Two Visions of Democracy Political Science and Comparative Politics Luca Bellodi 14 September 2022 Bocconi, DONDENA Center 1 From you laptop or smartphone go to www.menti.com 2 Today’s Lecture Two Visions of Democracy Implications for Representation and Accountability From Visions to Reality 3 Previous Episodes Politics: Process of reaching and executing authoritative collective decisions Political Regimes: Set of institutions and organizations that regulate ↑ Democracy: Political regime that favours contestation and inclusion • Citizens should influence policy decisions 4 Previous Episodes Politics: Process of reaching and executing authoritative collective decisions Political Regimes: Set of institutions and organizations that regulate ↑ Democracy: Political regime that favours contestation and inclusion • Citizens should influence policy decisions How is this translated into practice and institutions? Institutions: Rules of th game, both formal (constitution) and informal (practices, norms) 4 Previous Episodes Politics: Process of reaching and executing authoritative collective decisions Political Regimes: Set of institutions and organizations that regulate ↑ Democracy: Political regime that favours contestation and inclusion • Citizens should influence policy decisions How is this translated into practice and institutions? Institutions: Rules of th game, both formal (constitution) and informal (practices, norms) Institutional designers face several trade-offs: power disperse or concentrated 4 Two Visions of Democracy Two Visions of Democracy Two alternative views about how democracy should work 5 Two Visions of Democracy Two alternative views about how democracy should work 1. Majoritarian Democracy: power concentrated, the majority governs 2. Consensus Democracy: power dispersed, decision-making is a mirror of society, decisions are made through bargaining 5 Two Visions of Democracy Two alternative views about how democracy should work 1. Majoritarian Democracy: power concentrated, the majority governs 2. Consensus Democracy: power dispersed, decision-making is a mirror of society, decisions are made through bargaining Closely related to (but not the same as) families of electoral systems Better to think about them in a more abstract way, then move to concrete implementation 5 Two Visions of Democracy Two alternative views about how democracy should work 1. Majoritarian Democracy: power concentrated, the majority governs 2. Consensus Democracy: power dispersed, decision-making is a mirror of society, decisions are made through bargaining Closely related to (but not the same as) families of electoral systems Better to think about them in a more abstract way, then move to concrete implementation Why shall we care? 5 Two Visions of Democracy Two alternative views about how democracy should work 1. Majoritarian Democracy: power concentrated, the majority governs 2. Consensus Democracy: power dispersed, decision-making is a mirror of society, decisions are made through bargaining Closely related to (but not the same as) families of electoral systems Better to think about them in a more abstract way, then move to concrete implementation Why shall we care? • Because they have important implications for representation, decision-making, party competition, public policies, political conflict, and the economy 5 Starting Point: Two Different Ideas of Representation Democratic regimes involve a certain degree of representation - Voters elect representatives who decide on their behalf • Delegate Model of Representation • Clear mandate • Clear roles • Easy to monitor • Trustee Model of Representation • Open mandate • Benevolent ideal of policy-making • Policy-makers decide ex-post optimal policies 6 Majoritarian Democracy Decisions/Policies should be determined by the majority Voters → Majority → Decision 7 Majoritarian Democracy Decisions/Policies should be determined by the majority Voters → Majority → Decision • • • • Party with plurality of votes controls the government Create strong, single-party majority governments Unconstrained in the policy-making process It’s an ideal type: institutional designers should be motivated by these features. Note: plurality is relative majority, different from absolute majority (50% + 1) 7 Majoritarian Democracy Decisions/Policies should be determined by the majority Voters → Majority → Decision • • • • Party with plurality of votes controls the government Create strong, single-party majority governments Unconstrained in the policy-making process It’s an ideal type: institutional designers should be motivated by these features. Note: plurality is relative majority, different from absolute majority (50% + 1) Elections as competition between “teams,” the team preferred by a majority gets a “mandate” 7 Consensus Democracy Decisions/Policies should be the result of a bargaining between representatives from a wide range of groups Voters → Several Parties in Government → Bargaining → Decision/Compromise → Review 8 Consensus Democracy Decisions/Policies should be the result of a bargaining between representatives from a wide range of groups Voters → Several Parties in Government → Bargaining → Decision/Compromise → Review • Government should mirror the preferences and interests of society • Should reflect the opinions of all citizens • Decisions are made through bargaining, which leads to policies that are in line with citizens’ preferences • Strong “checks and balances” 8 Consensus Democracy Decisions/Policies should be the result of a bargaining between representatives from a wide range of groups Voters → Several Parties in Government → Bargaining → Decision/Compromise → Review • Government should mirror the preferences and interests of society • Should reflect the opinions of all citizens • Decisions are made through bargaining, which leads to policies that are in line with citizens’ preferences • Strong “checks and balances” Elections are still a competition between “teams,” although now teams will form a coalition government that bargains over policy decisions 8 Proportionate Influence and “Consensus” Slightly different concepts: • “Consensus” view of democracy is a broad concept, ideal type which aims to disperse power • To ensure that, each fraction of society should have proportionate influence over decision-making • Decisions will ultimately require joint agreement of different groups/parties 9 Implications for Representation and Accountability Political Representation • Substantive Representation: Representatives take actions in line with the ideological interests of those they represent → Congruence 10 Political Representation • Substantive Representation: Representatives take actions in line with the ideological interests of those they represent → Congruence • Descriptive Representation: Representatives resemble their constituents 10 Political Representation • Substantive Representation: Representatives take actions in line with the ideological interests of those they represent → Congruence • Descriptive Representation: Representatives resemble their constituents Substantive R may seem more valuable, but can it be achieved without Descriptive R? E.g., gender quotas and female representation. 10 Congruence “A democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do” — Dahl, 1989 Democracy (is good because it) induces congruence between citizens’ preferences, policy-makers, and policies 11 Congruence in Practice Ideological distance between position of the policy-makers/policy and that of the median voter. • • • • • • Assume left-right spectrum [0 = extreme-left, 10= extreme-right] Voters and policy-makers self-place themselves along the spectrum Order voters based on their self-placement Median is the voter which splits the group into two equal-size parts If median is different from mean, majority always prefers the former Congruence is distance between two “ideal points” 12 Congruence in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracy Empirical evidence shows that consensus democracy induces more congruence Majority control systems run risk of “leapfrogging representation” (thin advantage ensures majority rules) 13 Congruence in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracy Empirical evidence shows that consensus democracy induces more congruence Majority control systems run risk of “leapfrogging representation” (thin advantage ensures majority rules) We now look at two “versions” of congruence, between voters and • policies (decision) • policy-makers (those in charge of deciding) 13 Example: Abortion ANES Data, 2020 Other Always permitted Permitted but after need clearly established Only in case of rape, incest,woman's life is in danger Should never be permitted 0% 10% 20% 30% % Respondents 40% 50% 14 Presidential Candidates’ Position (as perceived by voters) Respondents asked Where would you place [candidate] on abortion? Biden Trump Always permitted Permitted but after need clearly established Only in case of rape, incest,woman's life is in danger Should never be permitted 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 0% % Respondents 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 15 Presidential Candidates’ Median Position (as perceived by voters) Respondents asked Where would you place [candidate] on abortion? Biden Trump Always permitted Permitted but after need clearly established Only in case of rape, incest,woman's life is in danger Should never be permitted 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 0% % Respondents 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 16 Congruence and Policies In the majoritarian vision of democracy, republican majorities will pass pro-life policies and democratic majorities will pass pro-choice policies. • ↑ policy change • What about the 45% of voters who disagree? 17 Congruence and Policies In the majoritarian vision of democracy, republican majorities will pass pro-life policies and democratic majorities will pass pro-choice policies. • ↑ policy change • What about the 45% of voters who disagree? In the consensus vision of democracy, policy-makers representing different opinions in society should reach a consensus and agree on a policy that takes into account the different groups in society. • ↓ policy change • Policy decision through bargaining based on who forms the government 17 Congruence and Government – Coalition Bargaininig Netherlands 2017 election 14 D66 7 SP CDA PVV GL PvdA PvdD 50PLUS DENK CU SGP FvD 0 Seat Share 21 VVD Left Right Ideology 18 Congruence and Government – Coalition Bargaininig Netherlands 2017 election 14 CDA 7 D66 CU 0 Seat Share 21 VVD Left Right Ideology 19 2017 Dutch Elections Different political forces participate in government and policy-making. 20 2017 Dutch Elections Different political forces participate in government and policy-making. On 26 October the new cabinet was formally installed, 225 days after the elections, setting a record for the longest cabinet formation in history. 20 Congruence and Government – “Winner Takes All” US 2016 election Republicans 33 16 0 Seat Share 49 Democrats Left Right Ideology 21 Congruence and Government – “Winner Takes All” US 2016 election Republicans 33 16 0 Seat Share 49 Democrats Left Right Ideology 22 Republican party wins elections and control Presidency, House, and Senate. 23 Republican party wins elections and control Presidency, House, and Senate. … although Donald Trump lost the popular vote by 2.87 million votes. 23 Congruence and Government Across Models of Democracy Italy Netherlands United Kingdom 0.75 0.50 0.25 2020 2000 1980 1960 2020 2000 1980 1960 2020 2000 1980 0.00 1960 % of Cabinet Posts 1.00 Year Ideology Center Left Right 24 2020 2000 Netherlands 1980 1960 2020 2000 Italy 1980 1960 2020 2000 1980 1960 Share of Seats and Votes Parties Classified as Social Democratic Congruence and Government – Votes-Seats Conversion United Kingdom 60 40 Seats 20 Votes 0 Year 25 Disproportionality Index The Disproportionality Index measures an electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes received and seats allotted in a legislature (Gallagher 1991) 1 π Disproportionality Index = √ ∑(π£π − π π )2 2 π=1 where π£π is the share of votes for party π, π π is the share of seats for party π and π the number of parties Remember that measurement is important! If you cannot measure it, you cannot compare 26 Disproportionality Index: Example Party 1 2 3 Votes (%) Seats (%) (π£π − π π )2 40 35 25 55 25 20 225 100 25 350 350/2 = 175 Disproportionality Index = √ 175 = 13 27 Disproportionality Index In Practice Disproportionality Index 20 15 Country Italy 10 Netherlands United Kingdom 5 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year 28 Congruence – Summary Congruence can be interpreted as the distance between the preferences of voters and policy-makers and/or policies • In MD: policy-makers and policy represent the plurality of voters • In CD: policy-makers and policy represent the different opinions and groups of society 29 Descriptive Representation Who governs? • Experiences of different groups (e.g., minorities) can improve substantive representation (ideological congruence) • Female issues better understood and promoted by women • Role model 30 Descriptive Representation Who governs? • Experiences of different groups (e.g., minorities) can improve substantive representation (ideological congruence) • Female issues better understood and promoted by women • Role model • Risk of essentialism: reducing a group to a set of identical individuals • Intersectionality: combining different groups (e.g., gender with race: women of colour, white women) • They advocate for a more ο¬ne-grained approach to descriptive representation 30 Women’s Descriptive Representation Evidence: It’s unclear whether MD or CD is better at favouring descriptive representation. • Proportional electoral systems (CD) favours women’s representation (McAllister and Studlar 2002) In particular: • District magnitude (how many MPs are elected in each district) • If more MPs are elected, parties have more incentives to nominate female candidates, traditionally less represented in politics • Closed list (voters cast ballot for party and lists of candidates set by party leaders) • Voters are biased against women, so if parties can decide who makes it to the list, women more likely to be elected 31 Women Descriptive Representation Data from Comparative Political Dataset (1960-2020) Share of Women in Parliament 50 40 30 20 10 0 −2 −1 0 1 2 Consensus Democracy Index (Larger values, power more dispersed) 32 Accountability Democracy gives citizens ability to reward and punish politicians • When election comes • re-elect if approve • vote for challenger if disapprove • Knowing expected reaction, incumbent has more incentives to perform well • exert “effort” • turn down (inefο¬cient) offers by special interests • avoid corruption 33 Accountability in MD and CD • Accountability higher when small change in support lead to complete loss of power • Majority control systems have an advantage: small changes → defeat • Because majoritarian democracy has a clear link voters → policy-makers → policies, easier for voters to attribute blame and credit for policy outcomes • This is harder for coalition governments 34 Clarity of Responsibility In order to reward/punish, need to know who decides Systems vary in terms of clarity of responsibility • Empirical evidence shows that • more c.o.r. → more punishment for poor economic performance • more c.o.r. → less corruption In general, majority control systems have higher c.o.r. than proportionate influence systems (by construction) 35 From Visions to Reality Institutions Institution Majoritarian Consensus Electoral System Party System Government Type Federalism Bicameralism FPTP Two-party Single-party majority Unitary State Unicameral PR Many parties Coalition Federal Bicameral Constitutionalism Regime Type Legislative supremacy Parliamentary Constitution Presidential 36 Institutional Choices are not Random Institutional mixes are not chosen by chance Strong interdependence between institutional features: • FPTP system tends to favour 2-party systems • Which are both associated with single-party majority government • Federalism (the decentralization of power to sub-national entities) tends to be associated with bicameralism, where one chamber represent the interests of the states • Constitutionalism makes sure that central government does not undermine decentralization 37 From Visions to Real Institutions • Alternative visions of democracy: different ideas about representation • Overarching principle: congruence (“doing what voters want”) • When voters’ preferences are highly heterogeneous, CD might be a better way to “institutionalize” conflict • Important take-home point: inherent tension (and trade-off) between proportionate influence and majority control 38 Dataset for Comparative Politics …there are many • The EUI has a nice list (link) • Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2020 (link) • World Bank Data (link) • ParlGov (link) 39
