions. In a quick/hasty relief, the commander abbreviates the planning process
and controls the execution using oral and situational orders. In both cases, the relieved
unit designates liaison personnel from its combat, combat support and CSS elements
to remain with the relieving unit until completing the necessary plans. The relieving
unit receives current intelligence, operations and logistics information from the unit
being relieved, as well as from common higher headquarters, adjacent units and
subordinate elements. The complexity of a relief in place requires extensive liaison
and reconnaissance. Exchanging information about the enemy and civilian situations,
friendly dispositions, terrain analysis and fire support and obstacle plans, coupled with
reconnaissance, helps the relieving commander plan and execute his mission.
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3267. The relief is a tactically vulnerable operation. The units involved must
concentrate on security while preparing for and executing the operation. The intent of
the operation is to complete the relief without discovery by the enemy. Consequently,
commanders typically plan reliefs for execution during periods of reduced visibility,
such as night or rain. Concealment of the relief from the enemy is a primary concern
when the unit is conducting the relief as part of an economy of force measure to free
forces for other operations. The enemy should perceive only one unit’s command
structure in operation - that of the unit being relieved - until completing the operation.
This requires a detailed knowledge of friendly vulnerabilities. A counterintelligence
assessment of enemy collective capabilities directed against the friendly forces
involved in the relief can provide that detailed knowledge.
3268. Generally, as soon as the mutual higher headquarters issues the warning order,
the commander of the relieving unit co-locates one of his command posts with the
command post of the unit being relieved. As a minimum, he establishes
communications and liaison with that unit. The warning order designates the time of
relief, relieving and relieved units, and sequence of events. It specifies the future
missions of the relieved force, route priorities, any restrictions on advance parties, any
extraordinary security measures and the time and place for issuing the complete order.
3269. During a relief, commanders and leaders from the relieving unit should conduct
reconnaissance of the area for which they will assume responsibility. This leaders’
reconnaissance should include the lowest-level leader allowed by the tactical situation.
The reconnaissance should focus on the route into the position the unit is to occupy,
the positions themselves, the current disposition of the unit being relieved, and any
obstacles that could affect troop movement.
3270. The two commanders must decide on a time or an event that initiates the
passage of command. This allows the smooth transition of command and control from
one commander to another. Normally, this occurs when the frontline subordinate
commanders have assumed responsibility for their respective AO and the incoming
commander has sufficient communication facilities in operation to control the
operation. Regardless of their parent organisation, all units in the AO come under the
operational control of the AO commander if the AO comes under attack or when a
specified event occurs during the relief.
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3271. The fire support coordinators coordinate fire support coordinating measures and
identify those artillery and other fire support units that are available to support the
relief. The relieving unit adopts the fire plan of the unit being relieved. The fire support
assets of both units support the relief. This is critical if the enemy detects the relief and
tries to exploit the situation. Units plan their fires to deceive the enemy and expedite
the relief. Units should maintain normal activity patterns. For example, a unit should
continue to expend the same average number of artillery rounds per day during the
relief that it expended prior to the initiation of the relief. The commander should not
relieve fire support and other combat support and CSS units at the same time as the
manoeuvre units they support. The commander relieves these organisations at other
times.
3272. The relief plan must specify the method to use in relieving artillery units. If terrain
allows, relieving artillery units should not occupy previously used firing positions.
Instead, relieving firing units should establish firing positions nearby those firing
positions of the relieved unit and carefully integrate their fire with that of the relieved
unit. Occupying firing positions at night or during periods of poor visibility enhances
OPSEC.
3273. Priority of the air defence effort is to protect identified choke points, defensive
positions, routes to conduct the operation and Assy A. The air defence assets of both
units support the relief. The air defence unit supporting the relieving force coordinates
with the replaced force’s supporting air defence unit. This coordination covers, but is
not limited to, air IPB, rules of engagement, current air activity, present fire unit
positions, airspace command and control, the operation plan, logistics and
communications. Higher-formation and joint air defence organisations may also
support the relief. Provisions to obtain local air superiority reduce the vulnerability of
the forces during the relief in place when the units involved cannot avoid congestion
on the ground.
3274. The relieving unit verifies the obstacle records of the unit being relieved.
Handover of obstacles is a complex procedure. Initially, the engineer priority is on
mobility to get the relieving unit into the AO. It focuses on those routes and lanes
leading into the AO. Once the relief occurs, priority of the mobility and survivability
effort transitions to support the relieving unit’s continuing mission. The commander
may require his engineers to assist with survivability tasks to support the relieving
force.
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3275. Force-intermingling inherent in a relief, places an increased burden on
command and control systems. The consequences of mutual interference between
the units and the complexity associated with such areas as traffic control, fire support
coordination, obstacle plans, and communications require close coordination between
all headquarters involved. Establishing early liaison between the stationary and the
relieving forces is critical.
3276. The relieving unit is responsible for all sustaining operations. As the support
elements of the unit being relieved displace, they leave the relieving unit supply stocks
according to previously coordinated arrangements. If the units conducting the relief
have different ET, mission analysis must be conducted to determine how the relieving
unit will meet all of its responsibilities and what weapon systems will be used. The unit
logistics staff must determine any special support requirements the relieving unit will
have and address supporting those requirements with the available supporting
organisations. The unit logistics staff ensures that both commanders know of any CSS
constraints that might affect the relieving unit. The two units’ rear command posts also
co-locate and a single headquarters coordinates traffic movement into and out of the
AO.
PREPARING A RELIEF IN PLACE
3277. The commander conceals the relief from the enemy for as long as possible. At
the first indication that a relief is necessary, which is usually the warning order for the
relieving unit, both the relieved unit and the relieving unit review their OPSEC plans
and procedures. Commanders may use deception measures when conducting a relief
in place to maintain secrecy. To maintain security during the relief in place, the
relieving unit makes maximum use of the relieved unit’s radio nets and operators. Both
units involved in the relief operate on the command frequencies and encryption
variables of the relieved unit at all levels. The relieved unit’s signal officer is in charge
of communications throughout the relief operation.
3278. To enhance security, commanders impose light, noise discipline and
electromagnetic emission control measures, such as radio silence or radio-listening
silence. In joint and combined operations, the higher commander specifies the
frequency bands and equipment types affected. Radio silence is a condition when the
commander turns off all or specific radio equipment. Radio-listening silence is a
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situation in which combat net radios remain turned on and monitored, with strict criteria
governing when a station on the radio network is allowed to break silence. An example
of radio-listening silence would be, “Maintain radio listening silence until physical
contact with the enemy is made”.
3279. The units conduct rehearsals to discover any weaknesses in the plan and
familiarize all elements of both forces with the plan. Finding time for rehearsals
requires commanders and staff to focus on time management.
3280. Reconnaissance elements of the relieving unit precede its movement with a
route reconnaissance to the Assy A. They conduct reconnaissance of the routes
leading from the Assy A to the positions of the unit being relieved. The commander of
the relieving unit normally conducts a commander’s reconnaissance before starting
the operation.
3281. The commander must allocate time to construct individual vehicle fighting
positions if a heavy unit is relieving a light unit. In a similar fashion, preparations for an
armour heavy unit to relieve a mechanized infantry heavy unit must include expanding
individual vehicle fighting positions to accommodate the larger tanks.
3282. While the units involved plan, prepare and execute the relief in place, their
common higher headquarters and other units continue actions to mask the relief.
These include using feints, smoke, harassing and interdiction fires. The common
higher headquarters executes operations to attack and disrupt the enemy’s
uncommitted and reserve forces during the relief. Its intent is to fix or distract the
enemy so that he does not detect or interfere with the relief.
EXECUTING A RELIEF IN PLACE
3283. In situations where the commander desires to conceal the relief from the enemy,
such as during a sequential or staggered relief, the relieving unit may occupy the same
positions as the unit it relieves. Alternatively, it may establish more favourable
positions within the vicinity of the relieved unit’s location. Occupying different positions
makes early discovery by the enemy more likely. Any increase in activity in forward
positions can reveal the relief to the enemy. Friendly intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems attempt to detect if the enemy can discover the relief before
its completion.
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3284. The enemy can usually detect a relief effort because of the increased activity
resulting from the movement of soldiers and equipment out of position by the relieved
unit and into position by the relieving unit. Additionally, after any period of combat,
there are differences in the types and amount of equipment between the relieving unit
and the relieved unit, even if they have the same ET. These differences can also reveal
the relief to the enemy. The two units establish guidelines for exchanging compatible
equipment and supplies to limit these differences. In addition, it may be necessary to
exchange certain weapons, supplies, equipment and occasionally, vehicles between
units. When major differences in the number of combat systems between the units
exist - for example, a tank-heavy task force relieves a mechanized infantry-heavy task
force - inoperable equipment or visual simulators may assist in hiding the change of
units.
3285. In a simultaneous relief, the relieving unit begins moving from its current location
to Assy A in the AO of the unit being relieved. Once the relief begins, all elements
involved execute the relief as quickly as possible. Both units are vulnerable to enemy
attack because of the concentration, movement and intermingling of forces in a
simultaneous relief. Any unnecessary delay during execution provides the enemy
additional time to acquire and engage the forces involved. All units in the AO come
under the operational control of the relieving unit commander at the time or triggering
event previously established by the plan for the operation.
3286. As the first relieving element arrives from the Assy A to assume the position, it
establishes a screen of the relieved unit’s positions as the tactical situation permits.
The remainder of the relieving unit moves forward to positions behind the unit being
relieved. The relieving unit may use the relieved unit’s alternate and supplementary
defensive positions to take advantage of any previous defensive preparations. At the
previously established time or event, passage of command takes place. At that point,
if possible, the commander of the relieving unit informs all units involved in the relief
of the passage of command.
3287. The relieved unit continues to defend. The relieving unit’s advance parties
coordinate procedures for the rearward passage of the relieved unit. On order, the
relieved unit begins withdrawing through the relieving unit and moves to Assy A. Crewserved weapons are usually the last elements relieved after exchanging range cards.
The relieving unit replaces them on a one-for-one basis to the maximum extent
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possible to maintain the illusion of routine activity. The relieved unit’s combat support
and logistics assets assist both the relieved unit and the relieving unit during this
period.
3288. A relief does not normally require artillery units to relieve weapon system for
weapon system unless the terrain limits the number of firing positions available.
Generally, the relieved unit’s artillery and other fire support assets remain in place until
all other relieved elements displace and are available to reinforce the fires of the
relieving unit in case the enemy tries to interfere. If the purpose of the relief is to
continue the attack, the artillery of both forces generally remains in place to support
the subsequent operation.
3289. Multiple main supply routes that allow only one-way traffic can simplify the
forward and rearward movement of both units. The relieving unit’s rear command post
controls both units’ military police and any other traffic management assets. (The main
command post performs these functions if the force does not have a rear command
post.) The commander uses these assets to help control unit and convoy movement
on lines of communications, main supply routes and movement routes throughout his
AO.
3290. In the future, it is likely that conflicts will involve the relief of coalition force. The
commander should consider the following additional points when such reliefs occur:
a.
Dissimilar unit organisations may require special adjustments in
assigned areas.
b.
Control of fire support may require special liaison.
c.
Language difficulties may require an increased use of guides and
translators.
d.
Using relieved unit communications requires special signal
arrangements and additional operators.
e.
Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may make exchanging
assets more difficult.
f.
Impact of civilians on the operations.
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SECTION 7
RESERVE DEMOLITION GUARD
INTRODUCTION
3291. Some critical points, such as key bridges and mountain passes, within the
Division or Brigade area may be vital to the tactical plan. Such points need to be
controlled to permit friendly units to use them and to prevent the enemy from using
them. If there is a plan to turn these critical points into obstacles by use of demolitions,
they are called res obs or res demolitions. The Commander designating these
obstacles normally retains the execution of these demolitions to their order.
3292. When the Division or Brigade Commander designates a reserve demolition,
they also designates a demolition firing party (normally made up of engineers) to
prepare and execute the demolitions. Likewise, they designate a demolition guard
(normally a rifle Coy or part of its subordinate elements) to secure the area until the
demolitions are fired and the obstacle is completed.
3293. If the rifle Coy is the demolition guard, its’ Commander is the demolition guard
Commander. They are under the command of and reports directly to a senior
Commander who will be designated as the authorised Commander. The senior in rank
in the demolition firing party is the Commander. However, the demolition guard
Commander has overall responsibility. The headquarters initiating the demolition
guard mission, prepares and provides an order to the demolition guard Commander
and to the demolition firing party Commander.
RESERVE DEMOLITION GUARD COMMANDER
3292. Tasks. Tasks of Reserve Demolition Guard Commander consists as follows:
a.
Commanding all soldiers at the site of the reserve demolition.
b.
Guarding the site from enemy attack and sabotage.
c.
Controlling traffic and refugees.
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d.
Giving the order to the demolition firing party Commander to change the
state of readiness of the demolition charges.
e.
Giving the order to the demolition firing party Commander to trigger the
demolitions.
f.
Keeping the authorized Commander informed on the status of the
demolitions and the defense.
g.
Informing the authorized Commander on the estimated time required to
change from State of readiness 1 to State of readiness 2.
h.
Maintaining a chain of command roster for both the demolition guard and
the demolition firing party.
i.
Ensuring the information is exchanged between the two groups.
j.
Reporting the effectiveness of the authorized Commander.
RESERVE DEMOLITION FIRING PARTY (ENGINEER)
3294. Tasks. Tasks of Reserve Demolition Firing Party consists as follows:
a.
Preparing the demolitions.
b.
Maintaining the state of readiness ordered.
c.
Firing the demolitions (after receiving a written order) and ensuring that
the demolition is successful.
d.
Reporting results of the demolition to the demolition guard Commander.
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SECTION 8
NIGHT ATTACK
3295. Generally in moonlight and artificial light a greater frontage and depth can be
achieved due to better definition of objectives and routes. Narrow frontage and depth
may have to be accepted in close country.
3296. Types of Night Attack. It may be advantageous, or the situation may dictate that
an attack is conducted at night. A night attack has a number of advantages as follows:
a.
Take advantage of a tactical situation which may not exist the next day.
b.
Achieve greater surprise.
c.
Reduce the effect of enemy observed fire and air attack.
d.
Reduce the possibility and effect of an armoured counter attack before
reorganization is complete.
e.
Maintain momentum to gain time.
3297. In close country or difficult terrain, the problems of controlling a large-scale night
attack may outweigh the advantages. Under these conditions it may be necessary for
smaller forces to conduct attacks with limited objectives.
3298. The commander must consider the need for rest. Troops cannot fight
continuously by day and night. When planning a night attack or the continuation of a
daylight attack into the night, the Division Commander must aim to use troops who
have been least committed.
3299. The stages and conduct of a night attack are similar to those of a day attack.
There are particular requirement for night attack are as follows:
a. Simple plans as control is more difficult to achieve at night.
b. Detailed reconnaissance by day and night.
c. Detailed control measures.
d. Detailed preparation, including orders and rehearsals.
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3300. Major regrouping during night operations creates the potential for confusion and
may waste valuable time. Forces should be grouped so that they can fight by day and
night.
3301. Night attacks can be conducted in two ways as follows:
a.
Silent Attack. A silent attack is launched to gain maximum surprise.
Silent attacks are planned to become noisy once surprise is lost. Thus the
supporting fire must follow the progress of the attack and be prepared to
commence firing immediately the fire plan is initiated which is usually by a
codeword or nickname. A silent attack requires the following:
(1) The assaulting troops are highly trained and experienced in night
operations.
(2) The going is suitable for silent movement or the weather conditions
such that they cover the attacking force’s activities.
(3) The enemy must not be active in the area over which the attack will
be mounted.
(4) The attacking force must dominate the area between the opposing
forces.
(5) The ground over which the attacking force passes is not covered by
enemy surveillance devices or steps have been taken to neutralise such
devices.
(6) The visibility is poor, and the efficiency of night observation devices
degraded.
(7) The absence of anti-personnel minefields.
(8) The navigation aids to be provided.
b.
Noisy Attack. The noisy attack uses all available fire support from the
outset. This method is chosen when preparatory fire support is desirable, when
there is little chance of achieving surprise by stealth or when an element of
surprise has been lost.
3302. Objectives. Objectives are likely to be more limited in frontage and depth than
in a daylight attack because of the following:
a.
Control is more difficult.
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b.
There is less scope for support between manoeuvre units and for the
engagement of targets of opportunity by artillery and armour units.
c.
Direction and distance are harder to estimate in the confusion of night
fighting.
3304. The depth and frontage will depend on the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
The strength of the enemy.
The weight of the covering fire available.
Visibility.
The degree of definition of the objective.
The terrain.
The availability of navigation aids.
3305. Generally, in moonlight and artificial light, a greater frontage and depth can be
achieved due to better definition of objectives and routes. Less frontage and depth
may have to be accepted in close country.
3306. H Hour. The selection of H hour for a night attack will depend on the same
considerations as those applying to a daylight attack. In addition, the following are to
be considered:
a.
b.
Visibility.
The availability of illumination.
3307. Battlefield Illumination. The control of illumination must be centralised to
prevent unintentional compromise. An illumination plan would normally be prepared
as part of the fire plan. The aims of battlefield illumination are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
To assist direction keeping.
To increase the effectiveness of both direct and observed indirect fire.
To aid deception.
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3308. Route Marking. Detailing and arranging the marking of assembly areas as well
as routes to the FUP and LD are crucial in the night attack. Troops from the Division
will be assigning for the tasks.
3309. Fire Plan. The fire plan does not differ from the day attack except that it must
take into account the difficulty of observation and determining locations of own troops.
Targets will normally be engaged on a timed program. The effect of fire support to
forward assault elements may be less because of poor visibility. If a silent attack is
attempted, the fire plan must be simple so that fire can be brought to bear on the
appropriate targets. The assault can easily become disordered and assaulting troops
may not know their exact location. Consequently, the call for fire may be delayed and
the fall of shot may need adjustment. The authority for ordering fires must rest with the
commander of the assault troops.
3310. Exploitation. Exploitation will normally be more limited by night because of the
difficulties of regaining control after the assault or maintaining control during the
exploitation. Where possible, easily recognisable features should be selected to mark
the LOE.
3311. Reorganization. Reorganization at night is difficult. Regaining control and
sitting positions will not be easy. Although it is easier for subunits to reorganize where
they are and with what they have including stragglers, there will be times when it is
risky to reorganize on the objective. Whatever location for reorganization is planned,
the position should be coordinated as quickly as possible. Once initial coordination
has been achieved, troops and their equipment should be reorganized into their
correct subunits. Commanders must ensure that weapons, ammunition, and essential
supplies are brought forward without delay.
3312. Command and Control. Since commanders can see little during a night attack,
they will have to depend on good communications to provide the information and
control required. The Division Commander may therefore command a night attack
from his headquarters, visiting his subordinate commanders at first light by which time
the situation may be clearer and enemy reactions ascertained.
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SECTION 9
CORDON AND SEARCH
GENERAL
3313. This operation is conducted in aid of civil power and normally a combined civil,
police and military operation. It is also as an offensive operation in rural areas, villages,
and towns to seek guerrillas who have infiltrated into these places or to pick up known
or suspected guerrilla supporters. The search operation may also be for arms, ammo,
explosives and documents.
3314. The cordon and search mission involves isolating a pre-designated area by
cordoning it off and systematically searching for enemy personnel, weapons,
ammunition supply explosives or communications equipment. While large-scale
cordon and search op are planned and rehearsed in advance and normally entail
extensive coordination with local law enforcement agencies, a squad-sized urban
patrol may often conduct a cordon and search of a point target-searching one house
or building ident by int as a possible wpn cache.
3315. Considerations for the cordon and search operation.
a.
the comd).
b.
c.
d.
e.
Positive intelligence of the guerrillas’ presence (plain clothes recce by
Pre-planned in detail and rehearsed.
Plan must be simple and capable of rapid exec.
As little inconvenience as possible be imposed on the people.
Secrecy must be maintained.
3316. Police and Military Responsibilities. Tasks and responsibilities for Royal
Military Police (RMP) and Armed Forces.
a.
RMP tasks and responsibilities.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Carrying out plain clothes recce.
Provide guides for the cordon element.
Provide Special Branch Officer.
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
b.
Warning the inhabitants and imposed curfew.
Carrying out search with assistance from other security forces
Making arrests.
Screening of suspects.
Con traffic.
Military tasks and responsibilities.
(1)
Plan, command and control the operation.
(2)
Providing the cordon.
(3)
Conduct the initial sweep through/assault.
(4)
Escort/protection of police search parties.
(5)
Escort suspects or detained pers.
(6)
Construct cages for holding detainees.
(7)
Guard detainees and suspects.
(8)
Provide aircraft to observe the cordon area.
(9)
Provide technical assistance for search ie mine detectors, dogs
and bomb disposal teams.
3317. Organization for Cordon & Search. The organization must consist of this
gp.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Combined HQ.
Inner Cordon Tp.
Outer Cordon Tp.
Search Parties.
Cage Tp.
Screening Teams.
Escort Tp.
Tfc Con Team.
Rd Blocks.
Res.
3318. Planning. The detail that needs to be consider in orders as follow:
a.
b.
Physical features forming the perimeter of the tgt area.
Loc and time of RV for mil and police.
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Assy A.
Routes to RV and fm Assy A to fwd RV.
OOM.
Time the cordon is to be in posn.
ROE.
Search/Cage Party org.
Allocation of area of responsibility.
Deception measures.
3319. Establishing the cordon. The purpose is to isolate the area so that sy
measure could be taken to control the movt of local fm in and out of that area. When
conducting the cordon, factors need to be considered as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
App.
No of Cordon.
Posn of Outer Cordon.
Timing.
Fwd RV.
Tfc con.
Routes.
Junc pt.
Sy.
3320. Disposn of tp in cordon. It will be depend on the sit as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Depend on en threat and the size and shape of the search area.
During darkness, a cordon must be unbroken.
After darkness, maint by OP.
Cover all likely escape routes.
Use of heli for con, obsn and rft.
Mob Res be sited to permit rapid deployment.
3321. Thinning out of cordon. Depend on the factors as follows:
a.
b.
c.
Size of the area.
No of bldg.
Str of search elm.
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d.
En threat.
3322. Conduct of the search. Search will be conduct when locals have been
warning to stay in their house. At this stage, these things need to be considered:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Strong escort for search parties.
Systematic search.
Wanted person and material to be hidden.
Mines and booby traps used extensively.
Search of women.
Long period – log.
3323. Screeening Procedure. Screening will be conduct by procedures that need
to be followed to differentiate the suspect at early stage.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Initial Ident Check.
Low-level Screening.
High-level Screening.
Evac.
3324. Precautions. To avoid any problems, those steps need to consider:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Female should be search by female.
Screened person must not be allowed to mix with unscreened persons.
Detainees must not be allowed to dispose of any evidence.
Pers undergoing screening should be treated with courtesy and tact.
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SECTION 10
AMBUSH
3325. An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed
positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. It may include an assault to close
with and destroy the engaged enemy force. In an ambush, ground objectives do not
have to be seized and held.
3326. The two types of ambush are point ambush and area ambush. In a point
ambush, a unit deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys
into two or more related point ambushes. A unit smaller than a platoon does not
normally conduct an area ambush.
3327. Ambushes are categorized as either hasty or deliberate but take place along a
continuum. A hasty ambush is an immediate reaction to an unexpected opportunity
conducted using SOPs and battle drill. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific
action against a specific target. Detailed information about the target, such as size,
organisation, and weapons and equipment carried; route and direction of movement;
and times the target will reach or pass certain points on its route may be available.
Heavy or light forces may conduct an ambush. (Figure 3.2.18) shows the tactical
mission graphic for an ambush.) Doctrine categorizes ambushes as near or far
ambushes, based on the proximity of the friendly force to the enemy.
Figure 3.2.18: Ambush Tactical Mission Graphic
3328. The typical goal of the ambush force is the death or capture of all enemy
personnel located within the kill zone. Another goal could be to destroy certain
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designated vehicles, such as all missile transporters-erector launchers. Ideally, the
ambush force can destroy the ambushed enemy so quickly that he is unable to report
the engagement while the ambush force accomplishes its mission.
3329. Organisation of Forces. A typical ambush is organized into three elements:
assault, support and security. The assault element fires into the kill zone. Its goal is to
destroy the enemy force. When used, the assault force attacks into and clears the kill
zone and may be assigned additional tasks, to include searching for items of
intelligence value, capturing prisoners and completing the destruction of enemy
equipment to preclude its immediate reuse. The support element supports the assault
element by firing into and around the kill zone and it provides the ambush’s primary
killing power. The support element attempts to destroy the majority of enemy combat
power before the assault element moves into the objective or kill zone. The security
element isolates the kill zone, provides early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief
force and provides security for the remaining ambush force. It secures the objective
rally point and blocks enemy avenues of approach into and out of the ambush site,
which prevents the enemy from entering or leaving.
3330. Planning an Ambush. Planning considerations for an ambush include:
a.
A ‘no-later-than’ time to establish the ambush.
b.
A tentative ambush formation or, for an area ambush, element locations.
c.
Insertion and exit routes.
d.
A forward passage of lines and movement to the ambush site in tactical
formation.
e.
Location of a rally point where the ambush force can reassemble and
reorganize if required.
f.
Actions if the ambush is prematurely detected.
g.
A scheme of manoeuvre that maximizes engagement of the enemy’s
flank or rear, provides early warning of target approach, includes assault
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element actions in the kill zone and details how the ambush element displaces
from the ambush site.
h.
Actions at the objective.
i.
Obstacles to augment the effects of the friendly fire.
j.
A fire support plan that integrates the direct fire and obstacle plans,
which results in the enemy’s isolation, inflicts maximum damage and also
supports forces in the rally point.
k.
The criteria for initiating the ambush; for example, only engage enemy
formations of the same or smaller size and withhold fire until the target moves
into the kill zone.
l.
Any required changes to the ambushing unit’s fire distribution SOP,
based on the factors of MAP.
m.
Rear security measures.
3331. A point ambush usually employs a line or an L-shaped formation. The names of
these formations describe deployment of the support element around the kill zone.
The kill zone is that part of an ambush site where fires are concentrated to isolate, fix
and destroy the enemy. The ambush formation is important because it determines
whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of fire necessary to isolate and
destroy the target. The commander determines the formation to use based on the
advantages and disadvantages of each formation in relation to the factors of MAP.
3332. The assault and support elements generally deploy parallel to the target route
of movement - the long axis of the kill zone - which subjects the target to flanking fire
in the line formation (Figure 3.2.19). The size of the target that can be trapped in the
kill zone is limited by the size of the area that can be covered by the support element’s
weapons. Natural, manmade and military obstacles - reinforced with tactical obstacles
integrated with direct and indirect fires - traps the target in the kill zone. A disadvantage
of the line formation is that the target may be so dispersed that it is larger than the kill
zone.
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Figure 3.2.19: Linear Ambush
3333. The line formation is effective in close terrain, which restricts the target
movement and in open terrain where one flank is blocked by existing or reinforcing
obstacles. The commander may place similar obstacles between the assault and
support elements and the kill zone to protect the ambush force from the target’s
counter-ambush drills. When the ambush force deploys in a line formation, it leaves
access lanes through these protective obstacles so that it can assault the target. An
advantage of the line formation is that it is relatively easy to control under all conditions
of visibility.
3334. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation (Figure 3.2.20). The
long leg of the “L” (assault element) is parallel to the kill zone and provides flanking
fire. An advantage of the “L” formation is that the short leg (support element) is at the
end of the kill zone and at a right angle to it and blocks the enemy’s forward movement.
It also provides enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg. The
commander can employ an L-shaped formation on a straight stretch of trail, road, and
stream or at a sharp bend.
3335. An area ambush is most effective when enemy movement is largely restricted
to trails or roads. The area should offer several suitable point ambush sites. The
commander selects a central ambush site around which he can organize outlying
ambushes. Once he selects his site, he must determine the enemy’s possible avenues
of approach and escape routes. He assigns outlying point ambush sites to his
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subordinates to cover these avenues. Once they occupy these sites, they report all
enemy traffic going toward or away from the central ambush site to the commander.
These outlying ambushes allow the enemy to pass through their kill zone until the
commander initiates the central ambush. Once the central ambush begins, the outlying
ambushes prevent enemy troops from escaping or entering the area (Figure 3.2.21).
Figure 3.2.20: L-Shaped Ambush
Figure 3.2.21: Area Ambush
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3336. The ambush unit commander normally specifies the signals required to control
the ambush. He changes the meaning of audible and visual signals frequently to avoid
setting patterns that the enemy can recognize. Otherwise, the enemy might recognize
a signal and react in time to avoid the full effects of the ambush. For example, if a
white star cluster is always used to signal withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy
might fire one and cause the ambush force to withdraw prematurely. The subordinate
elements of the ambush unit must receive communications - in the form of signals that relay the following information:
a.
Target approaching, normally given by a member of the security team to
warn the ambush commander and the ambush elements of the target progress.
b.
Initiate the ambush, given by the ambush unit commander. (This signal
should be a mass casualty-producing signal, such as a main gun round from a
tank, machine gun fire, the detonation of mines or explosives, or other direct
fire crew-served weapons).
c.
Lift or shift fire, given when the target is to be assaulted; all fires must
stop or be shifted at once so that the assault element can attack before the
target can react.
d.
Assault, given when the assault force is to move into the kill zone and
complete its activities.
e.
Cease fire, given to cease all fires.
f.
Withdraw from the kill zone or ambush site, given when the ambush is
completed, or an enemy relief force is approaching.
3337. The commander uses a variety of signals to communicate this information, such
as radio transmissions, voice commands, vehicle horns, whistles or pyrotechnics. All
signals must have at least one backup. For example, if the signal to shift fire fails, the
assault element should not attack the target unless it receives the backup signal.
Signals sent out before initiation of the ambush should not expose the ambush to
detection by the enemy. The commander reviews SOP signals to see if they need to
be revised or augmented to meet specific situational requirements.
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3338. Preparation for An Ambush. Surprise coordinated fires and control are the keys
to a successful ambush. Surprise allows the ambush force to seize control of the
situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete that the target
does not expect the ambush until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough planning,
preparation and execution help achieve surprise.
3339. The commander conducts a leader’s reconnaissance with key personnel to
confirm or modify his plan. This reconnaissance should be undetected by the enemy
to preclude alerting him. If necessary, the commander modifies the ambush plan and
immediately disseminates those changes to subordinate leaders and other affected
organisations. The commander must maintain close control during movement to,
occupation of and withdrawal from the ambush site. Control is most critical when the
ambush unit is approaching the target. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise and light
discipline.
3340. The ambush unit’s security element remains at full alert and uses all available
observation devices to detect the enemy’s approach to the ambush site. Each soldier’s
duties within each element are rotated as necessary to maintain alertness.
3341. All elements of the ambush force reconnoitre their routes of withdrawal to the
selected rally point. When possible, soldiers or crews reconnoitre the route they will
use.
3342. The commander positions all his weapons, including mines and demolitions
authorized by his rules of engagement, to obtain the maximum effectiveness against
the target in the kill zone. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artillery
and mortars. The goals of the support element are to isolate the kill zone, prevent the
target’s escape or reinforcement, and deliver a large volume of highly concentrated
surprise fire into the kill zone. This fire must inflict maximum damage so the assault
element can quickly assault and destroy the target.
3343. Execution of An Ambush. Fire discipline is a key part of any ambush. Fire
must be withheld until the ambush commander gives the signal to initiate the ambush.
That signal should be fire from the most deadly weapon in the ambush. Once initiated,
the ambush unit delivers its fires at the maximum rate possible given the need for
accuracy. Otherwise, the assault could be delayed, giving the target time to react and
increasing the possibility of inflicting casualty on own forces by friendly fire. Accurate
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fires help achieve surprise as well as destroy the target. When it is necessary to
assault the target, the lifting or shifting of fires must be precise. The assault element
does not conduct its assault until enemy fires or resistance has been negated or
eliminated.
3344. If the ambush fails and the enemy pursues the ambush force, it may have to
withdraw by bounds. It should use smoke to help conceal its withdrawal. Activating
limited-duration minefields along the withdrawal routes after the passage of the
withdrawing ambush force can help stop or delay enemy pursuit. The commander
positions the support element to assist in the withdrawal of the assault element.
3345. On the commander’s order, the ambush force withdraws to the rally point,
reorganizes and starts its return march. At a previously established location, it halts
and disseminates any combat information obtained as a result of the ambush to all
elements of the ambush force. However, future information systems should be able to
disseminate this information without the need to halt a heavy force.
3346. The commander or his representative debriefs the ambush force to help identify
enemy patterns of response, activities and procedures, both inside and outside the
ambush area once the force returns from conducting the ambush. Patterns should be
analysed and reported to all appropriate organisations through intelligence channels.
The commander adjusts his tactics, techniques and procedures to account for these
patterns.
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SECTION 11
ATTACK MRA CAMP
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
3347. Basic considerations for attk MRA camp as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Insurgents positively location.
Insurgents effectively contained.
Request larger force than insurgents.
Carefully planned and coordinated at all levels.
Secrecy to achieve surprise.
Executed rapidly.
Good communications between assault and cordon TPS.
Good leadership. Adequate artillery and air support
PLANNING
3348. Planning for attack MRA camp required:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Target acquisition.
Info.
Composition.
Observation.
Enemy sentries.
3349. Influencing factors of the successful attack MRA camp is experience or
standard of commander, time available and risk of being discovered.
3350. Stages in planning the attk MRA camp.
a.
Preparation. Preparatory stages include battle procedure, warning
orders, orders, reconnaissance and rehearsal. Preparatory stages principle is
high degree of silence, accurate night navigation and sufficient timing.
Organization consists iof assault group, follow up group, support group,
headquarters, cordon and stop group. All activities before H-hour are consider
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preparation hour. For the consideration is risk of being seen or heard, danger
of making fresh tracks, time taken, weather condition, sitting of enemy camp
and information.
b.
Assault. Destroy maximum number of enemies with initial bursts of fire
and to measures of performance up in the camp.
c.
Search. This stage is to serch the location of hidden enemy, food,
weapons and documents. Next is marking on enemy’s withdrawal track.
d.
Follow-up. This stages are depending on the problem to withdraw the
forces. Enemy not in position to react offensively after escaping the initial attack
must be pursued vigorously and deployment of combat tracker team.
e.
Redeployment.
CONDUCT
3351. There are several groups. There are assault group, follow-up group,
headquarters and support group. Assault group is balance between difficulty of
movement large force against max fire power. Movement as near as possible
undetected and assault with maximum fire power. Follow-up group is not tied down by
initial fire fight. It is close on the camp as soon as fire has been opened. Pick-up most
promising tracks and follow them. Headquarters are to cordon and stops enemy,
remainder of the force, cover all likely escapes routes and far enough not to prejudice
secrecy. Support group are providing communication, medical aid, interrogator and
can carry heavier part of assault group equipment.
3352. Method of attack. There are several method can be conduct to attk MRA
camp.
a.
Assault and ambush.
b.
Assault and block.
c.
Contracting cordon.
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d.
Encirclement and attack.
e.
Hammer and anvil.
f.
Rabbit hunt.
g.
Fire flush.
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SECTION 12
COMBAT TRACKER TEAM (CTT)
HISTORY OF THE WING
3353. Started with 8 Tracker Dog and 5 Infantry Patrol Dog. Jan 1972 U.S Army Dog
School at Fort Gordon, Georgia presents 13 Labrador to this wing. Establishment of 2
Officer, 26 other rank and 26 dogs. The present strength 4 officers, 135 other rank
and 97 dogs.
ROLES AND TASKS OF THE WING
3354. Roles. To support the Malaysian army with trained war dog teams in operation.
3355. Task. To train war dogs and to train war dog handlers and trainers. To attach
war dog team to operational division and brigade and do a demonstration.
COMBAT TRACKER TEAM (CTT)
3356. The Combat Tracker Team Consists of a Tracker Dog and 5 Men as follow:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Tracker Dog.
Dog Handler.
Front Cover Man.
Team Commander.
Visual Tracker.
Rear Cover Man.
3357. Tracker Dog. They are trained to track enemy withdrawal routes or to their
location. A fully trained dog is able to indicate the enemy presence from the distance
between 100 – 150 meters.
3358. Dog Handler. A Cpl by rank who is responsible to give necessary orders to
dog, read and interpret the indications given by the dog as for tracking is concerned.
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3359. Front Cover man. Lans Cpl by rank who is responsible to protect the dog
handler during tracking. He also act as a Reserve Dog Handler.
3360. Team Commander. Sgt by rank is trained in visual tracking and dog handler.
Responsible to liase with the ground commander on the essential information's
required prior to commencement of tracking.
3361. Visual Tracker. Cpl by rank and responsible to reestablish the trail whenever
the dog losses it due to natural obstacles and other factors. He also act as reserve
Team Commander.
3362. Rear Cover Man. Lans Cpl by rank. Besides providing protection from rear he
also act as a link man who communicate physically with the inf Commander whose
group task are to presume and destroy the enemy.
3363. Task of The Team. The task of the team is to track the enemy to the distances
of 100 – 150 meters. The team is usually deployed immediately after contact with
enemy. Once the dog indicates the follow up team commander take over from this
point onwards.
3364. Time & Successes Rate. The team has certain limitation which must be given
consideration during follow up operation. The fresher of the trail and the chances of
success is:a.
12 - hours below
-
75 % - 90 %
b.
12 - 24 hours
-
51 % - 74 %
c.
24 - 36 hours
-
40 % - 50 %
d.
36 - hours above
-
0%
- 39 %
3365. Disadvantage. There are several disadvantages of the CTT as follow:
a.
The dog cannot differentiate the scent of the enemy nor the friendly
forces. It is necessary to ensure the place of contact is not disturbed by the
troop so that the CTT able to start off on a fresh trail.
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b.
Rest. The dog has to be rest whenever it shows sign of tiredness and it
is difficult to stimulate the limitation because it depend on numbers of factors
such as weather and terrain.
c.
Bad Weather. The dog’s effectiveness would be reduced during bad
weather. Strong wind may blow away the scants, heavy rain may wash it away
and hot sun may rapidly evaporate the scent especially in open or exposed
areas.
d.
Sandy and Swampy Area. It is not suitable for tracker dogs. The visual
tracker has to play an important role in assisting the dog in tracking of the trail
in this kind of areas.
e.
Night Tracking. This not advisable unless night vision aid are provided.
The dog is not affected by darkness but it is difficult for the handler to read the
sigh or the indication given by the dog.
3366. Advantages of the CTT.
a.
The dog can track faster than man.
b.
It is able to track in the absence of visible signs or traces. The dog work
on the ground scent, therefore even if the human eyes could not see any trace
but the dog would be able to pick the scent.
c.
A tracker dog is trained to detect ambushes and indicates its handler
within 100 - 150 meter from the enemy present
3367. Information Requirement. There was some info that CTT required iot assists
to track the enemy.
a.
Where was the enemy was last seen and when ?
b.
Direction of the enemy withdrawal ?
c.
Extend of search.
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3368. Other necessary information such as the following should also be helpful.
a.
Location of other friendly forces/flanking troop.
b.
Terrain.
c.
Weather condition during and after the contact.
d.
Civilian movement.
e.
Enemy.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Strength.
Cloths.
Weapon.
Wounded in action. (Enemies if any)
3369. Preparation Required by CTT. Indicate the limit of exploitation by own troops
that presume the enemy. If the enemy’s sign valuable, mark the place and the area
should be left undisturbed.
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SECTION 12
BOOBY TRAP
INTRODUCTION OF BOOBY TRAP
3370. A booby trap is a device or setup that is intended to kill, harm or surprise a
person, unknowingly triggered by the presence or actions of the victim
3371. Creation of booby trap has now experienced a renewal of the evolution in terms
of design and materials used and its design depends on the skills and intelligence of
someone in the production of booby trap.
TACTICAL ASSESSMENT
3372. Defensive OP. Slow down en movement, prevent en to use all facilities and
resources in battle area and provide early warning.
3373. Offensive OP. Slow down en movement in counter attk, block en external
assistance, pursuit by channel en to killing area and achieving the Task.
3374. Booby trap generally set up in a place that offer advantage for enemy and along
a path that cannot be avoided by en. Examples of the areas mentioned are as follows:
a.
In building or around building area and others important installation in
base area.
b.
At the obstacles that must be cleared by the enemy.
c.
On the left and right path of bushes along the route.
d.
Assembly area and FUP.
e.
The main source area such as POL and food supply area.
f.
The train route point and the narrow road.
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3375. Sign of Booby Trap. Disturbance to soil surface such as scattered soil, found
other material such as explosive parcels, ammunition, safety pins, nails and bits of
wires or cables and suspected signs including pile of stones, leaves and trees, cross
spikewood, paint sign on leaves, trees and wall.
3376. Camouflage using wither leaves or trees and suspicious footprints on leaves or
tracks.
3377. Booby Trap - Non Explosive. Built using natural resources without any use of
explosives that normally built in forest area where a lot of natural resources can be
used and for the purpose of camouflage.
3378. Examples of Booby Trap - Non Explosive such as punjis, side trap, spike board
and venus flytrap.
3379. Booby Trap - Explosive. Explosive booby trap was produced using explosive
materials existing in the service such as plastic explosive no 4 or self-made explosives
3380. Main components of booby traps:
a.
Circuit. The components that used to link the main charge and switches
such as electrical cable or detonating cord.
b.
Power source. The main components that supply electricity to activated
the booby traps.
c.
Detonator.
(1) Detonator Electric used to trigger the explosion with electrical.
(2) Detonator Non-Electric used to trigger the explosion with combustion.
d.
Main Charge. The materials used as the main blast and equipped with
sharp materials such as nails, glass, sharp metal etc such as homemade
explosives and plastic explosives.
e.
Switch.
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(1) The components that are used to complete the circuit or as a firing
devices. Depends on the method of operating. Two types of switch which
is Standard Switch and Homemade Switch.
(2) Standard Switch have two types which are Igniter Safety Fuse and
Firing Demolition F1A1. Igniter Safety Fuse using spring mechanism to
trigger combustion while Firing Demolition F1A1 using spring
mechanism to trigger combustion by pull, pressure, pressure release,
tension release.
BOOBY TRAP CLEARANCE TEAM (BCT)
3381. A team equipped and trained to clear booby traps. May involve clearance in the
conventional and non-conventional environment.
a.
No 1 man is prodder man (prodder and trip wire feeler).
b.
Comd is to neutralise any booby trap detected.
c.
No 2 man - detector man - booby trap clearance.
3382. Booby Trap Clearance Equipments consists as follows:
a.
Mine Detector dan Prodder. Detecting objects underground.
b.
Trip Wire Feeler. Detecting trip wire.
c.
Hook and Cable (min length 50m). Pull the booby traps.
d.
Chalk, Paint, Mine Marker. Do marking works.
e.
Helmet, Armour Vest and Eye Protecter. Personal Safety Equipment.
f.
Ladder. Working in high place.
g.
White Tape. Marking Safe Lines.
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h.
Hands Tool (plier, knife, screwdrivers, Safety Pin and multitools).
Defuse Booby Traps.
i.
Torchlight and Mirror. Working in dark and narrow place.
j.
Binocular. Vision Equipment (Recce)
k.
Additional Equipment.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Plastic Explosive (PE).
Detonating Cord.
Detonator electric and non electric.
Safety fuse.
Electric cable.
Firing Set or battery.
Test set.
Spike wood.
Crimper.
3383. Clearance Procedure.
a.
Initial clearance by the prodder man
b.
Confirmatory
c.
Clearance by the comd
d.
Additional clearance by the detector man along his app and around the
exposed suspected booby trap.
3384. Method of Clearance.
a.
Destroy by using an explosive.
b.
Destroy the mechanism fm the safety dist with pulling by using the hook
and line.
c.
Clearance by hand which booby trap may be lifted and remove after
been neutralised.
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3385. Action If Exposed By Booby Traps.
a.
Do not move from your position.
b.
Report the incident and ask for help.
c.
Do the clearance within 1.0m around.
d.
Protect injured personnel (defend 360°).
e.
Give field treatment to injured personnel.
f.
CASEVAC.
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CHAPTER 4
CONDUCT OPERATION
CONDUCT CW
SECTION 1
COMPANY IN DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION
4001. A rifle coy in area defence will normally be given a mission to deny penetration
of its sector. It is the Bde, and to some extent the Bns role to destroy the enemy
because they have the capability to do so. A Bn must keep the enemy in the EA to
destroy it, and this is normally achieved by a combination of obstacles and coys
denying penetration of the bn sector. When this occurs the coy must achieve mutual
spt, which is probably the most important defensive consideration at this level. Bdes
will normally have spt arms allocated, and tactical obs belts; bns have integral MGs
and anti-armd; whilst the rifle coy only has limited firepower. A rifle coy will rarely be
able to fire into a bn EA, but can be tasked to cover bn obs, which will invariably
require the use of ER guns. This chapter will examine the techniques and
procedures of a rifle company in area defence and the withdrawal.
THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND WHAT THEY MEAN AT COMPANY LEVEL
MUTUAL SUPPORT
4002. Mutual support is the fabric that binds a defensive plan together. Without it you
are defeated. ‘Units and sub-units are considered to be mutual supporting if the
enemy cannot mount an attack upon one unit without serious risk of serious
interference from another.’ Notice how you cannot task a callsign to provide mutual
spt, you can only achieve it. To achieve it you must task pl, and coys, to prov spt to
each other. One problem in achieving mutual spt is the unforgiving nature of the
ground. Dead space and gaps need to be covered by observation and fire. A bn will
normally achieve mutual support by tasking coys to provide spt to each other. This
spt will normally involve the use of ER guns. The bns SFMGs will normally be used
to cover obs and kill inf in the bn EAs. The anti-armd pl will normally be tasked to
destroy en armour in the bn armour EA
THE OTHER BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND WHAT THEY MEAN
4003. Listed below are the remaining basic defensive considerations and how they
are relevant at company level.
a.
USE OF GROUND - Make best use of ground to employ MGs and site
obs. Consider the survivability of your guns positions. Often your coy decisive
terrain will be your rear boundary area, especially when defending on a
forward slope.
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b.
ALL ROUND DEFENCE - Some pits should be orientated to cover
flanks. Secondary pits can enhance all round def. LSW fire down flanks and
boundaries can also increase your all round defence.
c.
DEPTH - Depth is mainly achieved by fire, and then the accumulative
effects of obs, and pits in depth. The key is to create layers of fire that the
enemy must fight thru.
d.
FLEXIBILITY - Can the position sustain an assault not just from the
obvious approach? Flexibility is achieved by use of a c/pen force, alt and
secondary positions, alt use of comms etc.
e.
CENTRALIZATION OF FIREPOWER - The JOST should control all
indirect fires.
f.
COORD FIREPLAN - All fires must be coord; incl 84mm, LSW, 40mm,
indirect. Fireplan should cover obs, dead ground etc.
g.
SECURITY - Use of day/night locs, LPs/Ops, track plans,air sentries,
and discipline on the position.
h.
INTEGRATION OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES - At coy level this means
use of wire disruptive obstacles that are covered by all fires and observation.
i.
DESIGN FOR BATTLE - Best summed as ‘do you have a plan to
achieve your mission’. Design for battle is the way you will defeat the enemy.
E.g. Dismounted infantry will be slowly channelled into the coy EA by
CATWIRE type 2 obs belts covered by LSW and pl fires. The enemy will be
destroyed in the EA by a combination of all pl fire. Enemy APCs will be
engaged from 84mm SRAAW using alt pits etc
4004. The Coy RGp in defence is very flexible and the OC may be able to bring pl
comds forward on the recon. The RGp can also consist of pl and sect guides to allow
the occupation of the position to occur smoothly. The recon of the coy posn within a
bn will normally occur with bn security placed forward. The OC should develop his
def posn in his assigned sector and in accordance with bn orders.
4005. Engagement Area Development is conducted in seven steps.
a.
Step 1. Identify the enemy Avenues of Approach (AA). The AAs
should lead to an objective, such as the bn decisive terrain that will probably
be an enemy brigade immediate objective that will make your coy decisive
terrain an enemy bns subsequent objective. AAs should be categorised by
type, such as day/night, dismounted/mounted. Infiltration should also be
considered along concealed routes.
b.
Step 2. Determine likely enemy Scheme of Maneuver. This involves
identify what type of rates of advance and assault formations he will adopt.
This is important, as it is no use siting an EA when the enemy will only use
infiltration as a form of offensive maneuver. Consideration should also be
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made to his use of fire support. If his assault will be preceded by heavy
preparatory fire which will cause neutralisation of your coy, then the EA needs
to be sited closer to the coy weapons. E.g. If you sight your EA 500m from
your coy position and the enemy fire is neutralising, then he will have moved
through your EA and obstacle belts whilst the coy was still under OHP and
incapable of covering obstacles and killing the enemy.
c.
Step 3. Determine where to Kill the Enemy. Having identified your
coy bdrys you should select your EA(s). This is best done by moving around
the area and standing in the EA whilst looking back onto the position. You can
also get members of the RGp to move around the EA whilst you sight gun
posns. This will allow you to identify dead space etc. The EA should be a
broad area which as shown in Fig 4.1 which can have a mass of fire brought
onto it, and can be shaped. With a sketch map you can identify the best
positions to site guns. At this stage your EA is a broad area which you will
eventually narrow down by ‘shaping’ it with obstacles. The enemy will employ
covering fire onto your position when he attacks which will most likely force
you into your OHP. This may mean that your soldiers will not be able to
effectively engage the enemy until covering fire lifts and the aslt is as close as
200m for dismounted inf. Ideally, if you believe the enemy neutralising fire will
be effective, then your EA should start approx 40m from your fwd pits (just
outside gren range), and extend out no more than 250m. The width of the EA
will depend on how much wire you have been allocated, the ground, and your
bdrys. As a general rule your EA, with 1000m of catwire type 1, defending on
even gnd against an inf attack, will be less than 2/3 of the width of your coy
sector
Figure 4.1 : Broad Area of EA
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d.
Step 4. Plan and Integrate Obstacles. Having identified your EA(s)
you should now ‘shape’ the battlefield. Shaping at the coy level may seem
difficult, but it can be achieved when tied into the higher plan. If you are
allocated 1000m of catwire and you expect tanks on your position, then
shaping is a problem. If the higher scheme of maneuver is to destroy armour
forcing infantry onto your posn, then you can shape with wire. A belt of catwire
covered by accurate LSW is formidable. By shaping, you will force the enemy
into the EA. The enemy will try and breach the wire belts, but will suffer
significant casualties if it is covered by fire. Anchor your obs onto existing
ones, and they must be covered by observation and fire. Site your wire obs
belt in small folds so the enemy cannot see them from a distance. If detected
in his recon phase he will be prepared to breach the wire in the assault.
Fig 4.2 depicts the use of wire obstacles to shape the EA. Cat wire obstacles
are easy to construct and are useful in forcing enemy infiltration out of creek
lines and other concealed routes.
Fig 4.2 : The Use of Wire Obstacles to shape the EA
e.
Step 5. Emplace Weapon Systems. The task now is to site key wpns
to cover the EA, obs, achieve mutual spt etc. You will generally site one LSW
per sect (the second LSW belongs to the pl comd) and the coy wpns such as
ER guns and 84mm SRAAW. The priority of wpns to a task will depend on
your mission analysis. If your mission is to deny penetration, then mutual spt
must be achieved. When siting guns, note their tasks. E.g look at the
depiction in Fig 4.3 and you will notice that Gun 1 is to cov the coy left bdry,
Gun 2 is to prov spt to the right pl, and Gun 3 is to cov Obs belt ‘B’. When you
allocate pl sectors then these gun tasks will become pl tasks. Fig 4.3 depicts
the siting of key coy wpns. The remainder of the coy will be sited to protect
the key wpns, as shown in Fig 4.4. Remember the OC sites two down, or in
this case the guns. Goose egging the guns will allow the OC to then allocate
pl sectors and better defend the area. In some cases it will be more expedient
to allocate 4 sects to a pl. The sect and pl comds will site the individual wpn
pits. The OC should consider where support fire from neighbouring coys will
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fall. This type of fire is normally the best type of fire as it comes from outside
your sector from a flank or depth position, and will be more oblique or
enfilading due to the angle of fire. Supporting fire can cover your obstacles,
the EA, dead ground, or the immediate front of your position. Wpn primary
tasks can use Target Reference Points (TRPs) which are points or areas on
the ground where you want fire to fall. E.g. ‘dead tree’, ‘grassy knoll’. TRPs
are a control measure.
Fig 4.3 : Emplace Weapon System
Fig 4.4 : The Remainder of The Coy Will Be Sited to Protect the Key Wpns
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f.
Step 6. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires. A coy is likely to be
allocated several DFs, but will be low priority unless it is main effort. DFs will
normally be fired by the bn mortar pl and DS bty. DFs can be used to fire onto
obstacle belts, cover the EA, cover dead ground and flanks. Ammo type is
also important. Airbursting ammunition will be particularly unsavourary against
an enemy sapper team trying to conduct an explosive breach through wire.
Figure 1.5 depicts the coy EA divided into sectors for fire control.
Fig 4.5 : Depicts the Coy EA Divided Into Sectors for Fire Control
g.
Step 7. Conduct Rehearsals. This step will normally be coordinated
by bn and is designed to ensure all wpns are correctly adjusted onto tgts. Of
particular importance is the coordination of neighbouring coy fire into your
sector which is designed to increase the bn mutual support. You need to plan
how you will coordinate this supporting fire. The rehearsal will also
synchronise the rearward movement of security forces such as patrols, LPs,
and OPs forward of the position. The counter penetration plan should also be
rehearsed. Key aspects of the admin plan should be rehearsed such as the
CASEVAC and resupply plan.
DEVELOPING THE ENGAGEMENT AREA
4006. In developing the position the OC can allocate sectors to pls. These sectors
then become the pl comds responsibility to deny pen, patrol, and cover with
observation and fire as depicted in Fig 4.5. The OC can enhance the obs plan with
wire entanglement along infil routes. The EA can be divided up into sectors and fire
allocated. E.g. the left fwd pl can be tasked to prov rifle and 40mm fire into sector 1
etc. LPs and OPs can be established to prov early wng. Shaping can also be
enhanced by use of indirect fire. A DF firing VT onto an obs belt is a good deterrent
to breaching parties and may force them into the EA. The OC should also look at
where he wants spt fire and mark his map accordingly. The best fire you can get is
spt fire from a neighbour because this fire is usually from a flank and hence more
enfilade. Spt fire from another company is how the bn achieves mutual spt. This fire
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can be used in the coy EA, on obs, or close in near the fwd pits. Spt fire will normally
be prov by ER guns due to the ranges and weight of fire required. You must consider
how you will control the fire from a neighbours gun. Ideally land line from your coy
CP to that gun will achieve the task. You could use radio or may have to employ
signals such as flares etc as a bump plan.
FIRE CONTROL IN THE COMPANY
4007. It is advisable to number your guns to aid in control. The fire control of these
guns can be achieved by land line directly to the guns, or to the pl or sect HQ. Radio
can be used but consider EW and highers radio policy. Remember they are your
guns. The ER guns and 84mm SRAAW should also have comms to the coy CP.
4008. The fire control, as well as the illumination plan, must tie in with bn policy. You
need to develop a fire control policy to ensure fire discipline and security. You don’t
want all LSWs firing at a small probe. You need to control rates and types of fire.
This can be achieved by use of SOPs and signals. During a main aslt when the
enemy is in your sector you may go to a free fire plan where all coy wpns are firing
on primary tasks. (remember an arc has a primary and secondary task.) You need to
have a fire plan for your 84mm SRAAW so they know when to fire HE into the EA,
and HEAT onto AFVs. Fire control can be achieved by comms and signals, but
needs a bump plan. Fire lines can be drawn on maps and range cards to indicate
when wpns can fire.
DEVELOPING COY ORDERS
4009. An Ogp to occupy a def posn will normally be detailed enough to occupy and
commence def work. The critical part of the order is the execution. Look back at
schematic Fig 4.4 ‘Developing the Position’ and see how we can task the left fwd pl.
a.
Left Fwd Pl. Grouping. (anything under comd, or in loc)
(1)
Tasks.
(a) Deny penetration within bdry (pl mission)
(b) Cov obs belt ‘B’ (gun 3)
(c) Prov spt to R/fwd pl (gun 2)
(d) Cov coy left flank (gun 1)
(e) Other tasks such as LPs etc
4010. The coord instructions must give a priority of works to include stages of
defence and priority of effort. An example of coy orders is shown at Annex A
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Siting CHQ
4011. Where sapper/pnr spt is not available CHQ will defend in fighting pits. The pits
will conform to the ground to provide best observation, cover, and local protection.
The FO Ack and MFC may be loc in the coy sector, in an OP pit. Figures 4.6 and 4.7
depict possible layouts for CHQ in a bunker, and then in fighting pits. Consideration
should be given to digging in the Company Aid Post (CAP) which may at best be a
large shell scrape.
Fig 4.6 : CHQ in a Bunker
Fig 4.7 : CHQ in Fighting Pits
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SECTION 2
COMPANY IN WITHDRAWAL
4012. This sect will deal with the rifle company conducting withdrawal operations.
Chap 12 of the bn pam provides useful guidance on the conduct of withdrawal
operations, and in particular key timings and other coordinating details.
4013. The battalion pam provides useful detail on withdrawal operations. This
section will deal with some TTPs at coy level. During any defence an OC should
consider a withdrawal plan soon after occupation. If a WNGO is issued to withdraw
then it is important to inform troops what is happening, as morale may be effected.
The composition of bn Rear Recon Parties will be dictated in bn SOPs and will
normally be commanded by the bn XO, and consist of coy 2ICs, pl sgts, and guides.
It is the Rear Recon Party that will site the new defensive position. This composition
will vary depending on the state of threat. The OC, with the CSM should identify the
coy RV, and becomes the CSMs responsibility to control its occupation. The CSM
should have pl guides from each sect to assist him. Read on.
4014. Orders. The WNGO and orders for a withdrawal should kept simple. The key
to orders is using a detailed coord instructions, and in particular timings. Chap 12 of
the Battalion Pam provides useful guidance on timings in the withdrawal. One of the
key timings is when the position is to be denied by. This normally entails leaving at
least two thirds of the coy on the position at that time, but is judgment call to be
made by the OC. The OC must remember that a withdrawal in contact will create big
problems, so deception and security must be maintained.
4015. Fig 4.8 depicts the workings of the coy rear recon party, and recon parties.
Note that the rear recon party will move under BHQ to site the new position, whilst
the coy recon party is designed to site and control the coy withdrawal.
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Figure 4.8 : The Company Rear Recon Party
4016. Fig 4.9 depicts the movement of the coy in the withdrawal. The withdrawal
should be rehearsed and guides are essential to ensure a successful operation.
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Figure 4.9 : The Withdrawal
Annex:
A.
Example Five Para Order for Company Area Defence.
EXTRACT OF COY ORDERS
4017. Mission. B-Coy is to deny penetration of its sector, by 120500 Mar 99, in
order to prevent penetration of the of the bn MDP.
4018. Execution.
a.
Gen Outline. B-Coy will deny pen of the coy sector by achieving strong
mutual spt. The dismounted en inf will be channeled into the coy EA by a
succession of wire obs covered by LSW fire. The en will be dest by a
combination of LSW and pl fire. En AFVs will be dest by spt sect operating the
84mm SRAAW from the left flank. ER guns will be operated from the depth pl
to prov spt fire to flanking coys. Sect c/pen force will be prov by depth pl.
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b.
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1 Pl. (left fwd pl)
(1)
Gp.
(2)
Tasks.
In loc spt sect
i.
Deny pen of pl sector (e.g. msn: deny pen of pl sector in
order to prevent pen of the coy sector)
ii
Prov spt to 2 pl (LSW 1).
iii.
Cover obs belt B (LSW 2).
iv.
Cover coy EA (LSW 3).
c.
2 Pl. (right fwd pl)
(1)
Gp
(2)
Tasks.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
d.
Deny pen of coy sector
Prov spt to 1 pl (LSW 4)
Cover coy right flank (LSW 5)
Cover coy EA (LSW 6)
3 Pl. (depth pl)
(1)
Gp.
(2)
Tasks.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
e.
NC
Allocated 2 x ER guns for coy tasks
Deny pen of coy sector
Cover obs belt A (LSW 7)
Prov spt to 1 and 2pl (LSW 8)
Cover coy EA (LSW 9)
Prov spt to left coy (ER 1)
Prov spt to right fwd coy (ER 2)
Prov 1 sect for coy c/pen
Spt Sect.
(1)
Gp.
(2)
Tasks.
i.
ii.
In loc of 1 pl
Dest en armd in coy EA
Dest en inf in coy EA
Remaining detail omitted.
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SECTION 3
COMPANY IN ADVANCE
INTRODUCTION
4019. There are two types of advance; advance to contact and advance in
contact. The advance to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to
develop the situation and establish or regain contact. Forces conducting an advance
to contact seek to make contact with the smallest force feasible. On contact, the
commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay or withdraw. A successful
advance to contact requires units with sufficient mobility, agility and combat power to
gain enemy contact and rapidly develop the situation. A search and attack is a
specialized technique of an advance to contact that shares many of the
characteristics of an AO security mission. Search and attack is a technique for
conducting an advance to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an AO
security missions. An advance in contact is conducted when contact has been made
with the enemy’s security forces or with his main force. The emphasis is on
maintaining contact and probing for weaknesses. The processes of advancing to and
in contact are similar, differing only by degree and emphasis. However, advance in
contact occurs unexpectedly whereas in the advance to contact the commander is
deliberately seeking to establish contact with the enemy (as per MD 3.0 TD –
Operations).
ADVANCE TO CONTACT (136-159)
4020. Advance to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the
situation and establish or regain contact. A commander conducts this type of
offensive operation when the tactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has
broken contact. A properly executed advance to contact develops the combat
situation and maintains the commander's freedom of action after contact is gained.
This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative.
4021. Purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control and the hasty
deployment of combined arms formations from the march to attack or defend
characterise the advance to contact. The fundamentals of an advance to contact are:
a.
Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
b.
Make initial contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with
protecting the force.
c.
Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid
decisive engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. This
allows the commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation.
d.
Task-organize force and use movement formations to deploy and
attack rapidly in any direction.
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e.
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Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
f.
Maintain contact regardless of the course of action (COA) adopted
once contact is gained.
Close air support, air interdiction and counter air operations are essential to the
success of large-scale advances to contact. Local air superiority or as a minimum,
air parity is vital to the operation’s success.
4022. The Army’s improved future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities reduce the need for corps and divisions to conduct an advance to
contact since fully modernized units normally have a general idea of the location of
significant enemy forces. However, enemy use of complex terrain and offensive
information operations designed to degrade the accuracy of the friendly common
operational picture will continue to require small tactical units to conduct an advance
to contact.
ORGANISATION OF FORCES
4023. An advance to contact is organized with an offensive covering force or an
advance guard as a forward security element and a main body as a minimum. A
portion of the main body composes the commander’s sustaining base. Based on the
factors of MAP, the commander may increase his security forces by having an
offensive covering force and an advance guard for each column, as well as flank and
rear security (normally a screen or guard, see Figure 4.10).
Fig 4.10 : Force Organized For a Movement to Contact
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4024. An advance to contact mission requires the commander not to have contact
with the enemy main body. However, the commander may still know the location of
at least some enemy reserve and follow-on forces. If the corps or division
commander has enough intelligence information to target enemy uncommitted
forces, reserves or sustaining operations activities, he normally designates forces,
such as long-range artillery systems, attack helicopters and close air support, to
engage known enemy elements regardless of their geographical location within his
AO. At all times the forward security element and the main body perform
reconnaissance.
a.
Security Forces.
(1)
A corps or division commander conducting an advance to
contact typically organizes his security element into a covering force to
protect the movement of the main body and to develop the situation
before committing the main body. A covering force is task-organized to
accomplish specific tasks independent of the main body in accordance
with the factors of MAP, such as to conduct mobility and breach
operations. This covering force reports directly to the establishing
commander.
(2)
If a force conducting an advance to contact is unable to
resource a covering force for independent security operations, it may
use an advance guard in the place of a covering force. An advance
guard is a task-organized combined arms unit or detachment that
precedes a column formation to protect the main body from ground
observation or surprise by the enemy. This typically occurs when a
brigade or battalion conducts an advance to contact. In cases where
the higher formation (corps or division) creates a covering force,
subordinate elements can establish an advance guard behind the
covering force and ahead of the main body. This normally occurs when
subordinate units are advancing in multiple parallel columns. In this
case, each main body column usually organizes its own advance
guard.
(3) The advance guard operates forward of the main body to ensure its
uninterrupted advance by reducing obstacles to create passage lanes,
repair roads and bridges, or locate bypasses. The advance guard also
protects the main body from surprise attack and fixes the enemy to
protect the deployment of the main body when it is committed to action.
The elements composing the advance guard should have equal or
preferably superior mobility to that of the main body. For this reason,
mechanized infantry, armoured units are most suitable for use in an
advance guard. Engineer mobility assets should also constitute a
portion of the advance guard, but the main body can also provide other
support.
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(4) The advance guard moves as quickly and as aggressively as
possible, but, unlike the covering force, remains within supporting
range of the main body's weapon systems. It forces the enemy to
withdraw or destroys small enemy groups before they can disrupt the
advance of the main body. When the advance guard encounters large
enemy forces or heavily defended areas, it takes prompt and
aggressive action to develop the situation and, within its capability,
defeat the enemy. Its commander reports the location, strength,
disposition and composition of the enemy and tries to find the enemy's
flanks and gaps or other weaknesses in his position. The main body
may then join the attack. The force commander usually specifies how
far in front of his force the advance guard is to operate. He reduces
those distances in close terrain and under low-visibility conditions.
(5) When the command’s rear or flanks are not protected by adjacent
or following units, it must provide its own flank and rear security. The
command can accomplish this by establishing a screen or a guard on
its flanks or to its rear. The flank columns of the main body normally
provide these flank security elements; for example, the left flank
brigade would provide the left flank screen for a division in an advance
to contact. The rear guard normally comes from one of the subordinate
elements of the corps or division and reports directly to the corps or
division headquarters. A corps may conduct a flank cover if there is a
clearly identified, significant threat from the flank. A flank cover requires
significant resources that are unavailable to the main body. Aviation
units or intelligence systems may establish a flank screen if the factors
of MAP allow; however, this increases the risk to the main body. While
aviation units can use their combat power to delay enemy forces,
intelligence systems can only provide early warning; they cannot trade
space for time to “buy” time for the main body to react.
b.
Main Body.
(1)
The main body consists of forces not detailed to security duties.
The combat elements of the main body prepare to respond to enemy
contact with the unit's security forces. Attack helicopter units normally
remain under division and corps control until contact is made. If the
situation allows, the commander can assign a follow and support
mission to one of his subordinate units. This allows that subordinate
unit to relieve his security forces from such tasks as observing
bypassed enemy forces, handling displaced civilians and clearing
routes. This prevents his security forces from being diverted from their
primary mission.
(2)
The commander designates a portion of the main body for use
as his reserve. The size of the reserve is based upon the factors of
MAP and the amount of uncertainty concerning the enemy. The more
vague the enemy situation, the larger the size of the reserve. The
reserve typically constitutes approximately one-fourth to one-third of
the force. On contact with the enemy, the reserve provides the
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commander flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances and allows
the unit to quickly resume its movement.
(3)
The commander tailors his sustainment assets to the mission.
He decentralizes the execution of the sustainment support, but that
support must be continuously available to the main body. This includes
using pre-planned logistics system. A logistics system is a grouping
of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a
single convoy commander. Daily logistics system contain a
standardized allocation of supplies. Special logistics system can also
be dispatched as needed.
(4)
The commander frequently finds that his main supply routes
become extended as the operation proceeds. Aerial re-supply may also
be necessary to support large-scale advance to contact or to maintain
the momentum of the main body. Combat trains containing fuel,
ammunition, medical and maintenance assets move with their parent
battalion or company team. Fuel and ammunition stocks remain loaded
on tactical vehicles in the combat trains so they can instantly move
when necessary. Battalion field trains move in more depth, with the
forward support battalion in the main body of each brigade. Aviation
units use forward arming and refuel points to reduce aircraft turnaround
time.
CONTROL MEASURES
4025. A commander uses the minimal number and type of control measures
possible in an advance to contact because of the uncertain enemy situation. These
measures include designation of an AO with left, right, front and rear boundaries, or
a separate AO bounded by a continuous boundary. The commander further divides
the AO into subordinate unit AO to facilitate subordinate unit actions.
4026. The operation usually starts from a line of departure (LD) at the time specified
in the operations order (OpO). The commander controls the advance to contact by
using phase lines, contact points and checkpoints as required (Figure 4.11). He
controls the depth of the advance to contact by using objective. Figure 4.11 shows
objective for the advance. The commander could designate one or more objectives
to limit the extent of the advance to contact and orient the force. However, these are
often terrain-oriented and used only to guide movement. Although an advance to
contact may result in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus should be on the
enemy force. If the commander has enough information to locate significant enemy
forces, then he should plan some other type of offensive action.
4027. Corps, division or brigade commanders use boundaries to separate the
various organisational elements of an advance to contact and clearly establish
responsibilities between different organisations. Battalion task force commanders
use positive control over manoeuvre units, coupled with battle drills and formation
discipline. Company teams are not normally assigned their own areas of operation
during the conduct of an advance to contact.
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4028. The commander can designate a series of phase lines that can successively
become the new rear boundary of the forward security elements as that force
advances. Each rear boundary becomes the forward boundary of the main body and
shifts as the security force moves forward. The rear boundary of the main body
designates the limit of responsibility of the rear security element. This line also shifts
as the main body moves forward.
4029. Commanders may use an axis of advance in limited visibility. However, there
is the risk of enemy forces outside the axis not being detected and thus being
inadvertently bypassed.
Fig 4.11 : Control Measures in Advance
PLANNING AN ADVANCE TO CONCT
4030. The commander conducts intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
operations to determine the enemy’s location and intent while conducting security
operations to protect the main body. This includes the use of available fixed-wing
aircraft. This allows the main body to focus its planning and preparation, to include
rehearsals, on the conduct of hasty attacks, bypass manoeuvres and hasty
defences. The plan addresses not only actions anticipated by the commander based
on available intelligence information but also the actions anticipated once contact is
made with the enemy at anticipated times and locations where they might occur.
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4031. The commander wants to gain contact by using the smallest elements
possible. These elements are normally ground scouts or LOH performing
reconnaissance, but may also be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or other
intelligence systems. He may task organize his scouts to provide them with
additional combat power to allow them to develop the situation. The unit’s planned
movement formation should contribute to the goal of making initial contact with the
smallest force possible. It should also provide for efficient movement of the force and
adequate reserves. The commander can choose to have all or part of his force
conduct an approach march as part of the advance to contact to provide that efficient
movement. An approach march can facilitate the commander's decisions by allowing
freedom of action and movement of the main body.
4032. The frontage assigned to a unit in an advance to contact must allow it to
generate sufficient combat power to maintain the momentum of the operation.
Reducing the frontage covered normally gives the unit adequate combat power to
develop the situation on contact while maintaining the required momentum. Both the
covering force and advance guard commanders should have uncommitted forces
available to develop the situation without requiring the deployment of the main body.
The commander relies primarily on fire support assets to weight the lead element’s
combat power but provides it with the additional combat multipliers it needs to
accomplish the mission. The fire support system helps develop fire superiority when
organized correctly to fire immediate suppression missions to help manoeuvre forces
get within direct fire range of the enemy.
4033. The reconnaissance effort may proceed faster in an advance to contact than
in a zone reconnaissance because the emphasis is on making contact with the
enemy. However, the commander must recognize that by increasing the speed of
the reconnaissance effort, he increases the risk associated with the operation.
4034. Bypass criteria should be clearly stated and depend on the factors of MAP.
For example, a brigade commander in an open desert environment could declare
that no mounted enemy force larger than a platoon can be bypassed. All other forces
will be cleared from the brigade’s axis of advance. Any force that bypasses an
enemy unit must maintain contact with it until handing it off to another friendly
element, usually a force assigned a follow and support mission. The commander
tasks his forward security force with conducting route reconnaissance of routes the
main body will traverse.
4035. The echelon intelligence officer (G2), assisted by the engineer and air
defence staff representatives, must carefully analyze the terrain to include air
avenues of approach. He identifies the enemy's most dangerous COA in the war
gaming portion of the military decision making process. Because of the force’s
vulnerability, the G2 must not underestimate the enemy during an advance to
contact. A thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) - by developing
the modified combined obstacle overlay to include intervisibility overlays and other
products, such as the event templates - enhances the force's security by indicating
danger areas where the force is most likely to make contact with the enemy. It also
helps to determine movement times between phase lines and other locations.
Potential danger areas are likely enemy defensive locations, engagement areas,
observation posts (OP) and obstacles. The fire support system targets these areas
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and they become on-order priority targets placed into effect and cancelled as the
lead element can confirm or deny enemy presence. The reconnaissance and
surveillance plan supporting the advance to contact must provide coverage of these
danger areas. If reconnaissance and surveillance forces cannot clear these areas,
more deliberate movement techniques are required.
4036. The commander develops decision points to support changes in the force's
movement formation or change from an approach march to a combat formation.
Uses both human and technical means to validate his decision points, the
commander must determine the degree of risk he is willing to accept based on his
mission. The commander's confidence in the products of the IPB process and the
risk he is willing to accept determines his combat formation and manoeuvre scheme.
In a high-risk environment, it is usually better to increase the distance between
forward elements and the main body than to slow the speed of advance.
4037. Corps and divisions can execute shaping operations as part of an advance to
contact although, by definition, a force conducts an advance to contact when the
enemy situation is vague or totally unknown. This occurs when the necessary
information regarding enemy reserves and follow-on forces is available, but
information regarding those enemy forces in close proximity to the friendly force is
not available. As in any other type of operation, the commander plans to focus his
operations on finding the enemy and then delaying, disrupting and destroying each
enemy force element as much as possible before it arrives onto the direct-fire
battlefield. This allows close combat forces to prepare to engage enemy units on
their arrival.
4038. In an advance to contact, the commander can choose not to designate his
decisive operation until his forces make contact with the enemy, unless there is a
specific reason to designate it. In this case, he retains resources under his direct
control to reinforce his decisive operation. He may designate his decisive operation
during the initial stages of an advance to contact because of the presence of a key
piece of terrain or avenue of approach.
EXECUTING AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT
4039. Each element of the force synchronizes its actions with adjacent and
supporting units, maintaining contact and coordination as prescribed in orders and
unit standing operating procedures (SOP). The advance guard maintains contact
with the covering force. The lead elements of the main body maintain contact with
the advance guard. The rear guard and flank security elements maintain contact with
and orient on the main body's movement. These security forces prevent
unnecessary delay of the main body and defer the deployment of the main body as
long as possible. Reconnaissance elements operate to the front and flanks of each
column advance guard and maintain contact with the covering force. The
commander may instruct each column advance guard to eliminate small pockets of
resistance bypassed by forward security force (Figure 4.12).
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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Fig 4.12 : A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Combined Enemy
Force
4040. The commander of the advance guard chooses a combat formation, based on
the factors of MAP, to make contact with the smallest possible force while providing
flexibility for manoeuvre. Whatever combat formation is chosen, it must be able to
deploy appropriately once the commander becomes aware of the enemy’s location.
He ensures that the route or axis of advance travelled by the main body is free of
enemy forces. It may move continuously or by bounds. It moves by bounds when
contact with the enemy is imminent and the terrain is favourable. Some indirect-fire
assets, such as a mortar platoon or artillery battery and reconnaissance elements,
may be positioned with the formation. The reconnaissance elements of the
unit/formation can help to oversee the advance guard movement and indirect fires
focus on suppressing enemy weapons, obscuring enemy observation posts and
screening friendly movement.
4041. The main body keeps enough distance between itself and its forward security
elements to maintain flexibility for manoeuvre. This distance varies with the level of
command, the terrain and the availability of information about the enemy. The main
body may execute an approach march for all or part of the advance to contact to
efficiently use the available road network or reduce the time needed to move from
one location to another. Command posts and logistics trains travel along highmobility routes within the AO and occupy hasty positions as necessary.
4042. Behind these forward security elements, the main body advances over
multiple parallel routes with numerous lateral branches to remain flexible and reduce
the time needed to initiate manoeuvre. (While it is preferred for a battalion to use
multiple routes, battalions and smaller units can move on just one route). In an
advance to contact, the main body's march dispositions must allow maximum
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flexibility for manoeuvring during movement and when establishing contact with the
enemy force.
4043. The commander’s fire support systems tend to focus on suppression missions
to disrupt enemy forces as they are encountered and smoke missions to obscure or
screen exposed friendly forces when conducting an advance to contact. The
commander schedules the movements of fire support systems in synchronization
with the movement of the rest of the force. Fire support systems that cannot match
the cross-country mobility of the combat units cause them to slow their rate of
advance. If these units do not slow down, they run the risk of outrunning their fire
support. The commander synchronizes the employment of close air support to
prevent the enemy from regaining his balance while his ground fire support assets
are repositioning. The main body updates its priority target list during an advance to
contact operation.
4044. The same considerations apply to air defence when the enemy possesses
aerial capabilities. The commander ensures that his force stays within the air
defence umbrella provided by corps and division assets.
4045. The enemy has a difficult time detecting and targeting the main body when
executing an advance to contact until contact is made because of its tempo,
momentum and dispersal; and the attention the commander pays to electromagnetic
emission control. Once the force makes contact and concentrates its effects against
detected enemy forces, it becomes vulnerable to strike by enemy conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It must concentrate its combat effects
rapidly and disperse again as soon as it overcomes resistance to avoid enemy
counteractions.
4046. Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force and as
the enemy situation permit. Open terrain provides manoeuvre space on either side of
the line of march and facilitates high-speed movement. It also allows for greater
dispersal and usually permits more separation between forward security elements
and the main body than restricted terrain allows. The commander should never
commit his main body to canalizing terrain before these forward security elements
have advanced far enough to ensure that the main body will not become fixed within
that terrain. The enemy may have also established fire support control measures that
allow him to employ non-observed harassing and interdiction fires to interdict friendly
forces traversing these choke points. As the enemy situation becomes known, the
commander may shorten the distance between elements of the force to decrease
reaction time or he may deploy to prepare for contact.
4047. At the battalion and company levels, a moving force should move along
covered or concealed routes from one covered or concealed position to another,
using terrain to minimize its vulnerability to enemy weapons. Further, an appropriate
force should cover the moving force. Regardless of the specific movement technique
employed, both forces need to provide mutual support and be knowledgeable about
their counterpart’s sectors of fire.
4048. The force must attempt to cross any obstacle it encounters without loss of
momentum by conducting in-stride breaches. The commander uses his forward
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security forces in an attempt to seize intact bridges whenever possible. Lead security
elements bypass or breach obstacles as quickly as possible to maintain the
momentum of the movement. If these lead elements cannot overcome obstacles, the
commander directs subsequent elements of the main body to bypass the obstacle
site and take the lead. Following forces can also reduce obstacles that hinder the
unit’s sustainment flow.
4049. The commander locates himself well forward in the movement formation.
Once the formation makes contact with the enemy, he can move quickly to the area
of contact, analyse the situation and direct aggressively. The commander's security
elements conduct actions on contact to develop the situation once they find the
enemy. Once they make contact with the enemy, a number of actions occur that
have been divided into the following sequence. (Units equipped with a full set of
digital command and control systems may be able to combine or skip one or more of
the steps in that sequence. Those units will conduct manoeuvre and remain within
supporting distance of each other with a significantly larger AO than units equipped
with analogue systems.)
GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT
4050. All ISR assets focus on determining the enemy's dispositions and providing
the commander with current intelligence and relevant combat information; this
ensures that he can commit friendly forces under optimal conditions. The
commander uses all available sources of combat information to find the enemy's
location and dispositions in addition to his intelligence systems. Corps and divisions
employ long-range surveillance units and detachments in conjunction with data
provided by available special operating forces, joint and national assets, in addition
to their organic ISR assets. The commander may use his surveillance systems to
cue the conduct of aerial and ground reconnaissance.
4051. The enemy situation becomes clearer as the unit's forward security elements
conduct actions on contact to rapidly develop the situation in accordance with the
commander's plan and intent. By determining the strength, location and disposition
of enemy forces, these security elements allow the commander to focus the effects
of the main body’s combat power against the enemy main body. The overall force
must remain flexible to exploit both intelligence and combat information. The security
force should not allow the enemy force to break contact unless it receives an order
from the commander. When a strong covering force has not preceded the advance
guard, it should seize terrain that offers essential observation.
4052. Actions on contact are a series of combat actions often conducted
simultaneously taken on contact with the enemy to develop the situation. Actions on
contact are:
a.
Deploy and report.
b.
Evaluate and develop the situation.
c.
Choose a course of action.
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d.
Execute selected course of action
e.
Recommend a course of action to the higher commander.
4053. Once the lead elements of a force conducting an advance to contact
encounter the enemy, they conduct actions on contact. The unit treats obstacles like
enemy contact, since it assumes that the obstacles are covered by fire. The unit
carries out these actions on contact regardless of whether the enemy has detected
its presence. The unit’s security force often gains a tactical advantage over an
enemy force by using tempo and initiative to conduct these actions on contact,
allowing it to gain and maintain contact without becoming decisively engaged. How
quickly the unit develops the situation is directly related to its security. This tempo is
directly related to the unit's use of well-rehearsed SOP and drills.
4054. Deploy and Report. When a unit’s security element encounters an enemy
unit or obstacle, it deploys to a covered position that provides observation and fields
of fire. If the security element is under enemy fire, it uses direct and indirect fire to
suppress the enemy and restore freedom of manoeuvre. Simultaneously, the
commander of the security element reports the contact using a spot report format to
provide all available information on the situation to his higher headquarters. This
alerts the commander and allows him to begin necessary actions.
4055. Evaluate and Develop the Situation. The unit’s security force develops the
situation rapidly within mission constraints by employing techniques ranging from
stealthy, foot-mobile reconnaissance to reconnaissance by fire, which uses both
direct and indirect weapons. If possible the commander continues the security
mission with other elements much are not currently in contact with the enemy after
evaluating the situation. This helps to develop the situation across the front and
provides more manoeuvre space to execute further actions. As the situation
develops, the security force submits additional reports.
4056. Choose a Course of Action. After the security force makes contact, its
commander gathers information, makes an assessment and chooses a course of
action (COA) consistent with his higher commander's intent and within the unit's
capability. The unit initiates direct and indirect fires to gain the initiative if it is
appropriate to engage the enemy. This allows the security force to resume its
mission as soon as possible. The commander cannot allow small enemy forces to
delay the movement of the security force. Usually, available intelligence and the
concept of the operation indicate the COA to follow. For obstacles not covered by
fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or create the required number of lanes to
support its manoeuvre or the manoeuvre of a supported unit. Once enemy contact is
made, these COA are normally to conduct an attack, bypass, defend, delay or
withdraw. For obstacles covered by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or conduct
breaching operations as part of a quick attack.
4057. Execute Selected Course of Action. The security force commander should
determine quickly whether to bypass the enemy or attack. The security force attacks
if it has sufficient, immediately available combat power to overwhelm the enemy and
the attack will not detract from mission accomplishment. Such attacks are usually
necessary to overcome enemy attempts to slow the movement of the security force.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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If this initial attack fails to defeat enemy defences, the security force commander
must consider other options, such as making a more deliberate attack or assuming
the defence while continuing to find out as much as possible about the enemy’s
positions.
4058. The security force may bypass the enemy if it does not have sufficient combat
power or an attack would jeopardize mission accomplishment. It must request
permission to bypass an enemy force unless the operations order provides bypass
criteria. The security force commander must report bypassed enemy forces to the
next higher headquarters, which then assumes responsibility for their destruction or
containment. Alternatively, the security force could keep a minimum force in contact
with the bypassed enemy so that he cannot move freely around the battlefield.
4059. If the security force cannot conduct either a quick attack or a bypass, it
attempts to establish a defence. In the defence, the security force maintains enemy
contact, continues to perform reconnaissance and prepares to support other forces.
When the security force commander decides to defend, responsibility for further
action rests with his higher commander. In the event other COA would lead to
decisive engagements or destruction, the security force conducts those activities
necessary to assure self-preservation, such as delay or withdrawal, but maintains
enemy contact unless the higher commander orders otherwise.
4060. Recommend a Course of Action to the Higher Commander. Once the security
force commander selects a COA keeping in mind his commander’s intent, he reports
it to his higher commander, who has the option of disapproving it based on its impact
on his mission. To avoid delay, unit SOP may provide automatic approval of certain
actions. If the higher commander assumes responsibility for continuing to develop
the situation, the security force supports his actions as ordered. The higher
commander must be careful to avoid becoming overly focused on initial security
fights to the determent of operations directed against the enemy main body.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY
4061. Once contact is made, the main body commander brings overwhelming fires
onto the enemy to prevent him from conducting either a spoiling attack or organizing
a coherent defence. The security force commander manoeuvres as quickly as
possible to find gaps in the enemy's defences. The commander uses his ISR assets
to gain as much information as possible about the enemy's dispositions, strengths,
capabilities and intentions. As more intelligence becomes available, the main body
commander attacks to destroy or disrupt enemy command and control (C2) centres,
fire control nodes and communication nets. The main body commander conducts
operations to prevent enemy reserves from moving to counter his actions.
FIX THE ENEMY
4062. The commander tries to initiate manoeuvre at a tempo the enemy cannot
match, since success in an advance to contact depends on effective actions on
contact. The security force commander does not allow the enemy to manoeuvre
against the main body. The organisation, size and combat power of the security
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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force are the major factors that determine the size of the enemy force it can defeat
without deploying the main body.
4063. The commander uses his aerial manoeuvre and fire support assets - including
offensive information operations - to fix the enemy in his current positions by directly
attacking his combat and command systems, and emplacing situational obstacles.
The priorities are typically to attack enemy forces in contact, C2 and fire control
facilities, fire support assets and moving enemy forces not yet in contact, such as
follow-on forces and reserves. These priorities vary with the factors of MAP. Attack
helicopters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft working in joint air attack teams
are ideally suited to engage the enemy throughout the depth of his area of
operations.
4064. The techniques a commander employs to fix the enemy when both forces are
moving are different than those employed when the enemy force is stationary during
contact. In both situations, when the security force cannot overrun the enemy by
conducting a quick attack, he must deploy a portion of the main body. When this
occurs the unit is no longer conducting an advance to contact but an attack.
MANOEUVRE
4065. If the security force cannot overrun the enemy with an attack, the commander
quickly manoeuvres his main body to conduct a penetration or envelopment. He
does this to overwhelm the enemy force before it can react effectively or reinforce.
The commander attempts to defeat the enemy in detail while still maintaining the
momentum of his advance. After a successful attack, the main body commander
resumes the advance to contact. If he did not defeat the enemy he has three main
options: bypass transition to a more deliberate attack or conduct some type of
defence. In all cases, he makes every effort to retain the initiative and prevent the
enemy from stabilizing the situation by conducting violent and resolute attacks.
Simultaneously, he must maintain his momentum by synchronizing the actions of his
combat, combat support and combat service support elements.
4066. Main body elements deploy rapidly to the vicinity of the contact if the
commander initiates an attack. Commanders of manoeuvring units coordinate
forward passage through friendly forces in contact as required. The intent is to
deliver the assault before the enemy can deploy or reinforce his engaged forces. The
commander may order an attack from a march column for one of the main body's
columns, while the rest of the main body deploys. The commander can also wait to
attack until he can bring the bulk of the main body forward. He avoids piecemeal
commitment except when rapidity of action is essential and combat superiority at the
vital point is present and can be maintained throughout the attack or when
compartmentalized terrain forces such as COA.
4067. When trying to conduct an envelopment, the commander focuses on attacking
the enemy's flanks and rear before he can prepare to counter these actions. The
commander uses the security force to fix the enemy while the main body
manoeuvres to look for an assailable flank or he uses the main body to fix the enemy
while the security force finds the assailable flank.
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FOLLOW THROUGH
4068. If the enemy is defeated, the unit transitions back into an advance to contact
and continue to advance. The advance to contact terminates when the unit reaches
the final objective or limit of advance or it must transition to a more deliberate attack,
a defence or a withdrawal.
SEARCH AND ATTACK
4069. Search and attack is a technique for conducting an advance to contact that
shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission. A commander
employs this form of a advance to contact, conducted primarily by light forces and
often supported by heavy forces, when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed
elements or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given
area. The battalion is the echelon that normally conducts a search and attack. A
brigade will assist its subordinate battalions by ensuring the availability of indirect
fires and other support.
ORGANISATION OF FORCES
4070. The commander task organizes his unit into reconnaissance, fixing and
finishing forces, each with a specific purpose and task. The size of the
reconnaissance force is based on the available intelligence about the size of enemy
forces in the AO. The less known about the situation, the larger the reconnaissance
force. The reconnaissance force typically consists of scout, infantry, aviation and
electronic warfare assets. The fixing force must have enough combat power to
isolate the enemy once the reconnaissance force finds him. The finishing force must
have enough combat power to defeat those enemy forces expected to be located
within the AO. The commander can direct each subordinate unit to retain a finishing
force, or he can retain the finishing force at his echelon. The commander may rotate
his subordinate elements through the reconnaissance, fixing and finishing roles.
However, rotating roles may require a change in task organisation and additional
time for training and rehearsal.
CONTROL MEASURES
4071. The commander establishes control measures that allow for decentralized
actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. The minimum control
measures for a search and attack are an AO, target reference points (TRP),
objectives, checkpoints and contact points (Figure 4.13). The use of TRP facilitates
responsive fire support once the reconnaissance force makes contact with the
enemy. The commander uses objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of
subordinate elements. Coordination points indicate a specific location for
coordinating fires and movement between adjacent units. The commander uses
other control measures, such as phase lines, as necessary.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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Fig 4.13 : Search and Attack Control Measures
PLANNING A SEARCH AND ATTACK
4072. A commander conducts a search and attack for one or more of the following
purposes:
a.
Destroy the enemy: render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective.
b.
Deny the area: prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a
given area; for example, in any area he is using for a base camp or for
logistics support.
c.
Protect the force: prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy
friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property and key facilities.
d.
Collect information: gain information about the enemy and the terrain to
confirm the enemy COA predicted as a result of the IPB process.
4073. The products of the IPB process are critical to conducting a search and
attack. They focus the force's reconnaissance efforts on likely enemy locations.
4074. The search and attack plan places the finishing force, as the decisive
operation, where it can best manoeuvre to destroy enemy forces or essential
facilities once located by reconnaissance assets. Typically, the finishing force
occupies a central location in the AO. However, the factors of MAP may allow the
commander to position the finishing force outside the search and attack area. The
commander weights this decisive operation by using priority of fires and assigning
priorities of support to his other available combat multipliers, such as engineer
elements and helicopter lift support. The commander establishes control measures
as necessary to consolidate units and concentrate the combat power of the force
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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before the attack. Once the reconnaissance force locates the enemy, the fixing and
finishing forces can fix and destroy him. The commander also develops a
contingency plan in the event that the reconnaissance force is compromised.
4075. Fire support plans must provide for flexible and rapidly delivered fires to
achieve the commander’s desired effects throughout the AO. The commander
positions his fire support assets so they can support subordinate elements
throughout the AO. The commander must establish procedures for rapidly clearing
fires. To clear fires rapidly, command posts and small-unit commanders must track
and report the locations of all subordinate elements. Because of the uncertain enemy
situation, the commander is careful to assign clear fire-support relationships.
EXECUTING A SEARCH AND ATTACK
4076. Each subordinate element operating in its own AO is tasked to destroy the
enemy within its capability. The commander should have in place previously
established control measures and communications means between any closing
elements to prevent inflicting casualty on own forces by friendly fire. The
reconnaissance force conducts a zone reconnaissance to reconnoitre identified
Named Areas of Interest (NAI).
4077. Once the reconnaissance force finds the enemy force, the fixing force
develops the situation and then executes one of two options based on the
commander's guidance and the factors of MAP. The first option is to block identified
routes that the detected enemy can use to escape or rush reinforcement over. The
fixing force maintains contact with the enemy and positions its forces to isolate and
fix him before the finishing force attacks. The second option is to conduct an attack
to fix the enemy in his current positions until the finishing force arrives. The fixing
force attacks if that action meets the commander's intent and it can generate
sufficient combat power against the detected enemy. Depending on the enemy's
mobility and the likelihood of the reconnaissance force being compromised, the
commander may need to position his fixing force before his reconnaissance force
enters the AO.
4078. Brigades (and possibly battalions) may establish fire-support bases as part of
the operations of their fixing force to provide fire-support coverage throughout the
area of operations during search and attack operations conducted in restricted
terrain. These positions should be mutually supporting and prepared for all round
defence. They are located in positions that facilitate aerial re-supply. The
development of these positions depends on the factors of MAP because their
establishment requires diverting combat power to ensure protecting fire support and
other assets located within such bases.
4079. If conditions are not right to use the finishing force to attack the detected
enemy, the reconnaissance or the fixing force can continue to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance activities to further develop the situation. Whenever
this occurs, the force maintaining surveillance must be careful to avoid detection and
possible enemy ambushes.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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4080. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces, or
it may locate at a pickup zone and air assault into a landing zone near the enemy
once he is located. The finishing force must be responsive enough to engage the
enemy before he can break contact with the reconnaissance force or the fixing force.
The echelon intelligence officer provides the commander with an estimate of the time
it will take the enemy to displace from his detected location. The commander
provides additional mobility assets so the finishing force can respond within that time
frame.
4081. The commander uses his finishing force to destroy the detected and fixed
enemy during a search and attack by conducting hasty or deliberate attacks,
manoeuvring to block enemy escape routes while another unit conducts the attack or
employing indirect fire or close air support to destroy the enemy. The commander
may have his finishing force established an ambush area and use his
reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the ambushes.
ADVANCE IN CONTACT
4082. The advance in contact is a combat action that may occur when both sides
seek to fulfil their mission by offensive action. It will occur during an advance to
contact and can easily lead to a quick attack. In offensive, defensive or delaying
operations it will often mark a moment of transition in that the outcome may well
decide the nature of subsequent operations. This is why an advance in contact is
described as a transitional phase. Even when the main part of a force is attacking,
defending or delaying, individual elements may find themselves in situations which
have the characteristics of an advance in contact. Although forces of divisional size,
given room for manoeuvre, may occasionally be involved as a whole in an advance
in contact, it is normally more applicable at brigade level and below.
4083. The advance in contact differs from the advance to contact that it occurs
unexpectedly whereas in the advance to contact the commander is deliberately
seeking to establish contact with the enemy.
4084. An advance in contact may occur in various circumstances:
a.
When a force which is moving, either tactically or in column of route,
makes contact with the enemy about whom the friendly force has little or no
information. This might happen by chance or when reconnaissance has been
ineffective.
b.
When both sides become aware of the other and decide to attack
without delay in an attempt to obtain positional advantage, gain ground of
tactical importance, maintain momentum or assert dominance over the
enemy.
c.
An advance in contact may also occur when one force deploys hastily
for defence while the other attempts to prevent it from doing so.
PLANNING
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4085. It will not be possible to plan in detail for this kind of operation. However, a
force that is properly deployed in accordance with recognized tactical principles will
be poised to react to most situations. Advance in contacts will invariably force a
commander to reconsider and often adjust his plans. The basic principle is to seize
and retain the initiative. This will give the commander the freedom of action he
needs, either to accomplish his mission as he originally intended or to change his
plan to suit the new situation. High tempo is at a premium; success depends, to a
large extent, on the speed of reaction of the commander and his forces. He can then
decide how to develop the advance in contact into one of the three operations of war
(offensive, defence and delay).
4086. While commanders can make no firm plans, they should make use of the
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. In particular they should
study the terrain and the map to deduce areas in which it would be particularly likely
for an advance in contact to occur. Additionally, they should take particular note of
the latest situation or intelligence reports and assessments concentrating on likely
enemy capabilities, objectives, avenues of advance, going and natural obstacles.
4087. The characteristics of advance in contact are such that there will not normally
be enough time for complicated battle procedure as the two opposing forces
approach each other. Assuming a reasonable balance of forces, victory will go to the
side with a higher tempo; the commander who reacts more quickly, strikes the first
blow and keeps the enemy off balance. In the planning stage this implies careful
reconnaissance, mission, orders, balanced grouping, forward command and
responsive indirect firepower on call. Forward planning in this type of battle should
never be so detailed as to lead a commander into a preconceived course of action; it
is not a substitute for the intuitive and bold leadership which overturns material
superiority.
CONDUCT
4088. Information and Intelligence. The speed at which the tactical picture will
change when conducting manoeuvre prior to an advance in contact will generate an
increased requirement for accurate and timely intelligence. Intelligence assets must
be especially responsive to the commander’s needs. Strategic agencies or
operational assets may provide the initial warnings and indications of enemy
presence and help assess his intentions. Extra reconnaissance forces, which should
expect to fight for information, may have to be constituted from within the formation.
Once contact has been made, all available Intelligence assets must direct their effort
at the enemy formation to establish size and intentions and to develop target
information. The commander must have a quickly established and continuous flow of
information and intelligence if he is to seize the initiative.
MANOUEVRE
4089. The important characteristics of an advance in contact are a shortage of
information about the enemy and a limited amount of time available for the
commander to develop the situation favourably. Plans must be drawn up and
executed as quickly as possible. Success will depend primarily on the ability of the
commander to anticipate an advance in contact and to bring to bear, quickly, the
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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combat power at his disposal. Thus, at all levels, bold, vigorous action by
subordinate commanders is often the key to success. Prompt action to gain control
of the situation quickly will reduce the enemy’s chances of carrying out his plans and
may help to preserve freedom of action. Well-practised drills are often the key to a
successful advance in contact.
4090. If the enemy is much stronger, or if he is at a higher state of combat
readiness, it will be necessary for the force in contact to engage him with the
maximum combat power available as soon as possible, in order to hinder him from
deploying his forces and prevent him from using favourable ground. This will gain
time to allow action to be taken by a superior commander.
4091. Aviation. The speed of reaction and considerable firepower of armed and
attack helicopters, allow them to be committed very quickly against the enemy in an
advance in contact. Early deployment of reconnaissance and armed or attack
helicopters will always offer a commander an advantage.
FIRE SUPPORT
4092. Artillery. The amount of initial fire support available to the forces which
become involved in an advance in contact depends on the organisation for
movement laid down by the commander. It is important, therefore, that artillery forces
are located such that they are available to support the leading elements of a moving
force. Forward artillery observers must be allocated to the leading elements of a
combat force. An advance in contact is also an ideal situation in which to make use
of mines to restrict the enemy’s freedom of manoeuvre although there may be
insufficient time to prepare artillery delivered mines.
4093. Electronic Warfare. ESM (intercept and direction finding) resources will
provide information on the enemy’s critical C2 nodes. Once battle is joined, jamming
to disrupt and degrade enemy C2 and fire support communications will assist the
commander in achieving his aim.
PROTECTION
4094. The main considerations in terms of protection in an advance in contact are
essentially the same as those for any offensive operation.
COMPONENTS OF PROTECTION
4095. Air Defence. Air defence weapons should be allotted to forces on the move
and deployed to give as much forward protection as possible. Enemy ground forces
will often be supported by armed helicopters or they may approach under air cover
or by air transport.
4096. Mobility and Counter Mobility. Engineers will need some preparation and
deployment time before they can make an effective contribution to the battle.
Considerable speed of reaction and improvisation will be required but, if they are
kept readily available, and reconnaissance is reduced to a minimum, they may be
used for immediate mobility or counter mobility tasks such as:
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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a.
Breaching or crossing of obstacles.
b.
Opening routes.
c.
Rapid emplacement of obstacles to the front and/or flanks.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
4097. CSS must enable the commander to seize and maintain the initiative and
must be capable of responding quickly to the rapid changes in plans which may
occur. Because of the limited information available when an advance in contact
occurs, CSS commanders must be ready for the unexpected. Ensuring combat
supplies and materiel levels are maintained at the maximum practical level is one
means of achieving this readiness.
4098. Components of CSS. In an advance in contact speed is the major criterion
and CSS planning is subordinated to achieving that. CSS must be capable of
responding quickly to the developing needs, such as casualties’ evacuation
(CASEVAC) and ammunition, and anticipating post-engagement requirements such
as replenishment of combat supplies and repair of damaged equipment. At the level
above that which is in contact, CSS should therefore, concentrate on directing its
efforts on the formation or unit involved both during and after the battle. This might
include:
a.
G1. Move forward of medical support and the development of a
casualty evacuation plan.
b.
G4.
(1)
Ammunition for the battle if there is time, and certainly after
reorganisation.
(2)
Refuelling after reorganisation.
(3)
Ensuring maximum availability of equipment both during the
engagement and in preparation for subsequent operations.
(4)
Planning for the recovery of battle-winning equipment.
COMMAND
4099. The problems confronting the commander in an advance in contact are:
a.
Initially he will have little information on the strength, location and
intention of his enemy. It may even be necessary for him to confirm the
locations of his own forces. Immediate and clear situation reports from lower
commanders are essential to allow him to make his plan. When an advance in
contact occurs the commander will need to make a very rapid estimate of the
situation and issue a WngO.
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b.
The headquarters may be on the move and, therefore, its effectiveness
may be restricted. The staff may be dispersed or the commander separated
from them. Characteristically, units will be moving on radio silence and it may
take some time to activate communications between HQ.
4100. If an advance in contact is likely it is vital that commanders are well forward
and able to speak to each other, even if their HQ temporarily cannot.
PROCEDURE
4101. The commander whose forces make contact with the enemy in an advance in
contact must immediately decide how he wants to fight the battle. In deciding on a
course of action he must not lose sight of his original mission. If he is forced to
deviate from it, his actions must remain within the overall commander’s intent or
concept of operations. On the other hand, he must not shirk his responsibility to act
independently. His decision must be notified to his superior commander immediately.
4102. One of the commander’s first tasks in an advance in contact is to determine
the enemy’s strengths and dispositions. He should particularly ascertain the situation
on the enemy’s flanks. The identification and envelopment of an assailable flank will
generally disclose the enemy’s dispositions more rapidly than a frontal attack and will
give more opportunity for tactical surprise and decisive results. Whilst trying to
identify the enemy’s weakness, the commander must ensure that his own flanks are
secure.
4103. Often it will not immediately be possible to use all the forces that the
commander might wish to deploy. In this case, he must establish an order of priority
for deployment early in the operation. Throughout the operation he must keep a clear
picture of the location and status of all elements of his force.
4104. The commander’s decision on how to continue an advance in contact should,
wherever possible, be based on his personal assessment of the situation on the
ground. However, he must not sacrifice valuable time in order to obtain detailed
information. He must realise that he is in a race for time and space with the enemy
commander. It is, therefore, extremely important that before the operation starts, the
commander evaluates possible routes for movement and assesses any area of
terrain that may be useful, and that he keeps these in mind while his force is moving.
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SECTION 4
COMPANY IN ATTACK
4105. “Many years ago, as a cadet hoping someday to be an officer, I was poring
over the ‘Principles of War ‘ listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the
Sergeant Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. “Don’t
bother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. ‘There’s only one principle
of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you
can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain’t looking.” Field Marshal Sir William
Slim
2.
The 11 Basic Considerations for the attack are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
Surprise
Concentration
Penetration
Fire-power
Firm Bases
Secure FUP and LD
Secure Flanks
Maintenance of Momentum
Retention of the Initiative
Rapid Reorganization
Enemy Reserve
THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DETAIL
SURPRISE
“ The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know
where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he
prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.”
Sun Tzu
4106. Surprise means a state of disorientation resulting from an unexpected event
that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist. The potency of surprise as a
psychological weapon should not be under estimated. It causes confusion and
paralysis of the enemy chain of command and destroys the cohesion and morale of
his troops. It is not essential that we take the enemy totally unaware, but only that
awareness comes too late for him to react effectively. Surprise, therefor, is a genuine
source of combat power because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisively
affect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.
4107. The advantage gained by surprise depends on the degree of disorientation
and the enemy’s ability to adjust and recover. While the element of surprise is often
of decisive importance, it should be remembered that it is difficult to achieve and
easy to loose. The advantages of surprise are only temporary and must be quickly
exploited. Therefore, while surprise can be decisive, it is a considerable risk to
depend on it alone to provide the margin of victory.
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4108. How is surprise achieved? To determine this two things should be
remembered, firstly that surprise is not what we do; it is the enemy’s reaction to what
we do, and secondly it is in the mind of the enemy commander, not necessarily his
troops, that we want to achieve surprise. The enemy commander will have an
expectation of how we will conduct our attack based on his “understanding “of: our
aim and doctrine, the situation, the ground, and his experience of us. This
“understanding” will lead him to array his forces to meet his expectation. If we can
attack by following the path of least enemy expectation we will achieve surprise and
have the greatest chance of concentrating our strength where the enemy is weakest.
The following factors may assist in achieving surprise:
a.
Intelligence. A good understanding of the enemy will assist us in
achieving surprise because it can help us identify what the enemy expects us
to do, from where and when. Once we have identified the enemy expectation
we can act to avoid it, or use his expectation as a basis for deception.
b
Security. Security, (stealth), can deny the enemy information about our
intentions and us. This will increase the uncertainty the enemy commander is
forced to operate under, therefore making him consider a number of courses
of action open to us. It follows that the enemy will be less able to focus his
combat power against us without accepting a degree of risk in this uncertain
environment.
c.
Speed. Conducting our attack with such speed that the enemy cannot
effectively react will achieve surprise. Speed is a weapon. (Speed is
discussed below).
d.
Deception. Deception is measures taken to mislead the enemy by
manipulation; distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him act in a
manner that is prejudicial to his interests. In short this means providing the
enemy with information that he will misread.
e.
Originality. Surprise is achieved by operating unpredictably or
ambiguously. This, once again, increases the uncertainty under which the
enemy commander must operate under by making our action unpredictable. If
we can avoid templated plans and treat each tactical situation as unique we
are going a long way toward achieving originality. Think outside the box.
4109. Methods of Achieving Surprise. Methods of achieving surprise, at battalion
and company level, include but are not restricted to:
a.
Use of concealed routes and movement from the Assembly Area to the
FUP.
b.
Employment of radio silence
c.
High standards of battle discipline
d.
Capitalizing on conditions of limited visibility
e.
Employment of indirect fire at places and times that lead the enemy to
draw false conclusions
f.
Moving or positioning forces as deception
g.
Unexpected time of attack
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
h.
i.
j.
UNCLASSIFIED
Unexpected direction of attack
Speed
Personal camouflage
CONCENTRATION
4110. Concentration is not simply a superior number of troops, relative to the
enemy, that are applied at a particular place; concentration is the convergence of
effects, in space and time, on objectives which, in combination, overwhelm the
enemy physically, morally and informationally. The attacker must concentrate
superior combat power at selected points of assault. Concentration should occur at a
point that will have the greatest effect on the enemy (Decisive Points). Determining
the objectives against which the attacking force’s combat power is to be
concentrated is a crucial part of the appreciation.
4111. Concentration does not imply that the attacking force cannot be dispersed to
avoid detection and enemy interdiction or to achieve deception. What is critical is
that combat power is concentrated at the point and time of assault. Whenever
concentration becomes necessary, (in the Assembly Area or FUP for example), it
must be achieved swiftly so that the attacking force remains vulnerable for the
minimum time possible.
4112. The degree of superiority that is required cannot just be expressed as formula
or ratio. (See combat ratios below). The degree of superiority in combat power to be
concentrated will depend on the situation. The infantry commander must employ a
high level of situational awareness and judgement to determine how much, and
where, combat power is be concentrated to achieve success. Concentration can
achieve local superiority for a numerically inferior attacking force at a physically or
morally decisive point in the enemy’s defences. The following factors assist in
determining the required degree of combat power to be concentrated:
a.
Enemy. The enemy dispositions, intentions, morale/tenacity, state of
defensive preparations, and susceptibility to surprise, among other physical
and psychological factors, (how he is going to execute his mission - analyze
him) can assist the infantry commander in determining the necessary level of
combat power to be concentrated.
b.
Own Force. The ability of the attacking force to achieve surprise,
relative mobility, fire support assets available and their probable effect, and
the likely effectiveness of deception plans, among other physical and
psychological factors, can assist the infantry commander in determining the
necessary level of combat power to be concentrated.
4113. Achieving Concentration.
a.
Selecting Approaches. Fundamental to achieving concentration is
determining where available combat power should be applied so that
necessary superiority is achieved. Approaches should allow the attacker to
best concentrate his combat power while limiting the enemy’s ability to
concentrate his combat power against the assault. 14. Selecting Objectives.
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Critically objectives should be selected where the concentration of combat
power will have the greatest effect on the enemy, while sustaining minimum
losses to the attacker. Objectives must be within the capacity of the
nominated attacking elements to capture and hold against counter attack. The
objective should be clearly defined and easily recognizable to the attackers on
the ground, wherever possible.
b.
Coordination/Synchronization. Coordination of battlefield activity in
time and space for maximum effect at a decisive point is also known as
synchronization. Coordination allows activity to occur simultaneously, or at the
most effective time. This can achieve synergy, which creates a greater effect,
on the enemy, than the sum total of the individual parts of the combat power
when applied in isolation.
FIREPOWER
4114. Firepower will assist in achieving the requisite superiority to be concentrated.
The selection of objectives or approaches to objectives may well depend on the
ability to concentrate firepower on those objectives or approaches.
ECONOMY OF EFFORT
4115. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive strength is to be
concentrated at the critical time and space there must be no wasteful expenditure of
effort where it cannot significantly affect the outcome. This can be summed up as
planning for a balanced deployment with the allocation of resources strictly related to
the aim of the attack.
PENETRATION
4116. Penetration, at battalion and company level, is the attacker’s ability to rapidly
“break-in” to the enemy’s defensive position and continue the assault (fight through)
onto the last objective. If the attack cannot achieve Penetration it will by definition
fail. To achieve Penetration the “break-in” of the attack must be organized in depth
and on a narrow front. This is done to allow concentration of combat power and the
maintenance of momentum by the echelons of the assault.
4117. In order to establish the necessary preconditions for the “break-in” the assault
must achieve initial success on a wide frontage. This means that the objective’s
entire frontage is covered, and the assault’s frontage actually overlaps the objective
at its extremities, prior to the “break-in”. This is required to ensure that the:
a.
Whole enemy frontage is endangered by the assault and that the
enemy is, therefore, prohibited from concentrating his combat power at a
particular place, without risking the loss of some part of his position to another
portion of the assault.
b.
Enemy is unable to predetermine where the “break-in” is actually going
to occur on his front and therefore cannot adjust his defences to counter the
threat.
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c.
Depth or elements required to capture objectives in depth have a safe
passage forward.
d.
Enemy cannot bring enfilade fire to bear on the assault from the flanks
of its defences.
4118. Fundamental to Penetration are concentration of combat power, speed and
violence of execution, retention of initiative and maintenance of momentum. In
planning the attack the infantry commander should take into account these
considerations and ensure sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower can be
maintained throughout the attack employing fresh troops, wherever possible, for
each objective. Methods the commander may consider to achieve this are:
a. Grouping of the assault (see grouping below)
b. Phasing the attack (see phasing below)
4119. It should be remembered that the assault would probably be subject to less
enemy firepower once inside the enemy’s position. This is because the enemy is
hindered from engaging the assault within his perimeter, especially with indirect fire,
by his own troops in the assault’s vicinity. It therefore follows that the more swiftly the
assault can penetrate its objective the less time it will be vulnerable to the
concentrated effects of the enemy’s firepower.
4120. Successful penetration by the assault is characterized by:
a.
Initiative from junior commanders
b.
Aggression and speed
c.
Fire and movement at platoon, section, and group level
d.
Concentrated firepower.
4121. Firepower is the volume of fire, which may be delivered by a position, unit or
weapon system. It includes the effects of all available weapons under the direct
control of a commander or deployed outside his command. Firepower is employed to
establish such fire supremacy in the area of the attack that the enemy can neither
interfere with our efforts nor develop his own courses of action.
4122. The elements of firepower employed at battalion and company level include:
a.
Direct Fire. Direct fire is fire directed at a target, which is visible to the
aimer. Resources employed to provide direct fire include tanks and other
armoured vehicles, infantry machine guns and anti-armoured weapons. In the
attack the direct fire employed by the assaulting troops small arms will be
critical.
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Company Commander Wing, PULADA
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b.
Indirect Fire. Indirect fire is fire delivered at a target which cannot be
seen by the aimer. Resources employed to provide indirect fire include
infantry SFMG and mortars, artillery and naval guns.
c.
Close Air Support (CAIRS). CAIRS is air action against hostile targets
in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Resources
employed to provide CAIRS include Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) aircraft and
armed helicopters.
4123. Fire Support. The application of firepower in the attack is termed Fire
Support. Fire Support has two basic categories, these are:
a.
Close Fire Support. Close fire support generally is of critical concern
to the infantry battalion and company commander because: it engages enemy
troops, weapons or positions, which, because of their proximity to our troops,
present the most immediate and serious threat. The aim of close fire support
is to neutralize or destroy enemy infantry and armour, including organic heavy
weapons such as mortars, which can directly interfere with our attack.
b.
Depth Fire Support. Depth fire support engages enemy troops,
weapons, positions and installations that are not in close proximity to our
troops. This fire support is generally coordinated at formation level, or above,
with the aim of:
(1)
Breaking up concentrations of enemy infantry and armour
including reserves.
(2)
Neutralizing or destroying enemy field or air defence artillery, or
(3)
Disrupting the enemy command and control system, movement
and logistics.
4124. Effects of Firepower. The infantry commander must be aware of the physical
and psychological effects of firepower when planning the attack so that he can
employ them to the best advantage. These effects are :
a.
Psychological. All troops in battle experience a level of constant
anxiety usually caused by fear of becoming a casualty. One of the temporary
effects of fire is to raise this level of anxiety above a threshold beyond which
troops are unable to move, observe or fire their weapons. This is known as
neutralization. Neutralization can be categorized as follows:
(1)
Complete Neutralization. This implies that the enemy cannot
move, observe, or use his weapons. To achieve this fire support must
be:
(a)
Potentially lethal
(b)
Cover the target area
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(c)
Have sufficient density to achieve the effect
(d)
Give the enemy no respites.
(2)
Partial Neutralization. Essentially partial neutralization differs
from complete neutralization in that it only inhibits enemy activity and
does not totally prevent movement, observation or use of weapons. I t
may be achieved by the employment of smoke.
(3)
Lasting Neutralization. This occurs during the period
immediately after the firing stops, when troops are recovering from the
physical and psychological effects of the engagement, and regaining
sufficient cohesion to operate effectively. The degree and duration of
lasting neutralization depend upon the weight and density of fire
applied to the target, and the morale of the troops in the target area.
(4)
Demoralization. This occurs when the application of a very
heavy weight of fire, or fire over a protracted period, has destroyed the
enemy’s will to resist. In some cases the weight and duration of fire
may be so great that its cost is prohibitive.
b.
Physical. The physical effects of firepower include:
(1)
Damage/Destruction. These effects may be applied to material
and field defences. This is best achieved by aerially delivered
ordnance, direct fire support resources using special anti-tank
projectiles or HE (bunker busting), or from large calibre indirect fire
weapons. Artillery delivered delay-fused projectiles are effective
against well-prepared field defences.
(2)
Attrition. Attrition is the reduction of enemy personnel through
casualties. For artillery and mortars the infliction of casualties is best
achieved using HE, particularly during the first 10 to 15 seconds of the
engagement, before the enemy has had time to take cover or evasive
action.
4125. Types of Fire/The Employment of Firepower Effects. In the attack, at
battalion and company level, the effects of firepower, (especially indirect fire), may
be employed in the following ways:
a.
Preparatory Fire. This is fire on the enemy troops and installations to
cause destruction, demoralization, and disorganization before the attack. The
employment of preparatory fire must take into account its effect on
ammunition availability, surprise and deception.
b.
Covering Fire. This is fire has the aim of protecting the assaulting
troops by neutralizing enemy direct fire weapons, and enemy artillery and
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mortar observers, which can engage troops during the attack. This type of fire
is most important to the infantry battalion and company in the attack.
(1)
Smoke. Smoke may be used either to blind the enemy or
screen the movement of friendly troops or both. While blinding the
enemy will prevent observed fire by his artillery/mortars and direct fire
weapons, it will not affect weapons firing on fixed lines or recorded
targets. However smoke is capable of achieving, at least, the partial
neutralization of a far greater amount of ground than HE and, therefore
fewer fire support resources may be required to achieve the effect on a
given area.
c.
Defensive Fire (DF). DF, including targets in depth, is employed to
cover the attacks exploitation and reorganization by disorganizing enemy
preparation for counter attack, and breaking up his assault.
4126. The Fire Plan. The fire plan is a plan for using all the available fire support
assets, (including indirect fire and CAIRS), in a way that best contributes to the
success of the attack. The infantry battalion or company commander is responsible
for the tactical plan; this includes the fire plan. (See below for the principles of fire
planning).
4127. The infantry commander must detail when and where fire is needed and what
effect is required. The detailed fire plan to achieve the infantry commander’s
direction will be produced and coordinated by the senior direct support commander
(BC/Mortar Platoon Commander), or observer (FO/MFC).
4128. The fire plan must involve all fire support assets available for the attack. It
must be in depth up to and beyond the final objectives, and the covering fire so timed
that the assault can keep close to it. The fire plan must include DF for the
consolidation of each objective.
4129. The fire plan must also allow for the removal of some fire support assets to
meet contingencies, engage targets of opportunity, or for tasks imposed by higher
headquarters. This capacity is termed superimposition.
4130. Notwithstanding the general and diverse requirements for artillery in support
of the attack, the tactical plan should employ artillery by concentrated successive
engagements, rather than piecemeal use at widely spread targets. In this way, the
greatest desired effect can be achieved and the flexibility of the artillery best
exploited.
FIRM BASES
4131. A firm base is a secure area from which the attack and each subsequent
phase, if any, start. Every phase of an attack must start from a firm base to ensure
that the assaulting troops are not forced to react or counter enemy manoeuvre. This
is required to ensure that the attacks aim, initiative, momentum or
coordination/synchronization are not compromised.
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4132. The level of security required will relate to the situation. Fundamentally a firm
base must be secure from direct enemy action.
4133. Establishing Secure Firm Bases. Depth elements of the assault force, prior
to the attack or elements to be employed on subsequent objectives or who are
specifically positioned for the purpose may establish firm bases. The strength of this
force will be determined by the likely threat, the size of the area needed to be
secured and troops available.
SECURE FUP AND LD
4134. FUP. The Forming Up Place (FUP) is an area, used as a control measure, to
which assaulting troops deploy immediately before the attack and in which they
adopt assault formations. It can allow a buffer of time, if required, between the move
forward from the assembly area and crossing the LD at H hour. It is occupied for the
shortest period of time possible and must be secure from direct enemy action.
4135. The LD. The Line of Departure (LD) is the line the assaulting troops cross at
H hour and should be out of view of the enemy. It should normally be at right angles
to the axis of assault and must be secure. It should, wherever possible, follow some
clearly defined feature by day or be marked with tapes. By night it must be marked
with tapes or lights. Assault troops must not pause on this line. The LD will normally
be on the forward edge of the FUP.
4136. Siting the FUP and LD. The FUP and LD should be sited to ensure that they
are:
a.
Secure from direct enemy action.
b.
Defilade from direct enemy fire and observation, and if possible, away
from likely enemy DF tasks.
c.
Sufficiently large for the deployment of the attacking force that will
occupy it.
d.
If possible, accessible by a covered approach.
e.
As close as to the objective as enemy observation and small arms will
allow.
4137. Securing the FUP and LD. There must be a secure FUP and LD; otherwise
the assault may not start in accordance with the plan. Security of the FUP and LD is
achieved by the careful selection of its position relative to the enemy, minimizing the
time it is occupied by the assault, and by the employment of a force to secure it. The
FUP must be secured prior to its occupation by the assault. This is often best
achieved by a depth element and as a preliminary task.
SECURE FLANKS
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4138. The flanks of the assault, from crossing the LD onwards, are vulnerable to
direct enemy interference. This is because the enemy can achieve a great deal of
disruption with relatively little combat power concentrated where the attack is least
able to detect a threat, and concentrate its own combat power in response. This
response, by the attacker on his flank, runs a serious risk of deflecting the assault
from its aim and working to the defender’s considerable advantage. The attack’s
flanks therefore must be secure.
4139. Degrees of Flank Security. Given the situation and its attendant degree of
risk, along with available resources and troops the infantry commander must
determine what level of flank security he can achieve without undermining the aim of
the attack. The degrees of flank security are:
a.
Flank Security/Early Warning. Is the provision of early warning of a
threat to the attack’s flank in sufficient time to allow the infantry commander to
counter it. Effective flank security/early warning depends on:
(1)
Position. It being positioned at a place, or succession of places,
that will allow the timely detection of the threat.
(2)
Communications. Having the necessary communications to
advise the infantry commander of the threat, and the relevant details
concerning it.
(3)
Anticipation. The commander having anticipated the threat and
his consequent course of action to counter it.
(4)
Timely Reaction. Reaction to the threat occurring with the
necessary speed to ensure it prevents enemy interference with our
attack’s flank.
(5)
Flank Protection. Is the protection of the attack’s flanks from
ground observation, direct fire and surprise attack. Effective flank
protection depends on:
(6)
Position. It being positioned at a place, or succession of places,
that will allow the timely detection and engagement of the threat
without prejudicing the conduct of the attack. (Outside direct fire range
of the attack’s flank for example).
(7)
Grouping. It being grouped to effectively meet the threat.
(Having anti-armour assets if the likely threat is armour, for example).
(8)
Economy of Effort. The constitution of a flank protection
element not occurring is the at the expense of the combat power
necessary to be concentrated in the attack.
(9)
Methods of Achieving Flank Security. Degrees of flank
security can be achieved by:
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(a)
Speed. Conducting the attack with such speed and depth
that the enemy does not have time to react.
(b)
Firepower. Employing firepower, or siting DF, to cover
the vulnerable flanks.
(c)
Tasking. Detailing part of the attacking force to provide
flank protection. The commander must ensure that the element
given this task is capable of achieving the degree of flank
security he assesses as necessary.
(d)
Approaches. Using approaches, which are likely to
present the least opportunity for the enemy to attack or interfere
with our flanks.
(e)
Secondary Attacks. Employing secondary attacks to
widen the frontage engaged by the main attack. This effort’s aim
is to engage enemy elements, which might otherwise threaten
the flanks. This method may be difficult to achieve at battalion
and company without compromising concentration and economy
of effort. A secondary attack is an attack whose importance is
secondary to the attacks main effort.
(f)
Seizing Objectives in Depth. The assault seizing
objectives in depth, and then turning outwards to get behind the
enemy’s positions on the flanks. This is aimed at eliminating
those portions of the enemy’s defences on his flanks, which can
most readily effect our attack’s flanks.
MAINTENANCE OF MOMENTUM
4140. Momentum in terms of the attack, at battalion and company level, is the
measure of the assault’s size and speed (mass x velocity) in moving towards its
objective. Momentum is central to the retention of initiative.
4141. Momentum can be checked by:
a.
Fatigue. Fatigue of the assaulting troops may result from:
(1)
The distance troops have been forced to cover in the approach
to and assault/fight-through of their objective.
(2)
The carriage of an excessive combat load for their task.
(3)
The duration of the attack.
(4)
Previous or sustained operations.
b.
Ammunition Expenditure. The assaulting troops lacking ammunition
with which to continue the fight.
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c.
Enemy Depth. The depth of the enemy defensive position may be too
great for the assault to maintain its momentum.
d.
Unexpected Enemy Positions. Unexpected enemy positions may
prevent the movement of the assault towards its nominated objective.
4142. The momentum of the attack can be maintained by:
a.
Grouping. This involves ensuring that the assault has been allocated
sufficient resources to achieve its objective. This may involve phasing the
attack.
b.
Flexibility. Maintaining reserves of firepower (superimposition) and
uncommitted “reserves” of troops (most often the assault’s depth element) to
allow for the modification of the plan or to exploit success.
c.
Rapid Reorganization/Regrouping. The ability to rapidly reorganize
or regroup when required by the situation will assist in the maintenance of
momentum by minimizing pauses in the attack.
RETENTION OF INITIATIVE
4143. Initiative is forcing the enemy to react to our actions without being able to
develop his own courses of action. The attacker should have the initiative, at the
start of the attack, because he has chosen the specific time and place of the attack.
This however is not guaranteed. If the attacker’s actions do not pose a sufficient
threat to the enemy, (by not being directed at a decisive point for example), initiative
may not be gained. This situation gives the enemy the freedom of action to defend
most effectively.
4144. There are a number of levels of initiative, these are:
a.
Simple Initiative. This is employing forces in a manner that has the
potential to compel the enemy commander to react.
b.
Seizing the Initiative. This is employing forces in a manner that
compels the enemy commander to respond with significant forces or to
significantly alter his plans.
c.
Maintaining the Initiative. This is employing forces in a manner that
continually compels the enemy commander to react to that employment over
a significant period of time.
4145. By seizing and maintaining the initiative the infantry commander
systematically forces the enemy to respond in a manner that exposes his
vulnerabilities and forces him to fight with his weakest assets. This obviously can
provide the attacker with a distinct advantage. It follows that the more the attack
threatens the enemy critical vulnerability, the more likely it is to compel him to
respond (be reactive). In short maintenance of the initiative prevents the enemy from
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getting on with his own plans, keeps him in a constant state of reaction and forces
him to employ crisis management.
4146. Methods of Maintaining the Initiative. The following methods assist in
maintaining the initiative:
a.
Exploiting Advantage. Every opportunity of tactical advantage must
be exploited. This is achieved by ensuring all participants in the attack
understand its aims and that commanders are well forward, or in a position
that they can best observe the attack and thus react quickly to the changing
situation.
b.
Ruthlessness. When the opportunity for decisive action presents its
self the infantry commander must be ruthless in committing his total resources
and in demanding the utmost from his men.
c.
Pressure. Relentless pressure must be maintained on the enemy to
prevent him from regrouping and regaining the initiative.
RAPID REORGANIZATION
4147. When captured, each objective must be organized for immediately for defence
enemy counter attack. Speed of reorganization is critical to maintaining the attack’s
momentum. The attack is not complete until the reorganization is complete.
ENEMY RESERVES
4148. At battalion and company level sufficient reserves of firepower (most often
superimposition) must be maintained to deal with the commitment of the enemy’s
reserve if required to.
COMPANY ATTACK EXERCISE
4149. The following pictorials detail some of the key procedural aspects of a
company attack. The key to effective procedures is to develop simple and concise
coy SOPs. The procedures given are relevant to either a quick or deliberate attack. It
should be noted that a typical RGp may not always be dispatched, especially if time
does not permit. In this case the OC may identify an FUP from the map, or visually
from a distance. The recon and marking of the FUP may be conducted after the lead
pl has physically secured it, allowing the OC to confirm his map recon. This is most
applicable for attacks in open country where a recce will take too much time. The
vehicle for this TTP will be a hasty noisy coy attack onto a pl posn. The exercise will
follow the stages of the atk which are:
a.
Preparatory.
b.
Assault.
c.
Exploitation.
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d.
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Reorganisation.
PREPARATORY STAGE
4150. Initial Recon and Appreciation. When patrolling to contact the OC should
have analysed terrain in his IPB and identified possible enemy defendable localities.
In this scenario the lead pl of the coy gains contact with the enemy (Fig 4.14). The
OC needs to allow the pl in contact time to regroup and gain info on the enemy.
Remember, operations at coy level take more time than at pl level. Allow the pl and
sect comds to do their job. In this instance the lead pl establishes the enemy as
being a pl size security outpost position. The OC decides to conduct a coy quick atk.
The scheme of manouvre and application of fire support will tie in with the mission. If
the coy was tasked with clearing a route then the atk mission can be ‘clear’. If the
task was to destroy the enemy on route, then the scheme of manouvre will need to
employ cut-offs etc. OC warns out pls by radio or runner that the coy will conduct a
quick atk and gives likely tasks, times, and prelim moves. OC conducts a map recon
to identify approaches, F/spt locs, routes etc. Gathers info from initial contact and
determines objs and makes assumptions. One of the most important aspects of
coordinating the attack is the application of fire from the JOST. The FO and OC must
confer before any recon or wngo is sent, so fire can be coordinated. The FO must
understand the potential coy plan and advise the OC on fire/ammo type/atk avn/fast
air available. Once briefed the JOST can commence preparatory fire onto objs.
Fig 4.14 : The lead Pl of the Coy Gains Contact With The En
4151. After a map recon the OC may send an RGp with one pl comd on one
approach whilst he recces what he believes to be the most suitable (judging by the
map). A suggested OCs RGp composition is detailed below in Fig 4.15. The sect
comd is from a pl out of contact, which will most likely secure the FUP. The sect
comd is optional, but is better suited to navigating the coy to the FUP. The OC must
warn out the coy when and where he is departing, returning to avoid being shot. The
OC should prov the JOST with initial COAs so planning can commence.
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Fig 4.15 : A Suggested OCs RGp Composition
4152. The OC will be looking for a suitable FUP and route that is defilade etc. He
will not attempt a close recon. He will make notes and inform the guides where pls
are to move and form up. Key terrain or large trees are best used for reference
guides, but must be obvious to guides. Night marking of FUPs can use cylum in the
T formation, or IR cylum can assist in night atks with Night Observation Devices
(NODs). GPS can be utilised to confirm the centre of the FUP. GPS can also be
utilised to input routes and way points to assist in navigation at night or over complex
terrain.
4153. Whilst the RGp is away the 2IC assumes command and ensures the WNGO
is executed. The CSM conducts battle prep, including the construction of a mud
model, redistribution of ammo etc. The JOST continues preparatory fire. If the
WNGO gave a coy destroy msn then the Coy 2IC must ensure the enemy remains
fixed (prevent the enemy from moving) by direct and indirect fire. As a minimum
fixing should involve the use of observed indirect fire, but should ideally include
direct fire.
4154. The RGp must conduct a basic marry-up procedure when moving back into
the coy. This is an SOP such as color card system etc. When the RGp returns the
OC should consult any other RGp on their recon findings, The OC must consult with
the JOST and coord the maneuver and fire plan. The OC should then finish writing
his orders whilst the 2IC continues to control the coy. The 2IC or CSM should
assemble and account for the Ogp. The orders are NOT A BRIEF, and must follow
the SMEAC format. Para 3 (execution) is the most important and must include
detailed tasks and coord instructions. An example of a coy attack five para order is
shown at Annex A.
4155. The move to the FUP can be conducted as a complete coy, or the FUP
securing party can leave ahead of the main body. This avoids concentrating troops
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at the halt. The FUP securing party will have the sect comd and guides from the
initial OCs RGp. The securing party is normally the depth pl and will move onto the
fwd edge and flanks of the FUP whilst the main body moves in as detailed in
Figure 4.16. This is a critical stage, as soldiers must now the plan to avoid a clash.
Fig 4.16 : The Move to the FUP
4156. Securing the FUP. In this exercise the depth pl comd will firstly secure the
FUP and position his sections into posts. His sections should be sighted to prov all
round protection. The securing troops should ideally be positioned on the fwd edge
of the FUP where they are clearly visible to aslt troops on occupation and early firing
will not cause fratricide. Once the FUP is occupied the pl comd and guides from the
rest of the coy should start marking the FUP. Close vegetation such as jungle may
require track cutting. Figure 4.17 depicts a pl securing the FUP.
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Fig 4.17 : A Pl Securing The FUP
4157. FUP marking. There are many variations on how to mark an FUP. By day the
RGp guides may simply note distinguished features to help them guide. By night the
guides can be assisted by cylum or IR cylum. The depiction below shows a basic T
formation. Each pl should be capable of securing and marking a coy FUP. The
following depiction in Figure 4.18 shows how a coy may mark a night FUP
Fig 4.18 : Shows How a Coy May Mark a Night FUP
4158. Variations to FUP Marking. There are many ways to mark a coy FUP. This is a
procedure and must be rehearsed. You should practice this procedure in barracks on
a football field. Create an SOP so each pl knows how to layout the FUP, and how to
constitute the guide parties. The markers can be colour coded. Where navigation is
difficult a GPS reading can be made of the extreme points. A compass should be
used to ensure the center axis is the same as the axis of aslt. Figure 4.19 depicts the
use of multiple markers
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Fig 4.19 : The Use of Multiple Markers
4159. Occupation of the FUP. On arrival the main body should be met by the pl
guides at the start of the FUP. The guides then guide the pls/sects into position. This
must be REHEARSED. Pls will occupy one at a time. On occupation of the fwd pls
the securing pl may move rear, or stay in position if H-Hr is very close, and simply
regroup and move as the depth pl once the aslt pls have moved out. By night it is
often more expedient to leave depth in their securing posn to avoid unnecessary
movement. Figure 4.20 depicts the occupation of the FUP.
Fig 4.20 : Occupation of The FUP
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THE ASSAULT STAGE
4160. In the aslt all troops are up and moving at a moderate walking speed (approx
100m/2min for medium to open country). This timing is critical as the JOST has
calculated how long the covering fire will last. Covering fire normally starts around HHr and is designed to allow you to maneuver, that is ‘move in close combat’. If the
covering fire is effective then you should be able to move unimpeded from the obj. A
technique that can be developed is called the rush. The rush is used during the aslt
when covering fire lifts and troops rush forward to close the distance between the
aslt and breakin. This reduces the time of the aslt and is especially effective when
covering fire achieves lasting neutralisation. The depiction in Figure 4.21 shows a
single phase noisy left flank atk with one pl in aslt, and two in linear depth; an anchor
OP, and a Support By Fire (SBF) from an SFMG sect. Pl will be in two up, one
back formation. The depth pl comds can move in front of their lead aslt sects.
This allows the OC to quickly brief them when they are committed to the aslt.
Fig 4.21 : Single Phase Noisy Left Flk Attk With One Pl In Aslt, and Two In
Linear Depth
4161. Variations to Movement in the Assault. As a rule of thumb any aslt over
800m may lead to the aslt troops straying from the axis and extended lines being
disrupted due to terrain and vegetation. If the aslt is a considerable distance and
topography will create difficulties, then consider moving out of the FUP with pls in
open file. You can do this if you have the fires to neutralise the objective. As a
control measure you should consider when you will redploy back into extended line.
This can be done on an easily recognisable feature and just prior to covering fires
lifting. The ‘line of deployment’ is a physical control measure. Figure 4.22 depicts the
line of deployment.
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Fig 4.22 : The Line of Deployment
4162. The Break-in. The break-in is a critical point in the aslt. At this time indirect fire
will have lifted and direct fire spt (if employed) will not be as effective in suppressing
the enemy. The depiction in Figure 4.23 is a snapshot of the aslt showing a sect
breaking into a posn. The Breakin is a critical phase of the aslt precedes the fight
thru. The breaking occurs after covering fire has lifted, but aslt troops are still outside
the obj. Once contact is made troops will break into fire and movement and use all
firepower to establish a breakin. Remember the enemy is less capable of using his
wpns inside his posn. His fire sacs are on the outside. The breakin is characterised
by small group action.
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Fig 4.23 : A Sect Breaking into a Posn
4163. The Fight Through. The fight through is characterised by small group action
skirmishing through the posn using all wpns to reduce pits. The fight thru timing is
listed as 100m/15min but this will depend on the enemy and ground. The fight
through will be difficult to control and is very much a sect comd and group leader
fight. Sects should be using grenades, 66s, heavy small arms fire, 40mm, and
smoke to cover movement. The fight thru is not conducted in a straight line and
groups and sects will use ground to their advantage.
4164. Setting a limit of advance (LOA). LOA allows you to control how far you wish
to pursue enemy from the obj, and how much terrain you must clear in order to
achieve your mission. Your LOA must be an easily recognisable feature. The LOE is
a valuable control measure. If phasing is used then the OC should dictate LOAs for
each pl to ensure they do not become involve in the ‘next’ fight, or clash. The LOA
should not be over extended in a capture mission, in case c/atk occurs when troops
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are thin on the obj. Fig 4.24 depicts LOAs for a phased atk. In this case the LOA will
restrict pl aslts from interfering with the next phase.
Fig 4.24 : LOAs For a Phased Attk
THE REORGANISATION STAGE
4165. The reorg must be rapid and its aim is guard against counter atk NOT conduct
admin; this comes latter. The reorg posn should reflect the mission. A capture means
your reorg posn must hold the obj. A clear however means you can reorg well off the
posn, especially when enemy indirect fire is present. The coy can reorg into pl posts
or a coy long halt (harbour). This will depend on the ground and the mission. The
reorg posn is a defence and should achieve mutual spt, all round def and the basic
considerations of defence. The OC should as minimum tie in the pls to ensure the
coy has achieved a state of defence. A useful coy SOP might state that the OC will
meet the relevant pl comds at the 12, 4 and 8 O’clock posns in a harbour type reorg
to ensure the coy is completing tied in. The fireplan should be laid on DFs designed
to breakup enemy c/atks. Fig 4.25 depicts a coy reorg in pl posts, which may be
suitable for open ground and where dispersed key terrain must be held. The
consolidated reorg is suitable for close country. The amount of dispersal required in
the reorg should increase with the likelihood of enemy fires. The coy comd should
also consider the admin problems associated with reorganising well off the position
which will make battlefield difficult, especially the need to re-secure the objective so
dead and wounded can be dealt with.
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Fig 4.25 A Coy Reorg in Pl Posts
4166. Battlefield Clearance. The Battlefield clearance occurs when reorg is
complete. Ideally the OC should inform the CSM ‘Reorg complete, commence
battlefield clearance now.’ Coy SOPs or atk orders should stipulate the CSMs
workparty requirements. Battlefield clearance should address redistribution of ammo
first, then casualties. The 2IC should man the CP and work in with the CSM to
compile casevacs, sitreps etc. Bn should have AME on standby and an ammo resup.
CSMs will need to identify areas to hold and guard PWs, treat casualties, and locate
an area out of view to place friendly dead, covered. Battlefield clearance may take
hours and during this time the OC should be adjusting the position if required.
4167. The Coy Comd in the Attack. In trg for the assault the OC general saunters
to the rear of the lead assault pls. This is an indication that he is lazy and/or doesn’t
understand the effects of dangerous space. CHQ will be in the dangerous space of
enemy wpns so the OC needs to fire and move from cover to cover. You must
assume that not all the objective is neutralised and somewhere on the enemy
position is a sniper waiting to kill the man in the middle of the antenna farm, so get
on your guts and crack a nut.
4168. Fig 4.26 depicts CHQ as a complete formation on the move. The FO Ack/Sig
and MFC will normally patrol with the lead pl to effect quick fire response. The 2IC,
admin sig, CSM and medic can travel separate to the OC, behind the next pl.
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Fig 4.26 : CHQ As a Complete Formation On The Move
4169. Fig 4.27 depicts CHQ split with fire controllers forward and the Coy 2IC split to
avoid casualties. The FO should always travel with the OC, and the CSM should
travel close to the OC where he can influence the battle.
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Fig 4.27 : CHQ Split With Fire Controllers Forward and The Coy 2IC Split to
Avoid Casualties
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SECTION 5
OPERATION IN BUILD UP AREA (OBUA)
INTRODUCTION FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATION
4170. Manmade features on the urbanized battlefield influence offensive operations
at each level of command. To the battlefield commander a single built-up area may
be the dominant terrain feature in his assigned zone of responsibility and may limit
alternative courses of action and dictate the nature of combat to wage. To the
brigade and higher commanders, the elements or urban sprawl are factors to be
evaluated throughout the decision process.
4171. Units operating in built-up area may conduct or participate in an advance to
contact, an exploitation or pursuit, and hasty and deliberate attacks. Although
urbanization affects all offensive operations, its greatest influence is felt during the
attack.
CONSIDERATIONS
4172. The attack of a built-up area, regardless of its size and the level of command
involved, should be considered only as the last resort, and only when major
advantage accrues to the attacker through its seizure or control.
4173. Attacks against built-up areas may be launched to:
a.
Gain a Critical Objective. Selected built-up areas will be attacked to
gain a critical objective or to deny an advantage to the enemy. The objective
may be:
(1)
A vital bridge.
(2)
Transportation facilities that are required to sustain future
combat operations.
(3)
Strategic industrial or vital communications facilities.
b.
Rupture the Defence. The enemy will frequently prepare built-up
areas as strongpoint to gain favourable defensive advantages. The
elimination of selected strongpoint may be required in order to break through
his defensive system.
c.
Facilitate Future Operations. Built-up area will frequently preclude
bypass. Commanders will have to overcome those obstacles that restrict or
control their AA in order to continue the attack.
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4174. Attacks against built-up areas will be avoided when:
a.
The area is not required to support future operations.
b.
Bypassing is tactically feasible.
c.
The built-up area has been declared an “open city” to preclude civilian
casualties or to preserve cultural or historical facilities.
d.
Sufficient combat forces are not available to seize and systematically
clear the built-up area.
4175. Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on a
detailed analysis of each urban terrain setting, its types of built-up areas, and
existing structural forms.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
4176. There are 6 fundamental of the attack which is applicable to offensive
operations in built-up area. Commanders must understand urban characteristics, the
advantages and disadvantages they offer, and how they affect mobility and weapon
effectiveness. These fundamentals are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
4177. Knowing the Battlefield.
a.
No environment other than jungles or woods provides the degree of
concealment found on the urbanized battlefield. The limited depth the
battalion and company commanders can see is further reduced. On natural
terrain adjacent to built-up areas, observation seldom extends beyond the
1200 meters. On the approaches to and within built-up areas, observation
may be limited to one block, or one building, or one room. Reconnaissance
elements, frequently operating on foot and using infiltration techniques, are
more important than ever. Not only do they find the enemy, but they also
provide valuable reaction time and manoeuvre space.
b.
Masking effects of the terrain and concealment offered by built-up
areas make it easier for the enemy to hide his C2 elements, as well as CS
and CSS units. The effectiveness of ground surveillance, IR, and
visual/optical target acquisition devices is reduced. Aerial photos may provide
great detail and display every abnormality or alternation to the terrain. They
are blind, however, to what is located within individual buildings. Increased
emphasis must be placed on electromagnetic devices and the use of longrange air and ground reconnaissance. The armoured cavalry unit is
particularly well suited for the task of finding the enemy, identifying weakness,
and providing detailed terrain information.
c.
Although the advantage of knowing the terrain lies initially with the
defender, this advantage can be reduced through aggressive reconnaissance
at each level of command. The same factors which provide concealment to
the enemy also enable ground reconnaissance to be extended. Knowledge of
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how the enemy normally defends on weapons and mobility guide the
commander’s effort to see the battlefield.
4178. Concentrate Superior Combat Power.
a.
Mobility restriction imposed by urbanized terrain make it difficult to
concentrate ground manoeuvre forces quickly. Commanders must seek to
achieve concentration on terrain which avoids built-up area. When bypass is
not possible and the attack of a built-up area is required deception as well as
mass becomes critical.
b.
Although the defender has the planning advantage, the same mobility
restriction limits his ability to reinforce or shift forces. The urban terrain also
offers the attacker enhanced concealment during manoeuvre.
c.
Limited-objective attacks, which fix defences or cause the enemy to
dissipate forces by early reaction, contribute to concentration. Concentration
should be provided during the planning phase by allocating added CS,
particularly engineer and field artillery, to the main effort. During the attack,
field and air defence artillery, as well as armed helicopters and OAS (OAS),
provide flexible, responsive elements of combat power which may be massed
with less regard to mobility restrictions.
4179. Neutralise Enemy Defensive Fires.
a.
The urbanized battlefield provides the defender increased, readily
available cover as well as concealment for weapon systems at all levels. Its
obstacle characteristics may also increase the attacker’s vulnerability by
canalizing mounted manoeuvre. At the same time, the terrain frequently offers
the attacker concealment for dismounted manoeuvre and denies the defender
long-range observation of field of fire. The attacker is most vulnerable to
enemy fires during the initial phase of securing a foothold in a built-up area.
Defensive weapons, operating from the protection of structures that provide
mutual support with prepared fields of fire, must be neutralised or destroyed.
b.
At battalion and company level, there is an increased requirement for
direct, rather than indirect fire neutralization. With reduced engagement
ranges, this requirement may be satisfied in party by organic weapons. The
use of field artillery in the direct fire role may be required to neutralise gunners
in hardened positions. Extensive use of smoke also may be required to
conceal movement. The intensity of close combat and reduced direct fire
ranges within and smoke obscuration. Increased dependence must be placed
on the coordinated use of electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic
countermeasures (ECM) to locate enemy emitters and to neutralise and jam
these acquisition and control devises. Where effective neutralization by fires
or electronic means cannot be accomplished, night/limited visibility operations
may be required to reduce the defender’s advantages.
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4180. Maintenance of the Momentum.
a.
The attacker lead elements must possess the combat power to attack
as soon as a weakness is found or created. Enemy defences well forward of
built up areas must be ruptured and penetrated if bypass is to be achieved.
Commanders should seek to conduct a hasty attack, simultaneously
enveloping the defender’s flanks and rear. However, the size of a large urban
complex or the extent of enemy defences may deny the option of conducting
a hasty attack. A deliberate attack breaking through a prepared defensive
position is costly and usually results in heavy casualties and a protracted
battle which forward-looking planning seeks to avoid.
b.
Once the momentum of the attack has been gained, commanders must
maintain that momentum until the defence has lost its cohesion. Enemy
resistance is bypassed or destroyed by fires to preclude heavy casualties and
loss of momentum. Stalled attacking forces maintain pressure by fires while
reserves bypass the resistance and continue the attack. The attacker must
cause events to happen faster than the defender can react to them. The
enemy must be denied the opportunity to consolidate defences and must be
destroyed or isolated before he can occupy built-up areas.
4181. The Enemy Rear. Enemy defences will usually consist of strong points and
obstacles arrayed laterally and in depth over the most likely AA. After disrupting the
initial urban defences, the attacker must secure critical objectives and seek to drive
into the enemy rear to find and destroy his control headquarters, CS, and CSS units.
The attack and isolation of forward defences disrupt CSS functions. It also demands
that the defender employ his CS elements, thus aiding the attacker in locating and
destroying them. At battalion and company level, infantry forces, infiltrating by stealth
or under conditions of limited visibility, should be employed to attack by C2, and
support installations. The brigade commander should consider utilizing airmobile
assets and heavy reconnaissance elements to conduct rear area operations
throughout the attack to find and destroy the enemy C2 facilities. The splintering of
the defence, along with the disruption of C2 and disruption of support capabilities will
cause the defence to collapse.
4182. Continuous Mobile Support.
a.
Although urban battles are viewed predominantly as small-unit
combined arms actions, continuous CS and CSS are required. Tanks and
artillery provide the infantry with destructive firepower to defeat prepared
defences. Combat engineers breach obstacles to enhance mobility. Field
artillery, armed helicopters, and OAS disrupt the enemy C2 network and
destroy his support units. Air defence artillery helps protect the entire force.
b.
Forward replenishment do supplies and contact maintenance teams
help sustain momentum. Military police provide vital traffic control and area
security in the division rear. Electronic warfare and intelligence units obtain
information about the enemy needed by commanders. Communications units
provide for its timely dissemination.
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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
PROCESS
4183. The following specific considerations take on added importance during the
analysis of the situation and development of the commander’s concept for the attack.
The offensive may take the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack.
HASTY ATTACK
4184. A hasty attack is conducted when the enemy has not established strong
defensive positions and attacking forces can exploit manoeuvre to overwhelm the
defence. Three tasks are essential to its success:
a.
Locate a week spot or gap in enemy defences.
b.
Fix forward enemy elements.
c.
Rapidly move through or around the gap or weak spot to be exploited.
4185. Because a hasty attack is conducted to capitalize on opportunities as they
present themselves, commanders should not expect to execute these tasks in the
same order on all occasions. For example, advanced elements of the task forces
may be engaged with forward enemy elements when it becomes apparent that a
weak point exits in their defences. In another instance, a reconnaissance force may
discover the location of a gap and subsequently be ordered to seize it to prevent
enemy reinforcement. In any case, however, speed is essential; for if momentum is
lost, the hasty attack will fail.
4186. An urban area is an obstacle to tactical manoeuvre and in that respect the
hasty attack in OBUA is conducted somewhat differently than in open terrain. The
congestion and complete intelligence characteristic of urban fighting will frequently
require the attack to move through, rather than around, the fixing force. Techniques
of control and coordination become extremely important to prevent unnecessary
congestion at the edge of the urban area. In addition, commanders must ensure that
only those troops and resources necessary are committed to the fixing force, with the
balance of combat power committed to the main effort of the hasty attack.
4187. On-order, follow-up missions should be assigned to forces making a hasty
attack so that, once the attack objective is secured, the force is prepared to respond
to any contingency.
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DELIBERATE ATTACK
4188. A deliberate attack is necessary when enemy defences are extensively
prepared, when the urban obstacle is extremely large or severely congested, or
when the advantage of surprise has been lost. It may be divided into 3 basic phases:
isolation, assault, and clearance. Although not necessarily sequential in their
execution or totally interdependent, the use of these implied phases facilitates the
identification of specific tasks to be accomplished, the allocation of resources, and
the preparation of plans.
a.
Phase 1.
(1)
Is designed to isolate the objective by controlling AA into and out
of the built-up area. Armour-heavy forces, supported by anti-armour
weapons and field artillery, are well-suited to the task of isolating the
built-up areas from reinforcement and resupply by securing dominating
terrain and utilizing direct and indirect fires. This phase does not
involve combat in cities, although some units may be required to
eliminate defences.
(2)
The battle to isolate a built-up area is fought on the natural
terrain adjacent to it. Where the terrain precludes ground manoeuvre to
isolate the objective, long-range surveillance and fires, attack
helicopters, and OAS may be required. Failure to isolate the built-up
areas effectively before that assault begins may require, in the long
run, more casualties and time to secure the complex. The
psychological impact that isolation causes on defending forces,
coupled with the fact that the enemy must now decide if he wants to
expend resources to reinforce or combat a breakout, adds to the
confusion of battle and makes complete isolation an important
consideration.
b.
Phase 2. Consists of an assault to rupture the defences and secure a
foothold on the perimeter of the built-up area from which attacks to clear may
be launched. An envelopment, assaulting defensive weaknesses on the flanks
or rear of the built-up areas, is preferred; however, a penetration may be
required. The following basic actions are included in Phase 2.
(1)
Fix The Defence. Balanced forces representative of the major
organisation are used to fix the enemy defence and draw his attention
away from the main attack. Feints are highly effective as diversionary
supporting attacks. The force should be provided adequate assets to
portray convincingly the main attack and to continue the attack on
order if the feint penetrates the defensive system. Other limitedobjective or deception operations may be conducted to fix the enemy
when sufficient assets to conduct a feint are not available. Additionally,
the enemy can be fixed by fires
(2)
Conduct the Assault. Mobility, shock action, and massed
firepower are required to secure a foothold and rupture established
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defences. During a penetration or envelopment, assault forces are
task organised with armour, infantry, and engineers to rupture the
defence effectively. Over watching direct fires, along with indirect
neutralization and obscuration, help the attacker secure a foothold in
the built-up area. Once within the highly restrictive urban terrain, the
role of the infantry becomes dominant. Regardless of the form of
manoeuvre used, mobility and neutralization are required to maintain
the momentum of the assault forces. Small-unit, combat-in-cities
actions may be required to dislodge defender and consolidate the
foothold area.
c.
Phase 3.
(1)
Predominantly a clearance action which may consist of a
systematic building-by-building, block-by-block advance through the
entire area; or it may be a rapid advance through a lightly defended
section to secure a critical objective, with a subsequent detailed
clearance of the area by a follow-up unit. This phase is characterised
by decentralized, small-unit actions, and it requires detailed planning to
offset the difficulties control.
(2)
Frequent commitment and reconstitution of reserves, particularly
at Battalion/Company level, is common during this phase since
strongpoint defences are repeatedly encountered. Reserves should
parallel the composition of the main attack to facilitate commitment
where necessary. The reserve must be mobile and prepared to react
immediately to various contingencies.
(3)
During a hasty attack of a built-up area by units in contact or
moving to contact, there may be no clear distinction between these
phases. All actions may be accomplished by elements of covering or
reconnaissance forces or by leading brigades with Phase 1 and 2
conducted concurrently and followed immediately by Phase.
(4)
If a hasty attack of a well-defended built-up area fails or is not
possible, a deliberate attack sacrificing momentum and requiring
detailed planning and the allocation of major resources will be
necessary. During a deliberate attack, the phase will normally be
accomplished sequentially.
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
4189. In addition to knowing where the enemy is and in what strength, commanders
must also know how he usually defends a built-up area and the approaches to it.
Specific terrain information is required to maximize weapon effectiveness in this
special environment and to minimize the effects of unfavourable terrain
characteristics on manoeuvre and control. The following additional information is
required:
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a.
Natural terrain adjacent to a built-up area that supports the enemy’s
defence, or that which will provide attacking forces with over watching
positions.
b.
Cover and concealed routes to the built-up area and to objective within
the built-up area.
c.
Critical objective within the built-up area that provide decisive tactical
advantages.
d.
Tactical characteristics of the built-up area and its structures.
4190. Information about the population will frequently assist in determining where to
attack, what firepower restrictions may be imposed, and what areas within the urban
complex must be avoided to minimize destruction of life-support facilities and civilian
casualties.
LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS
4191. Limited visibility and night attacks are essential elements of the offense within
an urbanized area. Such operations may be conducted to achieve surprise or exploit
earlier success. On the urban battlefield, they are most frequently required to rupture
strong defences, minimize enemy mutual support, and maintain momentum.
Difficulties with C2, navigation, coordination of fires, fires and identification of friendly
forces are compounded on urbanized terrain. Other problems are:
a.
Restrictive terrain increases opportunities for elements of a unit to
become lost or separated.
b.
Limited AA, rubble and other obstacles decrease the chances for a
large unit to achieve surprise.
4192. At brigade level, limited visibility conditions are exploited to cover the
movement of major units and supplies. Battalion task forces use limited visibility
conditions to extend reconnaissance and infiltration or to attack occupied objectives.
Typical night or limited visibility operations at unit levels within a built-up area
include:
a.
Attacks across an open area to seize strongpoint or building.
b.
Ambush patrols to engage infiltrators.
c.
Raids or night combat patrols to achieve a limited objective.
d.
Reconnaissance patrols to develop intelligence.
CONTROL MEASURES
4193. The coordination and control of forces and fires is greatly complicated by the
restrictive nature of the urban environment. It is facilitated, however, by a detailed
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plan with explicit control measures for decentralized execution at the lowest level.
The control measures most frequently used within a built-up area are:
a.
Objectives.
(1)
While dominant features that provide observation or physical
control over access routes through or around the built-up area remain
important, additional consideration must be given to its facilities and
manmade objects. Communication networks whether vehicular, rail,
nautical, or telephonic/telegraphic, play an increasingly significant role.
(2)
Initial objectives to gain a foothold area usually located on the
outer edge of the built-up area; and, when occupied, they provide
concealment and cover for the attacking forces. Team/company-size
objectives are generally one to two blocks in depth. Their exact size is
determined by the nature of the built-up area.
(3)
An intermediate objective may be assigned by any commander
when its seizure is essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
When an enemy cannot be bypassed, the assignment of intermediate
objectives will frequently be required. When feasible, final objectives
are located on the exit side or beyond the built-up area.
b.
Phase Lines. Phase lines are normally employed to regulate the
advance of attacking forces. They may also be used in lieu of objectives.
Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines which are easily identified are
appropriate for use as phase lines.
c.
Boundaries. At brigade level and below, boundaries are habitually
used to control fires and designate areas of responsibility. They are normally
established in alleys or within a block of buildings to insure that both sides of a
street are included in the zone of one unit.
d. Check Points and Contact Points. Street corners, building, railway
crossings, bridges, or other easily identifiable features may be designated as
check points or contact points. These points facilitate reporting locations and
may identify specific points where the commander desires units to make
physical contact.
SECURITY
4194. Enemy forces emphasize spoiling attacks and infiltration of the flanks and rear
of attacking forces. Frequently the enemy will position individuals and small units in
concealed locations to perform stay-behind missions. Built-up areas provide the
defender excellent cover and concealment while limiting the attacker’s observation.
The requirement to maintain the continuity of the attack results in by-passing isolated
pockets of resistance which further complicated security problems. It is necessary to
increase overall security precautions for attacking forces while operating in highly
restrictive areas. Also, it is essential to provide security forces to escort CSS and CS
units and to monitor, patrol, and guard possible infiltration routes. Additionally,
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measures must be taken to guard against sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and
intelligence gathering by a hostile population.
ATTACHMENT
4195. Frequently, company teams, platoons, and sections will be isolated and will
have to fight for extended periods with what resources they have. In order to reduce
reaction time, maintain flexibility, and overcome communications difficulties, it may
be necessary to attach CS and CSS elements to a task force, a team, and
sometimes to platoons, thus permitting decentralized execution at the lowest level.
CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK
ISOLATION OF THE AREA
4195. Phase 1 is the isolation of the built-up area and the seizure of terrain features
that dominate the approaches into it. The attacker secures positions outside the
built up area from which to support the entrance into it. The tactics and techniques
for this phase of the operation do not differ from those employed in an attack against
other well-organised enemy defences.
ASSAULT
4196. Phase 2 is the advance of the attacking force to the edge of the built-up area
and seizure of a foothold. It should ensure the elimination of the defender’s ground
observation and direct fires on the approaches into the built-up area. The attacker
uses the foothold area to reorganise, decentralize control, and displace weapons to
firing positions from which the continuation of the attack can be supported.
Favourable AA are exploited. Supporting weapons are used to neutralise the enemy
and to isolate the foothold area from support and reinforcement from other parts of
the built-up area. Artillery and mortar fires are used extensively to cover the advance
of the attacking units and to prevent the enemy from manning crew-served or
individual anti-tank weapons. They may also be used to blow gaps through tactical
and protective wire where more efficient means of accomplishing this are not
available. Smoke shells may be used to screen adjacent areas and to further isolate
the foothold area. Supporting fires are shifted when attacking troops have reached
the final coordination line, and leading elements move without delay to the first block
of houses in the built up area.
4197. The probability of success is increased if the assault is launched from an
unexpected direction and preferably in the early morning just before first light, during
other periods of reduced visibility, or under cover of smoke.
4198. Combat engineer vehicles, mechanized and tanks equipped with mine
detonating devices such as demolition snakes, flails, or rollers should be including in
the assaulting force.
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CLEARANCE ACTION
4199. Phase 3 begins without pause after the completion of phase 2. Phase 3 of the
attack may be either a systematic block-by-block, house-to-house reduction of the
built-up area or a rapid advance through the town with clearance of specific critical
area and strategic buildings. Clearance and seizure techniques depend upon the
mission, size of the town, construction and building arrangement, and enemy
dispositions and strength. Factors governing the selection and execution of the
techniques are listed below:
a.
When the built-up area is exceedingly large and heavily fortified, or
when the mission requires a complete clearance of enemy forces, a
methodical, house-to-house, and block-to-block clearance operations is
performed. The area is divided into company zones of responsibility. Each
subordinate unit must clear its zone completely, leaving no enemy in its rear.
b.
When the built-up are is small or lightly defended, the attacking force
should attempt to drive through or into the town as rapidly as possible to seize
terrain or buildings and enemy routes into the town from the other side.
c.
Mopping-up Operations.
(1)
In a strongly defended built-up area, the leading elements must
mop up as they advance. Each building in the assigned zone must be
entered and thoroughly searched for enemy. This procedure protects
leading elements from surprise attacks on their rear, secures their lines
of communication, and prevents support and reserve unit from
becoming involved in unexpected mopping up operations which may
hamper their prompt employment elsewhere.
(2)
When a built-up area is lightly defended, it may be desirable for
leading elements to push forward, rapidly to seize critical areas. In
such a situation, supporting elements and reserve are given specific
mopping-up mission to clear sections of the area which have been
bypassed or only hastily cleared by the leading units. Close
coordination between the leading units and the mopping-up units is
essential to prevent them from becoming engaged in a fire fight with
each other because of mistaken identity.
d.
Consolidation takes place as each unit objective is taken. Attention is
given to placing weapons and men in firing positions to cover all AA. At this
time, plans are made or completed for the continuation of the attack. When
the entire built-up area has been secured, the consolidation will be such as to
prevent the enemy from regaining a foothold within the buildings.
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DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLANNING THE DEFENCE
4200. Commanders at each level must decide how best to integrate manmade
features into their overall scheme. In some cases, commanders may be directed to
defend a built-up area, a line of communications, or an industrial complex whose
retention provides significant advantage within the framework of the defensive plan
of a higher level commander. The decision to defend such an area may also be
made because of specific tactical advantages accruing to the defender assigned
responsibility for an area. In all cases, the elements of urban sprawl must be
analysed in conjunction with natural terrain in order to determine how to enhance
weapons effectiveness to slow, block, canalize, and destroy the enemy.
4201. Built-up areas, like jungles, hills, or other terrain features, may be
incorporated in the plan for the defence of an urban area in order to:
a.
Control AA. AA in urban areas are frequently interrupted by built-up
areas may provide a portion of the defensive grid for the combined arms
team. In some cases, the location of a built-up area on the urban terrain
complex may effectively deny bypass to major elements of an attacking force.
At lower levels of command, this many favour the use of villages or small
towns as strong points. At the other extreme, major urban complexes may be
so large that they cannot be totally avoided.
b.
Act as a Combat Multiplier. Built-up areas are obstacles to a
mechanized force. Passage through such areas can be blocked, canalizing
enemy forces into open terrain interlaced with anti-armour fires and reinforced
with mines and other obstacles. When urbanization significantly restricts
mounted manoeuvre or when sufficient mechanized forces are unavailable,
the integration of the elements of urban sprawl into the defence may provide a
combat multiplier for the defender.
c.
Conceal Forces. Technological advances have significantly improved
tactical imagery and send or devices. However, when employed against
built up areas, their effectiveness is greatly reduced. In addition, urban
features frequently offer cover and concealment to the defender with a
minimum expenditure of preparation time. Such features may be suitable for
use as battle positions within the overall defensive scheme.
d.
Retain Key Transportation Centre. The requirement to shift and
concentrate major combat forces and supplies rapidly over an extended battle
area may demand the retention of the hubs of main road and railroad
networks.
e.
Deny Strategic/Political Objectives. Industrial or economic
complexes may be incorporated in the defence for their strategic value, while
political/cultural centre may provide psychological/national morale
advantages.
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4203. Built-up areas will normally not be utilized as part of the urban defensive plan
when:
a.
Sufficient combat strength is not available for defence.
b.
The built-up area does not support the overall defensive concept.
c.
Terrain adjacent to the built-up area permits the enemy to bypass it.
d.
Structures within the built-up area do not afford adequate protection for
the defender.
e.
The complex is dominated by adjacent terrain that offers an attacker
significant observed fire advantages over the defender.
f.
The built-up area is declared an “open city” for humanitarian and
political reasons or to protect valuable structures.
4204. Planners should seek to avoid combat within built-up areas while recognizing
that this may not always be possible. They should also seek to integrate into the
overall defensive scheme these built-up areas which provide the commander
defensive advantages.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
4205. The fundamentals of the defence do not change on the urban battlefield. To
apply them, commanders must understand the characteristics and components of
urban sprawl, the advantages and disadvantages they offer, and how they impact on
the capabilities of units and weapons during the conduct of the defence.
4206. Understand the Enemy. When planning and urban defence, commanders at
each level must place themselves in the enemy’s position, view the battlefield from
this perspective, and fit his concepts, formations, and weapons to the terrain. This
estimate enables the defender to narrow the list of tactical options available to the
attacker and identify his most probable courses of action.
4207. Knowing the Battlefield.
a.
Once the commander has organised the defence to counter the variety
of attack options available to the enemy, he must aggressively seek to learn
where the enemy is, how he is organised, which way he is going, and in what
strength.
b.
Although the characteristic of urbanized terrain may complicate the
intelligence collection effort, the advantage lies initially with the defender.
Commanders at all levels must know the terrain over which they will conduct
the defence. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition resources
must be applied as far forward as possible along likely AA to provide data to
higher commanders.
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c.
Security forces operating from covered and concealed positions in
depth complement electronic warfare support measures and tactical imagery
activities by limiting the enemy’s ground reconnaissance and infiltration
capabilities.
d.
On the urban battlefield, the attacker must forfeit, at least in part, the
advantages of cover and concealment in order to move and mass; his routes
of advance are limited and more clearly defined, enhancing the defender’s
target surveillance capability; and he must be use increased communications
to coordinate the concentration of his forces, which reduces his ability to
achieve surprise.
e.
The defender must use his knowledge of the terrain and enemy to see
the battlefield more accurately than the enemy, to prevent surprise, and to
maximize reaction time for manoeuvre forces.
4208. Concentration of Force.
a.
The ability of the defender to concentrate rapidly throughout the battle
area may be limited by restrictive terrain. In order to maintain a favourable
mobility differential over the attacker, the commander must use his knowledge
of the terrain. Routes must be selected, reconnoitred, and prepared for the
forward and lateral movement of forces to be concentrated. The obstacle
value of the urban terrain complex must be reinforced to slow the attacker.
b.
Detailed movement data and explicit traffic control plans are essential.
Lines of communication which are dependent on bridges, overpasses, or
tunnels should not be used unless suitable bypasses are available. Weather
or land usage patterns, as well as other manmade features, may limit the
mobility of armoured and mechanized forces. Greater reliance must be placed
on an initial positioning of forces which accepts risk zones along the least
probable AA. These zones may be covered primarily by the ground screening
forces and fires. On urbanized terrain, it is more difficult to recover from an
erroneous decision which concentrates manoeuvre elements too early or at
the wrong place. In this manoeuvre restrictive environment, increased
emphasis on the use of artillery and armed helicopters as the first increments
of concentration is required. As the battle progresses, the commander’s
intimate knowledge of the terrain is used to maintain the mobility advantage.
4209. Employed Combined Arms Team. A detailed analysis of the urban-terrain
complex provides the basic for allocating and organizing available forces to
accomplish the defensive mission. Cross reinforcement of manoeuvre elements will
normally be required in order to match unit capabilities to the terrain mix. In the more
open portion of the urban environment, armoured and mountain forces may play the
dominant role. As the density of manmade features increases, the employment of
mechanized or dismounted infantry, supported by armour and engineers, become
increasingly important. If it is necessary to fight within a built-up area, the role of
infantry supported by other arms becomes dominant. Field and air defence artillery
and armed helicopters are employed throughout the battle are to maximize the
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combined arms team’s effectiveness, multiply its combat power, and enhance its
survivability.
4210. Exploit the Advantages of the Defender. The already significant advantage
of the defender becomes more pronounced on the urbanized battlefield. A common
thread running through the discussion of the application of these fundamentals is the
defender’s familiarity with the terrain. Every action by the attacker is made more
difficult because he must feel his way through this complex of manmade and natural
terrain features. The defender can prepare the ground in advance, build and
reinforce obstacle, and select firing positions and observation posts, many of which
require improvement only. He can reconnoitre and improve routes between battle
positions to shift forces and to supply them. Mutually supporting positions are often
readily available. This pattern of factorable positions should enable the commander
to strike the enemy repeatedly, slowing and disrupting him, inflicting losses, and
making him vulnerable to multiples, violent, local counterattacks. In many areas,
terrain restrictions may enable attacks by fire alone.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
ORGANISATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4211. On the urbanized battlefield, the defender fits his forces to the ground by
utilizing the terrain to take maximum advantage of its natural and manmade features.
Urban sprawl adds strength to the active defence by providing covered and
concealed and restricting the attacker’s mobility and observation.
4212. Dismounted infantry can contribute to this defence by occupying battle
positions or strongpoint around which the mobile battle is fought. In restrictive urban
terrain, dismounted forces may be required in order to find the enemy, deny him the
ability to close without being detected, and the fight the close-in battle.
4213. If the retention of a built-up area is required, the defence may assume the
characteristic of a position defence organised in depth and supported by strong
mobile forces.
COVERING FORCE AREA
4214. The urban area defence begins within mobile combined arms covering forces
deployed well forward of the main battle area. Company and battalion battle
positions are organised in depth to control approaches to the main battle area, with
emphasis placed on using natural manmade features which offer cover and
concealment or restrict opposing force manoeuvre. Small villages and settlements
may be incorporated the defensive scheme in the same manner as other terrain
features.
4215. Increased engineer support is required to reinforce the obstacle nature of the
terrain and maintain withdrawal and attack routes. Mixed calibre artillery contributes
to deception in this environment where it is difficult for the enemy to see the
battlefield and assists the covering force commander in maintaining the continuity of
the defence from successive positions. The air defence artillery umbrella must
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extend over the covering force area to deny the enemy the use of aerial observation
and attack taking advantage of the terrain which limits detection by ground
surveillance and screens aerial manoeuvre.
4216. The transfer of the enemy by the covering force not results in an easing of
pressure or allows the enemy to gain momentum. Once detailed coordination has
been accomplished, the restrictive nature of the urban terrain complex, its obstacles,
and readily available defensive positions may facilitate the actual handoff.
MAIN BATTLE AREA
4217. The defending commander must be aware of the impact that urbanization of
the terrain within the main battle area will have on his ability to defend. Consideration
should be given to the restrictive or compartmentalized areas caused by the
urbanization process and to the advantages or disadvantages which the areas may
offer the defender. It is possible that some of these may fall within risk areas which
provide the enemy with covered and/or concealed infiltration routes into the main
battle area. In such cases, responsibility for risk area must be clearly delineated
between adjacent units. If the urban terrain includes villages, small towns, and
settlements it might be advantageous to incorporate these features within company
battle positions. Such features can provide excellent cover and concealment to
defending forces and are frequently mutually supportable.
4218. As previously notes, it may become necessary to designate a built-up
complex within the main battle area as critical to the defence of the urban area.
When this situation arises, it is imperative to initiate the defence of the urban area as
far forward as possible to facilitate the defence of the built-up area and to avoid a
protracted combat-in-cities battle.
4219. Commanders should consider the potential value of urban features as
obstacles to attacking forces. Frequently urban areas sit astride, or otherwise
dominate, high speed AA into and through the main battle area. If urban areas
cannot be bypassed easily, they may reduce the momentum of the enemy’s attack
and his ability to manoeuvre. In these instances, the defending commander must be
prepared to capitalize on the situation. Conversely, the defending commander must
also appreciate the limitations which urban areas can place on his own ability to
manoeuvre particularly during active defence operations.
4220. A primary concern to commanders defending a built-up area is to avoid
becoming isolated by enemy forces. In planning the defence, the commander can
normally make two assumptions concerning this matter. The first assumption is that
although the built-up area may not occupy terrain which is dominant, it normally has
dominant terrain adjacent to it on at least one side. The second assumption is that,
doctrinally, the enemy will attempt to bypass and isolate a built-up area by securing
the adjacent dominant terrain before the built-up area itself is directly attacked.
Therefore, the defending commander must integrate surrounding dominant terrain
into his defensive scheme in order to preclude being bypass and isolated.
4221. Should the defence of an urban area develop to the point to operations within
the built-up area itself are required, the defending commander must consider the
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nature of the built-up area and the characteristics which are unique to fighting area.
The nature of the built-up area includes such aspects as the size of the area, the
type of construction used for buildings, the density of the buildings and the street
pattern or layout of the built-up area. These aspects may vary considerably from one
part of the built-up area to another, but each will affect in some way on the manner in
which the defence of the area is conducted.
4222. Manoeuvre room is restricted, placing a greater reliance on infantry-heavy
forces. Fields of fire and observation are also reduced, leading to violent,
independent small-unit actions at close quarters. The battle within a built-up area can
be expected to be multidimensional. It may be fought simultaneously above the
ground, on roof tops, in buildings, at street level, and below the ground in sewers
and subway systems.
REAR AREA
4223. The functions and organisation of the division rear area are not significantly
changed in an urban environment. Within larger urban areas, mobility may be
restricted by damage to and along lines of communication to maintain the forward
and rearward flow of CSS elements. Additionally, the ever-present threat to attack by
small elements infiltrating through the main battle area or from air assault forces
increases. Internal security and self-defence responsibilities expand because of the
limited availability of and reduced mobility of reserves.
4224. When the main battle area defence is organised around brigade battle areas,
security during logistic movements and for CS units located outside these battle
areas becomes increasingly critical. If maintenance area is located behind battle
areas, additional coordination may be required priority for security and movement
between the various brigade and division support elements.
LIMITED VISIBILITY
4225. The defender on the urban battlefield must be prepared to counter enemy
attacks launched at night or under other conditions of limited visibility. Within
built up areas, the attacker may use such conditions to attempt to extend his
reconnaissance, infiltrate friendly positions, cross open areas, or secure limited
objectives. To help depend against such operations, the following basic measures
may be employed:
a.
Shift defensive positions and crew-served weapons to alternate
positions just before dark to reduce chances for surprise and to deceive the
enemy as to their exact location. A section can often be shifted to an adjacent
building and provide the same cover on an AA.
b.
Occupy or patrol open areas between units which are covered by
observed fire during daylight.
c.
Employ radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices on the
best night AA. Use nuisance mines, noisemaking devices, tangle foot tactical
wire, and landing point (LP) on secondary AA for early warning.
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d.
Place LP for security outside of buildings being used as strongpoint or
battle positions.
e.
Plan illumination over the entire sector, integrating artillery/mortar
flares, trip flares, and hand-projected flares.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
4226. Urban warfare places a heavy strain on the C2 apparatus. Command of
subordinate units and the control of fires is complicated by restrictive terrain, the
proximity of opposing forces, reduced communications capabilities, and the
numerous small, isolated battles that may be fought simultaneously throughout the
urban complex.
4227. The primary control measures used are battle areas, battle positions, and
sectors. Phase lines, checkpoints, and restrictive fire control measures may also be
used to simplify reporting and control.
4228. Timely and accurate situation reports are more critical to the commander in
this environment. Distances between forces on the urban battlefield are reduced; an
unreported breakthrough may splinter defensive cohesion and seriously jeopardize
the entire defence. Commanders must constantly be informed of critical actions to
enable rapid assessment and reaction. Commanders should be located well forward
and within frequency modulation (FM) radio ranges of committed forces.
4229. An in-depth, well-thought-out concept of defence provides the latitude for
repositioning uncommitted units and quickly integrating them into the defence.
4230. Achievement of an integrated, flexible, and responsible C2 system will
require:
a.
A detailed, but simple, centralized concept for conducting the defence.
Subordinate units will be given restrictive missions and finite control measures
where necessary.
b.
Although told exactly what to do, how to accomplish assigned tasks will
be left to subordinate units (decentralized execution).
c.
Decentralized execution requires attachment of CSS assets.
d.
Commanders ensure accomplishment of assigned tasks in an orderly
fashion by establishing priorities and deadlines.
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE
THE MAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
4231. As the enemy comes under observation of security elements, he is subjected
to long-range artillery fires. Tactical air, if available, will be used to delay the enemy
advance and inflict maximum casualties. Prior to withdrawal, the security elements
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delay, deceive, and disorganise the enemy to the maximum extent possible without
becoming decisively engaged.
4232. Upon withdrawal of the screen, forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) forces
engage enemy targets as they appear, or fire against suspect or likely enemy
assembly areas or other positions. Artillery may be fired against on-call targets.
Further delay is accomplished by previously prepared obstacles such as anti-armour
and antipersonnel minefields, barricades, and barbed wire.
4233. When the enemy reaches an area from which he can launch an assault, final
protective fires are executed to disorganise the attacking forces and inflict maximum
casualties. If the attacker succeeds in reaching the battle area, resistance is
continued by increased fires and by close combat in the streets and within buildings.
Flat trajectory individual and crew-served weapons, grenade launchers, and hand
grenades become the primary means of defence within the built-up area. Each unit
holds its assigned area at all cost to maintain the continuity of the defence. Gaps
between units are closed by fires or by elements of their reserves.
4234. Observation must be maintained at all time. Observes in upper floors must be
able to spot enemy parties attempting to breach a wall or otherwise gain entry. Hand
grenades thrown or dropped out or windows may be effective. Successful entry of a
defended building must be made known to all occupants without delay. Immediate
efforts are made to seal off and destroy the intruders. When ordered to withdraw
form a portion of a building, troops withdraw toward prepared exits, preferably in
upper floors. They are demolitions to create new opening when necessary.
EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES
4235. Reserves are used to eject the enemy before he can seize a foothold and
consolidate and enlarge his penetration. They accomplish this by blocking or
employing counter-penetration force. Initially, all available fires are directed at the
penetrating force, during which designated forces counterattack in accordance with
previously prepared plans. The restrictions to observation with built-up areas require
that extremely close coordination of fires be achieved between the counterattack
force and adjacent units.
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SECTION 6
SMALL UNIT OPERATION (SUO)
GENERAL
4236. The concept of Small Unit Operations (SUO) stresses on the use of
unconventional tactics by the conventional forces in a jungle setting of the Malaysian
environment. Unconventional methods, especially those carried out by the Special
Forces units, can make a significant contribution to the overall success of operations.
Commanders who undertake to deploy small units, make use of trained small units
to strike at vulnerable points of the operations and create insecurity in the enemy’s
flanks, in order to gain success. The deployment of small units as part of major
operations, either in the defensive or offensive phase, should therefore be
considered so that commanders will have the tactical leverage to carry-out their
tasks effectively.
4236. A SUO is defined as a coordinated unconventional offensive operation
conducted by small units to augment and enhance the effectiveness of conventional
forces.
4237. Tactics Employed. Tactics employed by forces conducting SUO are almost
similar to those used by the Special Forces Small Unit Patrol or by guerrillas. The
former, although would normally be under control of immediate formation HQ, may in
some areas operate under the command of a HQ. The difference between the
employment of small units and the Special Forces is that the former operates in the
immediate front of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) while the latter in the
rear of the enemy main force. The yardstick on how far forward the SUO could be
conducted depends on the battle scenario. They, however, must be prepared to
operate independently for a limited period of time into likely enemy flanks taking the
advantage of the familiar terrain and environment.
4238. Offensive Action. Small Unit Operations are often characterised by offensive
actions. SUO attack through the maximum use of surprise and shock action,
followed by a sudden disengagement and rapid withdrawal. SUO make full use of
the advantages conferred by night, bad weather and terrain. SUO relies more on
mobility and boldness rather than on numerical strength. In fact, for SUO the
strength should not be more than a platoon; the less the better, making use of
concealment, camouflage and able to operate in stealth. SUO members carry light
equipment but lethal weapon for increased mobility, and off the land where possible.
ROLES
4238. Due to their limited strengths and capabilities, SUO units operate within a
given Area of Operation (AO) against lightly defended targets and on enemy’s lines
of communications such as communication centres, HQ, administrative installations,
gun positions, tank hides and bridges. In a conventional setting, SUO can perform
the following roles in support of the main operations:
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a.
Reduce the enemy’s fighting capability by destroying and harassing
vital targets such as HQ, communication centres, gun positions, tanks and
light air crafts in forward areas.
b.
Disrupt the enemy’s Lines of Communications (L of C) by ambushing
moving targets such as convoys and destroying or harassing stationary
targets such as administrative installations.
c.
Creating panic and insecurity in enemy location thereby forcing them to
deploy larger force for providing security to the installations.
d.
Creating uncertainty and demoralising the enemy by hitting them hard
in small packets thus reducing their combat efficiency to fight.
e.
Information gathering.
f.
Conduct close target reconnaissance.
TASKS
4239. Small Unit Operation (SUO) is clandestine in nature, thus it becomes
complementary to conventional components once fighting breaks out. Tasks which
can be carried out are as follows:
a.
Penny picketing enemy advancing columns by means of mines,
demolition, cratering and abatis; subsequently inflicting maximum casualty
onto enemy and its equipment.
b.
Neutralise enemy guns/mortars and rendering them incapable of
providing effective indirect fire support to the supported element/echelons.
c.
Disrupt where possible of enemy armour and rendering them incapable
of providing effective armour support or form an effective armour threat.
d.
Disrupt enemy logistics bases.
e.
Disrupt enemy A and B Echelons.
f.
Harassment on enemy harbour/leaguer areas.
g.
Disrupt their L of C.
h.
Conduct an attack/harassment onto the rear of enemy advancing
column/position, as to force the enemy to commit their reserve or to cut
off/disrupt supplies forward.
LIMITATIONS
4240. It must be remembered that SUO units operate in small unit forces. Hence,
they need to operate independently for a limited period of time with limited
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resources. In view of this, when planning the SUO, the following limitations should be
taken into consideration:
a.
Limited Supply. Small Unit Operations units are often cut off from their
L of C and hence proper planning is needed to resupply them. On certain
occasion, they may have to resort to indigenous methods for resupply and to
survive.
b.
Lack of Fire Power and Mobility. Being small in number and lightly
equipped, SUO units lack the fire power and fire support. They usually move
in stealth and may have to leave their vehicle.
c.
Intelligence and Information. Intelligence and information of the
enemy is vital to SUO. Higher formations must be able to feed them with upto-date intelligence and information on the enemy.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
4241. The deployment of SUO is to augment and enhance the conventional regular
troops capabilities but not to replace their core task. Some basic considerations
when employing SUO which need to be adhered to are as follows:
a.
Security. Since small units are not designed to hold ground, their main
efforts should be concentrated on the destruction of the enemy. By not
holding ground, their very survival or success depends on security. The
location of their base camps, hides, dumps/caches and communication
centres must be kept away from public knowledge. Likewise, populated
centres must be avoided.
b.
Surprise. To act quicker than the enemy is the essence of SUO.
Missions such as raids and ambushes are to surprise the enemy, rendering
him incapable to conduct retaliatory actions. Hit them hard when and where
they least expect it and survive for the next round is a key speciality of SUO
units.
c.
Mobility. The mobility of small units are essentially on foot, which
demands a high standard of physical fitness, knowledge of the terrain and the
ability to carry light equipment. At times when the enemy has air superiority,
over dependency on helicopters or vehicles should not become a common
feature. At best, small units may move on motorcycles or by using locally
acquired vehicles as a mode of transport. However, the usage of motorcycles
and locally acquired vehicles will be subjected to logistics and security draw
backs.
d.
Simplicity. Planning for all kinds of offensive actions (front, rear or the
flanks) must be clearly understood by every member of the group. As such
plans must be clear, concise and easily implemented. This is one way of
avoiding duplication and at same time ensuring a higher degree of success.
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e.
Coordination. Offensive actions unless properly coordinated at certain
levels, are bound to fail. On the other hand, a properly planned/coordinated
offensive action will bring the desired results which is meaningful to the overall
strategy. Since small units are dispersed and often left on their own,
command and control can become a major obstacle to SUO. However, with
good communication, command and control problems can be easily resolved
within the battalion Area of Responsibility (AOR).
f.
Exploit Tactical Opportunities. In SUO, the troops must continually
assess the situation. SUO is opportunistic but when the decisive movement
arrives, everything else is subordinate to the concentration of fire against
enemy's critical weakness. However, always avoid enemy strength, attacker
weaknesses and using tactics based on deception and surprise. This implies
boldness and risk taking.
g.
Designate a Main Effort. Main effort is the activity crucial to the
success of the mission at the time. It focuses combat power on the vital
element of the plan and allows subordinates to make decisions which will
support intention without constantly seeking orders.
h.
Act Boldly and Decisively. All actions to be executed must be bold
and decided to meet the objectives set. To achieve this, soldiers must be both
physically and mentally prepared.
i.
Communications. Good communication is the key element to success
and to remain flexible. In SUO, the ability to pass and receive information
depends on constant feedback of intelligence within their AO in enabling them
to execute and achieve the objectives. Hence, the need for good and reliable
communication systems are crucial for the success of SUO.
j.
Intelligence. Being confined to their pre designated AOR, small unit
fighters cannot be expected to read beyond their parameters. To be effective,
they must be continually fed with sufficient information of the overall tactical
situation. The basis of small unit actions is very much dependent on good and
accurate intelligence.
k.
Issue Mission Type Orders/Operational Instructions. Mission
Command means decentralising decision making, letting decision be taken at
the lowest possible level, and where the information is most likely to be
accurate. It also means informing a subordinate what action you want him to
have but not how to do it. In such case, when mission type orders cannot be
issued, an appropriate operational instruction should be given. This should
include the tasks in general or the tasks in particular, for a particular SUO.
l.
Initiative. Small unit fighters have the freedom of action in view of their
mobility. Since they operate "independently", they have the options on the
choice of targets and tactical manoeuvres.
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m.
Flexibility. Flexibility is important to any small unit commander.
Although a thorough appreciation has been done prior to the deployment of
the troops, there are times when the commanders need to adapt to the
situation. Commanders must also weigh the disadvantages and advantages if
they plan to commit forces when an unexpected situation arises.
INTELLIGENCE
4242. In SUO, a unit which is required to destroy a force larger than its own size,
must be successful at the first time at all times. To achieve this aim, intelligence
plays an important part in the planning, deployment and course of actions to be
undertaken by small unit forces.
4243. Successful small units must be able to move, shoot and communicate.
Therefore, the IPB is performed regardless of existing conditions, ie. during
peacetime, increased tensions or combat situation. The IPB is a continuous process
or analysis and evaluation of information used for intelligence and commanders’
planning. The implementation of IPB and battlespace surveillance in SUO is the
responsibility of the commanders at all levels. The Army intelligence assets should
be integrated with the formation and units’ intelligence assets, so that they can play a
more effective role in the course of an operation.
4244. Intelligence Requirement. In SUO, the most important intelligence
requirement is to identify the operational areas and targets, and when they can be
eliminated. SUO actions should be aggressive and offensive in nature. In the
preparation of intelligence for SUO, the following are required:
a.
Identify the characteristics and capabilities of the enemy.
b.
Identify the likely areas and likely battlespace for SUO and efforts to
identify targets.
c.
Prepare the SUO personnel and special agents to conduct battlespace
surveillance within their respective areas.
4245. If the intelligence requirement cannot be obtained, the preparation and the
ability of the SUO for aggressive and offensive actions would not be achieved. The
intelligence requirement to assist the SUO must therefore cover IPB and battlespace
surveillance.
4246. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Battlespace
Surveillance. The IPB and battlespace surveillance accounts for the maximum
integration of enemy, weather and terrain information, as it relates to the mission and
specific battlespace conditions. This is done to evaluate and determine enemy
capabilities, vulnerabilities and courses of action. The IPB is the systematic
approach which emphasises the use of graphics, templates, and overlays to aid the
analyst, staff and commander in making decisions. Battlespace surveillance is to
assist in implementing the process while on combat to identify the targets so that it
can be destroyed at the precise time and place. In IPB, the process can be divided
into 4 stages as follows:
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a.
Collection and evaluation of the enemy situation.
b.
Evaluation of the battlespace.
c.
Terrain and weather analysis.
d.
Threat integration.
4247. Implementation of Battle Surveillance in Support of the Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace. It has been identified that Battlespace Surveillance
is important in the last stage in support of the IPB. To implement the surveillance
activities in the SUO battlespace, the SUO HQ also needs other surveillance
sources. This can be achieved by coordinating other formation intelligence assets
and that include units organic to the SUO HQ. The SUO HQ should also seek other
assistance from other services such as the Navy, Air Force and other own
intelligence agencies. Other small units should also carry out their own surveillance
in the target area to detect and identify any enemy activities. The coordination of
other intelligence as set by the SUO HQ is for the purpose of the following:
a.
Planning the surveillance programme.
b.
Deploying the surveillance sources effectively.
c.
Giving a specific task which is relevant to each intelligence asset.
4248. Evaluation of the Battlespace. The purpose of this process is to identify
where the actual combat which include tactical actions will take place. In SUO, it
should be able to identify space for manoeuvre of the enemy combat and logistics
elements. At this stage, the following should be conducted:
a.
Identify the enemy strategic and tactical objectives in their offensive
action and concept of operation, that include the combat strength required.
b.
Identity important areas which are likely to be the enemy’s offensive
targets.
c.
Analyse the enemy's likely approaches on land, sea (beaches) and air
for which offensive actions may be launched.
d.
Analyse characteristics of the battlespace in the area of influence and
in the area of interest, which provide advantage to the enemy offensive.
e.
Analyse the concept and type of tactical actions of SUO and other
likely suitable operational areas in the battlespace.
f.
Develop a map/overlay, model and terrain board of the battlespace for
the subsequent planning of intelligence and operations.
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PLANNING AND CONDUCT
4249. The planning and conduct of SUO are important aspects to be considered.
Detailed planning of all the relevant factors and a comprehensive conduct plan is
crucial for the successful execution of this operation.
PLANNING
4250. The following factors must be taken into consideration during planning:
a.
To safeguard risk to the security of the plan, the depth of SUO and
targets must be controlled at a higher level. It is envisaged that the division or
the brigade will usually lay down the policy, boundaries and depth of the
operation. Brigade is generally the lowest HQ to have authority to control and
coordinated SUO.
b.
The nature of the operation requires detailed planning and thorough
preparation. These must commence well in advance and time must be
allowed for the following:
(1)
Collection of maximum possible information of planning the
insertion/ infiltration, execution of mission, prolonged operation and
withdrawal/exfiltration.
(2)
Training and rehearsals for the mission.
(3)
Issue of special stores and equipment required for the mission.
(4)
Coordinate with the overall Operational Plan.
4251. Preparation. The following preparations must be taken into consideration
during planning:
a.
Time is a factor that have to be considered in the execution of SUO. In
most cases, the operation needs to be conducted immediately where limited
time is given for preparation. However, this problem can be overcome if units
are well trained and prior preparation has been geared up. It will also take
time to deploy a battalion forward for such mission, especially to operate in
unfamiliar ground. This could be prevailed by predesignating a battalion to
cover a particular sector which will enable the sub units to prepare, recce and
make an appreciation on the overall AOR. If need be, prior planning and
rehearsals could be conducted during peace time.
b.
For units that have been tasked to conduct this operation in familiar
ground, the assistance and coordination with the local units is essential.
However, TA units must be trained and know their responsibility when the
situation demands. Only by this way, the TA units will be able to guide and
assist the incoming unit tasked for SUO, during insertion and withdrawal.
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c.
One other method to overcome the above problem is by preparing the
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) of the area of operation
during peacetime. This will permit us to identify specific area of interest,
approaches into the area by infantry or armour, possible vehicles and armour
concentration areas, possible gun positions and possible assembly areas,
concentration or harbour areas. In addition, the IPB will also depict possible
dumping areas, insertion and withdrawals routes. The assistance of local TA
elements will ease the conduct of operation irrespective of terrain and
weather, by day or by night. In the absence of such information, steps must
be taken to obtain information on the enemy as early as possible. One of the
ways to achieve this is by sending other teams immediately to gather
intelligence so as to enable the small unit force to update the targets within
their sectors and develop the plan as additional information is obtained.
d.
Having appreciated the situation, the AO needs to be sectorised
possibly down to section level. The division of AO should be based on specific
target where possible or in the area designated for the main effort.
4252. Security. In ensuring security, all possible precautions must be taken against
disclosing the plan. It is the duty of every commander at all levels to impose
measures to ensure the security of the operation. However, it is necessary for every
soldier to be informed on all aspects of the plan which are his concern. Sufficient
details must be given to permit effective planning. Decision undertaken by the
commander will include the following:
a.
Formulation of deception plan if required.
b.
Restriction on movement before and during insertion.
c.
Timing of Insertion.
d.
Routes and Hide-out.
e.
Pre dumping areas.
f.
Coordination with friendly troops.
4253. Timings. The following timings must be taken into consideration during
planning:
a.
The limitation imposed by the Higher Commander, if any.
b.
Time required for battle procedure.
c.
Duration of the operation.
CONDUCT
4254. Insertion. This will require time which could be critical. Areas for insertion are
important but it is the reaction time until deployment into the AOR that matters most.
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The time required to prepare the ground to gain the most advantage of it in achieving
the objective given is paramount. However, the shortcomings, can be overcome by
the following:
a.
With all the peacetime preparation mentioned earlier, the following
actions will be taken when the situation demands:
(1)
Activate the TA units concerned.
(2)
Deploy the designated battalion for the mission.
b.
With prior planning, preparation and rehearsals, insertion into the
various sectors should be automatic. Advantage on the use of the fastest
means of transport available should be expounded if the situation permits, to
save time. In cases where SUO force have to go through enemy areas,
infiltration should be conducted.
4255. Infiltration. In order to reach their targets or sectors, small unit forces have to
infiltrate into enemy areas. Even though infiltration can be conducted by air, sea or
overland, small unit forces will mostly be infiltrated overland. They either go round
the enemy position or through gaps between the enemy positions. The route
selected for infiltration must be the most unlikely and unexpected. Detailed and upto-date information on the tactical situation, perfected team work and field craft, good
map reading, and coordination with friendly troops in the area are essential for
successful infiltration. Infiltration may also be carried out with the help of reliable
local or TA personnel as guides.
4256. Extraction/Withdrawal. In this kind of operation, withdrawal will be more
appropriate. Extraction will require much more detailed preparation. This involves
selection of pick-up places and most important the means of transportation.
However, if the situation permits, extraction by transport should be made available.
The alternative is by making escape possible using identified routes and RV, and
finally disappearing by means of mixing with the population (if it exists).
4257. Exfiltration. This is the process of reaching own lines from sectors within the
enemy areas. The tactics and requirement of exfiltration are similar to those of
infiltration. It is best for small unit forces to exfiltrate in small groups to avoid capture
by enemy who will at this stage be more alert. There is an added requirement for
maintaining a high degree of vigilance when they close in onto their own FEBA.
Close coordination with forward troops, timings and routes of exfiltration, as well as
identification are all necessary for successful completion of a mission.
4258. Tactics. The conduct of SUO requires the full use of stealth, concealment,
camouflage, surprise and deception. Their tactics must be bold and innovative and
their mission carefully selected not only to allow a high degree of success but also to
allow some degree of flexibility and initiatives to the commander to ensure that
results achieved are compatible with the effort and with minimum casualty. The SUO
conducts a battle of attrition within sectors. Initially, it is likely that targets are
identified and execution of mission is easier, but they have to locate subsequent
targets within their sectors or being fed with such intelligence as to enable them to
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be successful in harassing the enemy. Survival is of paramount importance and this
can be achieved by having a wider area to manoeuvre. The tasks given are as
follows:
a.
Raid. To destroy or harass a stationary target (limited).
b.
Ambush. To destroy and harass a moving target.
c.
Demolition. To destroy specific targets or deny enemy approaches.
d.
Other Tasks. Collecting intelligence, directing air strikes and
conducting artillery shoots in areas where it is covered by artillery support.
4259. Cycle. The operational cycle of a SUO is as follows:
a.
Initiating directive.
b.
The initial planning.
c.
The detail planning.
d.
The preparatory stage.
e.
The isolation stage.
f.
Infiltration stage.
g.
The conduct of the operation/mission.
h.
Exfiltration/Withdrawals.
4260. Hideout. It is essential that the hideout before and after a mission must not be
detected or located by the enemy. It should be sited and organized in such a way
that if detected, they are able to escape and regroup for subsequent missions. The
success of SUO depends on surprise as summarised below:
a.
Before accomplishment of a task, the enemy must not know their
presence.
b.
After the accomplishment of a mission, the enemy must not be able to
locate them. If he does, the mental stress which is supposed to be put on
them will be lost/defeated.
c.
After the accomplishment of a mission, they must retreat to a
predetermined RV and be able to carry out the next mission.
EMPLOYMENT OF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS
4261. The employment of SUO are essential for enhancing the conduct of the
overall major operation; be it offensive or defensive in nature. In this context, SUO
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can be employed in a conventional setting or as part of asymmetric warfare.
Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that SUO are in itself a ‘combat multiplier’ and its
achievement will benefit the overall tactical scenario.
CONCEPT
4262. Being numerically small in strength, SUO is normally conducted in
pre designated sectors within the AO, with no frontage either in offensive or
defensive operations. This force is normally specifically organized, equipped and
trained to inflict maximum casualty onto the enemy and their equipment, with the
intention of reducing their combat power cohesion and concentration in any
engagement with our conventional forces.
4263. Due to its limited strength, SUO is only able to harass or inflict casualties or
damage to the enemy and his equipment without being involved in a decisive battle.
As the operations are clandestine in nature, intelligence is of utmost importance;
specifically in getting enemy information. All SUO are concluded with a sound
exfiltration plan or units merging back into their parent unit after the mission is
accomplished.
CONVENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT
4264. The use of SUO, if properly planned, will produce better results when
coordinated within the overall operational plan. The SUO units can be committed for
the following tasks:
a.
Advance and Pursuit. These cover the following;
(1)
Securing of Key Terrain as cited below:
(a)
Facilitate the advance through defiles, tunnels and
bridges.
(b)
Prevent the enemy from destroying facilities required by
own forces such as Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), ration
dumps and water point.
(2)
Destruction of the means of communication installations such as
bridges, tunnels and transport facilities.
(3)
Destruction or harassment of enemy’s HQ, communication
centres, administrative installations and gun positions.
(4)
b.
Information gathering.
Attack. These cover the following:
(1)
Gathering and passing information on enemy dispositions in
depth.
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(2)
Harassment and destruction of enemy gun positions to prevent
them from influencing the battle.
(3)
Direct fire, counter fire, counter bombardment, air strikes and
gun ship. Harassment and destruction of HQ and communication
centres.
(4)
Interdiction of routes or ambushing on enemy reserves to
jeopardise any enemy counter attack.
(5)
c.
Securing of critical features to facilitate the attack.
Defence. These cover the following:
(1)
Gathering and passing of information on enemy’s movement.
(2)
Harassment of the enemy advance column or attack plan by
raiding or ambushing critical targets.
(3)
Direct harassing fire, counter bombardment and air strikes by
Fighter Ground Aircrafts (FGA) or gunships.
(4)
d.
Conduct area surveillance.
Withdrawal. These cover the following:
(1)
Ambushing, harassing and disrupting on enemy’s advance.
(2)
Assist own forces to achieve clean break by the following:
(3)
(a)
Laying ambushes.
(b)
Mining the roads.
(c)
Demolishing bridges.
(d)
Sniping on critical targets.
Gathering information on enemy’s presence.
EMPLOYMENT OF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
4265. During the insurgency period against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM),
numerous confessions were made by surrendered enemy personnel that the use of
SUO tactics was most feared by them. The tactics of stealth and the practice of hard
routines, coupled by strict jungle discipline by the Special Forces units during the
Insurgency was a major blow to the terrorists. More often than not, the presence of
SUO units could not be predicted and they often stumbled with the SUO forces
without anticipating their presence. Being light and small in number, the SUO units
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are very flexible and could be reorganized quickly to form a fortified cordon around
the enemy in any situation that required them to do so.
4266. In a conventional setting, the use of SUO forces will also be able to carry-out
asymmetric activities in order to influence the overall tactical situations. Such forces
will be utilised to disrupt and to a certain extent destroy selected target of the
adversary, in order to render or weaken his capabilities.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
4267. Responsibility of Command and Control. Normally SUO will be controlled
at the next highest formation. However, because of the restriction in communication
the nature of operation and the extended L of C, control will be difficult and should
normally be decentralised. The initiatives of commanders of small units assume
added importance during the conduct of the operation.
4268. Coordination and Communication. The following should be noted in the
control of SUO:
a.
Sectors. The area must be divided into clearly designated sectors as
to enable the forces to have the freedom of movement within sectors and to
avoid clashes between friendly troops.
b.
Boundaries. Boundary should be clearly defined and must be easily
identified.
c.
Coordinating Points. These are essential in order to maintain
cohesion.
d.
Communication. Adequate communications are provided within the
force, between the forces and the formation HQ. Radio conversation between
groups must be restricted as it would compromise security. Use of
prearranged codes and nicknames should be used extensively.
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SECTION 7
COMPANY AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
4269. Airmobile (AM) operations are characterised very much by speed and afford
the coy comd the opportunity of inserting his force into a loc of his choice. AM
operations should be a very simple exercise in the tactical movement of troops, but
invariably cause friction due to the lack of cooperation between the aviation and
infantry commander. Some common problems are:
a.
Being told the AM sqn will use 10 helo and only 9 arrive, causing the
coy 2IC to quickly alter his chalks. (always have a bump plan) As soon as you
can see the helos, start counting.
b.
10 helos land, the coy enplanes only 9 lift off due to a break down and
you are not informed. Ensure you establish internal comms once you enplane
and ask if all the helos lifted off. (as silly as this may seem)
c.
Despite giving the AM sqn the coy comd frequency, no comms are
established, as the sqn is inbound to lift the coy. This makes it hard to confirm
the correct number of helos.
d.
Despite being told or briefing aviation comd to land facing a certain
direction, they land in another direction causing troops to rally the wrong way.
Ensure you establish comms with the aviation comd and confirm the loc of the
LZ and direction of landing. You should also quickly confirm your direction by
compass on deplaning.
e.
On enplaning you find there are no internal headsets. This is
inexcusable and will result in control problems for you. Ask the loadmaster for
a set, and if none are available, report the incident.
f.
Make sure hearing protection is carried by every soldier (SOPs).
4270. The above tips may paint grim picture, but you must ensure you leave nothing
to chance. Once the AM is underway there will be little you can do to change things.
ACHIEVING SURPRISE
4271. As stated, planning AM operations are relatively simple. The skill is using the
speed of movement to achieve some surprise. If you are conducting a company AM
then it is your operation and you should dictate where your primary, alternate, and
dummy LZs are; even if you cannot face to face with the aviation comd and are
required to send the information on the radio. The following guidance may help you
in planning:
a.
Depending on terrain and vegetation, if you land or travel within 15 km
of the enemy you will be heard
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b.
Use dummy LZs around the objective if you know your insertion will be
heard to create confusion. Chances are your AM will be heard by enemy
patrols and OPs.
c.
Many AM operations have failed to achieve deception because the
enemy could see the helos were empty from a considerable distance when
the doors are left open after deplaning. (The light and space of an empty helo
with doors open is very noticeable). Conducting the entire AM with doors
closed can assist in the deception.
d.
The helos are obviously not to be used in any aslt and you should take
all measures to avoid coming within heavy weapon range of the enemy. You
can assume that any LZ used is now compromised. If a LZ is to be continually
used by the bn then it must be secured at all time.
THE AIRMOBILE
4272. Remember to maintain your security at the enplaning end and only form into
chalks when necessary. Figure 4.28 depicts AM sqn, which should be capable of
lifting a coy in one lift if the coy strength is less than 100. Tactical loading should
work on 8 to 10 per acft, and up to 18 under operational conditions. (18 in each acft
in heavy threat conditions is risky and should be avoided if the helos are available).
Use of only an AM troop will simply slow down the operation, and you will need to
increase your security at the LZ. This may require the first pl in to sweep the LZ.
Fig 4.28 : AM Configuration
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SECURING THE LZ
4273. The dispersed nature of AM operations often means the coy often is out of
gun range. Security is paramount at the LZ. Figures 4.29 to 4.31 depict rally and
security methods.
Fig 4.29 : Company Rally Threat Known
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Fig 4.30 :
UNCLASSIFIED
Company Rally Threat Unknown
Fig 4.31 : Company Rally To Secure LZ for Next AM
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Orders for the AM
4274. The AM will normally be a prelim move to achieve a mission, so do not write
your orders around the AM. Groupings and tasks can mention the AM, and the coy
2IC can divulge the necessary detail about chalks and acft numbers at the end of
orders, or during coord instructions. e.g.
a.
10 Pl
(1)
Gp.
In loc for prelim move (AM) MFC
(2)
Mission.
Capture Objective Gold in order to protect the
coys left flank in phase 2 of the atk.
(3)
Tasks.
(a)
Prelim Op. Lead pl into LZ ‘BARNY’
(i)
Rally to the NE and secure 212 fet orientated
south
(ii)
Acft and chalk details to be issued by coy 2IC in
coord instructions
(b)
Phase 1. Secure coy ph 1 FUP
(c)
Etc.
4275. The OCs concept of operations in his orders should include the following on
the AM:
a.
An overview of how the AM will occur.
b.
How the LZ will be secured.
c.
What deception measures will be employed (use of dummy LZs etc).
4276. Coord instructions should include actions on lost, locs of LZs, alt LZs, and the
bump plan.
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CONDUCT CIW
SECTION 1
FRAMEWORK OPERATION
4277: PURPOSE OF FRAMEWORK OP. A few point to be taken and purpose of
framework op are as follows:
a.
Keeping the guerilla force off balance.
b.
Locating and fixing the guerilla force.
c.
Inflicting guerilla casualties.
d.
Preventing the guerilla force from conducting operations.
e.
Preventing the guerillas from resting, recuperating and expanding.
f.
Depriving the guerillas from getting local support.
g.
Recovering and Destroying the guerillas food and supply dumps, arms,
ammunition, explosive and documents.
4278. Type Of framework Op:
a.
Search and recover operations. Conducted to search and recover
Guerillas food and supply dump, dead letter boxes, arms cache, ammunition,
explosives and document. Recovery of this will force the guerillas to move
away form the area. A few consideration to success in this op are as follows:
(1)
Positive intelligence of the existence of those items.
(2)
Troops highly trained to recognize the guerillas signs
(3)
Slow an thorough search
(4)
In short duration but sufficient time for search.
b.
Cordon and search operations. U s u a l l y i n a i d t o c i v i l p o w e r
(combined civil, police and military). An offensive ops in rural area, villages
and town, to seek guerillas who have infiltrated into these place, or to pick up
known or suspected guerillas supporters. Search may also be for arms,
ammunition, explosive and documents. Consideration to be taken to success
in this op are as below:
(1)
Must be preplanned and rehearsed.
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c.
UNCLASSIFIED
(2)
(3)
Plan must be simple an capable of rapid execution
Plain clothes recon in cordon area and mov into at night.
(4)
Maintain secrecy throughout to achieve surprise.
(5)
Imposed min inconvenience as possible to the public.
Populace and resource control. Involves into two main operation:
(1)
Resettlement Op. Conducted jointly with civil auth as a
preventive measures to deny insurgent all forms of support from the
population, and to facilitate military ops. Mil task is to mov, protect, and
con the resettled population (ex: Briggs Plan). Consideration for
success are as follows:
(a)
Pre-planned jointly with civil auth.
(b)
Identify area where the insurgent get their sp and select
sites.
(c)
Prep new village sites by the engrs.
(d)
Move people into the new villages.
(e)
Forming self-defense force and initial security protection
(f)
Provide aid in terms of food and medical coverage.
(g)
Provision of mil civic actions to help the people after
resettle
(2)
Food Control and Denial Operations. Conducted as
preventive measures to deny insurgent from obtaining food and
supplies from the population. Consideration for success are as follows:
(a)
Pre-planned jointly with the civil auth and police.
(b)
The are should facilitate with military ops.
(c)
Ensure food denial measures are strictly enforced with
Firmness.
(d)
Adequate protection given to the people.
d.
Psychological operations. It is designed to deny the insurgents his
Base of popular support, to give the nation a sense of unity of purpose and to
justify necessary restrictive measures. The aim of psyops operations if to
effect:
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(1)
Emotionally, socially and intellectually isolating the insurgents
from the rest of the population.
(2)
Demoralizing insurgents and subversive forces by creating a
rejection of their ideological and political aspirations.
e.
Key Point Protection. Conducted to protect key point of national
importance agains guerilla sabotage and raids. Consideration to be taken are
as below:
(1)
The destruction of the KP will affect the internal development.
(2)
A contingency plan should be prep for regular army sp.
(3)
Troops guarding KP should have a def scheme and good
communications.
(4)
A security check system should be implemented to check.
4279. Police responsibilities in framework Ops:
a.
Conduct Surveillance.
b.
Providing guides required for the cordon troops.
c.
Providing Special Branch to quickly evaluate info.
d.
Warning the inhabitants of the search and the imposition of curfews
after the cordon in position.
e.
Carrying out the actual search with protective and specialist assistance
from the security force.
f.
Arresting suspicious person.
g.
Screening of suspects.
h.
Controlling Traffic.
4280. Military responsibilities in framework Ops:
a.
Planning, commanding and controlling the operation.
b.
Providing the cordon.
c.
Conducting the initial sweep through or assault on the objective
necessary
d.
Escort/protection of police search parties.
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e.
Escort suspect or detained personal.
f.
Construct cages for holding detainees
g.
Guard detainees and suspects.
h.
Provide aircraft to observe movement within cordon area and to
broadcast instruction to the inhabitants,
i.
Provide technical assistance for the search (mine detectors, dogs,
explosive and bomb disposal teams).
SECTION 2
BORDER OPERATION
INTRODUCTION
4281. Border Operation is part of the overall operation KESBAN. Border operations
are made to create a control over border with neighboring countries and also to
enable the residents to be free from the insurgents activities. Insurgent group using a
border area as a place of protection either known, allowed or not by the neighboring
state government. It also to deny cross border activities.
PUPOSE OF BORDER OP
4282. There are a few point to be taken and purpose to conduct border op, which is:
a.
To establish control over a land at the international land border with a
troops.
b.
To prevent infiltration and exfiltration by insurgents/en to our land
c.
To deny insurgents/en establish sanctuaries at neighboring countries
d.
To establish a physical observation; support by ISR devices
e.
To deny cross border activities
4283. Some Factor and concepts to be consider in border op are as follows:
a.
Traffic Control Isolation
b.
Planning
c.
Integrated
d.
Coordination
e.
Informer
4284. While conducting border control op, some organization will involve on
conducting this op such as:
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a.
Police
b.
Immigration
c.
Govt Agencies
d.
MAF
e.
Custom.
f.
Others
UNCLASSIFIED
4285. Contribution factor for Border Op are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Supervision:
(1)
Patrol
(2)
Tech Equipment
(3)
Obsn Post
(4)
Air Obsn
Avoidance
(1)
Delaying
(2)
Detection
(3)
Destruction
Restrain.
(1)
Obs
(2)
Fence
(3)
Barbed Wire
(4)
Mine Fields
Control Area
(1)
Restricted Area
(2)
Population Control Area
(3)
Residential Buffer Area
4286. Some example of border operation conducted in the Army:
a.
Op Jaga Kawan
b.
Op Kota
c.
Op Pagar
d.
Op Wawasan
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SECTION 3
STRIKE OPERATION
INTRODUCTION
4287. The aim of strike ops is to find, fix and destroy insurgent tactical forces or the
guerrilla groups which are characterized as an offensive ops. Usually conducted in
response to:
a.
Information and intelligence (Civil authorities/mil intel)
b.
Contact has been made by sy force during patrolling or aerial recon
(framework op).
c.
Guerrillas activity against civil or military installations and forces
(subversive act).
4288. Purpose. Strike ops are conducted to facilitate the establishment and
expansion of controlled areas by disrupting and destroying insurgents operating
within and outside the control areas. It should be mounted in area within helicopter
radius of action of a base or forward operational base. Fire sp bases in addition to air
sp must be available.
4289. Types of Strike Ops:
a.
Search and Destroy. To locate the insurgent disposition, str, destroy
then and clear the area.
b.
Encirclement. Attack en camp or fortified village.
c.
Area Ambush. To eliminate the guerrilla force which is expected to
move into ambush area.
d.
Airmobile. To mount an encirclement or a pursuit using heli as the
mean of delivery.
e.
OBUA. Op are conducted against urban guerrillas.
4290. Basic consideration to be taken of encirclement op:
a.
Enemy force must be positively located.
b.
Enemy must be effectively contained.
c.
A much larger force than the en is required.
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e.
Coordinated at all levels.
f.
Secrecy to achieve surprise
g.
Executed rapidly
h.
Good Communication.
i.
Good Leadership.
j.
Artillery and air sp
k.
Adequate reserve
4291. 7 variation of encirclement operations:
a.
Encirclement and Attack. Cordon should be completely tight. Cordon
is contracted until assault force can launch attack.
b.
Hammer and Anvil. Exact location of the enemy is known and a
blocking force in linear base acts as anvil and the assault force as the
hammer, force the enemy into the blocking force area.
c.
Rabbit Hunt. Conducted when there is insufficient forces to do a
complete cordon.
d.
Fire Flush. Conducted over small area (1 map square or less) and all
side are cordon. Fire is applied to destroy the enemy forces.
e.
Assault and Ambush. Assault from one direction. Ambushes are
made on likely enemy escape routes and it is the most economical method.
f.
Assault and Block. Similar to assault and ambush. Difference would
be to the greater number of blocking positions.
g.
Contracting Cordon. Enemy location are cordon from all direction
and contract until it reaches the enemy forces.
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CONDUCT OPERATION
SECTION 3
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
4292. Introduction to Aid Civil Authority.
a.
The MAF will provide assistance to civil authorities under specified
circumstances in its secondary role but will follow procedures and guidelines
from the government for its employment. The subject on ‘Military Aids to Civil
Authority’ is essentially the assistance given by the MAF to the civil authorities
in ensuring peace, security, providing humanitarian and disaster relief
assistance and helping in the social economic development of the nation as a
whole. Military aids to civil authorities include those activities provided by
military forces in support of Federal and State officials under the Emergency
Act and other laws and regulations stated otherwise. The MAF, particularly the
Army, is not a law enforcement agency and it is only to be considered as an
adjunct to the civil authorities. The Army’s involvement in providing assistance
to the civil authorities must therefore be guided by the respect for the primacy
of the civil authorities in such a role, and the need to establish a situation
whereby it can be withdrawn amicably on completion of its tasks.
b.
This operation dwells on the assistance that may be given by the Army
to the civil authorities paying particular interest in a peacetime non-combatant
role and to help on the uplifting of national resilience. It outlines the guidance
that could be applied to situations in which the Army units may be involved if
called out in assistance to the civil authorities. Hence , any decision to commit,
equip or train the Army for such a role will only be at the specific direction of
the Federal Government and highest level of command of the Armed Forces;
and would only occur as the result of a serious deterioration in the security and
stability of the nation. Directives from the government specifically in providing
the assistance will come from the Cabinet Committee via the Minister of
Defence. The Cabinet view on the requirements for military support in the
civilian domestic affairs is only provided as the situation warrants its
assistance
4293. Introduction to Peace Support Operation.
a.
The establishes the basis for Peace Support Operations (PSO) by the
Malaysian Army, as its involvement under the auspices of UN has been very
encouraging and significant over a long period of time. Over the years the
complexity of Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) has become more complex
and demanding. In a broad term, it is called PSO which encompasses PKO,
Wider PKO, Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) and Operations in Support
of Diplomatic Efforts. PSO are multi-functional operations, conducted
impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation
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such as the UN, NATO and regional organisations involving military forces,
diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a longterm political settlement or other specified conditions. PSO are neither in
support of, nor against a particular party, but rather conducted in an impartial
and even-handed manner. PSO are designed to create a secure environment
in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a
self-sustaining peaceful situation. PSO actions are based upon the
judgements to the degree of compliance and/or non-compliance of the parties
with the agreement between the parties and not against any bias or predetermined designation. The Peace Operations Continuum is as shown in
Figure 4.32.
Figure 4.32: The Peace Operations Continuum
b.
During the Cold War era, PSO was called ‘traditional peacekeeping’
(PK) missions, the so called “Blue Helmets”, and was allowed to use force only
in selfdefence. In the Post Cold War era, the challenges of PK have become
even more complex with wider threats confronting states. In order to respond
to situations in which internal order had broken down and the civilian
population is suffering, a wider PK concept was developed to achieve multiple
political and social objectives. Unlike traditional PK, wider PK often involved
civilian experts and NGO as well as soldiers. Another difference between
traditional and wider PK is that soldiers in some missions are authorised to
employ force for reasons other than self-defence. 403. In the 1990s, wider PK
missions all over the world involved troops from the developed and developing
world. Examples of PSO since the Cold War to the present are shown in the
Figure 4.33.
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Peace Building Confict Prevention Humantiatrian Operations Figure 4.33
c.
The Evolving Spectrum of Tension In the former Yugoslav province of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Malaysia was involved in UNPROFOR, IFOR and
SFOR), the Security Council created ‘safe areas’ to protect the predominantly
BOSNIAC (Bosnian Muslim) population from Serbian attacks. In addition to
traditional PK which includes preventive diplomacy, in the post-Cold War era
the functions of UN forces were expanded considerably to include Peace
Making and Peace Building (former UN Secretary-General Boutros
BoutrosGhali described in detail these additional functions in his report ‘An
Agenda for Peace [1992]’ and subsequently in the ‘Supplement to an Agenda
for Peace [1995]’. For example, since 1990 UN forces have supervised
elections in many parts of the world, including Nicaragua, Eritrea, and
Cambodia; encouraged peace negotiations in El Salvador, Angola, and
Western Sahara; and distributed food in Somalia.
4294. Introduction to Limited Intervention Operations. The acceptability criteria
for the conduct of Limited Intervention Operations are summarised below:
a.
Whether and When To Intervene? Recent practice has introduced a
capital distinction between collective interventions and state-led interventions,
and this difference must be the point of departure of the principle of Limited
Intervention. On the one hand, the UN Security Council may decide to
intervene in a given state, irrespective of its government’s consent, to maintain
or restore international peace and security, in application of Chapter VII of the
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UN Charter. A number of circumstances may be considered by the Security
Council to be threats to peace and security (civil strife, humanitarian crises,
attack to protected zones, the political situation, etc.) that justify a resort to
military force. The only limits that the UN Security Council must respect are the
procedural and substantive conditions set forth in the Charter. In allowing the
Security Council to act coercively, UN members accept that it acts as a global
body in the name of the whole international community. On the other hand, for
their part, individual states can also intervene militarily, even without the
authorisation of the UN Security Council, but only under certain strictly defined
conditions which are summarised as follows:
(1) States may intervene to avert overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophes that put at risk international peace and security.
State-led military intervention in other states may be undertaken when
forceful action can prevent or stop a humanitarian catastrophe. The
rationale behind general acceptance of this intervention is that the
principle of protection of human rights, particularly when they are
seriously threatened by violent conflicts, justifies external military action
in the absence of an effective response by the government and by the
Security Council.
(2) Diplomatic efforts and other peaceful means must have been
exhausted. Military intervention is only acceptable when other
institutional and diplomatic efforts are not capable of bringing about a
peaceful solution. Consequently, the decision whether or not to
intervene militarily must be based on the verified conviction that all
peaceful means have been tested and exhausted.
(3) In cases of particularly serious humanitarian situations, there is
an obligation to intervene. Under certain conditions, states have a
right to intervene; however, is there also an obligation to intervene on
some occasions? The question imposes itself in the face of the appalling
genocides that the world has witnessed in the last century: for instance
in Germany, Cambodia and Rwanda. Hence, governments have a moral
obligation to act if they can avert terrible massacres.
(4) Specific intervention to rescue nationals is allowed under
certain conditions. A sufficient number of precedents (French
intervention in Shaba, May 1978; Israeli intervention in Entebbe,
Uganda, in 1976; Belgian and French intervention in Kinshasa,
September 1991; British intervention in Sierra Leone, May 2000) show
that international society deems it acceptable to rescue nationals in
serious danger in other countries, when the government in those
countries have neither the will nor the means to protect them.
b.
How should an intervention be realised? Military force is the last
resort to manage a crisis with unbearable humanitarian consequences. The
coercive measures must accordingly be directed towards the objective of
averting the humanitarian catastrophe, and not towards a different end.
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Acceptable military intervention must be confined strictly to the forceful actions
that are necessary to attain the humanitarian purpose.
c.
Who may intervene? These are summarised as follows:
(1)
Any state having the appropriate means may intervene to
stop a humanitarian catastrophe. If a humanitarian catastrophe that
puts at risk international peace and security is actually occurring, and
the Security Council fails to act, any state that is in a position to avert it
and has the right means is entitled to act.
(2)
The correctness of a given intervention is in direct
proportion to the number of states that undertake it, and to their
democratic character. Whilst any state or international organisation
with the right means may launch a legitimate intervention, provided the
necessary conditions are met, it is obvious that the numbers of states
that decide carry out, and support a military intervention is a crucial
aspect of the general acceptability of that intervention. It is clear that
collective intervention that is authorised by the UN Security Council is
backed by all UN members, according to the UN Charter.
d.
The Primary Responsibility of the UN Security Council. State-led
intervention is possible only when the Security Council is unable to act but
there is support from the International Community. The UN Charter states
clearly that member states confer on the Security Council’s primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. States
can only use armed force, according to the Charter, in self defence and to
carry out enforcement measures decided by the Security Council. However,
states have also helped to maintain international peace and security when the
Security Council was unable to act, particularly in cases of legitimate military
interventions for the sake of humanity.
4295. Introduction to Internal Security. The primary role of the Malaysian Army is
to protect and defend the sovereignty and national interests from any threats.
Despite this, the internal security of the nation is indivisible with the defence against
external threats. Malaysia has all the elements which could incite internal security
situations, a precursor to external threat or as a means unto itself. As such, it is
imperative that the Malaysian Army assists the government in ensuring internal
security in order to protect our boundaries against external threats. As internal
security is considered a secondary task of the MAF, it may not be deployed
specifically to undertake one form of operation (unless related to Public Order,
Counter Insurgency, Anti Terrorists and Protection of KP and VP). As such, the
conduct of these operations will be synchronised in the Operation Orders to include
a number of activities related to these various operations.
a.
CONCEPT. The concept of internal security would centre on the
maintenance and restoration of law and order in support of an established
government. This is undertaken by the Army through close cooperation and
liaison with other government agencies and NGO.
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b.
TYPES OF OPERATIONS. The types of operations that would entail
involvement of the Army in internal security are as follows:
(1)
Anti-Illegal Immigrant.
(2)
Anti-Smuggling.
(3)
Public Order.
(4)
Anti-Piracy.
(5)
Border Control.
(6)
KP/VP Protection.
c.
COMMAND AND CONTROL. In the conduct of operations under
internal security whether, led by the Army or otherwise, would be in
conjunction with the assistance provided to civil authorities. If possible, units
undertaking these operations should be under the control of their respective
superior headquarters. Only under certain circumstances (especially relating
to specialist) would personnel be put under the C2 of non-military
organisations. Coordination and liaison would be of paramount importance
and any aid provided must be within the capacity and capabilities of the Army.
LEGAL POWERS 251. The Army can only be deployed to undertake internal
security operations with the legal powers provided by the government. The
different operations will be covered by various legal statutes specific to the
nature and purpose of the operations. There are however, common legal
powers which are inherent in all these operations. These powers are as
follows:
(1)
Penal Code.
(2)
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) (FMS CAP 6).
(3)
National Registration Act 1990. Section 7.
(4)
Protected Area Protected Places Act 1959 (PAPPA).
d.
Notwithstanding the above laws, additional powers could be given to
the MAF in accordance to the operations that are conducted. These laws
would be mentioned in the subsequent sections
4296. Introduction to Counter Terrorism. Like any war or operation, the response
against terrorism requires a strategy that sets priorities and focuses at what ever
available resources such as time, money, political ability and military power as the
main effort in ensuring the sustaining power of a country to stay in fight with the
threat. Since terrorism is a political act, it must be met with an integrated political
response. The history of counter-terrorism demonstrates, however, that uneven or
non-dimensional responses to terrorist groups such as using only law enforcement
techniques or only military force, virtually always fail in the long run. Based on this
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backdrop, the Majlis Keselamatan Negara (MKN) produced Directive No. 18
(Pengurusan dan Pengendalian Krisis Keganasan) specifically dealing with terrorism
crisis management with the aim to establish management mechanisms with the
purpose of determining the roles and responsibilities of various agencies involved in
handling international terrorism, including other threats to the Malaysian citizens or
Malaysia’s interest abroad.
4297. Definition. Terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use or threat of force or
violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies,
often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives”. A terrorist's activities do
not conform to rules or laws of warfare. Methods used include hostage taking,
hijacking, sabotage, assassination, arson, hoaxes, bombings, raids, seizures, use of
NBC weapons and so on. Victims are often non-combatants, symbolic persons and
places and political/military figures. Often the victims have no role in either causing
or correcting a terrorist's grievance.
4298. CATEGORIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS. A terrorist group's choice of
targets and tactics is also a function of the group's government affiliation. They are
categorised by government affiliation. This helps security planners foresee terrorist
targets, and his sophisticated intelligence and weaponry. Terrorist groups are divided
into three categories:
a. Non-state Sponsored. A terrorist group that operates autonomously,
receiving no support from any government.
b. State Sponsored. A terrorist group that operates alone but receives support
from one or more governments.
c. State Directed. A terrorist group that operates as an agent of a government,
receiving substantial intelligence, logistics and operational support.
4299. TERRORIST OBJECTIVES. The immediate objective of any terrorist attack
normally complies with one or more categories. The goals may be either immediate
or long-range. Terrorists demonstrate group power, demand revenge, obtain logistics
support and cause a government to overreact. They are recognised by coercion,
intimidation and provocation. Their goals are summarised as follows:
a.
Immediate Goals. These are as follows:
(1)
Obtain worldwide, national or local recognition for their cause.
(2)
Force government reaction, overreaction and repression leading
to immediate public dissension.
(3)
Harass, weaken or embarrass government, military or other
security forces.
(4)
Obtain money or equipment.
(5)
Show a government's inability to protect its citizens.
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(6)
Disrupt or destroy primary means of mobility or communications.
(7)
Demonstrate power or threat credibility.
(8)
Prevent or delay decisions or legislation.
(9)
Cause strikes or work slowdowns.
(10)
Discourage impending foreign
government assistance programs.
(11)
Free prisoners.
(12)
b.
investments
or
foreign
Seek vengeance.
Long Term Goals. These are as follows:
(1)
Cause dramatic changes in government such as revolution, civil
war or war between nations.
(2)
Disrupt and discredit an established infrastructure in support of
an insurgency.
(3)
Influence local, national or international policy decision making.
(4)
Gain political recognition as the legal body representing an
ethnic or national group.
4300. TERRORIST TARGETS. Anyone or anything can be a target or victim of a
terrorist act. A military organisation represents a source of arms and material as well
as a political or national body to the terrorists. This places the military at great risk.
The list below contains some possible military targets to the terrorists and it provides
some areas of concern. Targets may change as security increased.
a.
Sensitive night vision and communication items.
b.
Arms depots.
c.
Ammunition depots.
d.
Command and control facilities.
e.
Explosives storage.
f.
Military officer training facilities.
g.
Areas catering to personal needs (mess halls, barracks, religious
activities, community centre).
h.
Hydroelectric plants, dams, gas pipelines, nuclear facility sites.
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i.
Communication lines or facilities, computer facilities.
j.
Chemical storage sites.
k.
Equipment warehouses.
l.
Transportation centre parking lots, airports, railheads, bus depots, rail
lines and shipyards.
m.
Members of military force and their dependents.
n.
Key military leaders.
o.
Post offices and mail truck.
SECTION 4
EXECUTION OF HUMAN AID DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) OPERATION
4301. Level of Disaster Management. Based on NSC Directive No. 20, disaster
management is dealt with the respective level of occurrence as follows:
a.
Level 1 Disaster. A local occurrence that could be contained and is
unlikely to spread. It is not too complex and may only involve a small number
of lives and properties. The disaster did not endanger the activities of the
immediate area. The legal authorities in the district manage to handle the
disaster with the local bodies, without or with minimum aid from agencies
outside the district.
b.
Level 2 Disaster. A more serious occurrence involving more areas or
two districts and potentially spreading to other areas. The situation may
involve more lives and properties. The situation may also destroy more
infrastructures and jeopardising the locals’ activities. It is more complex than
Level 1 Disaster and harder in dealing with the search and rescue aspects.
State Authorities have to deal without or with limited aid from outside agencies.
c.
Level 3 Disaster. This level of disaster is an escalation of Level 2, and
more complex to deal with or involving more areas or more than two states.
The Central Authority is to coordinate the operation with or without foreign aid.
d.
The level of disaster is assessed by the authorities in
Districts/State/Central Government, to determine whether the local authority
would be sufficient to handle the problem or should the higher authority take
over
4302. Operational Environment.
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a.
Humanitarian Emergencies and Disasters. Disasters are a regular
part of global life, whether caused by acts of nature or acts of man. These
incidents become humanitarian emergencies when their effects impact on a
society or population whose inherent resources are insufficient to absorb the
impact and deal with the incident’s consequences. Many humanitarian
emergencies and disasters are prolonged. Their effects can be mitigated by
international aid and development programmed designed to address the
immediate needs of a stricken population and to build capacity enabling local
society to better cope with humanitarian emergency and disaster situations.
b.
Sudden Onset Disasters. Incidents can occur that have a relatively
sharply
defined start, pose an acute, generalised threat to life,
livelihoods, or basic societal well-being and overwhelm local capacity to deal
with the effects. These types of humanitarian emergency and disaster are
termed Sudden Onset Disasters.
c.
Military Involvement. The engagement of the Army in HADR
operations will normally be based on the necessity for speed of reaction,
including proximity of suitable resources to the disaster area, the scale of effort
required or specialist skills to deal with the consequences of a humanitarian
emergency and disaster. The Army will therefore normally be engaged in
response to natural and sudden onset disasters on the instructions and
coordination through the NSD.
d.
Unpredictability. Each HADR operation will take place in a unique and
unpredictable environment. Most HADR operations will normally be
undertaken in a dysfunctional environment with varying degrees of chaos.
There will be a mismatch between necessary resources and situational needs,
creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. The government of a
stricken state may well be overwhelmed by the effects of the humanitarian
emergency and disaster, and paralysed by the scale of the necessary
response.
e.
Responsibility. Notwithstanding the above, the overall responsibility
for all relief actions rests with the stricken state. The Army may undertake a
HADR operation to support the relief effort, either bilaterally or as part of a
wider international effort as directed by Cabinet Committee on the
recommendation of Wisma Putra following an appeal for assistance.
f.
Permissive Environment. Given that HADR operations are conducted
at the request of a stricken state, albeit through Wisma Putra, they will
normally be conducted in a permissive environment. Security issues, including
policing functions, remain the responsibility of the stricken state. However,
depending on the internal security situation and taking account of any local
tensions and the functionality of the state security system, there may be a
requirement to provide sufficient local security for essential asset protection.
g.
Coordination Requirement. National bodies and recognised
international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), International
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Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), NGOs and a
host of donor organisations, are likely to be involved in international relief
efforts to mitigate the effects of humanitarian emergencies and disasters.
Close and early coordination by civil and military authorities, both locally and
internationally, is highly desirable, though there will often be sensitivities
involved and every effort should be made to conduct, wherever possible,
integrated planning. Coordination on the ground will depend on the experience
and capability of the affected country. Notwithstanding this, the pattern of
operations is likely to be influenced significantly by the lead responding
agency.
4303. Characteristics of HADR Operations. The characteristics of HADR
operations are summarised as follows:
a.
Civil/Humanitarian Lead. The provision of humanitarian and disaster
relief is primarily the domain of civilian agencies. When undertaken, HADR
operations will generally be conducted to complement the relief efforts of the
stricken state or supporting international community, under the direction of
NSD as the ‘employing agency’. The Army will thus provide specific support
to particular requirements in response to an acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’
between the humanitarian emergency or disaster needs and relief community
resources available to meet them. Most HADR operation will therefore
normally be limited in both scope and duration.
b.
NSD/Army Approaches. The successful conduct of a HADR operation
requires the NSD and Army to work as a team to achieve the desired results in
an appropriate and timely manner. Both Departments must recognise the
requirements and needs of the other and should wherever possible take them
into account when planning and decision making. The NSD will utilise military
assets when the scale and timeliness of the assistance needed by vulnerable
populations cannot be met by civilian resources alone. Given that all military
assets work within particular readiness criteria, it is important that the NSD
provides the Army with as much advance warning as possible through the
Defence Operation Centre (DOC), even if the use of military assets is only
anticipated. However, the early engagement of military assets needs to be
considered against the potential raising of expectations, both national and
international, which may then necessitate the employment of military assets
when their use may otherwise have been unnecessary.
c.
Constraints. Malaysia’s participation in HADR operations will always
be subject to political, legal and economic constraints, including the availability
of appropriate assets and most importantly the needs of the stricken state.
These constraints may be influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the level
of national interest at stake and the expectations of the public at large.The
Government will decide the scale of Army involvement to a HADR operation
and the constraints imposed upon them.
d.
Media. Media interest in humanitarian emergency or disaster situations
may well be considerable, particularly during the initial emergency phase and
may well have induced military involvement. The media will have the ability to
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make uncensored live global broadcasts from the area of operations. There is
therefore the risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken society and
the general public, both at home and abroad, may receive direct and raw
information upon which inappropriate perceptions may be based and
unrealistic expectations raised.
4304. Types of Disaster. Disasters are termed natural if caused by uncontrollable
forces of nature; and man made if brought about by human interference. There is
however, no operational significance in the distinction and the same processes
would normally be applied to both disaster types. Disasters can be divided into two
basic categories as follows:
a.
Natural. These can be split further into two categories as follows:
(1)
Geological. Comprises of earthquakes, tsunamis (tidal waves),
volcanoes and landslides.
(2)
Climatic. Comprises of tropical cyclones, floods, droughts and
wild fires.
b.
Man Made. Chemical, industrial or major transport accidents and
environmental incidents.
4305. Assistance from the Army. As a guide, assistance from the Army may be
summarised as follows:
a.
Providing a workforce.
b.
Providing limited transportation.
c.
Providing equipment that is relevant for the tasks.
d.
Preparing specialists such as explosive specialists and engineers when
required.
e.
Provide assistance in construction of buildings when required.
f.
Providing divers’ assistance.
g.
Conducting SAR mission depending on the requirements.
h.
Providing air ambulance for emergencies and transporting people.
i.
Providing Liaison Officers and communications at all levels.
j.
Providing first hand support when the troop is the first to arrive at the
scene until the arrival of the official group.
k.
Providing medical support.
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l.
Providing assistance in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
Explosive (CBRNE).
m.
Providing other assistance or support deem necessary by the
appropriate military commander upon request.
4306. Command and Control. The C2 of the troops will remain within the military
chain of command. However, troops that are engaged in HADR operations should
take direction and guidance from the coordinating agency. In order to ensure that
disaster management can be implemented in an orderly, coordinated and effective
manner, two levels of C2 shall be established namely the On Scene Command Post
(OSCP) and the Disaster Operations Control Centre (DOCC). These are
summarised as follows:
a.
On Scene Command Post (OSCP).
(1)
As soon as the incident is decided as a disaster and requires
multiple integrated actions from various agencies, an OSCP is set up.
The responsibility to set up the OSCP is given to the District Police
(OCPD) who is also responsible to appoint officers and personnel of the
RMP and other agencies through their respective representatives, to
carry out disaster operations at the OSCP.
(2)
The RMP has to provide complete communication equipment to
be used during the operations. A communication network shall be
established between the OSCP and the DOCC according to the level of
disaster that occurs. The RMP has to also provide adequate number of
personnel on duty at the DOCC, to manage the communication system
and to record all information on the involvement of agencies as well as
the search and rescue operations.
(3)
The Commander of Disaster Operation at the scene of incident
is responsible to assess, manage and coordinate all search and rescue
efforts at the scene.
(4)
In the case of disaster caused by fire outbreak or Hazardous
Materials (HAZMAT), the Fire and Rescue Department is the main
agency for handling the disaster concerned. However, the OCPD or
CPO of the State concerned is still responsible as the Commander of
Disaster Operations at the scene of incident, to coordinate the
involvement of other agencies.
(5)
In CBRNE mishap, the Atomic Energy Licensing Board shall act
as the Main Technical Agency in handling the disaster.
(6)
All agencies involved in managing the disaster at the scene of
incident are required to report to the OSCP before executing their
duties.
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(7)
Agencies involved in managing the disaster are required to field
their representatives at OSCP to help the Commander of Disaster
Operations to smoothly coordinate the agencies’ duties and
responsibilities.
(8)
DOC.
b.
Military involvement will be notified by RMP or NSC through
Disaster Operations Control Centre (DOCC).
(1)
At the same time, the DOCC has to be set up according to the
level of disaster management concerned, namely at the District Office,
State NSD Operation Room or at NSD Operation Room. The Disaster
Management and Relief Committee (DMRC) concern shall meet at the
DOCC to monitor the development and ensure efforts in handling the
disaster, search and rescue operations, and emergency assistance are
effectively and smoothly implemented.
(2)
The DOCC is required to have a complete communication
equipment to connect it to the OSCP and other participating agencies
control centres, to report development to the Higher Authority and to
issue the necessary instructions in handling the disaster that has
occurred.
(3)
The representatives from MAF and Army HQ shall assigned an
appropriate level officer at the DOCC as liaison officers to coordinate
and channel necessary information and appropriate actions to be taken
based on the decision made by the DMRC.
4307. Planning and Execution. The involvement of the Army in foreign countries
will be coordinated by Operations and Training Branch (OPLAT ) through MAF HQ.
OPLAT will issue the directive/operation orders after receiving strategic guidance
from the Chief of Army. Following are the specific steps that require special
emphasis for HADR operations in a foreign country:
a.
Situation Assessment. A good assessment of the current situation is
essential to planning. Relevant information should be gathered with close
communication with Wisma Putra and NSC. The following factors should be
considered in the assessment:
(1)
Nature and the cause of disaster.
(2)
Other civilian and military organisations involved in the
operation.
(3)
Current situation and environment.
(4)
Any threat to foreign military and on the operations.
(5)
Other assessment factors which will influence the operations.
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b.
Force Structure. The force structure deployed for the operation should
be able to integrate with the incident’s coalition or combined task force (CTF)
structure. It must provide the means to coordinate and communicate with the
numerous organisations involved in the overall effort. Personnel trained in
political and military science are valuable in establishing necessary liaison
with the host nation authority and diplomatic community. Moreover,
multifunctional logistics and security assistance skilled personnel should be
employed within the structure to assist in the logistics based humanitarian
operations.
c.
Concept of the Operations (CONOP). The concept of operations
should be developed based on the nature of humanitarian support and mission
desired end-state. A typical HADR operation shall have the following as the
phases of operations:
(1)
Phase 1 - Preparation and deployment.
(2)
Phase 2 - Move to respective AO.
(3)
Phase 3 - Humanitarian and disaster relief operations:
(a)
SAR with emergency medical support.
(b)
Provision of transportation and security support for
distribution of relief supplies.
(c)
Assist in returning displaced persons to places of
residence.
(4)
Phase 4 - Post-crisis Transition (turnover operation to civilian
authorities).
(5)
Phase 5 - Redeployment.
d.
Legal Considerations. Many aspects of HADR operations in foreign
countries with military involvement have legal implications. Key planning and
operations staffs with the assistance of legal advisors should construct and
review the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Rules of Engagement (ROE),
and Operation Plan (OPLAN). Significant and complex legal issues that
surround HADR operation make it important that the troops understand
international and domestic legal principles associated with the mission.
e.
Liaison. Direct and early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief
agencies is a valuable source of accurate and timely information on many
aspects of the crisis area. It is an opportunity to build working relationship
based on trust and open communications among all organisations. Thus, it is
important to have liaison officers who are able to speak and write in other
languages especially when dealing with other agencies including the host
nation.
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f.
Medical Support. Health protection is a high priority for HADR
operation. Food, water, blood product, high level of industrial pollution and
indigenous diseases combined to provide a high risk environment for all
assigned personnel. Exposure to civilian population potentially carrying
endemic diseases as well as diseases outbreak resulting from a natural
disaster are all factors increasing the Disease or Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) risk.
Thus, they require a robust preventive medicine capabilities to perform
medical and environment health risk assessment and identify effective
preventive medicine measures to counter the threat.
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Company Commander’s Wing, PULADA
UNCLASSIFIED
TEAM MEMBERS OF THE MAKING A GUIDE TO INFANTRY RIFLE
COMPANY COMMANDER BOOK
Ser
Name
Remarks
1.
Mej Norshahidin bin Long
Leader
2.
Maj John Paul Waskiw
3.
Kapt Ridzwan Hafidz Bin Hayazi
Member
4.
Kapt Muhammad Ferdaus bin Zulkifli
Member
5.
Kapt Muhammad Faiz bin Hashim
Member
6.
Kapt Zulkarnain bin Mahadi
Member
7.
Kapt Mohamad Hisyam bin Mohd Nor
Member
8.
Kapt Mohd Noor Hafiz bin Mohamed Rashid
Member
9.
Kapt Nasyrul Izzuan bin Jamaluddin
Member
10.
Kapt Mohd Fitri bin Zamri
Member
11.
Kapt Muhammad Hafiz bin Zolkepli
Member
12.
Kapt Mohammad Noor Nazrin bin Mohd Norzri
Member
Proof Reader
UNCLASSIFIED