^
.'X"
^T^
Tzu
S UN
ON THE
ART OF WA.R
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE
IN
THE WORLD
TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE WITH INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL NOTES
BY
LIONEL GILES,
M. A.
Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed
in the British
Museum.
LONDON
LUZAC
1910
& C.
Books
& MSS.
u
101
WO
$7119?
PRINTED BY
E.
J.
BBILL,
LEYDEN (Holland).
mp
In
tfie
fcrotger
jjopc tgat
a toorfe 2400 pearg old
map
pet contain
bp
fc$ong
iuottg con^fdetation
tge ^olbiet of to^Dap
tgi^ translation
i^ affectionateH'p Uebicated
\
CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
Sun Wu and
vii
his Book
The Text of Sun Tzu
The Commentators
Appreciations of Sun Tzu
xi
xxx
xxxiv
xlii
Apologies for war
xliii
Bibliography
I.
Chap.
II.
III.
1
Laying Plans
i
Waging War
9
Attack by Stratagem
17
26
IV. Tactical Dispositions
V. Energy
33
VI._Weak Points and Strong
42
VIL Manoeuvring
55
VIII. Variation of Tactics
71
IX,-Xhe Army on the March
80
100
Terrain
The Nine Situations
The Attack by Fire
"
XIII. The Use of Spies
CHINESE CONCORDANCE
INDEX
114
.
150
160
176
192
PREFACE
The seventh volume
of "Memoires concernant 1'histoire,
sciences,
arts, les mceurs, les usages, &c., des
1
Chinois"
is devoted to the Art of War,
and contains,
les
les
amongst other
treatises,
"Les Treize Articles de Sun-tse, "
from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph
Pere Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small
translated
Amiot.
reputation as a sinologue in his day, and the field of his
labours was certainly extensive.
But his so-called trans-
Sun Tzu, if placed side by side with the original,
seen at once to be little better than an imposture.
It
contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and
lation of
is
very
little
indeed of what he did.
Here
is
a
fair speci-
men, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5
De Vhabilete dans le gouvernement des Troupes. Sun-tse dit Ayez
:
:
noms de
tous les
Officiers
les
tant generaux que subalternes; inscrivez-les
dans un catalogue a part, avec la note des talents & de la capacite de
chacun d'eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque 1'occasion en sera venue.
Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez
commander soient persuades que votre principale attention est de les
Les troupes que vous ferez avancer centre
preserver de tout dommage.
1'ennemi doivent etre comme des pierres que vous lanceriez centre des
oeufs.
De vous a 1'ennemi il ne doit y avoir d'autre difference que celle
du
fort
du vuide au plein. Attaquez a decouvert, mais soyez
Voila en peu de mots en quoi consiste 1'habilete &
perfection meme du gouvernement des troupes.
au
foible,
vainqueur en secret.
toute la
Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderdevelopment in the study of Chinese literature, no
translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzu, although his work
was known to be highly valued in China as by far the
ful
1
Published
at
Paris in
1782.
PREFACE
vm
wa;
and best compendium of military science. It
translation
not until the year 1905 that the first English
at Tokyo
by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A., appeared
under the title "Sonshi" (the Japanese form of Sun Tzu).
oldest
that the translator's know
Unfortunately, it was evident
far too scanty to fit him to grappl(
ledge of Chinese was
He himsel
with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzu.
two Japanes<
acknowledges that without the aid of
translation would have beer
gentlemen "the accompanying
with thei
can
We
only wonder, then, that
impossible."
It is no
so excessively bad.
help it should have been
from which non<
merely a question of downright blunders,
were frequent
Omissions
can hope to be wholly exempt.
hard passages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Sucl
offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerate(
plainly
a simila
any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and
standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in trans
lations from Chinese.
in
From
blemishes of this nature, at
translation
the
present
of any inflated
free.
is
It
least,
I
believe tha
was not undertake!
my own
powers; but
could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a bette
fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate
I could
hardly fail to improve on the work of my predeces
sors.
Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised editioi
out
estimate
of
Capt. Calthrop's translation was published in London
this time, however, without any allusion to his Japanes
collaborators.
My first three chapters were then alread;
of
the
in
printer's
Calthrop
therein
hands, so that the criticisms of Capl
contained must be understood as refer
In the subsequent chapters
have of course transferred my attention to the secon>
edition.
This is on the whole an improvement on th
ring
to his earlier edition.
other,
1
A
Ho Lu
though there
still
remains much that cannot pas
rather distressing
Japanese flavour pervades the
masquerades
as
"Katsuryo,"
Wu
work throughout. Thus, Kir
and Yu'eh become "Go" and "Etsu," etc. etc,
PREFACE
Some
muster.
and lacunae
IX
of the grosser blunders have been rectified
up, but on the other hand a certain
filled
number of new mistakes appear.
of the introduction
is
The very
startlingly inaccurate;
first
and
sentence
later on,
made of "an army of Japanese commentators" on Sun Tzu (who are these, by the way?), not
mention
while
word
a
is
vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators,
nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a much more
who
is
infinitely more important "army."
few special features of the present volume may now
In the first place, the text has been cut up
be noticed.
numerous and
A
numbered paragraphs, both in order to facilitate crossand for the convenience of students generally.
The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen's edition
but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or
more of his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other
works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare
title by way of reference, and the task of research is apt
With a view
to be seriously hampered in consequence.
to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzu is concerned,
into
reference
;
have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese
characters, following in this the admirable example of
Legge, though an alphabetical arrangement has been
preferred to the distribution under radicals which he
I
adopted.
Classics"
the
Another feature borrowed from "The Chinese
the printing of text, translation and notes on
is
same page
to the Chinese
;
the notes, however, are inserted, according
method, immediately after the passages to
which they refer.
From the mass of native commentary
my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the
Chinese text here and there when
points
of literary
interest.
Though
it
seemed
to present
constituting in itself
an important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has hitherto been made directly accessible
by
1
A
translation.
notable exception
l
is
to
be found
in Biot's edition of the
Chou
Li.
PREFACE
X
say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off
as they were completed, the work has not
sheets
my
had the benefit of a final revision. On a review of the
I
may
of
whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms,
I
might have been inclined in a few instances to temper
Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, hownot
ever,
cry out if in return I am visited with
over
the knuckles.
more than a rap
Indeed, I have been
at some pains to put a sword into the hands of future
their asperity.
I
shall
opponents by scrupulously giving either text or reference
A scathing review, even from
for every passage translated.
critic who despises "mere transmust confess, be altogether unwelthe worst fate I shall have to dread
the pen of the Shanghai
lations,"
come.
is
would
not,
For, after
I
all,
that which befel the ingenious paradoxes of
The Vicar of Wakefield.
George
in
INTRODUCTION
SUN
Wu
AND
HIS BOOK.
Ssu-ma Ch'ien gives the following biography of Sun
*
Tzu: 1
-
Sun Tzu
War brought him
Wu. Ho Lu said to
of
Wu
was a native of the Cn'i
to the notice of
him:
I
f|fj
IS Ho
State.
Lu,
2
His Art
King of
1^
have carefully perused your 13 chapters.
submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?
Sun
You may.
Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to
women?
The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements
were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them
May
Tzu
I
replied:
two companies, and placed one of the King's favourite concubines
head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands,
and addressed them thus: I presume you know the difference between
front and back, right hand and left hand?
The girls replied: Yes. Sun Tzu went on: When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight
ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand.
When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When
I say "About turn," you must face right round towards the back.
Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus ex-plained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill.
Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the
Sun Tzu said If words of command are
girls only burst out laughing.
not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the
So he started drilling them again, and this time
general is to blame.
gave the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into
fits of
Sun Tzu said If words of command are not clear and
laughter.
into
at the
:
:
distinct, if orders are
But
not thoroughly understood, the general
is
to blame.
orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it
is the fault of their officers.
So saying, he ordered the leaders of the
two companies to be beheaded. Now the King of
was watching the
if his
Wu
1
2
Shih Chi, ch. 6s.
Also written
^
Rf|
Ho
LU.
He
reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.
INTRODUCTION
xn
and when he saw that his fascene from the top of a raised pavilion
to
be
about
were
executed, he was greatly alarmed
vourite concubines
sent down the following message: We are now quite satisand
;
hurriedly
our general's ability to handle troops. If We are bereft of these
two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savour. It is our
Sun Tzu replied: Having once
wish that they shall not be beheaded.
to
be
commission
received His Majesty's
general of his forces, there are
fied as to
His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am
Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and
in order as leaders in their place.
straightway installed the pair next
When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more
commands
certain
of
unable to accept.
;
went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to
the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with
Then
to utter a sound.
perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing
and the
girls
Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: Your soldiers, Sire, are
inproperly drilled and disciplined, and ready for Your Majesty's
now
They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire;
spection.
But
bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey.
the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As
Therefor us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops.
upon Sun Tzu said: The King is only fond of words, and cannot transAfter that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one
them into deeds.
who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general.
into Yin
In the West, he defeated the
GJi__State and forced his way
the capital; to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch'i and Chin,
and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu
late
shared in the might of the King.
About Sun Tzu himself
all that Ssu-ma Ch'ien
But he proceeds to give
a biography of his descendant, J$fr
Sun Pin, born about
Jj||
a hundred years after his famous ancestor's death, and
has to
this is
us in this chapter.
tell
The
outstanding military genius of his time.
historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his
preface
we read:
"Sun
Tzu
had
his
feet
-f- $f jjjj] ft) jfft _E| j
also
the
%
cut
off
and yet continued
seems
on him
after
invented
in
It
to
discuss
the
art of war."
l
was a nickname bestowed
mutilation, unless indeed the story was
order to account for the name. The
crowning
likely, then, that
"Pin"
his
incident of his career, the
crushing defeat of his treacherous
rival
will
P'ang Chuan,
1
be found
Shih Chi, ch. 130
briefly related
,
f.
6
r.
on
p. 40.
INTRODUCTION
XIII
Sun Tzu. He
two other passages of the Shih Chi: -
To
to the elder
return
In the third year
of his
^
reign [512 B.C.]
Ho
mentioned
is
Lu, King of
J| Wu
in
Wu, took
[i.e. f
Yiian] and fj g-g Po
-^
and
He
of
attacked
Ch'u.
town
Shu and slew
the
P'ei,
captured
the two prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu.
He was
the field with
Tzu-hsu
^
then meditating a descent on
Ying [the capital]; but the general
|$
Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted.
It is not yet possible.
We
2
must wait".
further
"in
ninth
successful
the
year
[After
fighting,]
[506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu addressed Wu Tzu-hsii and Sun Wu,
saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for us to
'
.
.
.
enter Ying.
Is
the
^
3
The two men
now?"
time ripe
"ChVs
replied:
general, -^
Tzu-ch'ang,
grasping and covetous, and the princes
of
and
Ts'ai
both
have a grudge against him. If Your
HI* T'ang
^^
has
resolved
to
make
a
Majesty
grand attack, you must win over T'ang
and Ts'ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice,
4
[beat Ch'u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying].
This
date at which anything is recorded
does not appear to have survived his
died from the effects of a wound in 496.
the
is
Sun Wu.
of
is
latest
He
patron, who
In the chapter
portion of
which M. Chavannes believes to be a fragment of a treatise
on Military Weapons), there occurs this passage 5
entitled
ffit
fj
(the
earlier
:
From
this
the other
Wang-tzu,
time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after
^~
:
7
in
Kao-fan,
;||J
the service
6
who was employed by the Chin
Wu, in the service
of Ch'i; and Sun
These men developed and threw
1
I
note
that
M. Chavannes
Sun Tzu's own book
is
light
translates
f& *^
VII
(see especially
upon the
24
"le
principles of
The
4
Shih Chi^ ch. 31,
5
Ibid. ch.
6
The
7
^
appellation of
25,
fol.
i
appellation of
-^
jjjjjj
^
^T
fol.
war
peuple est e"puise."
fol.
3
;
Wu.
(
m
But
26) the ordinary meaning of
"army," and this, I think, is more suitable here.
2 These words are
given also in Wu Tzu-hsii's biography, ch. 66,
3
State
of
in
^&
r.
Nang Wa.
6r.
r.
^&
Hu
Wang-tzii
Ch
;jfjfj
c
Yen, mentioned in
ch.
39 under
eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.
t^'
year 637.
INTRODUCTION
XIV
obvious that Ssu-ma Ch'ien at least had no doubt
is
It
Wu
as an historical personage
about the reality of Sun
noticed presently, he is by
to
be
and with one exception,
;
most important authority on the period
in question.
of such
much
to
be
not
It will
say
necessary, therefore,
Yiieh Cfcun Cfciu, which
a work as the
Chao Yeh of
written
been
have
to
is
by
far the
^^^^
Wu
supposed
ful
Jj|
;
attribution
fl||
somewhat doubt-
is
were otherwise, his account would be
value, based as it is on the Shih Chi and ex-
but even
of
The
century A.D.
I st
the
little
if it
panded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will
The only
be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2.
new points in it worth noting are: i) Sun Tzu was first
recommended
a
native of
and
life,
his
Ho Lu
to
Wu.
Wu
by
He
x
3)
Tzu-hsli.
2)
He
is
called
had previously lived a retired
contemporaries were unaware of his
2
ability.
following passage occurs in ^ fjf -^ Huai-nan Tzu
"When sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind,
The
impossible even for a
is
it
:
Assuming
work
that this
Sun Tzu
to encounter the foe."
3
genuine (and hitherto no doubt
is
upon it), we have here
Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu
has been cast
the earliest direct
died in 122 B.C.,
before
the
Shih
Chi
was
many years
given to the world.
Liu
UJ [S]
Hsiang (B.C. 80-9) in his %fr ff> says: "The
reason why Sun
at the head of 30,000 men beat
reference to
Wu
1
a
The mistake
is
natural
enough.
Native
work of the Han dynasty, which
says
"Ten
li
Kiangsu]
there
Wu
c
of
Ch
i,
outside
is
who
the
a great
Wu
gate
mound,
(ch. 2,
[of
the
raised to
fol.
city
3 v
of
of
^
commemorate
excelled in the art of
war, by the
M * ? 7 ft ft
to
refer
critics
my
the
^
edition)
^ft
:
!^
/g P^
Wu, now Soochow
the entertainment of
King of Wu."
,
in
Sun
XV
INTRODUCTION
Ch'u with 200,000
^
15
T eng
tft
pleted in
that the latter were undisciplined."
is
Ming-shih
his
in
34) informs us that the
1 1
R ^ |f ||
jft
surname
stowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by
(com-
was be-
Duke Ching
+
j|Sr
^
1
Sun Wu's father Sun }J| P'ing,
of Ch'i [547-490 B.C.].
himrose to be a Minister of State in Ch'i, and Sun
Wu
to Wu
on
whose style was J| j)|||J Ch'ang-ch'ing, fled
account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the
kindred of gj jj& T ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom
self,
c
the second,
named
According to
Ming, was the father of Sun
B|j
this
account,
Pin
then,
3
Pin.
was the grandson
Sun
Pin's victory over
Wu, which, considering
Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as
Whence these data were obchronologically impossible.
of
that
^
by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course
no reliance whatever can be placed in them.
An interesting document which has survived from the
tained
close of the Han period is the short preface written by
the great ]f
Wei
Ts'ao Ts'ao, or
Ti,
jf
tffr
for his edition of Sun Tzu.
I shall
it in full
give
H
^
Wu
:
have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advan3
The Lun Yii says "There must be a sufficiency of military
4
The Shu Ching mentions "the army" among the "eight
strength."
I
tage.
:
and
firmness
2
The Shih
3fa
.
-fjl
warrior
An
5
of government."
objects
is
I
The I Ching
Chi, on the other hand, says
may remark
H^
allusion to
^^
f r a
,
II.
XIL
,
'army'
indicates
5
7'
7th diagram
(
gjg
).
6
for
had
one who was a great
his feet cut
off.
,:
^^
!if Jnf
name jj
man wh
^|J J[/j[
~j\ "They
bows, and sharpened wood to make arrows.
keep the Empire in awe."
4
||jjj
:
in passing that the
just as suspicious as
,
jtjjj^
"
says:
justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune."
attached
The
to
strings
use
IS t? V
of
'
wood
to
bows and arrows
iv *
7>
make
is
to
INTRODUCTION
XVI
The Shih Ching
and
says
"The King
:
troops."
Wu Wang
majestic in his wrath, and he
the Completer
rose
The Yellow Emperor, T'ang
'
marshalled his
used spears and battle-axes in order to succour their
all
The Ssu-ma Fa says "If one man slay another of set purgeneration.
2
He who relies solely on
slain."
pose, he himself may rightfully be
warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful
3
measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch'ai on the one hand
and Yen Wang on the other. * In military matters, the Sage's rule is
normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion
He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. 5
requires.
:
Many books have
read on the subject of war and fighting; but the
is the profoundest of them all.
[Sun Tzu
I
work composed by Sun
Wu
name was Wu. He wrote
13
King of Wu. Its principles
on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He
was a native of the Ch'i
the
Art of
War
state, his
personal
Ho
chapters for
in
Lii,
were tested
an army westwards, crushed the Ch'u State and entered Ying the
In the north, he kept Ch'i and Chin in awe. A hundred years
capital.
and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu]. 6
led
In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity
in taking the field, 7 clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun
ch.
I
(
)
ad
5)
3
The son and successor of
^J jg|
4
his
Kou
i
of
|fj
^
preface:
f.
Lu.
He was
i z/
of the
finally defeated
passage
$^
J-
IS
and overthrown by
whom Sun
Hsing-yen says in
m^n&mmz.
I
See Shih
^
II,
^
gfc
^ B 0TJT5t A
* * tr * mn .1 * 4
the
See post.
j
TV, Skn, HU. ch. 90:
in
A % A $t
"His humanity brought him to destruction."
and M. Chavannes' note, Memoires
Historiques^ torn.
ffjj
c
,
The passage
text
ft ft
Hsu, a fabulous being, of
B & :fc ft 1= A # B
6
-
Chien, King of Yiieh, in 473 B.C.
King Yen
Chi^ ch. 5,
Ho
The
init.
-A -^ Jt
have put
*
k.
p. 8.
gj|
H
1*
B
*
in brackets is omitted in the T'-u
Shu, and may be
was known,
Shou-chieh of
however, to j*J|
|j} Chang
the T'ang
dynasty, and appears in the T ai P^ing Yu Lan.
7
Ts'ao Kung seems to be
thinking of the first part of chap. II, perhaps
an interpolation.
^
It
l
especially of
8.
INTRODUCTION
XVII
stands beyond the reach of carping criticism.
My contemporaries,
however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and
Tzfi
while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work abounds,
they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which has
me
led
to outline a
rough explanation of the whole.
*
One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit
statement that the 1 3 chapters were specially composed
for King Ho Lu.
This is supported by the internal
evidence
ruler
of
I.
15,
in
which
seems
it
In the bibliographical section of the
an entry which has given rise to
is
clear that
some
addressed.
is
^^-f-A + H ^^1^
Wu
Han
Shu,
much
3
there
discussion
:
"The works of Sun Tzu
82 p'ien (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 chuan."
It is evident that this cannot be
merely the 13 chapters
known to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, or those we possess to-day.
of
in
Chang Shou-chieh
in his
jjj
ff
g
j
J||
refers to
an edition
of Sun Tzu's -ft jj- of which the " 1 3 chapters" formed
the first chuan, adding that there were two other chuan
3
besides.
Tzii
^{j
-
^
-
This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk
82
of these
we
chapters consisted of other writings of Sun
should call them apocryphal
similar to the
Wen
Ta,
Nine Situations
and another
4
in
of which
is
Ho
a specimen
preserved
in
the
dealing with the
:J||
Shih's commentary.
J& T^ung Tien,
It
is
suggested
ft*
AA
A # # s # am &
at
3
The
-|j^
fc?
*
See chap.
XL
~7yT
-a
=^
A IB
A*z
mentions two editions of Sun Tzii in 3 chuan, namely
INTRODUCTION
xvm
Lu, Sun Tzu had only
a sort
written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed
between
answer
and
of execresis in the form of question
author of the
himself and the King.
jfj Pi I-hsiin,
||
this
backs
Sun Tzu Hsu Lu,
up with a
that before his interview with
Ho
$
^
jy.
fe
^
Wu
Yueh Cfcun Cfciu: "The King of
Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about
Each time he set forth a chapter of his
the art of war.
the
work,
King could not find words enough to praise
l
As he points out, if the whole work was exhim."
pounded on the same scale as in the above-mentioned
quotation from the
number of chapters could not fail to
Then the numerous other treatises atbe considerable.
3
tributed to Sun Tzu
might also be included. The fact
that the Han Chih mentions no work of Sun Tzu except
fragments, the total
3
give the
good
is
whereas the Sui and T'ang bibliographies
of others in addition to the "13 chapters,"
proof, Pi I-hsiin thinks, that all of these were
82 p'ien,
the
titles
contained in the 82 p^ien.
Without pinning our faith to
the accuracy of details supplied by the
Yuek Cfcun
Wu
Cfciu, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises
by Pi I-hslin, we may see in this theory a probable
solution of the mystery.
Between Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan
cited
Ku
there
to
geries
was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of forhave grown up under the magic name of Sun
Tzu, and the 82 p'ien
edition
3
the
Such
Ckon
* e Rt
of these
as the
Li, the
^fe
Sui
/\
very well represent a collected
lumped together with the original work.
|8j[
g|
ffc
C'" h
-'
|jj
,
^
and the
may
quoted in
|Eff
S
^|J
^
fe and
~f" ^. ij[
Cheng Hsuan's commentary on
j
jjj
,
||
in 'he
,
mentioned
Han Tang
in
Chih.
XIX
INTRODUCTION
It
is
also possible,
that
less likely,
though
some of them
existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purl
posely ignored by him.
the most important commen3
tator on Sun Tzu, composed the preface to his edition
about the middle of the ninth century. After a somewhat
Tu Mu,
after
Ts'ao
Kung
3
lengthy defence of the military
art,
he comes at
last to
and makes one or two very startling
-- "The writings of Sun Wu," he says, "originally
comprised several hundred thousand words, but Ts'ao Ts'ao,
the Emperor Wu Wei, pruned away all redundancies and
Sun Tzu
himself,
assertions
:
wrote out the essence of the whole, so as to form a single
book in 1 3 chapters." 4 He goes on to remark that Ts'ao
Ts'ao's commentary on Sun Tzu leaves a certain proportion
of difficulties unexplained. This, in Tu Mu's opinion, does
not necessarily imply that he was unable to furnish a com5
According to the Wei Chih, Ts'ao
commentary.
himself wrote a book on war in something over 100,000
words, known as the
|J It appears to have been of
such exceptional merit that he suspects Ts'ao to have used
for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun Tzu.
plete
^
.
He
concludes, however, by saying: "The Hsin Shu is
lost, so that the truth cannot be known for certain."
Tu Mu's
1
On
6
in
the
other hand,
chapters,
Chttng
Yung
conjecture
is
has
to
-* Wu
noteworthy that
to
it
in the
See T-u Shu,
3
An
is
tempted
|g || M,
Han
extract will be found
% m 9 Ji
on
m.
to think that
ch. 442,
j|
^
Chih.
now
jg||
in
-m w
ff
Tzu, which
Likewise, the
one only.
is
pt|
now
m
In the case of
might simply mean "leaves."
2.
p. xlv.
1 r
6
be based on a passage
credited with 49 chapters, though
2
se
is
48 assigned
such very short works, one
4
it
seems
now
I
INTRODUCTION
XX
^ "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's
which in turn may have resulted from a
Art of War,"
misunderstanding of the final words of Ts'ao Kung's preface:
in the
^
|jf
$$
l
#fc
ft 1S fl&H
This
1^
>
as
Sun Hsing-yen points
2
out,
of saying that he made an explanain other words, wrote a commentary
or
tory paraphrase,
on it. On the whole, the theory has met with very little
is
only a modest
way
3
^
4
acceptance. Thus, the (Jtj J|[
|J says: "The mention
of the 13 chapters in the Shih Chi shows that they were
before the Han Chih, and that later accretions
be
considered part of the original work.
not
to
are
Tu
Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken as proof." 5
in existence
There
every reason to suppose, then, that the 13
chapters existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch'ien practically
as we have them now.
That the work was then well
is
known he
tells
Chapters and
us
Wu
in
so
Ch'i's
many words: "Sun Tzu's
Art of
W ar
T
13
are the two books
that people commonly refer to on the subject of
military
matters.
Both of then are widely distributed, so I will
not discuss them
here."
serious
difficulties
has
be faced
begin to arise.
is that the
Tso
to
temporary record,
frlr
6
But
as
we go further back,
The salient fact which
Chuan, the great con-
makes no mention whatever of Sun
4
Q
99,
INTRODUCTION
W u^
XXI
either as a general or as a writer.
view of
awkward
natural, in
that
Wu
not
should
It is
circumstance,
many scholars
as
cast doubt on the story of Sun
this
only
the
Shih Chi, but even show themselves frankly
given
as
to
the existence of the man at all. The most
sceptical
powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be
in
found
the
in
l
Shui-hsin
following
by
disquisition
IPf ^(C Aj>
Yeh
-
:
Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history that Siin Wu was a native of
and employed by Wu; and that in the^eign of Ho Lu
he crushed Ch'u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso's
Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso's Commentary need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain.
But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K'ao-shu, a Ts'ao Kuei, 3 Chu Chih-wu 4 and Chuan
She-chu. 5 In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were
so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given,
in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister
7
6
Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed over?
P'ei.
In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to the same school
as Kuan Tzu,* the Liu T'ao,* and the Yueh Yu, 10 and may have
It
the
is
stated
in
Ch'i State,
Yeh shih
1
ch.
221,
2
ff.
of the Sun s d y nast y
[11511223]. see
8.
7,
See Tso Chuan,
/
I.
,
[
3
ad fin. and XI.
3
ad
He
init.
hardly deserves
be bracketed with assassins.
to
3
See pp. 66, 128.
*
See
Tso
Chuan, fit
5
See p. 128.
6
7. e.
Po P
c
^
Chuan Chu
ei.
is
,
XXX.
5.
the abbreviated form of his name.
See ante.
mmzm
8
The nucleus
been made by
9
See infra,
10
Why
I
of this
work is probably genuine, though
Kuan Chung died in 645 B. C.
large
additions have
later hands.
p.
1.
do not know what work
that chapter should
this is, unless
it
be the
be singled out, however,
is
last
chapter of the
not clear.
||||
=|^>
.
INTRODUCTION
XXII
been the production of some private scholar living towards the end of
the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period.
The story that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is
of his followers. 2
merely the outcome of big talk on the part
3
From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty down to the time of
a
the Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well,
and the
class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns,
*
It was not until the period of the "Six States"
exist.
did not then
custom changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilised State,
conceivable that Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun
was a great general and yet held no civil office? What we are told,
that this
is
it
Wu
therefore,
about Jang-chu
5
and Sun Wu,
is
not authentic
matter,
but
Ho
The story of
reckless fabrication of theorising pundits.
Lu's experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and inthe
credible.
Yeh
6
Shui-hsin represents
Sun
Wu
Ssu-ma Ch'ien as having- said
Ch'u and entered Ying. This is
not quite correct.
No doubt the impression left on the
reader's mind is that he at least shared in these exploits;
that
crushed
but the actual subject of the verbs
is
certainly
^
*
H-
|ff)
^
fjg
'
either
About 480
M
is
shown
by
,
A M
>
the
an ^ II
next words
:
The fact ma y or ma y not t>e
nowhere explicitly stated in the Shih
that Sun Tzti was general on the occasion of
JJ
significant; but it
Chi
as
,
$
7
is
B. C.
'n^m^-^
*B %ilj ft A
4
5
That is, I suppose, the age of
In the 3rd
century B. C.
Wu Wang
and Chou Rung.
Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose
family name was
of the 6th
century B. C., and
Shih Chi,
ch. 64,
and infra,
is
p.
also believed to
|JJ
Tien, lived
in the latter half
have written a work on war.
1.
.
See the end of the
passage quoted from the Shih Chi on p.
xii.
See
INTRODUCTION
the
of Ying,
taking
or
we know
Moreover, as
XXIII
went there
that he even
Wu
that
Yuan and Po P
the expedition, and also that
its
largely due to the dash and enterprise of
^
took part
in
at
c
was
success
|f|
Ho
all.
both
ei
Fu Kai,
how yet
Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see
another general could have played a very prominent part
same campaign.
the
in
1H 3& Ch'en Chen-sun
$ft
of the
Sung dynasty has
l
the note
:
Wu
as the father of their art.
But the
Military writers look upon Sun
that he does not appear in the Tso Chuan, although he is said to
have served under Ho Lii King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period
fact
he really belonged
He
also says
The works
It
is
to.
2
:
of Sun
Wu
noticeable
and
Wu
Ch'i
be of genuine antiquity.
Yeh
both
that
may
Shui-hsin
3
and Ch'en
Wu
as
Chen-sun,
rejecting the personality of Sun
he figures in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work which
while
The author
passes under his name.
to
appreciate
attack on Ch'en
of the
Hsu Lu
and consequently
this distinction,
Chen-sun really misses
its
fails
his bitter
He
mark.
makes one
or two points, however, which certainly
favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters."
Tzu," he says, "must have lived in the age of
tell in
"Sun
Ching
Wang [519476], because he is frequently plagiarised in
4
subsequent works of the Chou, Ch4n and Han dynasties."
1
'
In the
See
fi yn
a classified catalogue of his family library.
^jJ jij# -9|j f
Hsien T'ung K'ao,
^jiL
Win
eh. 221,
1.
9 r
:
4 it A x li n ? j& M
ffi
=j
&% ^
.^- ii.
^''.M il if
\
jjflj
Bf A-tfc3
See
Hsu Lu,
f.
,4 ,
Here
is
a
list
of the
passages
in
Sun
Tzii
from which
INTRODUCTION
XXIV
The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu
Ch and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important historical
The former lived only a century
personages in their day.
after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known
l
i
to
have taken place
381 B.C.
in
was
It
to him, according
**
the Tso
^3 Tseng Shen delivered
Hsiang, that
l
its author.
him
to
entrusted
been
had
which
by
Chuan,
Now the fact that quotations from the Art of War,
to Liu
acknowledged or otherwise, are
of
authors
different
be found
to
a
establishes
epochs,
so
in
many
strong
very
was some common source anterior
probability
to them all, - - in other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was
th
already in existence towards the end of the 5 century B. C.
Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the
there
that
archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number
list of these, which might perhaps
of the words he uses.
be extended, is given in the Hsu Lu; and though some
A
of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is
3
hardly affected thereby.
Again, it must not be forgotten
that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank,
deliberately
the
either
VII. 9;
58;
substance
IX.
VII.
175
&
IV
'
VII
I
^
(U
I
20
&
III.
XL
IX. 23; IX.
I
-
IX. 15; IX. 4
V. 23;
IX
-
^
t ^ie
XI > I2
IX. 43;
III.
XL
gi ven
XI 30;
135 VII. 19
V. 15;
I-
VII. 26;
III.
i;
III.
-^).
8;
aDOve are
'
5
7; V.
3,
(^
(bis)
4;in2(g|^^).
^ wo
'
i,
2;
18;
8;
19; XI. 58;
I.
V. 13;
as quotations).
&
V. 4
&
The
IV. 7
XI. 39;
VII. 32;
;
VIII.
pj
u:
6:
vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27.
Legge thinks that the
written in the 5th century, but .not before 424 B.C.
instances quoted are:
M K
=
instead of
JJI
and
;
g|
VIL
28:
III.
H
14,
- ,t
15:
;
(the later form); XI. 64:
|ft^ antithetically
=XI
opposed
||J
XL
is
6o:
f^
said to be equivalent to
^
=
-
>^
1
;
5
XL
IX. 3:
ML
in the sense of
ffiff
XL
IV. 7
See Legge's
Classics,
IL I5:
of
v
^fti
Chuan must have been
2
95
-
IV.
words have been appropriated by early authors:
or the actual
24 (l|k |g| jj|).
2
VII. 25;
'
VI.
I.
VII. 24; VII. 26;
31;
(Itlf-7*)
X. 10
pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to
24
;
;
Tso
||
;
the use
^g =
and
ii
^;
XXV
INTRODUCTION
belong to the early part of the
he is actually engaged in an
fifth
Seeing that
century.
to
attempt
disprove the
existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he
would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later
date had he not honestly believed the contrary.
And it
is
precisely on such a point that the judgment of an
educated Chinaman
evidence
an
is
carry most weight. Other internal
not far to seek.
Thus, in XIII.
i, there is
unmistakable
will
allusion
to
the ancient system of land-
had already passed away by the time ol
Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified
The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried
form. L
tenure
which
^^
on between the various feudal princes (
in which
),
armoured chariots play a large part. Their use seems to
have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty.
He
a
speaks as
exist as early as
man
of
B. C.
473
Wu, a
On this
But once refer the work to the
state \vhich ceased to
shall touch presently.
I
th
century or earlier,
other
than
a dona fide probeing
duction are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries
did not come until long after.
That it should have been
and the chances of
forged
the
in
5
its
immediately following 473 is partino one, as a rule, hastens to identify
period
cularly unlikely, for
himself with a lost cause.
was a
that the author
As
for
Yeh
literary recluse,
3
Shui-hsin's theory,
that seems to me
If one thing is more apparent than anquite untenable.
other after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their
essence has been distilled from a large store of personal
and experience. They reflect the mind not
only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of gene-
observation
ralisation,
but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted
with the military conditions of his time.
1
See Mencius
III.
2
1
|
j
mountains.
/|>fC
I
|Jjl
think
I.
~JT
it
aloof from public affairs.
iii.
13
To
say nothing
20.
need not be pressed
to
mean an
actual
simply denotes a person living a retired
dweller in the
life
and standing
INTRODUCTION
XXVI
of the
that
fact
these
sayings have been accepted and
the greatest captains of Chinese history,
endorsed by
of freshness and sincerity, acutethey offer a combination
ness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea
all
If we
the study.
admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards the end of the
"Ch'un Ch4u" period, are we not bound, in spite of the
they were
that
silence
count
concocted
artificially
in
Tso Chuan, to accept Ssu-ma Ch'ien's acentirety? In view of his high repute as a
of the
in
its
sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the
records he drew upon for Sun Wu's biography were false
and untrustworthy? The answer, I
There is still one grave,
negative.
the
to
chronology involved
pointed out.
I
far as
contemporary
Though according
in
the
if
not
story
must be
fatal,
as
in
the
objection
in the
told
am
aware, nobody has yet
There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he
Shih Chi, which, so
alludes to
in
fear,
to
my
I
affairs.
The
first is in
VI.
21:
estimate the soldiers of Yiieh exceed our
own
advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.
say then that victory can be achieved.
number, that
The
other
shall
in
is
XI.
30
:
Asked
Yes.
if an
army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer,
For the men of Wu and the men of Yiieh are enemies; yet if they
are crossing a river in the same boat and are
caught by a storm, they
will come to each other's assistance
just as the left hand helps the right.
These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence
of the date of composition.
They assign the work to the
of
the struggle between
and Yueh. So much
period
Wu
has been observed
by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto
notice
is
that
escaped
they also seriously impair the creAs we have seen
dibility of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative.
above,
Sun
the
Wu
is
first
5
1
2
positive date given in connection with
B. C.
He is then spoken of as a general,
acting as confidential adviser to
introduction to that monarch
Ho
Lu, so that his alleged
had already taken place,
XXVII
INTRODUCTION
and of course the 1 3 chapters must have been written
But at that time, and for several years after,
earlier still.
down
^
the capture of Ying in 506,
Yiieh, was the great hereditary enemy of
to
Ch u, and not
Wu. The two
l
war for over
half a century,
whereas the first war between Wu and
Ylieh was waged only in 510, 2 and even then was no
more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst 01
states,
Ch'u and
Wu, had been
constantly at
1
the fierce struggle with Ch'u. Now Ch'u is not mentioned
in the 13 chapters at all.
The natural inference is that
they were written at a time when Ylieh had become the
prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch'u had suffered
At
the
great humiliation of 506.
dates may be found useful.
a table of
this point,
B.C.
5H
Accession of
5 12
Ho Lu
Ho
Lu.
attacks Ch'u, but
is
dissuaded from entering
Shih Chi mentions Sun
capital.
Wu
!g[$
Ying, the
as general.
Another attack on Ch'u.
510
Wu
makes a
successful attack
tween the two
on Yiieh.
This
is
the
first
war be-
states.
59
or
Ch'u invades Wu, but
is
signally defeated at
J&
jl^ Yii-chang.
508
506
Ho Lu
attacks
battle of
yjv^l
of
505
Wu
Sun
Ch'u with the aid of T'ang and Ts'ai. Decisive
Last mention
Po-chii, and capture of Ying.
Jljf;
in
Shih Chi.
Yiieh makes a raid on
Wu
in
the absence of
its
army.
Wu
is
beaten by Ch'in and evacuates Ying.
54
Ho Lu
497
^J
496
Wu
{j||
sends
1
When Wu
is
first
appears in
powerful neighbour.
Tso Chuan in 60 1.
is
Ch'ai to attack Ch'u.
is
of Yiieh.
defeated by
Kou Chien
at
#||
^
Tsui-li.
killed.
its
This
Fu
""*
attacks Yiieh, but
Ho Lu
with
4
Kou Chien becomes King
explicitly stated in
the
Ch'-un
The Cfrun
CWiu
Ch'-iu
in 584,
first
the Tso Chuan, ft3
it
is
already at variance
mentions Yiieh in 537, the
^.
XXXII,
2
:
W J&
>ffe
INTRODUCTION
XXVIII
B.C.
Fu
494
Ch'ai defeats
Kou Chien
in the great battle of
$
Fu-chiao,
and enters the capital of Yueh.
'
485
or
Kou Chien
renders
homage
Kou Chien
invades
Wu
Wu.
to
Wu
Death of
Tztt-hsu.
484
482
47
Further attacks by
in the
absence of
Fu
Ch'ai.
Yueh on Wu.
476
475
Kou Chien
473
Final defeat and extinction of Wu.
lays siege to the capital of
Wu.
The sentence quoted above from VI.
me as one that could have been written
of victory.
at
It
the
least,
21 hardly strikes
in the full flush
seems rather to imply that, for the moment
had turned against Wu, and that she
tide
was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may
conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505,
before which date Yueh does not appear to have scored
any notable success against
Wu.
Ho Lu
died in 496, so
must have been
during the period 505496, when there was a lull in the
hostilities, Wu having presumably been exhausted by its
supreme effort against Ch u. On the other hand, if we
choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu's name
with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light
between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482473,
when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious
that
if
the
book was written
for him,
it
c
l
menace.
We
may feel fairly certain that the author,
whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great
eminence in his own day.
On this point the negative
of
the Tso Chuan far outweighs any shred of
testimony
authority still attaching to the Shih Chi, if once
facts are discredited.
Sun Hsing-yen, however,
feeble
1
There
attempt to explain the omission of his
is
grow more
used in XI.
this
bitter
30.
to
be said
after
each
for
the
encounter,
later
period,
that
and thus more
the
its
other
makes a
name from
feud would tend to
fully justify the
language
INTRODUCTION
the
great
who got
latter
commentary.
all
an alien)
(being
the State.
in
the credit
XXIX
was Wu Tzu-hsii, he says,
of Sun Wu's exploits, because the
was not rewarded with an office
It
1
How
then did the Sun Tzu legend originate?
It may
book
of
the
growing celebrity
imparted by
degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was
be that the
to be only right and proper that one so _weiL-yersed
thescience ojaar- should have solid achievements to
his credit as well.
Now the capture of Ying was unthe
doubtedly
greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's reign it
made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding
states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her
felt
in
;
Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than
that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should
be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps
power.
his brain conceived and planned
was actually carried out by him in
3
Po P'ei and Fu Kai?
conjunction with Wu Yuan,
It is obvious that
any attempt to reconstruct even the
outline of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on
conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that
only
it;
in
the
sense
that
afterwards, that
it
Wu
he probably entered the service of
about the time
Ho Lu's accession, and gathered experience, though
only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the
of
intense
that
military
activity
3
prince's
If
reign.
which
marked the
first
half of
he rose to be a general at
all,
he certainly was never on an equal footing with the three
i
See his preface to Sun Tzu:
2 With Wu Yuan
a spurious treatise on
himself the case is just the reverse:
war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. Here we
have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have
been widely known to fame in the 5th century.
3
^
See Tso Chuan,
^
fc
^
UFrom
,
4 th year (506),
14:
date of Kin
Cnao
6Bf
^fC
year in which Ch'u was not attacked by Wu."
the
g
'
s
$J
^
[t|J
$L
^ g*
accession [515] there
was no
INTRODUCTION
XXX
above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's
sudden collapse
in
the following year.
when her
Ylieh's attack at
was embarrassed on
juncture,
him
have
convinced
that this upstart
to
every side, seems
kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort
would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus
a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his
famous book, which according to my reckoning must have
critical
this
rival
appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning,
Ho
The
Lu's reign.
of the
story
women may
ot
possibly
have grown out of some real incident occurring about the
same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this
from any source, he
is
hardly likely to have survived his
have taken part in the death-struggle with
Ylieh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li.
patron or
these
If
a
certain
most
to
are
inferences
in
irony
the
man
illustrious
approximately correct, there is
which decreed that China's
fate
of
peace should be contemporary
with her greatest writer on war.
THE TEXT OF SUN
I
have found
of Sun
Tzu's
it
difficult to
text.
Tzij.
much about
the history
that
in early
occur
quotations
that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-
glean
The
authors go to show
ma Ch'ien speaks were
essentially the same as those now
word for it that they were widely
circulated in his
day, and can only regret that he refrained
from discussing them on that account. 1 Sun
Hsing-yen
extant.
We
have
his
says in his preface:
During the Ch'in and
*^4.
A ..-
Han
dynasties
7^^
mysterious import,
1
See supra^ p. xx.
"""^
Sun Tzu's Art of War was
"
i"*"""
"^TT7"r~
and were unwillineMto ex
..
X.
in
INTRODUCTION
Thus
the benefit of posterity.
to write a commentary on it.
it
came about
XXXI
Wei
that
Wu
was the
first
'
As we have
already seen, there
is
no reasonable ground
suppose that Ts'ao Kung tampered with the text. But
the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of
to
which appeared from that time onward so great,
especially during the T'ang and Sung dynasties, that it
would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed
editions
to creep
Towards the middle of the Sung period, by
the chief commentaries on Sun Tzu were
in.
which time
all
^ ^^
existence, a certain
in
T ien-pao
l
published
^
^
"Sun Tzu
in 15 chuan entitled -f$j> 3f*
There
the collected commentaries of ten writers." 3
a work
with
Chi
was another
among
text,
^
of
variant readings put forward by
J|L
;
Sun Hsing-yen
reason
with
3
which also had supporters
Ta-hsing,
the scholars of that period but in the Ming editions,
Chu Fu
other
or
tells
us,
these
readings
no longer put into
were
circulation.
for
some
*
Thus,
end of the i8 th century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi T'ien-pao's
edition, although no actual copy of that important work
until
the
was known to have surrived. That, therefore, is the text
of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great
Imperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the ~j!t ^f*" HO 1*
^H jfc fat Chin T'u Shu Chi Ch'eng. Another copy at
my disposal of what is practically the same text, with
slight variations, is that contained in the
^
ffs;
-j-
^
"Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch'in dynasties"
a#
2S
3
ffl
%&%&
Alluded
to
on
p. xvii,
^ ir
note
3*
INTRODUCTION
XXXII
And
[1758].
edition
is
So
channels.
Japanese
through
M
the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first
evidently a similar version which has filtered
things
remained
until
Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished
l
who claimed to be an
antiquarian and classical scholar,
2
actual descendant of Sun Wu,
accidentally discovered a
t/T
copy of Chi T'ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a
3
p $&
to the library of the
to it was the
jjfc
^
visit
Appended
Hua-yin temple.
/ Skno
of J|$
ji^ Cheng Yu-hsien,
in
the
and
also
mentioned
believed to have
T^ung Chih,
4
is what Sun
This
perished.
Hsing-yen designates as the
^5C
"j^f
or
^
Jg(
for
misleading name,
before
set
the
us
edition
"original
(or
Sun Tzu
text of
a rather
text)"
any means claim
cannot by
it
in
its
to
pristine purity.
6
and appears to
T'ien-pao was a careless compiler,
have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased
Chi
version current in his day, without troubling to collate
1
A
H
good biographical
AH
$J It
Preface
with
notice,
Sfr>
ch
a
of his
list
it
works, will be found in the
8 > to
-
* /,,,
"My family comes from
am ashamed to say that
y\^
-Jjjj
Tztt.
I
point
of view,
without
Lo-an,
and we are really descended from Sun
only read
I
my
ancestor's
work from a
literary
So long have we
comprehending the military technique.
been enjoying the blessings of
peace!"
3
Hua-yin
Shensi.
of the
is
about 14 miles from
The temple
3p
[Jj
in question
of the
yjj|
still
^
T'ung-kuan on the eastern border of
visited
Western Sacred Mountain.
or
,
east
is
ch.
%^
32,
f.
-Ji jfe
by those about
It
is
22, as the
^ J^ If
to
mentioned
:
make
in the
-
the ascent
~fc
HH
'
asituated five
41-111
Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet in
scribed by the T'ang
Emperor Hsiian Tsuncr [713755] "
5 Cf.
district
city of
Sua Hsing-yen's remark h
frapos of
of the commentators:
*
his mistakes in
the
names and order
INTRODUCTION
XXXIII
Fortunately, two
Sun Tzu, even older than the newly discovered
work, were still extant, one buried in the T'ung Tien,
with the earliest editions then available.
versions of
Tu Yu's
great treatise on the Constitution, the other
in the
enshrined
T^ai P'ing Yii Lan encyclosimilarly
the
In
both
complete text is to be found, though
paedia.
split
up
into fragments, intermixed with other matter,
scattered
piecemeal
Considering that the
over a
number of
and
different sections.
takes us back to the year
Yu^Lan
983, and the T'ung Tien about 200 years further still,
the irii^J^_of^hje_J. _aii^_jlyna^^ the value of these
t
to
',
Tzu can hardly be overestimated.
them does not seem to have ocSun Hsing-yen, acting under Govern-
early transcripts of Sun
Yet the idea of utilising
curred to anyone until
ment
text.
instructions,
This
is
his
undertook a thorough recension of the
own account
:
Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his
had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition
[of Chi T'ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised
editors
and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor
Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I
had the whole work cut on blocks as a text-book for military men.
have
l
The three individuals here referred to had evidently
been occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsingyen's commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work
they really accomplished.
when
At any
ultimately produced, appeared
rate,
in
new edition,
names of Sun
the
the
Wu
Jen-chi.
Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, J^ J{ tjjj[
They took the "original text" as their basis, and by careful
comparison with the older versions, as well as the extant
commentaries and other sources of information such as
C
INTRODUCTION
XXXIV
Shuo, succeeded in restoring a very large number
of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what
must be accepted as the closest approximation we are
This is
ever likely to get to Sun Tzu's original work.
what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text."
the
/
The copy which
have used belongs
I
to a re-issue
dated
It is in 6 pen, forming part of a well-printed set
1877.
1
It opens with
of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pen.
a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this intro-
view of Sun Tzu's
duction), vindicating the traditional
and performances, and summing up
the
fashion
evidence
in
its
in
favour.
life
remarkably concise
This is followed by
edition, and the biography
Kung's preface
of Sun Tzu from the Shih Chi, both translated above.
Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I Shuo, 3 with author's
preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and
Ts'ao
to
his
bibliographical information entitled
Hsu Lu,
compiled
by
||f.
J(
3]
^ -^ ^ ^
Pi
I-hsiin.
Sun Tzu
As regards
body of the work, each separate sentence is followed
a
note on the text, if required, and then by the various
by
the
commentaries appertaining
These we
order.
shall
to
it,
arranged
now proceed
to
in
chronological
discuss
briefly,
one by one.
THE COMMENTATORS.
Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long and distinguished
of commentators, which would do honour to
any classic.
roll
^
Hfc 87
Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he
wrote before the tale was
complete, and rather ingeniously
it
explains
by saying that the artifices of war, being in-
1
See
my
"Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40.
a discussion of 29 difficult
passages in Sun Tzti, namely: I. 2;
16; II. 9 & 105 III. 3; HI & VII; III. 17; IV.
4; 6; V. 3; 10 & n; 14;
headings of the 13 chapters, with special reference to chap. VII; VII.
5; 15 &
27; 33, & c .; VIII. 1-6; IX. n; X. 1-20; XI. 23; 31;
19; 43; VII. 12-14 &
52; XI. 56; XIII. 15 & 16; 26; XIII in general.
This
is
26;
the
16;
XI.
XXXV
INTRODUCTION
exhaustible,
must therefore be susceptible of treatment
1
in
l
a great variety of ways.
W ^ Ts'ao Ts'ao
or
~f
^ Ts'ao Kung, afterwards
^j
There
Ti [A.D. 155-220].
ffi Wei Wu
room
for
doubt
the
earliest
that
commentary
hardly any
on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this extra3
ordinary man, whose biography in the San fato Chih
known
as
is
One
reads like a romance.
of the greatest military geniusesthat the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of
his operations, he was especially famed for the marvellous
rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the
& W II
Ts'ao Ts'ao
line
m
1"
fc
PI "^Ik of Ts'ao
Ts'ao, and
Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that
will appear."
he was a great captain who "measured his strength against
Tung Cho, Lu Pu and
the
two Yuan, father and son,
and vanquished them all whereupon he divided the Empire
Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is
recorded that whenever a council of war was held by
Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all
;
of
those generals who made use of
them did not lose one battle in ten those who ran counter
his
calculations
ready,
;
them in any particular saw their armies incontinently
beaten and put to flight." 3 Ts'ao Kung's notes on Sun
Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characto
teristic
is
of the stern
commander known
hard indeed to conceive of
litterateur.
Sometimes,
~
s
tin
See
it
them as the work of a mere
indeed,
Preface to Mei Yao-ch'en's edition:
to history, that
owing
^
M^
ch.
to
extreme com-
INTRODUCTION
XXXVI
they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less
1
As we
of a commentary than the text itself.
pression,
need
in
have seen, Ts'ao Rung is the reputed author of the ffi fj,
a book on war in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but
mentioned
2
InL J^t
-
the |||
in
^
3
.
Shih.
Meng
The commentary which has come
down to us under this name is comparatively meagre, and
nothing about the author is known. Even his personal name
has not been recorded. Chi T'ien-pao's edition places him
Chia Lin, and f
after
him
4^
Ch'ao Kung-wu also assigns
3l
3
but this
is
T'ang dynasty,
obviously a mistake,
In Sun
as his work is mentioned in the |^ |J |g |
as
he
Shih
of
the
appears
Hsing-yen's preface,
Meng
Liang
him
with
Others
would
identify
dynasty [502557].
|f
to the
^
Meng K'ang
he
named
is
the
^
of the 3 rd century. In the
"Five
last of the 3
others being
Wei
^
Wu
.
^
jjj
J|
,
Commentators
"
Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao and
Ti,
Chia Lin.
3.
^^
Li Ch'iian of the 8 th century was a
known
writer
been
constant use
in
on military
down
His -fc
tactics.
(^ $
E=J
The JH
to the present day.
^^
^
well-
nas
^
(lives of famous generals from the
#[
Chou to the T'ang dynasty) as written by him. 5 He is
also generally supposed to be the real author of the popular
mentions
Taoist tract, the |^ ^f
$g. According to Ch'ao
and the T'ien-i-ko catalogue, 6 he followed the
^
text
of
Sun Tzu, which
differs
considerably
Kung-wu
u ^g
^
from those
Catalogue of the library of the
family at Ningpo,
"His commentary
-
fol.
,
is
frequently
develop the meaning."
I2
^
^ | ^ (g ^
:
obscure
5
2
it
furnishes
a
clue,
Fan
fig
^^
but does
not fully
^|
See
ch. 141 ad init.
yjj
^F^w Hsien T'-ung
4 Ch.
ch.
f.
K^ao^
9^.
221,
207, f. 5 r.
5 It is
interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters i, 4
and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See B. E. F. E.
O,
^g
3
t.
VIII, nos.
34,
p.
525.
6
LoCt ci t.
,
INTRODUCTION
now
extant.
and
he
XXXVII
His notes are mostly short and to the point,
frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes
from Chinese history.
ti'fe Tu Yu O^ed 8l2 ) did n t publish a separate
commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the
T^ung Tien, the encyclopaedic treatise on the Constitution
which was his life-work.
They are largely repetitions of
Ts'ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed
4.
^^
drew on the ancient commentaries of
Wang
and
others.
to
the
Ling
Owing
peculiar arrangement of
the T^ung Tien, he has to explain each passage on its
merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own
that he
explanation
does
not
agree with
of Ts'ao
that
Kung,
whom
he always quotes first. Though not strictly to be
reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was
added
to
their
placed after his
5-
a
ti$C Tu
M
a bright star even
poet
the
number by Chi T'ien-pao, being wrongly
grandson Tu Mu.
U (803-852) is perhaps best known as
We
T'ang period.
in the glorious galaxy of
learn from Ch'ao Kung-wu that
although he had no practical experience of war, he was
extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military history of the Cfcun Ck'iu
and Chan
attention.
parallels.
Kuo
l
His notes, therefore, are well worth
are
They
very copious, and replete with historical
The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus summarised
eras.
by him: "Practise benevolence and justice, but on the
other hand make full use of artifice and measures of ex3
pediency."
i
2
He
Wen Hsien T^ung
further
K^ao, ch. 221,
declared
f.
9
Preface to his commentary (T<-u Shu,
:
{ft
j
that
f | >$
J&
,
all
the
$fr ffi
ch. 442):
military
^g
|&
INTRODUCTION
XXXVIII
triumphs and disasters of the thousand years which had
elapsed since Sun Wu's death would, upon examination,
be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular,
maxims contained
the
his
in
book.
charge against Ts'ao
spiteful
:
Tu Mu's somewhat
has already been con-
Kung
sidered elsewhere.
Ch'en Hao appears to have been a contempCh'ao Kung-wu says that he was imorary of Tu Mu.
to
new
write
a
pelled
commentary on Sun Tzu because
Ts'ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and subtle,
and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and
6-
$jt
(}!|
th
Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the n
century, calls Ts'ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch'en Hao the
three chief commentators on Sun Tzu (5Ei ^), and observes
that Ch'en Hao is continually
attacking Tu Mu's short2
diffuse.
His commentary, though not lacking
must rank below those of his predecessors.
comings.
7-
W
ffi
Chia Lin
T'ang dynasty,
tioned
in
the
of
jfijf
Meng
Shih
and
known
8
commentary on Sun Tzu is menand was afterwards republished by
^
same dynasty together with those
3
It is of somewhat scanty
of the
and Tu Yu.
in
$1 Jl E
known by his
-
with
too,
perhaps the least
Mei Yao-ch'en (1002-1060), commonly
"style" as
1 u Mu, a poet of
lished
have lived under the
to
point of quality,
valuable of the eleven.
texture,
merit,
for his
HJ Chi Hsieh
$
is
in
Mei
distinction.
H
-$
Sheng-yu, was, like
His commentary was pub-
a
laudatory preface by the great
Hsiu, from which we may cull the following:
Ou-yang
-
to
Later scholars have misread Sun
Tzu, distorting his words and trying
make them square with their own one-sided views.
Thus, though
1
**'
& ft'% #
ft
? A4M* $ jft*f
*
#l
ttc
|ft
INTRODUCTION
XXXIX
commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to
My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In atto
provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzu's "work, he does
tempting
not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with the
military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient
nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister
dynasties,
the task.
'
Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is
Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling
always deep.
soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it
of War.
2
always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict
sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who
is
logical
have probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary,
Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of these
critics,
and has
tried to bring out the true
meaning of Sun Tzu
himself.
In this way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings
made clear. I am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed
down
side by side with the three great commentaries; and for a great
deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant
reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. 3
Making some allowance
am
I
inclined
would
to
certainly
of merit.
1
endorse
place
for the
this
exuberance of friendship,
favourable judgment, and
Hao in order
him above Ch'en
The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally
Sun Tzii's day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old mili-
existent in
tary organisation had practically
planation of the passage.
2
See Chou Li,
see
r
s*.,
gone by
the board.
XXIX. 6-10.
r
m,
ch.
9 o,
f.
,.
I
can suggest no other ex-
INTRODUCTION
XL
Wang
of the Sung dynasty, is
his interpretations, but much
of
decidedly
less judicious than Mei Yao-ch'en, and on the whole not
He is fond of comparing his
a very trustworthy guide.
3E
9-
1=[
Hsi, also
some
original in
with that of Ts'ao
own commentary
is
parison
not
often
flattering
to
Kung, but the com-
him.
We
learn
from
Ch'ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text
l
of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes.
Ho
Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The
personal name of this commentator is given as above by
Ch'iao in the T'ung Chih, written about
JfU jftj. Cheng
10.
'(of
$&
$$9
the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply
as 'fof J^ Ho Shih in the Yu Hai, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes
Ch'ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is un-
known.
There seems
be no reason to doubt Cheng
I should have been inclined
to
Ch'iao's statement, otherwise
^
Ho
hazard a guess and identify him with one yfBf -^
Ch'u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled
'Off
ffjjjf,
to
Ho
who
Shih's
lived in the latter part of the
commentary,
^
in
the
n
th
words of the
2
century.
T'ien-i-ko
helpful additions" here
is
chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the
dynastic histories
catalogue,
fff
^L j
"contains
and there, but
and other sources.
1 1
The list closes with a com11 Bl Chang Yii.
mentator of no great originality perhaps, but gifted with
admirable powers of lucid exposition.
His commentary is
based on that of Ts'ao
whose terse sentences he
-
Kung,
expand and develop in masterly fashion.
Without Chang Yu, it is safe to
say that much of Ts ao
would
have remained cloaked in its
Kung's commentary
His work is
pristine obscurity and therefore valueless.
not mentioned in the
the
Sung history,
T'ung K'ao, or
contrives
to
l
See
m
|HJ Jjjl
m,
ch. 99,
f.
INTRODUCTION
Yu Hai,
the
finds
it
a
niche
in
the
T'ung Chih,
names him as the author of the ^j $$ *$$
which also
"Lives of
but
XLI
Famous
Generals."
l
is rather remarkable that the last-named four should
have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch'ao
It
all
Kung-wu accounts for it by
years of the Sung dynasty
and men ceased
spell of peace,
But
saying: "During the early
the Empire enjoyed a long
when [Chao]
to practise the art of war.
rebellion came [1038-42]
Yiian-hao's
and the frontier generals were defeated time after time,
the Court made strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war,
and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high
officials.
Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu
'
in
our dynasty belong mainly to that period."
Besides these eleven commentators, there are several
others
whose work has not come down
Shu mentions
four,
by Tu Yu
J
as
namely
ijg
-J-);
/||
-^
$j$
Wang
The Sui
to us.
Ling
(often
Chang Tzu-shang;
quoted
f|f ffj
^
Chia Hsu of Ut Wei-, 3 and #
Shen Yu of
Wu.
The T^ang Shu adds $fc
Sun Hao, and the T^ing Chih
=*
Hsiao Chi, while the T'u Shu mentions a Ming
jjlf
^
commentator,
^
}|ij
Huang
3
Jun-yii.
some of these may have been merely
of other commentaries, like Chi
mentioned above. Certainly
entry ${*
^ xi J ^
m
tne
in
T
;
It is
possible that
and editors
Chi
and
Hsieh,
ien-pao
collectors
the case of the latter, the
T^ung K'ao, without the
fol-
lowing note, would give one to understand that he had
written an independent commentary of his own.
There are two works, described in the Ssu K'u
1
This appears to be
T**g A-X
3
A
he.
still
ci,.:
extant.
fc
notable person in his day.
J|j
See Wylie's "Notes,"
p.
Ch'uan
91 (new edition).
^ ^^^#TA^^ ^
His biography
is
given in the San
Kuo
Chih^ ch. 10.
INTRODUCTION
XLII
and no doubt extremely rare, which I should much
like to have seen. One is entitled $fa
j^ |5f in 5 chuan.
It gives selections from four new commentators, probably
of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven known to
Shu
l
^
us.
The names
Chang Ao;
cheng. The
^
2$5
of the four are
^
other
Li
work
Cheng Tuan
Ts
is
l
ai;
$$
and
^ -^
f||
jf;
Hsieh Yuan
^ yg
f|fc
,
in
^
\
;
^
Huang
|||
Chih-
4 chuan, compiled
It is a com-
of the present dynasty.
by J|[$
pendium of information on ancient warfare, with special
reference to Sun Tzu's 1 3 chapters.
APPRECIATIONS OF SUN Tzu.
Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the
minds of some of China's greatest men. Among the famous
generals who are known to have studied his pages with
^
enthusiasm
2
I96),
4
(d.
Han Hsin (d. B.C.
34),
g || Lu Meng
The opinion
(i 103-1 141).
with Han Hsin the highest
may be mentioned
ay| Feng I (d. A.D.
and
219),
of Ts'ao
-gj-
^ Yo
Fei
Kung, "wHo~ disputes
{=f
3
5
Chinese military annals, has already been recorded. 6
place
Still more remarkable, in one
way, is the testimony of
such
as
purely literary men,
^J Su Hsiin (the father
in
^
of Su
Tung-p'o), who wrote several essays on military
all
of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu.
topics,
The following short passage by him is preserved in the
Yu Hai:
1
1
Ch. ioo,
2 see
3 Hou Han
ff.
2, 3.
p. 144.
S/iu, ch. 17 ad init.
San Kuo Chih^ ch. 54, f. ioz/
(commentary).
6
Sung Shih, ch. 365 ad init.
The few Europeans who have
yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves
with Sun Tzti are not behindhand in their
In this
I
4
praise.
may perconnection,
haps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord
Roberts, to whom the sheets
of the present work were
submitted previous to publication:
"Many of Sun Wu's
maxims are perfectly applicable to the
present day, and no. 1 1 on
that the people of this
"
country would do well to take to heart
1
Ch. 140,
f.
13^.
page 77
is
one
INTRODUCTION
XLIIT
*
saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering,
2
Ch'i was a
is very different indeed from what other books tell us.
man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and
Sun Wu's
Wu
Wu
But
they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu."
remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more
crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun
Ch'i's
work, wherej:he style
The
^ ^| fH
from the 5|
is
terse,but themeaning fully brought out
3?|,
pf] ffi
of Literature" by
^
ch. 17, contains the following extract
"Impartial Judgments in the Garden
Cheng Hou
Jf|$ j|*
:
Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military
men's training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and
men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound,
Such works
perspicuous and eminently practical.
/ Ching and
the great
Hsiin K'uang and
Chu
Hsi,
Commentary,
Yang Chu,
4
all fall
as
the
Lun
Yu, the
as well as the writings of Mencius,
below the level of Sun Tzu. 5
commenting on
this,
fully
admits the
first
criticism, although he dislikes the audacious
part
comparison with the venerated classical works. Language
of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler's bent towards
of the
unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism."
6
APOLOGIES FOR WAR.
Accustomed as we are
to think of
peace-loving nation on earth,
1
See IV.
2
The
4
The Tso Chuan.
we
China as the greatest
are in
some danger
3.
allusion
may
be to Mencius VI.
2.
ix.
2
:
m m % ro * in
ffi
w JB m
of
INTRODUCTION
XLIV
of war in all its phases has
forgetting that her experience
Her
also been such as no modern State can parallel.
which
at
a
to
back
stretch
they
point
long military annals
She had built the Great
are lost in the mists of time.
Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along
her
frontier
centuries
before
the
first
Roman
legionary
with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with
Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralisation of
was seen on the Danube.
What
government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the
overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless
rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and
flickered out again one by one,
say that the clash of arms has
in
hardly too much to
never ceased to resound
it
is
one portion or another of the Empire.
less remarkable is the succession of
No
tains
to
countries,
fateful
illustrious cap-
whom
the
crises
As in all
China can point with pride.
are
found
at
the most
greatest
emerging
of her history.
Thus, Po Ch'i stands out
conspicuous in the period when Ch'in was entering upon
her final struggle with the remaining independent states.
The stormy
years which followed the break-up of the Ch'in
are
illumined by the transcendent genius of Han
dynasty
Hsin.
When the House of Han in turn is tottering to
the great and baleful figure of Ts'ao Ts'ao dofall,
minates the scene. And in the establishment of the Pang
its
dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the
superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor
T'ai Tsung) was seconded
by the brilliant strategy of Li
Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with
the greatest names in the
military history of Europe.
In spite of all this, the
great
body of Chinese sentiment,
from Lao Tzu downwards, and
especially as reflected in
the standard literature of
Confucianism, has been consistently
pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form.
It is such an uncommon
thing to find any of the literati
XLV
INTRODUCTION
defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it
worth while to collect and translate a few passages in
which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by
Ssu-ma Ch'ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of
Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price :
weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence
to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and
and
to
succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood
dangers,
in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked.
How
much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love
and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection
Military
and
cruelty,
up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into
That is the natural law which governs his being .... What then
play.
shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and
springs
without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their
formulas about "virtue" and "civilisation," condemning the use of
stale
weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and
dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least,
they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and
military
general enfeeblement.
they have taken up.
Yet they obstinately refuse
The
truth
is
to
modify the position
that, just as in the family the teacher
must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the
can never be allowed to fall into abeyance
in the Empire.
All one can say is that this power will be exercised
wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms
some will be loyal and others rebellious.
State, so military chastisement
*
The
is taken from
on
Sun
Tzu commentary
next piece
Tu Mu's
preface to his
:
War may be
government.
1
itt
It
defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of
was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch'iu, both
Shih Chi, ch. 25,
m
nfr
fol.
i:
a fc & %
g
&z
INTRODUCTION
XLVI
Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing
disciples of- Confucius.
the
imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging
litigation,
of
But the wielding of huge
the market-place, are all done by officials.
cities, the haling of women and
fortified
of
down
the
throwing
armies,
this is also work
and the beheading of traitors children into
in
captivity,
The objects of the rack and of military
There is no intrinsic difference bethe
same.
essentially
weapons
tween the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the
lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a small amount
which
*
done by
is
officials.
are
of force need be employed hence the institution of torture and flogging.
For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness, which are hard to suppress, a
the use of military weapons
greater amount of force is necessary: hence
and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is
2
to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good
:
.
.
.
.
Chi-sun a,sked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you. Sir, acquired your military
Jan Yu replied: "It has been acaptitude by study, or is it innate?"
"How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that
quired by study."
"It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was
are
a
of
Confucius?"
disciple
you
3
It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise
taught by Confucius.
both civil and military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the
art of fighting has not yet gone very far."
Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil"
and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of
action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more
I
can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members
of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or
do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss
than
the subject, they are at once set
down
and brutal
an extraordinary instance of the way
1
The
propensities.
first
instance of
Ch'ien's letter to
'fjj-
translates
it
to indicate
3
Cf.
This
4^
is
^^
Jen
An
given in the
^fc
"la cangue et
(see
la chaine."
some single instrument of
SAIA Chi, ch. 47,
f.
ii
as eccentric individuals of coarse
AJT vjg
P'-'ei
cn
?
.
Wen Yun Fu
41,
f.
from Ssu-ma
9 r), where M. Chavannes
But in the present passage
torture.
is
in
it
seems rather
INTRODUCTION
XLVII
which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles. l
When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch'eng Wang, he regulated
ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and
2
he sallearning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted,
When Confucius held office under the
lied forth and chastised them.
Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, 3 he said "If
pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have been
:
made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed
cowered under him and dared not proceed to
said that these
We
the Marquis of Ch'i,
How
violence.
can
who
it
two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters?
be
*
have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu
He
high esteem.
Classics -
in
also appeals to the authority of the
:
Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have
never studied matters connected with armies and battalions." 5 Replying
to K'ung Wen-tzu, he said: "I have not been instructed about buff-coats
and weapons." 6 But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, 7 we find
that he used armed force against the men of Lai, 8 so that the marquis
of Ch'i was overawed.
Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he
ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and
fled
in
confusion.
He
9
once uttered the words
"If I fight,
:
* ?i ? li * ft #
***m
^
tr
2
See Shti Ching^ preface
3
See
Tso Chuan,
Jj
J3
* # JA BE
4
X. 2
;
Shih Chi, ch. 47,
Lun
6
8
Tso Chuan^
j
Tso Chuan,
^.
Sf-
ift
55.
XI.
,
X.
7.
2.
KB,
f.
4 r
XV.
7
See supra.
9
Ibid. XII.
i.
5; CA*Vz
K
i
ch
-
I
con-
INTRODUCTION
XLVIII
"The Sage exercises both civil and milbe a fact that Confucius never studied or
received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not
choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the
Yu
And Jan
quer."
2
itary functions."
*
also said
Can
:
it
specially
subject of his teaching.
3
Sun Hsing-yen, the
strain
Sun Tzu,
editor of
writes in similar
:
He also said:
unversed in military matters." *
Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated
"If I fight, I conquer."
5
music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial,
and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence,
Confucius said: "I
am
*
the words
"I
unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are
am
things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have
But
to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war.
if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who
was employed by Wu Tzti-hsu, there
Hence the remark added by Confucius
no need
is
to
learn
it
oneself.
"If I fight, I conquer." 6
The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these words
of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on
:
not worth reading. With blind persistency, they
adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father's books to
no purpose, 7 as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing
the art of war were
1
have failed
2
See supra.
to trace this utterance.
IN
*
5
M 6 ff
xliii.
m & ti ft A z
HB ftA ft 1? B.3U M &
&mmA
-
ft
See note 2 on p.
ft
ffi
See supra.
Vh.,
Epf jjjg
,
the
other
four
being
mourning, entertainment of guests and
and Chou Li, IX.
fol.
49.
Preface to Sun Tzu:
,
|X|
,
See
and
"worship,
J|
Shu Ching, II. I. iii. 8,
!jj|
^^.g^^^^^^^^^
E
See p. 166.
"=jy
festive rites."
m & m s. m z
^M
INTRODUCTION
XLIX
books on war have
to do with such things as opportunism in designthe
of spies, they hold that the art is immoral
and
conversion
ing plans,
and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies
of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also require
steady application and practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients
were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch their work.
2
and fighting perilous: and unless a general is in
Weapons are baneful
that
l
he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle. 3
Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should be studied. *
Hence
used
to
instruct his nephew Chi 5 in the art of war.
Hsiang Liang
Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not
constant practice,
essential that
is
it
pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that
he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realise that the
artifices of war are beyond verbal computation.
Duke Hsiang
and King Yen of Hsu 7 were brought to destruction by their
The treacherous and underhand nature of war
misplaced humanity.
necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There
is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted
8
and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. 9 Can we
oath,
then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and honesty? 10
tricks
and
of Sung
1
This
G
is
a rather
Tzu-ch^an says:
obscure allusion
to
Tso Chuan,
^ ^ E^ ^ ^ ^ ^
&%^f
|jg
^tQ
>^c
JJL
3
Too Te Ching,
Cf.
ch. 31:
Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius
$$
again.
XXXI.
,
4,
where
you have a piece
"If
||
of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to
*
fl<*
-*-^
make
it
up."
.
See
Lun
Yu, XIII. 29, 30.
A
5
Better
6
The
cident
7
9
10
known
third
as
Hsiang
among
referred
to,
the
^
^5,
see Tso
m
^
*
See supra, p. xvi, note
Ibid., ch. 38, f. 8z>.
ig
^j
Yii [B.C. 233-202].
4t\
r-l
I
(or
enumerated on
tfH)
-^Jyv
Chuan, 4&L /fe
4.
ft fch 43
8
,
XXII.
141.
p.
4.
Shih Chi, ch. 47,
f.
7
r.
For the
in-
INTRODUCTION
L
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Chinese treatises on war,
following are the oldest
each have been drawn
on
notes
The
Sun Tzu.
The
after
from
principally
the
1
^g
.
-^ -^ Wu Tzu,
Wu
Ch'i
^
jj
ming mu
ch'uan shu chien
in
i
lu,
A
(df.
fol.
9,
chuan or 6
B.C. 381).
^ g
fgj
ch.
^
^
Stf
#
22 sqq.
chapters.
By
^
See Shih
genuine work.
Chi, ch. 65.
2.
Hj
,lf
as
Ssu-ma Fa,
to
attributed
Wrongly
the
^
in
chuan or
i
fjf)
Its
6 th century B.C.
the customs of the three
ancient dynasties are con*
met with in its pages.
The Ssu K^u Ch'uan Shu (ch.
See Shih Chi, ch. 64.
99, f. i) remarks that
stantly to be
the oldest three treatises on war,
the
Ssu-ma Fa,
chapters.
5
J| fj| | Ssu-ma Jang-chu of
date, however, must be early,
Sun
Tzu,
Wu
Tzu and
generally speaking, only concerned
are,
with things strictly military
-
-
the art of producing, col-
lecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory
with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, trans2 in strong
port of goods and the handling of soldiers
-
contrast
usually
to
later
in
which the science of war
is
works,
blended with metaphysics, divination and magical
arts in general.
3-
^
tributed
known
@ Liu T'ao,
to
as
g
H
^ /^
Lii
T'ai
in
6 chuan or 60 chapters.
Wang
Kung)
Lii
(or
of the
1
2 th
^
At-
Shang,
century B.C.
3
also
But
3
See p. 174. Further details on T'ai
Kung will be found in the Shih Chi,
32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former minister of Chou
Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to which he would
appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by Wen
ch.
Wang.
INTRODUCTION
its
1
does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties.
Lu Timing (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work,
style
MW
1^
and enumerates the headings
J5%
LI
HI
^K)
'
later
anc*
^t
'
so
^, jj,
cannot
been
have
forgery
of the six sections,
t ^ie
t ^iat
than the Sui dynasty.
It IS "7" Wei Liao Tzu in 5 chuan. Attributed
Wei Liao (4 th cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous
JJjL
^r Kuei-ku Tzu. The g| ^, under
^, mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the
text we possess contains only 24.
Its matter is sound
4-
to
^
&
the main, though the strategical devices differ
3
considerably from those of the Warring States period.
in
enough
been furnished with a commentary by the
has
It
well-
known Sung philosopher ij|f jjfc Chang Tsai.
50& San Liieh, in 3 chuan. Attributed to J|
Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is said
H
^^
to
have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. B.C. 187) in an
interview on a bridge. 8
But here again, the style is not
that of works dating from the Ch'in or Han period. The
Wu
Han Emperor Kuang
from
one of
in
it
2557]
[A.D.
apparently quotes
but the passage in
later on, in order to
his proclamations;
question may have been inserted
prove the genuineness of the work.
out
we
if
refer
it
A.D., or somewhat
3
See
Han
Shu,
Jg j^
earlier.
^
,
*
4k
the
l
ai
Liu T~ao.
-^j?>
l/j[
ImF %&.
~jfc
Catalogue,
is
the
-|pr
there
called^
be far
pf ?^
also
included in
in
i
.
the
chuan.
^ .&
.
attributes both the
$.! 2
ft
Another work said
H}|
ips Su Shu
is
The T~u Shu
Kung.
&& 7'tt#it M *ff'
by Huang-shih Kung, and
shall not
4
The work
ch. 40.
Hence it has been confused with
Liu T-ao and the San Liieh to T
We
Northern Sung period [420-478
to the
to
have been written
military section of the Imperial
A
short ethical treatise of Taoist
INTRODUCTION
Lil
^
6.
Written
<&
f
ftjj
Wei Rung Wen Tui,
in 3 sections.
form of a dialogue between T'ai Tsung
the
in
ij Li
^
Li Ching, it is usually ascribed
to the latter.
Competent authorities consider it a forgery,
the author was evidently well versed in the art
and
his great general
jf|
though
of war.
l
^ & $; Lia Ching Ping Fa
(not to
S ^ $S Wu Ch<i chin
i
ip|
7.
be confounded
short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved
with the foregoing) is
This
the Tung Tien, but not published separately.
fact explains its omission from the Ssu K'u Ch'uan Shu.
in
8
-
to the legendary minister
^
Jjj^
3
g>
m
^-.
Attributed
Hou, with exegetical
of the Han dynasty
Jg Feng
notes by $$ $fc
Kung-sun Hung
eulogised by the
(d. B.C. 121), and said to have been
Yet
celebrated general Jf pj| Ma Lung (d. A.D. 300).
the earliest mention of it is in the
Although a
^ ^.
forgery, the
work
is
well put together.
3
Considering the high popular estimation
Chu-ko Liang has always been held,
in
^^
prising
his
(
(
to
find
pen.
2)
(i
^
which
is
not sur-
more than one work on war ascribed
Such are
the
(i)
-f-
^^
to
Shih Liu Ts'e
^ ^C ft
Yung Lo Ta Tien ;
Hsin Shu
?ff $L Chiang Yuan (i ^.)- and (3) Aj)
which
None of
steals
Tzu.
from
Sun
wholesale
ch.\
chuan\ preserved
i
it
in the
^<
these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine.
savour,
having no reference whatever to war,
hand of
^^ |^
Correct Wylie's
_ml Chang Shang-ying
"Notes,"
new
it
pronounced a forgery from the
is
(d. 1121),
who
edited
it
with commentary.
and Courant's "Catalogue des Livres
edition, p. 90,
Chinois," no. 5056.
We
are told in the
^ ^ J?
were those prescribed
Yu Hai,
2
ch.
140,
Also written
f.
for military
that the
above
training in the
six
works, together with Sun
j^
J|i. period (1078-85).
4 r.
g^
j
and
|
J
Wu
Chi Ching.
Tzii,
See
INTRODUCTION
LIII
Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain
may be
following" references
Tung
Tien
T<ai
3$C fit
35
'/S
H yf
(circa
P in
'
found useful
800 A.D.),
Lan
Yii
ch.
Yii
Hai
(13
cent.),
ch.
:
148-162.
(983), ch.
M ^ W ^n Hsien T'ung K'ao
th
140,
(13*
270-359.
cent.), ch. 221.
141.
\^
H" San Ts'ai T'u Hui (16* cent.),
Chih (1607), ch.
Kuang Po
If IS $3
}f ^|||J;ChHen Ch'io Lei Shu (1632), ch.
HII
Wu
^
?K3
SS iS
"ifr
-4*
Yiian Chien Lei
H S ^1
Ku Chin
J?!c
g| ^jgc^Ji^ Hsu
ch.
M 18 ^
tft
^t
Han
Wen
31,
ch. 7, 8.
32.
75.
(1710), ch. 206-229.
T<u Shu Chi Ch'eng
XXX,
Hsien
section
ex-
The
devoted to the literature of war.
sections
tensive
^jr/.
T ung
4
(1726),
ch. 81-90.
K'ao
(1784),
121-134.
H Huang Ch'ao Ching Shih Wen Pien
(1826), ch. 76, 77.
The bibliographical
also deserve mention
sections of certain historical
works
:
^ g| ^ Ch'ien
|5jf
3j|
^ff
Han
Shu,
^ Sui Shu,
jg m Chiu T'ang Shu,
^ Hsin T'ang Shu,
ch. 32-35.
ch. 46, 47.
ch.
)
Sung Shih,
T'ung Chih
To
ch. 30.
57-60.
ch. 202-209.
(>^
1150), ch. 68.
these of course must be added the great Catalogue
of the Imperial Library:
-
K'u Ch'iian Shu Tsung
Mu T'i Yao (1790), ch. 99,
100.
LAYING PLANS.
I.
This
is
the only possible
meaning of
which M. Amiot and Capt.
g-|-,
Calthrop wrongly translate "Fondements de 1'art militaire" and "First
Ts'ao Kung says it refers to the deliberations
principles" respectively.
we
the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as
should say, in his tent. See
26.
in
i
Sun
.
Tzii said
:
The
art of
war
is
of vital importance
to the State.
2.
It
is
a
matter of
life
Hence
safety or to ruin.
it
and death, a road
is
to
either
a subject of inquiry which
can on no account be neglected.
The
of war, then,
governed by five constant
be taken into account in one's deliberations,
when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in
3.
factors,
the
is
to
field.
The
etc.
art
old text of the
Tung
Tien has
Later editors have inserted
The former
correction
is
l|j
$r $g
after j
J# ft
,
and
perhaps superfluous, but the
before
J^
latter
||
jfc
^-|*
,
.
seems neces-
sary in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading
in
I am inclined to think, however,
12, where the same words recur.
that the
whole sentence from
no business here
saying that
g-(-
at
all.
If
it
jdfc
to
is
'H||
be retained,
an interpolation and has
be right in
Wang Hsi must
denotes the "seven considerations" in
13.
are
'fjfj
the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about victory or defeat.
The antecedent
of the
first
is
J
;
of the second,
J^
>
-
4.
contains the idea of "comparison with the enemy," which cannot well
12.
be brought out here, but will appear in
Altogether, difficult though
it is, the passage is not so hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop
in
burking
it
entirely.
The Moral Law (2) Heaven (3) Earth
The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
These are
4.
(4)
:
(i)
;
;
;
appears from what follows that Sun Tzti means by j|f^ a P ri nc ipl e
It
of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in
might be tempted to render it by "morale," were
attribute of the ruler in
13.
5,
6.
The Moral
Law
complete accord with their
him regardless of
The
omits
JjjJ
ffjj
.
ruler,
their lives,
original text omits
after
causes
^
^jjj,
moral aspect.
its
it
the
One
not considered as an
people to
be
in
so that they will follow
undismayed by any danger.
inserts
an
after
JJ
Capt. Calthrop translates
:
each
~flj*,
and
"If the ruling authority
be upright, the people are united"
a very pretty sentiment, but wholly
out of place in what purports to be a translation of Sun Tzu.
7. Heaven
and seasons.
signifies night
The commentators,
Thus Meng Shih
I think,
defines the
and day, cold and heat, times
make an unnecessary mystery
words
as
Mil
Inl'J
&
s\^
Tjft
JHL
&S
/MO
of
(^
"the hard
.
||J|?
and
waxing and waning," which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,
"the
however, may be right in saying that what is meant is jUj
of
general economy
Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.
the
soft,
^^
Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger
security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances
of life and death.
8.
and
^E ^fe (omitted by Capt. Calthrop)
because the safety of an army
may have been
depends largely on
these geographical features to account.
its
included here
quickness to turn
&^
10.
7^
9.
Commander
ffl
stands
the virtues of wisdom,
for
benevolence, courage and
sincerity,
The
g
ft id g-
strictness.
cardinal virtues of the Chinese are
five
benevolence;
of mind; (3)
l|| uprightness
(2)
jj|J|
^
(i)
f"!
humanity or
self-respect, self-control,
wisdom; (5) -jpj sincerity or good faith. Here
and
are put before
>JU
^^ and the two military virtues of "courage"
>j=|
and "strictness" substituted for l|h and
or "proper feeling;" (4)
,
ifi
10.
By Method and
of the
marshalling
.
discipline are to be understood the
in
army
proper subdivisions, the
its
of rank
gradations
among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
control of military expenditure.
The Chinese
so concise as to be practically unintelhave followed the interpretation of Ts'ao
Others take each of the
and again
J^
of this sentence
without commentary.
ligible
Kung, who
joins |Qj
six predicates
^j|J
is
I
^
separately.
f[j|
has the
"cohort" or division of an army.
.
somewhat uncommon sense of
Capt. Calthrop translates: "Partition
and ordering of troops," which only covers
1 1
.
These
five
^
^j|J
.
heads should be familiar to every general
will be victorious; he who knows
:
who knows them
he
them not
will
fail.
your deliberations, when seeking to
determine the military conditions, let them be made the
12. Therefore,
in
basis of a comparison, in this wise
The Yu Lan has an
that
the
interpolated
ust
J
^
:
before
.
g-J*
It is
obvious, how-
enumerated cannot be described as
^L ^jf
g-f.
Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which he had
omitted in
3, shows himself decidedly hazy: "Further, with regard to
ever,
and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must
be compared with our own." He does not appear to see that the seven
queries or considerations which follow arise directly out of the Five heads,
instead of being supplementary to them.
these
& & ft m
i&
V II ft** it 4
13.
Which of
(i)
the two sovereigns
is
imbued with the
Moral law?
I.
e.,
harmony with
"is in
his subjects." Cf.
5.
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
(2)
(3)
and Earth?
See
7,
On
(4)
Tu Mu
8.
which side
is
discipline
most rigorously enforced?
alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A. D. 155
220),
disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his
who was such a strict
own severe regulations
against injury to standing crops, he condemned
himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn
However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense
!
Ts'ao Ts'ao's
of justice by cutting off his hair.
present passage
f{
when you
is
characteristically curt:
down
a law, see that
the offender must be put to death."
lay
Which army
(5)
it is
|*
own comment on
^^^
fft
not disobeyed;
ffjj
if it is
jjfc
the
|^
disobeyed,
the stronger?
is
Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, ptj Jfft
|^
[
which might be freely rendered "esprit de corps and 'big battalions.'"
On
(6)
which side are
officers
,
and men more highly
trained ?
Tu Yu
quotes
3E -^
as saying:
"Without constant practice, the
of-
be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be
wavering and irresolute when the
crisis is at hand."
ficers
will
In which
(7)
in
army
is
there the greater constancy both
reward and punishment?
IJJ
,
literally "clear;" that is,
on which
side
certainty that merit will be properly rewarded
is
there the most absolute
and misdeeds summarily
punished ?
14.
By means
of these seven considerations
cast victory or defeat.
I
can fore-
I^
I?-
15.
upon
will
it,
nor acts upon
let
it,
counsel and acts
my
such a one be retained
in
general that hearkens not to my counsel
let such a one be
will suffer defeat:
!
The form
Sun Tzu's
of this paragraph reminds us that
composed expressly
of the Wti State.
@^
that hearkens to
conquer:
The
command!
dismissed
fllfe
ftf ffS i&J
The general
for
the benefit of his patron
^
not necessary, however, to understand
It is
some commentators
(as
||f]
treatise
Ho
Lii,
^j
was
king
before
as "generals under
*|^
do), or to take
my command."
1
6.
self
While heeding the
of any
also
profit of
my
counsel, avail your-
circumstances over and beyond
helpful
the ordinary rules.
Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: "Wherefore,
with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage,
and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory."
Mere
logic should
17.
have kept him from penning such frothy balderdash.
According
as
circumstances
are
favourable,
one
should modify one's plans.
Sun Tzu,
as a practical soldier, will
have none of the "bookish theoric."
He
cautions us here not to pin our faith to' abstract principles; "for," as
Chang Yii puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly
enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the
actions
in attempting to secure a favourable position in
the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge,
the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to
of the
enemy
On
actual warfare."
commanding
learn
what
his
plans
and calculations were
for the
morrow, because, as
he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and
would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke
I
listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first to-morrow
or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied
the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given
my
plans will depend
mine are ?"
upon
his,
Lord Uxbridge.
me any
how can you
"Well," continued
idea of his projects; and as
expect
me
*
*
"Words on Wellington," by
Sir
W.
Fraser.
to tell
you what
^ % H M.
18-
78 ft W4M:
4t& ff :$ 2 7 1^ K ^
ft
Sfcifii^za
20.
^ij
21.
&
22.
1
fffi
if
rffl
ffi
ii
ffn
$t
ffi
BB
&2
2. J&
ffi
If
;
2
ffi)
All warfare
8.
is
2
based on deception.
will be admitted by every
Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with
which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."
The
and profound saying
truth of this pithy
Col.
soldier.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
/i 9.
we must make the enemy believe we are far
away; when far away, we must make him believe we
are
near,
are near.
Hold out baits
and crush him.
20.
order,
as often in
JJ5(,
remarkable that
refer
more
to
ja^
natural
all
the
to
Sun Tzu,
the enemy.
entice
to
used in the sense of
is
Feign
It is rather
*j|c.
the commentators, with the exception of
enemy: "when he is in
suppose that Sun Tzu is
disorder,
dis-
Chang
crush him."
Yii,
It
is
illustrating the uses of
still
deception in war.
21.
he
If
he
If
is
in
||[
secure at
all
points,
be prepared for him.
superior strength, evade him.
The meaning
to
is
of
is
made
clear
jjj
"weak or vulnerable spots."
from chap. VI, where
jjtji
it is
opposed
Tu Yu and other
men as well as to
according to
commentators, has reference to the keenness of the
numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-fetched
"If there are defects,
Pretend to be
translation:
awe
the
enemy.
avoid you"
give an appearance of perfection, and
strong, and so cause the enemy to
!
22.
If
your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irPretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
ritate him.
follow Chang Yu
Mei Yao-ch'en into
I
in
my
^ J^
interpretation of :&%
j|r
jg
.
Wang
.
j|l
is
expanded by
Tzu, quoted by
Tu Yu,
23.
*Ht
fcUZfe
ffl
ift^lt^
2520.
says that the
a mouse,
tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with
good
first
weakness and immobility, and then suddenly
feigning
pouncing upon him.
23. If
This
is
K% $&
taking his ease, give him no rest.
probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch'en has
he
^
is
i^C
$f
$$.
^^
we
"while
enemy to tire himself out." The Yu Lan has
"Lure him on and tire him out." This would seem
the
Ts'ao Kung's
text,
judging by his
comment
the note:
are taking our ease, wait for
J,/j[
7Ji|J
jtj|
ffjj
also to
j&
^
^^
have been
.
forces are united, separate them.
If his
Less plausible
is
tators: "If sovereign
the interpretation favoured by most of the commenand subject are in accord, put division between them."
Attack him where he
24.
is
unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.
These
25.
military devices, leading to victory,
must not
be divulged beforehand.
seems
This
to
be
the
way
in
which Ts'ao
Kung
understood the
passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as
it stands.
Most of the commentators give the following explanation
:
touch
impossible to lay
with the enemy."
ignore
[J^
"It
is
,
down
rules
for
warfare before you
come
into
This would be very plausible if it did not
which unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzu
has been laying down.
It is possible,
of course, that
may be
jj
a later
interpolation, in which case the sentence would practically mean: "Success in warfare cannot be taught."
As an alternative, however, I would
venture to suggest that a second
that
to
we
get
:
"These maxims
for
^
may have
fallen out after
so
"jjj*,
succeeding in war are the
first
that ought
be imparted."
26.
Now
the
general
who wins
a battle makes
calculations in his temple ere the battle
is
fought.
many
8
Chang
Yii tells us that in ancient times
it
was customary
for a
temple
to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field,
in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt. Calthrop
misunderstands it as "the shrine of the ancestors,"
inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.
and gives a loose and
general who loses a battle makes but few calThus do many calculations lead to
culations beforehand.
The
victory,
and few calculations to defeat: how much more
no calculation at
I
can foresee
all!
who
is
It
is
by attention
to this point that
likely to win or lose.
II.
Ts'ao
WAGING WAR.
has the note:
Kung
^^^
"He who
wishes to fight must first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from
the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.
i.
are
Sun Tzu
in
said: In the operations of war,
where there
the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy
and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,
chariots,
were
the attack
;
Li Ch'iian,
the
"ffi
it
is
probable.
Capt.
respectively, but
to
note
the
according to Chang Yii, used for
were heavier, and designed for purposes of defence.
says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly
lightly built and,
ifi
true,
Calthrop translates "chariots" and "supply wagons"
not supported by any commentator. It is interesting
is
analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the
In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor,
did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number
Homeric Greeks.
forming as
it
With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed
was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy
chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into
a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.
of foot-soldiers.
that each swift chariot
with provisions enough to carry
2.78 modern li go
since Sun Tzu's time.
to
a mile.
The
them a thousand
length
may have
li,
varied slightly
the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint,
10
2.
A$
3.
en;
HM^&
IN
and sums spent on chariots and armour,
reach the
will
total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
ty
which follows
,
in the textus receptus,
?||!
is
important as indicating
In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it is omitted, so
the apodosis.
that he is led to give this meaningless translation of the opening sentence
:
"Now
the requirements of
The second
etc.
^
-3^
like
,
Such
it
which
JJP,
-5~^
are such that
is
1,000 chariots,"
omitted in the Yu Lan.
to suggest a large but indefinite
the Chinese have never possessed gold coins,
"1000 pieces of gold."
it is
incorrect
army of 100,000 men.
the cost of raising an
is
we need
is
redundant,
meant
is
above,
-^J- Jji
As
number.
to translate
War
Capt. Calthrop adds: "You have the instruments of victory," which he
to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.
seems
When
you engage in actual fighting, if victory is
long
coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and
their ardour will be damped.
2.
in
^
The Yu Lan omits
more
is
it
the
T ung
stead of
If
Tien and Yu
l
;
^^
but though
Lan
read
certainly a bold phrase,
is
Both
be right than not.
likely to
and
in this place
in
4,
in(in the sense of "to injure")
jji|j
$|,.
you lay siege
As synonyms
to a town,
to
Jjjl
you
are given
jjj^
exhaust your strength.
will
,
$p
,
|p|
and
^
.
3.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
of the State will not be
equal to the strain.
9\.
Of
-^
^
Sift
means
in this sense
W fS Tou
H
^ US ^ %k
J un
it
by
.
literally,
K'ang Hsi
in tne
"If there
cites
is
long exposure of the army."
an instance from the biography of
Hou Han Shu wnere
Cf. also the following
i
from the
|r^
tne
commentary
g^ ^
"General, you have long been exposed
:
defines
j|f
^
to all weathers."
1 1
4.
Now, when your weapons
are dulled, your ardour
and
exhausted
damped, your strength
your treasure spent,
other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your
Then no man, however wise, will be able to
extremity.
4.
avert the consequences that must ensue.
Following
i.
to
e.
Tu Yu,
But
mend.
I
understand
^
Tu Mu and Ho
in the sense of "to
Shih explain
it
make good,"
make good
as "to
for the future.
plans"
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
This concise and
difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the
Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'iian, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and
Mei Yao-ch'en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally
commentators.
stupid,
may
nevertheless conquer through
sheer force of rapidity.
Ho
Shih says: "Haste
may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of
energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they
bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking
:
"Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended,
an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yii says: "So
long as victory can be attained, stupid haste
Now
toriness."
plication,
is
preferable to clever dila-
Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by im-
about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy
What he does say is something much more guarded, namely
operations.
while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be
if only because it means impoverishment to the
anything but foolish
nation.
Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following:
that,
it is
acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration.
But though conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes
do always appear." It is hardly worth while to note the total disappearance
"Therefore
of
in
;j*(J
jj|j|
this precious
concoction.
In considering the point raised
here by Sun Tzti, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably
occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of
Rome against that of Hannibal's isolated army, because it seemed to him
that the latter was more likely to suffer from -a long campaign in a strange
But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have
country.
proved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favour.
12
There
6.
is
no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.
The Yu Lan
has
[gj
instead of
g|
evidently the mistake of
a scribe.
only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the
evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable
It
7.
is
of carrying
way
That
is,
it
on.
with rapidity.
Only one who knows the disastrous
effects of
a
long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to
a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but
it
fits
well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who
know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly
does not
pointless.
The
8.
skilful
soldier
does not raise
neither are his supply-waggons loaded
a second
more than
levy,
twice.
Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but
crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.
This may seem an audacious
recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to
that is, being a little ahead
Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time
of your opponent
has counted for more than either numerical superiority
policy to
or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.
the sense of
^
.
The T'ung
The commentators
^.
Tien and
Yu Lan have
~
|sj|
is
used in
the inferior reading
that the wagexplain ^f\
JJ& by saying
gons are loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is
met by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The
Yu Lan, however, reads
^.
here as well.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage
Thus the army will have food enough
9.
on the enemy.
for
its
|H
,
needs.
"things to be used," in the widest sense.
pedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.
It
includes
all
the im-
13
&tt & * M ft &
3 ft ft tt
m * * g * 1 m w ** it *8
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to
be maintained by contributions from a distance.
Con10.
tributing
maintain
to
an army at a distance causes the
people to be impoverished.
The beginning of this sentence does
not balance properly with the next,
though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so
awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It
never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may
be necessary
Tzu
for
and we get no help from them
the sense,
says that the cause of the people's impoverishment
is
Sun
here.
Jg|
jjffjjj
;
it
is
some system by which
clear, therefore,
the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct.
But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming then
that the
words have reference
to
ought to stand first in the sentence in order to balance j|
(the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus getting rid of
which latter word seems to me
we are still left with
|S|
[Jjjj
that
^^
^
J^
>
an obvious mistake for
^
,
"Poverty in the army" is an unlikely expression, especially as the general has just been warned not to encumber
.
army with a large quantity of supplies. If we suppose that (jj|}
somehow got written here instead of [H (a very simple supposition, as
we have jj j^ (jjjj in the next sentence), and that later on somebody,
his
scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss
J^
erasing
(Jj|j
,
the whole
1 1
.
On
prices to
to
^^
,
without however
muddle may be explained.
then would be
text
H^
"
My emended
etc<
the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
go up and high prices cause the people's sub;
stance to be drained away.
jj,
that
ritory.
the frontier.
even so
it
Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own terKung understands it of an army that has already crossed
is,
Ts'ao
as
Capt. Calthrop drops the
is
J^
,
reading
j^
j|j
^
,
but
impossible to justify his translation "Repeated wars cause
high prices."
12.
will
be
When
their substance is drained
afflicted
by heavy
exactions.
away, the peasantry
H
'
A JJ JB
^4Ui W II I
-b
14.
Cf.
JEt
Mencius VII.
^
xiv.
2.
2,
where
has the same meaning as
g*
j
was an ancient measure of land
-
The
-
iven
as
ful1 table >
= 1^; 100 ^ =
= #; 4^=1 eL;
^; ico^^ ^; 3 ^t = M; 3 M
=
According to the Chou Li, there were nine
4 S=iJ^; 4 j
by f^
^ ^, may
not be out of place here:
i
i
1
i
6/^
i
'fij
to a
husbandmen
lowance of 100
iJJ:,
(of
jjjj^
which would assign
which 6.6 now go
of these measures were in
Sun
Tzti's
time
to
is
man the
What
acre).
each
to
an
not
known with any
lineal
may
include levies of men, as well as other exactions.
f^,
V/I3, 14.
is
al-
certainty.
^
supposed to have been about 20 cm.
The
however,
goodly
the values
With this loss of substance and exhaustion of
the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
strength,
and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;
The Yu Lan omits gj Jjp
I n y i ew
etc
'/I SB y^-^
HlI Eft
.
-
>
S'* /M~I
I
would propose the emended reading
of tne
fact tnat
i
we nave St
^j
two preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that ^J
for
having been added afterwards to make
,
j||J
Jp
^ J^ ^Cj
the homes."
literally:
For
F
and Wang Hsi
:
of y3^, but of T7
from our
text.
^
,
^
cf.
,
Shih Ching
Tu Mu
.^ -^ 4.
^
of their income.
Ho
II. 3. vi.
says:
;
3
jifi
'^
i
n tne
a scribe's mistake
sense.
"Within the middle plains there
Jgr
3
regard to -f>
is
and
is
p|
jjjj|
^
emptiness in
II. 5. n. 3.
^ || -f ^ ^ ^
With
{fj
,
the people are mulcted not
that
is,
But
this
is
hardly to be extracted
Shih has a characteristic tag:
Sm^^^JgA*fi^fi'lt
||0
"
Jxj[
The
fji '1^ 2J!C
*&
being
regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people's heaven,
is it not right that those in
authority should value and be careful of
both?"
Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out
.horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears
and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy
waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
while
15
31
The K# Lan has
which are
Ji
2fc.
Jjj?
for
on
common
which
^,
j
country districts"
more important of
for
), "~J"'
j^, and
several various readings here, the
the less
for
1^-+
(cf.
(read
/'z'
must mean "oxen from the
if right,
latter,
supra,
^
2
For the meaning of >H|
12).
^^
Capt. Calthrop omits to translate fr.
III,
4.
15.
Hence a wise general makes a
jjl
,
see note
.
point of foraging
One
on the enemy.
cartload of the enemy's provisions is
twenty of one's own, and likewise a single
equivalent
picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's
to
own
store.
Because twenty cartloads
one cartload
to the front.
be consumed
will
According
or 64
but according to
g>J,
Meng
6.
Now
in
roused to anger
order to
;
in the process of transporting
Kung, a ||f
Shih, 10 ffl
picul consisted of 70 ^j* catties (Tu
literally, "beanstalks and straw."
1
to Ts'ao
kill
Mu
make
a
and others say
the enemy, our
= 6 ffi
|jf.
120).
gij.
,
^
lg ^f,
men must be
may be advantage from
that there
4
The
defeating
the enemy, they must have their rewards.
These are two
with
difficult sentences,
Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase.
which
I
have translated in accordance
We may
incontinently reject Capt.
Calthrop's extraordinary translation of the first: "Wantonly to kill and
destroy the enemy must be forbidden." Ts'ao Kung quotes a jingle current in
Mu
his
says:
day:
^ ft %
^ ^^ make
^ Q.
<
ffl|
"Rewards are necessary
in order to
Tu
the soldiers see the
advantage of beating the enemy thus, when you capture spoils from the
enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a
;
keen desire to
fight,
each on his own account.
the direct object of
J^(
17.
Therefore
chariots
,
in
which
is
chariot
Chang Yu
takes
^c|J
as
not so good.
fighting,
when
ten
or
more
have been taken, those should be rewarded who
took the
first.
i6
is.
the first to lay their hands
Capt. Calthrop's rendering is "They who are
on more than ten of the enemy's chariots, should be encouraged." We
should have expected the gallant captain to see that such Samson-like
prowess deserved something more substantial than mere encouragement.
and has Jjj/J _, in place of the more archaic g^ _^
T. omits
:
.
,
|jj
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction
The captured soldiers should be kindly treated
with ours.
A
and
kept.
1
i8./
This
/onown
.
called, using the
is
strength.
conquered foe to augment
^^ ^ ^f^ff^^,
f
.
As Ho Shih remarks:
this
to
be
chapter
20.
with."
trifled
is
victory, not
r*&2sC,
engthy campaigns.
/ thing
be
In war,* then, let your great object
^^pf^C^^'Srif ^w*
Sun Tzu here
reiterates the
r
is
not a
main lesson which
intended to enforce.
Thus
it
may be known
that the leader of armies
of the people's fate, the man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
is
the
arbiter
In the original
text, there is
a
/jh
before the
J$J
.
jk ft
III.
Sun Tzu
ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.
In the practical art of war, the best
the enemy's country whole and
take
thing
So, too,
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.
it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it,
1.
of
all
said:
is
to
to capture a regiment, a
than to destroy them.
A
jj[
detachment or a company entire
"army corps," according
to
Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of
12500 men; according to Ts'ao Kung, a j^j contained 500 men, a 7jj
any number between 100 and 500, and a '(JL any number between
and
100.
For the
last
two,
of TOO and 5 respectively.
Hence
however, Chang
and conquer in all your battles
not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists
breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
2.
to
5
Yii gives the exact figures
fight
is
in
Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old
Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge
French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.
3.
Thus the highest form of generalship
the enemy's plans
is
to baul
;
2
4
.
I.e.,
as Li Ch'iian says (<f&
3(
$ &)>
jft
"> their ver y inception.
^
falls short of expressing the full force of
Perhaps the word "baulk"
which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be content
to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an active policy of
,
Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the
a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by
made
has
enemy
delivering our own attack first."
counter-attack.
next best
the
forces
is
to prevent the junction of the
enemy's
;
him from
Isolating
his
We
allies.
must not forget that Sun
Tzti, in
always has in mind the numerous states or princithe
China of his day was split up.
into
which
palities
speaking of
hostilities,
the next in order
When
he
is
to attack the
is
already in
full
The
use of the word J5
modern
4.
The
rule
is
all
the field
is
;
to besiege walled cities.
somewhat unusual, which may account
text
not
is,
in
strength,
and the worst policy of
the reading of the
enemy's army
:
S
to
~J\ JJ
for
.
JjjjJJ
besiege walled
cities
if it
can
possibly be avoided.
Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it
an d refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley,
Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would
have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously
in 1899,
to oppose them.
The
preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months;
It is
as
^
not quite clear what
Ts'ao Kung simply defines them
were.
|J|
but
we get a better idea of them from Li Ch'iian,
;jtjg "large shields,"
who
says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting
the city walls at close quarters.
This seems to suggest a sort of Roman
testudo,
ready made.
j|2 ffi"
Hsi), but this
is
Tu Mu
says
they were "what are
now termed
(wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to
is
denied by Ch'en Hao.
also applied to turrets
on
city walls.
See supra,
Of
|j|f
4H
II.
14.
K'ang
The name
(fen yuri)
we
get
19
5
z-
H
g&mmmzw
%. -*
.
from several commentators. They were wooden
on four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men
to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat
a
fairly clear description
missile-proof
structures
with earth.
Tu Mu
adds that they are
now
called
"wooden
Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates the term, "battering-rams."
donkeys."
I follow
Ts'ao
with
/
.
lent
to
Kung
-^
and the
"long,"
and synonymous
in taking
as a verb, co-ordinate
J=T
Those commentators who regard
jj|
~fc j|||
JL
make
an adjective equivajj|
presumably into a noun.
as
up of mounds over against the walls
piling
will
take three months more.
The
J|J |||| (or Jjjj in the modern text) were great mounds or ramof
earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in order to
parts
,
discover the
weak
The
5.
points in the defence,
mentioned
fortified turrets
general,
men
launch his
and
also to destroy the
jjfe
Tu Yu
in the preceding note.
unable
to
control
to the assault like
his
irritation,
swarming
^
quotes the Tso
will
ants,
Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as Ts'ao
Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a
wall.
The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay,
may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of
war are ready.
with the result that one-third of his
town
the
still
remains untaken.
men
are slain, while
Such are the disastrous
effects of a siege.
We
are reminded of the
terrible
losses of the
Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.
Tien reads
^ J$ ^
For
the
"|H^ J
Yu Lan has
and
Therefore
6.
jg;
the
.
.
.
fQ ^K
||J
.
^
$L
.
.
.
#$
T'-ung
<
.
Capt. Calthrop does not translate
mistranslates
skilful
leader
subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their
\
The
cities with-
2O
7.
their
laying siege to them; he overthrows
without lengthy operations in the field.
kingdom
out
Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the
The
ment, but does no harm to individuals.
Wang, who after having put an end
"Father and mother of the people."
[j||
to the
,
that
classical
is,
the Govern-
instance
is
Wu
Yin dynasty was acclaimed
intact he will dispute the mastery
7. With his forces
of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
be complete.
will
the
to
Owing
& ^
double meanings of
,
[=
^
]
and
^
|J
,
the
latter part of the sentence
susceptible of quite a different meaning:
"And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains
is
Chang Yii says that
kingdom and a strong army."
perfect."
This
x
8.
is
It is
the
^pjj
"the advantage of a prosperous
is
method of attacking by stratagem.
the rule in war,
one, to surround
him
if
if
;
our forces are ten to the enemy's
him
one, to attack
five to
;
Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.
if
twice as numerous, to divide our
Note that
clauses.
Tu Mu
to
^
into two.
does not refer to the enemy, as in the two
^preceding
change of object is quite common in Chinese.
This sudden
takes exception to the saying;
violate a
and
fundamental principle of war.
a clue to Sun Tzti's meaning:
t$;f
army
ty ^
at first sight, indeed, it appears
Ts'ao Kung, however, gives
^
$ij
||J
j|
two to the enemy's one, we may use one
^ij pj "Being
army
in the regular way,
and the other
for
some
]
parlf;
of our
special diversion."
[For
and
see V. 3, note.]
explanation of j
Chang Yu thus further
elucidates the point
"If our force is twice as numerous as that of the
^
,
:
enemy,
in front,
it
should be
and one
up
upon
split
to fall
into
two
divisions,
one
to
meet the enemy
he replies to the frontal attack,
the rearward attack, he may be
his rear; if
he may be crushed from
behind; if to
crushed in front. This is what is meant
by saying that "one part may
be used in the regular way, and the other for some
special diversion."
Tu Mu does not understand that
dividing one's army is simply an irregular, just as
is
concentrating it is the regular, strategical method,
too hasty in calling this a mistake."
and he
21
1& HI it
If
9.
Li
=fc
_H
2
^t
XV
matched
as
j||2
if
we can
in
Ho
followed by
*&
|=t
$f
Wfe
IKl*. |R-
it
offer battle;
the
gives
"If attackers
~T*\
were
j|||
^jf
following paraphrase:
and attacked are equally
He
The Tu Shu has ^f*
which
,
instead of i^fc
A^
-J
is
thus takes
awkward.
numbers, we can avoid the enemy
inferior in
slightly
Shih,
B^ 3!
M'J
only the able general will fight."
strength,
though
3Pi
Z*^
JS
sfe
equally matched,
Ch'iian,
^Pl
&n
ifc
,
which
is
;
hardly distinguishable in sense
The meaning, "we can watch
the enemy," is
but
on
the
unfortunately there apabove;
certainly a great improvement
the
for
variant.
be
no
to
Chang Yu reminds
very good authority
pears
from
in the next clause.
:jjn|
us that the saying only applies
difference in numbers is often
if
the other factors are equal; a small
more than counterbalanced by superior
energy and discipline.
if
we can
quite unequal in every way,
flee
from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the
10.
larger force.
In other words: "C'est magnifique; mais ce n'est pas la guerre."
Now
11.
the
is
general
the bulwark of the State:
if
the bulwark is complete at
points, the State will be
strong if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
all
;
K!i cannot
translation,
be restricted
to
"divided in his
metaphor suggested by
^
anything so particular as in Capt. Calthrop's
allegiance."
.
ft&$W*Jfc &M
:
general's
ability
profession), his
12.
is
not perfect
army
It
As Li Ch'uan
"
C/l '*>
(i.
e. if
is
simply keeping up the
tersely puts
it:
(Sjjji
j|f
-{j^
gap indicates deficiency; if the
he is not thoroughly versed in his
'
will lack strength."
There are three ways
misfortune upon his army:
in
which a ruler can bring
22
'"""""""'
1
.
13.
being
retreat,
This
ad
Jin.
time to
of the
ignorant
advance or to
to
army
fact that
cannot obey.
it
called hobbling the army.
is
Ts'ao
the
By commanding
(i)
defines
Kung weakly
^
as
:jjjp
"control," "direct."
Cf.
17
But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors which from
time illuminate Sun Tzu's work, and is rightly explained by Li
comment:
Ch'uanas=:^. He adds the
#fl
^
]g| JgL
$$
tijfa
||
^
.
"It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable
to gallop."
One would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as
being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a
But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote
distance.
the saying of T'ai
pfa
^jin
g^pTJ^^t^^S^PTja^t
Kung:
"A kingdom
should not be governed from without, an army
Of course it is true that, during
an engagement, 'or when in close touch with the enemy, the general
should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.
should not be directed from within."
misjudge the position as a whole, and
Otherwise, he will be liable to
give
orders.
wrong
14.
govern an army
to
By attempting
(2)
in
the
same
way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the
conditions which obtain in an army.
This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
Ts'ao Kung's note
"Pf
Ji^l
and the
^
j?p
civil
ill
A 5 /H ^
5^^AB B^^
"The
which may be
principles on which
and flexibility (
|H
civic virtues."
-
freely translated
:
military sphere
sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid
And Chang Yu
gloves."
army"
is:
>
to
inserted before
$jjk
^
says:
"Humanity and
govern a state,
),
justice
(fc f^
)
are the
but not an army; opportunism
on the other hand, are military rather than
^
"to assimilate the governing of an
jg
jj|
of a State, understood.
The Tung Tien has
|ij
that
JiJ
to
,
here and in
,
^
15.
23
n=
B5
T
5-
the officers of his
By employing
(3)
army without
discrimination,
That
he
is,
is
not careful to use the right
man
in the right place.
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
I follow
etc. refer,
Mei Yao-ch'en
Thus Tu Yu
a general
The
here.
is
make
other commentators
13, 14, but to the
not to the ruler, as in
officers
~jf\
^JJ
he employs.
^ ^ ^ ^ ff f| ^ 1^ ft $ 1 &
Tu Mu
^
p?
men
says:
"If
ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be en-
trusted with a position of authority."
~fc
quotes
:
"The
will employ the wise man, the brave man, the
employer of
covetous man, and the stupid man.
For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action,
skilful
man
of death."
quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has
The Tung Tien reads
which Tu Yu
as
"is
the covetous
no
fear
explains
|j
is
U^
j|j
inaccurate rendering
:
j|f
Capt. Calthrop gives a very
defeated."
utterly
,
"Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere
in its dispositions."
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble
This is
is
sure to come from the other feudal princes.
simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging vic1
6.
tory away.
Most of the commentators take
^
seems to bear also in the Li Chi,
as
its
usual
equivalent,
sense,
but Legge
translating
Tu Mu and Wang
tries
"draw
.
.
HI
.
the sense
in
I.
.
18.
of
[^|7
jjl
^E, which
is
it
there given
notwithstanding to retain the more
back,"
which
Hsi, however, think jj| Jj|f
is
hardly
defensible.]
means "leading up
to the
enemy's victory."
17.
Thus we may know
that there are five essentials
24
for
victory:
He
(i)
and when not
will
win
who knows when
to fight
to fight.
Yii says: "If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;
He will
fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive.
Chang
he cannot
if
invariably conquer
or the defensive."
He
(2)
and
who knows whether
who knows how
win
will
it
is
right to take the offensive
to handle both superior
inferior forces.
This
is
not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly,
and others make out. Chang Yii expounds the saying more
as Li Ch'iian
"By applying the art of war, it
and vice versa. The
satisfactorily:
force
and
locality,
possible with a lesser
secret lies in an eye for
is
defeat a greater,
to
moment
not letting the right
in
make
'With a superior force,
slip.
Thus
Wu
Tzii says:
ground; with an inferior one, make
for easy
for difficult ground.'"
He
(3)
spirit
Kung
He
(4)
refers
will
He
will
interfered with
Tu Yu
on
all
j^
its
~"f\
is
animated by the same
ranks.
less well to
sovereign and subjects.
win who, prepared himself, waits to take
enemy unprepared.
(5)
"It
win whose army
throughout
Ts'ao
the
will
quotes
win who has military capacity and
is
not
by the sovereign.
^
as saying:
=|fg#;g-&ifc#,M
the sovereign's function to
give broad instructions, but to decide
battle is the function of the
It is needless to dilate on the
general."
is
which have been caused by undue interference with
operations in the field on the part of the home government.
Napoleon
undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he
military disasters
was not hampered by any central
authority,
J -Tfi
and
in one.
that he was, in fact,
H&
/*"
jg
Victory
lies
Literally,
1
8.
know
in the
"These
knowledge of these
five things are
Hence the saying:
yourself,
five points.
knowledge of the principle of victory."
If you know the
enemy and
you need not fear the result of a hundred
25
you know yourself but not the enemy,
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. ^
If
battles.
Ch'iian cites the case of
who
p
g| Fu
Chien, prince of
for
Ch'in,
A.D. marched with a vast army against the
^- Chin Emperor.
warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services
in 383
When
of such
men
as
||J-
Hsieh
^^
An and ^g
^
Huan
Ch'ung, he boast-
"I have the population of eight provinces at my back, infully replied
to the number of one million; why, they could dam
horsemen
and
fantry
up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the
:
stream.
What danger have
I
to
Nevertheless, his forces were
fear?"
soon after disastrously routed at the
y|j|2
Fei River, and he was obliged
to beat a hasty retreat.
you know neither the enemy nor
succumb in every battle, x^
If
The modern
J|
the
,
which
Tung
text,
represented by the
^
*jj
^^
and
should be inclined to adopt in preference to
I
Tien and
Yu Lan both have
you
yourself,
the latter.
will
Tu 6/^,has jjfc
^
here, though
Chang Yu
oifers the
S
He says that these words "have
best commentary on
^fl fj ffl
reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to take
the offensive,
He
adds:
knowing yourself enables you
to stand
^^^^t^^S?fe^^
of defence;
defence
is
the planning of an attack."
find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.
on the defensive."
"Attack
It
is
the secret
would be hard
to
2.
IV.
^U
comprehensive and somewhat vague term.
a very
is
TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.
Literally,
"form," "body," it comes to mean "appearance," "attitude" or "disposition ;"
and here it is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining,
"tactics"
and "disposition of troops."
Ts'ao
Kung
explains
it
as
jp[
^
"marching and counteron
the
of
with
view
to discovering each
two
armies
a
the
marching
part
^ifc^il^ii^il^ffi^'l^-tfc
^
other's condition."
Tu Mu says: "It is through the
dispositions of
an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions
an d your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory;
(3&|
JfJ)>
show your
dispositions,
leads to defeat."
^ 13
it
Hfc
Wang
Jt
^3j
and your condition
will
become
patent,
which
Hsi remarks that the good general can
^
&|& Jfa
"secure success by modifying his tactics to
meet those of the enemy." In the modern text, the title of the chapter
which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates "the order
appears as
j|f
^
,
of battle."
1.
Sun Tzu
themselves
said:
beyond
The good
the
fighters of old first put
possibility
of
defeat,
and
then
waited for an opportunity of
defeating the enemy.
2.
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is
provided by the enemy himself.
That is, of course, by a mistake on his
part.
Capt. Calthrop has:
"The causes of defeat come from within;
victory is born in the enemy's
camp," which, though certainly an improvement on
is
still
incorrect.
his previous attempt,
27
I
3-
4-
Thus the good
3.
able
is
fighter
to
himself
secure
against defeat,
"By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up
and taking unremitting precautions" (Chang Yii).
make
but cannot
The
certain of defeating the
original text reads
further modified into
^ ^
^
j|j
~pj*
jj\ ~p*
Jj^
.
J
his tracks,
enemy.
which the modern
,
text has
Capt. Calthrop makes out the
impossible meaning, "and further render the enemy incapable of victory."
4. Hence the saying:
without being able to do
One may know how
to
conquer
it.
Capt. Calthrop translates: "The conditions necessary for victory may
be present, but they cannot always be obtained," which is more or less
unintelligible.
5
.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics
enemy means taking the offensive.
;
ability
to defeat the
For
^p
i
3,
~p[* Jj|p
in
spite
The meaning
is
I
retain
they give,
plausible enough, but
become
6.
active
in
the
sense which
undoubtedly bears in
it
of the fact that the commentators are
this
all against me.
takes the defensive,"
"He who cannot conquer
it is
way.
^
highly improbable that
An
incorrect
variant
Standing on the defensive indicates
in
should suddenly
the
Yii
Lan
is
insufficient strength
attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7.
The general who
is
skilled in defence hides in the
most secret recesses of the earth;
Literally, "hides
under the ninth earth," which
is
the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the
a metaphor indicating
enemy may not know
28
The
his whereabouts.
-
with the
"Nine
jj
he who
^
Jjjj
of this passage have of course no connection
situations" of chap. XI.
from the topmost
skilled in attack flashes forth
is
heights of heaven.
Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunThis is the opinion*
derbolt, against which there is no time to prepare.
of most of the commentators, though Ts'ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu,
explains
and other natural
at
skilful
features
^
attacked, and
as
which
will
the phases of
account by the attacking party. Capt.
in attack push to the topmost heaven" conveys
may be turned
"The
no meaning
rivers,
hills,
or protection to the
weather which
Calthrop's
the
as
fyjfc
shelter
afford
to
all.
Thus on the one hand we have
ability to protect our-
selves; on the other, a victory that
is
complete.
Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: "If
these precepts be observed, victory is certain."
8.
the
To see victory only when it is within the ken
common herd is not the acme of excellence.
As Ts'ao Kung remarks,
before
^
^
"the thing
is
of
to see the plant
has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun.
Li Ch'iian alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack
it
the vastly superior army of
which was strongly entrenched in
Jj| Chao,
the city of
Ch'eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are
jfc
going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The
^
officers
hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent.
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever
Han Hsin had
But
as he foresaw, he was able to
capture the city and
a crushing defeat on his
adversary. For the full story, see
JS
stratagem, whereby,
inflict
ff
"A
may
>
chap. 34,
^ ^
even
>jg
^
.
Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with
popularly proclaimed as such
not be a true success."
victory,
if
by the
common
:
folk,
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
True excellence being, as
H
$5f
'fifc
Z,
H 1^
^
Tu Mu
says
"
jfJL -j/J
:
(^
|j| j||
To P lar>
^|
secretly,
^move
to
jty ffi
sur-
29
tit
ft
* tt * if ft # JK *
to
reptitiously,
the enemy's intentions and baulk his schemes, so
day may be won without shedding a drop of blood."
Tzti reserves his approbation
for
things
To
^ ft
when
it
see
to
is
an autumn hair
Mencius,
The
sun and
vii.
i.
I.
moon
the noise of thunder
Ho
plumb."
is
no sign of great strength;
explained as the fur of a hare, which
begins to grow afresh.
Cf.
writers.
lift
finger fail to
that
thumb
"the world's coarse
And
10.
It
foil
that at last the
Sun
11*11
10,
phrase
a very
is
and Chuang
is finest
in
common one in
Tzti,
ffi
;[[>
Chinese
*Jj,
no sign of sharp sight;
no sign of a quick ear.
is
is
autumn,
et al.
to hear
Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick
hearing:
Jf^ |||
Wu
Huo, who could
lift
a tripod weighing 250 stone;
^fc. Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects
JS
no bigger than a mustard seed and [Jjjj lj|lf Shih K'uang, a blind musician
;
who
could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.
1 1
who
The
But
What
.
the
ancients
called
a clever fighter
is
one
not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
by the Tu ^,has
an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of
wki cn means literally "one who, conquering,
original text, followed
this is
H^ W^
3
^^
ifc
'
:
Mei Yao-ch'en says: "He
excels in easy conquering."
obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks
who only
sees the
below the surface
of things, wins with ease."
12. Hence his victories bring him
wisdom nor credit for courage.
neither reputation for
Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained
over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows
nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as
the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives
no credit for courage."
13.
He
13.
wins his battles by making no mistakes.
"He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu
"One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be
Hao
Ch'en
says:
futile attacks."
:
winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished;
whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are
at
make a blunder and
not yet manifest, will never
Li Ch'iian thinks that the character
But
it is
ment
better not to
in sense
is
therefore invariably win."
should be
~fifc
"to have doubts."
J^
tamper with the text, especially
.
when no improve-
the result.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated.
The
in the
T'-u
Shu omits jj\
sense of
^jjfc
;
ignores the important
^^ is here = jW
.
but this
word
is
^
.
far-fetched.
Chia Lin says
it is
put for ^jp
Capt. Calthrop altogether
.
14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the
moment
for defeating the
A
Jj|j
"
^
ti
coimse l of perfection," as
need not be confined
troops.
make
Thus
strictly to the actual
Tu Mu truly observes.
ground occupied by the
the arrangements and preparations which a wise
to increase the safety of his army.
It includes
general will
enemy.
is
all
that in
war the
victorious strategist only
seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he
who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks
15.
it
for victory.
Ho
Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In
warfare, first lay plans which
ensure victory, and then lead
your army to battle: if you will not
will^
begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no
longer be assured."
fcflf
1
The consummate
6.
and
^
in
wrong
^
and
see supra,
,
altering
their
it
17.
in his
is
In
moral law,
4 sqq.
here,
I think that Chang Yu
and taking them as
is
respectively.
to control success.
power
of
respect
I.
signification
^
and $|J
thus
cultivates the
adheres to method and discipline;
strictly
For
leader
***<**<*
Estimation
Measurement; secondly,
we
have, firstly,
of quantity; thirdly,
method,
military
Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
Victory.
fifthly,
1 8. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation
of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of
quantity Balancing of chances to Calculation and Victory
;
;
to Balancing of chances.
It
is
not easy to
The
distinguish
the
four
terms
j|
-j|j*
f|
7pp|
very
seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,
clearly.
which enable us to
form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and
'to
Jjr
make
first
jjj
calculations
based on the data thus obtained; we are thus
a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances
;|p|
with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then
ensues. The
Jj|p victory
led to
chief difficulty lies in
of numbers^
-M]
is
j
it
nearly synonymous with
~JT?
Perhaps
.
of the enemy's general position or con-
or
is the estimate of his numerical strength.
^^ ^ip )? while
('|*j{|
the other hand, Tu
and adds jjSji
defines
as
f|!
jjjy
(^
1
^j
Mu
B^MH
having been
play."
by
which some commentators take as a calculation
rather a consideration
dition
On
,
thereby making
the
Ho
fact
fl
ffl
settled,
t^
H Wi &
we can
"
the q uestion of relative strength
bring the varied resources of cunning into
Shih seconds this interpretation, which
that
;|p|
is
:
,
is
weakened, however,
on
this cer-
given as logically consequent
jjjf
points to the latter being a calculation of numbers.
Calthrop's version the less said the better.
tainly
;
Of
Capt.
32
A
19.
victorious
army opposed
pound's weight placed
in
a
<|i
(^
oz.);
is
as a
the scale against a single grain.
i
army is like an
(20 oz.) weighed against
a routed army as a j^w weighed against an i" The
Literally, "a victorious
j^
to a routed one,
J^
point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed
with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat.
Legge, in his note on
Mencius,
I.
2.
ix.
2,
makes the Jj^
to
be 24 Chinese ounces, and cor-
Chu Hsi's statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch'iian
of the T'ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.
rects
The onrush
20.
of a conquering force is like the bursting
chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
of pent-up waters into a
So much
The
sense
for tactical dispositions.
construction here
is
plain.
The
is
slightly
awkward and
elliptical,
but the general
Tu Shu omits jj*-^. A|j7/=8^or Chinese feet.
V.
2.
ENERGY.
V.
here
^jj;
seem
to
is
in
T*u Shu and the modern
^
"
^JJP
The
soldiers'
says:
-^ ^i
is
found
Wang
text.
# #$ ft & && # & #1$ "When
energy has reached
Sun Tzu
i.
same
fuller title
Hsi expands it into
/jif!| 33)*
various ways, of accumulated power;" and
tne application, in
Chang Yu
would
Tzu, however,
3jk;
the sense of "power," and the latter
only in the sense of "circumstances."
in the
Sun
an older form of
said to be
have used the former
its
height,
The
said:
it
may
be used
control of a large force
the control of a few
in principle as
the
to secure victory."
men
it
:
is
the
is
merely
a question of dividing up their numbers.
That
is,
up the army into regiments, companies,
cutting
subordinate officers in
command
Tu Mu
of each.
with
etc.,
Han
reminds us of
first Han Emperor, who once said to him:
I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000
an
think
do
army
you
large
men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he an-
Hsin's famous reply to the
"How
swered,
"the more the better"
(
^^^
yjft
If).
Chang Yu
gives
5 men
make a |^; 2 [^ make a *?
fc
2
2 >fe
make a ;6
make a
the following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:
make
a
^.;
make
^|J
make a
2
men.
^|J;
2
make
2
|fl|!.
But
cf. III.
in that paragraph
;
a
2
W
i,
may
a
fc; 5
make a
.
A
note.
also
j|?
For
;
-
-
;
or
;
army
^
,
corps thus works out at 3200
seel.
10.
It is possible that
^
be used in the above technical sense.
2. Fighting with a
large army under your
nowise different from fighting with a small one
command
:
it is
is
merely
a question of instituting signs and signals.
3
34
careful to avoid translating
One must be
large
number," no reference
to the
pj
^
"fighting
intended.
enemy being
^,
is
ex-
and banners, by means of which
plained by Ts'ao Kung
own
his
soldier
regiment or company, and
particular
may recognise
every
he explains as drums and gongs,
thus confusion may be prevented.
as denoting flags
which from the
Tu Mu
retreat respectively.
^
^
^
times were used to sound the advance and the
earliest
troops in order," and takes
defines
^g
^
as
as the flags
|5jj[
"marshalling the
Wang Hsi
and banners.
also
to the ordering of the troops by
from Ts'ao Kung, referring
means of banners, drums and gongs, and -^ to the various names by
which the regiments might be distinguished. There is much to be said
dissents
for this view.
To
ensure that your whole host may withstand the
this
brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken
3.
effected
is
For jj\
,
by manoeuvres
there
direct
another reading
Ijj
is
We now come
Hsi and Chang Yu.
,
to
and
indirect.
"all together," adopted by Wang
one of the most interesting parts
^
As it is
and the
treatise, the discussion of the j
full
of
two
no
means
to
these
the
terms, or to
grasp
by
easy
significance
render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be
as well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject
of
Sun Tzu's
before proceeding further.
Li Ch'iian:
"Facing the enemy
making
H
tfc
is
cheng,
#1 IE g| $t
ffi
Jl/j[
^j^^jE^Hj^ii^
lateral diversions is ch
^&
.
l
i"
Chia Lin:
"In presence of the enemy, your
troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory
abnormal manoeuvres must be employed."
Mei Yao-ch'en
$ $ jE^MftZWjMi&Z
passive; passivity
means waiting
Ho
victory itself."
for
uc
*
an opportunity,
:
J|ff
active
is
-fjj*
is
activity brings the
Shih:
E
cause the
^|J
'""s
>
"We must
to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly
l
vice versa; thus cheng
may also be ch it and ch'i may also be
enemy
designed, and
cheng" He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin,
ostensibly against
[{
^
Lin-chin (now
j|JJ
^
who when marching
Chao-i in Shensi), sud-
denly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly
disconcerting his opponent. [Ch'ien
march on Lin-chin was ~|P
Yu
gives the following
,
Han Shu,
and the
summary
surprise
ch. 34.] Here,
we are told,
manoeuvre was
of opinions on the words
:
^
.
the
Chang
"Military writers
**>t^ # #*A*^
-fa&^JbUrt cJU^t^f
j
35
^^fc^C^ly
.
t*ife
5.
j
do not
all
agree with regard to the meaning of ch
Wei Liao Tzu [4*
cent. B.C.]
says:
l
i
and
cheng.
-^
Jj^J* j|j=?
ZE^^^D^^M'^
'Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the
Ts'ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct
rear.'
^fc
Jjjjjji
on the enemy's rear
appearing
operation;
^
an indirect manoeuvre.'
is
Li Wei-kung [6 th and 7 th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, to march
is nieng; turning movements, on the other hand, are ch'i*
These writers simply regard cheng as cheng, and ch'i as ch'i; they do nqt
note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other
like the two sides of a circle [see infra,
n]. A comment of the T'ang
Emperor T'ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter 'A ch i manoeuvre
may be cheng, if we make the enemy look upon it as cheng; then our
real attack will be ch i, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing
To put it perthe enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'"
straight
ahead
l
:
l
haps a
the
more
little
clearly
enemy has had his
:
any attack or other operation
attention fixed; whereas that
is
is
^-,
Jp
,
on which
which takes him
by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives
a movement which is meant to be ^- it immediately becomes Jp
.
,
impact of your army may be like a grindthis is effected by the
stone dashed against an egg
at the
weak
science of
^ jj
tuan
is
t
the
literally
Tu
:
points
and strong.
"the hollow
and the
solid,"
is
the
title
of chap. VI.
5^
Shu
It apreading, Cf^ hsia that of the standard text.
Hsi that there has been much confusion between the
pears from
K'ang
two characters, and indeed,
it
is
probable that one of them has really
crept into the language as a mistake for the other.
5.
In
all
fighting, the direct
method may be used
joining battle, but indirect methods
to secure victory.
Chang Yu
says:
will
be needed
in
for
order
&^W^$1g^$Wg^
"Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks
or falling on his rear."
brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which
A
decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round
the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. *
*
"Forty-one Years in India," chap. 46.
36
7.
89-
applied, are inexhaustible as
unending as the flow of rivers and
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently
Heaven and Earth,
streams;
is
the universally accepted emendation for
-^
,
the reading of the
sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like
away but to return once more.
like the
the four seasons, they pass
Tu Yu and Chang
But
7F.
at
Yii understand this of the permutations of
present Sun Tzu
we suppose with JUJ
is
-^
not speaking of "jP at a ll> unless,
and
in-
^
Yu-hsien that a clause relating
deed,
Jjp Cheng
to it has fallen out of the text.
Of course, as has already been pointed
out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations,
that they cannot really be considered apart.
Here we simply have an
expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a
great leader.
There are not more than
7.
the
yet
combinations
of
five musical notes,
these
five
give
rise
to
more
melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than
8.
j J
five
blue, yellow, red, white
yet in combination they produce
be seen.
There are not more than
9.
St
yet
$
B$C
~tf*
1?
sour
'
acrid
combinations of them
ever be tasted.
>
salt >
primary colours,
and
black.
more hues than can ever
five cardinal tastes,
sweet, bitter.
yield
more
flavours than can
37
IE
more than two methods of
In battle, there are not
io.
yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres.
attack
/
1 1
the
The
.
in turn.
It
direct
direct
and the
like
moving
is
Who
an end.
to
and the
indirect;
indirect lead
a
in
to
each other
you never come
circle
can exhaust the
on
possibilities
of their
combination ?
Tu
The
more probably,
or,
is
Shu adds
^
The
.
to the
final
-^ Jp
wrong with: "They are a mystery
The
12.
which
will
may
j
^
^|&
that
refer either to the circle
understood.
Capt. Calthrop
none can penetrate."
onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop
of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
For
Yu Lan reads
the
Jjjj
Ijpjf
in the
g
which
really
it
is
J^
fjj;
^
defies
equivalent to
But
rd
[3
,
which
cent. B.C.].
is
also supported
in
this context is
j[jj
the best efforts of the translator.
|[jj
jjj;
|||
j^
by a quotation
Tu Mu
a word
says that
"the measurement or estimation of
meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile in
As applied to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct
15.
of self-restraint which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until
distance."
the right
this
moment, together with the power of judging when the
moment has
arrived.
portant one of being able
which
it
right
quality in soldiers is the highly imto reserve their fire until the very instant at
The analogous
When the "Victory" went into action
effective.
more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes
a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun.
will
be most
at Trafalgar at hardly
exposed to
Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside
he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.
That was a case of iSJ
.
38
15.
Therefore the good fighter
14.
and prompt
onset,
Tu Yu
defines
in English,
^g
commentators
|[j}
is
say,
will
be
terrible in his
his decision.
in
here by the
word
||||f
,
which
very like "decision"
is
certainly used in a very unusual sense, even
it
=
jj
.
as the
if,
This would have reference to the measurement
of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking.
But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the word in a
figurative sense
comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp."
Hsi's note, which after describing the falcon's
^^WbHii1ttl&^f
"
This
is
J
mode
ust
Cf.
Wang
of attack, proceeds
how
the
:
'psychological
moment' should be seized in war." I do not care for Capt. Calthrop's
rendering "The spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden."
:
Energy may be likened
15.
to the
bending of a
cross-
decision, to the releasing of the trigger.
bow;
"Energy" seems to be the best equivalent here
comparison implies that the force
is
for
ijjfa
cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger.
mentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.
,
because the
up
in the bent
None
of the com-
potential, being stored
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid
confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or
1
6.
yet
tail,
J&
IS
it
|f|j,
|H)
Hf
wlfln5e~probf ''againSF defeat.
literally
"formation circular",
ifc "without back or front."
is
explained by Li Ch'iian as
Mei Yao-ch'en
says:
"The
sub-
divisions of the
army having been previously fixed, and the various signals
agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting
which will take place in the course of a battle, may
give the appearance
of disorder when no real disorder is
Your formation may be
possible.
without head or tail, your
dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of
your forces quite out of the question." It is a little difficult to decide
whether
should not be taken as imperatives: "fight
pj g[ and
[gj
^
in
disorder (for the purpose of
deceiving the enemy),
secure against real disorder."
Cf. I.
20:
pjj Jj(
and you
.
will
be
39
disorder
simulated
fear
postulates
perfect
discipline;
weakness
simulated
courage;
postulates
postulates strength.
make
In order to
down
the
translation
necessary to tone
Ts'ao Kung throws
is
it
intelligible,
the sharply paradoxical form of the original.
out a hint of the meaning in his brief note
:
-^
^^
[j^
*Jj|j
-jj^
"These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's condition."
But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline;
if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must
have extreme courage if you wish to parade your weakness in order to
:
;
make
1
the
enemy
you must have exceeding strength."
over-confident,
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder
8.
a question of subdivision
See supra,
is
simply
;
i.
concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes
a fund of latent energy;
"ffififc
It is
as
^k^
unaemana
passing strange that the commentators should
"circumstances"
a totally
different sense
Thus Tu
previously borne in this chapter.
from that which
Mu
i*ffi)^S&i$:A#^:a'l*&
favourably circumstanced and yet
that
we
make no move,
says:
"
seei "g
has
it
yf
^|J
that
we
Jjjl^
^
are
.
the
enemy
will believe
are really afraid."
-
masking strength with weakness
'
dispositions.
Chang
Emperor:
is
to be effected
by
tactical
^^U^^i^l^ ^L^^^^C^f.
Yii relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu/the first Han
"Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on
their condition.
able-bodied
emaciated
-
But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed
men and
cattle
recommended
the
to
well-fed horses,
be seen.
Emperor
The
and only allowed
result
ijj:
and
spies one and
was that the
to deliver his attack,
their
all
infirm soldiers
j^
all
Lou Ching alone
opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally
inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies
have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse
on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack."
The Emperor, however,
found himself surrounded
disregarding this advice,
at
Po-teng."
fell
into the trap
and
4o
20.
19.
the
Thus one who
move
is
at keeping the
skilful
maintains deceitful
which the enemy
Ts'ao Kung's note
and want," but
^
is
according to
appearances,
act.
will
Tu Mu
enemy on
J||
^ fy
"Make
a display of weakness
^
does not refer only to
rightly points out that
weakness "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness
may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be
led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact,
all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we
:
choose to give him."
The
descendant of Sun Wu,
is
following anecdote of Jjj^ J]J| Sun Pin, a
In
ffg, chap. 65:
related at length in the
^
Tien
341 B.C., the gC Ch'i State being at war with |j| Wei, sent gj
who
Chi and Sun Pin against the general
Chiian,
happened
P'ang
y^|
Sun Pin said "The Ch'i
to be a deadly personal enemy of the latter.
State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises
^
:
us.
Let us turn
this
circumstance to account."
army had crossed the border
into
Wei
territory,
Accordingly,
when
the
he gave orders to show
on the next, and the night after
only 20,000. P'ang Chiian pursued them hotly, saying to himself : "I
knew these men of Ch'i were cowards their numbers have already fallen
100,000
fires
on the
first
night, 50,000
1
:
away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow
which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark.
defile,
Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words
"Under this tree shall P'ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to fall,
:
he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to
shoot directly they saw a light.
Later on, P'ang Chuan arrived at the
spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was
written on it.
His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows,
and
his
whole army thrown into confusion.
[The above
is
Tu Mu's
version of the story; the Shih Chi, less
dramatically but probably with
more historical truth, makes P'ang Chuan cut his own throat with an
exclamation of despair, after the rout of his
army.]
He
sacrifices
something, that the
enemy may snatch
at
it.
20. By holding out baits, he
keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
This would appear to be the
meaning if we retain
Yao-ch'en explains as
TSC "men of spirit." The Tu
3X, which Mei
Shu
reads
-filfe
22.
^ JW Si 3f
39
ih
RiJ
3
an
Li Ching.
emendation suggested by
Jg|
would be, "He lies in wait with the main body of
2
1
The
.
The meaning then
his troops.".
clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
and does not require too much from
energy,
Tu Mu
"He
individuals.
considers the power of his army in the
says
bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each
man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from
:
of
first
all
the untalented."
Hence
his ability to pick out the right
men and
to utilise
combined energy.
Another reading has
Capt.
Calthrop could
"yet,
when an opening
When
22.
is
instead of
It
3jjjfc.
would be interesting
or advantage shows, he pushes
combined energy,
utilises
it
to its limits."
as
were
it
his fighting
men
like
on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
cornered, to
go
if
us where the following occurs in the Chinese:
For
unto rolling logs or stones.
the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless
become
it
he
^
tell
rolling
Ts'ao
come
to a standstill, but
if
if
four-
round-shaped, to
down.
Kung
calls this
Q
fj
4&
ffj8<
"the use of natural or inherent
power." Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence entirely.
In its stead he has: "So await the opportunity, and so act when the
another absolutely gratuitous interpolation. The
opportunity arrives"
T ung
l
is
Tien omits
^
.
23.
Thus the energy developed by good
as
the
momentum
of a
mountain thousands of
subject of energy.
The T'ung Tien omits
||
feet
.
fighting
men
round stone rolled down a
in height. So much on the
The
chief lesson of this chapter, in
Tu
Mu's opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions
and sudden rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with
small forces."
VI
0rt
)L
./fa.
7C
^
|4.*
WEAK
VI.
POINTS
AND STRONG.
Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:
"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the
defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods.
The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and
defence,
and then turns
his attention to direct
and indirect methods.
He
the art of varying and combining these two methods before proFor the use of direct
ceeding to the subject of weak and strong points.
or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception
studies
weak and strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence
the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy."
of
1
.
Sun Tzu
said
:
Whoever
in the field
is first
and awaits
coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to
the
will
arrive exhausted.
Instead of l||
'7^.
For the
is
fight;
battle,
,
antithesis
Yu Lan has
the
between
^
in both clauses the stronger
and
2fi
,
cf.
I.
23,
word JjH
l9>
where however
.
%ft
used as a verb.
2.
the
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be
imposed on him.
The next paragraph makes
as
Tu Mu
says,
but rather to
^
j|
Jfc
make him go
synonymous with
of a great soldier
.
fljjj
is
|^
in
Cf.
it
clear that
^
|*jj[
to
make
does not merely mean,
the
enemy approach me,"
any direction I please. It
Tu Mu's own note on V.
that he fights
on
his
own terms
is
thus practically
19.
One mark
or fights not at
* See Col.
Henderson's biography of Stonewall
Jackson, 1902 ed., vol.
II, p.
all.
*
490-
43
5.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the
enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting
damage, he can make it, impossible .for the e;iemy to
3.
draw
near.
In the
strike at
4.
If
first case^-he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will
some important point which the enemy will have to defend.
the
This passage
pretation of
if
I.
enemy
is
may be
taking his ease, he can harass him
cited as evidence against
Mei Yao-Ch'en's
;
inter-
23.
him out;
well supplied with food, he can starve
is probably an older form than
||H
-^|
Both are given in the gj
the reading of the original text.
/
,
^.
if
quietly
The
encamped, he can force him to move.
still
sS
1=1
direct admonitions,
and
subject
J
better as
to ofe
Nii
is
^&
H
jg&
\ >\
';
but these clauses would read
in the next sentence
we
find
Sun Tzu
dropping insensibly into the imperative.
Appear
defend; march
5.
at points
which the enemy must hasten to
where you are not expected.
swiftly to places
T
The
it
l
u Shu, has
lit
original text, adopted by the
|jj
$f ~jf> jfH
has been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts'ao
Kung and Ho
Shih,
who
;
^
The other reading
evidently read jj\
to which the enemy cannot hasten;" but
.
would mean: "Appear at points
in this case there is
is
something awkward in the use of
wrong of course with "appearing where the enemy
6.
if it
We
An army may march
^^
is
.
Capt. Calthrop
not."
great distances without distress,
marches through country where the enemy
must beware of understanding
country."
Sun Tzu habitually
uses
A
^^
jjjjj
in the sense of
as
||,
is
not.
"uninhabited
e.g. supra,
2.
44
Ts'ao
Kung sums up
^J
very well
"Emerge from
:
Jfj
^
lj
S
JL Jyf ->J- |jg
from the blue"], strike
|J[ $j|
the void [q. d. like "a bolt
shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected
is worth noting.
and
of meaning between
quarters." The difference
at vulnerable points,
^
^
You
can be sure of succeding in your attacks
only attack places which are undefended.
7.
^
j
TJP
is
of course hyperbolical;
Wang
where the general
if
you
Hsi rightly explains
it
as
lacking in capacity, or
"weak points; that
the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are
is
to say,
is
too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves."
You can
ensure the safety of your defence
hold positions that cannot be attacked.
if
you only
above. There
e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned
rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter clause.
I.
is
Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei
order to
make your defence
Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In
you must defend even those places
quite safe,
Mu
that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu
adds: "How much more,
then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances
less well with the preceding
always a consideration in the highly antithetical style
to
which
come nearer
the
is
natural to the Chinese.
mark
in saying:
"He who
Chang
is
Yii, therefore,
seems
skilled in attack flashes
from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV.
it impos7], making
enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that
shall attack are precisely those that the
He
enemy cannot defend
forth
sible for the
I
.
who
is
making
being
.
.
defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth,
impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This
skilled in
it
so,
the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the
enemy
cannot attack."
8.
Hence
does not
that general is skilful in attack whose opponent
know what to defend and he is skilful in defence
;
whose opponent does not know what to attack.
An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.
45
$ II
91
10.
O
divine art of sublety and secrecy! Through
learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
9.
we
you
Literally, "without
form or sound," but it is said of course with reference
enemy. Chang Yii, whom I follow, draws no sharp distinction
between i/o* and BJft but Tu Mu and others think that
indicates the
IW*
to
the
^
n"r
secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and
played in attack.
'
IK
* ft
The Yu Lan
mm
tic.
The Tung
Tien has
easily
it
in
full
"Now
:
apprehended,
the senses; but
is
when
j[j|jj
^ I*
**
j||
jj
version of this paragraph
the rapidity to be dis-
text differs considerably
and hence we can hold the enemy's
quoting
^
,
^J
)|&
>f|>
from ours, reading
it
fate in our hands.
fjj
^
.
Capt. Calthrop's
so remarkable that I cannot refrain from
the secrets of the art of offence are not to be
as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of
these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered."
You may advance and be
you make for the enemy's weak
10.
and be safe from pursuit
absolutely irresistible,
you may
points;
your movements
if
are
if
retire
more
rapid than those of the enemy.
The second member
nearly tautologous with
11.
If
we wish
of the sentence
'jfi ~pj*
to
^
fight,
.
is
weak, because
The Yu Lan
the
reads
^
|||
enemy can be
TJJ"
for
~fe
JJ
is
.
forced to
an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a
high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to
attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
Tu Mu says "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line
:
of communications
and occupy the roads by which he
we
will
have to return
;
are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign
himself."
It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late
if
:
Boer war, was no believer
in frontal attacks.
46
is.
&^A
we do
If
12.
wish
not
to
we can prevent
fight,
the
enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our
encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we
need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
his
way.
In order to preserve the parallelism with
the
Tu
Shu
which
text,
cise expression
is
inserts
intelligibly
g|
before
n,
I
should prefer to follow
This extremely con-
.
jjj- Jjjjj
paraphrased by Chia Lin
^
:
5j|
^
^
||| yjffi
"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." The real
of course
crux of the passage lies in 3Jfe
jg .
-|j^
j^f
S
^
the word
3Jg by
j^, which
obscurum per obscurius. Li Ch'iian, however, says
g^J
Ts'ao
Kung
defines
=
^
.
is
perhaps a case of
:
-jjjj*
j?
^
^^
Mu finally
fjjj
"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu
one of
clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes
^ <^
Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying ftjl?
2p Yang-p'ing and about to be
attacked by
Ssu-ma
I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped
ffj Jj^ ^^
and
open the city gates, showing only a
This unexand
sweeping
sprinkling the ground.
pected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an
ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzti is
advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use
of "bluff."
Capt. Calthrop translates: "and prevent the enemy from
attacking by keeping him in suspense," which shows that he has not fully
the beating of the drums,
few
men engaged
grasped the meaning of
13.
By
invisible
flung
in
3JJ?
.
discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
we can keep our forces concentrated,
ourselves,
while the enemy's must be divided.
^
/^^^/*vtty.
The
conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yii
(after Mei
Yao-ch'en) rightly explains it thus "If the enemy's dispositions are visible,
we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own
dispositions being
kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to
:
guard against attack from every quarter."
verb:
"to
"making
make
feints"
to appear."
is
^
is
here used as an active
See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop's
quite wrong.
47
We
14.
must
cap form a single united body, while the enemy
up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole
split
pitted against separate parts of a whole,
The
original text
more
the
has
;pf lit
]fy ||
T^ung Tien and
with the
plausible reading of the
in spite of
having to refer
-{f^
Yu Lan has been
-j-
Tu
Shu:
sisting of so
The
enemy.
accordance
in
-jj^
jj[ -J-
jit
;pJ
to the
alteration of
And
into ztt can
;gJ
if
^^
hardly be right, though the
\fy -[-
it
~ffi
JpJ
the
,
-jfj^
.
be many to the enemy's few.
we are able thus to attack an inferior force
shall
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire
Jjg
,
1
which means that we
For
fy
enemy. Thus
as the undivided force, conYao-ch'en both regard
-Jeach
of
the isolated fractions of the
and
as
many parts,
true text might conceivably have been
15.
which
and not
to ourselves
Tu Yu and Mei
,
altered as above. I adopt
Tung
Tien and
Yu Lan have j|
.
Tu Yu,
straits.
followed by
^
the other commentators, arbitrarily defines
as
"few
/j^ fjjj
J^J
)j|p
to conquer," but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence
and easy
absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop's translation: "In superiority
of numbers there is economy of strength," its meaning is probably known
to
himself alone.
refer to
Lun Yu
In justification of
IV. 2 and VII. 25
my own
6.
jj^J
,
I
would
(3).
The
spot where we intend
made known; for then the enemy
1
rendering of
to fight
will
must not be
have
to prepare
against a possible attack at several different points;
Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by
"while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering
what he was going to do, he was thinking most of what he was going to
saying that
do himself."
and
his
the
numbers we
will
be proportionately few.
forces being thus distributed in
shall
have
to
face
at
many
directions,
any given point
48
& *R
19.
*fe
ifc
*u
ifc
f
For should the enemy strengthen
weaken his rear; should he strengthen
weaken his van; should he strengthen
17.
weaken
weaken
he
will
he
will
his rear,
he
will
his
left,
he
will
he
will
should he strengthen his right,
he sends reinforcements everywhere,
his right;
his
his van,
If
left.
everywhere be weak.
In Frederick the
defensive war
is
Great's Instructions to
his
Generals
we
read:
"A
Those
apt to betray us into too frequent detachment.
little experience attempt to protect every point,
generals who have had but
while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only
the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce
in smaller misfortunes to
avoid greater."
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
1
8.
make
our adversary to
The
enemy
these preparations against us.
highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words,
to disperse his
is
"to
compel the
army, and then to concentrate superior force against
each fraction in turn."
19.
battle,
Knowing the place and
we may concentrate from
the
time
of the coming
the greatest distances in
order to fight.
There is nothing about "defeating" anybody in this sentence, as Capt.
Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice
calculation of distances and that
masterly employment of strategy which
enable a general to divide his army for the
purpose of a long and rapid
march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and
the right hour in order to confront the
enemy in overwhelming strength.
Among many such successful junctions which military history records,
one of the most dramatic and decisive was the
appearance of Bliicher
just at the critical
moment on
the field of Waterloo.
49
B
21.
But
neither time nor place be known, then the
to succour the right, the right
wing
equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to
20.
if
be impotent
will
left
the
relieve
or the
rear,
rear
How
support the van.
to
the furthest portions of the army are anything
much more
under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated
so
by several
if
li\
The Chinese
of this last sentence
we
a
is
little
lacking in precision, but
probably that of an army
a
in
towards
rendez-vous
advancing
given
separate columns, each of which
has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various
the mental picture
draw
are required to
is
detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions as to
and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the
the time
in detail.
army
not
know
Yii's
Chang
note
may be worth quoting here
mean to concentrate
"If
:
the place where our opponents
we do
or the day
on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited through our
preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will be insecure.
Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle
a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between
wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between
the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."
in
2
1
Though according
.
exceed our own
Yiieh
them nothing
in
Capt. Calthrop omits
is
in
to
estimate the soldiers of
my
number, that
it
advantage
the matter of victory.
3S, teF
J^j[
^
,
and
flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzu was
State,
shall
has been proposed to read
J&
his translation of the
remainder
in the service of the Jj
instead of
^*
Wu
a wholly un-
necessary tampering with the text. Yiieh coincided roughly with the present
province of Chehkiang.
^
Li Ch'iian very strangely takes
not as the
proper name, but in the sense of jj^ "to surpass." No other commentator
follows him.
belongs to the class of expressions like
JJ|f j|
"distance,"
-
/J> "magnitude," etc., to
^
jj
which the Chinese have to resort
50
22.
n. HI
23.
ft
ffij
order to
in
omits
The T'u Shu, however,
express abstract ideas of degree.
.
J|j
say then that victory can be achieved.
Alas for these brave words The long feud between
I
!
total defeat of
473 B. C. with the
in
With
{^ Kou
by ^J
Chien and
its
This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death.
Yiieh.
incorporation in
Wu
the two states ended
his present assertion
compare IV.
4
:
^
fjf ffl
jffl
^
"pf jj^
the obviously mistaken reading of the Yu Lan here). Chang Yu
(which
is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes
on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One
is
may know how to conquer without being able to do
have the statement that 'victory can be achieved.'
it,'
whereas here we
The
explanation
is,
the former chapter, where the offensive and defensire are under
discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make
that
in
certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the
of Yiieh who, according to Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept
in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle.
That is
soldiers
why he
22.
says here that victory can be achieved."
the
Though
enemy be stronger
in
numbers, we
may
prevent him from fighting.
Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates
in
number, prevent him,"
Scheme
:
"If the enemy be many
etc.
so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of
their success.
This
the
is
first
present decided
J$ fi
of four similarly constructed sentences,
difficulties.
^
ffj- ;
Chang
This
is
the alternative
beforehand
y
23.
all
of which
^^
Yii
as
explains 2$ fl|
If
perhaps the best way of taking the
-^C
to ourselves
words, though Chia Lin, referring
g-joffers
all
and not the enemy,
of^^^^^ff^^^-tfc
and
plans conducive to our success
to the
enemy's
Rouse him, and learn the principle of
"Know
failure."
his activity
or inactivity.
Instead of
have
^
,
ft
,
the
which the
T'ung
Tien,
Yii
Lan, and
also Li Ch'uan's text
latter explains as "the observation of
Chia Lin simply as
"watching and waiting."
ft
is
omens," and
defined by
Tu Mu
24.
as
and Chang Yu te U s us ^at by noting the joy or anger shown
enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude
Wi
t
by the
'
whether his policy
He
low or the reverse.
to lie
is
instances the action
of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress
to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.
Force him to reveal himself, so as to
find out his vulnerable
spots.
Two
commentators, Li Ch'uan and Chang
sense of
may
^
~
"put on specious appearances."
and
take
^
in the
says:
"You
^^
The former
enemy by a show
either deceive the
colours
Yii,
silencing your drums; or
of weakness
striking your
by a show of strength
making a
And
hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners."
the latter
^^
On the
certainly seems to bear this sense.
19,
of
must
this
where
with
other hand, I would point to
13
chapter,
J|J
is
hard
be
It
to
the
two
interchoose
between
active.
equal certainty
where
quotes V.
pretations, but the context here agrees better, I think, with the
I
Another
have adopted.
difficulty
arises over
Tfa
one that
^ Wj>
:
which
^
in XI.
most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of the
i,
J|Jj
refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is encamped.
The notes
of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch'en, however, seem to favour my view. The
same phrase has a somewhat different meaning in I.
2.
24.
Carefully
Tu Yu
defines
is
right,
compare the opposing army with your own,
I think, in attributing this force to
simply as ip"
it
.
gering translation "Flap the wings"
back of his
!
that you
and where it
Cf. IV.
25.
In
Can the Latin cornu
mind?
may know where
is
:
Ts'ao
Kung
Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with the stag-
sense) have been at the
so
^j|
strength
is
(in its figurative
superabundant
deficient.
6.
making
you can attain
The piquancy
is
tactical dispositions,
to conceal them
the
highest pitch
;
of the paradox evaporates in translation.
ifljE
J^
is
perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra,
9) as "showing no
sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.
52
so.
5
l^W *
H
81
If
28.
will be safe from the
your dispositions, and you
from the machinations of the
prying of the subtlest spies,
conceal
wisest brains.
expanded by
is
ft Hj
Tu Mu
into
g|
He
[For P|] ,see XIII, note on heading.]
^
|gj fg-
J#
explains
^^^it^^iti<flt&
"
^
'$
^jf
Jfc.
|
in like fashion :
thou h the
enem y ma y
capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans
have clever and
against us."
26.
How
victory
enemy's own
tactics
for them out of the
what the multitude cannot
may be produced
-
that
-
is
comprehend.
@$ ^
reads
^
27.
,
men can
All
is
v
see the
but what none can see
is
is
the battle.
refer to the
defined as
IV.
13.
jf
enemy.
.
The
The Yu Lan
3nxiL
tactics
whereby
I
^/>C^^fy
everybody can see
cannot see
^ee
is
conquer,
the strategy out of which victory
evolved.
I. e. t
^
.
evidently a gloss.
^
make
the commentators except Li Ch'iian
All
So Ts'ao Kung:
ffij lfc Jjf
T*u Shu has iS, with the same meaning.
It
seems
and the second by
how a battle is won; what they
and combinations which has preceded
superficially
the long series of plans
justifiable, then, to
render the
first
J^
by
"tactics"
"strategy."
Do
not repeat the tactics which have gained you
one victory, but let your methods be
the
28.
regulate_dr^y
infinite variet
of circumstances.
As Wang Hsi
sagely remarks: "There
underlying victory, but the tactics
(Jf)
,
is
which lead up
to
it
are infinite
number." With this compare Col. Henderson; "The rules of strategy
are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be
But such knowledge
taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams.
will no more teach a man to lead an
army like Napoleon than a knowledge
in
of
grammar
will
teach him to write like Gibbon."
53
* X 2JBJI ff IH S 1
^ m *& m m m & m n. m
31.
32.
i&
33.
is
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in
natural course runs away from high places and hastens
29.
its
downwards.
ff
30.
is
^j| jj:
So
^
war, the
in
what
to strike at
is
way
Water shapes
The Tung
the
Tien and
present text
he
is
is
strong and
least resistance.
it
flows;
Yu Lan read
^j|J
J&
the latter also
,
fljlj
Jft
.
derived from Cheng Yu-hsien.
works out
soldier
whom
is
what
to avoid
course according to the nature of
its
the ground over which
The
is
in the original text.
weak.
Like water, taking the line of
31.
^
Liu Chou-tzu's reading for
his
victory in relation to the foe
facing.
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33.
He who
can
34.
The
elements
modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, rqay be called
a heaven-born captain.
JT
Water,
fire,
five
wood, metal, earth.
are not always equally predominant;
That
is,
alternately."
as
Wang
Hsi
says:
ffi;
;j"|J
"^f
-jj^
"they
predominate
54
the four seasons
Literally,
"have no
make ^ay
for
each other
in
turn.
invariabl, seat>>>
There are short days a^ long; the moon has
of waning and waxing.
of
its
periods
The purport
the passage j s s i mp iy to illustrate the want
the chang s constanti
of fixity in war by
y taking place in Nature. The
not very happ.^
however, because the regularity of the
comparison is
Sun Tzu m n ti ons i s
by no means paralleled in war.
phenomena which
Cf.
V.
6.
VII.
VII.
The commentators,
this
as
MANOEUVRING.
well
as the subsequent text,
clear that
it
^
.
^ ^]
^ ^^M^f M 9A W*
means
tage;
make
Thus, Li Ch'iian says that
meaning of j|f ^jj
to
seize
an advantage"; Wang Hsisays:
"marching rapidly
the real
is
this
being
"'
means
Strivin g'
obtained, victory will follow;"
striving for
an advan-
and Chang Yii
to face, and each
:
1
"The two armies face
ffi ^j" f75 ^p ^J ifc
to obtain a tactical advantage over the other."
According
ppjj
jj?
striving
to the latter
analogous to that of two wrestlers
manoeuvring for a "hold," before coming to actual grips. In any case,
commentator, then, the situation
we must beware
if it
is
.
Capt. Calthrop
Sun Tzu said In war,
mands from the sovereign.
1
.
:&
Jfj
^
-gjj
is
"fighting" or "battle," as
falls
into this mistake.
the general receives his com-
:
For jB: there
word
1
of translating
the
4JJ by
were equivalent to
|g^
another reading
^
,
which Li Ch'uan explains as
"being the reverent instrument of Heaven's chastisement."
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof
2.
before pitching his camp.
Ts'ao
Kung
military camp.
hung
across.
takes
^p
This,
[Cf.
as referring to the
;pp
Tu Mu
Chou
Li,
tells
ch.
us,
p^
or
main gate of the
was formed with a couple of
xxvii.
fol.
3
r
flags
of the Imperial edition
^
:
would then mean "setting up his
opposite
^fc ffi
Jfft
that of the enemy." But Chia Lin's explanation, which has been adopted
lit
JS^ P^
]
56
Jt
* 4^ 1^
m
above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yii, while following
Ts'ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken to mean "the
establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower
ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu
Tzu
ad
i
(chap,
"Without harmony in the
init.}:
State,
no
military ex-
pedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle
In the historical romance
chap.
array can be formed."
j|J J^|j
||j|
^|J
Sun
75,
Tzti himself
is
represented as saying to
& Z &who
Jl ff
those
general rule,
fa
are
-^
8
E '& & It W ft
^
ft
jj^
the
It
.
here conveys the notion
-fc
"As a
ffi
waging war should get
rid of all domestic
troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."
as
,
Wu Yiian:
defined
is
of encamping after having taken
field.
3.
there
I
comes tactical manoeuvring-, than which
nothing more difficult.
After that,
is
have departed
Kung, who
says:
slightly
from the traditional interpretation of Ts'ao
^^^^^^^5^11^
"From
the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment
over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." It
seems to
me
tactics or manoeuvres can hardly be said
jp[ ^has
sallied
forth and encamped, and Ch'en Hao's
army
that the
to begin until the
note gives colour to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonising
and intrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve.
The
real difficulty
comes when we engage
also observes that "the great difficulty
in seizing favourable positions."
The
difficulty
of tactical
is
to
in tactical operations."
Tu Yu
be beforehand with the enemy
manoeuvring consists in turning
and misfortune into gain.
the devious into the direct,
is one of those
jyi x
highly condensed and
'jjfa ]jf[
matical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond.
This
plained by Ts'ao
"Make
Kung:
somewhat
is
how
it
enigis
ex-
^jaU^S^M^itSifc
appear that you are a long way off, then cover the distance
rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent."
Tu Mu says:
it
"Hoodwink
the enemy, so that he may be remiss and
leisurely while you
dashing along with the utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly
different turn to the sentence:
"Although you may have difficult ground
are
to traverse
and natural obstacles
to encounter, this
is
a drawback which
57
can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of movement." Signal
this saying are afforded by the two famous passages across
examples of
that of Hannibal,
the Alps
which
Napoleon two thousand years
of Marengo.
4.
to
Thus,
enticing
a
take
later,
which resulted
and
that of
in the great victory
long and circuitous
after
route,
of the way, and though starting
enemy out
the
laid Italy at his mercy,
shows
after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
knowledge of the artifice of deviation.
^
Chia Lin understands
adversary's course
him from
is
^
as the enemy's line of march, thus
one, and we can manage
really a short
:
"If our
to divert
by simulating weakness or by holding out
some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in the race for good
This is quite a defensible view, though not adopted by any
positions."
of course
and
and
are to be
other commentator.
it
(
^J
)
either
=
^
taken as verbs.
in
270
Tu Mu
jjj|
B.C. to relieve the
town of
vested by a
Ch'in army.
^ps;
correct pronunciation of
^
^Q
j|f|
Ijjl
O-yii,
-^
Chao She
which was
closely in-
j|&
,
as
is
the
given in the commentary on the
Han
Shu, ch. 34. Giles' dictionary gives "Yii-yii," and Chavannes,
know not on what authority, prefers to write "Yen-yii." The name
Cfrien
I
^
should be noted that the above
[It
]M
,
famous march of
cites the
omitted altogether from Playfair's "Cities and Towns."] The King of
Lien P'o on the advisability of attempting
first consulted
j||
a relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening
is
Chao
^
His Majesty then turned to Chao She,
country too rugged and difficult.
who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said
and the pluckier one
"We shall be like two rats fighting in a hole
:
win !" So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a
distance of 30 // when he stopped and began throwing up intrenchments.
For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and took care
will
The Ch'in general
that spies should carry 'the intelligence to the enemy.
was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact that
Han State, and thus not actually part of
had no sooner departed than Chao She
began a forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrived on
the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to
the beleaguered city was in the
Chao territory. But the spies
occupy a commanding position on the
^
[Jj
"North
hill" before the
enemy
58
5.
ffiJC
c.
5. ff
3iS
5
^
rfii
^
^
had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch'in
of O-yii in all haste and retreat
forces, who were obliged to raise the siege
across the border.
|g,
[See jjj
chap. 81.]
Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous; with an
undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
5.
make
Tien,
Cheng Yu-hsien and
the
^
appears to supply the exact nuance required in order
is
The standard text, on the other hand, in which
T'u Shu, where
to
Tung
here adopt the reading of the
I
sense.
j|F
repeated, seems
that manoeuvres
somewhat
pointless.
The commentators
may be
profitable,
or they
depends on the
ability of the general.
"the wrangles of a multitude"
take
to
it
mean
may be dangerous:
all
it
^^
Capt. Calthrop translates
!
you set a fully equipped army in march in order
snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
If
6.
to
too
late.
The
On
text has
original
balance
^jfc
instead of
to
detach
purpose involves the sacrifice of
j|?
possibly fine
sentence as though
much
7.
^g;
its
it
for the
stores.
who
.
^
On
the whole,
it
is
.
is
clear that
some deep-seated
Sun Tzu does not
march being undertaken without
supplies.
Cf. in-
ii.
Thus,
Ep
if
you order your men to
does not
mean
Yii says:
Jg ^g
roll
up
their buff-coats,
"to discard one's armour," as Capt. Calthrop
translates, but implies on the contrary that
Chang
flying
enthusiasm, being convinced that there
corruption in the text.
approve of a lengthy
fra,
to
Absolute
began with pj| ijijg
the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an imdistinction between iSb and
I submit my own rendering
the
tautology in
column
baggage and
a
evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators,
is
paraphrase
without
needed
is
23.
the other hand,
^
but a verb
J^;
^^
it
is
to
"This means, in
be carried with you.
full
panoply."
59
+ m&mMm
= + m ^ iw =
3L
9.
10.
ms
ffi
z
ft)
ffij
M
and make forced marches without halting day or
night,
covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
The
Tu Mu, was 30
ordinary day's march, according to
^
when pursuing ^|J
occasion,
Liu Pei, Ts'ao Ts'ao
covered the incredible distance of 300
said to
have
within twenty-four hours.
li
order to wrest an advantage, the
your three divisions will fall into the hands
doing a hundred
leaders of
but on one
li\
is
all
li in
of the enemy.
fall
will
be
this
plan only one-tenth of your
stronger
reach
will
army
For
out:
men
behind, and on
The
8.
will
jaded ones
destination.
its
see II.
,
j|j
front, the
in
The moral
14.
Don't march a hundred
li
as Ts'ao
is,
Manoeuvres of
or without impedimenta.
to short distances.
Kung and
others point
to gain a tactical advantage, either with
this description
should be con-
Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships
forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle."
fined
did not often
only
call
his troops
upon
when he intended a
extraordinary exertions. It was
a rapid retreat was impera-
when
surprise, or
he sacrificed everything to speed.*
tive, that
you march
If
9.
for
of
He
enemy, you
will
fifty
order to outmanoeuvre the
li in
lose the leader of
first division,
your
and
only half your force will reach the goal.
of the
>fe
its
^:
explained as similar in meaning to
is
jjjjfc
first
division will be torn away."
IH j^
lit
2J
"This
is
a case
Cf.
literally,
Tso Chuan,
of [the
falling
3|
tree]
"the leader
i9th year:
tearing
up
roots."
10.
If
thirds of
In
the
you march
your army
Tung
we may know
Tien
is
thirty
with the
li
same
object, two-
will arrive.
added:
j
$
"From
|
the difficulty of manoeuvring."
* See Col.
Henderson, op.
cit.
vol.
I.
p.
426.
this
We
i.i.
baggage-train is
bases of supply
j^jji
Wang Hsi as
^
|j|jj
Tu Yu
j|g j^f
as
^^
ffi
^^
Yii as
"
%, JB
ifem
army on
2.
1
and
Jff
its
We
S&
march.
,
Jj|
"fodder and the
"goods in general;" and by
But I think
>
in depots," as distinguished
various impedimenta accompanying an
the
Chou
Cf.
^
fuel salt > foodstuffs, etc."
what Sun Tzu meant was "stores accumulated
from
an army without its
it is lost; without
that
lost.
is
it
Tu Mu and Chang
by
like;"
then
it
lost; without provisions
explained by
is
5^
take
may
ch. xvi.
Li,
fol.
cannot enter into alliances
10:
until
2J
we
A
.
.
.
?(/
lr
are acquainted
with the designs of our neighbours.
j& -^Q. Li Ch'iian understands it as 'JJH "guard against," which
hardly so good. An original interpretation of ^j? is given by Tu Mu,
Ji or
who says it stands for
"join in battle."
is
^
^
13.
\
We
we
less
are not
are
and
[$H
its
defined as
forests,
J^j]
^
fjjrj^
to lead
an army on the march un-
with the face of the country
familiar
^mountains and
Ujjjr,
fit
its
(Ts'ao
its
pitfalls
Kung)
or
J^
^
(Chang Yu).
precipices,
,
defined as
"^
~T^
.
marshes
ja,
defined as
and swamps.
g|,
14.
defined as
We
shall
account unless
1214
be unable to turn natural advantages to
we make use
of local guides.
are repeated in
chap. XI.
52.
6i
Mmm
and you
In war, practise dissimulation,
15.
will
succeed.
Tu Mu,
In the
18.
jfc stands for jfc )0. Cf. I.
as
of
the
numerical
to
the
Turenne, deception
enemy, especially
*
strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.
According
to
tactics of
Move
only
This
is
who has
if
there
a real advantage to be gained.
is
the interpretation of
the brief note
g^
^
all
-fy
the commentators except
Wang
Hsi,
"Entice out the enemy" (by offering
him some apparent advantage).
Whether
^
/
concentrate or to divide your
troops,^
must be decided by circumstances.
1
6.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
17.
The
no
simile
Mei
as
but,
to
is
doubly appropriate, because the wind
Yao-*ch'en points out,
3jt
$fc
not only swift
"invisible
and
leaves
tracks."
your compactness that of the
hardly possible to take
It is
as
j^
is
Tu Yu
tries
to
do.
forest.
here in its ordinary sense of "sedate,"
Shih comes nearer the mark in his note
|jj
Meng
"W nen slowly marching, order and ranks must
- so as to
be preserved"
guard against surprise attacks. But natural
forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality
I think then that Mei Yao-ch'en uses the
of density or compactness.
^
"tr
^H ^f
'fT ?'J
right adjective in saying
1
8.
Cf.
In raiding
^ ^^^
and plundering be
Shih Ching, IV.
"Fierce as a blazing
#p
fire
3.
iv.
6:
fa
.
like fire,
^ ^ %\
g|J
which no man can check."
immovability like a mountain.
is, when
holding a position from which
or
perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he
dislodge you,
^ ft # ^
in
That
the
is
enemy is trying to
trying to entice you
into a trap.
* For a number of maxims
1907), p. 29.
on
this
head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans,
*
62
19.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
fall like a thunderbolt.
19.
and when you move,
The
U
original text has j|| instead of
Kung which
a saying of T'ai
^ If ^
^f 2
1|)
IV.
Cf.
.
@
IjlC
"You cannot
Tu Yu
7.
has passed into a proverb
^^
:
shut
quotes
^f\ ~fc
your ears to the
so rapid are they."
thunder or your eyes to the lightning
Likewise,
an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.
When
20.
you plunder a countryside,
divided amongst your
the spoil be
let
men;
of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts'ao Kung, is
wmcn is explained as referring to the subdivision of
The reading
ft
|S)
$$,
>
army, mentioned
V.
in
to
point out
is
very forced, and the
(
^[
to
)
2,
i,
each
man
ellipsis is
by means of banners and
the
way he should go
the
Some
corruption arose.
the sound of
and
this
^|J
being
the two
,
make
Meanwhile,
As
sense.
[6]
as
afterwards have been read as one character;
with
interchangeable
peared altogether.
order to
may
to the
commentator having inserted
early
this
Luckily,
which not only sugway in which
,
gests the true
the
serving
But
( |fj] ).
too great, even for Sun Tzu.
T'ung Tien and Yu Lan have the variant |j|j
reading ^pjj, but affords some clue
the
flags,
^
must
^p|5
|pjj,
finally
have disap-
would have been altered
;jjt
regards
^ ^J
,
believe
I
to
^
Ho
that
in
Shih
alone has grasped the real meaning, the other commentators
understanding
it as
Sun Tzu
"dividing the men into parties'' to search for plunder.
wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate
that
all
be
booty
fairly
be thrown into a
shall
divided amongst
common
all.
when
you capture new territory,
for the benefit of the
soldiery.
That
this
*5 *I
advice:
is
the meaning,
KIJ
#
flj
U
plundering by insisting
which may afterwards
stock,
may be
ja^f
^
cut
it
up
gathered from
5.
The
into allotments
Tu Mu's
H
&
note
means "to enlarge" or "extend"
jfa 3gi
)fj5
expense of the enemy, understood. Cf. Shih Ching, III. i. vii.
"
hatin g
all
the great States."
Ch'en
"quarter your soldiers on the land,
and
Hao
let
:
also says
^i
same
gives the
at the
i:
|^
lg &
them sow and plant
63
23.
mm
It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their
it."
most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of
Jff ^3
Pan Ch'ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,
those of
2
1
jjig
and
jfc Fu-k'ang-an
J|
Tso Tsung-t'ang.
Ponder and deliberate
.
Note that both these words,
phors derived from the use of
before you
make
Chang Yu quotes
like the
Chinese
^
/pH
,
are really meta-
scales.
a move.
as saying that
-^r
Jpsf j|
we have gauged
until
^^^
the resisting
we must not break camp
power of the enemy and the
ness of the opposing general.
Cf. the "seven comparisons" in
Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.
He
22.
conquer who has learnt the
will
clever-
I.
artifice
13.
of
deviation.
See supra,
Such
is
3, 4.
the art of manoeuvring.
With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an
earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when
Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different
from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to
there
its
genuineness.
23.
It
is
The Book
of
Army Management
perhaps significant that
any information about
this
none of the
work.
earlier
Mei Yao-Ch'en
says:
commentators give us
calls
it
U
jj?
^^
JpL
"an old book on
and Wang Hsi, ~^ jff
war."
Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on
for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the various kingdoms and
"an ancient military
principalities
military
lier
classic,"
of China,
it
is
not in
itself
improbable that a collection of
maxims should have been made and written downraf some
period.
V
e^r-
64
26.
On
the field of battle,
Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.
the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the
institution of gongs and drums.
have retained the words
I
<*
gfc
of the original text, which recur in
the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading
and
which
bells,"
Yu Lan.
XXIX.
^p
is
is
a bell with a clapper.
The
every kind.
l
Lun Yu
See
T'-u
Shu
inserts a
^
after
each
^jjj
K
drums
Cfcao and
III. 24,
and
of course would include both gongs
>
29.
15,
^f
j|{?
T ang Shu
found in the T^ung Tien, Pel
Chou Li
bells
of
.
Nor can ordinary
the institution
24.
objects be seen clearly enough: hence
of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and
are
flags,
means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host
The
^
original text, followed
in the next
for
by the T'-u Shu, has
||J here and
two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, A is generally used in Sun
Tzti for the
may be
enemy.
focussed on one particular point.
Note the use of
as a verb.
Chang Yu
$WH^iti,#B-^^
"
If
says
si S ht
:
jjj^
jg
J^j 7Jj
|J|J
and hearin g converge
simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as
soldiers will be like those of a single man"
many
as a million
!
25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is
impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for
the cowardly to retreat alone.
Chang Yu quotes a saying:
|
and those who
J
retreat against orders."
&4
j
"Equally guilty are those
who advance
Tu Mu
tells
against orders
a story in this con-
^g Wu
nection of
Ch'i, when he was righting against the Ch'in State.
J^.
Before the battle had begun, one of his
soldiers, a man of matchless
daring, sallied forth
by
himself, captured
two heads from the enemy, and
65
j&HS PT^^&mi^'tt
27.
Wu
Ch'i had the man instantly executed, whereupon
returned to camp.
an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying "This man was a good soldier,
and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch'i replied: "I fully be:
he was a good
lieve
but
soldier,
I
had him beheaded because he acted
without orders."
This
is
26.
the art of handling large masses of men.
In
make much use
then,
night-fighting,
of signal-
and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and
banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of
fires
your army.
for
With regard to the
the bad variant
||j
$jj&
believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole phrase
being slightly elliptical for "influencing the movements of the army through
Li Ch'iian, Tu
and Chia Lin
their senses of sight and hearing."
The Tung Tien has
latter
word,
.
I
Mu
certainly
take
Hk
seem
|jj (or
to understand
J^
)
it
The
thus.
other commentators, however,
enemy, and ^j& as equivalent to ^|& ~^ or %jj&
This does not agree so well with what
as the
"to perplex" or "confound."
has gone before, though on the other hand
27
less abrupt.
readings
enemy.
W
HI?
^
The whole
Hao
Ho-yang
renders the transition to
hinges on the alternative
The
and J\^.
Ch'en
it
question, I think,
alludes to
latter
would almost certainly denote the
^ -^
JS?
L
*
Kuang-pi's night ride to
head of 500 mounted men; they made such an
at the
M
imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader ifl JB^
Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their pasA.D. 756; but according
sage.
[Ch'en Hao gives the date as
=j^ ^j^
^
New
to the
later
T'ang History, ^|J ^j| 61,
ffi )!* ||
than this, probably 760.]
27.
A
whole army may be robbed of
it
its
must have been
spirit;
"In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade
all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible.
Now
the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have
newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at
once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and
then
strike.
It is in this
Li Ch'uan and others
way
tell
that they
may be robbed
an anecdote
(to
of their keen spirit."
be found in the Tso Chuan,
5
66
28.
29.
year 10,
The
of Lu.
to join
i)
of
latter State
battle at
-M
Ifj J||j
J\\
Duke Chuang
and the Duke was about
Ts'ao Kuei, & protege of
was attacked by
Ch'i,
Ch'ang-cho, after the
first roll
of the enemy's
drums, when Ts'ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had
beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they
Questioned afterfought, and the men of Ch'i were utterly defeated.
wards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts'ao Kuei replied:
"In battle, a courageous
drum tends
spirit
is
everything.
to create this spirit, but with the
Now
the
first roll
of the
already on the
I attacked when their
second
it
is
wane, and after the third it is gone altogether.
Hence our victory." J^.
its height.
spirit was gone and ours was at
first
(chap. 4) puts "spirit"
=
and continues:
'
.A. x
of a million
11
HH
men
t^Sl
is
among
-^
the "four important influences" in war,
"The value of a whole army
a mighty host
dependent on one man alone: such
is
the influence
of spirit!"
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with "defeat his general's ambition."
Chang Yu
says:
tf
$
ft
-&
ft
-
^
%
*
'!*
"Presence of mind is the general's most important asset. It is
Ao*
J^
the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire cour-
age into the panic-stricken."
571-649) has a saying:
B
*)k
^ ?& S ^
The
great general d^5 ij{| Li Ching (A.D.
^^^^lt^S^$S|$ff3
$3
"
Oil
Attackin g does not merely consist
assaulting walled cities or striking at an
army
in battle array;
clude the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."
28.
Now
a soldier's
spirit is
keenest
in
[
^jjj
it
must
^f
,
in
in-
pt. 3.]
the morning;
At the battle
Always provided,
of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas
Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8,
I
Iv.
i
and
suppose, that he has
had breakfast.
8.
by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29.
A
clever general, therefore,
67
30.
M g IE IE z m to *
82.
The
jjgjjf
Tu
which certainly seems to be wanted here,
,
7c?
is
n^*
omitted in the
Shu.
an army when
avoids
its
sluggish and
of studying moods.
when
art
^ 2 it ft
The
T ung
l
is
spirit
but attacks
keen,
This
inclined to return.
is
it
^
Tien, for reasons of
is
it
the
"avoidance of personal names
gj|[
of the reigning dynasty," reads jfjt for
p
in this
and the two next
paragraphs.
Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
this is the
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:
30.
-
art of retaining self-possession.
31.
from
To be
it,
T ung
The
near the goal while the
enemy
is
still
far
to wait at ease
l
^ ^
Tien has
for
The two
/
.
characters are practically
synonymous, but according to the commentary, the
latter is
the form
always used in Sun Tzu.
the
while
enemy
enemy
while the
is
and struggling,
toiling
famished:
is
to
be well-fed
this is the art
-
-
of hus-
banding one's strength.
32.
*|
To
is
from intercepting
refrain
the
reading of the original
quotes the passage with 4
is
text.
But the
J
1jj>
|g
|j
1
meaning "to intercept"), and this
the
Pei
Shu
the Yu Lan, and Wang Hsi's text.
Cfrao,
by
T'ang
supported
yao
(also
an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain
from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:
For
Mu,
this
who
translation
defines
mostly follow Ts'ao
the
of
^
'jg*
phrase
Kung, who
,
as
says
imposing". Li Ch'iian, however, has
somewhat
strange.
I
can appeal
3&E
||^
-^
^
,
.
to the authority of
The
other
Tu
commentators
probably meaning "grand and
Jfr "in subdivisions," which
is
68
33.
34.
this is the art of
studying circumstances.
^
have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases yj^
an d
though y|^ really bears the same meaning
yjpf
*/p J]
'/p Aj)
It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of "to govern"
in each case.
I
^
i
or "control," but rather, as
K'ang Hsi
defines
it,
=
fj|j
^
"to
,
examine
a watchful eye upon." We may
practise," hence "look after," "keep
find an example of this use in the Chou Li, XVIII. fol. 46 yj=f fi
-fc fljH
Sun Tzti has not told us to control or restrain the quality which he calls
and
:
^pj?,
it
is
.
but only to observe the time at which it is strongest. As for j(^,
important to remember that in the present context it can only mean
To speak of "controlling presence of mind" is aband Capt. Calthrop's "to have the heart under control" is hardly
"presence of mind."
surd,
The whole
so.
less
recommended here
process
is
that
of VI.
2
:
a military axiom not to advance uphill against
the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
33.
"
It
is
"
The
Yii
Lan
reads ^fe for
lr"
34.
Do
-T
14
not pursue an
.
enemy who
not attack soldiers whose temper
35.
Do
simulates flight; do
keen.
is
not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.
Li Ch'iian and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,
take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned
by the enemy. Ch'en Hao and Chang Yii carefully point out that the
saying has a wider application.
instead of
^
.
The
The T'ung Tien
reads
^
"to covet"
similarity of the two characters sufficiently accounts
for the mistake.
Do
not interfere with an
army
that
is
returning home.
The commentators
that a
man whose
explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying
heart is set on returning home will fight to the death
against any attempt to bar his way,
opponent to be tackled.
Chang Yii
i
and
is
therefore too dangerous an
quotes the words of
3& 'S 3|C li ^&
'fcf )9f ^P >nL
hath his desire and returneth homewards."
"I nv i nc ikl e
A
is
Han
Hsin:
the soldier
marvellous tale
is
who
told of
69
Ts'ao Ts'ao's courage and resource in ch.
*$*
$E
when
*n
:
*9^ A.D., he was besieging
of the San
i
EM
Kuo
Hsiu
||| Chang
Chih,
in
;js||
j|f*
Jang,
Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting
:||J =^j?
The
off
was obliged to draw off his troops, only to
find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each
In this desoutlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself.
Ts'ao's retreat.
latter
perate plight Ts'ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into
the mountain side and laid an ambush in it.
Then he marched on with
and when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the
had flown, pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole
army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts'ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into
his
baggage-train,
bird
confusion and annihilated.
Ts'ao Ts'ao said afterwards:
Jjjj-
to
check
my army
When
36.
in
its
and brought me
overcome them."
retreat
knew how
position: hence I
to
as
Tu Mu
make him
||<
Do
^
puts
believe
fighting with
it,
is
^
that there
is
is
may
to
^
to battle in a desperate
be allowed
free.
to escape.
The
^^
j(^ "to
J^ ffifr -A> ifllE jj\
a road to safety, and thus prevent his
J^j[
Tu Mu
the courage of despair."
"After that, you
adds pleasantly
:
|Jj
fjjj
crush him."
not press a desperate foe too hard.
For *Q, the T'u Shu reads
saying:
^
j[||
"pursue."
1&
|p| j||J ^jj(
|p| |J|J [^g
to bay will use their claws and teeth."
^
3f-
you surround an army, leave an outlet
This does not mean that the enemy
object,
j^
'
"if?
T^t
Hfe
fW
Hao
"Birds and beasts
Chang
IS
>F* "Pf *
Ch'en
?$>
Yii says:
||
"^
quotes the
when brought
^
^jjf
^jy ur adversary has
burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake
all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." The
Wen Yun Fu
doubtless originated with Sun Tzti. The /*
phrase
^g
jj|
gives four examples of
its use, the earliest being from the Ch'ien Han Shu^
have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of
^J j|* ^|J Fu
That general, together with his
Yen-ch'ing in ch. 251 of the
and
I
-^
Tu
jjj
.
Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior
^jrj^ |J Jg
army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desertlike, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of
colleague
;o
37.
ft
flj
:H
2 ft fc
they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to
Their ranks
squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture.
thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch'ing exclained "We are desperate
water.
The
wells
:
our country than to go with fettered hands
into captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the northTu Chungeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust.
wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final at-
men.
Far better to die
for
tack; but luckily another officer,
^*
jl
^J*
Li Shou-cheng by name,
was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are
few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible;
victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best
Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch'ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected
onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking
through to safety. [Certain details in the above account have been added
ally."
from the
37.
^
g
Such
is
Cheng Yu-hsien
4
,
ch. 78.]
the art of warfare.
in his
jjj^
g^
inserts
these words conclude the extract from the
jfp after
S
jffr
^,
I
take
which began
it
at
that
23.
VARIATION OF TACTICS.
VIII.
The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told
us (V.
6
n) that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who
says that
"Nine" stands
that in
is
^
warfare
utmost degree ...
an indefinitely large number.
for
it
jjjfe
we ought
$jj&
do not know what Ts'ao
I
Variations out to be [the latter's note
-Jjj^ ],
but
"All
it
means
our tactics to the
Kung makes
these
1
is^^Jg^fij^j
Nine
^^
has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine
it
This
of chap. XI.
Situations"
see note on
to vary
^
ijjj,
2.
The
the view adopted by
is
only other alternative
is
Chang
Yii:
to suppose that
a supposition to which the unusual shortness
something has been
lost
of the chapter lends
some weight.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the
general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates
his forces.
Repeated from VII.
where
i,
it
have been interpolated here merely
is
in
It may
certainly more in place.
order to supply a beginning to
the chapter.
2.
When
in
difficult
country, do not encamp.
For explanation of J^J ]fy
In
country where high
your
,
see XI.
roads intersect, join
allies.
See XI,
6,
12. Capt.
8.
Calthrop omits
hands with
72
Do
not linger
&
is
Jjjj
in
dangerously isolated positions.
not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning of
on
chap. XI, but occurs later
We may
43, q. v.).
(ibid.
Yii calls
it
^
a
compare
with
it
situated across
ijjj,
Chang
7).
$g
$fa (XI.
Li Ch'iian says it is "country in which
the frontier, in hostile territory.
there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;"
jg
Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which
to advance."
In
hemmed-in
See XI.
situations,
country," which
is
Calthrop has "mountainous and wooded
Capt.
14.
9,
you must resort to stratagem.
a quite inadequate translation of [j]
you must
In a desperate position,
.
fight.
Chang Ytt has an important note here, which
10,
must be given in full. "From Jg, ijjj fiffi
," he says, "down to this
The
reason why only five
to
us.
are
Variations
Nine
the
presented
point,
See XI.
14.
^
are given
is
that the subject
is
treated en precis
( Jjjf;
Jt
fy
-fc $fa
).
So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics corresponding
to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzu mentions only six variations; there again
we have an abridgment. [I cannot understand what Chang Yii means
by
this statement.
of chap.
XI; but
haps he
is
or
He can only be referring to
46 50
in both places all the nine grounds are discussed. Per-
1114
confusing these with the Six ^Jj
J^
of ground have corresponding military positions,
suitable to each
tactics
we find enumerated first
j^ jfy
(
2
[
the corresponding tactics.
to
Nine
the
<jj
7^
and
$j&
also a variation of
In chap. XI, what
).
10] are the situations; afterwards
Now, how can we
^ ^
Grounds"?
Variations" are simply the
ponding
^
jfy
It
is
%jj&
tell
All kinds
of chap. X.]
that the
1 1
[
14]
"Nine
"^
J||j&
"variations of tactics corres-
on
said further
[
5]
that
'the
general who does not understand the nine variations of tactics may be
well acquainted with the features of the country, yet he will not be able
knowledge to practical account.' Again, in chap. XI [ 41]
'The different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground
to turn his
we read
(
^L
:
Mfe
must be
'HI
)
an(^
^e
carefully examined.'
ex P e diency of aggressive or defensive tactics
From
a consideration of these passages the
meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds are enumerated,
Sun Tzu recurs to these nine variations. He wishes here to speak of the
Five Advantages [see infra,
6], so he begins by setting forth the Nine
Variations.
These are inseparably connected in practice, and therefore
they are dealt with together."
suggestion that
3
IJJ
The weak
"five things"
point of this argument
can stand as a
,
that
is
the
is,
an
73
abstract or abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less
important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not in-
cluded amongst the nine at
all.
There are roads which must not be followed,
3.
leading through narrow defiles," says
those
"Especially
"where an ambush
is
to
Li Ch'iian,
be feared."
armies which must not be attacked,
More
perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be
Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a trivial
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking,
for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."
correctly,
attacked."
towns
an unfortunate attempt to introduce
Capt. Calthrop says "castles"
local colour.
which must not be besieged,
Cf. III.
4.
Ts'ao
When
experience.
the city of jSE
Kung
gives an interesting illustration from his
invading the territory of
Jjjj?
^
own
he ignored
yft Hsu-chou,
Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed
on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded
by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district
cities.
Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken,
cannot be held, or
Hsiin Ying,
if left
when urged
alone, will not cause
to attack
>fg
Kjl?
any trouble
Pi-yang, replied:
"
^j
"The
jj
city
is
small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, 't will be no great
feat of arms
whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock."
In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war.
;
It
was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches,
He
countermarches and manoeuvres.
waste
men
in
taking a town
gain a province."
when
the
said:
"It
is
a great mistake to
same expenditure of
soldiers will
*
which must not be contested, commands of the
sovereign which must not be obeyed.
positions
This
thority,
is
a hard saying for the
Chinese, with their reverence for auis moved to exclaim:
and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu)
* "Marshal
Turenne," p. 50.
74
# ^ m t$ % -I m % m & MU ye ^ mn
ZM^
fU ^ .H ft A
^ ^ #,& * SI
5.
6-
2fl 3E.
531
'/
"
Weapons
.
are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order !" The unpalatable fact remains,
Imperial wishes must
however, that even
Cf. III.
necessity.
before
^
^&
,
17. (5),
This
etc.
being repeated by
is
X.
23.
a gloss on
Tu Yu became
be subordinated to military
The Tung
the,
Tien has
$f ^
1|[
words by Chu-ko Liang, which
incorporated with the
text.
Chang
Yii
referred to in
6. Another
thinks that these five precepts are the 3JL
?PJ
here
is
that
the
are
enumerated,
starting with
theory
mysterious ~j\^ %jj&
and endin
at
*tb
W
j^r
embraces and as
Ho
Shih says
:
"Even
if it
it
^^
is
perhaps a
little
while the
were sums up
all
command
to
be your sovereign's
cult country, linger in isolated positions, etc.,
theory
'
final clause
the nine.
encamp
you must not do
in
so."
Thus
diffi-
The
too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.
The
general Ivho thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to
handle his troops.
4.
Before
7J;|J
in the original text there
is
a ^|j which
is
obviously not
required.
The
general who does not understand these, may be
well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he
will not be able to turn his
knowledge to practical account.
5.
ground," which means not only
but availing oneself of natural advantages in
every possible way. Chang Yii says "Every kind of ground is characterised
by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability
Literally,
"get the advantage of the
securing good
positions,
:
of plan.
How is it possible to turn these natural features to account
unless topographical
knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art
of varying his plans, even
though he be acquainted with
the Five
Advantages, will fail to make the best use of
his
men.
75
M
J-ftflfr
Ts<ao
Kung
says that the
3
^|J
are
contained in
five "variations"
balance the
5t
%\\
)
te ^ s
3.
~^C
We
that follow;" but this cannot be right.
3
|Jj
^
"the five things
must rather look back
Chia Lin (who reads jfc
to the
here to
^|j&
us tnat these imply five obvious and generally
advantageous lines of action, namely "if a certain road is short, it must
be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in
a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it
:
must be attempted
;
and
if
consistent with military operations, the ruler's
But there are circumstances which some-
commands must be obeyed."
times forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain
road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds
in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he
will
not follow that road.
he knows that
will refrain
the
^|J
,
it
A
hostile force
may be open
to attack, but if
hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he
is
Here the
from striking," and so on.
and hence we
see the uselessness of
*|&
comes
knowing
in to
modify
the one without
of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy's armour
without being clever enough to recast one's plans on the spur of the moment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly translation "In the managethe other
:
ment of armies,
if
the art of the Nine
knowledge of the Five Advantages
is
Changes be understood
of no avail."
[stf\,
a
Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
7.
"Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says
Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."
our expectation of advantage be tempered in this
way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part
of our schemes.
If
8.
>j=|
is
,
according to
Tu Mu,
paraphrased by Chang
on
not
to say: "If
fix
we wish
is
Yii as
to wrest
equivalent to
^
,
and
%jfc Tfj"
^
-j^
Tu Mu
^
S oes
lf
"jjj* Jj[ ^jp
an advantage from the enemy, we must
our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy
some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our cal-
also doing
culations."
9.
If,
on the other hand,
in
the midst of difficulties
we
76
are always ready to seize an advantage,
we may
extricate
ourselves from misfortune.
A
translator cannot emulate the conciseness of
"to blend
J^
but the meaning is as given.
[thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage,"
Tu Mu says "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I
must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my
:
own
ability
to
gain an advantage
over the enemy.
If in
my
counsels
these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating
myself. . For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think
.
of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of
my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my
men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained
to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao, VII.
In his
35, note.
follows: "The wise
first
edition,
man
Capt.
perceives
7
Calthrop translated
9 as
wherein lies advantage and
clearly
disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not overlook
the risks, and saves future anxiety." This has now been altered into:
well both advantage and disadvantage.
He
out
of
and
on
the
is
to
not
blind"
of
day
victory
way
adversity,
danger
Owing to a needless inversion of the Chinese, the words which I have
"The wise man considers
sees a
italicised are evidently
Reduce the
10.
intended to represent
hostile chiefs
8
by
!
inflicting
damage on
them;
Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting
which would only occur to the Oriental mind:
this
injury,
some of
"Entice away the
without counsellors.
enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left
Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be
rendered futile.
Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension
between the ruler and
his ministers.
By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure.
Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb
and
unsettle his
Wang
mind by presenting him with
^
lovely
women." Chang Yu
be military chastisement: "Get the
enemy," he says, "into a position where he must suffer injury, and he
will submit of his own accord."
Capt. Calthrop twists Sun Tzu's words
into an absurdly barbarous
precept: "In reducing an enemy to submis-
(after
Hsi) considers the
sion, inflict all possible
make
UH
to
damage upon him."
trouble for them,
is
defined by Ts'ao
Kung
as
it}.
,
and
his definition
is
generally
77
adopted by the commentators.
sense of "possessions," or, as
^
to be
Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in the
we might say, "assets," which he considers
H W A 3 ^ ff
JK
"
a lar S e
arm y' a
harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of
give us a whip-hand over the enemy.
rich exchequer,
commands."
These
and keep them constantly engaged;
^,
"make
literally,
servants of them."
"prevent them from having any
hold out specious allurements,
any given
*|&
for
:
^^^^^
and make them rush
to
point.
an excellent example of the idiomatic use
g|? "cause them to forget pien (the reasons
Shih's note contains
Meng
of
Tu Yu says
rest."
"^
acting
T^J %jj& pjj JJ
otherwise than on
their
first
impulse),
and hasten
in
our
direction."
1 1
.
The
war teaches us
art of
to rely not
on the
own
lihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our
ness to receive him;
The Tung
Yu Lan read
Tien and
conciser form
is
more
likely to
be
^
||
^^
ifc
like-
readi-
but the
right.
not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the
fact that we have made our position unassailable.
The Tung
#
omit
1
2
.
Jft
Tien and
insert
3
-^
a ft e r the
first
]^
,
and
,
There are
a general:
Yu Lan
(i)
dangerous faults which may affect
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
five
without forethought," as Ts'ao Kung analyses
ffiE
fjfjj
j|T "Bravery
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull.
Such an opponent, says Chang Yii, "must not be encountered with brute
force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzti, chap. IV
_p|
%
it,
<^
Mt, ji
A
78
"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive
attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many
qualities
to
fight
of what
which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone
recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception
condemned."
expedient, must be
is
remark
incisive
^ >5 ^
_t
Ssu-ma Fa,
too,
makes the
"Simply going to one's death does not
bring about victory."
cowardice, which leads to capture-
(2)
'
is explained by Ts'ao Kung of the man "whom
timidity preJj>
vents from advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds, "who
is quick to flee at the sight of danger."
Meng Shih gives the closer
0^
paraphrase
^
man who
the
^
"he
who
never take a
risk.
jjfc
will
|r
be achieved in war unless you
to
said:
will
-fc %\]
^
fl^f
^
is
bent on returning alive," that
But, as
Tzti knew, nothing is
are willing to take risks.
T'ai Kung
S $&
g
"He who
subsequently bring upon himself real disaster."
Liu Yii pursued the rebel
^g "& Huan
fought a naval battle with
him
slip
^t
Hsiian up the Yangtsze and
at
|Jj|J.
an advantage
In 404 A.D.,
Jjjj\
lets
the
|]||| ty\\
island of Ch'eng-
The
loyal troops numbered only a few thousands,
ponents were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing
was in store for him should he be overcome, had a light
to the side of his war-junk, so that he
might escape, if
hung.
is,
Sun
while their opthe fate which
boat
made
fast
necessary, at a
natural result was that the fighting spirit of his
moment's notice. The
was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack
from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be
soldiers
Huan Hsuan's
in the fray,
first
baggage and
chap. 99,
fol.
had
to
two days and nights without stopping.
fled for
13.]
forces were routed,
Yii tells a
Chang
somewhat
burn
all their
[See ^|p jfe
similar story of
Chao
^
ffl
7Jjf>
Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the
army of Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the
river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.
a hasty temper, which can be
provoked by insults
(3)
I
fail
Tu Mu
^ Jg
to
tells
see
the
us that
Huang
meaning of Capt. Calthrop's "which brings
$|c
Mei,
j|
^
Yao Hsiang, when opposed
=fe
Teng Ch'iang and
behind his walls and refused to
sary
is
sallies
fight.
his walls, then
he
will
insult."
A.D. by
others, shut himself
Teng Ch'iang
said:
of a choleric temper and
easily provoked; let us
and break down
in 357
;
up
"Our adver-
make
constant
grow angry and come
out.
79
Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey."
This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on
as
^ j*
far as
San-yuan by the enemy's pretended
flight,
and
finally
attacked and slain.
(4)
a
delicacy
of honour which
This need not be taken to
mean
is
sensitive to
that a sense of
honour
shame
is
;
really a
a general. What Sun Tzti condemns is rather an exaggerated
sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by
opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch'en truly observes, though
defect in
somewhat paradoxically:
^j|J
^^
~jf\
|p|
"The seeker
after glory
should
be careless of public opinion."
(5)
over-solicitude
for
his
men, which exposes him to
Worry and trouble.
Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless
All he wishes to emphasise is the danger
of the welfare of his troops.
of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort
This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the
troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of
mistaken feeling of pity will
the war, which will be the consequence.
often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a
of his men.
A
hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now
generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the
South African
their
who
War were
so
many
strategical
blunders which defeated
purpose. And in the end, relief came through 'the very man
started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the
own
whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier
who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried
once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, he
was only condemning him out of Sun Tzti's mouth.
interests of the
of one
of our generals
These are the
five
besetting
ruinous to the conduct of war.
13.
sins
of a
When
general,
an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous
14.
faults.
Let them be a subject of meditation.
THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.
IX.
The
contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in
than
i
this heading.
by
i
.
Sun Tzu
encamping
The
:
discussion of
j|| jl?
^^
down
to
point
down
to
consists of a
We
said
come now to the question of
the army, and observing signs of the enemy.
#f IK
jj\
^jjjjl
&j
,
as
Chang
&
^
Yii points out, extends from here
and
ifc <SS i-'7),
18
(
39).
The
^|
$j
from that
of the chapter
rest
few desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.
Pass quickly over mountains,
For
use of
this
(standard edition
and keep
Tu Mu
jjfa,
cf.
infra,
of 1876):
in the
says that
$jjfc
3.
fa
See also
JjjJ*;
neighbourhood of
^
here =
jj.
The
Shih
^fjj*
-^
Chi,
ch.
,
ch.
i. fol.
27 ad
2
init.:
valleys.
idea
is,
not to linger
among
barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. Capt.
Calthrop translates "camp in valleys," heedless of the very next sentence.
Cf.
Wu
Tzu, ch. 3
^ ^ ^ IH
lowing anecdote
"
^ | ^ |g
"Abide not
the openings of large valleys."
"
:
:
j
the time of the Later
|j|$
^g
in natural ovens,"
Chang
/. e.
Yii tells the fol-
Wu-tu Ch'iang was a robber captain in
Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate
Han, and Jj|
^
Ch'iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no
attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and forage.
Ch'iang was soon in such a
his gang.
desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a total
surrender.
He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbour-
hood of
valleys."
8i
2
Camp
2.
in
Not on high
high places,
but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the sur-
hills,
rounding country.
facing the sun.
Hao
Do
Tu Mu
.
[::=: |fj
jjjj^
Ch'en
[j|^
not climb heights in
^jg
read
takes this to
order to
here simply equivalent to
is
n,
Cf. infra,
"facing east."
mean
"facing south,"
and
13.
fight.
The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan
.
"jf|f
.
|J
So much
After
mountain warfare.
for
[Jj
,
the
Tung
Tien and
Yu Lan
^
insert
.
After crossing a river, you should get far away from
3.
it.
"In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts'ao
Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your
The Tung
evolutions."
a river," etc.
But
in
Tien reads
j|
^
"
%jb -fa
view of the next sentence,
lf the
this is
enemy crosses
almost certainly
an interpolation.
When
an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream.
4.
It
be best to
will
let
half the
army get
across,
and then
deliver your attack.
The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read Jg for
Wu Tzu plagiarises this passage twice
meaning.
^
,
without change of
over:
ad fin.,
ch. II
Li
Ch'iian alludes to the great victory
Chu
at the
verso,
we
yjj^
find
Wei
River.
the battle
won by Han Hsin over ^|[
Turning
to the Ch'ien
described as follows:
Han
Lung
fl
Shu, ch. 34,
fol.
6
"The two armies were
drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered
his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct
a
dam
a
little
higher up.
Then, leading half
his
army
across,
6
he
at-
82
ft
.
fcJMR ftJl it M ft ft
tacked Lung CM; but after a time,, pretending to have failed in his
to the other bank.
Lung Chu was much
attempt, he hastily withdrew
elated by
Hsin was
this
unlooked-for success, and exclaiming
:
"I
felt
sure that
Han
coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river
Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus
in his turn.
down and prevented the
a
great volume of water, which swept
releasing
He then turned
across.
from
Chii's
of
getting
army
Lung
portion
really a
greater
upon the force
which had been cut
and annihilated
off,
himself being amongst the slain.
The
bank, also scattered and fled in
directions."
5.
If
all
you are anxious to
meet the invader near a
For
6.
it,
Lung Chu
of the army, on the further
you should not go
which he has to cross.
fight,
river
fear of preventing his crossing.
ridiculous
rest
to
Capt. Calthrop makes the injunction
by omitting
Moor your
higher up than
craft
the
enemy, and
facing the sun.
See supra,
is
The
2.
awkward.
very
*
-t i0 f} if ^1
words
repetition of these
Chang
Yii has the note
M i|
Jt ft
fffi
"
:
al/
^^
in connection with water
S ;J|
/i
xyy_ "1SJ
X*"ft
p
(fifi
*^?^4
tsSj\.
-^C
/+
Said either of tro P s marshalled
on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either
case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun."
The other commentators are not at all explicit. One is much tempted
to reject their explanation of
as "seeking safety.''
[Cf. Jjfc
that this involves taking
not
B
in
the
move up-stream
/Jl altogether,
in VIII.
jjjj^
Of course
possible sense.
translated in like manner.
Do
jjjj^
12,
and understand
and infra,
it
9.]
simply
It is
true
an unusual, though not, I think, an imwould then have to be
earlier passage
to
meet the enemy.
Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp
on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the
sluices and sweep us away in a flood.
This is implied above in the words
J|jj^
^
||J
jfyj
.
Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that
'in river
warfare
we must
not advance against the stream,' which is as much as to say
that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then
they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short
work of
us."
There
is
also the
danger, noted by other commentators,
83
enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down
Capt. Calthrop's first version was: "Do not cross rivers in the
a sapient piece of advice, which made one curious
face of the stream"
to know what the correct way of crossing rivers might be.
He has now
the
that
to
us.
improved this into: "Do not
and the source of the river."
So much
when
the
enemy
is
between the army
for river warfare.
In
7.
fight
your sole concern should
crossing salt-marshes,
be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage,
last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.
and
forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have
If
8.
water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump
of trees.
Li Ch'uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous
where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to protect
Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going wrong, says "in
the rear.
For
neighbourhood of a marsh."
the
wrongly read ^|J
So much
In
9.
,
and the
latter also
the
T ung
^g
instead of
^k
has
l
for operations in salt-marshes.
dry,
level
Tien and Ytt
^*
Lan
.
.1
take up an easily accessible
country,
position
This
is
doubtless the force of
Jjj^j
Mu
explains
firm,"
Rl
later
it
as
-JJ3
^
^f
and therefore adapted
^
ilk
"l eve l
its
^
opposite being
|fl
for cavalry;
ground, free
on that although Sun Tzu
be slight elevations and
theless
i$8
,
|^
"ground that
Chang
Ytt as
is
;JfJ
Thus,
.
smooth and
^ He
fit
from depressions and hollows."
is
discussing
flat
Tu
J^
adds
country, there will never-
hillocks.
with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
84
io.
Jl
11.
ii it
12.
#
The
P9
ift
W
sx9
ffi
:
3E4Ht 9
on
or tumulus
its
it
m n w ^ *n #
^ ^ Tu Mu
for
Lan again reads
"An army should have a stream
Yii
saying
5
.
quotes T'ai
marsh on
or a
its left,
may be
in front,
and
lie
safety
^^
contradicts the saying
jjj^
and therefore suspects a mistake in the text.
So much
thinks that
for
These
10.
as
hill
right."
so that the danger
Wang Hsi
Kung
and a
campaigning
are
the
in
four
flat
behind.
j:
in
2,
country.
branches
useful
of
military
knowledge
Those, namely, concerned with (i) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes,
Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. i.
(4) plains.
and
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns.
Mei Yao-ch'en
asks, with
some
plausibility,
whether
is
not a mistake
jjj
for
as nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered
jpT "armies,"
The Shih Chi (ch. I ad init.) speaks only of his
four other Emperors.
Yen Ti and j^ -fa Ch'ih Yu. In the
victories over
|?g
jj
^
*jjj*
mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire."
Ts'ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to
institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom (to the number
it
is
Li Chfcian tells us that the
title of Emperor.
war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister
of four) originally bore the
art of
M,
Hou.
J5f Feng
1 1
.
All armies prefer high
ground
to low,
"High ground," says Mei Yao-ch'en, "is not only more agreeable and
but more convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for
salubrious,
fighting."
The
original text
and the
Tu
l
Shu have ^jp
instead of Jal
and sunny places to dark.
12.
Ts'ao
If
you are careful of your men,
^
$
^^
"Make for fresh
Kung says: [fi] fc
~pf
>$
water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals to
graze." And
.
85
=
commentators follow him, apparently taking ^^ as
ffi
But
means
a
Mencius, V. i. ix. i, where
cattle-keeper.
ffi ^-
the
other
Cf.
^jji
^
here
of
title
.
surely has
jr
Chuang
reference to the health of the troops.
third chapter,
Tzii's
where
it
It is the
denotes moral rather than
physical well-being.
and camp on hard ground,
jj
This
jj
is
must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground.
to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators explain
as practically equivalent to
the
army
Chang
be
will
free
.
"Jj|j
from disease of every kind,
"The dryness of the climate
Yii says:
will
prevent the outbreak
of illness."
and
this will spell victory.
13.
When
you come
to
a
hill
or a bank, occupy the
sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you
will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilise
the natural advantages of the ground.
14.
When,
in
consequence of heavy rains up-country,
and flecked
a river which you wish to ford is swollen
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
The T'ung
15.
Tien and
Country
in
Ya Lan have a
superfluous
~~J\
before
which there are precipitous
fc
cliffs
.
with
torrents running between,
%
ffi
explained by Mei Yao-ch'en
,
as^^l^l^^C^^^I.
deep natural hollows,
^#
,
explained as |3J
@J
^^
ffl
l #f Hf
on every side by steep banks, with pools of water
confined places,
at the
V^ces
enclosed
bottom."
86
^
^
"natural pens or prisons," explained as
5}5
^A HE HJ
jgj
J||
surrounded by precipices on three sides
"P laces
^g
^
easy to
get into, but hard to get out of."
tangled thickets,
^ |f,
^ ^ ^ ^ |f |g ^ |g
explained as
"places covered
with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used."
quagmires
^^M
^
^
as
"pfflffig $.
jig, explained
so heavy with mud as to be impassible for chariots
"low-lying places,
and horsemen."
and crevasses,
^ tH
^
is explained by MeiYao-ch^n as
|$$
"a narrow difficult way between beetling
UJ $1 it
^ ft E K ^
*H[ ilb
ffi
ii:
[6)
^^
but Ts'ao
cliffs,"
3t
^.
^HL
^t
R
Lin explains
it
to
^
much smaller scale. Tu Mu's note is j^
j(S
"S roun(^ covered with trees and rocks, and inter-
5
by numerous ravines and
sected
^
says
which seems
denote something on a
^k
jfc
Kung
enough
clearly
St
S'
This
pitfalls."
as a defile or
anc^
Chang
is
very vague, but Chia
narrow pass
Yii takes
:
much
ppjj
the
^ ^
[J^
same view.
~f&
$5 "M
On
the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the
ff5
But the ordinary meaning of
(a crack or fissure)
[J
that
above must be something in the nature of a
<^U Jfljj
rendering "defile".
and the
fact
defile,
make me think
Tung
Tien and Yil
latter also
has
should be
-^
left
that
Lan
^
after
with
Sun Tzu
read
all
J|$
^
is
here speaking of crevasses.
for
J|J
|Jj^,
The
with the same meaning; the
a palpable gloss.
possible speed
and not approached
While we keep away from such places, we should
get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,
we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
1
6.
17.
The
yielding
If in ,the
neighbourhood of your camp
original text has
much
jg
better sense.
Jfj
,
but
^
has been generally adopted as
87
is.
at
a B5
# it s wrto
there should be any hilly country,
|J&
Iffi
according to Chang Yu,
-^ 2, *&
is
|$
ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins
with reeds,
The original
text omits
and
3JJL
"ponds and basins."
a pair:
there are several
^
fc, so that
This
is
enough
plausible
objections to the reading: (r)
got into the text as a gloss on
hand, that 3j. and afterwards
^;
tk
(2)
it is
3JL
is
^
make
join to
at first sight,
unlikely to
but
have
easy to suppose, on the other
balance of the sentence)
(to restore the
"
and
filled
VM*
i
I
were omitted by a copyist who jumped to the conclusion that gi| and
^p
must go together; (3) the sense, when one comes to consider it, actually
for it is absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in themselres
requires
^J,
an ambush;
suitable
places
-E
"Art of War" has the words:
j
This
for
|f $| !g
stood in the text at this early date.
^j
649 A. D.) in his
% #^g
glj
#..
or
woods with
read /\\
original
^
text,
text
little
may be added
.
-ft
doubt
that the
the latter also reads
:yj
thick undergrowth,
wit h tne
which
of the
It
Yu Lan both have $&, and
T'-ung Tien and
for
The
Li Ching (571
evidently a rerniniscence of Sun Tzti, so there can be
is
that
I
(4)
Tu
(
Yii
Lan
in the
in preference to
[Jj ^JC, given
accepted by the commentators without question.
is
Shu up
to this point runs as follows:
fr
they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these
men in ambush or insidious spies are likely
are places where
to
be lurking.
The
original text omits
Tien and Yii Lan.
stantive.
On
|j^,
which has been
The T'u Shu omits ||
Chang Yu has
restorecj
as well,
from the T~ung
"
making
a sub-
the note:
on our guard against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying
out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions.
Fu and chien are
to
be taken separately."
1
8.
quiet,
When
he
is
the
enemy
is
close
at
hand and remains
relying on the natural strength of
his position.
88
a us & a * # A 2 at
19.
is
* 4 * ft
ft
.
tfe
Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of which
so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like
Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."
When
19.
he
he keeps aloof and
provoke a
tries to
battle,
anxious for the other side to advance.
is
Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to
"If he came close up to us," says Tu Mu, "and tried to
dislodge us.
force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less
probability of our responding to the challenge."
place of
a
bait.
tendering
20. If his
is
Sj
is
here the opposite of
Tien and Yil
corrupt.
The
be
right.
sibly
2
the
encampment
Lan,
3t
tells
% fg $
which transposes
us that there
Movement amongst
enemy is advancing.
1
18.
.
easy of access, he
The
|Jj|r
ffi $j.
original text,
Tu Mu
in
is
is
reading of the T^ung
%\] ifc
^
,
is
pretty obviously
and 5", niay very
yet another reading
pos-
:
the trees of a forest shows that
Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and
Yii says: "Every army sends out scouts to climb high places and
observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving
Ts'ao
Chang
and shaking, he may know
that they are being cut
down
to clear a pas-
sage for the enemy's march."
The appearance
thick
grass
of a
means
number of screens
that
the
in
enemy wants
the midst of
to
make
us
suspicious.
Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive,
Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free rein to
the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical with ours, he
renders the above
"Broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing
of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion."
Tu Yu's explanation,
borrowed from Ts'ao Kung, is as follows "The presence of a number of
:
:
screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation
enemy has
fled
is
a sure sign that the
and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places
89
22-
23.
in order to make u's suspect an ambush." It appears that these "screens"
were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating
enemy happened
22.
The
to
come
across.
rising of birds in their flight
the sign of an
is
ambuscade.
Chang Yii's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying
along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers
are in ambush at the spot beneath."
Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack
An
example of
the
in
Tso
JJ
is
fou* in the meaning of "ambuscade"
Chuan, |g
present passage, however,
9
it
th
year:
is
to
3jg*
^
=
g[
may be found
Jj[ ffi
be distinguished from
-^
implies onward motion on the part of the attacking
Li Ch'iian defines it as
and Tu Mu as
ffp jg
that
jj;
.
force.
^
,
^
In the
just above, in
it
^
coming.
t|j
Thus,
^^
.
23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is
the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but
spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of
infantry.
ft
f?5 IPt
"high and sharp," or rising to a peak,
is
of course some-
what exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the
phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men,
raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track,
whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According
^^
Chang Yii, "every army on the march must have scouts ( $fc ^ffc
)
some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will
Cf. Gen. Badengallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief."
Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should
be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him figures, dust rising,
to
:
birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc."
When
parties
There
Yil
it
branches out
in
different directions,
have been sent to
is
*
some doubt about the reading
jffij. J^jJ
and Li Ch'iian proposes
Lan have
it
shows that
collect firewood.
,
* "Aids to
Scouting," p. 26.
.
The T'ung
Tien and
go
A
few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the
is
army
encamping.
Chang Yii says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light
horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and
strong points all along
dust and its motion*"
circumference.
its
Humble words and
24.
that the
enemy
is
Hence
the small quantity of
increased preparations are signs
about to advance.
"As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their obis- to make us
contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack
ject
us."
State,
Chang Yu
who
in
gj j|[ T'ien Tan of the Ch'i
ChiB.C.
was
in
his defence of
279
hard-pressed
[|p ||
alludes to the story of
mo against the Yen forces, led by
In ch. 82 of the
Ch'i Chieh.
jjjj^ 5J^f
Shih Chi we read: "T'ien Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the
Yen army may
in
cut off the noses of their Ch'i prisoners and place them
to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our
other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on
the "front rank
city.'
The
the suggestion;
but those within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should fall
into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend themselves more obstinately
than ever. Once again T'ien Tan sent back converted spies who reported.
these words to
the
enemy: 'What
dread most
I
is
that the
men
of
Yen
dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this
indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' Forthwith
the besiegers dug up all the
graves and burned the corpses lying in them.
And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the city-walls,
may
wept passionately and were
being increased tenfold.
all
T'ien
impatient to go out and fight, their fury
Tan knew then that his soldiers were
ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed
amongst his best
warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines.
He then served out all the
rations and bade his men eat their
remaining
The regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls
were manned with the old and weaker men and with women.
This
fill.
done, envoys were despatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of
surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy.
T'ien Tan
also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the
people, and got the wealthy
citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen
general with the prayer that,
when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be
plundered
or their
women
to
be maltreated.
granted their prayer; but his army
Ch'i Chieh, in high good humour,
now became increasingly slack and
9'
26.
Jfi5
careless.
Meanwhile, T'ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked
them with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured
stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes
on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes,
and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in
the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors.
The
animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's camp
where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted
as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the weapons
on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came into contact.
In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their
mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment
a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind
making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on
bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar.
Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men
of Ch'i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch'i Chieh
The result
.
.
.
of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had
belonged to the Ch'i State."
Violent language and driving forward as
are signs that he will retreat.
I
follow the
original text
standard text reads
of Ts'ao Kung's
||
=jfa
also
here,
ffjj
commentary
ij|j
Hfjjf
to the attack
adopted by the
J|t lg| ^g-
g^
if
-j^
,
^ fy
Tu
Shu.
The
on the strength
which shows that
his text in-
|^. Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can
counterbalance the obvious superiority of the other reading in point of
cluded the word
sense,
g^
not only provides no antithesis to j|f
,
but makes the whole
passage absurd; for if the language of the enemy is calculated to deceive,
it cannot be known as deceitful at the
time, and can therefore afford no
"sign."
tion,
Moreover, the extra word
by the way)
25.
When
in
itjj
j[
|g
(an
awkward
locu-
spoils the parallelism with
the light chariots
The same, according to Tu Yu, as the B^
of II. $ I.
come out first and take up a position on the wings,
is a
sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
The Tung Tien omits
26.
|fj
it
.
Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
indicate a plot.
92
27.
28.
29.
30.
ft
fffi
Tu Yu
tfc
defines
as
jjft
Jg $J
and Li Ch'uan
,
as
J|
;> $J
jg[
";
Wang Hsi and Chang Yii, 01
"without reason," "on a frivolou
treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages."
simply say fit
other hand,
the
pretext," as
jjg
bore the rather unusual sense of "important.'
^J
though
Capt. Calthrop has "without consultation," which
When
27.
Every man
and the
Chou
Tu
l
in
under
his
own regimental banner
calls
Tu Mu
.
^ Qg ^ 38 # ^
>g. J|J
When some
Jiri
omitting jjj after
TJr jfc
quotes
th<
.
moment has come.
that the critical
What Chia Lin
^
flft
,
as opposed to
are seen advancing and
||
some
retreating
a lure.
is
it
Shu
ch. xxix. fol. 31:
Li,
28.
much running about
soldiers fall into rank,
means
it
is
hastening to his proper place
follow the
I
there
too loose.
is
Capt. Calthrop
is
sudden retirement."
W hen
T
29.
hardly right in translating: "An advance, followed b)
It is rather a case of feigned confusion. As Tu Mi
the
stand leaning on their spears
soldiers
they are faint from want of food.
^
The
is
here probably not a
T ung
l
the
^
original text has
If
30.
Tien and
those
synonym
fflj
JJL
Mu
who
remarks:
|JJ
the condition of a whole
^
may mean
are
sent
army
worse
=&
"a weapon.'
draw water begin
to
is
either that they drink before
Chang Yu
^
b)
suffering from thirst.
"
army from the behaviour of a
Tien has the faulty
reading
still,
but
'^^^^r^ifa
or before they return to
camp.
Tung
,
which has been corrected fron
Yu Lan.
drinking themselves, the
As Tu
^*
^
for
-
One may knov
single
man." Th<
drawing water for the army
Th<
takes the latter view.
=
,
and the Yu Lan
93
& # P* * &
& $k %
32-
til
33.
*
34.
Not
the
If
31.
enemy
"booty," as Capt. Calthrop translates
necessarily
Yu Lan read
Tien and
sees an advantage to be gained
and makes no
fS]
^
Jjj,
effort to secure
32. If birds gather on
A
any
|J
,
it,
l
the soldiers are exhausted.
spot,
it
is
unoccupied.
mind when, for instance,
abandoned his camp.
secretly
T ung
etc.
useful fact to bear in
enemy has
the
%
The
it.
as Ch'en
Hao
says,
Clamour by night betokens nervousness.
to false alarms; or, as
Owing
^
^L
S
^
Tu Mu explains it: Jgf |H >P
jjjfc
men restless; so they fall to shouting
"Fear makes
ifi ifc
at night in order to keep up their courage."
Pj[
J^l
before
33.
|T^
If
there
is
is
weak.
authority
about, sedition
The Tung
Tien inserts
is
disturbance in the camp, the general's
If the banners and flags are shifted
afoot.
Tien and Yu
Lan omit
the officers are angry,
If
The T'ung
.
it
J^
.
means
that the
men
are weary.
And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu under"If all the officers of an army are angry
stands the sentence differently
with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" [owing
to the exertions which he has demanded from them].
:
34.
kills
an army feeds
horses
its
is
,fj|
with
|^j]
and
expanded by Mei Yao-ch'en (following Tu Mu) into
i
s
^'
which
have given above. In the ordinary course of things, the
fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.
i
grain
cattle for food,
^
lJaf*^.i^^^S
!L
|p
When
its
and when the men do not hang
is
the sense J
men would be
their cooking-pots
94
H ^ f& w A A
The 7^^
Lan
35.
|| ff
reads
TzV;*
Yu
jjj
which
,
is
which
,
much
is
same
the
and
th
not return
t<
as
feft
,
manifestly wrong.
over the camp-fires, showing that they
will
their tents,
For
}g
,
Tung
the
Tien and Yil
you may know that they are determined
^
Hou Han
Shu,
Wen Yun Fu: "The
rebel
For
1jj|
from the
,
the town of
see VII.
^
|Jjj[
.
to fight to the death
here the illustrative passag
may quote
I
36.
^
Lan both read
form by the /"<
was besiegin
Liang
i|
Huang-fu Sung, who wa
ch. 71, given in abbreviated
^
jg]
Ch'en-ts'ang,
U
Wang Kuo
and j||
"jjj
of
^f
Cho were sent out against hin
supreme command, and
j|t Tung
The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to h
At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to thro
counsel.
down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was now for advancin
'It is a principle of war not to pursue dei
to. ,the attack, but Cho said
perate-men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung answered: 'The
does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not
in
1
:
Kuo
it' Jf
1PI 7
and
The
being slain."
follows:
it
:fl|-
^
"tfc
inferior
A
-9:|Kii-'{k
e ^ rst c ^ ause strikes
me
hard to make anything of
is
am
falling on a disorganise
Thereupon he advanced t
and routed the enemy, Wan
34 is z
reading of the T'u Shu for
with disciplined troops I
multitude, not a band of desperate men.'
the attack unsupported by his colleague,
retreating host;
jjjjj:
V
flg'^'JIf
X' V4I
as rather shallow for
^
in the
Sun Tzi
second without
th
Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted, set down in his first edition
they cast away their cooking-pots." He now has: "When th
negative.
"When
cooking-pots are
35.
The
is
fi|[ |f|L
hung up on the
sight of
wall."
men
well explained
whispering together
Tu
Mu as
by
^jjl
vg
^
^
"speaking wit
bated breath."
in
small knots
The Shuo Wen
rh Ya says -A.
rather strangely defines
t
^
by the word ^E, but
o join" or "contract," which
is
undoubtedly
its
th
pr
mary meaning. Chang Yu is right, then, in explaining it here by th
word
The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts'ao Kun
Jpf
.
l,
Mei
Tu Yu
^ j^
Y ao-ch<en
Bjf
,
Tu Mu
^^
,
li\^^$l, Chia Li
Wang
Hsi
Eg
ift
J^
.
95
36.
M
37.
;fc|
33.
#
or speaking in subdued tones
~/{
^
is
said to be the
points to disaffection
^
-^
is
equivalent to
"the general," understood.
same
as
amongst the rank and
-^
J[t
^ j(,
file.
the subject of course being
In the original text, which seems to be
fol-
lowed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus: =j&
|f|[
Here h would be the s eneral
^^f^HAW^^c^ifcmen amongst
men,
who
is
which
is
the chief stumbling-block in the
gives the very
K'ang Hsi as
keep
not the
talking to his
plausible
^S
emendation
"to
speak
way
g^
fast").
For
themselves.
^^
(also read
But
this
/isi,
is
and defined by
unnecessary
if
36.
Too
frequent
end of
rewards signify that the enemy
is
his resources;
when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, theie is
fear
of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men
a
ways
good temper.
Because,
is
we
to the standard text.
at the
too
,
of this reading, the T'u S/iu
many punishments betray
al-
in
a condition of dire distress.
Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity
necessary to keep the men to their duty.
37.
To
begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of in-
the
at
telligence.
I
follow the interpretation of Ts'ao
^
Kung:
^Q
jgjt
$j
^^ ^^
ad P ted b y Li Ch'iian, Tu Mu and Cha*ng Yii.
fy
Ml]
HJ*
Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch'en
and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first tyrannical towards his men,
and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect
the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The
'
also
T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read
38.
When
mouths,
it
is
"affection" instead of
'|*j
;^|
envoys are sent with compliments
a sign that the
enemy wishes
.
in
their
for a truce.
96
^
40.
* **
it
Tu Mu
^
R # * ft *
#f
says:
*
Ji
^A
"
enemv
If tlie
P en
IH
t
*A
Q
fr i en dly
relations
by sending
tit
for an armistice, either because
anxious
are
that
a
they
sign
hostages,
But it hardly
their strength is exhausted or for some other reason."
needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu
Mu is supported by Mei Yao-ch'en and Chang Yii, I cannot think that
ifc
$fc
is
it
hostages are indicated by the
facing
or taking
.
a long time without either joining battle
themselves off again, the situation is one that
for
demands great
vigilance
and circumspection.
into a trap
falls
Capt. Calthrop
He
^
enemy's troops march up angrily and remain
39. If the
ours
word
which often lurks
in the
^
word
.
"When
both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a
considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring," etc. Had he reflected
a little, he would have seen that this is meaningless as addressed to a
commander who has control over the movements of his own troops.
translates:
;j|J
|jj
,
mean
then, does not
that the
two armies go
but simply that the other side comes up to us.
were not perfectly clear of
If this
make
it
so
^g
:
manoeuvre of
jfjj
meet each
other,
;jig
^
.
Mei Yao-ch'en 's paraphrase would
As Ts'ao Kung points out, a
etc.
itself,
^^
^Jj
to
Likewise with
,
may be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected
flank attack or the laying of an ambush.
40.
this sort
our troops
If
enemy, that
Wang
k 1_*
is
amply
^
^
no more
in
number than the
sufficient;
Hsi's paraphrase, partly
borrowed from Ts'ao Kung,
is
jg|
t*^
Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the T*u
Jg JjL
Ji ^ji
j||-
"Numbers
are no certain
.
is
it
are
^jHj?
^
,
S~f\J
S/iu,
which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely
mark
:
of strength."
only means that no direct attack can be made.
Literally,
and
"no martial advance."
frontal attacks
What we
That is to say, j
"chtng" tactics
must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.
can do
is
simply to concentrate all our available
a
close
watch on the enemy, and obtain
keep
reinforcements.
strength,
97
#H^ A
$ 3t % pt 18 2 7 JR ^
B Ifllt A fi 7 f? 'M 7 W M A
42.
MiJ
iffi
This
is
an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed
squeezing very good sense out of
words
Jl
Jffi
I follow
in every possible way.
offer the simplest explanation:
to
in
the
^^^
the side that gets more men will win." Ts'ao Kung's
ifc "Only
concise as usual to the verge of incomprehensibility, is
|^
4-ft
Fortunately
.
language which
in
difficulty
lies chiefly in
%&
note,
jFjL
which have been taken
who appears
Li Ch'iian,
^t"
,
The
it.
is
we have Chang
Yii to
expound
its
meaning
:j|
to us
lucidity itself:
1IV&&& B
"When
numbers
the
and no favourable opening presents itself, although we may not
be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional
recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating
our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch
But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us."
the victory.
are even,
He
then quotes from
Wei Liao
Tzti, ch. 3:
g^^^g^|J-]-^S
Jf -7*
S& j-jj ^Ef "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may
be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure."
According to this interpretation, Jjj( J^ means "to get recruits," not
i
from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in the wake
This does not sound a very soldierly suggestion, and I
of a large army.
feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzu meant. Chia Lin, on the other
hand, takes the words in a different sense altogether, namely "to conquer
But in that case they could hardly be followed
the enemy" [cf. I.
20].
by
jj]j
Qi
Better than
would be the rendering "to make isolated
this
captures," as opposed to ;g
$
"a general attack."
He who
exercises no forethought but makes light
of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
41.
The
force of
-^
is
not easy to appreciate.
Hao
says
^t
thus
'
continues, quoting from the Tso
fW /l^ II& ^(P
much more will a
Ch'en
hostile state
I
^
^
^
Chuan: jj^
^jj
HU
Jj /^
bees and scor pi ns carry poison, how
XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent,
,
[ f|t
-7 "W ^^ "^
^
then, should not be treated with contempt."
42.
If
soldiers
are
punished before they have grown
7
98
& ii # w
R * 4 * * ff
*e
* JR
attached
to
they
you,
not
will
prove submissive; and,
unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when
the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments
are not enforced, they will
be
still
useless.
e
wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: lf the troops know the
not
his
but
are
affected
general,
by
punishments, they are useless."
This
is
43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means
of iron discipline.
and
jj^
jj
,
fg" respectively.
Yen Tzu
according to Ts'ao Kung, are here equivalent to
Compare our two
word
uses of the
"civil."
^
^ and
^P*
]p
^
Ssu-ma Jang-chii
^| || fJ|
gg
"
His
civil virt ues endeared him to the people;
IW
fl(J H!
j|)C ifc
his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe."
Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.\
[f B. C. 493] said of
M
^
:
^m^^^mzm^MmmM^^m^
"The
commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profesarms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness." Again
ideal
sion of
I
must find
we
fault with Capt. Calthrop's translation
"By
obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity."
This
is
:
a certain road to victory.
44. If in training soldiers
forced, the
will
humane treatment
army
will
commands
be well-disciplined;
are habitually enif
not,
its
discipline
be bad.
The Tung
Tien and Yii
m ^ * ff w A
45- If a general
on
insists
The
Tung
fa,
read:
shows confidence
men
but always
^ ^ ft ^ ^ ^
Tu Mu
awkward
his orders
in his
being obeyed,
is
.
but on the other hand
Tien text, which
^
^^^Tji^^^A^
4 * 7 n.ty A x
original text has
without
Lan
is
it
is
certainly
clear that
identical with ours.
He
says
:
"A
accepted the
general ought
99
men and
time of peace to show kindly confidence in his
in
his authority respected, so that
when they come
to face the
also
make
enemy, orders
may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and
look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in
44, however, would lead
one rather to expect something like this "If a general is always confident
that his orders will be carried out," etc.
Hence I am tempted to think
:
that
he
may have
written
^^
=
j=|
But
.
Jf=f
this is
perhaps too
conjectural.
the gain will be mutual.
Chang Yu
;jg
^
-jj^
and the men are
mutual."
B $ 15 & K* men
1g J$
says:
"The general has confidence
He
docile,
Thus the
Wei Liao Tzu,
having confidence in him.
quotes a pregnant sentence from
4ZZ &*M
ft
$&
~$i
>Mi;
M
T
under his command,
in the
4
"
The
art
gain
is
ch. 4:
of g ivi "g
not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by
Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping
petty doubts."
the confidence of an army.
Capt. Calthrop winds up the chapter with a
orders
is
final mistranslation of a more than usually heinous description: "Orders
are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy."
Besides
inventing the latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert protasis
and apodosis.
X.
X.
TERRAIN.
Only about a third of the chapter, comprising
^
J|5
,
the subject being
more
13, deals
i
fully treated in ch.
XI.
The
with
"six cala-
14 20, and the rest of the chapter is again
a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps,
on that account.
mities" are discussed in
Sun Tzu
i.
We
said:
may
rain, to wit: (i) Accessible
Mei Yao-ch'en
says:
^H* $fa
distinguish six kinds of ter-
ground;
^U
"plentifully provided with roads
and means of communication."
(2)
entangling ground;
The same commentator
country, venturing into
(3)
says: $pj
|g
^^Q
jfa jjfr
$$
"Net-like
which you become entangled."
temporising ground;
Tu Yu
explains ^JT as
phrases such as j|r
-^
^,
.
This meaning
^^
is
still
retained in
"stave off," "delay."
I
do not know
Capt. Calthrop calls ^JT Jjjj "suspended ground," unless he
.
fusing it with
why
(4)
is
con-
^^
narrow passes;
The
root idea in
($}
is
|$g
(6)
modern
precipitous heights;
narrowness; in
|Jjpt,
steepness.
positions at a great distance from the
enemy.
is hardly
necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification.
strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.
It
A
101
my
3.
2.
Ground which can be
freely traversed
by both sides
called accessible.
is
"level
Generally speaking,
2p
||j|
With regard
to
ground of
3.
The Tung
Tien reads
be before the enemy
See IX.
and
A
2.
carefully
Jg *j J^
in
The Tung
Cf. IX.
9:
this nature,
.
Tien reads
as
7Jc|J
doubtless, as
is
meant.
is
occupying the raised and sunny spots,
guard your
curious use of
meaning
country"
a verb,
Tu Yu
of supplies.
line
if
says,
our text
fit
>
ffi&
H
is
right.
jjjjb
The
^ ^H
general
"
^tf'
not
your communications." Tu Mu, who was not
a soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of fighting,
goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications
to allow the
enemy
to cut
or enclosing it by embankments on each side (
( trjg| ),
jfc
In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the com))!
*
we could wish that Sun Tzti had done more than skirt the
munications,"
^
by a wall
u. Col. Hen10, VII.
edge of this important subject here and in I.
derson says "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence
:
as the heart to the life of a human being.
Just as the duelwho finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and
own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's move-
of an
list
his
army
ments, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a
false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his
plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and
to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to
prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail
the ruin or the surrender of his whole army." **
Then you
will
be able to fight with advantage.
Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
* See K Pens<es de
Napoleon !," no. 47.
** "The Science of
War," chap. 2.
102
B5
ffn
ttj
Ground which can be abandoned but
4.
re-occupy
is
Capt. Calthrop
From
5.
you may
wrong
in translating
"retreat from it."
:j|<
a position of this sort, if the enemy
But
sally forth and defeat him.
prepared for your coming, and you
is
hard to
is
called entangling.
is
fail
is
unprepared,
if
the
enemy
to defeat him,
then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
^f\
jj\
7J?|J
^
(an example of litotes)
When
6.
by making
'S^
first
is
move,
ffi 'Hf "tit
IP!
situation remains at a
In
7.
the position
the
a
position
such that neither side
it
is
"Each
^l
-^
and the
check."
will receive a
"you
^j|J
paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch'en as
is
will
gain
called temporising ground.
side finds
it
inconvenient to move,
deadlock" (Tu Yu).
of this sort, even though the
enemy
should offer us an attractive bait,
Tu Yu
says
flee."
But
to
this
quit our position.
"turning their backs on us and pretending
one
of the lures which might induce us to
only
Here again ^pl] is used as a verb, but this time in a
^T*
^=j
^^ -^
is
different sense: "to hold out
it
will
thus
his
an advantage
be advisable not to
enticing
the
stir forth,
in
enemy
army has come out,
to."
but rather to retreat,
his turn; then,
we may
when
part of
deliver our attack with
advantage.
Mei Yao-ch'en paraphrases the passage
of rhymes being
aMdd: %.
%
ffi $fe
in a curious jingle, the
^
ft ft fa
%
^
scheme
f
|J
fflj
io 3
With regard
8.
them
to
narrow
you can occupy
if
passes,
first,
Calthrop says:
Capt.
"Defiles,
conditional clause, answering to
make
haste to occupy."
^^ j^
-^Q
^
But
this is a
~
in the next paragraph.
them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of
the enemy.
let
Because then, as
$HJ
"^ie
Tu Yu
pected attacks
tators
make
we
shall
observes,
w ith
f
ft\\
an d by making sudden and unexhave the enemy at our mercy." The commen-
initiative Wl ^
iilfc
^e
lls >
a great pother about the precise meaning of
the foreign reader seems to present
no
difficulty
Should the enemy forestall you
do not go after him if the pass is
if it
is
to
occupying a pass,
fully garrisoned, but
in
9.
only
^9, which
whatever.
weakly garrisoned.
10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised
and sunny
Ts'ao
spots,
Kung
says:
and there wait
^J
him
for
^ |^ H ^ ^
Pf
to
come
^^A
"
up.
The P ar~
advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand
principle alluded to, see VI.
Chang Yu tells the following anec2].
ticular
dote of
^ ^j
|jtt]r
P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D.
619
a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes.
and
682),
"At
who was
sent
on
nightfall he pitched
had already been completely fortified by wall
orders that the army should shift its
a hill near by.
This was highly displeasing to his officers,
who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on
the men.
P'ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances
and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a
terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment
to the depth of over twelve feet.
The recalcitrant officers were amazed
at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong.
'How did
P'ei Hsing-chien
you know what was going to happen?' they asked.
replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking
his
and
camp
as
ditch,
quarters to
usual,
it
when suddenly he gave
104
jiiftA
13.
Cte
T^aw^ S>4, ch. 84, fol. 12 r., and
v.} From this it may be seen," Chang
Yii continues, "that high and sunny places are advantageous not only
for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods."
unnecessary questions.'
:T'0/*-
-fltt
11.
If
67^
ch.
1
[See
08,
fol.
5
enemy has occupied them before you, do
the
not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
The
turning-point of
^*
against the two rebels,
in
|||
|j|i
Tou
3p
King of
Cheng, was
Chien-te,
Shih-ch'ung, Prince of
lE Ht ^j Wang
the heights of jj
Ijjf
Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D.
|f
J||J
Wu-lao, in spite of which
Tou
W
Hsia,
and
his seizure o
Chien-te persisted
attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken
his
[See Chiu
prisoner.
Tang
Shu, ch.
2,
fol.
5 z>.,
and
also ch. 54.]
you are situated at a great distance from the
and
the strength of the two armies is equal,
enemy,
12.
If
The Tung
is
it
Tien reads
not easy to provoke a battle,
^
Ts'ao Kung says that
means $[
"challenging the enemy."
Ifffe
jj|
But the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,
n to meet him." The point of course is, that we must not
$$, Hfc "&i g
think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which
xfe
$5
"
fci
I
IPt
we
s hould.
be exhausted and our adversary fresh
and keen."
and righting
13.
These
will
be to your disadvantage.
six are the principles
Or perhaps, "the
connected with Earth.
principles relating to ground."
The general who has
attained
a
See, however,
responsible
8.
I.
post must
be careful to study them.
Capt. Calthrop omits
^
Out of the foregoing six ^|j}
it
Eg <g
be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have
the
to
no
reference
really
configuration of the country, and that
only 4 and 5 can be said to convey
any definite geographical idea.
will
.
,
105
15.
^c^J^JlJJl
Now
14.
I*
an army
+
is
six several calamities,
exposed to
not arising from natural causes,
The T*u Shu
reads
but from faults for which the general
is
responsible. These
are: (i) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin;
(5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
take
I
to
exception
"distress"
Capt.
Calthrop's rendering of
and "disorganisation,"
as
jjfo
respectively.
Other conditions being equal,
15.
and
|Sjg
against another ten times
its
size,
if
one force
is
hurled
the result will be the
flight of the former.
Cf. III.
The
10.
general's fault here
calculating the enemy's
same force
the
as in
strength."
12,
where
it
It
is
^ ^ J]
that of
obvious that
is
was equivalent
to
cannot have
life
Ji ^J
it, with Chang Yu, to
t|^
Jj|
wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness
As Li Ch'iian very justly remarks, -^
>gj
~
^|J 3p
of the
should
I
.
^^
not be inclined, however, to limit
-&
"not
"the
weapons."
^
ft
When
the
Z some
It
^
^^
"
Given a decided advantage in
ffl
position, or the help of
stratagem such as a flank attack or an ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten]."
2.
*tfe
1
6.
officers
iffll
common
and
their
the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow.
Capt.
soldiers are too strong
too weak, the result
"laxity"
Calthrop's "relaxation"
is
cites the
unhappy case of
who was
sent to
I
R'J "ST
/Ji ip;
^|
Wang
Wei
is
insubordination.
not good, on account of
its
ambiguity.
Tu Mu
T'ien Pu \Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 148],
A.D. with orders to lead an army against
J|J ^ffj
in 821
T'ing-ts'ou.
But the whole time he was
in
command,
the utmost contempt, and openly flouted
his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at
a time. T'ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when,
his
soldiers
treated
him with
io6
n.
H5
some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy,
After that, the
troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction.
unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.
after
his
common
When
the officers are too strong and the
too weak, the result is collapse.
Ts'ao
Kung
energetic
says:
and want
f}%
^ *gcommon||
T
is
whereas in the former clause
equivalent to
j
,
and Tu
Mu
Pi
The
officers are
and sud-
be taken literalb of physical weak-
to
it
"
$Bl
soldiers are feeble
to press on, the
Note that j$j
denly collapse."
ness,
g*
soldiers
is
Li Ch'iian
figurative.
it
explains
as
|lg
^^
makes
Tft ^jj
[^
"stumb-
ling into a death-trap."
17.
When
the higher officers
of inacc ording to Ts'ao Kung, are the >J>
jj^ "generals
~fc |tl
rank."
But Li Ch'iian, Ch'en Hao and Wang Hsi take the term
'
ferior
as simply convertible with
or
j|^
-^ 4^.
are angry and insubordinate,
on
give battle
ment,
before
no he
is
Ts'ao
their
the
and on meeting the enemy
own account from a
feeling of resent-
commander-in-chief can
tell
a position to fight, the result
in
Kung makes
-fc
seems rather far-fetched.
i^,
understood, the
Wang
Hsi's note
is
whether or
ruin.
subject of
^R
which
,
is:
"This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same
time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he
arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."
He
is
takes
|^
,
^
^
therefore, in the sense of
right in his paraphrase
^
jjjj|
j||;!
but
I
think that Ch'en
"they don't care
if it
Hao
be pos-
sible or no."
My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yaoch'en and Chang Yu. Tu Mu
gives a long extract from the Tso Chuan,
Pi [597 B.C.] was
Hf <$, XII. 3, showing how the great battle of
j{\|$
^
Chin State through the contumacy of
Hsien Hu
-^Q |^
and the resentful spite of
Wei
I and
Chao
Chan.
Chang
|J| |^lost for the
^g
Yu
also
alludes to the mutinous
^
conduct of |f|
B
Luan Yen
[ibid.
When
general is weak and without authority;
when his orders are not clear and distinct;
1
8.
the
Wei Liao Tzu
^^4,|lJ^^Zl|i,
(ch. 4) says:
H^
^
^
"If the commander gives his orders
^
jfjf
H(J
Jfi 31
with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice ; if his moves
are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about
fiffi
General Baden-Powell says,
doing their duty."
words:
the
italicising
of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in
*
one nutshell
in the clearness of the instructions they receive."
As-
"The
secret
suming that clear instructions beget confidence,
Tztt (loc. cit.) goes on to say:
#*;&*&
^
H ~k
this is
^^^
Wei Liao
Cf.
alsoWuTzuch.
3
:
ffl
much what
very
>g 3t J$
jjft
*
W
J
M
g|
"i^ _/ >
1_ ty
V ~\ w /y* "the most fatal defect in a milir ^^*f sf > fii
tary leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise
<
from hesitation."
when there are no
|J*
^X
^^
~ffij
fixed duties assigned to officers
^^
"Neither officers nor
and men,
men have any
regular
routine" [Tu Mu].
and the ranks are formed
the result
is
in
a slovenly haphazard manner,
utter disorganisation.
When
unable to estimate the enemy's
strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,
or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and
19.
a
general,
to
place picked
result must be a rout.
neglects
Chang
in
the front rank, the
Yii paraphrases the latter part of the sentence
H!
ffl
soldiers
&&&&*
ft to H ^
H
3t
"Whenever there
RIJ }|t
is
fighting
to
til
>
^- ^
RIJ
be done, the keenest
* "Aids to
Scouting," p.
^
and c ntinu <*:
xii.
j|3| ||j| Jj|
Jl
Sfc
$
^ ^ -&
spirits
should be
io8
20.
appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the
own men and to demoralise the enemy." Cf. the primi
There seems
ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44 et a/.).
resolution of our
to
little
^
distinguish
from
in
^
except that
15,
j^jr
is
a more
forcible word.
These are
20.
six
Hao makes them
Ch'en
ways of courting
out to be: (i)/
^
estimate the enemy's strength;" (2)
2J
J*
(3)
gfl|
anger;" (5)
HH
|i
"defective training;" (4)
|&
^v
^^
"failure to use
J||
'jfc
I
JflJ
defeat,
"neglect to
J&J
>T>
-fa
-T^.
jjf
>5^-
^
"want of authority;"
# 3g
jft
&
"non-observance of discipline
"unjustifiable
;" (6)
^^
picked men."
which must be carefully noted by the general who has
attained a responsible post.
See supra,
21.
The
13.
natural formation of the country
is
the soldier's
best ally;
Chia Lin's text has the reading
^
for
Hao
Ch'en
.
JJjff
says:
^^
$fj i^ ^c|J "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to
those connected with ground."
>P
but a power of estimating the
adversary,
The insertion of a "but" is necessary to show the connection
here.
A
general should always
advantages of terrain.
utilise,
of thought
but never rely wholly on natural
of controlling the forces of
victory,
wl
)$af
^s
Chinese, and
is
one
f
those condensed expressions which
mean
so
much
in
an English translation. What it seems to imply
complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.
so
little
in
and of shrewdly calculating
difficulties,
The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read
dangers and distances,
@
^
%\] <g
fe
ff
fa
decidedly puzzled by Capt. Calthrop's translation "an eye for steepness, command and distances."
Where did he find the word which I have
put in italics?
I
am
:
.
109
#
22.
it
m
a^$
ffl
*#
lit
23.
constitutes the test of a great general.
A
somewhat
^
$
"
free translation of
^
As Chang Yu remarks,
.
the essentials of soldiering," ground
these are
being only a helpful
accessory.
22.
He who knows
his
into
knowledge
who knows them
these things, and in fighting puts
not,
win
will
practice,
his
nor practises them,
battles.
will surely
He
be
defeated.
23.
must
will
If
fight,
not
even
result
sure
is
fighting
though
in
to
result
the
victory,
in
ruler
victory,
forbid it;
then you
if
fighting
then you must not fight even
at the ruler's bidding.
3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said
have been the patron of EM
Chang Liang and to have written the
|5, has these words attributed to him:
^j gj|
Cf. VIII.
to
^
^
JJUJ
|jj
"The
responsibility
of setting an
army
in
jj?
motion must devolve on
advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace,
Hence the god-like ruler and
brilliant results will hardly be achieved.
the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering
their country's cause [///., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This
the general alone
means
;
if
^$
^
"in matters lying outside the
j|F gjj
#\*
zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute." Chang
Yu
that
|gj
also quotes the saying:
^^^P^^'T'^sS
"Decrees of
Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp." Napoleon,
who has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence
of action, speaks in the same sense: "Un general en chef n'est pas a
convert de ses fautes a la guerre par un ordre de son souverain ou du
ministre, quand celui qui le donne est eloigne du champ d'operation, et
*
qu'il connait mal, ou ne connait pas du tout le dernier etat des choses."
the
*
"Maximes de Guerre,"
no. 72.
I
24.
10
J
The general who advances without coveting fame
24.
and retreats without fearing disgrace,
It
was Wellington,
a soldier
I
think,
who
said that the hardest thing of
all
for
to retreat.
is
whose only thought
is
to protect his country
and do good
service for his sovereign,
^,
which
equivalent
to
something
like
is
Tu Shu, is said by Ch'en Hao to be
be separately translated, it would be
omitted by the
is
^
.
If
had
it
to
our word "accrue."
the jewel of the kingdom.
A
noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior."
S
Such a man, says Ho Shih, fj= ~fc
had to suffer punishment, would not regret
-Iff
^
$|
^
"even
if
he
his conduct."
Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as
25.
will
your own beloved sons, and they
will
stand by you even
unto death.
I.
In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging pic6.
of the famous general
Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have
frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate
Cf.
Wu
ture
the same food as the
meanest of
his
soldiers, refused to
have either a
mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations
wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his
soldiers was suffering from an
abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out
the virus. The soldier's mother,
hearing this, began wailing and lamenting.
Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison
horse
from
to
ride
his sore.'
or a
The woman
similar service for
replied
:
'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a
left him afterwards, and finally
And now that he has done the
husband, who never
met his death at the hands of the
enemy.
same
for
mentions
my
my
son, he too will
^ -^
fall
fighting I
the Viscount of Ch'u,
Hsiao during the winter.
^
know
not where'."
who invaded
^ The Duke
Li Ch'iian
the small state of
of Shen said to him
:
|||
"Many
of
1
j? BO
1 .
^ HI $ s
ffi
1 1
7 si 4 ii ro
27.
the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold."
So he made a round
of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk.
\Tso CJntan, j|
^.
XII.
,
5].
Chang
Yii
same passage,
alludes to the
however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce
26.
If,
commands
your
disorder
and
;
incapable,
of quelling
moreover,
:
Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong.
translates: "overindulgence may produce disorder."
The
last
he
then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they
are useless for any practical purpose.
Cf. IX.
We
42.
read in the
"Injury comes out of kindness."
make your
Tu Mu
2
\&- ffi $g pt.
=j|
Li Ching once said that
,
:
^ =f ^
if you could
would not be afraid of the enemy.
an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in
soldiers afraid of you, they
recalls
219 A.D., when
Q
Lii
^^
Meng was occupying
the town of
yT
[|fe
He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest
Chiang-ling.
the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a
certain
officer
townsman,
who happened to be a
bamboo hat (
) belonging
serving under his banner,
ventured to appropriate a
^
fellowto
one
of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a proLii Meng considered that the fact of his being
tection against the rain.
also a native of
VrT tvj JTu-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear
Y?* rrJ
breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution,
This act of
the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so.
and
from
that
time forth
wholesome
with
filled
the
awe,
army
severity
even
articles
ch. 54,
i
f.
27.
If
3
dropped
in the
we know
to attack, but are
attack,
That
that our
as Ts'ao
own men
are in a condition
unaware that the enemy
we have gone
is,
highway were not picked up. \SanKuo Chih,
r.&*.].
Kung
is
not open to
only halfway towards victory.
says, "the issue in this case
is
uncertain."
I
^
29.
2*
12
^
ifc
-tit
so.
28. If
we know
that the
is
enemy
open
to attack, but
own men are not in a condition
we have gone only halfway towards victory.
are unaware that our
attack,
Cf. III.
13
(i).
we know that the enemy is open
know that our men are in a condition
29. If
also
to
are unaware that the nature of the ground
impracticable,
we have
to attack,
and
to attack, but
makes
fighting
gone only halfway towards
still
victory.
I
in
take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction
may
meaning between
jpj?
and
Jpjr.
The
without any further implication, whereas
is simply
"to attack"
a stronger word which in
latter
is
tjpc
nine cases out of ten means "to attack with expectation of victory," "to
fall upon," as we should
On the other hand,
say, or even "to crush."
is not
quite synonymous with >0, which is mostly used of operations
jpc
on a larger scale, as of one State making war on another, often with the
added idea of invasion.
finally, has special reference to the subjugation
^j
of rebels.
,
See Mencius, VII.
2.
ii.
2.
Hence the experienced
soldier, once in motion, is
never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never
at a loss.
30.
The reason
so
being, according to
thoroughly as
to
ensure
Tu Mu,
that he has taken his measures
"He does not move
victory beforehand.
"so that when he does move, he makes no
Chang Yu,
Another reading substitutes
[g for $$ and jp| for ^|
The latter variant only is adopted by the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan. Note
that
here means "at the end of his mental resources."
jjj|
recklessly," says
mistakes."
3
1
.
.
Hence the saying
yourself,
your victory
:
If
will
you know the enemy and know
not stand
in
doubt;
Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified,
if
you know Heaven and know Earth,
^
and
and jfy are transposed
^
.
The
for
the sake of the jingle between
original text, however, has
made from
rection has been
^W ^C ^W
ijfe
>
^
an d tne cor-
the T'ung Tien.
you may make your victory complete.
As opposed
to
|j^
^">
above.
The
original
text has
B^L 7JT
the corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of
in
^f\ |p|
jf\ *JK*
the preceding sentence. Here, however
would not be synonymous
,
~jf\ j|S|
^
^
but equivalent to
]Q *jjj* "inexhaustible," "beyond
^f\
jf\
n. The T'ung Tien has again supplied the true
computation." Cf. V.
with
,
^^^
^
Ch'uan sums up as follows:
^jp jfy ^}J
"
Given a knowledg e of three things 1^ 9$ K'J
ifc
the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of
earth
victory will invariably crown your battles."
Li
reading.
^
W
,
W^
*
XI.
Li Ch'iian
is
THE NINE SITUATIONS.
^ ^%
not quite right in calling these
As we
j|^
some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military
~
J
of
view.
Wang Hsi more correctly says
point
jfy ^|J
"There are nine military situations, good and bad." One
shall
see,
^ ^L
would
ifc
like to distinguish the
-j\^ ij|j
from the
^
^
:
six
^^
of chap.
X
by
saying that the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features
^
of the country, while the
the army, being jfy
^i
have more to do with the condition of
Jjjj
"situations" as opposed to "grounds."
soon found impossible to carry out the distinction.
But
it
is
Both are cross-divisions,
among the J{|j -^ we have "temporising ground" side by side with
"narrow passes," while in the present chapter there is even greater confusion.
for
Sun Tzii said The art of war recognises nine varieties
i
of ground: (i) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3)
contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground;
:
.
(8)
hemmed-in ground;
2.
is
When
a chieftain
desperate ground.
(9)
is
righting in his
own
territory,
it
dispersive ground.
So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious
and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded
by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes
to see their wives
Tu Mu,
"they will lack the valour of desperation, and
they will find harbours of refuge."
The
Shu, seems to have been accidentally
standard
text.
^
,
when they
which appears
omitted in
my
retreat,
in the
edition
T'u
of the
3.
When
3.
he has penetrated into hostile
no great distance,
to
Ho
Li Ch'iian and
for
^ )Q
Shih say
"When your army
home."
after
idiomatic translation
it clear to
everybody that you have
do not think that "disturbing ground,"
j|(fr
ijjj,
has anything to justify
an
If
it.
out of the question, one should at least attempt
is
literal.
Ground the possession of which imports great
4.
vantage to either
must apologise
I
facility
similar explanations.
make
I
Capt. Calthrop's rendering of
be
"because of the
has crossed the border, you should burn your
boats and bridges, in order to
to
^^
|g J
115^^^^^^-^^^^^
remarks:
no hankering
ground.
and the other commentators give
retreating,"
Tu Mu
facile
is
it
but
territory,
tionary,
Kung
:
ad-
contentious ground.
for using this
word
in a sense not
Tu Mu's
"to be contended for"
i.e.
says
side,
is
"Pfj^l^^^^^^S
Jj\
known
to the dic-
Jjjjj
tjf-
Ts'ao
.
"g rouncl on which the few
and the weak can defeat the many and the strong," such as
[^ Pj^
"the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch'iian.
Thus, Thermopylae was
a
jfy because the- possession of it, even for a few days only, meant
^j
,
holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable
time.
Cf.
Wu
-Tztt,
ch. V.
"For those who have
better than
ad
init.i
$
a narrow pass."
When
-f^
!jc
to fight in the ratio of
one to
Lii
-^
{zj
J| ||
;j$
ten, there is
Kuang was
$&
nothing
returning
from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got
as far as
>UJ
VJrf
administrator of
J|^ WEt Liang Hsi,
Fu
of
the
of
death
Chien, King of
Liang-chou, taking advantage
*SJf
I-ho, laden with spoils,
-^
Ch'in, plotted against
^1 j^ Yang
him and was
for barring his
Han, governor of ^|j
M
way
into the province.
Kao-ch'ang, counselled him,
is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers
and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of
the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a
different plan.
Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the
saying: "Lii
are vigorous
"JEJJJ
Oj^
when
Kuang
Kao-wu
pass,
thus cutting
him
his troops are prostrated with thirst,
without moving.
we could make
Or
if
off
from supplies of water, and
we can
you think that the pass
a stand against him at the
^
I
dictate our
own
mention
too far
is
terms
off,
I-wu pass, which
is
n6
The cunning and resource of -^ j^ Tzu-fang himself [i.e. jj|
would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two
Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed
positions."
and swept away by the invader. [See ^jj- |J ch. 122, fol. 3 r, and
nearer.
,
>
fol.
Ground on which each
5.
is
ch -43,
26.]
movement
side has liberty of
open ground.
This
Kung
is
which according to Ts ao
only a makeshift translation of ^|F
a network of roads," like
with
covered
&j& "ground
,
stands for
^
^ a|
Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih,'is
on
which
intercommunication is easy." In either case,
"ground
"flat country," and therefore
be
evidently
^4
a chess-board.
^p
J|f
not be blocked."
6.
Cf.
j|
^
^
^6
"Sf
must
"
can ~
2.
Ground which forms the key
to three contiguous states,
rrfnfi&IHi
conterminous
" Our
and a third country
with both." [Ts'ao Kung.]
Shih instances the small principality of
which was
J||$ Cheng,
the enemy's
Meng
bounded on the north-east by
the south
^
by
so that he
at his
^
X.
,
it
^
Ch'i,
on the west by
^
Chin, and on
Ch'u.
who
occupies
it
has most of the Empire
first
command,
~J\
of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into which
China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds
this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.
See infra,
48.
^
of the Empire, but
it
appears at
is
first
sight to
more probably,
as
be "the masses" or "population"
Tu Yu says,
*&
^|
&
.
ground of intersecting highways.
is
Capt.
2
ijjj
Calthrop's
above, but
"path-ridden
it
ground" might stand well enough for
which
J|jj
does not bring out the force of
clearly denotes the central position
^
,
where important highways meet.
AA
7.
B
ttttrtt&VJt
tft
9-
iW!
10.
When
7.
hostile
its
a
leaving
country,
number of
fortified
cities
in
rear,
^
After
,
the
T ung
l
Tien intercalates the gloss
J|j|
J^ jg
.
serious ground.
is
it
an army has penetrated into the heart of a
^
Hsi explains the name by saying that -fi rJj? jf
"when an army has reached such a point, its situation
Wang
2
l|j.
^
serious."
ifc
Yo
I into the
Li Ch'iian instances (i) the victorious march of
|$|
capital of Ch'i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch'u, six years later,
is
^^
Q
by the Ch'in general
Mountain
8.
Or
Po
Ch'i.
forests,
simply, "forests."
^
||[
jfg
I
follow the
Tu
l
Shu
given in the standard text, which
,
in omitting the
Jfj before
is
not only otiose but spoils
rhythm of the sentence.
the
marshes and fens
rugged steeps,
hard to traverse
3
J^
(after
p*i
the
tE Mb
(to
:
this is
difficult
be distinguished from
J|J
Shuo Wtri]
as g round
as
^f
$2 ^K
)9f
all
-
"
is
ground.
i
4
)
"to destroy."
Wi
country that
that has
^
is defined by K'ang Hsi
Hence Chia Lin explains
been ruined by water Pas~
^
it," and Tu Yu simply as
Jj^ "swampy ground."
yJ0
But Ch'en Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep hollows
what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the expressive term
sing over
^tb
^
"earth-hells."
the
Compare
^^
of IX.
15.
Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,
and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so
that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush
a large body of our men this is hemmed-in ground.
9.
:
10.
tion
Ground on which we can only be saved from
by fighting without delay,
is
destruc-
desperate ground.
11.
ft
& ic
*fe
a H *4
IW
f
ft It
H'J
Ufa
IN ft
.
The
situation, as pictured
except that here escape
^ 7K it
RlJ
is
^^
large river behind,
by Ts'ao Kung,
is
very similar to the H||
no longer possible:
Ji. HlJ
^ $E
"
A
^jjj
loft y
^
1^1
Uj
mountain
^
ijjj
,
^ff
in front, a
advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch'en Haosays:
"
to be on 'desperate ground'
A^^E^^^'it^^'JiM
Tu
in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house."
of
the plight of an army
a
vivid
Li
from
description
Ching
quotes
thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the
it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's
aid of local guides:
the
on
A
ravine
left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so
mercy.
is
like
sitting
Mu
carperilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots
ried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice
but to proceed in single file (fjj* ^J J3| jf'
J^). Then, before
in
order
of
our
soldiers
there is time to range
battle, the enemy in over-
whelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can
nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge.
We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defenIf we simply maintain our
sive, none of us has a moment's respite.
ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a
move, we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The
country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the
resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single
man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of
offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited
in this terrible plight, even though we had the most
by ourselves:
valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed
with the slightest effect?"
Students of Greek history may be reminded
of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians
under Nicias and Demosthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].
On
dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile
On contentious ground, attack not.
ground, halt not.
ii.
But rather
let all
your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous
So Ts'ao Kung. Li Ch'iian and others, however, suppose
position first.
the meaning to be that the
enemy has already forestalled us, so that it
^
would be sheer madness
^ ^,
to attack.
In the
when the
-^
King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies
"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession
:
have the advantage over the other
side.
If a
position
of this kind
is
119
first by the enemy, beware of attacking him.
Lure him away
- - show
your banners and sound your drums
by pretending to flee
trail brushmake a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose
detach a body
confound his ears and eyes
wood and raise a dust
Then your opof your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade.
secured
will sally forth to the rescue."
ponent
1
2.
On open
ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
Because the attempt would be
1
is
follow that of
Chang
Yii
jfi
(
gj"
\% J
indicated in Ts'ao Kung's brief note
together"
i.e.,
see
that a portion
Hsi points out that
Wang
^g
of X.
"accessible ground"
and would expose the blocking
futile,
There are two interpretations of ^SE
force itself to serious risks.
ijjj
is
|Sj[
:
$&
^
JjJg
J||| -jj^
The
).
"Draw
^
.
other
closer
own army is not cut off.
name for the 5^ jfy
another
only
of your
and says
2,
^g
lit
that the
advice here given
is
a sharp eye on the line of sup5flJ ^H :jjj[ "keep
be careful that your communications are not cut. The T'ung Tien
simply a variation of
plies,"
On ground
of intersecting highways, join hands with your
allies.
Or perhaps, "form
has
Kung
much
^^^
too timid
13.
On
:
On
this,
with neighbouring states."
alliances
ifc
and vague.
Capt. Calthrop's
The
Thus Ts'ao
"cultivate intercourse"
original text reads
^ -^
is
.
serious ground, gather in plunder.
Li Ch'iian has the following delicious note
^ S 11 ft A
>tf
:
'^j
& ft ^
enemy's country, care must be taken not
by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the
Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch'in territory was marked
by no violation of women or looting of valuables. \Nota bene: this was
an army penetrates
to
far into the
alienate the people
207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies
entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In
the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not
in
that
^
'do not plunder'."
Alas, I fear that in this
'plunder,' but ^&E
;jjt
instance the worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu,
120
*ij
m m % Mb w a
He says: "When encamped on 'serious
least, has no such illusions.
inducement as yet to advance further, and no
ground,' there being no
one ought to take measures for a protracted resispossibility of retreat,
tance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch
at
on the enemy."
In difficult
Cf. also II.
2,
On hemmed-in
Kung says: ^jjjf jjfr
and Tu Yu amplifies this by
^
H||
^
fi|
"do not encamp."
|]j|
"Try the
saying:
Jg
effect of
jj
g|J
some unusual
artifice;"
|g ^f
|| |g g|
"In such a position, some scheme must be devised which
and
will suit the circumstances,
the peril
occasion
.
ground, resort to stratagem.
:
Ts'ao
Jj[
fjfc
ground, keep steadily on the march.
Or, in the words of VIII.
14.
|| $$
9: |g|
may be
if
This
escaped."
we can succeed
is
exactly
when Hannibal was hemmed
road to Casilinum, and to
in
in deluding the enemy,
what happened on the famous
among the mountains on. the
appearances entrapped by the Dictator
Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was
remarkably like that which T'ien Tan had also employed with success
all
When night came on,
24, note.]
exactly 62 years before.
[See IX.
bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set
on
the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain
towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange
spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the
fire,
side
Romans
that they withdrew
from their position, and Hannibal's army
[See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.
passed safely through the defile.
16,
17.]
On
desperate ground, fight.
For, as Chia Lin remarks:
fight
with
tain if
to
is
knew how
is
egfe
/H
^4*
life
;
|M
||||
^
whereas death
"if
you
is
cer-
called skilful leaders of old
omitted in the T'u Shu
to
|jj
a chance of
your corner."
Those who were
fH
Jj
your might, there
you cling
15.
j^j-
all
drive
text.
a wedge between the enemy's front
and rear;
More
literally,
"cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."
121
between
to prevent co-operation
doubt
I
if
^^
This
translates.
can mean
wanted
is
and small
his large
divi-
good troops from rescuing the bad,
sions; to hinder the
for
"officers
J^
~|\
and men,"
as Capt. Calthrop
.
the officers from rallying their men.
The reading ^^, derived from
The original text has
doubtful.
1
>^,
When
6.
the enemy's
Yu Lan, must be considered very
and the T'u Shu )|.
the
men were
scattered, they prevented
them from concentrating;
Capt. Calthrop translates ffi
cannot be right.
even when
them
their forces
fjffi>
"they scattered the enemy," which
were united, they managed
Mei Yao-ch'en's note makes the sense
&
^
S^
1$.
fln
When
17.
7
H^
are dependent on
^f\ ij|js
it
was
^^
5?
in
'fi|l
plain
:
nt/
^^
R
i
t
keep
this
W fl WM M IIIIE
with the foregoing:
5
down
to
15.
to their advantage, they
Mei Yao-ch'en connects
rSi ^f\ gte
Sft
*
rtt-i
rvFc HM
of course,
these clauses,
ward move; when otherwise, they stopped
tt
to
disorder.
in
RIJ
Ih
made
a
for-
still.
^
1
j||| -jj|j
"Having succeeded
^jj
^g
in thus
they would push forward in order to secure any
advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they
would remain where they were."
dislocating the enemy,
1
If
8.
enemy
asked how to
cope with a great host of the
orderly array and on the point of marching to
in
the attack,
j|
ffl
is
like
fjg
PJj
,
introducing a supposed question.
should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
I
122
jt
what Sun Tzti had in mind.
differ as to
Opinions
it
is
is
depending."
Jt)r
^
*Hp
"some
5f?lJ
Tu Mu
says:
strategical
fl |$
Ts'ao
Kung
thinks
advantage on which the enemy
%4H
f|j
B3 Sf
i.lt#3-#ikA-^/Bir!fft^*.l
"
f
'J
Thethree
things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of
which his success depends, are: (i) to capture our favourable positions;
ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications."
object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions
But this exegesis unduly
and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III.
3.]
(2) to
Our
strains the
meaning of iS* and
says that
^
ffife
,
and
1
agree with Ch'en Hao,
who
does not refer only to strategical advantages, but
is
ffi
any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.
By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other
side
on the defensive.
19.
Rapidity
the essence of war:
is
means "the conditions of war,"
"the spirit of the troops."
says,
tpf
ftJc
"this
is
a
summary
According
to
not,
as
Tu Mu,
Capt.
j^
[[
Calthrop
^
-f
of leading principles in warfare," and
**''
$$
"These are the
ft
til 1ft ft
IS.
profoundest truths of military science, and the chief business of the general."
The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached
he adds:
to
speed by two of China's greatest generals.
In
227
A.D.,
^
j||
under the Wei Emperor Wen
^jft tyfa Hsin-ch'eng
Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into
correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The
Meng
Wei
Ta, governor of
general Ssti-ma I was then military governor of
wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he
^
Wan, and
get-
an army to
anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message
of friendly import.
Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng
Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move." Ssti-ma I replied: "Meng
Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,
while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by
a series of forced marches, he
brought his army under the walls of Hsinch'eng within the space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in
a letter to Chu-ko
Liang: "Wan is 1200 li from here. When the news
of my revolt reaches Ssti-ma
I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master,
but it will be a whole month before
any steps can be taken, and by that
ting
at
once
set off with
I2 3
so.
time
my
come
will
city
* A JW
2
I?
Jl
be well
A
Besides, Ssu-ma
fortified.
and the generals
I
sure
is
not to
be sent against us are not
worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with consternation
"Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my
allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity
himself,
that
will
:
is
A
this!"
1
rebel
jljlj
Hsin-ch'eng had fallen and Meng Ta had
In 621 A.D., Li Ching was
i, f. 3.]
later,
[See Chin Shu, ch.
j.
from
sent
ffil
fortnight
his -head.
lost
M4
K'uei-chou
in
Ssti-ch'uan
$fa Hsiao Hsien, who had
^N Ching-chou F U
in
Hupeh.
set
It
up
to
as
reduce the successful
Emperor
at the
modern
was autumn, and the Yangtsze
being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would
venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no
preparations.
But Li Ching embarked
his
army without
loss of time,
and
when
the other generals implored him to postpone
his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation.
Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount
was
just
about to
start
importance, and he must never miss opportunities.
strike, before
Now
is
the time to
Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together.
If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which
is heard before you have time to
stop your ears against it.
[See VII,
This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know
19, note.]
of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that
oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be
as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to
surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone
they will not be
ours."
All
fit
to
came about
suffer the penalty of death.
take advantage
[See
of the
Hsin T^ang Shu,
ch. 93,
enemy's unreadiness,
f.
i
v.~\
make your
way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20. The following are the principles to be observed by
an invading force The further you penetrate into a country,
:
the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus
the defenders will not prevail against you.
21.
Make
your army
Cf. supra,
22.
forays in
with food.
13.
fertile
country
in
order to supply
Li Ch'iian does not venture on a note here.
Carefully study the well-being of your men,
124
HI
according to
^,
Wang
Hsi, means:
ft
^
ffc
j J^ fl
"Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look
after
them generally."
Concentrate your energy and
and do not overtax them.
hoard your strength.
Tu Mu
explains these words in a rhyming couplet:
^
^J
||| -j^
1 flX Jffi> and Ch ^ n recalls the line of action adopted in 2 24 B.C.
Wang Chien, whose military genius largely
by the famous general ^
l|jj
He had invaded the
contributed to the success of the First Emperor.
Ch'u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being
doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight
and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch'u general try
to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and
would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning
the affection and confidence of his men.
He took care that they should
'
be well
fed,
sharing his
own meals
with them, provided
facilities
for
bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld
them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed,
he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves.
The answer was, that they were contending with one another in
^
When Wang
weight and long-jumping
jjg Jiff?).
Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew
that their spirits had been
strung up to the required pitch and that they
were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch'u army, after repeating
(^
putting the
and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust.
Ch'in general immediately broke up his camp and followed them,
and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter.
Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch'u was conquered by Ch'in, and the
their challenge again
The
king
It
j|
^
Fu-ch'u led into captivity.
should be noted that,
dynasty, the
name
Keep your army
In order that the
^
figures as
_j
"link your
^jj|j
enemy may never know
true
army together"
which would be more
in
exactly where you are.
reading might be, not
[cf.
keeping with
and devise unfathomable
plans.
is:
5
r.
move,
supra
ffi
sjfr
46,
|f
|j|
Jj
g$.
.
cuts the Gordian knot
by omitting the words altogether.
Ch'ang YQ's paraphrase
f.
throughout.]
continually on the
struck me, however, that the
5J|
[See Shih Chi, ch. 73,
being a taboo character under the Ch'in
yjj[
$J
It
has
,
but
&
JQ
],
Capt. Calthrop
125
Z m ffi a 5B Jl # *
23.
&
j*
24.
ifimm
fig jin
jjfr
1 ^ ft A H
w
tt jw m * A
5E
M>J
23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there
no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.
speech
to
the Athenians:
u,vu,yxa,\QV
re
ov
Nicias'
Cf.
(TTpUTturM,
%up!ov syyvs
If
But
native but death."
Chinese.
Chang
nothing they
and
^
do not see how
is
favourite
his
may
^
:
J^
Wei Liao Tzu
$
av^pes")
= 7J^
no
.
alter-
be got out of the
5E
Zj
(ch. 3):
m HHAg
-{^
"If one
man were
and everybody
this
man
on his
The
truth
is,
and men
J^ A
amok
with a sword in the market-place,
that a desperado
and a man who
sets
some value
do not meet on even terms."
life
Officers
run
tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that
had courage and that all the rest were contemptible
else
alone
cowards.
to
alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
appears to stand for the more usual -f-
i^^mitb^r^^^^S^
place together, they
will surely exert their
when
"
7X
.
Chang
lf the y are in
Yii says
:
an awkward
united strength to get out of
it."
desperate straits lose the sense
nf fear.
If there is no place of refuge, they will stand
firm
If
they are in the heart of a hostile country, they
will show a stubborn front.
24.
Soldiers
in
is unity," as though the text were
But ^pj introduces quite a new idea
that of
^|J
-- which Ts'ao Kung tries to explain by the word
"to
tenacity
^JJJ
bind fast."
Capt. Calthrop weakly says: "there
S,
If there
as
is
in
20.
no help
for
it,
they
will
fight hard.
H
/u.
vii.]
not achieve.
"If there be
:
A
a$ py ovro$
the interrogative
this is to
Yii gives a clear paraphrase
and quotes
,
is
the protasis,
I
J-VPTTUV
[Thuc. VII. 77.
makes the protasis end with
Calthrop
Capt.
death, there
itself constitutes
by
yvurs, 5
avSfxeiv cLyuAoic, yiyvccrbcci,
(//wTv
&v (tahstxtffbsvTSS (rubetre, etc.
will face
they
^
OTTCI
To rs
is
^
126
be marshalled, the soldiers
25. Thus, without waiting to
be constantly on the qui vive;
will
Tu Mu
translates
^ ^ \$ ^
^^
says:
#J
jfjj
f||
Capt. Calthrop wrongly
"without warnings."
without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;
Literally,
"without asking, you will get."
Chang
without restrictions, they will be faithful
Chang
Ytt says:
^
jjft
^
Yii's
paraphrase
is:
;
ffij
without giving orders, they can be trusted.
This
last
clause
very similar in sense to the one preceding, except
is
indicates the soldiers' attachment to their leader, and
the
'fpf
jjp^
I rather doubt if
can mean "they
leader's attitude towards them.
that
^
will
cate.
is
have confidence in their leader," as the commentary seems to indiThat way, the sense is not nearly so good. On the other hand, it
just possible that here, as in VIII.
8
and infra,
55,
>
fp|
may =
The whole
^
:
"without orders, they will carry out [their leader's plans]."
of this paragraph, of course, has reference to "desperate ground."
Prohibit
26.
the taking of omens, and do
away with
superstitious doubts.
~
jjfp
is
amplified by Ts'ao
I! 1^
Then,
ft'
until
the Ss "- ma
Cf<
death
Kung
itself
into
Fa
,
Iffi
ch
-
jffi
=^
,
and ^p^into
3:
comes, no calamity need be feared.
The
into
superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate
cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes
Huang Shih-kung: tt
1^1
?S 91
/[A
5 i ^2 ^
jjjj?
^
"'Spells
and incantations should be
strictly
forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes
of an army, for fear the soldier's minds should be
seriously perturbed.'
The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are dis-
127
ft*
irffft
ft ft
***#**
28.
carded, your
men
The reading of
which does not
5^
never
will
fit
in
falter
the standard text
is
in well here.
fi|
I
their resolution
Jfjff-
27. If our
soldiers
they die."
"there will be no refuge,"
therefore prefer to adopt the variant
which evidently stood in Li Ch'iian's
,
^
until
text.
are not overburdened with money,
not because they have a distaste for riches; if their
lives are not unduly long, it is not because
they are disit
is
inclined to longevity.
Chang Yu has
the best note on this passage
"Wealth and long
ti ill
a natural inclination.
sacrifice their
own
Hence,
lives, it is
if
life
:
jj
are things for which
they burn or fling
away
all
men have
valuables,
and
not that they dislike them, but simply that
they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are
but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting
and grow
are not thrown in their way.
rich
the adjective, has:
jj&
because long life is evil."
for
On the day
soldiers may weep,
28.
The word
more genuine
in
"not because
they are
the Chinese
is
^
Capt. Calthrop, mistaking
money
is
a bad thing ... not
ordered out to battle, your
"snivel."
This
is
taken to indicate
grief than tears alone.
those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying
down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
Not because they are
ffi
"all
tj[\
afraid,
but because, as Ts'ao
Kung says,
have embraced the firm resolution
to
Jjj
^p
do or die."
jjfi\
We
the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in
showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the
I River between
Ching K'o and his friends, when the former
may remember
^
^jj
was sent
in
that
227
farewell
ijjpj"
to attempt the life of the King of Ch'in (afterwards First Emperor)
B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them
and uttered the following
lines:
Jjj^
jHf
JJJJJ
tfj> ^
^
2J
^
%
128
^ttsS
burn; Your champion
But
let
is
them once be brought
Chu
the courage of a
H&
State
^
"The
Not
going
blowing, Chilly the
shrill blast is
to return."*
and they
to bay,
will display
or a Kuei.
^
Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu
was the personal name of Jll
and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by
Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lii Wang, to assasLiao with a dagger which he secreted
sinate his sovereign
^j? Wang
at
a banquet. He succeeded in his atin the belly of a fish served up
jy.
-^
^
but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king's bodyguard.
tempt,
The
This was in 515 B.C.
other hero referred
to,
Ts'ao Kuei
||f J|r|J
exploit which has made his name
(or Ts'ao ^k Mo), performed
famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by
the
Ch'i,
and was
of territory,
about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large
just
Ts'ao Kuei suddenly seized
when
^Q
^
Huan Kung,
slice
the
of Ch'i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against
None of the Duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and
Ts'ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was
Duke
his
chest.
being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker
state.
Huan
was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts'ao Kuei
his
and
dagger
quietly resumed his place amid the terrified
flung away
assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As was to be
expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to lepudiate the bargain, but his
in peril of his
Kung,
wise old counsellor
life,
^
-ffjl
Kuan Chung
pointed out to him the impolicy
of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained
for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched battles.
[For
another anecdote of Ts'ao Kuei see VII.
phies of these three bravos, Ts'ao,
29.
Now
The
the shiiai-jan
2p
jffi
is
7
called
this passage, the
manoeuvres."
may be
ufeSA?/
means "suddenly" or
doubtless so
and for the biograShih Chi, ch. 86.]
see
likened to the shuai-jan.
a snake that is found in the Ch'ang
skilful tactician
mountains.
27, note;
Chuan and Ching,
owing
term has
The
to
^
"rapidly,"
now come
jj[|
and the snake
the rapidity of
to
its
be used
in question
movements.
was
Through
in the sense of "military
have apparently not been
* Giles'
Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.
identified.
129
Strike at
its
at
its
strike
strike at
its
head,
tail,
middle,
Another reading
and you
Yu Lan
in the
for
pb
Hff
is
be attacked by head and
will
Asked
30.
and you will be attacked by its tail;
and you will be attacked by its head;
if
an
"belly."
tail
army can be made
both.
to
imitate
the
shuai-jan,
That
is,
as
HH
]jffl
Mei Yao-ch'en
-3p>
"Is
it
^^^^J^^^^^
says,
possible
to
make
the front
and
rear of an
army
each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were
parts of a single living body ?"
I should
answer, Yes.
of Ylieh are enemies;
Cf. VI.
yet
are
if
For the men of
Wu
and the men
21.
they
are
crossing
a
river
caught by a storm, they
assistance just as the left
will
in
the
come
hand helps the
same boat and
to
each other's
right.
The meaning is If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound
:
Yet it is
together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling.
notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.
Hence
31.
it
is
not enough to put one's trust
in
the
tethering of horses,
~^J
is
said here to be equivalent to
^|
.
and the burying of chariot wheels
in
the ground.
These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall
Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried an anchor with him at the
battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one
Sun Tzu, to render
spot.
[See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says
the
flight
impossible by such mechanical means.
You
will
not succeed unless
9
3o
1
32.
33.
84.
and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of
This is the lesson which can be learned from
co-operation.
men have
your
sympathetic
tenacity
the shnai-jan.
on which to manage an army is to
up one standard of courage which all must reach.
The
32.
set
Literally,
If the
ideal
principle
"level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one."
army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that
parts must be of the same
below a certain standard. Wellington's
seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst
he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in
Had he not
this important particular -- unity of spirit and courage.
and
the resolution
quality, or at
any
spirit
rate
of
its
must not
foreseen the Belgian defections
component
fall
and
carefully
background, he would almost certainly have
How
33.
that
-
This
will
of
is
is
^
German
the day.
make
the best of both strong and weak
a question involving the proper use of ground.
to
rather a hard sentence
be found,
itself.
kept those troops in the
lost
firstly,
The
in the
on the
pause
best equivalent
after
first
^;,
reading, but the key to
and
this that
for
next, in the
I
it
meaning
can think of
is
the
kommen." Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase is: J fi
""
"
The wa y to elimin e
strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to
"zur Geltung
$($}%inJft%&ffi*&Z1&&
the differences of
utilise
accidental features of the ground."
Less reliable troops, if posted
hold out as long as better troops on more exposed
in strong positions, will
terrain.
The advantage
of position neutralises the inferiority in stamina
and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books,
and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study
of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance
is attached to the selection of
and to the immense advantages
positions
that are to be derived, whether you are defending or
attacking, from the
.
proper utilisation of natural features."
34.
Thus the
though he
skilful
.
.
*
general conducts his army just as
a single man, willy-nilly, by
were leading
the hand.
p.
333.
35.
Tu Mu
says
which he does
his
Wu
in
$jfa
it."
jf\
simile has reference to the ease with
means
do otherwise than obey.
troops to
found
^
^Q
^f Z
"The
:
Tzti, ch. 4:
makes
that he
Chang
it
impossible for
Yii quotes a jingle, to be
# ^
ffi
,
the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
35. It
pjp
is
seems to combine the meanings "noiseless" and "imperturbable,"
both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy.
explains
|^|
y
"|F
IJHE
as
||
ffjlj
(j|j
in
*/Snr
I
the sense of
brought out at
all
j|j|J
no sense be said
36.
by
He
to represent
i&
T99
and "|p
"self-controlled."
The
as
^
the com-
|||
and
K-^-l
respectively.
This
is
not
"The general should be
last adjective,
moreover, can
.
jjj^j
must be able to mystify
and appearances,
his officers
and men
false reports
Literally,
"to deceive their eyes
a verb in the sense of
Ts'ao
Kung
gives
^W^
and ears"
j^
being here used as
j|JJ.
and thus keep them
^
I
in Capt. Calthrop's rendering:
calm, inscrutable, just and prudent."
in
1=3
I
are causally connected with
inscrutable,"
Tu Mu
and J
Mei Yao-ch'en alone among
and unbiassed."
"fair
mentators takes
{^
|^| $jg
"deep and
us
in
total ignorance.
one of
"
apophthegms: ^^ ~jjj* ffi
must not be allowed to share
his excellent
The tro p s
J&
JS> #&
your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over
their happy outcome."
"To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,"
is one of the first
principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out.
But how about the other process
the mystification of one's own men?
Those who may think that Sun Tzti is over-emphatic on this point would
do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley
campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to
conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pro*
nounced useless"
In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47
etc. etc.
* "Stonewall
Jackson," vol.
I,
p.
421.
132
37.
of the ffou Han Shu, "Pan Ch'ao took the field with 25,000 men from
Khotan and other Central Asian states wi th the object of crushing Yarkand.
The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Kumo and Wei-t'ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan Ch'ao summoned his officers
and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said: 'Our forces
are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The
best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different
direction.
The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route,
and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the
evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch'ao now secretly
released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha
was thus informed of
his plans.
Much
elated by the news, the latter set
the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch'ao's retreat
in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastwards with 8000 horse
in order to intercept the King of Khotan.
As soon as Pan Ch'ao knew
once
off at
that the
them
at
two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got
in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of
well
it
The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in
lay encamped.
and were closely pursued by Pan Ch'ao. Over 5000 heads were
brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses
and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating,
Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From
Yarkand, as
confusion,
that time forward,
of the west." In
Pan Ch'ao's
this
case,
prestige completely overawed the countries
see that the Chinese general not only
we
kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the
bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.
37.
By
Wang Hsi
altering his
arrangements and changing
thinks that this means, not using the
his plans,
same stratagem
twice.
He
he keeps the enemy without definite
knowledge.
^
Note that
denotes the enemy, as opposed to the
-^ ~tt of 36.
Capt. Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into one.
*
as S
Chang Ytt quotes
;fc
it
^
Ul
A
^S'-
& f| ft
$ ft jt
n & nm 3%&n&m^&&z& -^
axiom, that war
of the enemy.
based on deception, does not apply only to deception
deceive even your own soldiers. Make them
follow you, but without
letting them know why."
is
You must
133
38.
zmm
By
camp and taking circuitous routes, he
enemy from anticipating his purpose.
his
shifting
prevents the
^
^g-
ground," and Chang Yti follows him, saying: ijt
Jg
Hsi paraphrases
Wang
Jj;
jgft
VII.
cf.
now
But
.
this
is
awkward
is
At
38.
the
as
jit J
j||
an utterly untenable view.
Chia Lin, retaining
4.
^
obliged to explain
which
^
ijt
his
JJE~
"camp on easy
=
|^
j||J
For
fj^
^^
j
old interpretation of those words,
as "cause the
enemy to
shift his
,
is
camp,"
in the extreme.
moment, the leader of an army
critical
acts
one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
away the ladder behind him.
like
'
I
must candidly confess that
I
JIB
is
^^
been
though the
,
felt,
for
meaning
Tu Mu
tells
do not understand the syntax of
The
fairly plain.
us that one text omits
likely, however, that a couple of characters have
He
carries
shows
his
his
men deep
IM
^[[j]
difficulty has evidently
SH
fl
dropped
more
It is
.
out.
into hostile territory before
he
hand.
j||, literally,
some decisive
"releases the spring" (see V.
step which
makes
it
15), that
impossible for the
army
is,
takes
to return
who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch'en
;j|| ^JJ Hsiang Yii,
IS
Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as
in
this
derived
artifice
at
his
command."
But
forth
every
AH* fjjl "puts
|^
like
^
sense occurs nowhere else in
Sun Tzu.
39. Jie burns his boats
Omitted
in the
Tu
and breaks
his cooking-pots;
Shu.
shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his
men this way and that, and none knows whither he is going.
like
The
a
Tu
Shu
inserts another
|g
after
i
Tu Mu
.
ft&&2ft^ft&jytZ1$i&
advance
or retreat;
cognisant of orders to
ends of attacking and conquering."
it
is
"
says:
The arm y
is
ignorant of the ulterior
134
40.
41.
43.
may
this
host and bring it into danger:
be termed the business of the general.
To muster
40.
Sun Tzu means
his
that
after
mobilisation there should be no delay in
aiming a blow at the enemy's heart.
23
:
^^
Among
point.
doubt a much
l^r
4ft^
;
^ ^ J^
With
cf.
fflfe
supra,
Note how he returns again and again to
.
this
warring states of ancient China, desertion was no
more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies
the
of to-day.
The
41.
different
measures suited to the nine varieties
of ground;
Yii says:
Chang
hide-bound
&^
Jl *&
"
^J $6
Pf
in interpreting the rules for the
One must
not be
nine varieties of ground.
the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;
The
use of IS
/r^
-frfj
I
I
"contraction and expansion"
faut
illustrated
by
which almost exactly corresponds to the French
JjjJ J^j[ 3^ -j^
*
reculer pour mieux sauter."
Capt. Calthrop, more suo, avoids
the saying
"il
may be
,
a real translation and has: "the suiting of the
means
to the occasion."
and the fundamental laws of human nature
things that
42.
When
these are
invading hostile territory, the general prin-
ciple is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion
but a short way means dispersion.
Cf. supra,
:
must most certainly be studied.
;
penetrating
20.
When
you leave your own country behind, and
take your army across neighbouring territory,
43.
Chang
you
Ytt's
paraphrase
find yourself
on
is
jffl
^
critical
gj|}
^
.
ground.
* See Giles'
Dictionary, no. 9817.
135
44.
This "ground"
figure
among
One's
first
is
the Nine
trust
J^Jj
VIII.
in
but
2,
does not
it
^
of this chapter or the Six Jjjj
in chap. X.
it "distant
ground" (
it
is
is
precisely
S
^
j
jjjjjtj
the sense of "distant lands"), but this,
in
the commentators,
ch'en says
mentioned
impulse would be to translate
commonly used
is
cursorily
what
&
#
^
*ft
jxjfa
we can
Mei Yao-
not meant here.
is
if
2 BB *
"a position not far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near
enough to home to be called 'dispersive,' but something between the
That, of course, does not explain the
two."
name
^
,
which seems to
imply that the general has severed his communications and temporarily
cut himself off from his base.
Thus, Wang Hsi says "It is ground sepa:
home by an
interjacent state, whose territory we have had to
cross in order to reach it.
Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our
business there quickly."
He adds that this position is of rare occurrence,
rated from
which
the reason
is
why
it is
not included
among
the
~j\^
Calthrop gives but a poor rendering of this sentence:
and cross the borders is to be free from interference."
When
there are
The T^u Shu
on
all
From
reads
^| down
]fy.
Ca.pt.
leave
home
means of communication
jj^
four sides, the
IJtj
"To
for
^|
.
is
ground
to the
end of
one of intersecting highways.
45,
we have some
of the definitions
of the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different language.
Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.
44.
When
serious ground.
is
facile
45.
When
my
a
you penetrate but a
it
is
way,
it
country,
little
ground.
When
you have the enemy's strongholds on your
and narrow passes in front,
there is no place of refuge
it
at
is
hemmed-in ground.
all,
Therefore, on dispersive
men with unity of purpose.
46.
into
you penetrate deeply
it
is
rear,
When
desperate ground.
ground,
I
would inspire
136
47.
This end, according to
defensive, and avoiding
On
facile
the
ported by
^H
of
gj
n.
^
The present reading
As Tu Mu says, the
.
Yu-hsien.
Cheng
^ ?S S
"(*)
fP.
jijfc
^e
^own
ft
says:
1^
fl
#
j
/
|jj|
desertion of our
sudden attack on the part of the enemy."
Mei Yao-ch'en
close con-
is
army.
guard against two possible contingencies:
to
Hi
my
Tien has "fr instead of
The T'ung
is
parts of
all
best attained by remaining on the
is
Cf. supra,
would see that there
I
ground,
nection between
Tu Mu,
battle.
Cf. VII.
17
is
sup-
object
j^ $&
troops; (2) a
:
it 18
ffi
"On
the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications." He seems
have forgotten, by the way, what Sun Tzu says above:
to
On
47.
This
contentious ground,
would hurry up
I
|jJ^S^'j|j'ffJI^5g
rear, so that
head and
tail
may both
reach the goal."
not be allowed to straggle up a long
way
Hf
K'J
^ ^ Jland^we^
the coveted position,
all
speed
itive
the
Cf.
VII.
4:
That
to the attack.
i,
is,
they must
offers
^^^
^^
we should advance
"ffi
with
would thus denote the
would retain
its
^AI^^tA^'
had
other hand, assuming that the
ground, quotes VI.
rear.
Mei Yao-ch'en
jg
are behind him,
being the preposition, and
sense.
j||J
lit ijjj
jj|
"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached
in order to dispute its possession."
^
enemy,
apart.
^
another equally plausible explanation:
^
my
Jjjj
Chang Yu adopts its, saying:
"We must quickly bring up our
Ts'ao Kung's interpretation.
is
iijff
usual intrans-
Hao on
select his own
Ch<<n
'
time
enemy has
where Sun Tzu warns us against coming exhausted
His own idea of the situation
is
JaA^ill^^m^M^
rather vaguely expressed:
" If there
is
a
^curable
position lying in front of you,
detach a picked body of troops to occupy
the enemy, relying on their
numbers, come up to make a fight
you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and
then
it;
for
it,
if
victory will be assured."
the
is
It
was
army of Ch'in. [See p. 57.]
not easy to see
why.
thus,
he adds, that Chao She beat
Li Ch'iian would read
^
for
g
,
it
48. On open ground,
my defences.
As Wang Hsi
Tung
says,
On ground of
my alliances.
^ fy
||| j|j
Tien reads here
would keep a
I
|gj lj
fjj
the market towns," $i& ||L ~5?
-5c ^r *~
jS
*Tin
Calthrop translates
[jj]
^|
^
Tu Yu
which
,
would consolidate
I
intersecting highways,
Tien reads
explains as "watching
"the hotbeds of revolution."
by the same words as
-fejj
The
"fearing a surprise attack."
(see next sentence).
jj^t
S
The Tung
on
vigilant eye
-^
^
Capt.
in
12:
"cultivate intercourse."
49. On serious ground,
tinuous stream of supplies.
I
would
try to ensure a con-
The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as
one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.
One
text,
indeed, gives the reading
"be careful of supplies"
On
difficult
fails to
ground,
I
"ffi
ijjaf
^
.
Cf.
render the force of
13. Capt. Calthrop's
||!
.
would keep pushing on along the road.
Capt. Calthrop's "do not linger" cannot be called a translation, but
only a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts'ao
"Pass away from
50.
it
Kung
:
Jj^ jjJ
^
-{^
in all haste."
On hemmed-in
ground,
I
would block any way
of retreat.
^^^|||^Jj[j*|jS|
defend the position, whereas
the enemy's lines"
to
make my
^f ^ ^
Tu Mu
[Meng
soldiers
Shih]; 'gl
fight
"fearing lest
my
"To make
real intention
j^
2J
is
it
seem
that I
mean
to
to burst suddenly through
"
in
^ ^B 1$
order
ifc
^
with desperation" [Mei Yao-ch'en];
|j||
be tempted to run away" [Wang Hsi].
my men
points out that this
is
the converse of VII.
36,
where
it
is
the
enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., ~fjjj ||jj Kao Huan, afterwards
Emperor and canonised as j|fl jj Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great
^^%
army under
His own force was
Erh-chu Chao and others.
of 2000 horse and something under
comparatively small, consisting only
lines of investment had not been drawn very closely
The
foot.
30,000
being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of
together, gaps
a shift to block all the remaining outlets
trying to escape, actually made
himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped to-
As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for
but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of
exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing
gether.
it
ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.
mentary, and
^
ch.
i,
fol.
[See
6.]
On desperate ground, I would proclaim
the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu
says:
5^ ^E
$fa
your stores
stoves,
must
Tu Mu's com-
to
my
soldiers
f
"Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away
Hfe "tit
and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-
and make
it
plain to your
fight to the death."
men
Mei Yao-ch'en
that they
cannot survive, but
says epigrammatically
:
^
jj\
^
"The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This
concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the "variations"
~pT
corresponding to them.
Reviewing the passages which bear on this imfail to be struck by the desultory and unme-
portant subject, we cannot
thodical fashion in which it
is
treated.
Sun Tzu begins abruptly
in VIII.
enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but
only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and
one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with
2
to
X
the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap.
sets forth six new
grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned
again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4
in
in the next chapter.
At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds
par excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us
down to
In
14.
43 45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5,6,
and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed
chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more
from beginning to end, all, with the exception of
5, 6 and 7, being different from those
previously given. Though it is impossible to account
2,
8
in
for
the
present state of
Sun Tzu's
text,
a few suggestive facts
may be
brought into prominence: (i) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should
deal with nine
variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds.
Several
of these are defined twice
over, besides which there are two distinct lists
of the
corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX.
I do not propose
'39
nmm
draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion
Sun Tzti's work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which
it left his hands:
chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of
place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a
later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.
to
that
For
51.
the
is
it
resistance
stinate
disposition to offer an obsurrounded, to fight hard when
soldier's
when
he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he
has fallen into danger.
jfi
3&
till
But
retreat."
*s
ren dered by Capt. Calthrop
j^
"to pursue the
:
cannot mean "to retreat."
Its
enemy
primary sense
if
he
is
to
Here, however, the
pass over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err.
word has lost all implication of censure, and appears to mean "to pass
the boundary line dividing safety from danger," or, as Chang Yii puts it,
$?
The
R
^ H
Wj
iol
"
to
be deeply involved
in
a perilous position."
commentator alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch'ao's devoted
followers in 73 A.D.
The story runs thus in the Hou Han Shu, ch. 47,
fol.
latter
iv: "When Pan
Ch'ao arrived at
|||J
||
Shan-shan,
J| Kuang,
King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and
respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden change,
the
and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch'ao spoke about this to
the officers of his suite: 'Have you not noticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's
polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have
come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a
state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot.
That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive
things before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that
are already manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had
been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where are
those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days ago?' The man
was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted
out the whole truth.
Pan Ch'ao, keeping his informant carefully under
lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirtyWhen the wine had mounted
six in all, and began drinking with them.
into
their
heads a
little,
he tried
to rouse their spirit
still
further
by ad-
'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated
Now
region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit.
it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom
dressing them thus
:
only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy
prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu,
140
52.
3
53.
our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert.
What
are
we
do ?' With one accord, the officers replied 'Standing as we do in peril
of our lives, we will follow (our commander through life and death*
)" For the se i uel of this
to
:
(4#)atr*tb5E$t^.i
adventure, see chap. XII.
52.
We
cannot
i,
enter
note.
into
alliance
with neighbouring
We
princes until we are acquainted with their designs.
are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are
familiar with the face of the country
forests, its pitfalls
We
precipices, its
mountains and
marshes and swamps.
be unable to turn natural advantages to account
shall
unless
and
its
we make
use of local guides.
These three sentences are repeated from VII.
in order to
12
14
emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer
to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to
the following words.
With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have
added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their
treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):
Hannibal,
we
are told, ordered a guide to lead
him
into the
neighbourhood
of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but his
Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused
the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from
his proper route, he took the
army in that direction, the mistake not
being discovered until they had almost arrived.
53. To be ignorant
or five principles
I
Referring,
think,
to
what
^
^|J
is
contained in
Ts'ao Kung,
54, 55.
them
be fa jfy
6,
3 ^|J
"the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine
thinking perhaps of the
^|
varieties of
of any one of the following four
ground."
The
takes
in VIII.
Tu
Shu
reads
=
jf
^
to
.
does not befit a warlike
prince.
princes
"one who rules by force," was a term specially used for those
established their hegemony over other feudal states.
The
who
famous
of Ch'i (2)
^ ^ -^
^
of Sung, (4)
Mu
of the ;th century B.C. were (i)
3L HI
of Ch'in.
a
warlike
shows
^^^
He
attacks a powerful state,
preventing the concentration
overawes
in the next sentence, the
their allies are
Duke
591 B.C.
prince
itself in
of the enemy's forces.
and
Duke Huan
Duke Hsiang
j| -^
Prince Chuang of Ch'u, (5)
Ijj:
his generalship
Here and
of Chin, (3)
7J^
Their reigns covered the period 685
When
54.
Duke Wen
:
^ ^g ^.
Yu Lan
his opponents,
inserts
n
after
.
prevented from joining against him.
Mei Yao-ch'en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so
affected by the Chinese
"In attacking a powerful state, if you can
much
:
her forces, you will have a superiority in strength ; if you have a
superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy if you overawe the
divide
;
be frightened; and if the neighbouring
are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining
enemy, the neighbouring
states
The
her."
'
$L JW
states will
following gives a stronger meaning to Jg^
/l^
H
defeated (before she
states will hold aloof
:
JljJJ
^k
-fc
HU
^ fi5 >P Jpl r^C "^ ^ e &reat state h as once been
has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser
and refrain from massing their forces." Ch'en Hao
The former
Yii take the sentence in quite another way.
"Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he
will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rfely to some extent on
external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence
and Chang
says:
in
his
own
strength, simply tries to intimidate the
Chang Yii puts his view thus: "If
be defeated."
enemy, he
we
will surely
recklessly attack a
own people will be discontented and hang back. But if
then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half
to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to
large state, our
(as will
join
~Ac
us."
H
55.
For
According
but to t^e
to
SB
this interpretation,
I
himself.
Hence he does not
3
the
Yu Lan reads
strive
A
.
it
would
refer,
not to the
142
so.
-A
to ally himself with all
^ ~K
as in
,
6,
and sundry,
^^
stands for
"the feudal princes," or the
by them.
states ruled
nor does he foster the power of other states.
own
out his
He
carries
secret designs,
The com8.
For t=* (read shn ) in the meaning of ^b cf. VIII.
mentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore beware
!
,
of translating
^
>jpf
fy
Capt. Calthrop (omitting
^^
)
train of thought appears to
fit
Pfl
%h
^J?
has
be
^T
&
of his enemies,
"secretly
self-confident"
or the like.
"he has confidence in himself."
:
awe.
his antagonists in
keeping
The
by
this
:
Secure against a combination
It
## B #
jfe
jS
"he can afford to reject entangling alliances and
5j||*
simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense
with external friendships."
(Li Ch'iian.)
Thus he
their
able
is
to
capture
their
cities
and overthrow
kingdoms.
This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch'in State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which
the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the
way for her final triumph
Chang Yii, following up his previous note, thinks
condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and
under Shih Huang Ti.
that
Sun
haughty
it
Tzti
is
isolation.
He
appear that in the
again refers Jit to the warlike prince, thus making
end he
is
bound
to
succumb.
Bestow rewards without regard
56.
Wu
Tzu
(ch.
3)
less
wisely
says:
to rule,
^^Slt^&^JtWJ
"Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."
issue orders
^,
"hang" or "post up."
literally,
without regard to previous arrangements;
^t
if
general
%ty\
"In order to prevent treachery," says
meaning
is
made
clear
by Ts'ao
Wang
Hsi.
The
Kung's quotation from the
Ssii-ma
& ^ ft
Fa:
3jf
?ft
fjjj
ft
*jj[
"Give instructions only on
enemy; give rewards only when you see deserving deeds."
Ts'ao Kung's paraphrase,
$ff )$, however, presents some difficulty.
sighting the
S&^^JiSftSfl-tft'
tions
1
take to mean: " The final inst
c-
you give to your army should not correspond with those that have
Chang Yu
been previously posted up."
simplifies this into Jfc
^
^
^J
And
"your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand."
"tf
Chia Lin
^
"there should be no fixity in your rules
says:
tffc
TJ*
and arrangements." Not only is there danger in letting your plans be
known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last
moment.
and you
:J[f
is
,
will
be able to handle a whole army
according to Ts'ao Kung,
is
here equal to
J^j
.
The exact meaning
brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.
as though you had to do with but a single man.
Cf. supra,
57.
34.
Confront your soldiers with the deed
them know your
let
itself;
never
design.
Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any
order.
Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons"
for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general
than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates this sentence with beautiful
That is all.
simplicity: "Orders should direct the soldiers."
When
but
the
outlook
58. Place your
it
Compare
army
bring it before their eyes;
the situation is gloomy.
bright,
them nothing when
tell
plunge
is
in
deadly
into desperate straits,
the paradoxical saying
peril,
and
it
and
will
will survive;
it
come
off in safety
.
"f^^^
These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in ex2J
planation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles,
In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army
already alluded to on p. 28.
.
of Chao, and halted ten miles from the
mouth of the
^
[Iffi
Ching-
hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight,
he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished
144
with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of
Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortiThis must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck
fications and give chase.
up the red banners of j^| Han in their
stead."
Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary
holds a strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until
he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I
should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first
of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to
down
the
Chao standards and
set
line of battle with their
form in
backs to the River
Ti.
Seeing this
yj
Chao broke into loud laughter. By this
manoeuvre, the whole army
time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo's
flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately
of
engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time;
until at length Han Hsin and his colleague EM iEC Chang Ni,
leaving
drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank,
where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue
them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men;
but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was
with the utmost desperation.
fighting
2000 horsemen to play their
part.
The time had now come for the
As soon as they saw the men of
Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted
walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han.
When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the sight of these
red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had
got in
and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort
of their leader to stay the panic
being in vain. Then the Han army fell
on them from both sides and completed the rout,
killing a great number
and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King
Ya himself ....
jjfc
After the battle, some of Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In
the Art of War we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the
right rear,
and a river or marsh on the left front.
[This appears to be a blend of
Sun Tzu and T'ai Kung. See IX.
9, and note.]
You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under
these conditions, how did you manage to
gain the victory?" The general
"I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with
sufficient care.
Is it not written there
'Plunge your army into desperate
straits and it will come off in
safety; place it in deadly peril and it will
survive '? Had I taken the usual
course, I should never have been able
replied
:
'
:
to
bring
my
colleagues
round.
What
says the Military Classic
'Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men
(
H*
r|j
text of
A
ffij
*$$
Sun Tzu.]
^
If I
)
($g)?
off to fight'
[This passage does not occur in the present
had not placed
my
troops in a position where
145
**'
02.
Jtflp
follow
and
but had allowed each man to
would have been a general debandade,
would have been impossible to do anything with them." The
admitted the force, of his argument, and said "These are higher
than we should have been capable of.
[See CA'ien Hah Shu,
were obliged to
they
his
it
officers
tactics
ch. 34,
59.
own
fight for their lives,
:
5
ff.
4,
'
5-]
For
is
it
has fallen into
effect.
warfare
in
force
capable of striking a blow for victory.
is
it
Danger has a bracing
Success
when a
precisely
harm's way that
60.
there
discretion,
is
gained by carefully accom-
modating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
Ts'ao
Kung
says
:
f^
fa:
by an appearance
"Feign stupidity"
-Jgj
of yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chan^ Yii's note
makes the meaning clear "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance,
:
lure
him on
to
do so;
if
he
anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that
is
The object
carry out his intention."
contemptuous before we deliver our attack.
he
may
61.
one direction."
and make
is
to
for the
first
Ts'ao
Kung
shall
says:
to
flank,
mean "accompanying
^ -&
[S]
]^
remiss and
the
enemy
"unite the soldiers
But such a violent displacement of characters
Mei Yao-ch'en is the only commentator who seems
reads
jfc
succeed
Literally, "after a
in
four words
have grasped the meaning
we
make him
enemy."
quite indefensible.
The T'u Shu
to
hanging on the enemy's
persistently
understand the
I
in
By
is
in
^J
:
[^
||
|Sj
jffi
^^^
jj
-^
.
.
the -long run
thousand
/*'."
killing the commander-in-chief.
Always a great point with the Chinese.
62.
This
is
called
ability
to
accomplish
ffc
^
a
thing
by
sheer cunning.
o
The T'u Shu has
^g
||
&j
~fft
,
and yet another reading,
10
146
is
&j jfc jfa ||J Capt. Calthrop omits
thus
translated the two preceding: "Discover
having
sentence,
When these
the enemy's intentions by conforming to his movements.
mentioned by Ts'ao Kung,
.
after
this
are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general
though he be one hundred leagues distant."
On
63.
may be
the day that you take up your
killed,
even
command,
does not mean "when war is declared," as Capt. Calthrop
]fc J&
"when your
nor
says,
yet exactly, as Ts'ao Kung paraphrases it, gjj! ^j
mapped out your campaign. The phrase
Yun Fu. There being no causal con-
plans are fixed," when you have
ei Wen
not given in the
P
is
l
nection discoverable between this and the preceding sentence,
must perforce be
left
^
jtjr
untranslated.
block the frontier passes,
explained by Mei Yao-ch'en as
is
|
destroy the
The
tallies,
locus classicus for these tallies
1
ff
edition):
The
official
ffl
&$
Chou Li, XIV.
is
M f*
jfc ffl
generic term thus appears to be
||j}
used at city-gates and on the frontier.
,
^J
fol.
40 (Imperial
*&
fl!
Jt ft
.
being the special kind
They were
tablets of
bamboo
or
wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official
in charge of a gate (
or
"border-warden"
fjj f^
(^ Cf. the
^
of
Lun Yu
III.
was returned
the gate and
24,
to
let
^^
.
who may have had
similar duties.)
When
this half
him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open
the traveller through.
and stop the passage of
all
emissaries.
Either to or from the enemy's country.
Be
64.
stern in the council-chamber,
Show no weakness, and
Igfi /^yj
jiB
/xii
clear
if
of
5
JJUJ
insist
on your plans being
indicates a hall or temple in the Palace.
other
officers
would be present.
the reading of the
conjecture
^
so that you
,
standard text,
which appears in the
may
Tu
l
ratified
Cf.
I.
by the sovereign.
y
26.
It is
not
Hardly anything can be made
so I have adopted Tu Mu's
Shu.
control the situation.
'47
An m&&Az
<
Another
by yjpj and Ho Shih by
j
and
Mei
understands
whole
the
Yao-ch'en, adopting this,
reading
gjj
sentence to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in
Ts'ao
Kung
explains
is
.
,
,
your deliberations. Capt. Calthrop glides rather too smoothly over the
rough places. His translation is "conduct the business of the govern:
ment with
vigilance."
65. If the
enemy
leaves a door open, you must rush
in.
This looks a very simple sentence, yet Ts'ao Kung is the only comwho takes it as I have done. Meng Shih, followed by Mei Yao-
mentator
ch'en and
Chang
Yii, defines
jJB
[||j
as
^fl
^
"spies,"
^
and makes
an active verb: "If spies come from the enemy, we must quickly let
them in." But I cannot find that the words
have this meaning
^
anywhere
On
else.
the other hand, they
M
moment
X: ^ PI P| H ^ ^ l
and
^^
adduced
way
^ The
commas and
we
flJc
IflJ
SK
'
to attack him.
chap.
It
fact
jgfc
not easy to choose between this
that
or
taken as two verbs,
ex P ressm g tne enemy's indecision whether to advance
or retreat, that being the best
is
|ff]
may be
;
alsoZ '
'
2 5-]
Ts'ao Kung's explanation; the
leave a door open, the
might be
68,
in the sense of
^
.
"If
Ui
ft it'
Ef occurs shortly afterwards, in
||
in support of either.
must be understood
jjfa\
to avoid this is to put
only
translate:
Tao Te Ching,
[Cf.
'
between
|||j
enemy
is
sure to
rush in."
66. Forestall your opponent
Cf. supra,
1
by
seizing
what he holds dear,
8.
and subtly contrive to time
on the ground.
his arrival
Capt. Calthrop hardly attempts to translate this difficult paragraph, but
invents the following instead: "Discover what he most values, and plan
to seize it."
Ch'en Hao's explanation, however,
is
clear enough:
j
but the enemy does
JJ\ 3| "If I manage to seize a favourable position,
not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained cannot be turned
to any practical account. He who intends, therefore, to occupy a position
of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful appointment,
148
67.
68.
so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there as well.'
Mei Yao-ch'en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be made
through the medium of the enemy's own spies, who will carry back just
amount of information
the
we choose
that
cunningly disclosed our intentions,
to give
them.
^ J^
^j
Then, having
"we musl
^jf -fa J^ gj?
manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him" (VII. 4),
We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we
must arrive before him
Taken
in
order to capture the place without trouble,
some support to Mei Yao-ch'en's
the present passage lends
interpretation of
47.
thus,
Walk
67.
stands for
U!
Mencius VII.
^g
^jj
f^
^
i.
^|
jj|
xli.
2.
"a marking-line," hence a rule of conduct.
Ts'ao
Kung
"square and compasses."
me
explains
The
it
See
by the similar metaphor
baldness of the sentiment rather
to favour the reading
J||J
adopted by Chia Lin in place of
which yields an exactly opposite sense, namely "Discard hard and
rules."
Chia Lin says:
ffij
inclines
fast
path defined by rule,
in the
:
,
f
is
"Victory
)$ fe %
\\
the only thing that matters,
^
pf
J*
and
this
cannot be achieved
J^ $f
g
by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this variant
on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much
rests
more
Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of
he defeated, won his battles by violating every ac-
satisfactory.
the old school
whom
cepted canon of warfare.
and accommodate yourself to the enemy
until
you can
fight a decisive battle.
The last four words
Tu Mu says:
|g .j^
JT^
tfefe
offers;
"Conform
then
68.
At
come
of the Chinese are omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
AZ
to the
forth
J&
%%
enemy's tactics
and engage
% 2^W
in a battle that shall
the
ft fa
prove decisive."
coyness of a maiden,
enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late
first,
then,
exhibit
until the
the
I
until a favourable opportunity
for the
enemy
to
oppose you.
149
As
for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly
But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed.
The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as
quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu. Capt.
the hare
is
noted
appears felicitous.
Calthrop
to China,
last sixteen
it
^
"rabbit." Rabbits are not indigenous
wrong in translating
and were certainly not known there in the 6th century B.C. The
is
characters evidently form a sort of four-line jingle.
closed in similar fashion.
may be remembered,
Chap. X,
XII.
of
THE ATTACK BY
Rather more than half the chapter (
the author branches
fire, after which
Sun Tzu
with fire. The
So
Tu Mu.
to
fire
first
kill
Pan Ch'ao,
is
five
to burn soldiers
Li Ch'uan says:
camp, and
the
the flames).
is
13)
devoted to the subject
off into other topics.
There are
said:
i.
i
FIRE.
ways of attacking
in their camp;
^Sf^^lftiZJ*^
"Set
they try to escape
from
the soldiers" (when
sent on a diplomatic mission
King of
to the
Shan-shan [see XI.
51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by
the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies
of the Chinese], in consultation with his officers, he exclaimed "'Never
*
The only course open to us now is to make an
venture, never win
:
!
on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will
Profiting by their panic, we shall
exterminate them completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover
assault
fire
by
not be able to discern our numbers.
us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.'
all replied that it would be
necessary to discuss the matter
Intendant
(
^
jtf
Pan Ch'ao then
).
fell^
into a passion
:
The
Mt
is
The Intendant
officers
with the
first
to-day,'
only a
of our project will certainly be afraid,
and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy
fate for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly,
he cried,
'that
humdrum
civilian,
our fortunes must be decided
!
is
who on hearing
band quickly made their way
was
strong gale
blowing at the time. Pan
Ch'ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy's
barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they
as soon as night
to the barbarian
*
yp y^ IS
came
on, he
camp.
*^*
cannot get hold of the
and
his little
A
>K ^^ IS -^
tiger's cubs."
"Unless yon enter the
tiger's lair, you.
drumming and
should begin
The
yelling with all their might.
rest of his
men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the
He then set fire to the place from the windward side,
gate of the camp.
whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front
and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder.
Pan Ch'ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions
cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder,
more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following
^
Pan Ch'ao went back and informed
Kuo Hsiin [the Intendant]
^|J
The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale.
But Pan Ch'ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although
day,
of what he had done.
you did not go with us
last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole
This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch'ao, having
credit for our exploit.'
sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian
envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which
Pan Ch'ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then,
taking the king's son as hostage, he returned to make his report to
W
Tou Ku."
[3|
the second
Tu Mu
:
Han
Shu, ch. 47,
if.
i,
2.]
to burn stores;
is
says
\Hou
TJJ
^ ^
"ffi
"Provisions, fuel
and fodder."
In order
Kao Keng
subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan,
~fjjj jjpj
recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and
burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely
to
successful.
[Kg f&,
the third
is
An
to
ch. 41,
fol.
burn baggage- trains;
example given
is
Tu Mu
specifies
the
is
^
the destruction of
and impedimenta by Ts'ao Ts'ao
the fourth
2.]
in
to burn arsenals
and magazines;
says that the things contained in
is
Shao's waggons
200 A.D.
and
jj^jj
weapons and other implements, bullion and
fifth
Yuan
j$g
to hurl dropping fire
are the same.
He
Jjj[
clothing.
Cf. VII.
1 1.
amongst the enemy.
No
fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence are
It is
given by the commentators, not one of which is quite satisfactory.
or
of
that
the
obvious, at any rate,
ordinary meaning
ffi ("regiment"
Mu's
Tu
note,
"company") is here inadmissible. In spite of
I|L %~J
^
t
69 91
ffij
(
i
l
must
re S ard
"company burning"
We
(Capt. Cal-
may also, I think,
throp's rendering) as nonsense pure and simple.
Li
Ch'iian, Mei Yao-ch'en
reject the very forced explanation given by
and Chang
^
Ho
by Chia Lin and
sense of "a road,"
^
K^
= ^.
"a
sfj
difficult
The commentary on
K ang
l
quoted in
'
^
Jfe
^
|^
jgl
J
may have
That leaves only two solutions open: one, favoured
Shih, is to take |^ in the somewhat uncommon
nothing to fight with."
"y*
the last-tiamed says:
"burning a regiment's weapons, so that the soldiers
Ef
wfe
whom
of
Yii,
Hsi, defines
[^
a passage in the
(read jw/) as
Here
road leading through a valley."
^^
;gt pjl
it
|Jj^
would stand
"line of supplies," which might be effectually interrupted
was laid waste with fire. Finally, the interroundabout
country
I have adopted is that given by Tu Yu in the T'ung
which
pretation
the
for
if
7J|| 2f|"
the
He
Tien.
reads
sometimes used
"
by which
them
may
this
same
the
is
chut being
[^
sense), with the following note
:
4^
Jj[
'
To drop
be done
into a brazier,
not absolutely necessary,
is
||| (which
in
fire
mto
the
enem y' s cam P-
'
The method
to set the tips of arrows alight
by dipping
and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into
the enemy's lines."
In
2.
order to carry out an attack with
fire,
we must
have means available.
Ts'ao
Kung thinks that
He
to.
more
thus takes
likely to
[^|
be right
^^
as
the
"traitors in the
in saying:
^l^S^^^^^
must have favourable circumstances
help us."
Chia Lin says:
pjtj.Jjjj^
enemy's camp" are referred
But Ch'en Hao is
cause only.
efficient
in
j)^
general, not
"We must
merely
,"We
traitors
avail ourselves of
to
wind
and dry weather."
the
material
for
raising
fire
should
always be kept
in
readiness.
j|g5
fire."
^
is
explained by Ts'ao
Tu Mu
suggests
Kung
as
%& JL
Xffi^Slf^lh/ft^ll "^
vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw,
have the material cause. Chang
"vessels for hoarding
3.
fire,
"appliances for making
fire,
Yu says:
grease,
oil,
etc."
Here we
|^^C^^^^^^/
stuff for lighting fires."
There is a proper season for making attacks with
and special days, for starting a
conflagration.
'S3
&Z Hife-
5
jt
-fc
# # eg s. 'X z % m m z
A
f-
Jfi
Z ft ft
be begun
^^
"recklessly" or jj^
ft ft
*.
must
fire
riot
fl'J
The proper season
^^
"at haphazard."
when the weather is very dry;
those when the moon is in the constel-
4.
is
the special days are
lations of the Sieve, the Wall, the
These
are,
the
respectively,
yth,
Wing
and 28th of the
27th,
14111,
or the Cross-bar
"""*.
;
-p
y\ ^j* Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to SagitThe original text, followed by the
tarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.
T'u Shu, has
J=J
thority of the
&
)^T
in place of
Tung
For
iit
'
H/
precise location ^-^
is
meant the
constellation
;
S|
m It *
ft
is
is
Tu Yu
quoted by
of summer,
X^>
-jj>
Mu
the
;
by
tail
Jffij
,
fg
says:
Y&
^^ ^
Lan g ive
tells
the
us that by
more
4
^
-
the eastern part of that
of the
Quail.
days of rising wind.
dKp*l
(afterwards fourth
I
^\\
Mei Yao-ch'en
.
Dragon
,
for these four are all
Hsiao
ifii
and
!
Lan.
both TlunS Tien and
>^V
>
-^
of the
tail
by
^M
^W^
the present reading rests on the au-
;
tjfij
Y&<
Tien ancl
for
^*
Emperor of
as saying that the days
of autumn, and
PI ?g
llfc
^
If II
the Liang dynasty, A.D. 552
ffl
pj ~f
of spring,
j^ of winter bring
jj^
555)
g,
fierce gales
of wind and rain.
I
Yu
in
attacking with
In
5.
meet
five possible
take
is
i.
6.
wrong
in referring
What
(i)
one should be prepared to
developments:
as qualifying
3
fire,
^,
not
^ J^
therefore think that Chang
J^, and
to the five
methods of attack
follows has certainly nothing to
When
fire
breaks out inside the enemy's camp,
respond at once
The Yu Lan
do
set forth
with these.
incorrectly reads 1|f for jjl
with an attack from without.
.
154
7.
an outbreak of
but the enemy's
soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
(2) If there
7.
The
fire is
original text omits
lit
ffjj
that
the
enemy
is
fire,
The prime
.
throw the enemy into confusion.
to
means
it
is
object of attacking with
not produced,
If this effect is
ready to receive
Hence
us.
the necessity
for caution.
8.
When
(3)
height, follow
if
not, stay
Ts'ao
Kung
it
the
where you
9.
(4)
If
it
is
if
if
that
tft
&
is
its
practicable;
are.
~fl
says:
has reached
flames
up with an attack,
way, advance; but
sible
of the
force
&
ift
you
$
1$
"
If
'
y u see a P os
find the difficulties too great, retire."
possible
to
make an
assault with
fire
from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but
deliver your attack at a favourable moment.
Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire
breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of
inside
incendiaries)
^
the enemy's camp.
^
"But," he continues,
Jk
jfc
^
"^
e enemv i s settled in a waste place littered
^E jJC
im.
with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a position which
can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any seasonable
for
and not wait on
in hopes of an outbreak occurring within,
opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegeand thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous dJ5
opportunity,
fear our
tation,
Li Ling once baffled the
The
jffi
^
||fe
leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way.
taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the
Chinese general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had
already been burnt down. On the other
latter,
^
Po-ts'ai, a general of the
j| (jj |$ Yellow Turban rebels,
was badly defeated in 184 A.D.
through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of a
large army he was besieging
Ch'ang-she,
hand, $fc
which was held by
J|[
^j
^
-^
Huang-fu Sung.
The
jjff;
garrison was very
'55
11.
<Ji,
12.
Jl?
small,
Sung
and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu
called his officers together and said: 'In war, there are various in-
methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The
commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, V.
Now the rebels
5, 6 and ro.]
have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass
t=jf
3jj* ),
direct
(^
which
jj!j
burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night,
be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack
will easily
they will
them on
all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T'ien Tan.'
[See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu
Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount
guard on the city
who
walls, after
made
stealthily
their
which he sent out a band of daring men,
way through
the lines
and
started the fire with
loud shouts and
yells.
Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the
city- walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge,
which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight."
\Hou Han Shu,
ch. 71,
f.
2
r.]
When
you start a fire, be to windward of
not attack from the leeward.
io.
Do
(5)
Chang
Yii, following
Tu Yu,
^
says:
"
^
*&
wh en
& 31
Rfi
^
it.
(^
you make a fire, the enemy will
*& Ifc %& M!| >5 HI ife
retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he
will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather
more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the
east,
begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack
If you start the fire on the east side, and then
yourself from that side.
attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy."
1 1
.
A
wind that
night breeze soon
Cf.
rises in
the daytime lasts long, but a
falls.
Lao Tzu's saying: ||| Jj^
^$
j|J}
"A
violent
wind does not
space of a morning." (Tao T<? Ching, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch'en
and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night
last the
This is what happens as a general rule."
daybreak.
observed
phenomenon
may be correct enough, but how this sense
breeze
at
be obtained
12.
with
is
In
fire
calculated,
The
is
to
not apparent.
every army, the five developments connected
must be known, the movements of the stars
and a watch kept
for the
proper days.
156
Tu Mu's commentary shows what
sense out of
^
7J
%
^
jfc
and watch
making our attack with
of
Rjfc:
"
0^"^T^.^C
of the stars,
"We must
He
.
be supplied
-to
in order to
^ ^ g jg
f{r
must make calculations
wind
the days on which
for
fire."
not only
We
has
says:
Chang Yu
know how
seems
^^
as to the paths
will
rise,
to take
to assail our
make
before
in the sense
^J*
opponents with
fire,
but also be on our guard against similar attacks from them."
13.
show
least hesitation in rejecting the
$J as= $J
.
.
Thus Chang
|.
will clearly
[i.e. obviously]
only clumsy in
who
those
Yii says:
but does not balance
cf.
and Lun
use
ijtji
infra,
commentators' explanation
$
#ft "Pf
be able to gain the victory."
itself,
"intelligent,"
IjjJJ
as an aid to the attack
fire
intelligence;
have not the
I
of
".
Hence those who use
16,
water as an
aid
$
J#
Jfc
This is not
in the next clause.
Yii
XII.
to
the
For
6.
attack gain an
accession of strength.
Capt.
"...
water
Calthrop
the
if
is
to assist
gives
is
By means
14.
an
rendering of the paragraph:
must be unquenchable. If
the attack, the flood must be overwhelming."
attack
to
extraordinary
be assisted, the
of water, an
fire
enemy may be
but not robbed of
all
his belongings.
Ts-ao Rung's note
^
pf Jg
^
is:
HH "^ e
intercepted,
% ft
can mere ty obstruct the enemy's road or divide his
IF!* Tatf
army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do
useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive
power of fire. This is
the reason, Chang Yii
concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple
of sentences, whereas the attack
Tzu
by fire is discussed in detail.
Wu
(ch. 4)
speaks thus of the two elements
Hi 15
"BIT
^ BB ^
"
If
an armv
:
ig
encamped on low-lying marshy
off, and where the rainfall is
ground, from which the water cannot run
heavy, it may be submerged by a flood.
If
an army
is
encamped in
and visited
wild marsh lands
thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles,
by frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire."
157
Unhappy
15.
one who
win
tries to
his
his attacks without cultivating the
for the result is waste of time and
in
of enterprise;
spirit
fate of
the
is
and succeed
battles
general stagnation.
This
one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzti. The diffiof which two interpretations appear
lit
is
culty lies mainly in ~jfi
Most of the
possible.
known
as
K ang Hsi)
l
to
the
referring to
^
'H
Uf*
,
^
of
"reward" or
J^
"Rewards
And Tu Mu
for
'jj^
in
the sense (not
^
"promote," and jfc
merit of officers and men.
Q
Jffjj
~^J
jfifa
commentators understand
Thus Ts'ao Kung
says:
good service should not be deferred a
"If you do not take opportunity to advance
single day."
and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your com-
mands, and disaster
&
ffiff
ensue."
will
-JS?
^
would then probably mean
"stoppage of expenditure," or as Chia Lin puts
%&
"Bf
:
it,
flf
>|
For several reasons, however, and in
"the grudging of expenditure."
of
scholars
on the other side, I prefer the
formidable
of
the
array
spite
interpretation suggested
^
Tii
4
ceeding
%
lft
in
)]
their
^
by Mei Yao-ch'en alone, whose words
^
|X|
battles
and
"Those who want
assaults
must
to
make
I will
sure
seize the favourable
quote
:
of suc-
moments
when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that
is to say, they must resort to such means of attack as fire, water and the
What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still
like.
and simply hold on to the advantages they have got." This retains the
more usual meaning of
^,
and
also brings out a clear connection of
thought with the previous part of the chapter.
Wang
Hsi paraphrases
tiring out
[///.,
it
as
Wjf
j^
ageing] the army."
^jir
^
(Jjjj
With regard
to
Jjjjjf
"expending treasure
of course
is
&
,
and
expenditure or waste
of time, money or strength.
But the soldier is less
general,
concerned with the saving of money than of time. For the metaphor
in
either
expressed
in "stagnation"
^@
^K
I
am
indebted to Ts'ao Kung,
who
says:
^
Capt. Calthrop gives a rendering which
"til
^ji 3
bears but little relation to the Chinese text: "unless victory or possession
be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and misfortunes arise. The
~Jfi
war drags on, and money
is
spent."
Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
plans well ahead-, the good general cultivates his resnnrres.
1
6.
158
&^
is.
ftf ff5 Sft
As S\m Tzu
^
must suppose
^
^ fU R5 It
quotes this jingle in support of his assertion in
to stand for
^~^L~Sft
15,
we
or something analogous.
be that the ruler lays plans which the general
must show resourcefulness in carrying out. It is now plainer than ever
The meaning seems
that
to
cannot mean "to reward."
YJ&
following from the
= B&>
2:
-
^
ft
$J
Tu Mu
1% ft
K a IH
&^W
M
m
ch
Nevertheless,
quotes the
M
$
*
ffl tfr
"The warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, knits them
together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith
decays, there will be disruption;
rewards are deficient,
if
commands
will
not be respected."
17.
^E
Move
not unless you see an advantage-,
Yu Lan's
the
variant
for
"jjjjj
,
is
adopted by Li Ch'iian and
Tu Mu.
use not your troops unless there
fight not unless the position is
is
something to be gained
;
critical.
Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes
so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao
Ching.
T
^*#
ch. 6 9:
i
tfij^g^tfcJt^flnilM
"I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare
not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."
No
18.
ruler
to gratify his
should
own
troops into the field merely
spleen; no general should fight a battle
put
simply out of pique.
Again compare Lao Tzu, ch. 68
is a weaker word than jfeC
|j|jj
||
:
that
as opposed to
for
$16
19.
if
not,
This
>
the sovereign.
and the
la tter
^
for
,
and
j|
is
The T'ung
gjr
Chang Yu says
=jg jfi jjg
therefore applied to the general
.
Tien and
Yu Lan read
jg
.
to your advantage, make a forward move;
where
stay
you are.
If
is
it
is
repeated from XI.
17.
for it is evident that
interpolation,
Here
I feel convinced that it is an
20 ought to follow immediately on
159
21.
1
For
8.
the
,
Tung
Tien and F#
Z0
have
^"Do
.
invents a sentence which he inserts before this one:
unless victory
have credited
20.
may be gained
Sun
in
may be succeeded by
countenance,
to
make war
not
While he was about
it,
he might
Tzti with something slightly less inane.
Anger may
According
thereby."
Capt. Calthrop
time change to gladness; vexation
content.
Yii, jj, denotes joy outwardly manifested in the
the inward sensation of happiness.
Chang
*|*j^
But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can
21.
never come again into being;
Wu
The
State
was destined
to
be a melancholy example of
this saying.
See p. 50.
nor can the dead ever be brought back to
Hence the enlightened
22.
good general
full
ruler
is
life.
and the
heedful,
of caution.
which usually means "to warn,"
l|&,
fc3
This is a
here equal to 3ji
y tArf
Chinese characters, which stand for ideas, refuse
good instance of how
to be fettered by dictionary-made
as in
is
The T'u Shu
reads
^Q
,
the
way
to
keep a country
at
peace
and an
intact.
army
It
definitions.
16.
This
III.
.
is.
is
odd
i, q. v.
that
>jfc
jlf should not have the same meaning here as in
me to consider whether it might not be pos-
This has led
sible to take the earlier passage thus: "to preserve
your own army (country,
regiment, etc.) intact is better than to destroy the enemy's." The two
words do not appear in the
ung Tien or the Yu Lan. Capt. Calthrop
misses the point by translating: "then is the state secure, and the army
T
victorious in battle."
l
'
1>
-
-
o
.
^j*^
***
-
'
v*i.
*
^.,HT
,
;
;J
XIII.
XIII.
is
really
THE USE OF
a vulgar form of
and
,
|j|j
SPIES.
not appear
floes
in, the^
Shuo
In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct character
meanings of its own, and I have therefore followed my
with
special
form throughout the chapter.
will be found.
|JJ]
edition of the standard text in retaining this
In VI.
25,
on the other hand, the correct form
The
evolution of the meaning "spy" is wprth considering for a moment,
provided it be understood that this is very cjoubtful ground, and that any
is
dogmatism
form of
^
jjjj^)
^g-
Hsu
Wn
The Shuo'
out of place.
"
^fJB^^Tfeft^liPlifc
light of the
it
is
moon
example
^
original force of |gj , that
to stand alone with the
U|]
word may
that the
that
to
constant
last
to
'
a door
is
^^
sh "^
if'
it
ffi
is
"
:
^jj
the
ffl]
!|
to
word which means
K^V
association
so affected the
be dropped altogether, leaving
signification.
have come
-^ Pj
:
(the old
we may accept
must come through a
the meaning "space between,"
Here
could at
same
ni ht
in the phrase
act as a secret spy between enemies."
we may suppose
At
is visible,
an easy step
or simply "between," as for
is
|5j|
[Jf]
Ch'ieh's analysis as not unduly fanciful
when it is shut, the
chink" From this
"spy;" but
as
defines
"a crack" or "chink," and on the whole
Another possible theory
mean
"to peep" (see
jsjjj
-jf^ jj||
quoted in frang Hsi), which would naturally be suggested by "crack" or
"crevice,"
first
and afterwards the man who peeps, or
,
spy.
Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand
men and marching- them great distances entails heavy loss
on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.
The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces
i.
of
silver.
Cf. II.
i,
13, 14.
be commotion at home and abroad, and men
drop down exhausted on the highways.
There
will
will
J St $&
J
'
which
is
omitted b y the
Yti
Lan appears
,
at first sight
be explained by the words immediately following, so that the obvious
translation would be "(enforced) idleness along the line of march."
[Cf.
to
&
H
"
Too Te Ching, ch. 30: gjfj %,
Where tro P s
ffl $$ ^fe
W(
have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up."] The commentators,
is here equivalent to
a meaning which is
however, say that Jt
|g?
retained in the phrase
still
^
Jg^
Tu Mu
.
refers
Jg^
to those
who
are
conveying provisions to the army. But this can hardly be
said to emerge clearly from Sun Tzti's text.
Chang Yii has the note:
"We may be reminded of the saying 'On serious ground, gather in plunder'
[XI.
13]. Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion
on the highways?
The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts
engaged
in
:
of munitions of war have lo be conveyed to the army.
Besides, the in-
junction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is
deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided
Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn,
against.
we must
plies.
forage in order that there
may be an
uninterrupted flow of sup-
^
Then, again, there are places like salt deserts (5j|
where
provisions
dispensed with."
being
As many
seven
impeded
as
unobtainable, supplies from
thousand
hundred
^tfa)
[^
home cannot be
families
will
be
in their labour.
Mei Yao-ch'en
plough-tail."
says;
The
allusion
^
^
J^
|
is
to
"
3JR
|jj
nine parts, as shown in the character
Men w ^
be lacking at the
the system of dividing land into
^
each consisting of a
,
-^
or
the plot in the centre being cultivated on behalf
fc|| (about 15 acres),
It was here also, so Tu
of the State by the tenants of the other eight.
Mu
by
tells
all
in
us,
and a well sunk, to be used
These groups of eight peasant
that their cottages were built
common.
[See
II.
12, note.]
f tne fam ilies had to
I n ti me of war one
|SK
to its support
contributed
serve in the army, while the other seven
f
I00 000 men
Thus> by a levy
proprietors were called
'
(
?? 4&
$
(reckoning one
-fc
>
^ ^ 2)'
able-bodied soldier
'
to
each family)
the husbandry
of
700,000 families would be affected.
2.
Hostile armies
may
face each other for years, striving
62
I
This
victory which is decided in a single day.
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition
simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces
for
the
of silver in honours and emoluments,
"For spies"
of course the meaning, though
is
of this curiously elaborate exordium
if
it
would
spoil the ettect
spies were actually mentioned
at
this point.
the height of inhumanity.
is
Sun
Tzti's
argument
is
and
the frightful misery
He begins by adverting to
certainly ingenious.
vast expenditure of blood and treasure which
war always brings
in its train.
Now, unless you are kept informed of
enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a
war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to
the
employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they
are properly paid for their services.
But it is surely false economy to
a
amount
for this purpose, when every day
grudge
comparatively trifling
that the
burden
that
war
falls
to
lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum.
This grievous
on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes
neglect
the
use
of spies
is
nothing
less
than a crime against
humanity.
3.
One who
acts thus
is
no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign,
An
inferior reading for
no master of
^
is
fc
,
thus explained by
Mei Yao-ch'en
:
victory.
This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the natemperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these
memorable words were uttered by Prince
tj Chuang of the Ch'u State
tional
:
Bt
up of jj-
'to stay'
"
41" ifc
and
^
The chara cter
'a
for 'prowess'
(jj)
spear' (cessation of hostilities).
is
made
Military
seen in the repression of cruelty, the
calling in of weapons,
the preservation of the
appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of
merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between
the princes, the diffusion of wealth."
XII. 3 ad Jin.}
[Tso Chuan,
prowess
is
*g
^
5.
ft BE
#
e.
Jl*
**
2 IS *&
A*
Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond
4.
the reach of ordinary men,
That
5
.
is,
knowledge of the enemy's
Now
is
dispositions,
foreknowledge cannot be
this
^Lfchsinw^
&*^<UsvL*
foreknowledge.
and what he means to
elicited
from
do.
spirits
,
Jt SI JnE "ky P ra yers or sacrifices," says Chang Yu. J^ are the
disembodied spirits of men, and
supernatural beings or "gods."
jjjjjj
it
cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
Tu Mu's
he says,
note makes the meaning clear:
^j|,
is
the
same
"SaflLJtJRrffiSfc
reasoning by analogy;
as
"[ know
'
ledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analog-
ous cases."
nor by any deductive calculation.
Li Ch'iian says
:
^ -g
g
p]
ffi
$jj[ jj
J^liA^1 W^>S^il^
1
1^
J
breadth,
distance
determination;
'tfc
^
/J\
P "Pf ,|^
^
"Quantities like
and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical
human
actions cannot be so calculated."
Knowledge of the enemy's
obtained from other men.
6.
Mei Yao-ch'en has
dispositions can only
rather an interesting note:
J^
jjjty
^
ff| Iff
be
J^j[
.
information in
ledge of the spirit- world is to be obtained by divination;
natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning ; the laws of the
universe can be verified by mathematical calculation but the dispositions
of an
are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."
:
enemy
(
164
7.
Hence the use of
classes:
(4)
.spies;
Local spies;
(i)
doomed
of
spies,
whom
inward spies;
(2)
g
which
in
This
facts leak out
as
3t
ff|
fifr
all
none
at work,
^ ff ^
"the
way
and dispositions are revealed."
the reading of the standard text, but the
is
Tu
converted
called
is
'Jjft
and
Tu Mu
explained by
is
(3)
are five
spies; (5) surviving spies.
When
these five kinds of spy are
can discover the secret system.
8.
there
Shu
all
have ||}
Tung
Yu Lan
Tien,
.
"divine manipulation of the threads."
Capt. Calthrop translates
Yao-ch'en's paraphrase
number
the control of a
It
is
^j(jj
jjjjjj
j$
^
^
"
tne
Jjj|jjjj
Mysterious Thread," but Mei
^j*
shows that what
is
meant
is
of threads.
the sovereign's
most precious
faculty.
4
Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders,
had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect all
possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc.,
his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge
and much of
of the enemy's
9.
moves thus gained."
Having
^P|5 Rlj
ig
^e
unintelligible jjj
theless reads
*
local spies
emen ded reading
here and in
PJJ
^|K Rfl
,
of Chia Lin and the
7,
Tu
Shu
for the
of the standard text, which never-
in ^ 22.
means employing the
services of the inhabitants of a district.
Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind
ment, and use them as spies."
* "Aids to
Scouting," p. 2.
treat-
Having inward
10.
making use of
spies,
officials
of
Tu Mu enumerates
the
the enemy.
^!f
includes both civil and military
officials.
do good service in this respect: "Worthy
following
men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone
punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men
who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been
as likely
classes
to
passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their
side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of
displaying
their ability
in
and
each boat
talents, fickle turncoats
(jjj$
g^
who always want
to
&%
^ ^ pg ^
have a foot
)
Offici als
of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and
bound to one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will
be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain
the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the
harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers."
The
necessity
for
extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward
from an historical incident related by Ho Shih:
"j|S l8f
Lo Shang, Governor of
^| I-chou, sent his general [^ >fj Wei Po
spies," appears
^
to attack
the rebel
^
Li Hsiung of
$j|
After each side had experienced a
P'i.
fjiJJ
Shu
-J
in his stronghold at
number
of victories and
defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain
^
^\
jfig
P'o-
He
t'ai,
began by having him whipped until
the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to
delude by offering to co-operate with him from inside the city, and to
Lo
give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault.
Shang, confiding in these promises, marched out all his best troops, and
placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P'o-t'ai's
a native of
jj
bidding.
Wu-tu.
Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general,
an ambuscade on
^^
Li Hsiang, had prepared
of march; and P'o-t'ai, having reared long
Wei
scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire.
Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and [began climbing the ladders
their line
as fast as they could, while others
above.
were drawn up by ropes lowered from
More than a hundred of Lo Shang's
soldiers entered the city in
way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then
charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed
the enemy completely."
[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know
this
where
Ho
Shih got the story from.
Li Hsiung or that of his father 'Li
not given in the biography of
It is
T'e,
Chin Shu, ch. 120, 121.]
1
Having converted
ir.
spies
and using them
66
spies, getting
for our
own
hold of the enemy's
purposes.
By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from
the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information
Thus Tu Yu:
as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen.
On
JJ
gjj?
Hsiao Shih-hsien in denning the
^
not to have detected him, but contrive to
impression of what
B5
7T*
i5>l
Ift
^
proved by
(21 sqg.\
>
we pretend
away a
^J
false
^
it is
not what Sun Tzu meant
is
conclusively
subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously
Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were
i) by T'ien Tan in
Chao
She on his march
by
used with conspicuous success
mo
carry
hand
fl
( j|
fj|
f^
$J
Several of the commentators accept this as an
)
alternative definition ; but that
his
says that
him
\%
going on
is
^j]
let
the other
(see supra, p. 90); 2)
:
and by the wily ^jj $|| Fan Chii
in
his defence of Chi-
to O-yii (see p. 57);
260 B.C., when Lien P'o was con-
ducting a defensive campaign against Ch'in. The King of Chao strongly
disapproved of Lien P'o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been
unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready
ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy
and were already
in
causes Ch'in anxiety
Fan
Chii's pay.
is lest
jjjjj^
j^
They
said:
"The only thing which
Chao Kua should be made
general.
Lien P'o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished
in the long run."
Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao
From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of
She.
war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was
no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His
father was much disquieted by this
overweening conceit, and the flippancy
with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared
that if ever Kua was appointed
general, he would bring ruin on the armies
of Chao, This was the man who, in
spite of earnest protests from his
own mother and
the veteran statesman
j||j
now
^ig $ff
Lin Hsiang-ju, was
sent to succeed Lien P'o.
Needless to say, he proved no match for
the redoubtable Po Ch'i and the
He fell
great military power of Ch'in.
into a trap by which his
army was divided into two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance
lasting 46 days, during which
the famished soldiers devoured one
another, he was himself killed by an
arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly
put to the sword.
[See
^ j^ |g ^ ^
g|,
ch. 19,
ff.
4850].
i6 7
a
*
Having doomed
spies, doing certain things openly
of
deception, and allowing our own spies to
purposes
know of them and report them to the enemy.
12.
for
^
Li Ch'iian's conjecture for
is
Tu
and the Yu Lan.
The
after
adds ffl
-fy
&.
of the enemy, to
whom
But
3
l
,
which
found
is
in the
T'ung Tien
unsupported by any good authority,
doomed spies would be those
S/iu,
In that case, the
our
own
spies
had conveyed
false information.
Tu Yu
gives the best exposition
of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things calculated to deceive our
own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly
this
disclosed.
is
unnecessarily complicated.
Then, when these spies are captured
make an
will
in the
enemy's
lines,
they
and the enemy will take measures acThe spies
that we do something quite different.
death." Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle
entirely false report,
only to find
thereupon be put to
As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the
of the sentence.
(See
prisoners released by Pan Ch'ao in his campaign against Yarkand.
cordingly,
will
He
132.)
p.
sent
by T'ai
refers to
also
Tsung
^^
to lull the
T'ang Chien, who
Turkish
Khan
|
in
630 A.D. was
Chieh-li into fancied
TJcjJ
Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him.
Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T'ang Chien,
but this is a mistake, for we read in both the Old and the New T'ang
and
History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped
security, until Li
lived
on
until
656.
J|$
part in 203 B.C.,
when
ations with Ch'i.
He
^
sent
l|t
by the
has certainly
Li I-chi* played a somewhat similar
King of Han to open peaceful
more claim to be described as a
negoti-
^
Rjj
;
King of Ch'i, being subsequently attacked without warning by
Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi,
the
for
ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.
back
Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring
from
the
news
enemy's camp.
13.
This
part
is
the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular
of the army.
"
jib
* Cfrien
Han
Tu Mu
says:
^
Rjj
^ fa ^(
Your surviving spy must be a man of keen
Shu, ch. 43,
fol.
i.
^
gj|j "jjf
Yen Shih-ku
jXj
tyj
#\>
intellect,
^
though
in loc. says:
j
1
68
outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron.
be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage;
of dirty work, able to endure hunger
thoroughly accustomed to all sorts
and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the fol-
in
He must
^
lowing story of
^| jj Ta-hsi
Eastern
of
Ch'in, jjj||j
governor
movement upon ffi
Wu
jj
Sha-yuan.
~fifa
of the Sui dynasty
:
"When he was
Shen-wu of Ch'i made a
The Emperor
T'ai
Tsu
hostile
Kao Tsu]
[?
spy upon the enemy. He was accompained by two
All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform.
other men.
When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the
sent Ta-hsi
Wu
to
enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in
catching the passwords used by the army. Then they got on their horses
again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of nightand more than once, happening to come across
watchmen ( 30&
)
^^
;
who was committing some breach
of discipline, they actually
stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling Thus they managed to
return with the fullest possible information about the enemy's dispositions,
a soldier
!
and received warm commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence
of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary." With
the above classification it is interesting to compare the remarks of Frederick
the Great:* "Es giebt vielerley Sorten von Spions: i. Geringe Leute,
welche sich von diesem Handwerk meliren. 2. Doppelte Spions. 3. Spions
von Consequenz, und endlich 4. Diejenigen, welche man zu diesem
unglucklichen Hankwerk zwinget." This of course is a bad cross-division.
The
to
first
Spions"
falsche
verted
in
class ("Biirgersleute,
Sun Tzu's
it
is
Bauern, Priesters, etc.") corresponds roughly
"local spies," and the third to "inward spies." Of "Doppelte
broadly stated that they are employed "um dem Feinde
Thus they would include both conFrederick's last class of spies does not appear
Nachrichten aufzubinden."
and doomed
Sun Tzu's
list,
spies.
perhaps because the risk in using them
is
too great.
14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are
more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
The
original text
Tu Mu and Mei
and the T'u Shu have
|Jj
in place of the first
Yao-ch'en point out that the spy
is
^
.
privileged to enter
even the general's private sleeping-tent. Capt. Calthrop has an inaccurate
translation: "In connection with the armies, spies should be treated with
the greatest kindness."
"Umerricht des Konigs von Preussen an die Generate seiner
Armeen," cap. 12
(edition
of 1794).
169
None should be more
rewarded.
liberally
Frederick concludes his chapter on spies with the words: "Zu allem
fiige ich noch hinzu, dass man in Bezahlung der Spions freygebig,
ja verschwenderisch seyn muss. Ein Mench, der um cures Dienstes halber
den Strick waget, verdienet dafiir belohnet zti werden."
diesem
In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
Tu Mu
gives a graphic touch
communications with
:
{f|
p
^ Jf ^
,
that
is
Calthrop has: "All matters relating to spies are secret," which
An
to say, all
should be carried on "mouth-to-ear."
spies
is
Capt.
distinctly
is
The following remarks on
;gp
who made perhaps larger use of them
than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who give
them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be
known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When they
feeble.
spies
may
interior
reading for t&&
.
be quoted from Turenne,
propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your
Never
possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity.
communicate anything
*
they should know."
absolutely necessary that
it is
Spies cannot be usefully employed
15.
This
them but what
to
is
Tu
the nuance of
^
Yu's paraphrase
without a certain intuitive sagacity.
Mei Yao-ch'en
says:
&
ft ft
know
$
^
j
fa
g|J
$
from falsehood, and be able
to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing."
Wang Hsi takes
"intuitive
and
as
former
the
separately, denning
Bg
j|| jfjj
"In order to use them, one must
fact
^
perception"
Mu
^Q
and the
latter as
HH
"fc^
jif.
strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves
HiZ&M^^^B&vlftZ
must assure ourselves as
their experience
skill."
:
-yfa
Before usi "g
Tu
j|f ^Jj
s i> ies
we
and the extent of
^
^
But he continues: J|[
'$? '|f| |J^
"
9& A brazen face and a crafty disposition
dangerous than mountains or rivers;
So that
penetrate such."
opinion on the passage.
to
"
to their integrity of character
^ IE A ^ Hi
more
Uj JH
are
and
^
"practical intelligence."
we
are
left
in
it
takes a
some doubt
* "Marshal
Turenne," p. 311.
man
of genius
as to his real
i/o
17..
ftft
is.
They cannot be properly managed without bene-
6.
1
* ft* ft 7 )B B ft
volence and straightforwardness.
^g
^
Yii says that
Chang
means "not grudging them honours and pay;"
"showing no distrust of their honesty." "When you have attracted
substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity;
,
them by
then they will work for you with
17.
all
their might."
Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports.
Mei Yao-ch'en
"Be on your guard against the
says:
read
1
for
gj&
8.
Be
Cf. VI.
indeed
is
T ung
The
going over to the service of the enemy."
l
possibility of spies
Tien and Yu
Lan
^?,
subtle! be subtle!
Capt. Calthrop translates: "Wonderful
9: fjfjj; 5p. ;j| 3J1.
the power of spies."
and use your spies
for
every kind of business.
divulged by a spy
before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
with the man to whom the secret was told.
19.
If
a secret
The Chinese here
necessary for the
-jff
^,
of news
so concise
is
and
however,
else.
it.
^
enemy obtained from a
is
ijjf.
it.
^^
Thus, word for word, we get:
heard before [our plans] are carried out,"
etc.
some expansion
is
denotes important
surviving spy.
not this information
stratagem built up on the strength of
by anybody
is
elliptical that
proper understanding of
information about the
ject of
piece
The
but the
itself,
means
"is
sub-
secret
heard"
"If spy matters are
Capt. Calthrop, in trans-
^
^
"the spy who told the matter, and the man
Jjjl ffi &f
repeated the same," may appeal to the authority of the commentators; but he surely misses the main point of Sun Tzu's injunction.
lating
who
For, whereas you
kill
the spy himself
S& J^
jfjjf-
"as a punishment for
letting
out the secret," the object of killing the other
Ch'en
Hao
puts
it,
JJ
p
"to
stop his
man
is
only, as
mouth" and prevent
the
20.
9 it & ft it
had already been repeated to others, this
Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to
news leaking any further. If
object would not be gained.
it
the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying
that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly
not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm
The T'ung Tien and Yii Lan have the reading
out of him.
fi etc., which, while not affecting the sense, strikes
4r
it fM
me as being better than that of the standard text. The Tu Shu has ...
which I suppose would mean "the man who heard
ffi
ffi
|^j
the secret and the man who told it to him."
it
.
^
^
^
-
.
,
:
,
Whether the
20.
.
object be to crush an army, to storm
a city, or_ to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,
-fc
it
who
a comprehensive term for those
is
~jb+
vants and retainers generally.
Capt. Calthrop
wait on others, ser-
hardly happy in rendering
is
"right-hand men."
the aides-de-camp,
IfJI =f
,
literally
"visitors,"
"those whose duty
]j! ^j
it
is
is
Tu Yu
equivalent, as
to
says, to
:j:
^
keep the general supplied with infor-
with him. Chang
mation," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews
Yii goes too far afield for
?Sr
^ s$
"
an explanation in saying that they are
J&
^pf
tne lea(^ ers of mercenary troops.".
the door-keepers and sentries
HfJII and
<?&
of the general in
Acommand.
^Q
to Chang Yu, is simply
^f*
TJ* $$> according
"a general on active service." Capt. Calthrop is wrong,
directly dependent on
$
j*
in charge," etc.).
Our
As
spies
the
first
"Then
(.
must be commissioned
set
.
"the
^$
making
names of the general
to ascertain these.
no doubt, towards finding out if any of these important
won over by bribery. Capt. Calthrop blunders badly
the spies to watch them."
step,
functionaries can be
with:
^ ^g
.
ffiJc
I think, in
172
22.
24.
;
The enemy's
21.
must be sought
jj\
^^
T ung
Tien and
l
Lan.
Its
recurrence
to gain
by
it.
Yii
may seem
certainly suspicious, though the sense
Shu has
on us
to spy
out,
omitted by the
is
who have come
spies
The
is
Tu
l
"
this variation:
...
etc.
tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.
^
ad
is
fin.,
well.
probably more than merely Jj| j
where Sun Tzu
Yii's
Chang
Thus they
paraphrase
will
is
Bg
-^g-
or
;3p||
^
"detain." Cf.
25
converted spies shall be treated
insists that these
.
become converted
spies
and available
for
cur service.
22.
It
is
through the information brought by the con-
verted spy that
and inward
are able to acquire and employ local
spies.
Tu Yu expands
]^
we
@
Jf
[ft
into
ft
@ we^
conversion of the enemy's spies
jp| "through
condition."
And Chang
Yii says:
^ *WA 2#
^%
& %.
*
ffl
gjjr
f^
fffi
^J
learn the enemy's
$.M X Z,
%H
"
We
must tem p l the
*fl
if ffij
SK
converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of the
local
inhabitants are greedy of gain,
to corruption."
and which of the
In the
officials
Fung Tien, ^Jj has been altered to |g|
for the sake of
uniformity with
9.
23.
It
cause the
is
owing
,
to his information, again, that
to carry false tidings to the
doomed spy
are open
doubtless
we can
enemy.
"Because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be deceived"
(Chang Yu). The T'ung Tien text, followed by the Yu Lan, has here
the obviously interpolated sentence
^^
"Sf
^ ^ -^
fffl
.
Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving
can
be used on appointed occasions.
spy
24.
Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.
>73
25.
The end and aim
25.
of spying in
varieties
all its five
knowledge of the enemy,
is
I
have ventured
to differ in this place
Yu and Chang Yu
^
^jj
Iff,
who understand
the antecedent of
as
ij:
^
:jr,
and make
ruler to
with the methods of spying (though one would rather expect
in place of
But
JT).
way from the
ferent
this involves taking
^Jfl
in the previous sentences.
enemy's condition, and
ij:
used
exactly the
in
way of
the
^
^
^JJ
3L
^
be familiar
iteC
"general"
here in quite a
dif-
immediately following, as also from those
there refers vaguely to the
in order to retain the
a verb, governed by
3^
(the others ignoring the point altogether).
enough that Sun Tzu should require the
It is plausible
Tu
from those commentators
R!j
same manner.
iff-
The
enemy
same meaning
Cf. XI.
19,
here, I
where
make
IJT
is
can see in
sole objection that I
the fact that the
or the
or fourth
7fa ^f]
of spy, does not add to our knowledge of the enemy, but only
misinforms the enemy about us. This would be, however, but a trivial
this
interpretation
is
,
variety
oversight on Sun Tzti's part, inasmuch as the "doomed spy" is in the
strictest sense not to be reckoned as a spy at all.
Capt. Calthrop, it is
hardly necessary to remark, slurs over the whole difficulty.
and
knowledge can only be derived,
this
in the first in-
stance, from the converted spy.
He not only brings information himself,
As explained in
22
24.
but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.
Hence
it
essential
is
that
the converted spy be treated
with the utmost liberality.
Of
26.
Sun
Tztt
the rise of the Yin dynasty
old,
means the
name was changed
was due
Better
who took
to
I
known
to
in 1766 B.C.
jj Shang dynasty, founded
P'an Keng in 1401.
Yin by j^
J^f
Its
Chih
as
^^
I
Yin, the famous general and statesman
part in Ch'eng T'ang's campaign against |j|
^
Chieh Kuei.
174
,
27.
who had served under the Hsia. Likewise,
the Chou dynasty was due to Lii Ya
S
the
rise
of
Lu Shang, whose "style" was -^ ^f, rose to high office
under the tyrant &J- rfe Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to overa title bestowed on him by Wen
throw.
Popularly known as
IpJ
^^
Wang, he
fied
is
said to have
with the -fc Ipg
composed a
There
is
less
treatise
on war, erroneously
identi-
.
who had served under
introduce into
,
the Yin.
precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to
translation, and the commentaries on the passage are
my
by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly
doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lii Ya as illustrious examples
His suggestion is,
of the converted spy, or something closely analogous.
that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings which these former ministers
Mei Yao-ch'en appears to reseat
side.
any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lii Ya," he
says, "were not rebels against the Government ( ife
~jfe [|| -{^ ).
were able to impart to the other
^
Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could
not employ the latter, hence Chou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant:
"
How
snou ld two divinely inspired
men
and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of
them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a
matter which requires men of the highest mental calibre like I and Lu,
The above
whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task.
words only emphasise this point." Ho Shih believes then that the two
heroes are mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of
such as
I
But
spies.
words
^g jj
and
^
"the province of Yin
the people of Shang."
27.
Hence
general
for
weak, as
this is very
who
it
jj*
.
.
is
will
.
.
it
leaves totally unexplained the significant
Capt. Calthrop speaks, rather strangely, of
the country of Hsia
.
.
.
the State of
Chu
.
.
.
only the enlightened ruler and the wise
use the highest intelligence of the army
purposes of spying,
Ch'en
out that
Hao compares
^
H
jit ;
T'ang and Wu
T'u Shu omits
Wang
^
15
ffr
led
:
^ ||
$
Jj* jfi
3lt
them
to
/
pjj
may
|ij|
I
^K
^ ^"
also be the
rfii
pjj
points
Lii
Shang."
The
.
results.
^
JJ
^
1 & ^ Rg #f K il ^c HJ * W H RB
^fC ffi
j||
"Just as water, which carries a boat from
means of sinking
tive of great results,
He
.
wisdom of Ch'eng
Yin and
closes with a note of warning:
*W
^
|
the god-like
employ
and thereby they achieve great
Tu Mu
"
is
it,
so reliance
on
bank
-jfj-
to bank,
spies, while produc-
oft-times the cause of utter destruction."
most important element in war, because on
r
them depends an army's ability to move.
a
Spies are
^
The antecedent to
/
|Hw must be either Rfl
I wV
**-
from the whole sentence.
like a
man
5&
PI
or ffl Rfl
M
/
I -9
I
V
4M
understood
Chia Lin says that an army without spies
without ears or eyes.
is
CHINESE CONCORDANCE
177
chi
IX.
XL
15;
7,
VI. 25; XII.
IX. 32;
XL
III.
VIL
65.
8.
^
chia
H
IX
chiang
XT
v.
6.
?I
V.
17, 18.
16.
^' XL 18,46, 47, 48, 49, 50.
V,
16;
XL
12;
VII.
13;
12,
^
25.
I7
;
4
L 4
IX.
VII.
10.
V. 15; XI. 38.
VIL
VI. 4;
XII.
!
ii
XL
;
IIL
4,
27; VIII.
I2
5,
11,17;
5,
i, 7, 9,
13,
,
I4J
IX. 33; X. 13, 14,
31; IX. 29.
VIL
IV. 20;
i5; IL
9, ii, i3,
,
15, 20;
22;
17,
18,
XL
35, 40, 61; XII.
19, 20, 21;
i.
16, 18, 22; XIII. 3,
4, 20, 27.
3? IX
XII. 4.*
XL
IX. 4 ;
XL
ch'i
_
'7-
'
ch'iang 3Jg I.i3,2i;II.i8; III.n;
IX. 24; X. 16, 19;
30.
XII. 13.
49-
chiao
VII.
3g IH.3;
passim.
I
XL 38, 66; XIII. 24.
IX.
2 7;
II.
17;
"
VIL
24,
23,
^L
^
26,
J||
IL
i.
II.
4; IX. 22; XII. 3, 4;
ch'iao
IX. 43;
15.
XL
V.
3,
5,
6
>
chieh
16, 32.
13; XIII.
II.
I0
i.
>
^
1j(\
22.
25; II. 13, i4,2o;XIII.
II.
i,
14;
V. 4;
XL
VIL
|f|
i.
7.
54, 55-
-
II.
tl IX
Jg IL
n
XL
22; X. 26.
ch'ieh
XL
5;
'
62.
23
I2
ii,
;
V.
6.
VI. 275X1.33; XIII. 19.
?S XL
n.
VII. 27, 28, 29;
I.
X^
||>
IV. 20; X. 25.
chia
5,
12.
3,
I.
Wn
8.
IIL n; IX.
i,
IX. 44; X. 18.
4.
XIII.
XL
12,28,48,52,54,55.
32; IX. 33.
IIL
12; VIII.
2,
IX. 8;
2;
X
vm
V.
25-
9>
-
iz
14,
13,
^
VI11
^
XL
JL
HI. 16;
-
-
15.
9-
48.
XL
23.
12
ch'ieh
10; IX. 14, 37; X. 13,
V. 17, !8; VII. 25.
XL
20;
chien
XIII.
sim.
VII.
chih
VI. 2; XII.
S^
II.
jf
IX.
chin
III.
10.
IX.
n;
XL
67.
I.
XL
10
8,
19;
6,
XL
II.
6i;XlII.
i.
13; VI. 10;
XL
42, 44.
16,
VIL
25;
IV. 12;
91 II. 4, 15;
ch'in
XL
26.
XL
28.
I.
VIII. 7; XIII. 15,27.
23, 24; XIII.
2.
IX. 17, 39;
passim.
49-
23.
VIL
i;
i,
XL
XL
7;
II.
15, 45-
I.
15,
IX. 19, 24, 28, 31,40;
VII. 23;
;
VI. 17, 20; IX. 9;
chih
31; IX.
18; X. 21.
X. 24;
XL
n; VI. 20;
II.
19;
8,
15,
IV. 20; V. 23; VI.
i;
8.
7,
III.
26; IV.
II.
18.
i.
VIL
IX. 31.
ch'ien
29;
7.
IX. 17.
I.
Ifc
26,
6,
2.
XL
IX. 42;
23;
22, 48.
XL
25;
XIII. 14.
passim.
10
III.
[= =g]
XL
V. 22;
i,
ii,
XL
39.
VIL
17; XII.
ching
n,
8,
X.
VI. 12;
XL
VIL
30;
35; XII.
7.
7.
VIL
3, 4, 22.
I.
10, 17: VI. 27, 31;
17: VII. 23, 24, 26;
IX. 33IX. 15, 17.
X. 21.
XL
18.
IX. 18;
II.
7,
VII. 7; IX. 41.
V. 22; VI. 23;
19.
6,
;
VII.
8.
46.
I.
3-
XIII. 26.*
IX- 37XII. 22.
V.
17, !8;
i,
VII. 29, 30,
31, 32; VIII. 6;
XL
III.
3,
XL
2 6;
ch'ing
35-
16;
9*
X.
V.
12,
25; VII,
13; VI.
4, 8, 9,
I.
3,
4312;
XIII.
IX. 26.
XL
2,
6.
19, 41, 51;
ch'ing
IX.
$|
XI.
25;
u,
3,
i,
44, 46.
chio
chiu
^
VI. 24.
g
XIII.
IV. 7; VIII.
;/(,
XL
^
II.
4,
6;
5,
41.
2,
3,
5,
19; III.
6,
6; IX. 39; XII. ii.
VI. n, 20; XI. 15, 30.
$fc
Ch'ill
2.
^
IV. 15; V. 21
X.
;
24
;
XI. 25.
U.
jfc
fl
IV. 10.
|K
chiung
12, 14.
VII. 33; IX. 13.
IX. 36.
jjlf
V.
ch'iung1||
6,
n;
10,
VI. 28;
VII. 36; IX. 34; X. 30.
cho
chou
II.
ffl
|J!
VII. 26, 28; XII.
-^
XI. 30, 39.
Jg
III.
g
chu
5.
XIII. 26.*
U.
II.
10, 13; II. 20;
I.
3:
n:
n.
X. 23,
24; XI. 19, 20; XII.
16, 18; XIII. 3, 25.
H
4; HI. 16; VII.
II.
VIII.
XL
10;
1
2;
2,
6,
VI. 1,24,30; VII.
7;
28,* 38, 52.
^
IX. 45-
IX. 13; X. 21.
|jf/
I3c
ch'u
H
^
3
XL
64.
XL
6,
46.
IX.
i,
13;
XL
2,
6, 8,
68.
9, 12,
ch'u
80
I
ch'ii
I.
II.
20;
VI.
7,
16; V. 19;
9,
XII. 15; XIII.
II.
i,
XL
XL
VIII. ro;
7;
XL
IX. 24;
VIII.
Fa
j,
XL
i,
22, 25,
n;
i,
56.
35
XL
6,
7,
28,38;
9,
io;
XIII. 19.
13; IX. 36, 42.
I.
fan
43, 48.
XL
III. 3;
55
12,
9,
37; VIII.
V. 15; VII. 4;
47-
6,
8,
i,
33,
XII.
39-
XL
2;
6;
2,
41.
30; VII.
29,
5,
5, 6.
III.
13;
2, 4,
VIII. io;
VI.
VII.
33; IX. 40, 43.
XIII.
*
54.
IT,
7,
IX. 34; X.
13, 21, 25.
4, 5-
io.
I.
isstm.
VII.
chiian
7.
XL
IX. 33-
56, 57.
VIII. 12.
ch'uan
IV.
III. i, 7;
7;X.
3 i;
17; HI. 15; VII. 21
I.
XL
chueh
V. 22;
fang
XII. 22.
fei
VIII. 2; IX,
i, 3, 4,
II.
7,
8, 9;
X. 14;
XL
27, 53; XII.
17; XIII.
XL
VII. 36;
chiin
III. 1 2, 17;
i,
4,
fen
50.
III. 5 , 8;
3; XII. 22; XIII.
III.
8, 27.
V.
XL
ch'iin
Erh
12,
H
I.
15.
^f
io
IV.
XL
ft
ffl}
Fa
X.
;
;
IV.
XII.
VII.
17;
I.
24,
26;
II.
i;
X.
19.
XL
30; XII.
II.
XIII.
i.
36.
IX. 34-
fou
25.
4,
39.
IO,
IX. 22.
passim.
I.
io,
i, 45
16, 17.
VI. 13, 14,
III. 4.
15;
VII. io
erh
i;
5; VIII. 12.
VII. 17;
II.
V.
16.
XL
39-
4;
3, 15,
IX. 40;
VII. io, 16, 20.
VII i;VIII.
passim.
X.
15;
IV.
9.
ch'iieh
XII.
i.
III. 2, 6;
IV. 20;
VII.
14;
13,
i,
XIII.
XL 22, 43; XII. 14.
XL 67.
15;
31.
IX. 13.
55
;
55-
XL
13;
II.
i; III.
7,8; IV. 16,17;
f
|^
XL
63.
III.
5; IX.
5,42.
4,
fu
hsia
passim.
XL
V.
HI-
IV.
i7;
7,
9; VI. 29; IX. ii
15.
;
7,
XL
15, 55; XII. 10.
6,
VI. 28; XII. 20,21.
6;
3,
XIJI. 26.*
r
VIII. 14; IX. 17.
hsia
I.
8.
IX. 17, 22.
hsiang
I.
'..V.
VII.- 13; IX. 39,
1 1;
26; III. 18.
14,
45;
XL
1
5,
30; XIII. 2.
IX. 42, 44; X. 17.
XL
X.
II.
|6J
ii.
~
XL
10;
ban
I.
hao
IV.
heng
X. 18.
ho
V.
7,
.
VII.
2;
IX.
2,
16;
65.
XL
18.
60.
hsiao
III.
10; IX. 17.
hsieh
III. 4.
IX. 22.
IX. 38.
hsien
passim.
I.
V. 14; VII. 13;
8;
IX. 17, 18; X.
21
XL
;
8, 40,
IX. 15
15; X.
.
hou
^P
VII. 2; IX. 26.
J|f
X. 26; XIII
^
^
hsi
=g^
II.
14,
VIII. 10; XI.
2,
hsien
XIII. 4, 27.
14, 16;
XL
hsin
I.
9; IX. 45;
XL
25.
6, 52.
VII. 27, 30.
passim.
IV.
XIII. 26.
i;
i.
hsing
13; v. 22; vi. 6, 29,
VII.
34;
HI
10,
i,
52.
24, 5 8 > 59
25.
HI- 16; VII. 12;
4;
5.
XL
19,
24; XL 12, 16, 17, 54;
XII. 19.
XL
:?>:;[
VII. 33; XI. 61.
26.
VIII.
X.
39;
52;
22.
XL
57, 59.
10.
5;
9,
9,
7.
i,
7,
VI. 29; XIII.
VI. 3; VIII.
7;
XL
20;
14,
XIII.
25.
III.
Hai
VII.
39-
IX. ii
^
^
,t
m XL
;
XII. 20.
42, 445
XIL
VI. 21.
IX
'
35-
IX. 38.
34.
13; IX.
7,
XL
8,13,52;
2.
J|J passim.
Jgl
XIL
18; XIII,
V. 22.
i,
26.
182
II. 10, II, 13;
hsing
hsiu
XIII.
XL
4; IV. 6;
III.
I,
IX. 40, 42;
20.
^j
25;
I.
XII. 15, 16.
|XJ
hsii
|f;
$ft IV.
V. 4; VI. 10;
13;
|J
fft
ft
hsiian
XII.
4-
VII. 21; IX. 34;
X.
19.
hsiin
V.
ii.
hu
I.
XL
XL
26; VI. 9;
56.
^
II.
^
VI. 21
;
$C
IX.
8.
^
IX. 29
30.
ffi
IX. 32.
XL
hua
huan
lH
VII. 3; VIII.
III. 12;
V.
i,
7
ift
9.
ff
ii.
XL 26.
IX. 21;
4; VII. 31.
i,
XL
4.
.
28.
H
VII. 30.
IX. 24, 40.
XIII. 26.*
gg XL
XL
VI. 12.
60.
12; VIII. 10.
8,
el XL
68.
VI. 33-
5)
23; VI.
I.
;
XL
19-
III. 15, 16;
VII. 17; IX. 35.
20,
9,
37.
18; VI. 21
;g
IX. 32.
51.
IX.
24; VI. 5;
5,
II.
xii. 15.
II.
I.
XL 24, 34,
ii;
XL
41;
IX. 38.
hsiung
IV.
8;
63.
XIII. 16.
III.
5.
XII. 4.*
IX. 10.*
huang
J[/j[
IX. 17.
hui
V.
III.
6;
XL
55-
^
passim.
Jan
^
II.
jao
IS
IX. 33-
m
XL
13.
VI. 19.
hun
V.
1 6.
huo
II.
4,
16;
Jen
XL
Jl
f
XL
16.
jih
ii.
29, 30, 58, 59.
21.
passim.
i.
9
;
xiii. 2
,
16.
V. 21, 22j X.
fff;
III. 15;
^
IV. 20; V. 23.
13, 20.
50.
passim.
a
XL
i;
27.
fr
III. 14,
passim.
i
7; in. 4
II. i;
IV. 10; V. 6; VI.
20, 34;
;
iv.
i
3
63; XII.
VII.
3,
7;
XL
4; XIII.
19.
28,
i, 2.
jo
184
k'uo
vii. 20.. ,,
Lai
VIII.
IX.
1 1;
1.15; VIII. 2;
IX.
21, 23,
VI. 31; IX.
6.
18,39;
IX.
tin
4,
XL
38 ;X. 2;
5,
7;
XII. 15.
15.
XIII. 21.
lang
XI. 64.
lao
I.
VIII. 12.
II.
XL ...22.
IX. 31;
lei
14; III. 4.
23; VJ.i,4,:6; VII. 31;
XIII.
i.
IX. 15.
IX. 9 /
VI. ii.
XIII.
IV. 10; VII. 19.
X.
IX.' 33;
VI.
II. i;
16,
luan
18; VII. 30; IX. 33; X.
7,
13; IV. 10; VII.
31; IX. 40; XI. 22,23;
.
XII.
IV.
I.
I
4
4,
lun
XL
31.
lung
IX.
2.
lu
VIII. 7; IX. 41- XI. 375
XII.
8.
;
VII.
XL
23;
V,
i.
VI. 23; XI. 33, 41.
II. 2, 4,
18, 26.
14,
20; VII.
6, 19,
10; XI. 61; XIII.
9,
20; III. 16; V. 16, 17,
I.
18.
17,
2.
i
5
;
1 6.
XIII. 26.*
IX. 29.
in.
16.
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IX. 36.
passim.
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IV. 17, 18.
8,9; VII. ii ;X.
55
II.
55
XII. 16, 22.
i,
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VII. 18, 20;
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INDEX
[The numerals
refer to pages]
Abstract ideas of degree, 50.
Beasts,
Accessible ground, 100, 101, 119.
Accommodating oneself to the enemy,
Belgians at Waterloo, 130.
145, 148.
startled, sign of surprise at-
tack, 89.
Benevolence
Biot's
Aides-de-camp, 171.
"Aids to Scouting," quoted, 88, 89,
Blucher, 48.
107, 164.
to spies,
Chou Li,
Adaptation to circumstances, 23.
170.
ix.
Birds rising, sign of ambuscade, 89.
Bluster, 95.
Alliances, 60, 119, 140, 142.
Allotments of land, 62.
Boers, 18.
"Book of Army
Alps, crossings of the, 57.
Buff-coats, 58.
Amiot, Pere, vii, i.
Anger, succeeded by gladness, 159.
Burning one's boats, 133.
Army,
divisions of the, 17, 33.
the march, 140.
Army on
Arsenals, burning of, 151.
"Art of War," quoted by Han Hsin,
Art of war in a nutshell, 44.
Athletics, 124.
skill in, 28.
six,
Calthrop, Capt.
Tzti's
text,
:
105.
his edition of
xxxii;
of Sun Tzu,
Camp,
144.
Attack,
Calamities,
Management,"
viii
shifting,
;
63.
Sun
his translation
quoted, passim.
133.
Camping, 80 sqq.
Cannae, battle of, u.
Casinum, 140.
Attack and defence, 25, 44.
"Catalogue of Chinese Books," xxxiv.
Autumn
Chan Kuo
hair, 29.
Ts'e,
quoted, 10; referred
to, xxiv.
Baden-Powell, General. See "Aids to
Scouting."
Baggage, 58.
Baggage-train, 60.
Baggage-trains, burning of, 151.
Bait, offered by the enemy, 68.
Balancing of chances, 31.
Banners. See Flags and banners.
Bases of supply, 60.
Chan Ton Ta Chia Ping Fa, xviii.
Chang Ao, a commentator, xlii.
Chang Hsiu, 69.
Chang Liang, li, 109, 116.
Chang Ni, 144.
Chang Shang-ying, lii.
Chang Shou-chieh, xvi, xvii.
Chang Tsai, li.
Chang Tzu-shang, a commentator, xli.
INDEX
Chang
xl;
commentary on Sun Tzu,
Yii's
quoted,
n,
5, 8, 9,
20, 21, 22,
24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35,
39,42,
44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 60,
193
Hsiian's
Cheng
Chou
Cheng Tuan, xlii.
Cheng Yu-hsien's
xxxiv;
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85,
70, 136.
in,
105, 107, 109,
112, 119, 124,
125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134,
i3 6 > T 39 I 4i, J 42, 143, !45> I 5 2
155, *5 6 J 5 8 J 59, l6l l6 3> l6 7>
,
>
,
,
170, 171, 172; referred to, 6, 15,
17, 31, 36, 45, 71, 86, 95,96, 106,
147, 153, 173.
Ch'ang mountains, 128.
Ch'ang-she, siege
Chao State, army
143; defeated
of, 28,
by Ch'in, 166; King of,
Chao Chan, 106.
Chao Kua, xlviii, 166.
Chao She, famous march of,
57.
xxxvi,
129.
to, xiii, xvi, xlvi,
Ch'en Chen-sun, quoted, xxiii.
Ch'en Hao's commentary on Sun
quoted, 30,
44, 56, 62, 65, 69, 73, 81, 93, 97,
no,
117, 118, 122, 124,
133, 136, 141, 147,
referred to, 18, 68.
Ch'en-ts'ang, siege
of,
IS 2 ,
170,175;
Chia Hsu, a commentator,
46,
5,
xli.
57, 72, 75, 76, 86, 92, 94,
Chia Yu, referred
Chiang-ling, town
to, xlvii.
of,
in.
Tiukish Khan, 167.
Han
Cfrien
Shu, quoted 81, 145,
to,
li,
28, 34,
57,69;
bibliographical section of, quoted,
xvii, xix, li; referred to, xviii, xx,
liii.
Ch'ih Yu, 84.
Chin State, xii, xvi, 106.
Chin Shu, quoted, 78, 116; referred
123, 165.
Ch'in State, 142.
China's experience of war,
xliv.
Chinese characters, elasticity of, 159.
Chinese sentiment opposed to militarism, xliv.
xliii.
Hi.
Ch'ien Ch'io Lei Shu, liii.
Cfrien Fu Lun, referred to, xxiv.
to,
94.
Cheng, principality of, 104, 116.
Cheng and ch'-i. See Tactics, direct
and indirect.
Cheng Ch'iao, xl.
Cheng Hou, quoted,
Tzti,
Chia-ku, meeting at, xlvii.
Chia Lin's commentary on Sun Tzu,
167; referred
57-
106, 108,
78.
Chi-mo, siege of, 90.
Chi T'ien-pao's edition of Sun
Chieh-li, a
of,
Chavannes, M.: his "Memoires Histo-
Tzu, xxxvi, xxxviii;
of,
Ch'eng T'ang, xvi, 173, 175.
Chi Hsieh, editor of commentaries
on Sun Tzti, xxxviii, xli.
Chiang Yuan, a spurious work,
Chieh Kuei, the tyrant, 173.
Chariots, 9, 91.
riques" referred
Ch'eng-hung, battle
62, 65, 96, 108, 164.
xli.
xli.
Chariot fighting, 15, 16.
Chariot wheels, burying
Han
"7, 120, 133, 143, 148,
152, 157, 175; referred to, 51,55,
quoted,
xxxvii, xxxviii, xl,
captured by
Hsin, 28.
95, 97,
Chao Yeh, xiv.
Chao Ying-ch'i, 78.
Chao Yiian-hao's rebellion,
Kung-wu,
58,
xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 20, 30,34,
57, 136;
his use of spies, 166.
Ch'ao
of,
xxxii,
53,
Ch'i State, xii, xvi, 128.
Ch'i Chieh, 90.
154.
of,
Ch'eng-an, city
36,
to,
xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii.
of, 66.
Ch'ang-cho, battle
/ Shuo,
referred
63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74,
87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94,97,99, 103,
commentary on the
Li, xviii.
Ching,
Duke
of Ch'i, xv.
14
INDEX
194
Ching-chou Fu, 123.
Ching-hsing pass, battle
Ching K'o, 127.
Confucius, and the art of war,
of,
xlviii;
;
Ching Wang, period of, xxiii.
Chiu T'ang Shu, referred to, 104,
section
167; bibliographical
referred to, liii.
Chou C/i'm Shih I Tzu,
of,
text of Sun
Tzti in, xxxi.
oath, xlix.
Constellations, 153.
Contentious ground, 115, 118, 136.
Contraction and expansion, 134.
Conventional canons of warfare, 148.
Co-operation, 129.
Chou dynasty, 174.
Chou Hsin, the tyrant, 1,
Chou Li quoted, 14, 55,
60, 68, 92,
Country, natural features of, 60.
Courage, one standard of, 130.
Courant's
"Catalogue
xvii,
by Legge, 32:
Chu-ko Liang, 46,
51, 74, 82,
117,
122; supposititious works of, Hi.
Chu-ko Wu-hou. See Chu-ko Liang.
Ch'u
State,
xii,
Livres
Cowardice, 78.
134, 135.
Cromwell's use of
spies,
164.
Cross-divisions, 100.
xlvii.
xliii,
des
Chinois," Hi.
Critical ground,
quoted,
in the,
146.
174.
Chu Chih-wu, xxi.
Chu Fu's edition of Sun Tzu,
Hsi, corrected
sternness
Council-chamber,
146; referred to, xxxix, xlviii, 64;
Biot's translation of, ix.
Chu
xlvi,
contemporary with
Sun Tzu, xxx violates extorted
xlvii,
143.
xiii,
124; the
xvi,
enemy of Wu, xxvii;
Viscount of, no.
Chuan Chu, xxi, 128.
Chuan She-chu. See Chuan Chu.
Chuang, Duke of Lu, 66.
hereditary
Chuang, Prince of Ch'u, 141, 162.
Chuang Tzu, referred to, 29, 85.
Chung Yung, xix.
Cunning, 145.
Danger, bracing effect of, 139, 145.
Dangerously isolated ground, 72.
Deception, war based on, 6, 132.
Decision, 37, 38.
Deductive calculation, 163.
Defence, skill in, 27.
Deliberation, 63.
Demosthenes, the Athenian general,
118.
Desertion, 134, 136.
Circumstances, art of studying, 68.
Classics, compared with Sun Tzti, xliii.
Desperate
Clearness of orders, 107.
Clever fighter, the, 29, 41, 42.
Desperate ground, 72, 114, 117, 120,
69, 94.
Cohesion, 134.
Collapse, one
105, 106.
of the six calamities,
125, 126, 135, 138, 143.
Deviation, artifice of, 57, 63.
Difficult grond,
Columns, marching
Commander,
Desperado, running amok, 125.
foe, not to be pressed,
the,
2,
3.
See
also
General.
117, 120, 137.
Discipline,
2,
3,
4,
98,
in.
Disorder, seeming, 38.
Commander-in-chief, killing the, 145;
presence of mind of the, 66.
Commentary, native, on Sun Tzu,
ix, xxxivj^.
Communications,
Compactness, 61.
71,
Disaffection, signs of, 95.
in, 49.
line of,
101, 119.
Disorganisation, 105, 107.
Dispersive ground, 114, 118, 135.
Disposition of troops, 26.
Dispositions, concealment of, 51, 52;
knowledge of the enemy's, 163.
Dissimulation, 6r.
INDEX
195
Pa Wang,
Dividing the enemy, 47.
Five
Divination, to be prohibited, 126.
"
Divine manipulation of the threads,"
Five primary colours, 36.
Flags and banners, 16, 34, 64, 65.
Flat country, campaigning in, 83, 84.
164.
Door,
141.
xlix,
left
open by the enemy, 147.
Flight, 105.
Doorkeepers, 171.
Foraging, 12, 15, 123, 161.
Drums,
Foreknowledge, 163.
34, 64, 65.
Dust, sign of the enemy, 89.
Forestalling the enemy, 147.
Earth, as opposed to Heaven,
27,
28,
113;
six
2, 4,
con-
principles
false,
Energy, 38,
of,
162.
Frederick
concentration
41;
39,
to, 35-
Four seasons,
nected with, 104.
Economy,
Forethought, want of, 97.
"Forty-one Years in India," referred
1
the, 54.
the
Great,
Frontier passes, 146.
124.
Entangling ground, 100, 102.
Frontal attacks, 45.
Enterprise, the spirit
Fu Ch'ai. xvi.
Fu Chien, 25,
Fu-ch'u, King
Fu Kai, xxiii,
157.
of,
Enticing the enemy, 102.
Erh-chu Chao, 138.
Erh Ya> quoted, 94.
Excellence, supreme, 17; the
of,
acme
9,
10,
Fabius Cunctator,
Yen-ch'ing, 69, 70.
an aid
8,
7,
15, 16, 19,
130, 131, 134, 157, 159, 163,
171, 174.
Generalship, degrees
xlii.
to the attack, 156;
dropping, 151, 152; five ways of
attacking with, 150; material for,
152; proper seasons for attacking
with, 152, 153; to be started on
the windward side, 155.
Five advantages, the, 72, 74, 75.
Five cardinal tastes, 36.
Five cardinal virtues, 3.
Five classes of State ceremonial, xlviii.
Five dangerous faults, 77.
Five developments in attacking with
fire, i53->W.
Five elements, the, 53.
Five essentials for victory, 23, 24.
Five factors in war, i.
Five musical notes, 36.
no,
4, 5,
55, 66, 77, 98, 107, 109,
Generals, professional, xxii.
Fei River, battle of the, 25.
Feng Hou, Hi, 84.
Feng I, a student of Sun Tzu,
44,
21,
120.
Facile ground, 115, 118, 135, 136.
Fan Chii's use of spies, 166.
as
xxix.
160.
General, the,
u.
115.
of Ch'u, 124.
Fu-k'ang-an, 63.
Fu
28.
Expenditure on war,
Fire,
quoted, 48,
68, 169.
17, 18; the
of,
highest, 48.
Giles' Biographical Dictionary, quoted, 128.
Giles'
Chinese-English
Dictionary,
referred to, 57, 134.
Gongs, 34, 64.
Grant, General, 47.
Great Wall of China,
xliv.
Greeks, Homeric, 9.
Grindstone and egg, 35.
Ground, high and low, 84; of
inter-
116,
119,
secting
i35
J
highways,
71,
37; proper use
of,
130.
Grounds, the nine, 114, 134, 138.
Guides, local, 60, 140.
Han, red banners
Han
Chih.
of,
144.
See Cfrien
bibliographical section
J/iin
of.
.S'////,
INDEX
196
Han Kuan
Han
Chieh Ku, quoted, xx.
Hsin, xliv, 28, 33, 34, 81, 143,
a student of Sun Tzti, xlii;
167;
Hsin Shu
Han
Shu. See Ch'ien
n,
Hannibal,
Hasty temper,
Shu.
Using Li Hui
120, 140.
57, 66,
work attributed
to
Chu-
to,
65,
104, 105, 123, 167; bibliographical
section of, referred to, xviii, liii.
quoted, 68.
Han
(a
ko Liang), Hi.
Hsin Tang Shu, referred
quoted,
Yao,
xliii,
xlviii.
78.
Hearing, quick, 29.
Hsing Shih Pien Cheng Shu,
Heaven,
Hsiung-nu, 39, 139, 150.
Hsu Ch'ieh, quoted, 160.
Hsii-chou, invaded by Ts'aoTs'ao, 73.
28, 113.
4.
2,
Heights, precipitous, 100, 103.
Hemmed-in ground,
135.
117,
72,
120,
Hsu
r 37-
Henderson,
52, 59,
Col., quoted,
6,
42, 48,
to,
TzU, quoted, 80.
Hsiin Ying, 73.
129.
Ho Ch'u-fei, xl.
Ho Kuan 7zti, referred to, xxiv.
Ho Lu (or Ho Lii), King ofWu, xi,
xiii,
xvi, xvii, xviii, xxvi,
Shih. See
Ho
Yen-hsi's
29,
30,
128.
to,
n,
34, 56,
14,
xiii.
Hua-pi, city of, 73.
Hua-yin temple, xxxii.
Huai-nan Tzu, plagiary of Sun Tzu,
xxiv; quoted, xiv.
16, 18,
69, 74,
no,
115, 116, 122, 147, 165, 166, 167,
168, 174; referred to, xvii, 31,43,
Ch'i,
128, 141.
Huan Ch'ung, 25.
Huan Hsiian, 78.
Huang Ch'ao Ching Shih Wtn Pien,
liii.
Huang
Chih-cheng, a commentator,
xlii.
62, 152.
Horses, tethering
Hou Han Shu,
Yen,
Huan, Duke of
65.
commentary on Sun
Tzu, xl; quoted,
21,
5,
Hu
Yen-hsi.
Ho-yang, night ride
Ho
We*n Hsien Tung K'ao, liii.
Hsiian Tsung, T'ang Emperor, xxxii.
Hsun
101, 130, 131.
Herodotus, referred
Ho
xv.
of,
129.
quoted, 10, 94, 132,
139, 151, 155; referred to,
xlii.
Huang
Huang
Jun-yu, a commentator,
Huang-shih Kung,
Hsi, the graduate, xxxiii.
li;
quoted, 109,
126.
Hsia dynasty, 174.
Hsiang, Duke of Sung, xlix, 141.
Hsiang Chi, xlix, 133,
Hsiang Liang, xlix.
Hsiang Yu. See Hsiang Chi.
Hsiao State, no.
Hsiao Chi, a commentator, xli.
Hsiao Hsien, 123.
Hsiao I, 153, 166.
Hsiao Shih-hsien. Sec Hsiao I.
Hsieh An, 25.
Hsieh Yuan, a commentator, xlii.
Hsien Hu, 106.
Huang
Hsin-ch'eng, town
/ Pu Che Chung, xliii.
/ Shuo. See Cheng Yu-hsien.
of,
122.
Hsin Hsu, xiv.
Hsin Shu (by Ts'ao Kung), xix, xxxvi.
xli.
Mei, 78.
Ti. See Yellow Emperor.
Huang-fu Sung, 94, 154, 155.
Human
nature, to be studied, 134.
Humanity, misplaced, xlix;
to be treated with, 98.
soldiers
Husbanding one's strength, 67.
Husbandry, impeded by war, 161.
I
river,
I
Chih, 173, 174, 175.
I
127.
Ching, quoted, xv.
I-chou, 165.
I-ho, 115.
I-wu pass, 115.
INDEX
I
Yin. See
Chih.
I
197
Kuei-ku
heroes of the, 127.
Impoverishment of the people, 13, 14.
Induction from experience, 163.
li.
Tzti,
Iliad,
K'uei-chou, 123.
Inhumanity, the height
Kung-sun Hung, lii.
Kuo Cfrao Shih Jen Chtng
of,
162.
Insubordination, 105.
Intuition
spies,
Wai Cfrun
A''////
Cfriu, xxxvi.
Lilch,
xxxii.
Kuo
necessary in dealing with
Hsiin, 151.
Kutcha, King
169.
of,
132.
Invading force, principles to be observed by an, 123.
Jackson, Stonewall, 59, 131.
Jan Yu, disciple of Confucius,
Ladder, kicking away the, 133.
Ladysmith, relief of, 79.
Land-tenure, ancient system of, xxv,
161.
xlvi,
Lao Tzu,
xlviii.
Jang,
Jingles,
149, 158.
Jn-nan,
in.
dictionary, referred to,
Li Ching Ping Fa,
xxxvi; quoted,
5>
Tsu, Sui Emperor, 168.
81,
no,
pass, 115.
Khitans, 69.
Khotan, 132.
.
under Sui dynasty,
soldiers,
no, in.
Ku Chin Tu Shu
xli,
Shu
li,
liii.
text
ChiC.frtng, quoted,
xxxix referred to, xix,
Sun Tzu, T'u
T
>
55>
6o 6 5> 6 7, 68, 72, 73,
83, 84, 89, 92, 97, 105, 106,
113, 114, 115, 117, 118,119,
136, 142, 150, 158, 163, 167; referred to, 52, 95, 123, 127, 151.
Li Shou-cheng, 70.
of.
Kuan Chung,
5
Li Shih-min, afterwards the Emperor
T'ai Tsung, xliv, lii, 35, 104, 167.
;
See also
18, 21, 22,
Li I-chi, 167.
Li Kuang-pi, 65.
Li Ling, 154.
Chien, King of Yiieh, xvi, 50
xvi, xxxvii,
n,
Li Hsiang, 165.
Li Hsiung, 165.
151-
Kou
9,
24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 38, 46, 49,
"9-
Kindness to the
lii.
Li Chu, 29.
Li Chilian's commentary on Sun Tzu,
Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor, 137.
Kao Keng, 151.
Kao Tsu, first Han Emperor, 33,
rebels
11.
lii.
war,
Kiangnan
10,
167; quoted, 35, 66, 87, in, 118;
author of a work on
60.
Kao-wu
quoted, 155,
supposed
Kao-ch'ang, 115.
Kao-fan. See Hu Yen.
39
;
Li, length of the, 9.
Li Chi, referred to, 23, 147.
Li Ching, the general, xliv, 41, 123,
10, 18, 35, 68, 95, 117, 152, 157,
Kao
of, 2
Lengthy operations,
Junction of forces, 48.
1
Tao
xxiv, 23, 32.
to, ix,
Julius Caesar, 12; his "De Bello Gallico" referred to, 108.
K'ang Hsi's
the
158. See also Tao Te Ching.
Legge's "Chinese Classics," referred
siege of, 69.
Li Tai Chi Shih Nien Piao, quoted,
128.
Kuan
TzG, xxi.
Kuang, King of Shan-shan, 139, 151.
Kuang Po Wu Chih, liii.
Kuang Wu, Han Emperor,
70,
li.
\
116, 166.
Li T'e, 165.
Li Ts'ai, a commentator, xlii.
Li Wei-kung. See Li Ching.
INDEX
198
Li Wei Rung Wen
Liang, kingdom of,
Tui,
"Marshal Turenne," quoted, 73, 169;
lii.
referred to, 61.
94.
Liang-chou, 115.
Marshes, 60.
Liang Hsi, 115.
Lien P'o, 57, 166.
Measures, of land, 14; of length, 32;
Lin-chin, in Shensi, 34.
Lin Hsiang-ju, 166.
Mei Yao-ch'en's commentary on Sun
of weight, 15, 32.
Tzu, xxxviii; quoted,
Line of least resistance, 53.
Liu Chou-tzu, 53.
Liu Hsiang, quoted, xiv, xxiv.
T ao
(
xxi,
1,
121, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137,
174;
144,
Kung),
quoted, 22,
106, 151.
46, 51,
quoted,
Yii, 78.
les
Chinois,"
vii.
"Memoires Historiques," referred
Livy, quoted, 66, 120, 140.
Lo Shang,
157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 169,
170, 174; referred to, 15, 23, 43,
"Memoires concernant
62, 78, 84.
Liu
xvi. See also
165.
Mencius, quoted, xxv,
Logs and
referred to, 29, 32, 112, 148.
Meng K'ang, xxxvi.
stones, rolling, 41.
Longevity, 127.
Lou Ching, 39.
Lu State, 128.
Shih's
Meng
li.
Meng
Method,
Kuang, 115.
Meng, a disciplinarian, in; a
student of Sun Tzu, xlii.
Lii Pu, xxxv.
LirShih Ch'un
as T'ai
Kung,
Liu T'ao.
1,
Cfriu, referred to,
xxiv, 37.
Lii
Luan
Yii,
Lung
Lu Shang.
quoted, xv, 146; referred
to, xlvii, xlix, 47.
64, 156.
Chii, 81.
Ma Lung,
Ma Tuan-lin, xl.
Tung K ao.
Ma Yiian, 80.
15,61,
3, 31.
2,
144.
Military tactics like water, 53.
Military virtues, 22.
Misfortune, three ways
ruler
can cause,
Modem
in
which a
2 1 sqq.
making no, 30.
of Sun Tzu. See Sun
text
Tzu.
Modification of plans,
5.
Moltke, 17.
Moods, art of studying, 67.
Moral Law, the, 2, 4, 31.
Mounds, used
lii.
See also
Wen Hsien
l
Maiden, coyness of
18.
Marches, forced, 59.
Marengo, battle of, 57.
148.
19.
shelters, 18.
Mu, Duke
a,
in sieges,
Mountains, 80.
Movable
Mansfield, Lord, 143.
Mantlets, 14,
n,
2,
"Military Classic,"
Mistakes,
(or Lii Ya). See
Yen, 106.
Wang
Lun
commentary on Sun
116, 137, 147.
Ta, 122.
Lii
175. See also
85;
77, 78,
Lii
Lu Shang, known
14,
xliii,
Tzu, xxxvi; quoted,
^Lu Te-ming, quoted,
to,
Chavannes.
Lo-yang, 104.
174,
n,
7,
138, 141, 145, 147, 148, 153, 155,
(attributed to T'ai
li,
6,
84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 102,
Liu Pei, 59.
Liu Piao, 69.
Liu
4,
29, 34, 38, 40, 44, 47, 61, 63, 79,
of Ch'in, 141.
Mu-so, an instrument of torture,
Mu
T'ien
Tzu Chuan,
xlvi.
152.
Mystification of one's men, 131.
Xang Wa,
xiii.
INDEX
199
5, 12, 148; his
passage across Alps, 57; not ham
Pi I-hsiin, xviii, xxvi, xxxiv. See also
pered by central authority, 24; his
"Maximes de Guerre," quoted, 84,
Pi Kua, xxxiii.
Pi-yang, city
109; his "Pensees," quoted, 101.
P'i, siege of,
Napoleon Bonaparte,
speech
quoted, 125.
(or situations), the, 72,
114.
Ping Pa Tsa Chan, xviii.
Ping Shu Yao Chiieh, 67.
of,
158.
60.
Pitfalls,
Nine punitive measures, the, xxxix.
Nine variations, the, 71, 72, 74, 138.
"North hill", battle of the, 57.
town
O-yii,
73.
of,
165.
soldiers in front rank, 107,
Pique, battles not to be fought out
Night-fighting, 65.
Nine grounds
Hsu Lu.
108.
Athenian general, 118;
of,
Tzti
Picked
Nelson, at Trafalgar, 37.
Nervousness, a sign of, 93.
Nicias, the
Sun
of,
Opportunism,
Sun Tzu,
the
baulking
Plans,
change
of,
xxiii, xxiv.
enemy's,
17;
132.
5,
Plataea, battle of, 129.
Playfair's "Cities and
57.
Omens, not to be regarded, 126.
Onset of troops, 37, 38.
Open ground,
Plagiaries of
Towns
of
China", referred to. 57.
Plunder, 62.
Po
116, 119, 137.
Ch'i, xliv,
117, 166.
Po Chiang Chuan,
xlix.
Orders, not to be divulged, 142, 143.
Original text of Sun Tzu. See Sun
Tzu.
Po
xli.
P'ei, xiii, xxiii, xxix.
Po-teng, battle of, 39.
a leader of the Yellow Tur-
Po-ts'ai,
Ou-yang Hsiu, quoted, xxxiv, xxxv,
ban
Po
xxxviii.
Overawing the enemy,
141.
P'o-t'ai,
Over-caution, 158.
Over-solicitude for one's men, 79.
Pa
Chtit
Pa
Wang, the
Pan Ch'ao, 63;
to,
160.
a spy, 165.
Polybius, referred
to,
Port Arthur, siege of,
Presence of mind, 66.
120.
19.
141.
at Shan-shan,
150; his attack
154.
Punishment, 95, 97, 98.
T'tt, xviii.
five,
rebels,
Ya, referred
139,
on Yarkand, 132,
Rabbits, not indigenous
to China,
P'an Keng, 173.
149.
of war,
Rapidity, 12, 61; the essence
122.
P'ang Chiian, xii, 40.
Passes, narrow, 100, 103.
Reward and punishment, constancy
167.
Rewards,
Peace, the true object of war, 162.
Pel Cfci Shu, referred to, 138.
Pel Lun, xl.
Pei Tang Shu Cfrao, 25, 36, 64,
Wen Yun Fu,
quoted, 94;
ferred to, xlvi, 69, 146.
M., xxxvi.
Pelliot,
Pi, battle of,
106.
in, 4.
Riches, soldiers not to acquire, 127.
River, crossing
67.
a,
129.
River warfare, 81, 82.
Roberts, Lord, night march
P'ei Hsing-chien, 103.
P'ei
15, 95, 142-
re-
on Sun
of,
35;
Tzti, xlii.
Rout, 105, 107.
Ruin, one of the six calamities, 105,
106.
INDEX
200
Ruler, military commander independent of the, 109; the enlightened,
157,
J
59.
J
74-
Rules of warfare, conventional, 148.
Shuai-jan, the, xxvi, 128, 129.
Shuo Wen, quoted,
94, 117, 160.
Sicilian expedition, 118.
Sieges, 10, 18, 19, 73.
Sight, sharp, 29.
Salt-marshes, 83.
65.
Signal-fires,
San Kuo Chih, quoted,
ferred to, xxxv,
re-
See also
xlii.
xli,
m;
69,
Wei Chih.
San Lueh, li; quoted, 62,
San Shih Erh Lei Ching,
San Ts'ai Tu Hui, liii.
158.
xviii.
Signals, 33.
Signs, observation of, 88.
Situations, the nine. See Nine grounds.
Six Chancellors of the Ch'in State,
142.
"Six States" period, xxii.
San-yuan, 79.
"Science of War," quoted, 101, 130.
Skilful fighter, the,
Scouts, 88, 89.
Solidarity of troops, 123.
Sophanes at Plataea, 129.
Sovereign, the, 55; the wise, 163.
Screens, grass, 88.
Secrecy, 45, 131.
by a
Secrets, divulged
Sedan, capitulation
120.
Spies, xlix, 52, 147, 148; converted,
spy, 170.
172, 173; doomed, 167,
173; five classes of, 164;
Frederick's classification of, 168;
importance of, 175; intimate re-
17.
of,
30.
Skilful leaders of old,
1
90,
66,
172,
Self-possession, 67.
Sensitiveness in a general, 79.
Sentries, 171.
be
maintained
Serious ground, 117, 119, 135, 137.
lations
Seven considerations,
168; inward, 165, 172; local, 164,
i,
4.
Sha-yiian, 168.
172;
Shan-shan, 139; King
Shang dynasty,
Shen,
Duke
of,
150, 15
of,
c.
Spirits, 163.
"Spy,"
quoted,
xi, xiii,
xv, xx,
128;
referred to, xvi, xxii, xxiv, xxxiv,
See also Ssu-ma
1.
Ch'ien.
xvi, 61, 62; re-
ferred to, 14.
Huang
Ti, 127, 142.
Shih K'uang, 29.
Shih Liu Ts
l
e,
Mu
Ssu
Lu, quoted,
Chilian
K'u
Ti
to,
Shih Ssu-ming, the rebel leader, 65.
referred to,
xlvii, xlviii.
xxiii.
character
1,
Hi.
li,
Shu Tsung
xli, 1;
Mu
referred
xl, Hi, liii.
Ssu-ma Ch'ien,
xlv
;
xiv,
xx; quoted,
xi,
credibility of his narrative,
xxvi; his letter to Jen An, referred
to, xlvi; his mention of the 13
chapters, xxx. See also Shih Chi.
78,
Shu Ching, quoted, xv;
of the
Yao, quoted, xx,
Ssu-ma Fa,
Hi.
Shu Lu Chieh Ti
evolution
169.
65, 66.
Spying, end and aim of, 173.
Ssu K'-u Ch'uan Shu Chien Ming
xii,
Shih Ching, quoted,
172; to be
167.
meaning, 160.
xlvi, xlvii, xlix,
Shih
an army's,
no.
xlv, 40, 58, 80, 84, 90, 124,
with,
properly paid, 162,
Spirit,
Sheridan, General, 47.
Shih Chi, objection to the chronology
xxvi;
surviving,
173.
Shen-wu of Ch'i, 168.
Shen Yu, a commentator, xli.
Shepherd driving sheep, 133.
of,
to
1;
quoted, xvi, 14, 17,
126, 143.
Ssu-ma I, 46, 51, 122.
Ssu-ma Jang-chii, xxii,
1,
98.
Stagnation, 157.
Standard text of Sun Tzu. See Sun Tzu.
INDEX
2O I
Stellar Mansions, the twenty-eight, 153.
Stonewall
biography
Jackson,
quoted, 42, 59, 131.
Strategy
and
Su Hsiin, quoted,
of,
5,
xxxiii,
19,
25,
7,
10,
37,
42,
3,
27,
52, 53, 62, 64, 67, 68,
,
129, 141, 153, 158, 159, 161, 164,
167, 170, 171, 172.
Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, xviii, xxxiv; quoted,
li.
Subdivisions of an army. 17, 33, 39.
Sui Shu, quoted, 151; bibliographi-
quoted,
referred to, xxxvi,
text,
15,
77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89,
9 2 , 93, 94, 95, 9 8 Io8 , II2 > I2 i,
xlii.
ethical treatise,
cal section
14,
45, 47,
tactics, 52.
Strength, great, 29.
Stupidity, to be feigned, 145.
Su Shu, an
Lan
Yii
12,
of,
118.
xxiii, xxiv,
xviii, xli;
liii.
Sun Hao, a commentator, xli.
Sun Hsing-yen, xxxii; his edition of
Sun Tzu, ix; his preface, xxxiv;
Sun
Sun
Sun
Sun
Tzu Hui Chtng, xlii.
Tzu Ts'an Tung, xlii.
Tzu Wtn Ta, xvii.
Wu, a
practical
soldier,
xxv;
quoted, xvi, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii,
conjectural outline of his life, xxix;
not a man of eminent position,
xxviii; probable origin of the legend
xxxiii, xxxvi, xlviii.
connected
Sun
Sun
Pin,
xii,
archaic words
Tz%,
xxiv;
in,
xxxiv; state of the text, 138; probable date of the work, xxviii.
text, 25, 26,
Sstt-ma
xxix;
biography of, xi; supposititious works of, xvii, xviii.
bibliographical description of edition used, xxxiv; corruptions in the
text of, xxxi ; difficult passages in,
- Modern
with,
Ch'ien's
xv, xvi, 40.
graphical
xxxvi, Hi,
section
of,
biblio-
xvii,
xxxi,
liii.
Superstitious doubts, 126.
27, 33.
2, 16,
Original text, xxxii, xxxiii,
See also Sun Tzu.
Sun Wu Sun Tzu, xvii.
Sung Shih, referred to, xlii;
101.
Supplies, 137, 161: line of,
27, 29, 43, 47, 53, 58, 62, 64, 67,
84, 86, 87, 88, 91,
92,95,98,113,
- Standard
text, xxxiv, 10, 58, 91,
Tai I Tun Chia text, xxxvi.
T u Shu text, xxxi, 16, 21, 25,
29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 4, 43, 46,
47, 5, 5 2 58, 64, 67, 69, 84, 87,
k
,
91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 105,
no,
114,
117, 120, 121, 133, 135, 140,145,
-
Wu,
168.
character, 124.
Tactical manoeuvring, 56.
Tactician, the skilful, 128.
Tactics, direct and indirect, 20, 34
not
sqq.; modification of, 52, 53;
to
be repeated, 52; variation
See
Lu Shang.
T'ai
i?2, 175-
Tai Kung Ping Fa,
Tai P'ing Yu Lan,
text,
xxxiii,
10,
i,
12, 19, 22, 23, 25, 41, 45, 47, 50,
53, 5 8
59, 62
,
6 4> 65, 67, 68, 74,
77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91,
92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 104, 108,
112, 113, 117, 119, 136, 137,
l6 7, i? *
r
53, !5 8 *59, l6 4,
,
172.
J
52,
1
? 1
*
of,
26, 71, 74-
146, 153, 159, 164, 167, 168,171,
T'ung Tien
Chih, quoted,
xxxii.
Taboo
95, 117, 127, 164.
-
Ta-hsi
Ta Ming / Tung
119, 121, 153, 154, 168.
Kung.
See also Sun
Tzti,
li.
xvi, xxxiii,
Yu Lan
liii.
text.
Tai-po Shan-jen, quoted, 132.
Tai Po
T'ai
Yin Ching, xxxvi.
Li
Tsung, the Emperor. See
Shih-min.
Tai Yuan
Ching, referred
Tallies, official, 146.
to,
xxiv.
INDEX
202
T'ang, prince of, xiii.
Tang, the Completer.
Ch'eng
xl;
18,
17,
13, 15,
Tziti,
quoted,
xxxv,
i,
20, 22,
7,
24,
26, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 4i, 44, 46,
bibliographical section
51, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60, 67,
See also
xli.
71, 73,
75. 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88, 91,
IC 3.
106.
Hsin T'ang Shu and Chiu T'ang
94, 95. 96, 97, 9 8
Shu.
Ill, 115, Il6, Il8, 119, 120, 122,
Tao
Te* Ching,
quoted,
xlix,
155, 158, 161.
Temple, used for deliberations,
7, 8.
143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152,154,
156, 157; referred to, 19, 43, 62,
136; his preface, xx, xxxiv; trans-
Tseng Shen, xxiv.
Tso Chuan, delivered to Wu Ch'i,
xxiv; has no mention of SuiiTzu,
xv.
of,
108;
xx, xxvi, xxviii; quoted, xxvii, xxix,
Textual criticism and emendations,
i,
13,
7,
H,
xlix,
113,
99,
133, i5 8
.
117, 121, 124,
Thucydides, quoted,
1 1
to,
the, xxxix.
referred
n,
3.
144.
Chi, 40.
T'ien-i-ko catalogue, quoted, xxxvi,
14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29,
31
.
33. 34, 37. 39. 40, 41, 42,
5. 52, 55. 5 6 57, 59.
77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88,
89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 101,
105, 106, 107, no, in, 112, 114,
Tien Pao, xv.
Tien Pu, 105.
Tien Tan, defender
115, Il8, 119, 122, 124, 126,131,
of Chi-mo, 90,
120, 155; his use of spies, 166.
Time, value of, 12; waste of, 157.
Ton Chien-te, King
Tou Ku, 151.
of,
officers
,
60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76,
xl.
Trafalgar, battle
Tzii,
quoted, 4,
44, 45. 46,
Tien
Training of
xxxvii, xxxviii;
xxxvi,
8.
river,
63.
Tsui-li, battle of, xxx.
Tu Chung-wei, 69, 70.
Tu Mu's commentary on Sun
125;
in,
to, xxi, xlvii.
Tso Tsung-t'ang,
127,
l6 7-
Thermopylae, 115.
Three ancient dynasties,
59, 65, 89, 97, 106,
19,
162; referred
25, 29, 30, 36, 41,
43, 46, 47, 49, 71, 74, 86, 87, 91,
94,
xv sqq.
lated,
Terrain, natural advantages
six kinds of, 100.
i4,
125, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142,
Tenacity, 125.
Teng Ch'iang, 78.
Teng Ming-shin, quoted,
.
147,
Temporising ground, 100, 102.
Ti
ii,
9,
referred to, xxxviii,
of,
xxxviii,
xxxvii,
T'ang.
Tang Chien, 167.
T'ang Shu,
commentary on Sun
his
See
133, 136, 137, 138, 146, 148, 149.
J
5 6 i57,
151. !5 2 r 53> i54, 155.
158, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168,
,
,
of Hsia, 104.
169, 171, 175; referred to, 20,65,
37.
73, 150; his preface, quoted, xix,
xxxvii, xxxviii, xlv.
and men,
Tu Shu Chih,
Tu Yu, xxxiii;
4.
Trebia, battle of the, 66.
Hi.
his notes
on Sun Tzii
Ts'ai, prince of, xiii.
in the
T ung Tien, xxxvii; quoted,
Ts'ao Kuei, mentioned in the Tso
4,
n,
Chuan, xxi; on the advantage of
spirit, 66; threatens Huan Kung,
Kung or Ts'ao
xxxvi,
xiii, xliv, 4,
93. 94, 95. I0
23,
24, 36, 38, 47,
.
I01
.
I02 I0 3. I0 4,
,
116, 117, 120, 137, 138, 152, 153,
166, 167, 169, 171, 172; referred
Ts'ao, xix, xxxi,
59.69.76,151;
19,
56, 60, 61, 62, 77, 83, 88, 91, 92,
128.
Ts'ao
6,
l
i
to,
28,
51, 74, 155, 173.
INDEX
Tu
l
Shu
See
encyclopaedia.
Ku
Chin T^u Shu Chi Ch'eng.
Text of Sun Tzti in the. See
Sun Tzu.
Tung Cho, xxxv, 94.
Tung Chou Lieh Kuo,
Waterloo, battle
Weapons, 14
Weeping, 127.
Wei, kingdom
quoted, 56.
l
of,
5,
48, 130.
xxxv;
of,
province
105.
of,
T iing Chih, referred to, xxxii, xxxvi,
Wei river,
Wei Chih
81.
San Kuo
(in the
T'ung Tien,
xvii, xxxiii, xxxvii, Hi,
See also
Tu Yu.
- Text of Sun Tzu
in
the.
See
Sun Tzu.
Turenne, Marshal, on deceiving the
enemy, 61 on sieges, 73; on spies,
;
Wei I, 106.
Wei Liao Tzu,
li; quoted, 35, 73,
97, 99, 107, 125; referred to, xxiv.
Wei Po,
Wei Wu
165.
Ti. See Ts'ao
Kung.
Well-being of one's men, to be studied, 123.
169.
Tzu-ch'an, saying of, xlix.
Tzu-ch'ang. See Nang Wa.
Wellington,
army
at
his
description
Wtn
xxi, xxiii,
in. 112;
Victory, halfway towards,
saying, of,
T'ung K'ao, quoted,
xl, xli;
Wen-su, King
of,
referred to,
liii.
xxxvi,
132.
Wen Ti, Emperor of Sui dynasty, 151.
Wen Wang,
174.
without fighting, 17.
Virtues, the five cardinal, 3.
1,
Western Sacred Mountain,
on Sun Tzu,
n,
13, 14, 23,
quoted,
i,
>
2,
44, 5 2
53> 55.
6o
61, 63, 71, 78, 84, 92, 94, 95, 96,
106, 114, 117, 119, 124, 132, 133,
J
37,
142, i55>
J
57> 169; re-
i35>
ferred to, 67, 76.
Wang Kuo, the rebel, 94.
Wang Liao, 128.
Wang
xli.
Wang
Wang
Wang
city of, xiv; king of,
Lu.
also
118.
Sec
Ho
Wu
State, xxv, 49, 50, 129, 159;
dates in the history of, xxvii, xxviii;
first
Wu
mentioned
Ch'i,
Sun
1,
in history, xxvii.
64, 65,
Wu,
Tzti, xxiv.
no; compared
xliii;
plagiary of
See also
Wu
Tzu.
Wu C/i'i C/iing, Hi.
Wu Huo, 29.
Wu Jen-chi, xxxiii.
Wu-lao, heights of, 104.
Wu Nien-hu, xxxiii.
Shih-ch'ung, 104.
T'ing-ts'ou, 105.
4, 6,
Wu,
with Sun
Ling, a commentator, xxxvii,
See also Wang Tzu.
Tzu, quoted,
xxxii.
Wind, days of, 153; duration of, 155.
"Words on Wellington," quoted, 5.
Wan, town of, 122.
Wang Chien, 124.
Wang Hsi's commentary
26, 33, 34, 3 8
no;
of Chin, 141.
Hsien
xxxvii, xxxviii,
Valleys, 80.
;
skilful in dissimulation, 6.
Wen, Duke
sen," quoted, 168, 169.
Uxbridge, Lord, 5.
5
of his
130; on the
Waterloo,
eve of Waterloo,
"Unterricht des Konigs von Preus-
xl;
Chili},
xix, xxxvi.
xl, xli, liii.
liii.
203
24.
Wang-tzu Ch'eng-fu, xiii.
War, want of fixity in, 54.
Warlike prince, 141, 158.
Water, an aid to the attack, 156.
Wu-tu, town
of,
165.
Wu-tu Ch'iang, 80.
Wu Tzu, xix, 1; quoted,
24, 56,66,
77, 80, 81, 98, 107, 115, 131, 142,
referred to, xxiv.
156;
INDEX
204
Wu Tzu-hsii, xxix, xlviii. See also
Wu Yuan.
Wu Wang, xvi, 20, 175.
Wu Yuan, xiii, xxiii, 56; a spurious
treatise fathered on, xxix.
Wu
Ch un
l
Yiieh
Ch'iu, quoted, xiv,
xviii.
Wylie's "Notes," referred
to, xli, Hi.
Yin and Yang, 2.
Yin dynasty, 173, 174.
Yin Fu Ching, xxxvi, in.
Ying, capital of Ch'u, xii, xiii, xvi,
xxix.
Ying K'ao-shu,
Yo
Yo
xxi.
Fei, a student of
I,
Yu Hai, quoted,
Ya, King of Chao, 144.
Yang Han,
115.
Yang-p'ing, city
Yangtsze
river,
of,
46.
123.
Yao Hsiang,
Yarkand,
132.
Yeh Shih or Yeh Shui-hsin, his theory
about Sun Tzu, xxi, xxiii, xxv;
on Sun Tzu's style, xxiv.
Yellow Emperor, the, xvi, 84.
Yellow Turban rebels, 154.
Yen
Yen
Yen
xiii.
xxxvi,
xl, Hi,
xiii;
referred
to,
liii.
Yu Lan encyclopaedia. See T'ai
P'ing Yu Lan.
Text of Sun Tzu in the. See Sun
Tzti.
78.
battle of,
Yen, King of Hsu,
Sun Tzu,
117.
xvi, xlix.
Yuan, the two, opponents of Ts'ao
Ts'ao, xxxv.
Yuan Chien Lei Han,
Yuan
liii.
Shao, 151.
Yiieh State, 129; compared with
xxvi,
49, 50;
history, xxvii.
Shih-ku, 167.
Yiieh Chiieh
Ti, 84.
Yiieh
Tzti, quoted, 98.
Yung Lo Ta
first
Wu,
mentioned
Shu, quoted,
Yu, xxi.
Tien, Hi.
xiv.
in
CORRIGENDA
P. ix, note:
For "edition" read "translation."
For "by" read "in the."
5: For "T." read "T'u Shu:'
14, line 3:
16, line
"War"
Before
19, note:
"Soldiers are not to be used as
insert
playthings."
17,
^
i:
jtF
,
The more
etc.
I
think about
it,
the
more
I prefer
the rendering suggested on p. 159,
22, note.
i note, and
p. 78, line 6: Insert "the" before "Ssu-ma Fa."
33, note
on heading:
though
and
Wn
it
fife
Cf.
X.
12,
where
fife
is
translated "strength,"
might also be "conditions." The three words ^Jj ^jjjfa
have been much confused. It appears from the Shuo
that
,
the last character
is
post-classical,
so that
Sun
Tzii
in all senses.
or
must have used either
^fj
ijjjjfc
line
read
i:
For
45,
"subtlety."
"sublety"
63, line 4: M. Chavannes writes in the T'-oung Pao, 1906, p. 210:
"Le general Pan Tch'ao n'a jamais porte les armes chinoises
de la mer Caspienne." I hasten to correct
j usque sur les bords
this
on
statement
authority.
my
80, 9
109,
th
line
23,
from the bottom: For
note,
and
p.
126, 5
!h
Q
line
read pj
from bottom: For "Huang Shih-
kung" read "Huang-shih Kung."
124, line 7: For "Ch'en" read "Ch'en Hao."
th
line from bottom: Insert "to" before
136, n
152,
.
"select."
2: Substitute semi-colon for full stop after "available."
o
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51987
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