Bryce Russel Mitchell, Complainant,
Vs.
Atty. Juan Paolo F. Amistoso, Respondent.
PERALTA, C.J.:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit [1] filed by Bryce Russel
Mitchell (complainant) against respondent Atty. Juan Paolo F.
Amistoso (Atty. Amistoso), docketed as A.C. No. 10713 for
violation of Lawyer’s Oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Bryce Russel Mitchell, a citizen of Canada, married,
and with residence at 848-F Mayon St., Plaridel 1, Malabanias,
Angeles City, Pampanga, alleged that he and Atty. Amistoso had
agreed to a professional fee in the amount of Six Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P650,000.00) for the handling of complainant’s
annulment case, as indicated in the engagement proposal. The
annulment case was thereafter filed and docketed as Civil Case
No. 13-13953, entitled “Bryce Russel Mitchell vs. Mitchie Mae
Benerable” before Branch 113, Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City.
During the pendency of the case, complainant alleged that Atty.
Amistoso made several cash advances from him, and the total
amount he gave to him amounted to P800,000.00, which was over
and above the agreed professional fee. Complainant further
averred that, on March 26, 2014, Atty. Amistoso, due to financial
difficulties, also borrowed money from him in the amount of
P65,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note marked as Annex
“B” of the Complaint-Affidavit.
However, in the course of the annulment case, complainant
lamented that Atty. Amistoso vanished completely and failed to
return his e-mails and telephone calls. During the scheduled
hearings of the case, Atty. Amistoso also failed to appear, as
evidenced by Court Orders dated August 28, 2014 and September
25, 2014, respectively. [2] Thus, complainant was constrained to
hire another lawyer, as collaborating counsel, to handle his
annulment case, as evidenced by Formal Entry of
Appearance[3] dated November 4, 2014.
In its Report and Recommendation [6] dated November 10, 2017,
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended
that Atty. Amistoso be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years for his breach of duties under Canons 17 and 18, and
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer “shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
[therewith] shall render him liable.” What amounts to
carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to
his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has
consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation. [11] Thus, by mere
failing to attend court hearings with justifiable reasons, and
simply vanishing in thin air, Atty. Amistoso was remiss in the
discharge of his responsibility. He, thus, violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated June 29, 2018 of the IBPBoard of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Juan Paolo F.
Amistoso GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED.
He is SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) years from the
practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision. Atty.
Amistoso is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Juan Paolo F. Amistoso is DIRECTED to
formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this Decision,
the date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his
suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this Manifestation to all
the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty.
Amistoso as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7907
December 15, 2010
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA, Respondent.
The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the
spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda),
with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case.
The spouses Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01,
entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.
In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,1 the spouses Aranda alleged that
Atty. Elayda’s handling of their case was "sorely inadequate, as shown by
his failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence,"
6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] never
informed them of such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their case to
him;
10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the judgment
became final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon motion of the
plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in the said case;
11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ of
execution and it was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of the
judgment of the Court, certified xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex
"E";
12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their case
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock, dismay
and disbelief, they found out that they have already lost their case and worst the
decision had already become final and executory;
13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial recourse of the
situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag forcibly took
possession and custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;
14. That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the said case and
of their right to appeal because of the gross negligence of respondent."3
Atty. Elayda filed his Answer5 dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:
8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty.
Elayda] to prepare for the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask
for postponement of the case for reason that he still have to confer with the [spouses
Aranda] who were not around;
13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary
pleadings in court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;
14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to give
their contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his office to
leave their contact number;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel
F. Elayda is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt
of the finality of this DECISION. He is sternly WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe
penalty.7
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Brion, Jr. vs. Brillantes, Jr.
A.C. No. 5305
Facts:
March 17, 2003
Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for disbarment, avers that
respondent violated the court’s decree of perpetual disqualification imposed
upon respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706,
entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.) from
assuming any post in government service, including any posts in governmentowned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said
consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of
Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the
legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special
Consultancy Agreement.
Respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as
the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense
that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be
considered government services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter and spirit of the court’s
decree in the Atienza case.
Held:
By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual
employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has
transgressed both letter and spirit of the Court’s decree in Atienza.
The Court finds that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and
functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of
LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply, there is a difference between a
consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s.
1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among others,
by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). The
lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting
his reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government,
including government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged
by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00).
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
MIKE A. FERMIN VS. ATTY LINTANG H. BEDOL
FACTS:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Mike A. Fermin against respondent Atty. Lintang H. Bedol for violation of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant averred that one of his
opponents and defeated candidate for the mayoralty post of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao, Bai Susan Samad, filed with the COMELEC en banc a petition to
declare a failure of election in Precinct No. 25A/26A of Barangay Guiawa, and the
subsequent holding of a special election; and that the COMELEC issued its
Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring a failure of election and the holding of the
special election on July 28, 2004. However, before the issuance of the COMELEC
Resolution, the respondent, in his capacity as the Provincial Election
Supervisor III of Maguindanao, had already issued a Notice 1 dated July 23,
2004 to all candidates, which included him, political parties and registered voters of
Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, informing them of the scheduled
special election for Barangay Guiawa on July 28, 2004; that he issued another
notice 2 informing the candidates and political parties of a conference on July 25,
2004 to be held in his office; and that on July 26, 2004, he again issued a notice that
the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak Maguindanao. Complainant
alleged that respondent, without basis in law and in fact, issued the above-mentioned
premature notices of special election which highlighted his shameless
disregard of the truth and brazen disrespect for the rule of law which is his
foremost duty as a member of the Bar; and that those false and illegal notices
showed his dishonest ways and predilection to wrongdoings and his natural
susceptibility to the culture of corruption and deception which renders him totally unfit
to remain as an honorable member of the Bar.4 Complainant prays for respondent's
disbarment to protect future clients from falling prey to his corrupt and evil deeds. In
his Comment, respondent argued that the notice dated July 23, 2004 was to apprise,
alert and notify all candidates concerned that, in a short period of time, a special
election would be conducted on July28, 2004; that election personnel in the province
cannot afford to have only a day before election to notify the parties and to prepare for
the election the next day. As to the conference held, it was done to do away with
violation of the Fair Elections Act and the parties' duties respecting the special
election. He claimed that all the cases filed by complainant against him with the
COMELEC were dismissed ont he ground of complete absence of cause of actions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bedol is guilty of violating Canon 1 of the CPR.
RULING: Based on the foregoing provision of law, the declaration of failure of
election and the calling of special elections shall be decided by the majority
vote of the members of the COMELEC en bane. In this case,the COMELEC en
banc issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring the failure of election and the
holding of a special election on July 28, 2004. However, prior to the issuance of the
said Resolution, respondent, as the Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao,
had already issued the following to wit: Notice dated July 23, 2004 of the
special election to be done on July 28, 2004; Invitation dated July 25, 2004
for conference at his office in Cotabato City; and Notice dated July 26,
2004 informing that the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, dated April
16, 2010. Accordingly, Atty. Lintang H. Bedol is found GUILTY of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect
immediately upon receipt. He is DIRECTED to
immediately INFORM the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasijudicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country; and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a lawyer.
In re CARLOS S. BASA. (41 Phil. 275|, [December 7, 1920])
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the
disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to
the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty
in a decision rendered by the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, Judge
of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a
period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision
correcional. On appeal, months and eleven days of prision
correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment
handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpide . . . ." The sole
question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction
with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpide.
"Moral turpide," it has been said, "includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although
no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it
cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral
turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against
good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re
Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard v. Lyon [1875], 91 U. S.,
225; 5 Ops. Atty. -Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action
which should be taken by court, we do so regretfully and
reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by
the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion
to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
utterly ruined.
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day
when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be
suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So
ordered.
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA,
complainant, vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent. (A.C. No. 389,
[February 28, 1967], 125 PHIL 831-839)
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging
Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality
and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having
been a public-school teacher for a number of years. The
respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise
of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for
sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified
true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the
relationship between the respondent and the complainant was,
the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the
complaint, and as a special defense averred that the
allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be
disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before
the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character.
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that
he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which
at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special
defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of
the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall
under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power
of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of
the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without
number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient
and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in
paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission
to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive
at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but the administration
of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred
and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Magdalena Arciga vs Segundino Maniwang
On August 14, 2012 106 SCRA 591 Legal Ethics Gross Immoral Conduct In
1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with
Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual
relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to
Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also
made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they would
have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar
exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of
securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his
oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his
whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another
woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so
he inflicted physical injuries against Arciga. Arciga then filed a
disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral
conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he
did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises
because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an
illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from
the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein
cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled
as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the
ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to
state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon, Complainant, v. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco, Respondent
A.C. No. 6116, 1 August 2012
Facts:
According to the complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney’s fees, the latter would
received in representing Spouses Yap whom he referred, in an action for
partition of the estate of the spouses’ relative. Their agreement was reflected in a
letter dated 11 August 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting to 17% of the
total estate or about PhP 40 million. Instead, the complainant was informed
through a letter dated 16 July 1997 that Spouses Yap assumed to pay the same
after the respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees from 25% to 17%.
He then demanded the payment of his commission which the respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that the respondent has not lived up to the high
moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife
with whom he has two children, and cohabited with another with whom he has
four children. He also accused the respondent of engaging in money-lending
business without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
In his defense, the respondent disputed the 11 August 1995 letter for being a
forgery and claimed that the Spouses Yap assumed to pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pefianco is in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and Lawyer’s Oath.
Held:
Respondent’s defense that forgery of the 11 August 1995 letter was belied by
his 16 July 1997 admitting to have undertaken the payment of the complaint’s
commission but passing on the responsibility to the Spouses Yap. Clearly, the
respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case
at bar.
Furthermore, the respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children.
The Supreme Court found credence to IBP’s findings that the respondent violated
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
The respondent was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR. The respondent was suspended
from active practice of law for one year.
Salvacion Cordova vs Atty. Laurence Cordova 179 SCRA 680 – Legal Ethics –
Moral Delinquency
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo
and with two children, left his wife and children to cohabit with another
married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where
Cordova promised to leave his mistress . But apparently, Cordova still
continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with
another woman and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the
child away from Salvacion. In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for
disbarment against Cordova. Eventually, multiple hearing dates were sent
but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989,
Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar
Discipline intimating that she and her husband has reconciled. The
Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her evidence ex parte, merely
recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence
that he has been morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation
between him and his wife. Before a person can be admitted to the bar, one
requirement is that he possesses good moral character. That requirement
is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage” such was the case in the case at bar
CRISTINO G. CALUB, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARBRAHAM
A. SULLER, RESPONDENTS.
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against
respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having
raped his neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away,
respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in
Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the
complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in
different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent
threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with
him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for
real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and
respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.[1] She was kicking
respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other
leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal
Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint[2] for rape against
respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance,
Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court
the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Abraham A. Suller.[3]
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within
ten (10) days from notice.[4]
On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as
a fabrication.[5]
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report, and recommendation.[6]
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted
hearings where both parties appeared with their respective counsel. In a
petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension
of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420
pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.[7]
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor
General, the case having been referred to him previously.[8]
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on
Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the
latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.[9]
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the
proceedings and considering the case submitted for resolution as notice to
complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite
due notice.[10]
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the
disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.[11]
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent
Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative
case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint,
particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that
respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having
carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in
her very home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."[12]
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the
immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted
serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a
member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally.[13] "Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity."[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the
practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8698
MANUEL B. BERNALDEZ, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. WILMA DONNA C. ANQUILO-GARCIA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For resolution is the complaint1 dated August 2, 2010 filed by Manuel B.
Bernaldez (complainant) charging respondent Atty. Wilma Donna C.
Anquilo-Garcia (Atty. Anquilo-Garcia) with gross misconduct, deceit,
violation of Lawyer's Oath, and abuse of authority as notary public.
Antecedent Facts
In his complaint, the complainant alleges that during the 2010 National and
Local Elections, Atty. Anquilo-Garcia coerced and threatened
registered voters in the Municipality of Biri, Northern Samar to sign
blank and ready-made affidavits stating that they were
illiterate/disabled voters when in fact, they were not and that they
needed assistors in voting. 2
According to the complainant, the scheme was employed by Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia to ensure the victory of her husband,' Jaime Garcia,
Jr. (Garcia Jr.), who was running for Mayor in Biri, Northern Samar.3
Moreover, the complainant avers that the affiants never appeared before
Atty. Anquilo-Garcia nor was it possible for her to go to Catarman,
Northern Samar which is 50 kilometers away by land and sea from
Biri, Northern Samar to execute the affidavits on the election day
itself.4
On June 28, 2013, before the case was resolved, the complainant filed
his Affidavit of Withdrawal12 of the complaint stating that he is
desisting from pursuing the instant disbarment case. He stated that
the filing of the instant case was merely due to misapprehension of
facts and misunderstanding of the incidents.
Resolutions of the IBP
On April 29, 2015, Commissioner Giovanne T. Lim (Commissioner Lim)
issued his Report and Recommendation13 recommending that the instant
case against Atty. Anquilo-Garcia be dismissed without prejudice.
Commissioner Lim stated that since the alleged irregularities perpetrated
by Atty. Anquilo-Garcia are the subject of the election protest filed by the
complainant before the RTC and made subject of this disbarment case, it is
premature to rule on the administrative liability of Atty. Anquilo-Garcia
pending resolution of the election protest. 14
As to the withdrawal of the complaint, Commissioner Lim held that in
disbarment cases, the desistance or withdrawal on. the part of the
complainant is not sufficient to terminate the administrative proceedings.
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution15 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Lim after finding the same to be supported by the evidence
on record and applicable laws.
Ruling of the Court
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant."19 Here, the complainant failed to show by clear
preponderance of evidence that Atty. Anquilo-Garcia coerced any
registered voters in the Municipality of Biri, Northern Samar to sign the
alleged blank and ready-made affidavits. Apparently, the affidavits
presented by the complainant point to other persons responsible in
the employment of force, intimidation or threat upon the voters in the
Municipality.20
With regard, however, to the charge of abuse of authority as notary
public, the Court finds that the affidavits prepared by Atty. AnquiloGarcia were notarized without the personal presence of the affiants, in
violation of the notarial law which the Court cannot countenance.
The complaint clearly established that Atty. Anquilo-Garcia notarized the
subject affidavits without having the affiants personally appear before
her as required by law. The Court, likewise, finds no merit with her
defense that the headings of the affidavits which indicated Municipality of
Biri, and in some Catarman, Northern Samar as the place of execution
were just simple and harmless clerical and typographical errors.
A cursory perusal of the affidavits of the concerned registered voters of the
Municipality of Biri sufficiently shows that these affidavits were merely
handed to them at the polling precincts on election day, bearing already the
signature and notarial seal of Atty. Anquilo-Garcia.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries
public that the affiants must personally appear before them. Rule IV,
Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reads:
WHEREFORE; premises considered, the Court RESOLVES to:
(i) NOTE the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-547 dated June 20, 2015
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and dismissing the complaint against Atty. Wilma Donna C.
Anquilo-Garcia without prejudice;
(ii) NOTE the Letter dated April 14, 2016 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline transmitting the documents
pertaining to this case;
(iii) REVOKE the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Wilma Donna C.
Anquilo-Garcia for breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
and DISQUALIFY her from reappointment as notary public for a period
of ONE (1) YEAR; and
(iv) SUSPEND Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia's personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
April 7, 1922
In Re MARCELINO LONTOK
Ramon Diokno for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of
Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands,
because of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The
respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and
bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former GovernorGeneral Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This judgement was affirmed on
appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case before
the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921,
a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine
Organic Act on August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case
of Marcelino Lontok convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to
imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which
sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme
Court is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty
of any misconduct.
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the
Attorney-General relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok,
provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21) That conviction of the crime of
bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be
doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the pardon by the
Governor-General. On the one hand, it is contended by the Government
that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash
out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is contended by the respondent
that the pardon reaches the offense for which he was convicted and blots it
out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has
on the right of a court of disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony.
On close examination, however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in
the decisions is more apparent than real, and arises from differences in the
nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based. Where
preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and
depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out
the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 Cal.
App., 121; Scott vs. State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343). But where
proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction
of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve
him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to
the disbarment proceedings, in as much as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good
moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to
practice law. (People vs. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George
[1900],186 Ill., 122; Nelson vs. Com. [1908],128 Ky., 779; Case of In re —
——— [1881],86 N.Y., 563.)
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly in
point. The petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law in the
United States courts, without first taking an oath to the effect that he had
never voluntarily given aid to any government hostile to the United States,
as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems, had been a member of the
Conferate Congress, during the secession of the South, but had been
pardons by the President of the United States. It was held, buy a divided
court, that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense
named would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, notwithstanding
the pardon which the court had no right to do; and the opinion of the court,
in part, said:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as
if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him
to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices
forfeited, or property or interest vested in others in consequence of
the conviction and judgement.
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting
justices, in the Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court,
we feel ourselves under obligation to follow the rule laid down by the
majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more grace when
we recall that according to the article 130 of the Penal Code, one of the
different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon. We
must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely
on the judgement of conviction for a crime of which the respondent
has been pardoned, We must also remember that the motion for
disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for crime of which
the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is
not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole.
It may be mentioned however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok
should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would
be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot
be granted, and that the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall
be taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So
ordered.
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar,
admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed
on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on
August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim
in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying
that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule
127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting
the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the
authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil.
293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt,
such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa,
41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to
his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right
and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84
P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon
extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on
disbarment a forecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok
case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court
decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's
name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In
making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted
to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of
the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons,
29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the
record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for
the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered
in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any
felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony
conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be
a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of
executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote
v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex.
191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in
the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if
granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man,
and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but
conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It
does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which
was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in
connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United
States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for
murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs.
Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to
certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a
candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the
risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27
Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him,
of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the
nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has
been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from
the roll of lawyers.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL
from the practice of law
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to
show cause in the Court of First Instance. in the city of
Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should
not be suspended as a member of the bar of the city of
Manila for the reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the
"Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that
the said organization was made for the purpose of evading
the law then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas
Artes" during the time of and after its organization, which
organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W.
A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same,
and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony
given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States
v. H. D. Terrell, 1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and
after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his
counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the
charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true,
and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office
as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk
of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order
of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the
conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in
arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their
objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws
against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to
malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for
which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which
the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a
violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of
United States v. Terrelle was acquitted on the charge of estafa,
and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional
and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we
are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in
the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day
of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended form the practice of law for a term of one year
from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006
Facts: Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as the
notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against others
(Duane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for estafa thru falsification of public
document. A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May 20, 2003 against
respondent Atty. Emmanual O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
arose when respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-charge of perjury against
Donton. Atty. Tansingco in his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized
the Occupancy Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time
resident of a real property located at Cubao, Quezon City. Since Mr. Stier is a U.S.
Citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name, he agreed that
the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino. Donton averred
that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be
disbarred. Atty. Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Aletajan, because he refused to act witness in the criminal case against Stier and
Manggay. In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred the matter to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation and for which the latter,
through Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the IBP Commission of Discipline
recommended suspension from the practice of law for two years and cancellation
of his commission as Notary Public. The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for six months. The report was then forwarded to SC as mandated
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code. The Court ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice
to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath
and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to
evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. As such, respondent is
being suspended for six (6) months.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO
LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO
A.C. No. 6672
September 4, 2009
FACTS:
• There was a complaint for disbarment filed by LINSANGAN against Atty.
TOLENTINO for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
– LINSANGAN alleged that TOLENTINO, with the help of a paralegal, LABIANO,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. TOLENTINO promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
• LINSANGAN presented an affidavit attesting that LABIANO tried to prevail upon
a client to sever his lawyer-client relations with LINSANGAN and utilize
TOLENTINO's services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
• LINSANGAN also attached TOLENTINO's calling card.
• TOLENTINO denied knowing LABIANO and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.
• The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
IBP.
• The CBD recommended that TOLENTINO be reprimanded as it found that he:
– had encroached on the professional practice of LINSANGAN, violating Rule 8.02
and other canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
– contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid
agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court
ISSUE/S:
• W.O.N. Tolentino's actions warrant disbarment
RULING:
• SC adopts the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of TOLENTINO but
modifies the recommended penalty.
• The means employed by TOLENTINO in furtherance of the said misconduct
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
• • Canon 3, CPR provides:
– A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
– The practice of law is a profession and not a business. To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that
high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
• • Rule 2.03, CPR provides:
– A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
– Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
• • Rule 1.03, CPR which provides:
– A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
– This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
• TOLENTINO clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• TOLENTINO also committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice, in violation of
• • Rule 8.02, CPR
– A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain
him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
• Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, TOLENTINO violated:
• • Rule 16.04, CPR
– A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
• • The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that
the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the clients cause.
• Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
Courts disciplinary powers.
• Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
• Atty. TOLENTINO for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.
• Lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable
law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only
contain the following details: lawyers name; name of the law firm with which he
is connected; address; telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
MONTECILLO v GICA
G.R. No. L-36800. October 21, 1974
ESGUERRA, J.
FACTS:
Montecillo was accused by Gica of slander. Atty. del Mar represented Montecillo
and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. The Court of Appeals
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he
made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks
the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been
rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the
three justices of the CA the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to
the Montecillo case, but SC denied both. Del Mar also intimated that even the
Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge
who handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Del Mar should be held liable.
HELD: Yes. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE
IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed.
Canon 2 – Cases digest: 1. Jasfer Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et. al.
(A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012)
Facts: A Complaint for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against
Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), et. al., for gross and serious
misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Manuel, together with Atty. Almario and
Atty. Espejo, senior and junior associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office,
agreed handle William Strong Deportation case. (William Strong (Strong), an
American, was arrested and detained by the operatives of the Bureau of
Immigration). During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that
he has a property in Boracay and that he suspected his neighbors as the persons
who caused his arrest. According to Strong, his live-in partner Rodica filed a
Complaint before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for recovery of possession and
damages (against Hillview Marketing Corporation). He disclosed that he and
Rodica had been trying to sell the Boracay property. They even offered the
property to Apostol but the latter was hesitant because of the said pending case.
Atty. Manuel averred that towards the end of the interview with Strong, Rodica
arrived. Strong described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his liaison in
the case. Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that
Strong s arrest was made pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; In her Complaint,
Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law
Office, she hinted that Atty. Tan who is also the lawyer of Hillview. According to
Rodica, Atty. Manuel, allegedly informed him that Atty. Tan admitted having
initiated the immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty.
Tan threatened to do something bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty.
Tan demanded for Rodica to withdraw the RTC case as part of a settlement
package. The Bureau of Immigration rendered its Judgment granting the motion
of Strong to voluntarily leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the
Philippines. Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011, Rodica filed with the RTC a motion
effectively withdrawing her complaint. Rodica alleged that after the deportation
of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she heard nothing from the Lazaro
Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations, there was no
"simultaneous over-all settlement of her grievances x x x [with] the defendants [in
the RTC] case. Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant
administrative case.
Issue: Whether the allegations in Rodicas Complaint merit the disbarment or
suspension of Respondents.
Ruling: In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Rodica s claim of "settlement
package" is devoid of merit. Rodica s assertions are mere allegations without
proof and belied by the records of the case. The documents issued by the Bureau
of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the Interpol Red Notice for
being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in Brazil. His
warrant of arrest was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly, even
before Strong was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan had already
obtained a favorable judgment for his clients. Rodica was not the client of the
Lazaro Law Office. All the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to the
immigration case, and not to the RTC case. Records also show that the RTC case
was filed long before Strong was arrested and detained. Strong is not a party to
the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty.
Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would
show that respondent Attys. Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation
therein. Atty. Espejo s participation in the RTC case. He admitted drafting Rodica s
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating
therein the firm name of the Lazaro Law Office as well as his name and the names
of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, and in likewise affixing his signature thereon. At the outset, Atty.
Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in the RTC
case. Atty. Espejo s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend
assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01
and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed,
and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render
legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard
the latter s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as
defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel
in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would
have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer, which,
however, is not the case. He should have thought that in so doing, he was actually
assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being
represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against
respondents Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel
M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty.
Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his
actuations.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall
not
refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the
extent
necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
ARCELINA ZAMORA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. MARILYN V.
GALLANOSA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant controversy stemmed from a complaint1 for
disciplinary action filed by complainant Marcelina Zamora
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Marilyn V. Gallanosa
(respondent), for allegedly violating multiple provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant averred2 that sometime in June 2012, outside the
office of Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga (LA Azarraga) of
the National Labor Relations Commission where her husband's
illegal dismissal case against DM Consunji, Inc. was pending,
respondent approached her and inquired about the said case and
the "papers" that she has. When she showed respondent the
Position Paper prepared by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) for
the case, the latter remarked, "[W]alang kadating dating ang
ginawa ng abogado mong PAO, matatalo ang demanda mo
dyan[.]"3 Respondent further inquired about the pieces of
evidence in the case, to which complainant replied that she
provided them to the lawyer from the PAO but the latter did not
attach the same to the position paper. Respondent then
remarked, "[K]aya hindi niya ikinabit[,] ayaw niya kalabanin ang
arbiter na humawak ng papel mo kasi magkakasabwat yang mga
yan. Yong arbiter na humawak ng papel mo at saka [attorney] ng
kumpanya. Alam ko yan kasi dati akong government pero umalis
na ako kasi nga ayaw ko yong ginagawa nila, nag pro-labor na
lang ako[.]"4 Respondent thus opined that complainant should
change the position paper and, subsequently, listed the
documents to be attached to the new position paper, assuring the
latter that once said documents were completed, she will surely
win the case.5
A week later, complainant went to respondent's office at the
Pacific Century Tower in Quezon City. She confirmed whether it
was possible to replace the position paper she had already
submitted, to which respondent replied, "Pwede. Eto nga,
tumatawag ako ng ibang hahawak," giving her the impression
that another Labor Arbiter will handle the case. When she asked
how much respondent's professional fee was, the latter informed
her that the same shall be twenty percent (20%) (of the
judgment award) but on a contingent basis, i.e., payable only
after the case is won, hence, she need not pay anything while the
new position paper was being drafted.6
Complainant returned after a week to get the new position paper,
and was instructed to submit the same to LA Azarraga. The
opposing counsel did not object to the replacement, however,
before accepting the same, LA Azarraga asked complainant
whether respondent will attend the next hearing, which was
confirmed by the latter when asked via cellphone call. However,
respondent failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing,
resulting to the submission of the case for resolution sans
hearing.7
Subsequently, complainant received notice of the decision in the
case. When she informed respondent thereof, the latter
instructed her to email a copy as she has not yet received her
copy. She was assured by respondent that the necessary appeal
would be filed, however, the reglementary period lapsed without
an appeal being perfected. When she confronted respondent, the
latter denied being complainant's lawyer since she did not sign
the position paper and never received any fees therefor.
Complainant thus went to the radio program of Mr. Raffy Tulfo,
whose staff referred her to the PAO Central Office which, in turn,
wrote respondent a letter about the appeal. However, the latter
maintained that she is not complainant's lawyer.8
Nonetheless, complainant prevailed upon respondent to agree to
file an appeal after the latter comes back from Bicol where she
was attending to some family matters. Upon respondent's return,
complainant called her but was informed that the appeal was
already too late. Instead, respondent offered to negotiate with
the opposing party's counsel for a higher amount of financial aid
than what was awarded in the decision, but she failed to do so
despite complainant's numerous follow-ups, which were
eventually ignored.9 Hence, the instant complaint averring that
respondent violated the following Rules and Canons of the CPR,
to wit:
• Rule 2.03 of the CPR when she solicited legal business on a
contingent basis;
• Canon 17 of the CPR when she denied any professional
relations with complainant;
• Rule 3.01 of the CPR when she made it appear with great
certainty that she will win the case;
• Rule 18.03 of the CPR when she abandoned the case and
allowed the appeal period to lapse;
• Rules 8.01 and 8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR when she maligned
the position paper prepared by the PAO and made baseless
accusations against the Labor Arbiter, the corporate lawyer,
and the PAO; and
• Rule 15.06 of the CPR when she assured the admission by
the Labor Arbiter of a new position paper, thereby implying
that she has influence over the said official.10
In a Resolution11 dated December 9, 2015, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
For her part, respondent maintained12 that she is not
complainant's lawyer and denied having offered her professional
services as a lawyer in the labor case of complainant's husband.
While she admitted having prepared the position paper in the
case, the same was free of charge as a way of extending help to
complainant. She did not sign the pleading or entered her
appearance in the case, nor was there any discussion or
agreement on the compensation.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation14 dated January 30, 2017, the
IBP found the charges to be well-founded. It held that: (a) the
series of exchanges between the parties, such as the visits for
advice and guidance at respondent's office, as well as the
telephone calls and text exchanges between complainant and
respondent; and (b) respondent's drafting and preparation of the
position paper and instructions to file the same before the office
of the Labor Arbiter in lieu of the earlier position paper filed in the
case, clearly demonstrate a lawyer-client relationship between
them because the acts of respondent constitute rendering legal
services.15 Thus, it recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with severely.16
In a Resolution17 dated August 31, 2017, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but
the same was denied in a Resolution19 dated December 6, 2018;
hence, this petition.20
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere
to, including the manner by which lawyers' services are to be
made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
CANON 3 - SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is
a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers
to advertise their talents or skills is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and
impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of
service to which every member of the bar is called.21 Thus,
lawyers in making known their legal services must do so in a
dignified manner. They are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.22
Rule 2.03 of the CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do
or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business." Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of
almost any kind of business by an attorney, personally or through
an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.23
In this case, respondent admitted having met complainant (albeit
under different circumstances as claimed by complainant),
advised the latter to see her in her office so they can discuss her
husband's labor case, and prepared the position paper for the
case,24 all of which constitute practice of law. Case law states that
the "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Thus, to engage in the practice of law is
to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession requiring the use of legal knowledge or
skill,25 and embraces, among others: (a) the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings; (b) the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts; and (c)
advising clients, and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effects of
facts and conditions.26
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first
moment respondent discussed with complainant the labor case of
her husband and advised her as to what legal course of action
should be pursued therein. By respondent's acquiescence with the
consultation and her drafting of the position paper which was
thereafter submitted in the case, a professional employment was
established between her and complainant. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion,
or that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged.27 The fact that
one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's
case, or that no formal professional engagement follows the
consultation, or no contract whatsoever was executed by the
parties to memorialize the relationship is hardly of
consequence.28 To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in
any matter pertinent to his profession.29
Corollarily, the Court finds that respondent is likewise guilty of
violation of Rule 8.0230 of the CPR. Settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the
latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or
reduced fees for his services.31 It is undisputed that respondent
was aware of the professional relationship between the PAO and
complainant/her husband with respect to the labor case, yet, she
assumed the drafting of a new position paper, especially to
replace the one originally filed by the PAO.
There being a lawyer-client relationship existing between the
parties, respondent was duty-bound to file the appeal she had
agreed to prepare in the case at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the client's interest. Her failure to do so made
her liable for transgressing Canon 17 which enjoins lawyers to be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them, as well as
Rule 18.0332 of the CPR which prohibits lawyers from neglecting
legal matters entrusted to them.
In Hernandez v. Padilla,33 a lawyer who similarly denied the
existence of any lawyer-client relationship with the complainant
and was negligent in handling his client's case was suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. Consistent with this case, the Court agrees with
the IBP's recommendation to suspend respondent for the same
period.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marilyn V. Gallanosa is
found GUILTY of violating Rules 2.03, 8.02, and 18.03, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, effective immediately upon her receipt of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
She is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court
that her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance as
counsel.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed
name
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner
is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased.
DACANAY VS. BAKER HYPERLINK
"HTTP://ATORNI.BLOGSPOT.COM/2012/08/DACANAY-VS-BAKER-MCKENZIE-AC-NO-2131.HTML"& HYPERLINK
"HTTP://ATORNI.BLOGSPOT.COM/2012/08/DACANAY-VS-BAKER-MCKENZIE-AC-NO-2131.HTML" MC KENZIE (A.C. NO. 2131 05/10/1985)
FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine
other lawyers from practicing law under the name Baker and
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent
Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which
contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for
the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to
H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability
of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the
letterhead of another law office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising
law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
•
Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes
a representation that being associated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law
under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the
firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows
him to practice law currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives
of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business.
CANONS 4 AND 5: Upliftment in the Quality of Legal Services Rendered to
the Public
LEA P. PAYOD v. ATTY. ROMEO P. METILA
528 SCRA 227 (2007)
A lawyer who accepts a case must give it his full attention, diligence, skill,
and competence, and his negligence in connection therewith renders him
liable.
Atty. Metila failed to submit important documents to the Court of Appeals
(CA) and the serious consequences brought by such act became prejudicial
to the case of Lea Payod. Payod said they made sufficient follow ups with
Atty. Metila but the latter failed to show up in appointed meetings at
the Court. Pagod thereafter charged Atty. Romeo P. Metila for willful
neglect and gross misconduct in the discharge of her duties.
Atty. Metila denied the charges and insisted that there was no attorneyclient relationship between him and Payod for there was no Special Power
of Attorney authorizing Payod’s mother to hire him as a lawyer.
After investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline, to which the complaint was referred, found Atty. Metila guilty of
simple negligence and recommended that he be seriously admonished. The
IBP Board of Directors adopted the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Metila be seriously admonished.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of Atty. Metila to submit documents to the CA
constitute gross negligence
HELD:
The circumstances attendant to Atty. Metila’s initial handle of Payod’s case
do not warrant a finding of gross negligence, or sheer absence of real effort
on his part to defend her cause.
Atty. Metila accepted Payod’s case upon her mother’s insistence, with only
six days for him to file a petition for review before this Court, and without
her furnishing him with complete records, not to mention money, for the
reproduction of the needed documents. Despite these constraints, Atty.
Metila exerted efforts, albeit lacking in care, to defend his client’s cause by
filing two motions for extension of time to file petition. And he in fact filed
the petition within the time he requested, thus complying with the
guideline of this Court that lawyers should at least file their pleadings
within the extended period requested should their motions for extension of
time to file a pleading be not acted upon.
Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that Atty. Metila was
motivated by ill-will. In the absence of proof to the contrary, a lawyer
enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.
RESOLUTION
Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended
by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed
and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education,
the Court hereby resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following rules
for proper implementation:
RULE 1
PURPOSE
Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE
Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession
and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee
Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme
Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in accordance
with these Rules.
Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE
Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three
(3) years, at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive
and procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
Section 1. Initial compliance period
The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months
from the constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial
compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the
establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six
(36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
Section 2. Compliance Group 1.
Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be
permanently assigned to Compliance Group 1.
Section 3. Compliance Group 2.
Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 2.
Section 4. Compliance Group 3.
Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 3.
Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program.
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the
program shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance
Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or
readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on
the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member is not required to
comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required
to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal
education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted.
Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be
rounded up to the next whole number.
RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS
Section 1. Guidelines
The following are the guidelines for computation of credit units (CU):
PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, INHOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES,
ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS
UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE
OR SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION
1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE
OR SPONSOR'S SPEAKER CERTIFICATION
1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
SPONSORING PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION
REACTOR/COMMENTATOR
1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY
CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT
2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE
AUTHOR 12-16 CU 17-20 CU
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU
2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
WITH PROOF AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE
SINGLE AUTHOR 6 CU 8 CU
2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU
2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL
EDITOR
3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW
DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU PER LECTURE OR BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW TEACHING
Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units
In numbers 2 and 3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total
maximum credit units shall not exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3)
years.
RULE 5
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT
Section 1. Classes of credits
The credits are either participatory or non-participatory.
Section 2. Claim for participatory credit
Participatory credit may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,
conferences, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops,
dialogues or round table discussions.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator
in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit
Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published
or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter,
book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of
the member's practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS
Section 1. Computation of credit hours
Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual
instruction or speaking time), in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.
RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS
Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE
The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members
of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered
by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least 10 years accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE
The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the
IBP Board of Governors.
Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for
exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad,
proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of
the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in
accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
Section 4. Change of status
The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a
member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and
shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
Section 5. Proof of exemption
Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement
shall be under oath and supported by documents.
RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
Section 1. Approval of MCLE program
Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee,
continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of
two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an approved provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2)
the provider is specially mandated by law to provide continuing legal
education.
Section 2. Standards for all education activities
All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical
content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning
related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that
enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects
in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive
written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such
materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and
location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and
other distractions.
RULE 9
APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS
Section 1. Approval of providers
Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers
Any persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2)
years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are
eligible to be approved providers. Application for approval shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;
(b) Contain all information requested on the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;
Section 3. Requirements of all providers
All approved providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at
the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll
of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter,
and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be
furnished the IBP.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the
amount of ________ hours of which hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to
MCLE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activities by members of the IBP Board of
Governors, the MCLE Committee, or designees of the Committee
and IBP staff for purposes of monitoring compliance with these
Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of
the activity, the time devoted to each devoted to each topic and
identify of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each
participant a copy of IBP-approved Education Activity Evaluation
Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the
activity, copy furnished the IBP.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under
this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these
Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
Section 4. Renewal of provider approval
The approval of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be
denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these
Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding
period.
Section 5. Revocation of provider approval
The approval of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a
majority vote of the IBP Board of Governors, upon recommendation of the
MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
RULE 10
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE
Section 1. Payment of fees
Application for approval of an education activity or as a provider requires
payment of an appropriate fee.
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card
Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by
attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement
or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not
later than the day after the end of the member's compliance period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement
Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption,
copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to
the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be
sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of nonparticipatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to
in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance
The following shall constitute non-compliance
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence
of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a noncompliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or
intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance
A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating
the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit
hours for compliance. Credit hours earned during this period may only be
counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case, the
excess hours may be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee
A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member
Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12
shall be listed as a delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when
the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement,
including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the
necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of noncompliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These
credit hours may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of noncompliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance
period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement.lawphil.net
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in
nature but it shall be made with notice and hearing by the MCLE
Committee.
RULE 15
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Section 1. Composition
The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chair, and four (4) members,
respectively, nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.
They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years
and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
Section 2. Duty of the Committee
The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules
as may be necessary subject to the approval by the Supreme Court. It
shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule
of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.
Section 3. Staff of the IBP
The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the
record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary
functions.
Section 4. Submission of annual budget
The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy
to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its publication in
two (2) newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.
SAMUEL B. ARNADO v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, AC. No. 9834,
2015-08-26
Facts:
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the
attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE
application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed
the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's
compliance
In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation[3] dated 14 August 2013,[4] the
MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that...
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007,
respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board... denied the request on 14 January
2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither
applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15
April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In his Compliance and Comment[5] dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged
that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated
that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He
further alleged... that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for
exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof.
Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the
Romualdo family.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been
practicing law for about 50 years.
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported
that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request
on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed... respondent of the denial of his
application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to
the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant
to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant
must... submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his
expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to
meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section
12 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the
pleadings from the records.[7] The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of
the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply
with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the... requirements. Section
12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period
shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of
the MCLE Governing
Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to
respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013,
the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed against respondent
in connection with the pleadings he filed without the
MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance
period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the
Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same... or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be
directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
Issues:
whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements.
Ruling:
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law."[8] The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14
April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April
2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings... filed in 2009, 2010, 2011,
and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April
2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the
four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an
application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE
Governing Board, respondent's application for... exemption covered the First and
Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application
for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet
the... requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its
letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof.
Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo,
and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of
the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter[9] dated 29
November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply
with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his... application for exemption. He furnished the Court
with his letter dated 7 February 2012[10] to the MCLE Office asking the office to
act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it
to the MCLE Office.[11] He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to
comply with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was
reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption.
The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent
on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,
respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his
Compliance and Comment before this Court,... respondent stated that because of
his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could
comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he
already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines
(UP)
Diliman on those dates.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP
Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He
is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The
Court has not been furnished proof of compliance... for the First Compliance
Period.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to
inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only
informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and... after it received inquiries regarding
the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he
was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for...
exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application
for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to... satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when
respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a
pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six
months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is
also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such
time as he submits proof of full... compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and
the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his
reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence,
we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to
suspend... him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully
complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required
non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act
on matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to
applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties
within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required noncompliance and reinstatement fees.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron
200 SCRA 584
Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case
filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision,
Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for
the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for
registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor
of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
suspended the registration of the documents with certain “special conditions”
between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip,
or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G
or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He
himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the
registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator,
the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the
parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in
his previous denial.
Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the
Court for his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of
official tasks.
Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action.
(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service
in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt
motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY.
PEDRO VEGA, Respondents. A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013 REYES, J.
Facts Complainants – Rosario and Pablo Berenguer filed a disbarment case
against Respondents - Atty Florin, Atty Jornales and Atty Pedro. Petitioners as an
owner of agricultural land situated in Bicol Province was subjected their property
under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program CARP. Respondents being
officer of the Department of Agrarian Reform DAR rendered unjust judgment,
orders, and resolution adverse and prejudicial to the interest of petitioners, issued
order and granting a writ of execution ex-parte knowing fully well that they had no
authority to do so.
Issue
Whether or not respondents violate code of professional responsibility?
Ruling
Yes, Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides: Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority so to do. Canon 6 of the Code of the Professional
Responsibility which is applicable to government employees states that lawyers in
the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. They should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the Public.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Datu Remigio M.
Duque, Jr., (Duque) against former Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias
R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim; Attys. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz,
Esmeralda A. Amora-Ladra, Ma. Juana S. Valleza, Shemidah G. Cadiz,
and Fernando F. Cot-om; and Prosecutor Noel S. Action for Conduct
Unbecoming a Lawyer, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross Misconduct.
The case stemmed from a Complaint dated May 26, 2011 filed by Duque
against respondents Sheila D. Mabutol, Cleotilde L. Balite, Camilo M.
Labayne, Reynaldo P. Erese, Jr., Ruth Joy V. Gabor, Luzviminda V.
Galanga, Esmeraldo Galanga, Jr., Gavino V. Rufino, Jr., Zenaida T. Rufino,
Melanie M. Tagudin-Cordova, Alona D. Rocacorba, Alma P. Bunag, Joey
G. Lomot and Nena G. Bactas, docketed as I.S. No. 111-18-INV-11-D0390, for alleged violation of election laws, particularly Sections 223, 224,
Article 19, Section 261 (y) (17), (z) (21), and Article 22 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
Duque, who ran for Punong Barangay of Lomboy, La Paz, Tarlac but lost,
filed a petition for recount contesting the results in a number of precincts
where respondents were chairman and members of the Board or Election
Tellers (BETs), respectively. Duque alleged that there were several
irregularities in the canvassing of the ballots, i.e., the discovery of alleged
crumpled official ballots during the recount proceedings and unsigned
election returns. Respondents, however, vehemently denied said
allegations.
On June 13, 2011, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Noel S. Adion
recommended that the complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the COMELEC has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses, and to
prosecute the same. Duque moved for reconsideration but was denied m a
Resolution[1] dated September 21, 2011.
The records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC.
On March 14, 2013, in its disputed Decision,[2] as recommended by the
Law Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc[3] dismissed
the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found no violation of any of the
pertinent election laws. It likewise pointed out that Duque failed to
substantiate the complaint by clear and convincing evidence.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint against
Commissioners Brillantes, et al.
On July 1, 2013, the Court resolved to require respondents to Comment on
the complaint against them.[4]
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in its
Comment[5] dated October 24, 2013, pointed out that respondents, being
COMELEC Commissioners may only be removed from office solely by
impeachment. As impeachable officers who are at the same time members
of the Bar, respondent Commissioners must be removed from office by
impeachment before they may be held to answer administratively for their
supposed erroneous resolutions and actions.
Respondents likewise maintained that there exists no valid ground for their
disbarment. While complainant insists that respondents conspired to
deprive him of his constitutional rights by dismissing his complaint despite
"voluminous evidence," complainant, however, failed to establish said
allegation of conspiracy by positive and conclusive evidence. Other than
his bare allegations of conspiracy, complainant failed to show how
respondents acted in concert to deprive him of his constitutional rights or
even specify the particular acts performed by respondents in the supposed
conspiracy.
In his separate Comment[6] dated September 10, 2013, respondent
Prosecutor Adion averred that the complaint against him has no legal and
factual basis.
For his part, respondent Commissioner Lim, through his counsel, echoed
the other Commissioners' contention that as an impeachable officer, he
must first be removed from office through the constitutional route of
impeachment before he may be held administratively liable for his
participation in the disputed Resolution. He added that Duque miserably
failed to allege, much less submit a clear, convincing and satisfactory proof
of any act of Lim which may be construed as a ground for disbarment.
Respondent further pointed out that the COMELEC En Banc, in dismissing
the complaint of Duque, properly applied paragraph (m), Section 3, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court which states that "it is presumed that official duty
has been regularly performed;" hence, the members of the BETs enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties unless a
clear and convincing evidence is shown to the contrary.
RULING
To begin with, the Court takes notice that respondents Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr., Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, all retired from the COMELEC
on February 2, 2015. However, it does not necessarily call for the dismissal
of the complaint, considering that the very thrust of the instant disbarment
complaint is the issuance of a Resolution dated March 14, 2013 which
dismissed E.O. Case No. 12-003,[7] where respondents Brillantes, Tagle
and Yusoph concurred in, when they were still members of the
COMELEC's En Banc.
Be that as it may, after a careful perusal of the facts of the case, the Court,
however, finds no merit in the instant petition.
This Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman,[8] In
Re First Indorsement from Raul M. Gonzales[9] and Cuenco v. Hon.
Fernan,[10] has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a
member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. At
the time the present complaint was filed, respondents-commissioners were
all lawyers. As impeachable officers who are at the same time the
members of the Bar, respondents-commissioners must first be removed
from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before they may be
held to answer administratively for their supposed erroneous resolutions
and actions.
Nevertheless, even if the Court were to look into the assailed actions of
respondents-commissioners as well as respondents-lawyers under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, We find no specific actuations and
sufficient evidence to show that respondents did engage in dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in their capacity as lawyers.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves
a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a
specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the
country. It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and
city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the
factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered
with by this Court.[11]
It must likewise be emphasized that the assailed actions of the respondents
pertain to their quasi-judicial functions. The quasi-judicial function of the
COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications.[12] Thus, the COMELEC, in resolving the subject
complaint, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth
behind the allegations in the complaint. The fact that the COMELEC's
resolution was adverse to the complainant, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion, does not make a case for disbarment.
It is settled that a judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty,
gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[13] As we held in Balsamo v. Judge Suan:[14]
It should be emphasized, however, that as a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or
administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the
error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge.
If at all, complainant felt aggrieved and wanted to properly proceed against
the COMELEC, the remedy of an aggrieved party against a judgment or
final order or resolution of the COMELEC is a petition under Rue 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court brought before this Court,[15] and
not a disbarment proceeding. There being no evidence whatsoever tending
to prove unfitness of respondents to continue in the practice of law and
remain officers of the court, and there being no showing that respondents
were motivated by bad faith or ill motive in rendering the assailed decision,
the charges of conduct unbecoming a lawyer, gross ignorance of the law
and gross misconduct against them, thus, must be dismissed.
We must reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on
the complainant; the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by
one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the
other party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly
balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the
equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the
burden of proof.[16]
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard
for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus, the power to disbar
attorneys ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear
cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.[17]
WHEREFORE, the instant disbarment complaint against respondents
former COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners
Lucento N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim, Attys. Ma.
Josefina E. Dela Cruz, Esmeralda A. Amora-Ladra, Ma. Juana S. Valleza,
Shemidah G. Cadiz, and Fernando F. Cot-Om, and Prosecutor Noel S.
Adion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES EDWIN B. BUFFE AND KAREN M. SILVERIOBUFFE, Complainants, v. SEC. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, USEC.
FIDEL J. EXCONDE, JR., AND CONGRESSMAN ELEANDRO
JESUS F. MADRONA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Spouses
Edwin B. Buffe and Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (complainants)
against former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez,1 former
Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former
Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona (respondents), for
committing an unethical act in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, particularly
the willful violation of Republic Act Nos. (RA) 6713, 3019, and
civil service law and rules.
The Facts
The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 15 July 2008, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Karen M. Silverio-Buffe
(Silverio-Buffe) as Prosecutor I/Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Romblon province. On 15 August 2008, Silverio-Buffe took her
oath of office before Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
24, Judge Jesusa P. Maningas (Judge Maningas). She, then,
furnished the Office of the President, Civil Service Commission
and Department of Justice (DOJ) with copies of her oath of office.
On 19 August 2008, Silverio-Buffe informed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon that she was officially reporting
for work beginning that day.
In a letter dated 26 August 2008, Romblon Provincial Prosecutor
Arsenio R.M. Almadin asked former Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzalez (Gonzalez) to confirm the appointment of Silverio-Buffe
since the Provincial Prosecution Office did not receive any official
communication regarding Silverio-Buffe's appointment.
In a Memorandum Order dated 19 December 2008, Gonzalez
ordered Silverio-Buffe "to cease and desist from acting as
prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon,
or in any Prosecutor's Office for that matter, considering that [she
has] no appointment to act as such, otherwise [she] will be
charged of usurpation of public office."2chanrobleslaw
On 11 February 2009, Silverio-Buffe, together with her husband
Edwin B. Buffe, filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Joint Complaint-Affidavit3 alleging that former Congressman
Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona (Madrona), acting out of spite or
revenge, persuaded and influenced Gonzalez and Undersecretary
Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. (Exconde) into refusing to administer
Silverio-Buffe's oath of office and into withholding the transmittal
of her appointment papers to the DOJ Regional Office. Madrona
allegedly acted out of spite or revenge against Silverio-Buffe
because she was one of the plaintiffs in a civil case for
enforcement of a Radio Broadcast Contract, which was cancelled
by the radio station due to adverse commentaries against
Madrona and his allies in Romblon.
In their Joint Complaint-Affidavit, they narrated that: (1) on 1
August 2008, the Malacanang Records Office transmitted SilverioBuffe's appointment papers to the DOJ and they were received by
a clerk named Gino Dela Pena; (2) on 13 August 2008, a certain
Cora from the Personnel Division of the DOJ asked Silverio-Buffe
if she had any "connection" in the Office of the Secretary because
her papers were being withheld by Exconde, and when she said
none, Cora told her to come back the following day; (3) on 14
August 2008, Silverio-Buffe was introduced to Gonzalez, who
informed her that Madrona strongly opposed her appointment
and advised her to work it out with Madrona; (4) since Gonzalez
refused to administer her oath of office, Silverio-Buffe took her
oath before Judge Maningas on 15 August 2008; (5) SilverioBuffe twice wrote a letter to Gonzalez pleading for the transmittal
of her appointment papers, but Gonzalez never replied; and (6)
on 13 November 2008, they went to the DOJ and met Exconde,
who informed them that they should think of a solution regarding
Madrona's opposition to her appointment. Exconde asked for the
reason of Madrona's opposition and Silverio-Buffe replied that she
supported Madrona's rival, Eduardo Firmalo, during the elections.
Exconde persuaded Silverio-Buffe to talk with Madrona, but she
insisted on not approaching Madrona because of their diverse
principles. Exconde, then, suggested that Silverio-Buffe write
Gonzalez a letter stating that she already approached Madrona
yet the latter ignored her plea, but Silverio-Buffe refused the
suggestion.
In a Resolution dated 15 April 2009,4 the Court, through the First
Division, required the respondents to comment on the complaint.
In his Comment with Counter-Complaint dated 23 June
2009,5 Madrona denied that he acted out of spite or revenge
against Silverio-Buffe or that he persuaded, induced, or
influenced anyone to refuse to administer oath to Silverio-Buffe
and to withhold the transmittal of her appointment papers.
Madrona insisted that the allegations against him are without
proof, and based on general conjectures and hearsay. On the
other hand, Madrona alleged that complainants should be
accountable for their dishonest and deceitful conduct in
submitting to the Court as annexes a complaint without its last
two pages and a contract altered by Silverio-Buffe.
In a joint Comment dated 1 July 2009,6 Gonzalez and Exconde
claimed that: (1) the complaint is unfounded and purely for
harassment because Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers were
not endorsed by the Office of the President to the DOJ for
implementation; (2) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
complaint because a case for violation of RA 6713 and civil
service rules should be filed with the Civil Service Commission
and a case for violation of RA 3019 should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (3) the proper venue for her grievance is with
the Office of the President; (4) assuming that her appointment
papers were withheld, such act was presumed to be the act of the
President herself, with the presumption of regularity of official
functions; and (5) Exconde was erroneously impleaded since he
never signed any document relating to Silverio-Buffe's
appointment.
In her Reply dated 17 July 2009,7 Silverio-Buffe insisted that her
appointment papers were endorsed by the Office of the President
to the Office of the Secretary of Justice, as evidenced by the
Endorsement Letter of then Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita. However, Exconde, as Chief of Personnel Management
and Development under the Office of the Secretary of Justice,
refused to forward her appointment letter to the Personnel
Division of DOJ for implementation.
In a Resolution dated 21 October 2009,8 the Court, through the
Third Division, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In a Memorandum dated 12 July 2010,9 then DOJ Secretary Leila
M. De Lima transmitted Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon.
In a Resolution dated 20 October 2010,10 the Court, through the
Second Division, referred the Motion to Dismiss11 filed by
Madrona to the IBP. Madrona sought to dismiss the present
administrative complaint on the ground of forum-shopping,
because he received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman
directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same
administrative complaint filed before the OBC.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated 5 October
2011,12 Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
(Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with
merit, and recommended the penalty of censure against the
respondents.13 The Investigating Commissioner found
respondents' united action of stopping the appointment of
Silverio-Buffe unethical.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-21514 issued on 28 June 2012, the IBP
Board of Governors reversed the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby unanimously REVERSED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering that the complaint
lacks merit the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED.
Complainants then filed a motion for reconsideration.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-30715 issued on 21 March 2013, the
IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
Resolution and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which
had already been threshed out and taken into consideration.
Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-215 dated June 28, 2012 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Hence, complainants filed a petition before this Court.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Gonzalez, Exconde, and
Madrona should be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the administrative case against Exconde and Madrona
for lack of jurisdiction. The present administrative case should be
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman, considering that
complainants have filed a complaint before it on 12 February
2009.16 In the case of Gonzalez, his death on 7 September 2014
forecloses any administrative case against him.17chanrobleslaw
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complainants'
administrative complaint is anchored on Section 13(1), Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that: "[t]he Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties: (1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient."
Under Section 1618 of RA 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during
his or her tenure.19 Section 1920 of RA 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited,
to acts or omissions which are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive,
or discriminatory.
Considering that both Exconde and Madrona are public officers
being charged for actions, which are allegedly unfair and
discriminatory, involving their official functions during their
tenure, the present case should be resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman as the appropriate government agency. Indeed, the
IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged
with administrative offenses involving their official duties. For
such acts, government lawyers fall under the disciplinary
authority of either their superior21 or the
Ombudsman.22 Moreover, an anomalous situation will arise if the
IBP asserts jurisdiction and decides against a government lawyer,
while the disciplinary authority finds in favor of the government
lawyer.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the administrative complaint against
now deceased Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez for being
moot. We also DISMISS the administrative complaint against
respondents, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde,
Jr. and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, for lack
of jurisdiction.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action the Ombudsman
may wish to take with respect to the possible administrative and
criminal liability of respondents Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. and Eleandro
Jesus F. Madrona.
SO ORDERED.chanRo
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not
to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with
his public duties.
Misamin v San Juan
FACTS: Respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New
Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as
captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that t h e l a w
did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules
of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, as member of the Bar be found in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: N o . T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t w a s
dismissed for lack of evidence. Respondent's practice of his profession not
withstanding his being a police official, is not embraced in Section27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds f o r t h e
s u s p e n s i o n o r r e m o v a l o f a n a t t o r n e y. T h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s
appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an
incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.
Facts:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to
Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and
related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the
mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25,
1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was
held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government.
One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged illgotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano
Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo,
Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development
Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings,
Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc.,
Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of
sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties' comments, this
Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases
were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank,
"actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
he advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which
he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central
Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent
Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the oneyear prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction
embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Mendoza can be a counsel if Tan,
et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 without violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with
the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the
CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. the Supreme Court held that this advice given
by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in
the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from
the subject “matter” in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on
the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK.
GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged
banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FELIPE
G. ZAPATOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took
on the case that he had intervened in during his incumbency on the Bench.
The complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in the case. The
charge specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse
interest, illegal practice of law, conduct and (sic) becoming as a former
member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the canons of
legal ethics with prayer for disbarment"[1]
Antecedent
The antecedents summarized in the Report and Recommendation
submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD)[2] are as follows:
Complainant alleged that respondent was the former Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Branch 35, Ozamis City and retired as such. But
before his appointment as RTC Judge, he was the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities 10th Judicial Division, Tangub City where he
presided [over] a Forcible Entry case docketed as Civil Case No. 330
entitled "Ronald Rupinta vs. Sps. Pacifico Conol and Malinda Conol."
Complainant was the counsel of Rupinta and the decision was rendered
against
him
by
respondent.
Sometime on 24 November 1994 and while respondent was still the
Presiding Judge of MTCC, Tangub City, another civil complaint was filed by
Ronald Rupinta with his mother, Anastacia Rupinta, as co-plaintiff, against
Carmen Alfire and Pacifico Conol, docketed as Civil Case No. 357, for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of
Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and
Damages with Petition for the Appointment of a Receiver. Complainant
represented the plaintiffs and the complaint was heard by respondent as
Presiding Judge of MTCC, 10th Judicial Region, Tangub City. When the
case was already scheduled for trial on the merits, respondent suspended
the scheduled hearing "motu proprio" for reason that there was still
affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of lack of
jurisdiction which prompted the plaintiff to file a Manifestation and
Memorandum which made respondent to (sic) inhibit himself from trying the
case.
Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CB
After the parties submitted their position papers, the IBP-CBD issued its
Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2008,[4] whereby it found and
held the respondent guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice
of law and as a member of the Bar for one (1) month. It observed that
under Rule 6.03, "a lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service;" and that the words or phrases any
matter and he had intervened qualifying the prohibition were very broad
terms, and included any conceivable subject in which the respondent acted
on in his official capacity.[5]
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403 adopted on August 14, 2008,[6] the IBP
Board of Governors approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBPCBD.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX2011-434[7] denying the respondent's motion for reconsideration, and
affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to the Court in
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, to wit:
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice or law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
This rule, according to Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan,[8] traces its lineage to Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, viz.:
36.
Retirement
from
judicial
position
or
public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter
upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ.
To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the respondent must be shown to have accepted the
engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his
judicial office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome
of the proceedings.[9] That showing was sufficiently made herein. The
respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City,
presided over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further
proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention within the
meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length of
the intervention in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and
unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from which the canon was derived,
prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling any case
upon which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context,
he not only exercised the power to influence the outcome of the
proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing about the result of the
case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.
The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent
could not accept work or employment from anyone that would involve or
relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf
of the body or authority that he served during his public
employment.[10] The restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his tenure
in relation to the matters in which he had intervened as
judge.[11] Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired from the Bench,
or that he was already in the private practice of law when he was engaged
for the case was inconsequential.
Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once his
neutrality and impartiality were challenged, he ultimately did not stay away
from the cases following his retirement from the Bench, and acted thereon
as a lawyer for and in behalf of the defendants.
The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his
plight of "poverty." Although we can understand his current situation and
symphatize with him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they
contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In any case, his representing the defendants in
the civil cases was not the only way by which he could improve his dire
financial situation. It would not be difficult for him, being a lawyer and a
former member of the Bench, to accept clients whom he could ethically
represent in a professional capacity. If the alternatives open to him were
not adequate to his liking, he had other recourses, like serving as a notary
public under a valid commission. His taking on of the defendants' civil
cases despite his previous direct intervention thereon while still a member
of the Bench was impermissible. He should have maintained his ethical
integrity by avoiding the engagement by the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G.
ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for a period of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of this
decision, with warning that a similar offense by him will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of the
respondent and be entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and
be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
lower courts in the country, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749 | January 20, 2000
Second Division Decision | Mendoza
FACTS:
A Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he
has been using this for at least three years already.
On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is
only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and
included in this exemption is the payment of membership dues.
RULING:
Yes. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name
from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, the
exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from
payment of membership or association dues.
In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings
and thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for one year or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later.
GUILTY.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission
to the bar.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling)
from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal
Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21,
2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his
wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in
his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact
that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter
which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27,
2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his
Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed
against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former
professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing
in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of
the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed,
he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should
not be taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is
proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and
signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a
Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a
Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of
the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer.
By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar
of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education,
or other relevant attribute.
Leda vs. Tabang Leda vs. Tabang
1Legal Profession (2019) PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT: Evangeline Leda DIGEST
AUTHOR: Nikki Paglicawan RESPONDENT: Trebonian Tabang I.
Recit-ready Summary Complainant Evangeline Leda assails Atty. Trebonian
Tabang’s good moral character. She filed against him Bar Matter No. 78 and the
present petition for disbarment, Administrative Case No. 2505. Leda and Tabang
contracted marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character. The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Tabang had finished his law studies and taken the Bar. He finished his
law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he
declared that he was “single." He then passed the examinations. First Complaint:
Leda blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Tabang had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was
unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Tabang
reconciled with Leda and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Second
Complaint: Leda filed a petition for the disbarrment of Tabang. She alleges that he
is not of good moral character and he only reconciled with her in order to get the
complaint dismissed. Tabang claims that he had acted in good faith in declaring
his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Leda to keep the marriage
under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from
the beginning. Tabang was suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Respondent's lack of good
moral character is only too evident. Tabang through his actuations, has been
lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.
II. Facts of the Case
Leda and Tabang contracted marriage on October 3, 1976 in Iloilo. The marriage
was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character.
The parties agreed to keep the marriage a secret until respondent had finished his
law studies (began in 1977) and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981),
allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Leda admits they had not lived
together as husband and wife. Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and
applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was “single.” First
Complaint: Leda blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting B.M. No. 78,
claiming that Tabang fraudulently filled out his application, thus showing lack of
good moral character. She also alleged that after Tabang’s law studies, he became
aloof and abandoned her. The Court required Tabang to answer. He admitted that
he was “legally married” to Leda but that the marriage was not yet declared
public. He also said he and Leda had reconciled and he prayed for the complaint
to be dismissed. The Court dismissed B.M. No. 75 and allowed Tabang to take his
Oath. Present Complaint: Leda filed a petition for the disbarment of Tabang
stating the following grounds: (a) For having made use of his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage with me, assuming that our marriage is not valid and
making a mockery of the marriage institution. (b) For having misrepresented
himself as single in his application. (c) For being of not good moral character. (d)
For being guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the
affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the
comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for
he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family,
friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to
withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court. Leda presented an
unsigned and undated letter, allegedly written by Tabang, stating that he did not
love her anymore and only considered her a friend. Although the letter was
unsigned, Tabang's initials appeared on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
envelope. He asked her not to do anything more and that there is nothing she can
do to take him away from his goal as a full-pledge professional. Tabang denies he
sent this letter. Their marriage was actually void for failure to comply with
therequisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them minimum cohabitation
of 5 years, that parties must be at least 21 years old when they were only 20
years old at the time. It was respondent who told the court that their marriage
was void from the beginning, that it was the reason why they didn’t want to tell
anyone they were married in the first place.
III. Issue/s
• W/N respondent Tabang lacks good moral character and violated Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
• YES. He violated Canon 7 as well
IV. Holding/s
1. YES, respondent’s lack of good moral character was only too evident.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. Firstly, his
declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad
faith, and a violation of Rule 7.01, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of
good moral character. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in
order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 thereof which states that "a
lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola). Tabang through his actuations, has been
lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.
V. Law or Doctrine
Applied Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT Rule
10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITYANDDIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORTTHEACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule
7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar
VI. Disposition
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until
further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in
a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Tan vs. HYPERLINK
"https://drbookleech.wordpress.com/2018/06/28/tan-vs-sabandal206-scra-473-february-24-1992/"Sabandal HYPERLINK
"https://drbookleech.wordpress.com/2018/06/28/tan-vs-sabandal206-scra-473-february-24-1992/" 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992
FACTS:
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1975 Bar Examinations but was denied to
take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized
practice of law. Since then, he has filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed
to take his lawyer’s oath.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the
province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent’s
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive
judge stated therewith in his comment that he is not aware of any acts
committed by the respondent as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar.
However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his Court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land
Investigator in the Bureau of Lands is alleged to have secured a free patent and
later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which upon investigation, turned out
to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and
which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and
the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed
the land since then.
The case was however settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable
settlement cancelled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his
mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the
RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered
by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts
of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a
certain sum for the loan and interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law
considering the he already submitted three testimonials regarding his good moral
character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
RULING:
His petition must be denied. Time and again, it has been held that practice of
law is a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau
of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title
over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in public service, which cannot be erased
by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence
was made because his suit has been compromised. this is a sad reflection of his
sense of honor and fair dealings.
Although the term”good moral character” admits of broad dimensions, it has
been defined as “including at least common dishonesty.” It has also been held
that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness
or candor.
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622,
July 10, 2012 Case Digest
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December
06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court
required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The
complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted
issues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified
position papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred
that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the
respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed
that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition
to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay
Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent
being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together,
the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent
engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy
firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality,
complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the
complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent
alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his
job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the
payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.
Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his
contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit
executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with
two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts of respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the
Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to
Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to
controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against
him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He
also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had
recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO
bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on
different
occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November
2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for nullification he
filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative
case
against
him
be
submitted
for
resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first
charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was
dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having
advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that
he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission
found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating
Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the
recommendation
to
disbar
him
was
premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008
recommending
respondent’s
disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment
of
fees
to
complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married
thrice.
RULING:
First
charge:
Dishonesty
for
non-payments
of
share
in
the
fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent,
but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be
true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree
to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to
practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an
agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from
clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s
allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the
charge
against
respondent
on
this
matter.
Second
charge:
Unlawful
solicitation
of
clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to
point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case,
he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases
for
the
purpose
of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted
in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of
the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend
itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was
indeed
a
vehicle
used
by
respondent
as
a
means
to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a
must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy
or
legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence
of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to
reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third
charge:
Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis.
Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in
the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v.
Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification
of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or
the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.
The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment
of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In
this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In BustamanteAlejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found
guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character
required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar
but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He
is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected
to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional
honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty
and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer
plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him
as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section
27,
Rule
138
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent
and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAURO L.
TAPUCAR, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred
Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in
Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962
respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City),
where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. Tapucar
vs. Tapucar, 293 SCRA 331, Adm. Case No. 4148 July 30, 1998.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On
December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano
Peña.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation,
the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was
meted by this Court upon respondent.
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise
to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases
were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and
separation from the service.6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He
continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of
their second child named Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely
abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal,
bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent
contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani
A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent’s marriage to
complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon
her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who
remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered
because of their father’s acts, including deception and intrigues against them.
Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976,
complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the
compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the
despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was
referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a
thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken
off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable
Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the
charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery
of the law and the Court, as when he said:
“I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in
1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife.
Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy.
If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple jeopardy. If
that’s the law so be it.”
ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred.
HELD:
Yes. Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in
order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a hightoned morality is more imperative than that of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals
and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers
must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state,
those whose conduct—both public and private—fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus
proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only
in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. For disbarment
proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to
vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general
public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are
competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
ARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RAMON F.
NIEVA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint[1] dated March 3, 2010 filed by
complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for sexually harassing her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of
the Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since
October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the CAAP Office
of the Board Secretary under the supervision of respondent, who was then acting
as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During complainant's stint under respondent,
she would notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch
"pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be
pornographic films. Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got
close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. During
these instances, complainant would remove her hands and tell him to desist.
According to complainant, respondent even offered her a cellular phone together
with the necessary load to serve as means for their private communication, but
she refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular phone
and does not need another one.[2]
Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of April 1,
2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that respondent
might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to
accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent's arrival and seeing
that complainant had companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2)
office staff to lock the door when
they leave.[3]
Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009,
respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text
message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the office.
At about 9:30 in the morning of even date, respondent asked complainant to
encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his
hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing the
latter's torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told
him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology, respondent told
complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket
and even gave her a note stating "just bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si
mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At
around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while complainant and
respondent were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door,
grabbed complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted
to kiss complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent's advances
with her left arm, raised her voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag
naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako." After
respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance
from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative
case[4] against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (CODI).[5]
Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was
traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression.[6] Eventually,
complainant filed the instant complaint.
In his defense,[7] respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He
maintained that as a 79-year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP on
a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against
him, especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his staff. In this
regard, he referred to his Counter-Affidavit[8] submitted before the CODI, wherein
he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he indeed watches "interesting shows" in
his office laptop, he never invited anyone, including complainant, to watch with
him and that he would even close his laptop whenever someone comes near
him;[9] (b) he never held and kissed complainant's hand because if he had done so,
he would have been easily noticed by complainant's co-staffers;[10] (c) he did offer
her a cellular phone, but this was supposed to be an office phone which should
not be used for personal purposes, and thus, could not be given any sexual
meaning;[11] (d) he did tell complainant to wait for him in the afternoon of April 1,
2009, but only for the purpose of having an available encoder should he need one
for any urgent matter that would arise;[12] and (e) he would not do the acts he
allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as there were other people in the office and
that those people can attest in his favor.[13] Respondent then pointed out that the
administrative case filed against him before the CODI was already dismissed for
lack of basis and that complainant was only being used by other CAAP employees
who were agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon his assumption as
CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting Corporate Board Secretary.[14]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[15] dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of
the instant administrative complaint against respondent.[16] He found that
complainant failed to substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed
to respondent's defenses which are ably supported by evidence. Citing
respondent's evidence, the Investigating Commissioner opined that since the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary was very small, it is implausible that a startling
occurrence such as an attempted sexual molestation would not be noticed by not
only the other occupants of said office area, but also by those occupying the
office adjacent to it, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which is separated only by
glass panels. Further, the Investigating Commissioner drew attention to the
investigation conducted by the CODI showing that the collective sworn
statements of the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion that none of the
alleged acts of misconduct attributed to respondent really occurred.[17]
In a Resolution[18] dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board)
unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As such,
respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
In view of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,[19] the IBP Board referred the
case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for study, evaluation, and
submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP Board.[20]
In the Director's Report[21] dated July 8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director
recommended that the current IBP Board adhere to the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the
evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP
Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set aside.
In this light, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution[22] dated August 10, 2014
setting aside the previous IBP Board's Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the
administrative complaint against respondent.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court's Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."[23]
In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR states:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess.
It may be defined as "what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality."[24] Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the public;
(b) to protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients; and
(d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[25]
In Valdez v. Dabon,[26] the Court emphasized that a lawyer's continued possession
of good moral character is a requisite condition to remain a member of the
Bar, viz.:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts
from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity
of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.[27] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28]
After due consideration, the Court reverses the findings and recommendations of
the IBP, and finds respondent administratively liable for violations of the CPR, as
will be explained hereunder.
To recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to complainant's purposedly bare
and uncorroborated allegations, respondent's evidence point to the conclusion
that none of the alleged sexual advances made by respondent against
complainant actually occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from any
administrative liability. In support of such finding, the IBP largely relied on the
following: (a) the five (5) photographs[29] respondent submitted to the CODI to
show that respondent's office space was so small that any commotion caused by
a sexual harassment attempt would have been easily noticed by the other
occupants thereof;[30] and (b) the investigation conducted by the CODI per the
Transcript[31] submitted by respondent where the witnesses said that they did not
notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2, 2009, the date when respondent's
alleged sexual advances against complainant were committed.[32] However, the
foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's
allegation that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009,
respondent closed the door, grabbed complainant's right arm, uttered the words
"let's seal it with a kiss" and attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's
resistance.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript shows that at around past 11 o'clock
in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a time that complainant and
respondent were indeed left alone in the office:
Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to
11:00 sinu-sino kayo doon?
Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma'am Carrie Anne
[complainant], si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka aka po.
Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang ang witness, ang taong naroon 9:30 to 11?
Witness 1: Yes sir.
xxxx
Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?
Witness 1: Sa loob po kami naglulunch.
Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang iba?
Witness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira nung umalis po aka. Um... pagbalik
ko po wala na po si Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am Amy nalang po ang
nandoon.
Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang at tsaka si Atty. Nieva
[respondent] ang naiwan doon sa room? Eh nasaan na yung ibang OJT pa?
Witness 1: Tatlo lang po kasi kami nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung dalawa.
Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may nangyari na naiwan silang
dalawa [complainant and respondent] na time na silang dalawa lang ang naiwan
sa kuwarto?
Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po nun.
Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa
kuwarto?
Witness 1: Yun lang po kasi yung natatandaan ko po sir na time na naiwan sila eh.
xxxx
Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva
[respondent]?
Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero tapos
na po silang magtype nun tas nag decide na maglunch na eh.
Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan?
Witness 1: Dalawa pa lang sila sir pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman po
si Ma'am Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po ako si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka
si Ma'am Caan yung nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma'am Caan, si
sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nandoon.
Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang iba?
Witness 1: Opo.[33]
The same Transcript also reveals that the CODI interviewed the occupants of the
adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which, according to the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, was only separated from complainant and
respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary, by glass panels.
Pertinent parts of the interview read:
Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang
alas dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]?
Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP Operations Center].
Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong
bandang ganung oras past eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata si Atty. Nieva
[respondent] kay Ms. Reyes (Caan) [complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan
siya parang ganun ang dating eh "Iraised up my voice also, so that the OPCEN
personnel will hear of the alarm" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya?
Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun yung time na ano yung RPCC 764 so
nag-cocoordinate kami...
Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764?
Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa
so intransi po kami... opo...
Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?
Witness 4: Opo lahat kami.
Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw?
Witness 5: Opo.
Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa nun?
Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami ng coordination lahat kami nasa
telepono.
Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig?
Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya
kaming may kausap sa telepono eh.
Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala kayong ginagawa, narinig
niyo ang usapan doon sa kabila.
Witness 5: Yes sir.
Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas.
Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice lang level.
Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may
mga music sila. Eto sir yung time na kinuha... Dami nila eh... Lumabas nakita
naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan nabasa sir.
Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago magalas dose (12) ang pinaka latest message mo dito 02/03/06 11:06. So between
11:06 to 12 wala kayong...
Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga kami kahit... kami lang nandoon sa
telepono.
Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo?
Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book.
xxxx
Mr. Abesamis: Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig niyo si sir
[respondent] sa kabila kung wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na kapag malakas
yung salita?
Witness 4: Opo.
Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas may possibility na maririnig
niyo yung usapan kung walang radio? Siguro if intelligible or knowledgeable pero
maririnig mo sa kabila?
Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?
Mr. Abesarnis: Normal na usapan, conversation.
Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila.
Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?
Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag nagdidictate si Attorney
[respondent] minsan naririnig namin.
Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto?
Witness 4: Ah opo.
Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?
Witness 4: Kung malakas.
Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
Witness 4: Opo.
Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man lang kahit isang word na malakas
doon sa kanila during the time na nangyari ito?
Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming maalala...
Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy kayo sa
telephone operation.
Witness 4: Busy kami.
Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano...
Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae nga pero kala lang namin ah...
Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi?
Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi...
Mr. Abesarnis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang sinasabi mo?
Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na
iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon hinahanap pa namin yung requirement.
Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na
nag-aanuhan ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva
[respondent], wala? May narinig kayong movie na parang sounding
na porno ganun?
Witness 4: Wala music lang talaga sir.
Mr. Mendoza: So music.
Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto
nila.
Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon?
Witness 4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano cartolina na white.
Mr. Borja: Makakatestify lang kayo sa audio eh, kasi wala kayong nakikita.[34]
The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o'clock in
the morning of April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent were left alone in the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as complainant's officemates were all out on
errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to hastily conclude from
the testimonies of complainant's officemates who were interviewed by the CODI
that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a position to
confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in the
office so as to make a credible testimony as to the events that transpired therein
during that time.
Neither can the testimonies of those in the CAAP Operations Center be used to
conclude that respondent did not do anything to complainant, considering that
they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with their
coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is indeed
separated from the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary only by glass panels, they
could not see what was happening there as they covered the glass panels with
white cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official duties as well as
the fact that the glass panels were covered, it is very unlikely for them to have
noticed any commotion happening in the adjacent CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary.
Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the
CODI proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that all those interviewed in
the CODI proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP.
Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a
high-ranking official of the CAAP such as respondent who was the Acting Board
Secretary at that time - lest they earn the ire of such official and put their career
in jeopardy.
Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did
not perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves that
there was indeed a period of time where complainant and respondent were left
alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a window
of opportunity to carry out his acts constituting sexual harassment against
complainant.
More importantly, records reveal that complainant's allegations are adequately
supported by a Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation[35] dated April 13, 2009 stating
that the onset of her psychiatric problems - diagnosed as post-traumatic stress
disorder with recurrent major depression started after suffering the alleged
sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. Moreover, complainant's plight
was ably supported by other CAAP employees[36] as well as a retired Brigadier
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines[37] through various letters to
authorities seeking justice for complainant. Perceptibly, complainant would not
seek help from such supporters, and risk their integrity in the process, if none of
her allegations were true. Besides, there is no evidence to establish that
complainant was impelled by any improper motive against respondent or that she
had reasons to fabricate her allegations against him. Therefore, absent any
competent proof to the contrary, the Court finds that complainant's story of the
April 2, 2009 incident was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias;
and hence, worthy of belief and credence.[38] In this regard, it should be
mentioned that respondent's averment that complainant was only being used by
other CAAP employees to get back at him for implementing reforms within the
CAAP was plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving assertion that
deserves no weight in law.[39]
In addition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's
allegation that he would regularly watch "pampagana" movies in his office-issued
laptop. In fact, respondent readily admitted that he indeed watches "interesting
shows" while in the office, albeit insisting that he only does so by himself, and
that he would immediately dose his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or go
near his table. As confirmed in the Transcript[40] of the investigation conducted by
the CODI, these "pampagana" movies and "interesting shows" turned out to be
pornographic materials, which respondent even asks his male staff to regularly
play for him as he is not well-versed in using computers.[41]
Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches
pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office premises,
during office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously,
the Court cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity on
respondent's part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of
the government agency he works for - the CAAP where he was engaged at that
time as Acting Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal
profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government service, respondent
is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty.[42] However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase
these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of
respect to the government position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse
that he only does so by himself and that he would immediately close his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or come near his table is of no moment, because
the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of this case, remains. The legal
profession - much more an engagement in the public service should always be
held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should be unwavering
exemplars of integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith,
lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
Indeed, those who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice
should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the
weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case.[43]
In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against
respondent were assessed was preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it."[44] Generally, under Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so
far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number. (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon[45] cited by
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the burden of
proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the
complainant.[46] These rulings appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the
matter which contrarily hold that substantial evidence is the quantum of proof to
be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.[47] The latter standard was
applied in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang,[48] wherein the Court
had, in fact, illumined that:
[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum
of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of
evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.[49] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno,[50] it was held:
Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how
proved)] and 2 [(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states
that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as
in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[51] (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v.
Sususco,[52] which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was
pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore,
quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in
administrative cases against lawyers.
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to
preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of
and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates,
"[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor."[54]
With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been
clarified, the Court finds that the present charges against respondent have been
adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her claims
through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion - that is, that respondent had harassed her and committed
despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine, respondent
should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar administrative cases where the lawyer
exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging from reprimand to
disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata,[55] the lawyer was reprimanded for his
distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and
kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña,[56] the lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for rubbing the female
complainant's right leg with his hand, trying to insert his finger into her firmly
closed hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and
pressing his finger against her private part. While in Guevarra v.
Eala[57] and Valdez v. Dabon,[58] the Court meted the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs. Here,
respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of
pornographic materials while in the office and his acts of sexual harassment
against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court deems
it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance and be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS
AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING v. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, GR No. 133090, 2001-01-19
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6,
1998 of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A.
Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc.,
the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of
title a notice of lis... pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15,
1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders,... Inc., filed an opposition to the
motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis
pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed...
an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to
Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.
While making his manifestation, the presiding judge caught the attention of the
petitioner as his companion was taking pictures without consent from the court.
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with
one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of
the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to
the effect that he was... ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his
Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite,
Diosdado Concepcion.
The petitioner explained that they came from a function and thereafter sent out
the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not
cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted
that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman
was in tow with him and the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since
its permission was not sought, such situation was an... abuse of discretion of the
Court.
The respondent of that hearing, Atty. Concepcion of the Register of Deeds
requested Atty. Barzaga to represent him on the said proceeding.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he
needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio
Barzaga to represent him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second
call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist... that he be allowed to mark and present his
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting
that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the
Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are... complicated.
Since Atty. Barzaga was just appointed, the Court allowed them to have time to
submit a formal written opposition. At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that
he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his
documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his
manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard... orderly procedure, the
Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly
proceeding.
As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him
to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing
so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring
flared up and uttered words insulting the Court; such as: `that he knows better
than the latter as he has won all his... cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts,
that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the
inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and
other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing
so.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the
Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
While serving the first day of his sentence, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day,
the petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved until he was released.
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the
Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.
Upon his release, the petitioner then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals
praying for the annulment of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court and
for the reimbursement of the fine P3,000.00.
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order
dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the
reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds... that respondent Judge
Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt
of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that
the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to
the extent of being disrespectful,... annoying and sarcastic towards the court.
The court of appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit however, they found
that the fine exceeded the limit prescribed by the Rules of Court. Therefore,
ordering the return of excess of P1,000 pesos to the petitioner.... the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5,
1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner
Petitioner insisted and so a petition for review on certiorari was submitted before
this court.
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by
respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was
polite and respectful towards the court... as he always addressed the court with
the phrase "your honor please."
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court and appellate court committed error in citing the
petitioner in contempt of court.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.
Ruling:
We disagree.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged
deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as
"your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior
therein:... the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court
(pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,... offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts".
the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor
of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against
Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers from attributing to a... judge "motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case".
behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time
he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely
interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in
edgewise... is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and... the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard
Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to
"exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and... efficient
administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of
the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter
disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an
officer of the Court cannot and... should not be countenanced, if proper decorum
is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions
in espousing the case of his client - by persisting to have his documentary
evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order - he did so in the
honest belief that he was bound to... protect the interest of his client to the best
of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause"
He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort
and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient... administration of
justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility
He should not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct
the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit
any reversible error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is
ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00
out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.
Principles:
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct
the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
In Re Clemente Soriano [G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970]
16AUG
Ponente: CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Attorney Clemente Soriano, by virtue of a pleading entitled “Appearance” filed
with this Court on October 10, 1969, entered his appearance in the a certain case
(L-24114) as “chief counsel of record” for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et
al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was
done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty.
Soriano was in effect asking the Supreme Court to exhume this case from the
archives. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the
respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the
other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases,
to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled “Varsity Hills vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al.” (L-30546). He relied on these premises without
further communicating and ascertaining with the courts on its records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Santiago’s conduct would warrant suspension from the
practice of law.
HELD:
NO. Respondent was simply admonished.
RATIO:
Atty. Clemente M. Soriano was found guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This
inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice
of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in
owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this
Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano
is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier
disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano was ordered, in the case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance
that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino
Tiburcio, et al.
Camacho vs. Pangulayan
1.
2.
3.
a.
b.
FACTS:
• PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not
communicate upon subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer must avoid
everything that may tend to mislead party not represented by counsel and
should not advise him as to law.
• HIRED LAWYER OF DEFENDANTS who had compromised agreements
with CAMACHO’S CLIENTS.
• Required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had
against AMACC (principal defendant) and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it.
i. Denied that they had negotiations, discussion, formulation or
execution.
ii. No longer connected with Pagulayan and Associates Law Offices.
iii. Re-Admission Agreements nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE
involving 9 students of AMACC.
Civil case involved publishing of features or articles in Editorial Board of
DATALINE.
Found guilty by Student Disciplinary Tribunal of using indecent language and
unauthorized use of student publication funds.
Expulsion
Students appeal and was denied by the AMACC President which gave rise to civil
case.
During civil case, apology letters and Re-Admission Agreements were separately
executed by some expelled students.
ISSUE:
Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL
CASE involving 9 students of AMACC?
HELD:
3 MONTHS SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST OTHER RESPONDENTS
THAT DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATION.
• Individual letters and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized in which
PANGULAYAN was already counsel of AMACC.
• Had full knowledge; did not discuss it with the student’s parents or
their counsel.
i. Re-Admission Agreements affected the dismissal of the civil case
because signatories agreed to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings against AMACC.
ATTY. DELIO M. ASERON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE A. DIÑO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
In a verified complaint[1] filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Atty. Delio M. Aseron (complainant)
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Diño, Jr. (respondent) for his alleged
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts of the Disbarment Case
On January 25, 2009, the complainant figured in a vehicular accident along
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City with a bus operated by Nova Auto
Transport, Inc. (NATI) which, at that time, was driven by Jerry Garcia (Garcia).[2]
Consequently, the complainant filed the following cases: (i) a criminal case against
Garcia for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Serious
Physical Injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 025403 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36; (ii) a civil case for Damages against Garcia
and NATI docketed as Ci Case No. Q-09-64558 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 105. In both instances, the respondent is the counsel of
record for Garcia and NATI.[3]
On March 3, 2009, Atty. Alberto H. Habitan, counsel for complainant, demanded
from NATI damages in the amount of not less than Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) as a result of the accident.[4]
The complainant, however, claimed that the respondent's reply letter[5] dated
March 20, 2009, was couched in abusive, disrespectful language, malicious and
unfounded accusations and besmirched his reputation.[6] The reply letter in part
stated:
With reference to said Criminal Case No. 09-025403, we received information that
[the complainant] allegedly used his "influence" in persuading the former
handling Prosecutor of Inquest Case No. 09-388, not to allow the release of the
Passenger Bus with Plate No. TWL-653, unless our client agrees to immediately
pay the mercenary claim of Php 2 Million as demanded by [the complainant].
Fortunately, our client heeded our Law Office's persistent advice not to fall prey
to such hustler tactic.[7]
Due to the insinuations made by the respondent in his reply letter, the
complainant was constrained to file a libel case against the former before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.[8]
Also, the complainant asseverated that the respondent made a mockery of the
judicial system by employing unwarranted dilatory tactics in Criminal Case No.
025403 and Civil Case No. Q-09-64558 by filing numerous motions that were
eventually denied by the courts for lack of merit.[9]
Moreover, the complainant alleged that the respondent committed malpractice
by misleading the court when he admitted ownership of the passenger bus with
body number 054 and plate number TWC 653 as that of NATI in one pleading and
denying it in another.[10]
On February 11, 2010, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[11] directing the respondent to
file his Answer within a period of 15 days from receipt thereof. The respondent,
however, failed to file his Answer within the period given to him.
On August 9, 2010, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice[12] directing the parties to attend a
mandatory conference. The parties were likewise ordered to submit their
respective briefs at least three days prior to the scheduled conference.
On April 6, 2011, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[13] declaring the case submitted for
resolution due to the respondent's failure to attend the mandatory conference
and to file his brief.
Resolutions of the IBP
On November 6, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) issued his Report and Recommendation[14] recommending that a
penalty of censure be meted against the respondent for failure to conduct himself
toward his fellow lawyer with courtesy.
On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution[15] adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero
after finding that the respondent breached his ethical duties as a lawyer and that
the same is fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules.
The respondent, on May 16, 2013, filed his motion tor reconsideration[16] but the
same was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution[17] dated
September 27, 2014 it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. The IBP Board of Governors,
however, modified the penalty by increasing it from censure to reprimand.
Undaunted, the respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Motion
for Reconsideration[18] on April 15, 2015 praying that second motion for
reconsideration[19] be given due course.
Issue
Essentially, the sole issue in the present case is whether or not there is sufficient
evidence on record to hold the respondent liable for violation of the CPR.
Ruling of the Court
The rule does not recognize the filing of a second Motion for Reconsideration
In Bar Matter No. 1755, the Court emphasized the application of Section 12, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, thus:
In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors] that exonerates the
respondent or imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the
aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period
from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed,
the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be
furnished this Court.[20]
Clearly, the rule does not recognize the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the rule expressly provides that the proper remedy of the
losing party is to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 with this Court.
In accordance, however, with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of substantial justice, the Court treats the second Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondent as a petition for review under Rule 45.
This is consistent with the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings which
focuses on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the
bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case.[21]
There is no sufficient reason to reverse the findings of the IBP
Nonetheless, after a careful perusal of the records of the case, the Court agrees
with the findings of the IBP-CBD and the Board of Governors that the respondent
violated the CPR when he used intemperate language in his letter to the
complainant.
Canon 8 of the CPR directs all members of the bar to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the CPR provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In the present case, the respondent's actions failed to measure up to this Canon.
Records show that he imputed to the complainant the use of his influence as a
former public prosecutor to harass his clients during the inquest proceedings
without sufficient proof or evidence to support the same.
As an officer of the court, the respondent could have aired his charge against the
complainant in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language.
He should refrain from being tempted by the adversarial nature of our legal
system to use strong language in pursuit of his duty to advance the interest of his
client.[22] Commissioner Cachapero's Report and Recommendation in part stated:
Indeed, there is a strong showing that the Respondent had failed to conduct
himself toward his fellow lawyer with that courtesy that all have the right to
expect. When he mentioned that Complainant had used his influence in
persuading the fiscal, he used a language which was abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper. He showed ill-feelings toward Complainant and allowed such
feeling to influence him in his conduct and demeanor towards the latter.[23]
The Court has consistently reminded lawyers that though they are entitled to
present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.[24]
As to the penalty, in Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,[25] the Court reprimanded the lawyers
for misconduct in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation.[26]
Here, considering that the respondent was merely over-zealous in protecting the
rights of his client, the Court finds that the recommended penalty by the IBP
Board of Governors to reprimand him for the use of intemperate language against
his fellow lawyer is proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RESOLVES treat respondent Atty.
Jose A. Diño, Jr.'s second Motion for Reconsideration as a Petition for Review
under Rule 45, and DENY the same for lack of merit.
Moreover, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XXI-2014-597
dated September 27, 2014 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors meting out the penalty of REPRIMAND against Atty. Jose A. Diño, Jr.
for breach of his ethical duties as a lawyer.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the bar in good standing.
[G.R. No. L-3593. March 23, 1907. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA
BOSQUE, Defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta, for Plaintiff.
C.W. Ney, for Defendants.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; SUBSCRIPTION TO PLEADINGS. — Under section 102
of the Code of Civil Procedure, pleadings must be subscribed by the party or his
attorney. The subscription of the names of other persons is impliedly prohibited
and is illegal; nor can a subscription by an agent, other than an admitted attorney,
be recognized.
2. ATTORNEY AT LAW. — A person not admitted to the bar may not hold himself
out to the public as engaged in the practice of law, either alone or as associated
with a practicing attorney under a firm name.
3. ID.; CONTEMPT. — An attempt to practice law by a person who has by order of
this court been refused admission to the bar, is a disobedience of such order and
is contempt of court, not qualified by the fact that an appeal has been taken from
the order.
4. ID.; ID. — The repeated irregular signature of pleadings by an attorney in the
name of a firm improperly constituted, with one partner, who, by an order of this
court, had been denied the right to practice, and the participation by him in an
act of contempt committed by such partner, is misbehavior which renders him
guilty of contempt under section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
DECISION
TRACEY, J. :
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground
that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject
and as such was not qualified for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep.,
88), and an order was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing
attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney &
Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law
in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney,
abogado americano."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts,
and with one exception, occurring through an inadvertance, papers from the
office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the
firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney,
abogado."cralaw virtua1aw library
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906,
this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the
defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906,
ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action
thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being
within the law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication
prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or
otherwise; therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor
an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too
obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney.
The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so
named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly
denied admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were
properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names
appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified in
the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by non-qualified
attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. (In re Cooper, 22
N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm
designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the
suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The
defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded
against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted
this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties
or in his official transactions."cralaw virtua1aw library
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to
punishment for acts so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court
has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the
defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to
practice law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding
proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing
it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been entitled under the
statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an
application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court,
while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed
by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to
engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the establishment
of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in
the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign
countries, in regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without
practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not
amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent
of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from
practicing law. One of the most eminent American advocates was an alien
barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. (In re
Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain’s Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the
defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to
which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not
answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand,
under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his
conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the
offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney
participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and
personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a
violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it.
Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of
the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive
character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the
hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the
bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of
200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with
the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.
ALAUYA VS, SOPHIA ALAWI
Facts:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase
of one housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing
company. Thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to
render the contract void ab initio. Several correspondences ensued, all of which
were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the
Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does
not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local
legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.
Alawi filed complaint against Alauya, alleging, that Alawi usurped the title of an
attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an
attorney
Held:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved
for those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had
successfully passed the bar examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and
may only practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title
of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
A.C. No. 9604
March 20, 2013
Facts:
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had
yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit
to attest to such fact.
The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence
an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per
Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of
public document for insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for
dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime Laboratory 6 which examined
three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly
close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures
in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo
were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical
practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before
the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, the
court finds Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
Penalty: suspension from the practice of law for one year
HERNANDO PETELO, COMPLAINT, v. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA, RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO, J.:
This administrative complaint stemmed from the alleged unauthorized filing by
respondent Atty. Socrates Rivera (Atty. Rivera) of a Complaint1 for Declaration of
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note, Certificate of Sale and
Foreclosure Proceedings in Connection with TCT No. 455311 with Damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, captioned as Fe Mojica
Petelo, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact Hernando M Petelo, plaintiff, versus
Emme,2 Bartolome Ramirez, World Partners Bank, and as Necessary Parties, the
Register of Deeds, Makati City and the Assessor's Office, Makati City,
defendants, and docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 13-580.
In the said Complaint, there was a declaration that Fe Mojica Petelo (Fe), thru her
Attorney-in-Fact, Hernando Petelo (Petelo), engaged the legal services of Atty.
Rivera and that Petelo himself caused the preparation of the Complaint.3
Upon discovery of the pendency of the Complaint, Petelo filed on March 31, 2014
a Petition before this Court praying for the disbarment, suspension, or imposition
of any disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Rivera for alleged commission
of acts constituting malpractice of law, misconduct, and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Petelo narrated that sometime in 2011, his sister, Fe,
who was based in the United States of America, designated him as Attorney-inFact to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with Red Dragon Builders
Corporation for the construction of a townhouse on the lot owned by Fe, located
at Brgy. Palanan, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
455711. Complainant claimed that Jessie and Fatima Manalansan,4 the owners of
Red Dragon Builders Corporation, inveigled him into surrendering to them the
original copy of TCT No. 455711 which they eventually used as collateral for the
Php8 million loan they contracted with World Partners Bank without the
knowledge and consent of Petelo. According to Petelo, the Spouses Manalansan
superimposed the name of a certain Emmer B. Ramirez to make it appear that he
was the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Fe in the Special Power of Attorney
instead of Petelo. When the Spouses Manalansan failed to pay the monthly
amortizations, World Partners Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against the
mortgage. During the auction sale, World Partners Bank emerged as the highest
bidder and was issued a certificate of sale over TCT No. 455711.
When Petelo got wind of the foregoing transactions, he instructed his daughter to
secure a certified true copy of TCT No. 455711 from the Register of Deeds of
Makati City. To his surprise, he learned that an entry of lis pendens pertaining to
Civil Case No. 13-580 for Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Promissory Note, Certificate of Sale and Foreclosure Proceedings in Connection
with TCT No. 455311 with Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 150, was annotated at the back of the title. Upon further investigation
with the RTC, Petelo found out that the civil complaint was filed by respondent
Atty. Rivera purportedly on Petelo's and Fe's behalf.
Since he never engaged the services of Atty. Rivera, Petelo wrote the latter a
letter5 seeking clarification/explanation as to how his services was engaged, but
the same went unheeded. Consequently, and in order to draw out Atty. Rivera,
Petelo filed a Manifestation6 with the RTC of Makati City stating that neither he
nor his sister Fe authorized Atty. Rivera to file the aforementioned case. However,
Petelo's ploy to draw out respondent Atty. Rivera was unsuccessful because the
latter did not attend the hearing on Petelo's Manifestation before the RTC.
Bothered by the tum of events, Petelo filed the instant administrative complaint
charging Atty. Rivera with negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer,
because he did not verify the identity of the person he was dealing with prior to
the filing of the civil suit. Also, Petelo posited that if Atty. Rivera was in good faith,
he should have responded to Petelo's letter and attended the hearing on the
manifestation before the RTC. In fine, Petelo asserted that Atty. Rivera engaged in
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
By Resolution7 dated April21, 2014, the Court required Atty. Rivera to file his
Comment on the complaint. Citing his busy schedule and other similar urgent
pleadings to prepare, Atty. Rivera moved for additional period of time within
which to submit his comment.8
However, when Atty. Rivera eventually submitted his Comments, We noticed that
he committed a number of legal somersaults equivalent to the number of
comments he submitted. Stated otherwise, Atty. Rivera presented a different
version each time he submitted a comment. For example, in his Comment9 dated
July 31, 2014 filed before the Court, Atty. Rivera narrated that during the first
week of May 2013, a person representing himself to be Hernando Petelo sought
to engage his legal services regarding the filing of the civil suit. In effect, Atty.
Rivera admitted authorship of the Complaint filed before the RTC ofMakati City,
which a certain Hernando Petelo supposedly caused to be prepared and filed
thereat. However, even after being informed that it was not the real Petelo who
caused the preparation and the filing of the Complaint, Atty. Rivera still saw
nothing wrong in what he did and even prayed for the dismissal of the
administrative complaint for lack of merit. Incidentally, he also informed the
Court that the RTC of Makati City already dismissed Civil Case No. 13-580 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed, in its Order10 dated May
23,2014, the RTC of Makati City ordered the dismissal of the complaint, it being
deemed not filed by the proper party in interest. Moreover, the RTC ofMakati City
held that "[i]t appearing that the lawyer who signed the complaint was not
authorized by the real Hernando Petelo, the alleged Attorney-in-Fact of Fe Mojica
Petelo who disowned knowing him, then, it can be safely concluded that the
lawyer who signed the pleading violated Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court."11
On August 18, 2014, the Court required Petelo to file a Reply to respondent's
Comment.12 The Court, however, dispensed with the filing of the Reply
by.Resolution13 dated July 4, 2016. At the same time, the Court referred this case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Investigating Commissioner scheduled the case
for mandatory conference/hearing14 and, likewise, required Atty. Rivera to file his
Answer.
In compliance with the Order15 of the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Rivera
filed a Comment.16 Perhaps forgetting that he had earlier admitted having filed
the complaint in behalf of Petelo, Atty. Rivera this time presented a totally
different version. He vehemently denied any participation in the preparation and
the filing of the complaint. He even disowned the signatures affixed therein and
even went to the extent of having them labelled as forgeries; he also alleged that
he never attended any of the hearings in the said case.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers. In his Position
Paper, Petelo pointed out that during one of the scheduled mandatory
conferences before the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Rivera made the
following admission: "that he learned about the case thru a disbarred lawyer,
Bede Tabalingcos,17 with whom he had previous collaborations; that his details
were still being used by Tabalingcos' office because before, he allowed them to
sign for him on 'minor' pleadings."18 When asked by the Investigating
Commissioner on how he came to know about the case, he said that he received a
call from Tabalingcos' office. During the same hearing, petitioner admitted that he
remained in contact with the office ofTabalingcos and that said office have been
using his signature/details without his authority."19
In his yet another Comment20 dated June 23, 2014 filed before the IBP, and again
forgetting his protestation on non-participation in the preparation and filing of
the complaint, Atty. Rivera reversed himself and revetted to his earliest version
wherein he admitted that he was the one who filed the civil
complaint.21 Nonetheless, he disavowed having committed any unethical conduct,
and thus moved for the dismissal of the administrative complaint.22 Atty. Rivera,
however, again executed another turnabout by changing his theory in his Position
Paper23 when he denied any hand in the filing of the complaint before the RTC of
Makati City and claimed that the signatures therein were forgeries.
On May 17, 2019, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report with
recommendation that Atty. Rivera be suspended from the practice of law for at
least one (1) year. The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to the version
of Petelo finding the same in accord with normal human experience and
straightforward, while he found the version of Atty. Rivera to have failed the test
of factual consistency, common sense and logic. The Investigating Commissioner
noted the tendency of Atty. Rivera to shift versions of his factual narrations,
particularly with regard to whether he had a hand in the filing of the complaint or
not. In the end, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that the submissions of
Atty. Rivera were "factually implausible if not outrightly erroneous."24 He opined
that "[t]here is no need to belabor the obvious, [that is,]the unauthorized filing of
a Civil Complaint and effecting a Notice of Lis Pendens for and in behalf of a party
is an act which constitutes, at the very least, dishonest and deceitful conduct and
at the same time an act intended to mislead a court of law."25 The defense of
Atty. Rivera that the filing of the complaint and the affixing of his "signatures"
therein might have been orchestrated by the staff of disbarred lawyer Bede
Tabalingcos was given short shrift because it would not serve to exculpate Atty.
Rivera; on the contrary, if given credence, it would even constitute unauthorized
practice of law proscribed under Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.26 The Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP, in its
Resolution27 dated June 29, 2018 resolved to adopt the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Rivera must be meted
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
with a stem warning that repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP there being reasonable
grounds to hold him administratively liable. Indeed, Atty. Rivera's flip-flopping
version deserves no credence at all. What is apparent in his narration is that he
was indeed the one who filed the subject civil suit by allowing somebody to use
his signature and other details in the preparation of pleadings and filing the same
before the court. As correctly pointed out by Petelo, Atty. Rivera's act of allowing
persons other than himself to use his signature in signing papers and pleadings, in
effect, allowed non-lawyers to practice law. Worse, he failed to display or even
manifest any zeal or eagerness to unearth the truth behind the events which led
to his involvement in the filing of the unauthorized civil suit, much less to rectify
the situation. Although he claimed that the signatures were forgeries, there was
nary a display of willingness on his part to pursue any legal action against the
alleged forgers. On the contrary, he openly admitted his association with a
disbarred lawyer and their ongoing agreement to allow the latter to use his
signature and "details" in the preparation of pleadings. By so doing, Atty. Rivera
not only willingly allowed a non-lawyer to practice law; worse, he allowed one to
continue to practice law notwithstanding that this Court already stripped him of
his license to practice law.
Clearly, the foregoing acts of Atty. Rivera constituted violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 9.01, Canon 9, Rule 1.10, Canon 1
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10, which read:
Rule 9.01, Canon 9: A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
Rule 1.1 0, Canon 1: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.0 1, Canon 10: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; now shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
It bears to stress at this juncture that membership to the Bar has always been
jealously guarded such that only those who have successfully hurdled the
stringent examinations, possessed and maintained the required qualifications are
allowed to enjoy the privileges appurtenant to the title. Thus, it has been said that
"[t]he title of 'attorney' is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction."28 "The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is
reserved only for those who meet the twin standards of legal proficiency and
morality. It is so delicately imbued with public interest that it is both a power and
a duty of this Court to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare."29
However, Atty. Rivera abused the privilege that is only personal to him when he
allowed another who has no license to practice law, to sign pleadings and to file a
suit before the court using his signature and "details." By allowing a non-lawyer to
sign and submit pleadings before the court, Atty. Rivera made a mockery of the
law practice which is deeply imbued with public interest; he totally ignored the
fact that his act of filing a suit will have a corresponding impact and effect on the
society, particularly on the life and property rights of the person or persons he
wittingly involved in the litigation, in this case, Fe and Petelo. Atty. Rivera's
cavalier act of allowing someone to use to his signature and his "details" in the
complaint have concomitant and significant effects on the property rights of Fe
and Petelo. Our pronouncement in Republic v. Kenrick Development
Corporation30 is relevant:
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by
the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It
requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates
to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not
delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules
of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession.
Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do
so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01-A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to
just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void.
There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos'
subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that
Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another "as long as it
conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving
statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just
anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondent's
answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed
to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if
it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was
a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere
technicalities have their own valid raison d' etre in the orderly administration of
justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
xxxx
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made
to account for his possible misconduct.
There is, thus, no question in our mind that by delegating to someone else the
work that is reserved only for lawyers, Atty. Rivera violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the actuations of Atty.
Rivera tended to mislead the Court. Indeed, the RTC of Makati City was misled
into believing that the complaint was filed by the real party-in-interest and that
Atty. Rivera was duly authorized to file the same. As it turned out, the RTC
eventually dismissed the complaint after it was established thru the
Manifestation filed by Petelo that it was filed not by the real party-in-interest or
by the duly authorized representative. Atty. Rivera, thus, in violation of Rule
10.01, Canon 10, committed a falsehood, or consented to the doing of any in
court; he not only misled the RTC but likewise wasted its precious time and
resources.
Atty. Rivera must be reminded that "[t]he practice of law is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character,
with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified."31 Being a
personal privilege, Atty. Rivera cannot simply consent to anyone using his
signature and other bar details. Atty. Rivera did not have the authority to bestow
license to anybody to practice law because by doing so, he usurped the right and
authority that is exclusively vested upon this Court. The authority to allow
somebody to practice law and to closely scrutinize the fitness and qualifications of
any law practitioner remains with this Court; and Atty. Rivera has no right
whatsoever to exercise the same. To emphasize, "the right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust."32
Finally, we find the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Rivera from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year warranted by the circumstances of the
case. In Tapay v. Bancolo,33 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension
of one (1) year to the respondent-lawyer therein who was found to have
authorized or delegated to his secretary the signing of the pleadings for filing
before the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Atty. Socrates Rivera administratively liable
for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, and Rule 10.01, Canon 10,
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Socrates Rivera's
record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
•
•
Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a
partner or associate that, upon the latter's
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished
legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer
employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing
agreement.
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant
Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime
in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters
Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and
the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The
property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the
name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch
24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the
hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her
interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to
end LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00
he received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of
the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his
estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement
plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing
arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To
be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must
be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a
case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers.
The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must
be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00
savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings
deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the
compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with
a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3)
years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect
the public and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future
will be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they
possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct8 and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.9 They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this
negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of
complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be
sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of
the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case
No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the
agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal
assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is
unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous
stipulations in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the
validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already
expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her
claims against it.12 As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant
agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she
could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of
a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his
discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal
profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.13
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other people as
a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except in certain cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a
lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes
him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts
and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once
he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and
care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer
should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to
sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses
the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention
to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his client’s cause.18
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six
months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the
amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01,
9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice,
and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the
sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on
the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: