2023 INDEX OF
edited by
Dakota L. Wood


© 2023 by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
ISBN: 978-0-89195-308-1

edited by
Dakota L. Wood


We are honored to dedicate the
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
to Senator James M. Inhofe (R–OK)

Contents
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Kevin Roberts, PhD
Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
AUKUS: New Opportunities for the United States and Its Closest Allies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Peter Jennings
Recruiting the All-Volunteer Force: New Approaches for a New Era.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Richard Brady
Determining the Real Cost of the Tools of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
John G. Ferrari, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Global Operating‌Environment
Assessing the Global Operating Environment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Daniel Kochis
Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Nicole Robinson
Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner, and Walter Lohman
Conclusion: Scoring the Global Operating Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
China.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Dean Cheng
Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Alexis Mrachek
Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
James Phillips
North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Bruce Klingner
Non-State Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
James Phillips and Jeff Smith
Conclusion: Global Threat Level.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
U.S. Military Power
An Assessment of U.S. Military Power.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
U.S. Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
Thomas W. Spoehr
U.S. Army Modernization Table.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
U.S. Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Brent D. Sadler
U.S. Navy Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
U.S. Air Force.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
John Venable
U.S. Air Force Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
U.S. Marine Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Dakota L. Wood
U.S. Marine Corps Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444

Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
U.S. Space Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
John Venable
U.S. Space Force Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
U.S. Nuclear Weapons.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Patty-Jane Geller
Missile Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Patty-Jane Geller
Cyber Warfare and U.S. Cyber Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
James Di Pane
Conclusion: U.S. Military Power.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533

Glossary of Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
Methodology.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Senator James M. Inhofe (R–OK). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Contributors
Heritage Experts
Dakota L. Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served
for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of
the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense’s Director of Net Assessment.
Thomas W. Spoehr, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.), is Director of the Center for National Defense. Before
joining The Heritage Foundation, he served America for more than 36 years in the U.S. Army.
Frederico Bartels is a former Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Center for National Defense. Before
joining The Heritage Foundation, he served for three years as a Policy Analyst with Concerned Veterans for America.
Dean Cheng is a former Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center of the Davis Institute. He specializes in
China’s military and foreign policy.
Maiya Clark is a Senior Research Associate in the Center for National Defense. She focuses on the military
industrial base.
Luke Coffey is a former Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy of the Davis Institute at
the time he contributed to this edition of the Index. He joined Heritage after service as Senior Special Advisor to the
Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
James Di Pane is a Policy Analyst in the Center for National Defense. He focuses on military cyber and the U.S. Coast
Guard and manages production of the Index of U.S. Military Strength.

Patty-Jane Geller is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for National Defense. Her work addresses nuclear
deterrence and missile defense.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades
at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Daniel Kochis is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Davis Institute’s Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, where he specializes in trans-Atlantic security issues including NATO, U.S.–Russia relations, and the Arctic.
Walter Lohman is a former Director of the Asian Studies Center. He has served on the staff of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, in the office of Senator John McCain, and as Executive Director of the U.S.–ASEAN Business Council.
Alexis Mrachek is a former Policy Analyst for Russia and Eurasia in the Allison Center.
James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center. He has also served at the
Congressional Research Service and at the East–West Center.
Nicole Robinson is a Senior Research Associate in the Allison Center. She specializes in Middle East matters.
Brent D. Sadler is Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in the Center for National
Defense. He retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain and served for 26 years as a submarine officer aboard multiple
nuclear submarines and in various senior posts including Naval Attaché, Malaysia, and Senior Advisor to the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Jeff Smith is Director of the Asian Studies Center. He specializes in South Asia, has authored and contributed to
several books on Asian security matters, and formerly served as Director of Asian Security Programs at the American
Foreign Policy Council.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
ix
John Venable is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy in the Center for National Defense. A 25-year veteran of
the U.S. Air Force and F-16 pilot, he served in three combat operations, was commander of the Thunderbirds, and
earned the rank of colonel before retiring.
External Reviewers and Expert Contributors
Richard Brady, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), is CEO of the American Society of Military Comptrollers.
John G. Ferrari, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Peter Jennings is a Senior Fellow at and former Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Robert Soofer, PhD, is Senior Associate (Non-resident), Missile Defense Project, at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Any views presented in or reflecting the results of any prepublication review of this document by an officer or employee of the United States government
are rendered in his or her individual capacity and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States government or any agency thereof.
x
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Acknowledgments
T
to account for changes in content delivery as our
world becomes increasingly digital, portable, and
driven by social media, and the guidance and coordination provided by Director of Research Editors
Therese Pennefather ensured the creation of a cohesive finished product.
We believe that this Index helps to provide a better-informed understanding and wider appreciation of America’s ability to “provide for the common
defence”—an ability that undergirds The Heritage
Foundation’s vision of “an America where freedom,
opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish.”
The Index continues to be cited and referenced across
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We remain encouraged that so many Americans are
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and to help Americans everywhere more fully understand the state of our defenses, our Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security
and Foreign Policy is publishing this ninth annual
edition of the Index of U.S. Military Strength.
In addition to acknowledging all of those who
helped to prepare this edition, very special recognition is due to the Heritage members and donors
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
xi

he Index of U.S. Military Strength is truly a team
effort. This edition includes the work of 20 authors, an amazing research editor, two extraordinarily talented graphics specialists, designers and
marketing specialists and web-design/digital content experts, and a handful of very bright interns—
Conner Bolanos, Jackson Clark, Aaron Eudaimon,
and Grace Hermanson—who assisted with the research and tabulation of budget and acquisition
data that make the service capability tables possible. But among the members of this team, there are
a few special contributors who go the extra mile and
make the Index a remarkable and uniquely special
undertaking.
James Di Pane, Policy Analyst in the Center for
National Defense, extended his winning streak in
shepherding production of the 2023 Index of U.S.
Military Strength. He worked with everyone involved to make this Index a reality, both in print
and on the web.
Senior Editor William T. Poole is a force of nature
in the world of editing, each year using his ability
to maintain a consistent tone, impeccable accuracy, and a fresh approach to conveying essential
information throughout this multi-author document to enhance the excellent work produced by
our authors. Data Graphics Services Manager John
Fleming continued his impressive work in giving
visual life to text and statistics to convey a message
with maximum impact, working with the authors
to explore more creative ways to convey important
information. Research Editor and Paper Production
Specialist Kathleen Scaturro again used her proofreading skills to ensure a high-quality final product.
Graphic Designer Grace DeSandro created the cover
image for this year’s Index. Senior Designer and Web
Developer, Research Projects, Jay Simon and Senior
Digital Strategist Augusta Cassada Irvine ensured
that the presentation of Index materials was tuned

whose continued support has made this 2023 Index
of U.S. Military Strength possible.
Finally, as we do each year, The Heritage Foundation
expresses its enduring appreciation to the members
of the U.S. armed forces who continue to protect the
liberty of the American people in an ever more challenging world.
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Preface
T
destroyer, and the KC-46 tanker must never happen
again. Wasteful spending on unnecessary programs
to push the military to go “green” (which will cost
$3 billion in 2023) must be curtailed. Less effort
should be placed on critical race theory and diversity,
equity, and inclusion programs in favor of increasing readiness.
A strong U.S. military is all the more important
because America’s existential threat—the People’s
Republic of China—is expanding its strength and
global influence with the cunning of serpents. The
Chinese Communist Party has spent the past three
decades methodically leveraging Western elites’ decadence and compromising American institutions to
its own strategic advantage.
China has invested in an arsenal of missiles designed to target U.S. warships, has upgraded its fleet
of fighter jets, and is fielding advanced equipment
that is rivaling the U.S. military’s in quality. U.S. intelligence experts gauge that China has surpassed the
U.S. in hypersonic missiles, space systems, and naval
shipbuilding. It has initiated a massive increase in
its nuclear capabilities. We should remember Vladimir Putin and Ukraine when thinking of China and
Taiwan. America’s adversaries have shown a willingness to do more than simply invest in capabilities;
they have also shown a willingness to use them.
Even if China had no hard military power, its
rancid ideological ambitions, demographic urgency, and institutionalized technological aggression
would make it our most dangerous adversary. That
the Chinese navy is adding the equivalent of the entire British navy every year in new warships, is developing missiles designed to target U.S. warships, is
upgrading its fleet of fighter jets, and now fields an
army 50 percent larger than our own adds an exclamation point to the fact.
This Index of U.S. Military Strength, composed
by experts who have studied these areas for decades,
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
xiii

he Russia–Ukraine War of 2022 shocked many
from the complacency that suggested conventional war was a thing of the past. Vladimir Putin’s
invasion of Ukraine has reminded many countries of
the global threats that remain and has caused several to begin to rebuild their national defenses. It’s
a message the U.S. should heed as well.
U.S. foreign policy has tended to oscillate between
an overreliance on internationalism to remake the
world to America’s liking and an urge to isolate ourselves behind our oceans. Neither policy is appropriate for American interests. The American people
want—and deserve—a new approach to global leadership: policies that draw lessons from our realist and
idealist traditions but apply those lessons narrowly to
American interests rather than elite fantasies.
The world is more dangerous today than it has
ever been. A strong military and effective strategies
to project military strength to friend and foe alike
are not luxuries, but necessities.
Times change; human nature does not.
In global affairs, as on street corners, ideals like
justice, freedom, and human dignity, however true,
are ultimately only as strong as their enforcers. If
America is going to remain free, safe, and prosperous,
it requires the military power necessary to ensure
that its adversaries would never dare to challenge it
on the battlefield. The leaders of Russia and China
understand this.
In Washington, American “strength” is too often,
and lazily, solely measured by military spending—
as if courage, lethality, technology, and ingenuity
were budget line items themselves rather than the
byproducts of intelligent budgeting and inspiring leadership.
If the U.S. military is going to regain its preeminence, the Pentagon must act to be both more focused and more efficient. Procurement disasters
such as the Littoral Combat Ship, the Zumwalt-class
effort too with tariffs, sanctions, economic and institutional disengagement from Chinese agents—and
closer ties to Pacific allies.
We are in a new era, against a new enemy, wielding
and deflecting new weapons. But the fight remains
the same: to protect the American people, our interests, and our unique constitutional freedoms from
oppressive tyrannies abroad and elite complacency
and entitlement here at home. In this fight, as ever,
success is not a battle to win, but a choice to make.

provides an unvarnished assessment of the U.S. military. In many cases, the reports are troubling. The
U.S. Army is the smallest it has been since 1940.
The Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has been
since its inception. The Navy is nowhere near its
goal of 350 ships and is retiring more ships than it
is building.
We need to do not simply more, but better to
check Beijing’s ambitions. A strong and modern
military is not enough. Congress must finally close
the soft-power gap, reclaim information and technological supremacy—and end the high-tech piracy
on which China has built its economic and military
power. We should deploy economic policy in the
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Kevin Roberts, PhD, President
The Heritage Foundation
October 2022
Introduction
T
Soft approaches cost less in manpower and treasure than military action costs and do not carry the
same risk of damage and loss of life, but when the
United States is confronted by physical threats to
its national security interests, it is the hard power
of its military that carries the day. In fact, the absence of military power or the perception that one’s
hard power is insufficient to protect one’s interests
will frequently—and predictably—invite challenges that soft power is ill-equipped to address. Thus,
hard power and soft power are complementary and
mutually reinforcing. An insufficiency of either
damages the other and ultimately jeopardizes the
country’s future.
The decline of America’s military hard power, historically shown to be critical to defending against
major military powers and to sustaining operations
over time against lesser powers or in multiple instances simultaneously, is thoroughly documented
and quantified in this Index. It is harder to quantify
the growing threats to the U.S. and its allies that are
engendered by the perception of American weakness abroad and doubts about America’s resolve to
act when its interests are threatened.
The anecdotal evidence is consistent with direct conversations between Heritage scholars and
high-level diplomatic and military officials from
countries around the world: The aging and shrinking of America’s military forces, their reduced presence in key regions since the end of the Cold War,
and various distractions created by America’s domestic debates have created a perception of American weakness that contributes to destabilization
in many parts of the world, prompts old friends to
question their reliance on America’s assurances, and
spurs them to expand their own portfolio of military
capabilities. While stronger allies are generally a
boon for U.S. security and economic interests, allies
that are less tied to U.S. security assurances reflect
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
1

he United States maintains a military force primarily to protect the homeland from attack and
to protect its interests abroad. Other uses—assisting
civil authorities in times of emergency, for example,
and maintaining the perception of combat effectiveness to deter enemies—amplify other elements of
national power such as diplomacy or economic initiatives, but America’s armed forces exist above all
else so that the U.S. can physically impose its will on
an enemy and change the conditions of a threatening
situation by force or the threat of force.
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of U.S. Military
Strength gauges the ability of America’s military to
perform its missions in today’s world and assesses how the condition of the military has changed
during the preceding year. The Index is not meant
either to predict what the U.S. military might be
able to do in the future or to accord it efficacy today
based on the promise of new technologies that are
in development rather than fielded and proven in
use. It is a report to American citizens on the status
of the military that they join, that they support, and
on which they depend.
The United States prefers to lead through “soft”
elements of national power—diplomacy, economic
incentives, and cultural exchanges—but soft power
cannot ultimately substitute for raw military power. When soft approaches like diplomacy work, their
success often owes much to the knowledge of all involved that U.S. “hard power” stands ready, however silently, in the diplomatic background. In similar
fashion, countries seek an economic relationship
with the United States because of the strength of
the U.S. economy and the country’s perceived longterm viability and stability. All are predicated on
the ability of the U.S. to protect itself, safeguard its
interests, and render assistance to its allies, and all
depend on a competent, effective, and commensurately sized military.

the decline of U.S. influence in regional affairs. For
decades, the perception of American strength and
resolve has helped to deter adventurous bad actors
and tyrannical dictators and has underwritten a vast
network of U.S. allies and partners. Regrettably, both
that perception and, as a consequence, its deterrent
and reassuring effects are eroding.
Recognition of this problem is growing in the U.S.
and was forcefully addressed in the 2018 National
Defense Strategy (NDS), which called for a renewal
of America’s military power. However, spending on
defense must be commensurate with the interests
that the defense establishment is called upon to protect, and there continues to be a significant—even
growing— gap between the two. Meanwhile, America’s allies, with a few notable exceptions, continue to
underinvest in their military forces, and the United
States’ chief competitors are hard at work improving
their own. The result is an increasingly dangerous
world threatening a weaker America.
This can seem odd to many observers because
U.S. forces have dominated the battlefield in tactical engagements with enemy forces over the past
30 years. Not surprisingly, the forces built to battle
those of the Soviet Union have handily defeated the
forces of Third World dictators and terrorist organizations. These military successes, however, are quite
different from lasting political successes and have
masked the deteriorating condition of America’s
military, which has been able to undertake such operations only by “cashing in” on investments made
in the 1980s and 1990s. Unseen by the American
public, the consumption of our military readiness
has not been matched by corresponding investments
in replacements for the equipment, resources, and
capacity used up since September 11, 2001, in places
like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.
It is therefore critical that we understand the
condition of the United States military with respect
to America’s vital national security interests, the
threats to those interests, and the context within
which the U.S. might have to use hard power. It is
likewise important to know how these three areas—
operating environments, threats, and the posture
of the U.S. military—change over time, given that
such changes can have substantial implications for
defense policies and investments.
The U.S. Constitution opens with a beautiful passage in which “We the People” state that among their
handful of purposes in establishing the Constitution
2
was to “provide for the common defence.” The Constitution’s enumeration of limited powers for the
federal government includes the powers of Congress
“To declare War,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To
provide and maintain a Navy,” “To provide for calling forth the Militia,” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” and the
power of the President as “Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”
With such constitutional priority given to defense of the nation and its vital interests, one might
expect the federal government to produce a standardized, consistent reference work on the state
of the nation’s security. Yet no such single volume
exists, especially in the public domain, to allow comparisons from year to year. In the past half-dozen
years, the Department of Defense has moved to restrict reporting of force readiness even further. Thus,
the American people and even the government itself
are prevented from understanding whether investments in defense are achieving their desired results.
What America needs is a publicly accessible reference document that uses a consistent, methodical, and repeatable approach to assessing defense
requirements and capabilities. The Heritage Foundation’s Index of U.S. Military Strength, an annual
assessment of the state of America’s hard power, fills
this void, addressing both the geographical and functional environments that are relevant to the United
States’ vital national interests and the threats that
rise to a level that puts or has the strong potential to
put those interests at risk.
Any assessment of the adequacy of military power
requires two primary reference points: a clear statement of U.S. vital security interests and an objective
requirement for the military’s capacity for operations that serves as a benchmark against which to
measure current capacity. Top-level national security documents issued by a long string of presidential
Administrations have consistently made clear that
three interests are central to any assessment of national military power:
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Defense of the homeland;
Successful conclusion of a major war that has
the potential to destabilize a region of critical
interest to the U.S.; and
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Preservation of freedom of movement within
the global commons: the sea, air, outer space,
and cyberspace domains through which the
nations of the world conduct their business.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
3

advances in their own militaries or that the new
capability might not be as effective as we believed
during its development. The current war in Ukraine
offers compelling evidence of this. Although new
technologies—unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-arEvery President has recognized that protecting mor guided munitions, cyberwarfare—are on display
America from attack is one of the U.S. military’s in abundance, “old school” weaponry like artillery,
fundamental reasons for being. Going to war has rockets, and automatic weapons have proven to be
always been controversial, but the decision to do so devastatingly effective.
has been based consistently on the conclusion that
The historical record of war shows repeatedly that
one or more vital U.S. interests were at stake.
new technologies convey temporary advantages: The
This Index embraces the requirement that the force that wins is usually the one that is best able to
U.S. military should be able to handle two major sustain operations over time, replace combat losses
wars or two major regional contingencies (MRCs) with fresh forces and equipment, and use its capabilisuccessfully at the same time or in closely overlap- ties in novel ways that account for the enemy, terrain,
ping time frames as the most compelling rationale time, and achievable objectives. This reality has led
for sizing U.S. military forces. The basic argument the authors to return consistently to an appreciation
is this: The nation should have the ability to engage of the force’s capacity, the modernity of its capabiliand defeat one opponent and still have the ability ties, and its readiness for close combat with an equalto guard against competitor opportunism: that is, ly capable and competent enemy. Consequently, this
to prevent someone from exploiting the perceived Index continues to emphasize the importance of the
opportunity to move against U.S. interests while two-war force sizing benchmark and the need to enAmerica is engaged elsewhere.
sure that the current force is ready for war and mateThe Index is descriptive, not prescriptive: It re- rially capable of winning in hard combat.
views the current condition of its subjects within
the assessed year and describes how conditions Assessing the World and
have changed during the previous year, informed by the Need for Hard Power
the baseline condition established by the inaugural
The assessment portion of the Index is composed
2015 Index. In short, the Index answers the question, of three major sections that address the aforemen“Have conditions improved or worsened during the tioned areas of primary interest: the operating enassessed year?”
vironments within or through which America’s milThis study also assesses the U.S. military against itary must be employed, threats to U.S. vital national
the two-war benchmark and various metrics that are interests, and the U.S. military services themselves.
explained further in the military capabilities section. For each of these areas, the Index provides context,
Importantly, the Index measures the hard power explaining why a given topic is addressed and how
needed to win conventional wars rather than the it relates to understanding the nature of America’s
general utility of the military relative to the breadth hard-power requirements.
of tasks it might be (and usually is) assigned in order
The authors of this study used a five-category
to advance U.S. interests short of war.
scoring system that ranges from “very poor” to “exThe authors acknowledge that advances in tech- cellent” or “very weak” to “very strong” as appronology can translate into new military capabilities. priate to each topic. This approach was selected as
New tools, platforms, and weapons tend to prompt the best way to capture meaningful gradations while
some observers to assume that older capabilities can avoiding the appearance that a high level of precibe replaced easily with new ones, often in reduced sion was possible given the nature of the issues and
numbers, or that the current force will be trans- the information that was publicly available.
formed in ways that make it decisively better than
Some factors are quantitative and lend themthat of an opponent. Typically missing in the most selves to discrete measurement; others are very
optimistic assessments of what the military might qualitative in nature and can be assessed only
then be able to do is a corresponding recognition through an informed understanding of the material
that competitors quickly adopt similar technological that leads to an informed judgment.
l

By themselves, purely quantitative measures
tell only part of the story when it comes to the
relevance, utility, and effectiveness of hard power.
Using only quantitative metrics to assess military
power or the nature of an operating environment
can lead to misinformed conclusions. For example,
the mere existence of a large fleet of very modern
tanks has little to do with the effectiveness of the
armored force in actual battle if the employment
concept is irrelevant to modern armored warfare.
(Imagine, for example, a battle in rugged mountains.) Also, experience and demonstrated proficiency are often so decisive in war that numerically
smaller or qualitatively inferior but well-trained
and experienced forces can defeat a larger or qualitatively superior adversary that is inept or poorly
led. Again, the differing performance of Russian
and Ukrainian troops is illuminating, and countries
like China are taking note.
The world is still very much a qualitative place,
however digital and quantitative it has become
thanks to the explosion of advanced technologies,
and judgments have to be made in the absence of
certainty. We strive to be as objective and evenhanded as possible in our approach and as transparent as
possible in our methodology and sources of information so that readers can understand why we reached
the conclusions we reached—and perhaps reach
their own as well. The result will be a more informed
debate about what the United States needs in terms
of military capabilities to deal with the world as it is.
A detailed discussion of scoring is provided in each
assessment section.
In our assessment, we begin with the operating
environment because it provides the geostrategic
stage upon which the U.S. attends to its interests:
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The various states that would play significant
roles in any regional contingency;
The terrain that enables or restricts military
operations; the infrastructure—ports, airfields,
roads, and rail networks (or lack thereof )—on
which U.S. forces would depend; and
The types of its linkages and relationships with
a region and major actors within it that cause
the U.S. to have interests in the area or that
facilitate effective operations.
Major actors within each region are identified,
described, and assessed in terms of alliances, political stability, the presence of U.S. military forces and relationships, and the maturity of critical
infrastructure.
Our assessment focuses on three key regions—
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—because of their
importance relative to U.S. vital security, economic,
and diplomatic interests. This does not mean that
we view Latin America and Africa as unimportant.
It means only that the security challenges within
these regions do not currently rise to the level of
direct threats to America’s vital interests as we
have defined them. We addressed their condition
in the 2015 Index and will provide updated assessments when circumstances make such reassessments necessary.
Next is a discussion of threats to U.S. vital interests. Here we identify the countries and non-state
actors that pose the greatest current or potential
threats to U.S. vital interests based on two overarching factors: behavior and capability. We accept
the classic definition of “threat” as a combination
of intent and capability, but while capability has
attributes that can be quantified, intent is difficult
to measure. We concluded that “observed behavior”
serves as a reasonable surrogate for intent because
it is the clearest manifestation of intent.
We based our selection of threat countries and
non-state actors on their historical behavior and
explicit policies or formal statements vis-à-vis U.S.
interests, scoring them in two areas: the degree of
provocative behavior that they exhibited during the
year and their ability to pose a credible threat to U.S.
interests regardless of intent. For example, a state
full of bluster but with only a moderate ability to act
accordingly poses a lesser threat, and a state that has
great capabilities and a record of bellicose behavior
that is opposed to U.S. interests still warrants attention even if it is relatively quiet in a given year.
The combination of behavior and ability to pose a
credible threat eliminates most smaller terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups and many problematic
states because they do not have the ability to challenge America’s vital national interests successfully.
Finally, we address the status of U.S. military
power in three areas: capability (or modernity), capacity, and readiness. To do this, we must answer
four questions:
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
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Do U.S. forces possess operational capabilities
that are relevant to modern warfare?
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Can they defeat the military forces of an opposing country?
Do they have a sufficient amount of such
capabilities?
Is the force sufficiently trained to win in combat, and is its equipment materially ready?
Topical Essays
Each edition of the Index provides the opportunity to share with readers authoritative insights into
issues that affect U.S. military power. Past editions
have included essays on logistics, alliances, experimentation, the spectrum of conflict and the domains
in which forces operate, and special operations forces, among many others. There is a lot of shaft that
makes the pointy end of a spear effective, and we endeavor to explain what this means with these essays.
In this edition, we are pleased to share the work
of authors who address recruiting, the complexity
of military program costs, and a recently announced
agreement between the U.S., the United Kingdom,
and Australia involving naval power.
l
In fiscal year 2022, the military services are
struggling to recruit a sufficient number of
young Americans to fill the ranks. There are
many reasons why this is the case, and there
are substantial consequences for America’s
military power should the services continue
to fall short in their efforts. In his essay, “New
Approaches for a New Era in Recruiting the All
Volunteer Force,” Richard Brady draws on his
extensive experience in the field to explain the
various factors, systems, and processes involved
and to offer recommendations that, if implemented, could help to improve such efforts.

All of these are fundamental to success even if they
are not de facto determinants of success (something
we explain further in the section). We also address the
condition of the U.S. nuclear weapons capability, assessing it in areas that are unique to this military component and critical to understanding its real-world
viability and effectiveness as a strategic deterrent, and
provide a descriptive overview of current U.S. ballistic
missile defense capabilities and challenges.
The Index does not assess (“score”) U.S. cyber and
ballistic missile defense capabilities. There are as yet
no viable metrics by which to measure the capacity,
capability, or readiness of these elements of national
defense, their constituent service components, and
elements of the government that contribute to activities in these domains, and it is not yet clear how one
would assess their roles in measuring “hard combat
power,” which is the focus of this publication. However, we do provide overviews of each functional capability, explaining to the reader the capability as it
is currently constituted and aspects of its function
and contribution.
Contributing from “down under,” Peter Jennings writes from Australia to explain why the
recently signed agreement involving Australia,
the U.K., and the U.S. (AUKUS) is so important to their mutual security interests. The U.S.
and U.K. have agreed to help Australia develop
a nuclear-powered submarine capability. In
“AUKUS: New Opportunities for the United
States and Its Closest Allies,” Jennings provides
context essential to understanding why this
is a big deal.
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John Ferrari concludes with “Determining the
Real Cost of the Tools of War,” a superb explanation of why the defense budget is so hard
to understand. On the surface, a request for
funding to purchase an airplane might appear
simple. However, as one gets into the wicked
details, the multitude of confusing terms, tricky
definitions, and different ways to treat “cost”
can easily mislead any but the most expert analyst to an incorrect understanding of what the
defense budget actually buys.
Scoring U.S. Military Strength Relative
to Vital National Interests
The purpose of this Index is to make the national
debate about defense capabilities better informed
by assessing the U.S. military’s ability to defend
against current threats to U.S. vital national interests within the context of the world as it is. Each of
the elements considered—the stability of regions
and access to them by America’s military forces; the
various threats as they improve or lose capabilities
and change their behavior; and the United States’
armed forces themselves as they adjust to evolving
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
5

fiscal realities and attempt to balance readiness, capacity (size and quantity), and capability (how modern they are) in ways that enable them to carry out
their assigned missions successfully—can change
from year to year.
Each region of the world has its own set of characteristics that include terrain; man-made infrastructure (roads, rail lines, ports, airfields, power grids,
etc.); and states with which the United States has
relationships. In each case, these factors combine
to create an environment that is either favorable or
problematic when it comes to the ability of U.S. forces to operate against threats in the region.
Various states and non-state actors within these
regions possess the ability to threaten—and have
consistently behaved in ways that do threaten—
America’s interests. Fortunately for the U.S., these
major threat actors are few in number and continue
to be confined to three regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—thus enabling the U.S. (if it will
do so) to focus its resources and efforts accordingly.
Unfortunately, however, when one of these major
threat actors does something outrageous like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the damage is not confined
to the immediate region.
Our globally interconnected world means that
local wars have global consequences that lead to severe economic, diplomatic, and security problems
for the U.S., its allies, and its trading partners. Russia’s assault on Ukraine has sent shocks throughout
energy and food markets, causing severe shortages
and spikes in costs for nearly every country. One
can only imagine the catastrophe that would result
if China decided to seize Taiwan or use force to take
control of disputed islands or if Iran’s acquisition
of a nuclear weapons capability prompted Israel to
use force to protect itself. The question that looms
large in any of these scenarios is both simple and
fundamental: Is the U.S. military up to the task of
defending America’s interests?
To that point, America’s military services are beset by aging equipment, shrinking numbers, rising
costs, and problematic funding. These four elements
interact in ways that are difficult to measure in concrete terms and impossible to forecast with any certainty. Nevertheless, the exercise of describing them
and characterizing their general condition is worthwhile because it informs debates about defense policies and the allocation of resources that are necessary if the U.S. military is to carry out its assigned
6
duties. Further, as seen in this 2023 Index, noting
how conditions have changed during the preceding
year helps to shed light on the effects that policies,
decisions, and actions have on security affairs that
involve the interests of the United States, its allies
and friends, and its enemies.
It should be borne in mind that each annual Index
assesses conditions as they are for the assessed year.
This 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength describes
changes that occurred during the preceding year
with updates current as of early September 2022.
Assessments for global operating environment,
threats to vital U.S. interests, and U.S. military power
are shown in the Executive Summary. Factors that
would push things toward “bad” (the left side of the
scale) tend to move more quickly than those that
improve one’s situation, especially when it comes
to the material condition of the U.S. military. Munitions can be expended in seconds, and an airplane
or a tank can be lost in an instant. Replacing either
takes months or years. Similarly, wars unfold at a
breakneck pace and can last weeks, months, or years,
but their aftermath can extend decades into the future, changing the geopolitical and global economic
landscapes in ways that cannot be undone.
Of the three areas measured—global operating
environment, threats to vital U.S. interests, and U.S.
military power—the U.S. can directly control only
one: its own military. The condition of the U.S. military can influence the other two because a weakened
America arguably emboldens challenges to its interests and loses potential allies, but a militarily strong
America deters opportunism and draws partners to
its side from across the globe.
Conclusion
During the decades since the end of the Second
World War, the United States has underwritten
and taken the lead in maintaining a global order
that has benefited more people in more ways than
at any other period in history. Now, however, that
American-led order is arguably under the greatest
stress since its founding, and some wonder whether it will break apart entirely as fiscal and economic
burdens (exacerbated by the costs incurred in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic and the disruptions caused by the Russia–Ukraine War) plague
nations, violent extremist ideologies threaten the
stability of entire regions, state and non-state opportunists seek to exploit upheavals, and major states
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
compete to establish dominant positions in their
respective regions.
America’s leadership role remains in question,
and its security interests are under substantial pressure. Challenges continue to grow, long-standing
allies are not what they once were, and the U.S. is
increasingly bedeviled by debt and domestic discord
that constrain its ability to sustain its forces at a level that is commensurate with its interests.
Informed deliberations on the status of America’s
military power are therefore desperately needed. It
is our hope, as always, that the Index of U.S. Military
Strength will help to facilitate those deliberations.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
7

Executive Summary
“As currently postured, the U.S. military is at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of
defending America’s vital national interests. It is
rated as weak relative to the force needed to defend
national interests on a global stage against actual
challenges in the world as it is rather than as we
wish it were. This is the logical consequence of years
of sustained use, underfunding, poorly defined
priorities, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and a
profound lack of seriousness across the national security establishment even as threats to U.S. interests
have surged.”
T
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
9

officials and to the American public, to gauge the U.S.
military’s ability to perform its missions in today’s
world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a
baseline assessment on which each annual edition
builds, one that both assesses the state of affairs for
its respective year and measures how key factors
have changed during the preceding year.
The Index is not an assessment of what might be,
although the trends that it captures may well imply
both concerns and opportunities that can guide
decisions that are germane to America’s security.
Rather, the Index should be seen as a report card for
how well or poorly conditions, countries, and the U.S.
military have evolved during the assessed year. The
he United States maintains a military force to past cannot be changed, but it can inform, just as the
protect the homeland from attack and to pro- future cannot be predicted but can be shaped.
tect its interests abroad. There are other uses, of
course—for example, to assist civil authorities in What the Index Assesses
times of emergency or to deter enemies—but this
The Index of U.S. Military Strength assesses the
force’s primary purpose historically has been to ease or difficulty of operating in key regions based
make it possible for the U.S. to physically impose its on existing alliances, regional political stability, the
will on an enemy when necessary.
presence of U.S. military forces, and the condition
It is therefore critical that the American people of key infrastructure. Threats are assessed based on
understand the condition of the United States mili- the behavior and physical capabilities of actors that
tary with respect to America’s vital national security pose challenges to vital U.S. national interests. The
interests, threats to those interests, and the context condition of America’s military power is measured
within which the U.S. might have to use “hard pow- in terms of its capability or modernity, capacity for
er” to protect those interests. Because changes can operations, and readiness to handle assigned mishave substantial implications for defense policies sions. This framework provides a single-source refand investment, knowing how these three areas erence for policymakers and other Americans who
change over time is likewise important. Of the three, seek to know whether our military is up to the task
the condition of the military is the most important of defending our national interests.
to understand because it is the only one over which
Any discussion of the aggregate capacity and
the U.S. has complete control, and it underwrites breadth of the military power needed to protect U.S.
the ability of all other aspects of national power to security interests requires a clear understanding of
flourish or fail.
precisely what interests must be defended. Three viEach year, The Heritage Foundation’s Index of tal interests have been specified consistently (albeit
U.S. Military Strength employs a standardized, con- in varying language) by a string of Administrations
sistent set of criteria, accessible both to government over the past few decades:
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Defense of the homeland;
Successful conclusion of a major war that has
the potential to destabilize a region of critical
interest to the U.S.; and
Preservation of freedom of movement within
the global commons (the sea, air, outer space,
and cyberspace domains) through which the
world conducts its business.
To defend these interests effectively on a global scale, the United States needs a military force of
sufficient size: what is known in the Pentagon as capacity. The many factors involved make determining
how big the military should be a complex exercise,
but successive Administrations, Congresses, Department of Defense staffs, and independent commissions have managed to arrive at a surprisingly
consistent force-sizing rationale: an ability to handle two major conflicts simultaneously or in closely
overlapping time frames.
At its root, the current National Defense Strategy (NDS) implies the same force requirement.1 Its
emphasis on a return to long-term competition with
major powers, explicitly naming Russia and China
as primary competitors,2 reemphasizes the need for
the United States to have:
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Sufficient military capacity to deter or win
against large conventional powers in geographically distant regions,
The ability to conduct sustained operations
against lesser threats, and
The ability to work with allies and maintain a
U.S. presence in regions of key importance that
is sufficient to deter behavior that threatens
U.S. interests.
No matter how much America desires that the
world be a simpler, less threatening place that is
more inclined to beneficial economic interactions
than violence-laden friction, the patterns of history
show that competing powers consistently emerge
and that the U.S. must be able to defend its interests
in more than one region at a time. Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, China’s dramatic expansion of its military and its provocative behavior far beyond the
10
Indo-Pacific region, North Korea’s intransigence
with respect to even discussing its nuclear capabilities, and Iran’s dogged pursuit of a nuclear weapon
capability and sustained support for terrorist groups
illustrate this point. Consequently, this Index embraces the two-war or two-contingency requirement.
Since its founding, the U.S. has been involved in a
major “hot” war every 15–20 years. Since World War
II, the U.S. has also maintained substantial combat
forces in Europe and other regions while simultaneously fighting major wars as circumstances demanded. The size of the total force roughly approximated
the two-contingency model, which has the inherent ability to meet multiple security obligations
to which the U.S. has committed itself while also
modernizing, training, educating, and maintaining
the force. Accordingly, our assessment of the adequacy of today’s U.S. military is based on the ability
of America’s armed forces to engage and defeat two
major competitors at roughly the same time.
We acknowledge that without a dramatic change
in circumstances such as the onset of a major conflict,
a multitude of competing interests that evolve during
extended periods of peace and prosperity will cause
Administrations and Congresses to favor spending on
domestic programs rather than investing in defense.
Extended peace leads to complacency, which can lead
to distraction and less willingness to invest in defense.
The result: a weakened military, competitors that are
emboldened, and a nation at risk. Consequently, winning the support needed to increase defense spending to the level that a force with a two-war capacity
requires is admittedly difficult politically. But this
does not change the patterns of history, the behavior
of competitors, or the reality of what it takes to defend
America’s interests in an actual war.
This Index’s benchmark for a two-war force is
derived from a review of the forces used for each
major war that the U.S. has undertaken since World
War II and the major defense studies completed by
the federal government over the past 30 years. We
concluded that a standing (Active Component) twowar–capable force would consist of:
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Army: 50 brigade combat teams (BCTs);
Navy: 400 battle force ships and 624
strike aircraft;
Air Force: 1,200 fighter/ground-attack aircraft;
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
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Marine Corps: 30 battalions; and
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Space Force: metric not yet established.
This recommended force does not account for
homeland defense missions that would accompany
a period of major conflict and are generally handled
by Reserve and National Guard forces. Nor does it
constitute the totality of the Joint Force, which
includes the array of supporting and combat-enabling functions that are essential to the conduct
of any military operation: logistics; transportation
(land, sea, and air); health services; communications
and data handling; and force generation (recruiting,
training, and education) to name only a few. Rather,
these are combat forces that are the most recognizable elements of America’s hard power but that also
can be viewed as surrogate measures for the size and
capability of the larger Joint Force.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
11

The Global Operating Environment
The United States is a global power with global
security interests, and its military must be able to
protect those interests anywhere they are threatened. While this may occur in any region, three regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—stand
apart because of the scale and scope of U.S. interests associated with them and the significance of
competitors that are able to pose commensurately
large threats. Aggregating the three regional scores
provides a global operating environment score of
FAVORABLE in the 2023 Index.
Europe. Overall, the European region remains
stable, mature, and friendly to U.S. military operational requirements. Russia remains the preeminent
military threat to the region, both conventionally
and unconventionally, and its invasion of Ukraine
marks a serious escalation in its efforts to exert influence on its periphery. China continues to have a
significant presence in Europe and, by mitigating
sanctions, has been a key enabler of the Russian
government’s ability to conduct the war in Ukraine.
The past year saw continued U.S. reengagement
with the continent along with increases in European allies’ defense budgets and capability investment
spurred by alarm over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
and related threats to countries that are supporting
Ukraine’s defense.
It is difficult to predict whether NATO’s renewed
emphasis on collective defense and its reinvigorated
defense spending will continue in the long term or
whether this is a short-term response to Russia’s
invasion. We hope for the former but must plan
against the latter.
For Europe, scores this year remained steady, as
they did in 2021 (assessed in the 2022 Index), with
no substantial changes in any individual categories
or average scores. The 2023 Index again assesses the
European operating environment as “favorable.”
The Middle East. The Middle East region is
now highly unstable, both because its authoritarian regimes have eroded and because it continues
to serve as a breeding ground for terrorism. Overall, regional security has continued to deteriorate.
Although Iraq has restored its territorial integrity
since the defeat of ISIS, the political situation and
future relations between Baghdad and the United
States will remain difficult as long as a government that is sympathetic to Iran is in power. U.S.
relations in the region will remain complex, but
this has not stopped the U.S. military from operating as needed.
The region’s primary challenges—continued
meddling by Iran and surging transnational terrorism—are made more difficult by Sunni–Shia sectarian divides, the more aggressive nature of Iran’s Islamist revolutionary nationalism and its open pursuit
of nuclear weapon capabilities, and the proliferation
of Sunni Islamist revolutionary groups.
In the Middle East, the U.S. benefits from operationally proven procedures that leverage bases, infrastructure, and the logistical processes needed to
maintain a large force forward deployed thousands
of miles away from the homeland. The personal links
between allied armed forces are also present, and
joint training exercises improve interoperability and
give the U.S. an opportunity to influence some of the
region’s future leaders.
America’s relationships in the region are pragmatic, based on shared security and economic concerns. As long as these issues remain relevant to both
sides, the U.S. is likely to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests
require that it do so.
Although circumstances in all measured areas
vary throughout the year, in general terms, the 2023
Index assesses the Middle East operating environment as “moderate,” but the region’s political stability continues to be “unfavorable” and will remain a
dark cloud over everything else.
Global Operating Environment: Summary
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
FAVORABLE
EXCELLENT
Operating Environment: Europe
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
FAVORABLE
Alliances
EXCELLENT
%
Political Stability
%
U.S. Military Posture
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%
Operating Environment: Middle East
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
Alliances
FAVORABLE
EXCELLENT
FAVORABLE
EXCELLENT
%
Political Stability

MODERATE
%
U.S. Military Posture
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%
Operating Environment: Asia
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
Alliances
%
Political Stability
%
U.S. Military Posture
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%
Global Operating Environment
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
Europe
Middle East
12
FAVORABLE
%
%
Asia
%
OVERALL
%
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
EXCELLENT
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Interests that conflict with those of the
United States;
Sometimes hostile intentions toward
the U.S.; and
In some cases, growing military capabilities
that are leveraged to impose an adversary’s
will by coercion or intimidation of neighboring countries, thereby creating regional
instabilities.
The government of the United States constantly
faces the challenge of employing the right mix of diplomatic, economic, public information, intelligence,
and military capabilities to protect and advance its
interests. Because this Index focuses on the military component of national power, its assessment
of threats is correspondingly an assessment of the
military or physical threat posed by each entity addressed in this section.
Russia remains the primary threat to American
interests in Europe as well as the most pressing
threat to the United States. Its invasion of Ukraine
reintroduced conventional war to Europe. It also is
the largest conflict on that continent since the end of
the Second World War, and its many economic and
security repercussions are felt across the globe. Moscow also remains committed to massive pro-Russia
propaganda campaigns in other Eastern European
countries as well as disruptive activities around its
periphery and across the Middle East.
The 2023 Index again assesses the threat emanating from Russia as “aggressive” in its behavior and “formidable” (the highest category on the
scale) in its growing capabilities. Though Russia
is consuming its inventory of munitions, supplies,
equipment, and even military personnel in its war
against Ukraine, it is also replacing those items
and people. Unlike Ukraine’s, Russia’s industrial
capacity remains untouched by the war, and will
allow Moscow to replace older equipment lost in
the conflict with newly manufactured items. Russia’s military is also gaining valuable combat experience. Consequently, the war may actually serve
to increase the challenge that Russia poses to U.S.
Threats to U.S. Interests
interests on the continent.
America faces challenges to its security at home
China, the most comprehensive threat the
and interests abroad from countries and organiza- U.S. faces, remained “aggressive” in the scope of
tions that have:
its provocative behavior and earns the score of
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
13

Asia. The Asian strategic environment includes
half of the globe and is characterized by a variety of
political relationships among states with wildly varying capabilities. This makes Asia far different from
Europe, which in turn makes America’s relations
with the region different from its relations with Europe. American conceptions of Asia must recognize
the physical limitations imposed by the tyranny of
distance and the need to move forces as necessary to
respond to challenges from China and North Korea.
The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations
and the lack of an integrated, regional security architecture along the lines of NATO make defense of
U.S. security interests more challenging than many
Americans appreciate. However, the U.S. has strong
relations with allies in the region, and their willingness to host bases helps to offset the vast distances
that must be covered.
The militaries of Japan and the Republic of Korea
are larger and more capable than European militaries, and both countries are becoming more interested in developing missile defense capabilities that
will be essential in combatting the regional threat
posed by North Korea. In Japan, the growing public
awareness of the need to adopt a more “normal” posture militarily in response to China’s increasingly
aggressive actions indicates a break with the pacifist
tradition among the Japanese since the end of World
War II. This could lead to improved military capabilities and the prospect of joining the U.S. in defense
measures beyond the immediate vicinity of Japan.
We continue to assess the Asia region as “favorable” to U.S. interests in terms of alliances, overall
political stability, militarily relevant infrastructure,
and the presence of U.S. military forces.
Summarizing the condition of each region enables
us to get a sense of how they compare in terms of the
difficulty that would be involved in projecting U.S.
military power and sustaining combat operations in
each one. As a whole, the global operating environment maintains a score of “favorable,” which means
that the United States should be able to project military power anywhere in the world to defend its interests without substantial opposition or high levels
of risk other than those imposed by a capable enemy.
Threats to U.S. Vital Interests: Summary
SEVERE
HIGH
ELEVATED
GUARDED
LOW
Behavior of Threats
HOSTILE
AGGRESSIVE
China
%
Russia
%
Iran
%
North Korea
TESTING
ASSERTIVE
BENIGN
ASPIRATIONAL
MARGINAL
GUARDED
LOW
%
Non-State Actors
%
OVERALL
%
Capability of Threats

FORMIDABLE
China
%
Russia
%
GATHERING
Iran
%
North Korea
%
Non-State Actors
CAPABLE
%
OVERALL
%
Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
SEVERE
HIGH
China
%
Russia
%
Iran
%
North Korea
%
Non-State Actors
%
OVERALL
%
“formidable” for its capability because of its continued investment in the modernization and expansion
of its military and the particular attention it has paid
to its space, cyber, and artificial intelligence capabilities. The People’s Liberation Army continues
14
ELEVATED
to extend its reach and military activity beyond its
immediate region and engages in larger and more
comprehensive exercises, including live-fire exercises in the East China Sea near Taiwan and aggressive
naval and air patrols in the South China Sea.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
and international financial institutions. This Index
therefore assesses the overall threat from North
Korea, considering the range of contingencies, as
“testing” for level of provocation of behavior and
“gathering” for level of capability.
A broad array of terrorist groups remain the
most hostile of any of the threats to America examined in the Index. The primary terrorist groups
of concern to the U.S. homeland and to Americans
abroad are the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS) and al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and its branches remain active and effective in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and
the Sahel of Northern Africa. Though no longer a
territory-holding entity, ISIS also remains a serious
presence in the Middle East, in South and Southeast
Asia, and throughout Africa, threatening stability as
it seeks to overthrow governments and impose an
extreme form of Islamic law. Its ideology continues
to inspire attacks against Americans and U.S. interests. Fortunately, Middle East terrorist groups
remain the least capable threats facing the U.S., but
they cannot be dismissed.
Just as there are American interests that are
not covered by this Index, there may be additional
threats to American interests that are not identified here. This Index focuses on the more apparent
sources of risk and those that appear to pose the
greatest threat.
Compiling the assessments of these threat sources, the 2023 Index again rates the overall global
threat environment as “aggressive” and “gathering”
in the areas of threat actor behavior and material
ability to harm U.S. security interests, respectively,
leading to an aggregated threat score of “high.”
The Status of U.S. Military Power
Finally, we assessed the military power of the
United States in three areas: capability, capacity, and
readiness. We approached this assessment service by
service as the clearest way to link military force size;
modernization programs; unit readiness; and (in
general terms) the functional combat power (land,
sea, air, and space) that each service represents.
We treated the United States’ nuclear capability
as a separate entity because of its truly unique characteristics and constituent elements, from the weapons themselves to the supporting infrastructure that
is fundamentally different from the infrastructure
that supports conventional capabilities. While not
fully assessing cyber as we do the Army, Navy, Air
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
15

China also continues to conduct probes of the
South Korean and Japanese air defense identification zones, drawing rebukes from both Seoul and Tokyo, and its statements about Taiwan and exercise
of military capabilities in the air and sea around the
island have been increasingly belligerent. China is
taking note of the war in Ukraine and U.S. military
developments and has been adjusting its own posture, training, and investments accordingly.
Iran represents by far the most significant security challenge to the United States, its allies, and its
interests in the greater Middle East. Its open hostility to the United States and Israel, sponsorship
of terrorist groups like Hezbollah, and history of
threatening the commons underscore the problem it
could pose. Today, Iran’s provocations are of primary
concern to the region and America’s allies, friends,
and assets there. Iran relies heavily on irregular (to
include political) warfare against others in the region and fields more ballistic missiles than any of
its neighbors.
Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and its potential nuclear capability also make it a long-term
threat to the security of the U.S. homeland. In addition, Iran has continued its aggressive efforts to
shape the domestic political landscape in Iraq, adding to the region’s general instability. The 2023 Index
extends the 2022 Index’s assessment of Iran’s behavior as “aggressive” and its capability as “gathering.”
North Korea’s military poses a security challenge for American allies South Korea and Japan,
as well as for U.S. bases in those countries and on
the island territory of Guam. North Korean officials
are belligerent toward the United States, often issuing military and diplomatic threats. Pyongyang also
has engaged in a range of provocative behavior that
includes nuclear and missile tests and tactical-level
attacks on South Korea. It has used its missile and
nuclear tests to enhance its prestige and importance
domestically, regionally, and globally and to extract
various concessions from the U.S. in negotiations on
its nuclear program and various aid packages.
Such developments also improve North Korea’s
military posture. U.S. and allied intelligence agencies assess that Pyongyang has already achieved nuclear warhead miniaturization, the ability to place
nuclear weapons on its medium-range missiles, and
the ability to reach the continental United States
with a missile. North Korea also uses cyber warfare
as a means of guerilla warfare against its adversaries

Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force, we acknowledge the importance of new tools and organizations
that have become essential to deterring hostile behavior and winning wars.
These three areas of assessment (capability, capacity, and readiness) are central to the overarching
questions of whether the U.S. has a sufficient quantity of appropriately modern military power and
whether military units are able to conduct military
operations on demand and effectively.
As reported in all previous editions of the Index,
the common theme across the services and the
U.S. nuclear enterprise is one of force degradation
caused by many years of underinvestment, poor execution of modernization programs, and the negative
effects of budget sequestration (cuts in funding) on
readiness and capacity in spite of repeated efforts
by Congress to provide relief from low budget ceilings imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011. The
services have undertaken efforts to reorient from
irregular warfare to large-scale combat against a
peer adversary, but such shifts take time and even
more resources.
Because of the rising costs of fuel, munitions, and
repair parts and the lack of qualified maintainers
and maintenance facilities, much of the progress in
regaining readiness that had been made in 2020 and
2021 has been lost in 2022. The forecast for 2023 is
likewise gloomy given a proposed defense budget for
FY 2023 that will not be sufficient to keep pace with
ongoing and dramatic increases in inflation.
Experience in warfare is ephemeral and context-sensitive. Valuable combat experience is lost
as servicemembers who individually gained experience leave the force, and it retains direct relevance
only for future operations of a similar type: Counterinsurgency and adviser support operations in Iraq,
for example, gained over the past two decades are
fundamentally different from major conventional
operations against a state like Iran or China.
Although portions of the current Joint Force are
experienced in some types of operations, the force as
a whole lacks experience with high-end, major combat operations of the sort being seen in Ukraine and
toward which the U.S. military services have only recently begun to redirect their training and planning.
Additionally, the force is still aged and shrinking in
its capacity for operations even if limited quantities
of new equipment like the F-35 Lightning II fighter
are being introduced.
16
We characterized the services and the nuclear
enterprise on a five-category scale ranging from
“very weak” to “very strong,” benchmarked against
criteria elaborated in the full report. These characterizations should not be construed as reflecting either the competence of individual servicemembers
or the professionalism of the services or Joint Force
as a whole; nor do they speak to the U.S. military’s
strength relative to the strength of other militaries around the world in direct comparison. Rather,
they are assessments of the institutional, programmatic, and material health or viability of America’s
hard military power benchmarked against historical instances of use in large-scale, conventional
operations and current assessments of force levels
likely needed to defend U.S. interests against major enemies in contemporary or near-future combat operations.
Our analysis concluded with these assessments:
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Army as “Marginal.” The Army’s score
remains “marginal” in the 2023 Index, and significant challenges that have arisen during the
year call into question whether it will improve
its status in the year ahead. Though the Army
has sustained its commitment to modernizing
its forces for great-power competition, its modernization programs are still in their development phase, and it will be a few years before
they are ready for acquisition and fielding. In
other words, the Army is aging faster than it
is modernizing. It remains “weak” in capacity
with only 62 percent of the force it should have.
However, 25 of its 31 Regular Army BCTs are
at the highest state of readiness, thus earning a
readiness score of “very strong” and conveying
the sense that the service knows what it needs
to do to prepare for the next major conflict.
Nevertheless, the Army’s internal assessment
must be balanced against its own statements
that unit training is focused on company-level
operations rather than battalion or brigade
operations. Consequently, how these “ready”
brigade combat teams would actually perform
in combat is an open question.
Navy as “Weak.” This worrisome score, a
drop from “marginal” assessed in the 2022
Index, is driven by problems in capacity (“very
weak”) and readiness (“weak”). This Index
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
assesses that the Navy needs a battle force of
400 manned ships to do what is expected of it
today. The Navy’s current battle force fleet of
298 ships and intensified operational tempo
combine to reveal a service that is much too
small relative to its tasks. Contributing to a lower assessment is the Navy’s persistent inability
to arrest and reverse the continued diminution
of its fleet as adversary forces grow in number and capability. If its current trajectory is
maintained, the Navy will shrink further to 280
ships by 2037. Current and forecasted levels of
funding will prevent the Navy from altering its
decline unless Congress undertakes extraordinary efforts to increase assured funding for
several years.
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Marine Corps as “Strong.” The score for
the Marine Corps was raised to “strong” from
“marginal” in the 2022 Index and remains
“strong” in this edition for two reasons: (1)
because the 2021 Index changed the threshold for capacity, lowering it from 36 infantry
battalions to 30 battalions in acknowledgment
of the Corps’ argument that it is a one-war
force that also stands ready for a broad range of
smaller crisis-response tasks, and (2) because
of the Corps’ extraordinary, sustained efforts
to modernize (which improves capability) and
enhance its readiness during the assessed year.
Of the five services, the Corps is the only one
that has a compelling story for change, has a
credible and practical plan for change, and is
effectively implementing its plan to change.
However, in the absence of additional funding
that would enable the Corps to maintain higher
end strength while also pursuing its modernization and reorientation efforts, the Corps
will reduce the number of its battalions even
further to just 21, and this reduction will limit
the extent to which it can conduct distributed
operations as envisioned and replace combat
losses (thus limiting its ability to sustain operations). Though the service remains hampered
by old equipment in some areas, it has nearly
completed modernization of its entire aviation
component, is making good progress in fielding a new amphibious combat vehicle, and is
fast-tracking the acquisition of new anti-ship
and anti-air weapons. Full realization of its redesign plan will require the acquisition of a new
class of amphibious ships, for which the Corps
needs support from the Navy.
Space Force as “Weak.” The mission sets,
space assets, and personnel that have transitioned to the Space Force from the other
services since its establishment in December
2019 and that have been added over the past
two years have enabled the service to sustain
its support to the Joint Force. However, there
is little evidence that the USSF has improved its
readiness to provide nearly real-time support
to operational and tactical levels of force operations or that it is ready in any way to execute defensive and offensive counterspace operations
to the degree envisioned by Congress when it
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
17

Air Force as “Very Weak.” The Air Force
has been downgraded once again, the second,
time in the past two years. The Air Force was
assessed as “marginal” in the 2021 Index but,
with public reporting of the mission readiness and physical location of combat aircraft
implying that it would have a difficult time
responding rapidly to a crisis, fell to a score
of “weak” in the 2022 Index. During FY 2022,
the year assessed for this Index, problems with
pilot production and retention, an extraordinarily small amount of time in the cockpit
for pilots, and a fleet of aircraft that continues
to age compounded challenges even more,
leading to the current score of “very weak,” the
lowest on our scale. The USAF currently is at
86 percent of the capacity required to meet
a two-MRC benchmark, it is short 650 pilots,
the average age of its fighter aircraft fleet is
32 years old, and pilots are flying barely more
than once per week across all types of aircraft.
New aircraft like the F-35 and KC-46 are being
introduced, but the pace is too slow. Although
there is a chance the Air Force might win a
single MRC in any theater, there is little doubt
that it would struggle in war with a peer competitor. Both the time required to win such a
conflict and the attendant rates of attrition
would be much higher than they would be if
the service had moved aggressively to increase
high-end training and acquire the fifth-generation weapon systems required to dominate
such a fight.
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U.S. Military Power: Army
VERY WEAK
Capacity
WEAK
MARGINAL
STRONG
VERY STRONG
%
Capability
%
Readiness
%
OVERALL
%
U.S. Military Power: Navy
VERY WEAK
Capacity
WEAK
MARGINAL
STRONG
VERY STRONG
STRONG
VERY STRONG
STRONG
VERY STRONG
%
Capability
%
Readiness
%
OVERALL
%
U.S. Military Power: Air Force

VERY WEAK
WEAK
MARGINAL
Capacity
%
Capability
%
Readiness
%
OVERALL
%
U.S. Military Power: Marine Corps
VERY WEAK
Capacity
WEAK
MARGINAL
%
Capability
%
Readiness
%
OVERALL
%
U.S. Military Power: Space
VERY WEAK
18
WEAK
Capacity
%
Capability
%
Readiness
%
OVERALL
%
MARGINAL
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
STRONG
VERY STRONG
U.S. Military Power: Nuclear
VERY WEAK
WEAK
MARGINAL
STRONG
Nuclear Stockpile
%
Delivery Platform
Reliability
%
Warhead
Modernization
VERY STRONG
%
Delivery Systems
Modernization
%
Nuclear Weapons
Complex
%
National Labs Talent
%
Allied Assurance
%
OVERALL
%
U.S. Military Power
VERY WEAK
WEAK
Army
STRONG
VERY STRONG
%
Navy
Air Force
MARGINAL
%
%

Marine Corps
%
Space
%
Nuclear
%
OVERALL
%
authorized the creation of the Space Force. The
majority of its platforms have exceeded their
life span, and modernization efforts to replace
them are slow and incremental. The service’s
two counterspace weapons systems (Meadowlands and Bounty Hunter) cover only a fraction
of the offensive and defensive capabilities
required to win a conflict in space. Other counterspace systems are likely being developed or,
like cyber, are already in play without public announcement. Nevertheless, the USSF’s current
visible capacity is not sufficient to support, fight,
or weather a war with a peer competitor.
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Nuclear Capabilities as “Strong” but
Trending Toward “Marginal” or Even
“Weak.” This conclusion is sustained from
the 2022 Index. The scoring for U.S. nuclear
weapons must be considered in the context of
a threat environment that is significantly more
dangerous than it was in previous years. Until
recently, U.S. nuclear forces needed to address
one nuclear peer rather than two. Given senior
leaders’ reassurances with respect to the readiness and reliability of U.S. nuclear forces, as
well as the strong bipartisan commitment to
modernization of the entire nuclear enterprise,
this year’s Index retains its grade of “strong,”
but only for now. U.S. nuclear forces face many
risks that, without a continued commitment to
a strong deterrent, could warrant a decline to
an overall score of “marginal” or “weak.” The
reliability of current U.S. delivery systems and
warheads is at risk as they continue to age and
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
19

the threat continues to advance. Iran, for example, has announced an ability to enrich uranium to 60 percent (90 percent is needed for a
weapon), and Russia and China are aggressively
expanding the types and quantities of nuclear
weapons in their inventories. Nearly all components of the nuclear enterprise are at a tipping
point with respect to replacement or modernization and have no margin left for delays
in schedule. Future assessments will need to
consider plans to adjust America’s nuclear forces to account for the doubling of peer nuclear
threats. While capacity was not assessed this
year, it is clear that the change in threat warrants a reexamination of U.S. force posture and
the adequacy of current modernization plans.
Failure to keep modernization programs on
track while planning for a three-party nuclear
peer dynamic could lead inevitably to a decline
in the strength of U.S. nuclear deterrence.
Endnotes
1.
Though issued during President Donald J. Trump’s Administration, the 2018 NDS has not yet been superseded by a similar document, focused on
the military, from the Administration of President Joseph R. Biden. However, the Biden Administration has released interim guidance in which
it sets out the broad outlines and priorities of its national security agenda. In particular, President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance reiterates the same core national security interests and the same set of major competitor countries posing challenges to U.S. interests
that the preceding Administration identified and places them in a global context wherein the U.S. military must be ready to handle several
problems in geographically separated locations. See President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White
House, March 2021, pp. 8–9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed August 1, 2022).
2.
James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, p. 2. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed
August 1, 2022).
20
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
In the aggregate, the United States’ military posture can only be rated as “weak.” The Air Force is
rated “very weak,” the Navy and Space Force are “weak,” and the U.S. Army is “marginal.” The Marine
Corps and nuclear forces are “strong,” but the Corps is a one-war force, and its overall strength is
therefore not sufficient to compensate for the shortfalls of its larger fellow services. And if the United
States should need to employ nuclear weapons, the escalation into nuclear conflict would seem to imply
that handling such a crisis would challenge even a fully ready Joint Force at its current size and equipped
with modern weapons. Additionally, the war in Ukraine, which threatens to destabilize not just Europe
but the economic and political stability of other regions, shows that some actors (in this case Russia) will
not necessarily be deterred from conventional action even though the U.S. maintains a strong nuclear
capability. Thus, strong conventional forces of necessary size are essential to the ability of the U.S. to
respond to emergent crises in areas of special interest.
The 2023 Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is at significant risk of not being able
to meet the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence and
engagement activities. The force would probably not be able to do more and is certainly ill-equipped
to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs—a situation that is made more difficult by the generally weak
condition of key military allies.

In general, the military services continue to prioritize readiness and have seen some improvement
over the past few years, but modernization programs, especially in shipbuilding, continue to suffer
as resources are committed to preparing for the future, recovering from 20 years of operations, and
offsetting the effects of inflation. In the case of the Air Force, some of its limited acquisition funds are
being spent on aircraft of questionable utility in high-threat scenarios while R&D receives a larger share
of funding than efforts meant to replace quite aged aircraft are receiving. As observed in both the
2021 and 2022 editions of the Index, the services have normalized reductions in the size and number
of military units, the forces remain well below the level needed to meet the two-MRC benchmark, and
substantial difficulties in recruiting young Americans to join the military services are frustrating even
modest proposals just to maintain service end strength.
Congress and the Administration took positive steps to stabilize funding in the latter years of the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This mitigated the worst effects of BCA-restricted funding, but sustained
investment in rebuilding the force to ensure that America’s armed services are properly sized, equipped,
trained, and ready to meet the missions they are called upon to fulfill will be critical. At present, the
Administration’s proposed defense budget for FY 2023 falls far short of what the services need to regain
readiness and to replace aged equipment, and Congress’s intention to increase the proposed budget by
5 percent accounts for barely half of the current rate of inflation, which is nearing 10 percent.
As currently postured, the U.S. military is at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of
defending America’s vital national interests. It is rated as weak relative to the force needed to defend
national interests on a global stage against actual challenges in the world as it is rather than as we
wish it were. This is the logical consequence of years of sustained use, underfunding, poorly defined
priorities, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and
a profound lack of seriousness across the national security establishment even as threats to U.S.
interests have surged.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
21

AUKUS: New Opportunities for the
United States and Its Closest Allies
Peter Jennings
O
on a free and open Indo-Pacific enduring and flourishing in the decades ahead.”4
While the Australian Navy appeared to be the first
beneficiary of AUKUS’s focus on nuclear propulsion,
the reality is that even on the most optimistic projections, a nuclear-powered submarine for Australia is
at least a decade—and perhaps more realistically 15
to 20 years—in the future. In this essay, I will assess
the opportunities and risks associated with AUKUS,
asking what each of the three partners may want to
get for their political and economic investment. All
three countries stand to gain from AUKUS in geopolitical, strategic, and defense terms, but not without
some risk to the practical delivery of defense technology outcomes.
AUKUS: The Strategic Context
AUKUS reflects a shared understanding among
the three partner countries that the PRC presents
an immediate and sustained challenge to the international security order, not only globally, but most
pressingly in the Indo-Pacific region. Each country
has been forced to change policy on the PRC over the
past decade, moving from attempts to engage Beijing
with a view to shaping its behavior to a point now
where the three countries openly acknowledge the
danger of an assertive China’s growing power.
This has not been an easy process. Australia concluded a free trade agreement with China in late
2014 on terms that would hardly be acceptable today,
and Tony Abbott, then the center-right Australian
Prime Minister, welcomed Xi Jinping to Canberra
saying that “a relationship might begin with commerce but it rarely ends there once trust has been
established, as I believe it has between Australia
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
23

n September 15, 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden,
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and
U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson held a virtual media conference to announce “the creation of
an enhanced trilateral security partnership called
‘AUKUS’—Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.” The partnership focuses on the Indo-Pacific and is intended to “foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains.”1
The most striking initial AUKUS project is “a
shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines” and a projected
18-month time frame “to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability.” Only once before
has the United States given a foreign power access
to technology to develop nuclear propulsion: the
United Kingdom in the 1950s. AUKUS therefore
represents a significant strategic opportunity for
Australia. More broadly, the partnership offers to
pool defense-related science and technology and
each country’s defense industry into a shared endeavor, working on the following high-priority areas:
“cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum
technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.”2
Early reactions to AUKUS described the agreement as a big deal. The Economist declared AUKUS
to be as profound a strategic shift as “Nixon going to
China in 1972 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.”3
It was a new piece of strategic architecture in the
Indo-Pacific and for that reason directly aimed at
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Beijing’s
challenge to the rules-based order. Biden underlined
this point at the agreement’s launch: [T]the future of
each of our nations—and indeed the world—depends

and China.”5 In 2015, then-British Prime Minister
David Cameron was welcoming a “golden era” with
Beijing based on massive PRC investment in critical
infrastructure.6 When Xi visited Washington, D.C.,
in September 2015, he gave assurances to President
Barack Obama that China had “no intention to militarize” the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and would reduce the cyber-enabled theft of
American intellectual property.7 For a short while,
there was hope in the White House that Xi could be
taken at his word.
Since those optimistic times, policy toward the
PRC has hardened in the AUKUS capitals. The need
to respond to Beijing’s militarization of the South
China Sea, massive military spending, coercive
use of trade and investment, cyber espionage, and
attempts to undermine American and allied influence in the Indo-Pacific has forced governments to
make more negative assessments about Beijing’s
intentions. The arrival of AUKUS reflects a shared
realization that more concerted effort is needed
to align policy responses to China and fast-track
emerging military capabilities to strengthen deterrence. AUKUS should therefore be seen in the
context of the arrival of the QUAD (a grouping that
includes the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India); the
rapidly growing Australia–U.S.–Japan trilateral defense partnership; and an enlarged and revitalized
NATO. These are all recent examples of the world’s
consequential pluralist countries grouping together in the face of a sustained authoritarian challenge
from the PRC and Russia.
AUKUS does not supplant existing bilateral treaty agreements and defense cooperation activities between the U.S. and Australia and the U.S. and Britain,
but it brings a new trilateral mechanism to the fore,
creating the possibility of wider cooperation among
the three countries’ defense and intelligence establishments, research and development, and industrial sectors.
AUKUS is perhaps also a tacit acknowledgement
of the limits to the individual capacities of the three
countries. As powerful as the United States is, it
needs capable allies to bolster American military
strength, add options for logistic support and sustainment, and field interoperable military platforms.
For all three countries, AUKUS is a potentially valuable force multiplier with the capacity to strengthen
conventional deterrence and complicate Beijing’s
strategic planning.
24
How Does AUKUS Fit with U.S. Strategy?
Successive American Administrations have
sought to give more priority to the Indo-Pacific, and
Biden’s February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy stresses
an “intensifying American focus” on the region. Two
themes dominate the Biden strategy:
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This is a competition for influence with China, which “seeks to become the world’s most
influential power” through “coercion and
aggression,” and
The United States will counter this through
“collective efforts over the next decade” with
allies and partners.8
On America’s defense posture in the region, the
Biden strategy refers to AUKUS in the context of reinforcing and strengthening deterrence and bringing
together European and Indo-Pacific partners. The
AUKUS technology agenda fits neatly into the strategy’s priority list for Indo-Pacific defense priorities:
We will foster security ties between our allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and
beyond, including by finding new opportunities
to link our defense industrial bases, integrating
our defense supply chains, and co-producing
key technologies that will shore up our collective military advantages. As we do, we will
bring together our Indo-Pacific and European
partners in novel ways, including through the
AUKUS partnership.9
There is substantial continuity between the
Trump and Biden Administrations in terms of American force posture in the Indo-Pacific. The National Security Strategy released by then-Secretary of
Defense James Mattis in 2018 defines key desired
attributes of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific:
Forward force maneuver and posture resilience.
Investments will prioritize ground, air, sea, and
space forces that can deploy, survive, operate,
maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while
under attack. Transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that
include active and passive defenses will also be
prioritized.10
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
This is particularly relevant to U.S. thinking
about Australia’s strategic geography and the potential for American forces to operate with their
Australian Defence Force (ADF) counterparts in
and from the north of Australia. Since 2010, the U.S.
Marine Corps has been staging annual six-month
to eight-month rotational deployments to Darwin
in the Northern Territory. The U.S. Air Force has
been staging increasing numbers of flights from
Australia’s northern air bases. Current planning
seeks to intensify this cooperation. At the most
recent annual Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) talks in September 2021, bringing
the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense together
with their Australian counterparts, the Secretaries
and Ministers endorsed the following areas of force
posture cooperation:
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Enhanced maritime cooperation by increasing
logistics and sustainment capabilities of U.S.
surface and subsurface vessels in Australia.
Enhanced land cooperation by conducting
more complex and more integrated exercises
and greater combined engagement with Allies
and Partners in the region.
Establish a combined logistics, sustainment,
and maintenance enterprise to support
high‑end warfighting and combined military
operations in the region.11
Without much attention being drawn to it, the
U.S. is investing substantially in building a fuel facility near Darwin, to be completed in September 2023,
which will be able to store 300 million litres (nearly
80 million U.S. gallons) of military jet fuel.12
Taken together with the arrival of AUKUS, it
seems clear that American thinking about Australia’s strategic value in the Indo-Pacific is changing.
Northern Australia is becoming more important to
support a dispersal strategy, while Australia’s potential as a supply and sustainment hub is growing. An
Australian Defence Force operating nuclear-powered submarines (in all probability Virginia-class
The British Agenda for AUKUS
In March 2021, the U.K. government released a
policy statement, Global Britain in a Competitive
Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The statement argued
that “the Indo-Pacific will be of increasing geopolitical and economic importance, with multiple regional powers with significant weight and influence,
both alone and together.”14 As a result, Britain would
“tilt to the Indo-Pacific,”15 in part as a response to the
competitive challenges presented by China. The policy shift was underscored by a deployment to the Indo-Pacific of the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier and
a maritime strike group in late 2021.
Not all in the U.K. are convinced that the “tilt”
will survive after the Prime Ministership of Boris
Johnson, the chief architect of the policy. The judgment of Peter Ricketts, now in the House of Lords
after a career at the heart of British foreign policy,
is unambiguous: “A tilt to the Indo-Pacific is a slogan not a strategy. It does not match closely enough
the pattern of Britain’s vital interests to become the
basis for a durable national strategy.”16 Ricketts does
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
25

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Enhanced air cooperation through the rotational deployment of U.S. aircraft of all types
in Australia and appropriate aircraft training
and exercises.
SSNs) along with an array of interoperable platforms, sensors, and weapons is valuable. Combine
that with key elements of equipment production and
prepositioning in Australia along with access to ADF
bases and national infrastructure, and this becomes
a powerful force multiplier for the U.S. military at
great distance from the continental U.S.
Are there risks to the United States in pursuing a
closer defense relationship with Australia? All alliances impact autonomous decision-making to some
degree. However, nothing can replace the value of
Australia’s strategic geography to the south of the
Asian mainland. Just as in the Second World War, a
major military campaign focused on the Western
Pacific would find Australia a vital piece of geography for the United States. The U.S. must factor in
occasional political differences between Canberra
and Washington that may impact the conduct of operations. For example, how would the two countries
manage political decision-making in support of military operations mounted from Australian territory? Nevertheless, over the 70-year life of the ANZUS
treaty,13 Australia and the United States have had a
remarkable confluence of shared strategic interests,
and this confluence is only being reinforced by the
rise of an assertive Beijing.

accept, though, that an active foreign policy in Europe and deeper engagement in the Asia–Pacific “are
not mutually exclusive.”17
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a reminder that
Europe and the U.K. face more immediate strategic
threats in their own neighborhood. This, appropriately, will be a primary driver of British defense policy. However, enabled by the size of its economy and
population and driven by a nationalist and assertive
ideology, the PRC will remain the biggest long-term
strategic challenge to global stability. Whether acknowledged or not, all countries are tilting to the Indo-Pacific. After Brexit, the U.K. is looking for markets and economic prospects in the region. This mix
of risk and reward is likely to sustain a long-term British interest in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps best regarded
as a second-level security priority after the existential
threat presented to Europe by a revanchist Russia.
AUKUS is a prime enabler for the U.K. to pursue
its agenda for an Indo-Pacific tilt. The two policy
objectives of enhanced trilateral cooperation and
a stronger British presence and interest in the Indo-Pacific align comfortably. In a perfect policy
world, AUKUS should add momentum to independent British efforts to pursue a tilt to the region.
From a British perspective, AUKUS cements a stronger bilateral relationship with the U.S. that is quite
separate from NATO or other European connections. If the aspired level of technology cooperation
is achieved, AUKUS lifts the U.K. and Australia into
a closer and stronger relationship with the United
States relative to any other ally or partner. Britain
will probably also assess that a close AUKUS industrial partnership will strengthen its defense export
position relative to European competitors.
AUKUS and Australia
The arrival of AUKUS reflects a strong Australian
interest to seek support from like-minded democracies in what has been a protracted and complicated
set of disputes with China. In 2018, Australia became
one of the first countries to exclude PRC companies,
in particular Huawei and ZTE, from participating
in the rollout of the 5G network. Canberra has also
passed laws banning PRC funding of political parties,
prevented at least some Chinese acquisitions of critical infrastructure, and modernized anti-espionage
and anti-covert interference laws. Following thenPrime Minister Scott Morrison’s call for an international investigation into the origin of the Covid-19
26
virus, Beijing retaliated with official and unofficial
bans on Australian exports including coal, barley,
wine, beef, seafood, and other commodities.
From a defense perspective, Australia has been
particularly concerned about the PRC’s illegal annexation of much of the South China Sea and its cultivation of political influence with Australian state
governments, with Pacific Island countries, and in
Southeast Asia. A Defence Strategic Update issued
in 2020 concluded that:
Previous Defence planning has assumed a tenyear strategic warning time for a major conventional attack against Australia. This is no longer
an appropriate basis for defence planning.
Coercion, competition and grey-zone activities directly or indirectly targeting Australian
interests are occurring now.… Reduced warning
times mean defence plans can no longer assume
Australia will have time to gradually adjust military capability and preparedness in response to
emerging challenges. This includes the supply of
specialised munitions and logistic requirements,
such as fuel, critical to military capability.18
In responding to these developments, Canberra
has sought to deepen alliance cooperation with the
United States significantly, build closer defense ties
with Japan and India, and restate the importance
of cooperation between countries that support the
international rule of law.
There is bipartisan political and domestic popular support for lifting defense spending beyond the
current level of 2.1 per cent of gross domestic product, as well as for establishing the conditions for domestic production of a range of missiles for ADF and
allied use, expanding offensive and defense cyber
capabilities, and looking for other ways to increase
ADF range and firepower to boost deterrence. Australian governments have recognized that emphasizing force structure improvements—replacing aging
submarines and surface vessels, for example—that
would not deliver new capabilities until well into the
2030s was a major weakness in defense planning.
AUKUS therefore addresses five identified Australian strategic needs.
l
It seeks to engage the United States more
closely, giving Washington reason to put higher
value on its alliance with Australia.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
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British involvement is welcomed by Canberra
as a way of signaling that likeminded democracies will work together to resist the PRC’s
challenge to the global order. This is a way of
internationalizing what has been a difficult bilateral struggle between Canberra and Beijing.
AUKUS offers the possibility of fast-tracking
the acquisition of new military technology that
will strengthen deterrence and give the ADF a
technology edge.
AUKUS underpins a strategic judgment that the
defense of Australia is something that can be
credibly assured only within an alliance context,
so the ADF needs to have the best possible levels of interoperability with the U.S. military.
AUKUS addresses a central policy failure spanning several Australian administrations, which
is the inability to find more capable replacements for the ADF’s high-quality but aging
Collins-class submarines.
The Submarine Strategy
Prior to the AUKUS announcement, Australia
was planning to replace its six Collins-class conventional attack submarines with 12 locally built
French-designed submarines designated the Attack-class. The aim as stated in the 2016 Defence
White Paper was to produce 12 “regionally superior
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
27

Australian critics of AUKUS argue that the agreement draws the country too closely into the U.S. rivalry with China. Hugh White, for example, argues
that “we cannot take it for granted the US will solve
our China problem for us. On the contrary, our ally
will probably fail us. Americans will find that it will
cost them more than it is worth to maintain leadership in Asia against China’s formidable challenge.”19
White’s critique is based on his concluded view
that China will not be deterred from seeking dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Australian national security policymakers do not accept that position, preferring instead to argue that a close alliance with the
United States helps to strengthen deterrence. It is
certainly true, though, that an alliance made closer through AUKUS will lift American expectations
about what Australia should be able to contribute to
that collective defense effort.
submarines with a high degree of interoperability
with the United States.” The “key capabilities” of
these submarines “will include: anti-submarine
warfare; anti-surface warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and support to special operations.”20 By 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison
had formed doubts about whether the Attack class
would provide that regionally superior capability at
the time of initial delivery around the mid-2030s.
Morrison directed a small team in the Defence
Department to identify alternative submarine designs. By the time of the G-7 meeting in Cornwall in
the United Kingdom, Biden, Johnson, and Morrison
had agreed privately on the broad shape of AUKUS
cooperation, noting that “the strategic context in
the Indo-Pacific was changing and that there was
a strong rationale for deepening strategic cooperation between the three governments.”21 It was a
remarkable step made possible only by the presidential decision to allow Australia access to nuclear technology.
In my personal experience as Deputy Secretary
for Strategy in the Defence Department between
2009 and 2012, the United States Navy and wider national security system was not in any way disposed
to give Australia access to submarine nuclear propulsion technology. Australian officials had raised
the issue on several occasions only to be politely
but firmly rebuffed. The U.S. Navy’s interest was in
assisting Australia to strengthen its capacity for conventional attack submarine operations.
Media reports suggest that there are substantial
reservations in the U.S. Navy about the AUKUS plan
to develop an Australian SSN. For example, Randy
Schriver, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in
the Trump Administration, identified “many potential obstacles on both sides” including from the U.S.
Navy. Schriver told The Australian newspaper that
there needed to be “sustained commitment from the
senior political leaders in both capitals, otherwise
the chances of Australia deploying its own nuclear
submarine will drop below 50 per cent.”22 In effect,
the decision to proceed with finding a pathway for
Australia to access SSNs could have come only from
President Biden. From an Australian perspective, an
essential part of the 18-month “pathway” to March
2023 is to assure the U.S. Navy, Department of Energy, and other parties that Australia is capable of
handling this transfer of intellectual property and
technology securely and safely.

An Australian Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce was established to work with the U.K. and U.S.
on defining an 18-month pathway to development of
an acquisition strategy. Key issues that the pathway
is intended to address are “[s]ubmarine design, construction, safety, operation, maintenance, disposal,
regulation, training, environmental protection, installations and infrastructure, industrial base capacity, workforce, and force structure.”23
Compared to normal Defence business processes, this work is happening at breakneck speed, and
measurable progress is being made. By December
of 2021, a key parliamentary committee agreed to
a U.S.–U.K.–Australia treaty enabling the exchange
of naval nuclear propulsion information, an essential platform for classified information sharing. The
committee noted that “the Australian Government
has approved funding of up to $300 million for the
operation of the Nuclear Powered Submarine Task
Force. As of 25 November 2021, the task force had
134 staff.”24 By May 2022, that staff had grown to 226
people—by Australian standards a significant policy
commitment.25
In the United States, a bipartisan congressional working group announced in June 2022 that
the Australia–U.S. Submarine Officer Pipeline Act
was being introduced to ”establish a joint training
pipeline between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy” and “enable the start of U.S.-based
training of Commanding Officers for Australia’s future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the
AUKUS alliance.”26
Given the rapid worsening of the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been
paid to how quickly a nuclear propulsion capability
could be delivered to Australia. A complicating factor is that the Morrison government insisted that
the nuclear submarines could be built in Adelaide,
South Australia. To put it mildly, this is a major commitment, well ahead of current Australian industrial
capability. The head of the Nuclear Powered Submarine Task Force, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, has
said that outside of weapons fit, no design changes
would be made to a choice between either the British
Astute-class or American Virginia-class SSNs. Mead
has acknowledged that, given design priorities in the
U.K. and U.S., “new versions, the American SSNX and
the British SSNR, will be in the mix.”27
In January 2022, U.K. Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss commented to the Australian media that
28
there could be the possibility of “collaborative development by the three AUKUS parties rather than a
choice of Britain’s Astute-class or America’s Virginia-class.”28 There is promise in that approach, which
could produce a design common to all three navies
along lines like the common development approach
used for the Joint Strike Fighter.
There is intense speculation in Australia that it
might be possible to lease or acquire a U.S. Virginia-class SSN in U.S. service, reflagging the boat as
Australian before 2030 and before construction of
Australian SSNs. Peter Dutton, Australia’s Minister
for Defence up to the May 2021 election and now
leader of the centre-right Opposition, claims that:
I believed it possible to negotiate with the
Americans to acquire, say, the first two submarines off the production line out of Connecticut.
This wouldn’t mean waiting until 2038 for the
first submarine to be built here in Australia. We
would have our first two subs this decade. I had
formed a judgment that the Americans would
have facilitated exactly that.29
For that to happen, Biden or his successor would
have to conclude that there was value in giving Australia access to these boats ahead of the U.S. Navy’s
own demands for more submarines. The advantage
to the U.S. is that Australia would pay for the capability, allowing an expansion of a larger “federated”
submarine presence in the Indo-Pacific. However,
no one should underestimate the costs and challenges ahead in realising this Australian capability in every area from construction and sustainment to basing, crew training, safety, and operational planning.
The Wider AUKUS Technology Agenda
In addition to nuclear propulsion, the September
2021 AUKUS announcement identified four “high
priority areas” for collaborating work: cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities. Further,
in April 2022, Biden, Johnson, and Morrison met
virtually to review progress on the AUKUS agenda and added some new categories for increased
collaboration: “We also committed today to commence new trilateral cooperation on hypersonics
and counter-hypersonics, and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as to expand information sharing
and to deepen cooperation on defense innovation.”30
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Little has been publicly released about progress
to date. A tripartite senior officials’ group has been
appointed to oversee progress. In Australia, the
Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet is the representative, while U.K. and U.S.
National Security Advisers Stephen Lovegrove and
Jake Sullivan, respectively, lead for their countries.
Two joint steering groups have been established:
one focused on submarines and the other covering
all other nominated areas of advanced technology.
Working groups have been established for each technology. To date, a work plan has not been released.
On April 5, 2022, the partners released a fact
sheet reporting the following meetings:
l
l
“The three countries have held multiple Joint
Steering Group meetings for each of the two
AUKUS lines of effort, including in-person
meetings in Canberra, London, and Washington, D.C.”32
“Seventeen trilateral working groups have been
established (nine relating to nuclear-powered submarines, and eight to other advanced
military capabilities); each has met multiple times.”33
On April 1, 2022, it was announced that a bipartisan AUKUS Working Group, also known as the
“AUKUS Caucus,” had been formed in the U.S. Congress. Its members, drawn from both the Democratic
and Republican parties, are intent on “provid[ing]
a forum for congressional attention on the implementation of AUKUS and on completing the steps
needed to strengthen our already-existing security
relationship.”34
Three areas of weapons development activity that
have been publicly revealed may be taken as examples of what could emerge from AUKUS cooperation.
First, in April 2022, the AUKUS leaders reviewed
progress on implementation and, on autonomous
systems, said: “Through the AUKUS Undersea Reactions to AUKUS
Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS) project,
International reactions to AUKUS were varied
our nations are collaborating on autonomous un- and largely divided on lines reflecting the stratederwater vehicles, which will be a significant force gic competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific.
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29

l
“On March 10, 2022, National Security Advisors
from the three allies met virtually to review
AUKUS progress and provide direction to the
trilateral partnership going forward.”31
multiplier for our maritime forces. Trials and experimentation of this capability are planned for
2023.”35 In May 2022, during the election campaign,
then-Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced
plans to fast-track the acquisition of three Extra
Large Autonomous Undersea Vehicles (XLAUV).36
For a planned cost of USD$100 million, the boats
are to be built in Australia over three years in a
co-development project between the Australian
Defence Organisation and U.S. company Anduril.37
The boats are said to be capable of long endurance
and multi-mission roles.
Second, a large investment in cyber capability
was announced in the March 2022 Australian budget. Project REDSPICE—an acronym standing for
Resilience, Effects, Defence, Space, Intelligence, Cyber and Enablers—will invest an additional AUS$9.9
billion over the coming decade in a range of areas,
including tripling the size of the Australian Signals
Directorate’s offensive cyber capability. In terms of
cooperation with the U.S. and U.K., ASD claims that
Project REDSPICE will enable “[g]reater integration
through expanded global footprint,” “[c]o-investment
in Five-Eyes initiatives,” and “[c]ollaboration on AI
and cyber technologies.”38
Finally, without providing details, the Australian
government has alluded to “collaboration with the
United Sates to develop hypersonic missiles” as part
of wider plans to develop a local missile manufacturing capability and increase stock holdings of U.S.
missiles, including Tomahawk cruise missiles; joint
air-to-surface standoff missiles (extended range);
long-range anti-ship missiles (extended range); and
precision-strike guided missiles for land forces with
a range of over 400 kilometres.39 In April 2022, the
government announced that “Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have been chosen to deliver the Sovereign Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance
Enterprise (GWEO), to initially enhance self-reliance and supply chain resilience, but with a future
goal of developing a guided weapons manufacturing
capability in Australia.”40 It is clear that the project
is intended to support U.S. missile requirements in
the Indo-Pacific as much as it is to expand the ADF’s
missile capabilities.
Countries that welcomed the agreement included
Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines. While Vietnam remained silent on the subject, it is assumed
that it tacitly approves. France was critical based
on the difficult reality that AUKUS ended its contract to design and build conventionally powered
submarines in Australia.41 The change of government in Australia has opened the way to resuming
a more positive bilateral relationship between Canberra and Paris.
Predictably, the PRC was a strident critic. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson condemned
the agreement, claiming that:

Cooperation on nuclear-powered submarine
technology between the US, the UK and Australia will gravely undermine regional peace
and stability, aggravate arms race and impair
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
It runs counter to regional countries’ wishes.
The three countries should discard the Cold
War zero-sum mentality and narrow geopolitical perspective, follow the trend of the times
for peace and development, and stop forming
exclusive blocs or cliques.42
Concerns about a supposed proliferation risk
were aired by Indonesia and Malaysia. In May,
Prime Minister Ismail Sabri of Malaysia told Japan’s Nikkei newspaper that “We are worried that
some other major economies will take advantage of
AUKUS. For example, if China wants to help North
Korea purchase nuclear-powered submarines, we
can’t say no because AUKUS has set a precedent.”43
Australia continues to make the case in Southeast
Asia that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear
weapons. All three AUKUS partners maintain that
the agreement to provide Australia with a pathway
to nuclear propulsion does not compromise their
support for nuclear non-proliferation. The AUKUS
countries advised the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) that a critical objective of their cooperation will be to maintain “the strength of both
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and Australia’s
exemplary non-proliferation credentials.”44
One important task for the AUKUS partners will
be to determine whether any other countries should
be allowed to participate in the broader technology
development programs being advanced by the agreement. In an interview with the Australian Strategic
30
Policy Institute (ASPI) in November 2021, Japan’s
ambassador to Australia said, “We have been told
there are some instances or areas where AUKUS
members may need Japanese cooperation and participation and we are more than willing to do our
contribution.”45
With two AUKUS members in NATO, it is relevant that the recently released NATO Strategic Concept commits the alliance to “promote innovation
and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability
and military edge.”46 This too could create a basis
for expanding AUKUS cooperation, although hopefully without a loss of focus and pace, which are key
aspects of the AUKUS strategy.
Next Steps
A defining event in AUKUS’s short history will
be in March 2023 when officials are projected to
bring to the President and the two Prime Ministers
the plan for how Australia can acquire nuclear-propelled submarines. Australia’s new Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Richard Marles, has
said that he hopes to achieve three key outcomes
at that time. The first is an identified submarine
type, which amounts to a choice between the U.S.
Virginia-class or British Astute-class SSNs or their
design successors. Second, it is expected that the
advice in March 2023 will identify a realistic time
frame for the Australian submarine acquisition. Finally, Marles has said that he wants to understand
options for an interim conventional submarine replacement if there is a gap between the end of life
of the Collins-class submarines and the arrival of
the SSNs.47 The Australian Defence Organisation
is working on the third of these options in parallel
with the AUKUS study.
At this stage, there is little on the public record
indicating timelines for developments in the other
technology areas. A potential critical waypoint will
be the AUSMIN Ministerial meeting, which is due
to be held in Australia toward the end of 2022. Given
the priority that recent AUSMIN meetings have put
on strengthening interoperability between the ADF
and U.S. forces and on shared technology development, we should expect that the United States and
Australian governments will put a high priority on
the AUKUS agenda’s leading to the quickest possible
deployment of new military capabilities.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
A further risk is that once the 18-month study into
Australia’s nuclear propulsion options is concluded in
March 2023, U.S. officials might conclude that Australia does not have the capacity or resolve to adopt nuclear propulsion. By then, the Albanese government
will have a clearer sense of the cost involved. A Labor
government might conclude that the cost is too high,
although against that, Labor would have to balance the
negative implications for wider alliance cooperation.
Alliance relationships work best when they are
delivering practical outcomes that benefit all parties. In short, AUKUS needs some practical results,
including in areas where the fast delivery of capability will show the value of each country’s changing
long-standing industrial and procurement practices. While that is clearly the aim of officials working
on AUKUS delivery, we should not underestimate
the challenges. Will the U.S. Congress, for example,
really support the early delivery of a Block IV Virginia-class SSN to Australia ahead of the U.S. Navy’s
own requirements? To date, congressional backing
for AUKUS has been vocal and impressive, but in all
three countries, local industrial and political perspectives will have to be acknowledged.
On balance, there is more for the AUKUS countries to gain by continuing cooperation under the
agreement than there is by backsliding. Biden’s personal investment in AUKUS is such that a failure to
deliver tangible outcomes would damage the Administration’s position, particularly in the Indo-Pacific
region, weakening future options for the U.S. military posture in the Western Pacific. For Australia,
the costs of an AUKUS backdown would likely have
an election-losing consequence for any Australian
government. The U.K. has perhaps the least to lose
if AUKUS fails to deliver, but London has much to
gain if it can shape a closer industry and technology
relationship with Washington.
Conclusion
Speaking at Singapore’s Shangri La Dialogue in
June 2022, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin
summed up the value of AUKUS:
That’s another reason why our new security partnership with Australia and the U.K. is so important. AUKUS won’t just deliver nuclear-powered
submarines. It holds out the promise of progress
across a range of emerging tech areas that can
bolster our deterrence, from AI to hypersonics.51
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31

What Could Go Wrong?
For all its promise, a lot could happen to derail
AUKUS. The agreement is too disruptive of existing policy processes to have come from officials,
and AUKUS would not have proceeded without
the personal commitment of President Biden, Boris Johnson, and Scott Morrison. On May 21, 2022,
Morrison’s government was defeated in Australia’s
federal election. The new centre-left Labor government of Anthony Albanese has pledged to continue
with AUKUS, although there are elements of the
Labor Party that oppose nuclear propulsion. Labor
depends on support from minor parties in the Senate, which in some cases are adamantly opposed to
AUKUS and the alliance with the United States.
Whatever the views inside the Labor Party,
AUKUS was popularly received by Australians. A poll
conducted in March 2022 found that 52 percent of
those surveyed thought AUKUS would make Australia safer, while 70 percent surveyed were in favor of
acquiring nuclear propelled submarines.48
As for Boris Johnson, in addition to having become deeply unpopular with British voters, he
narrowly survived a vote of no confidence in his
leadership from Conservative Party members of Parliament in early June and was finally forced to resign
on July 7.49 The Conservative Party is going through
lengthy mandated processes to select a new party
leader and therefore Prime Minister by October
2022. It would be surprising if a new Conservative
Prime Minister opposed AUKUS, but beset with domestic and international problems, a new British PM
might not give AUKUS the priority that Boris Johnson did. The British Labour Party maintains support
for the U.K.’s own submarine-based nuclear deterrent (although this is a contested position within the
party) and has also indicated support for AUKUS.50
While President Biden has indicated an intention to run for a second term, his age is giving rise
to speculation about his capacity to continue in office. All three of the original AUKUS leaders could
therefore be out of office before the agreement delivers tangible progress on any defense capability
plan. Would a re-elected Donald Trump continue
AUKUS? It must be said that while Trump was skeptical of NATO, in office he was a strong supporter of
the alliance with Australia and bilateral partnership
with the U.K. Much could depend on how Trump or
any future Republican President might choose to
engage with Beijing.

The defining words here are surely “the promise
of progress.” AUKUS offers a remarkable new stage
of alliance cooperation that will substantially lift
Australian defense capabilities and strengthen allied military forces in the Indo-Pacific with exotic
new technology. If AUKUS succeeds, it will be transformative. If for whatever reason AUKUS fails, that
would do lasting damage to the United States’ position in the Indo-Pacific and to the position of the U.K.
and Australia as America’s closest allies. The next
12 months will be hugely consequential as officials
work to deliver a viable path forward.
32
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Endnotes
1.
“Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/ (accessed July 7, 2022).
2.
Ibid.
3.
“The Strategic Reverberations of the AUKUS Deal Will Be Big and Lasting,” The Economist, September 19, 2021, https://www.economist.com/
international/2021/09/19/the-strategic-reverberations-of-the-aukus-deal-will-be-big-and-lasting (accessed July 7, 2022).
4.
“Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation
of AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-bypresident-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/
(accessed July 7, 2022).
5.
Prime Minister Tony Abbott, statement to Parliament of Australia on visit by Chinese Prime Minister Xi Jinping, November 17, 2014, https://
parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F35c9c2cf-9347-4a82-be89-20df5f76529b%2
F0003;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F35c9c2cf-9347-4a82-be89-20df5f76529b%2F0005%22 (accessed July 7, 2022).
6.
Reuters, “China, Britain to Benefit from ‘Golden Era’ in Ties—Cameron,” October 17, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-britainidUSKCN0SB10M20151017 (accessed July 7, 2022).
7.
David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “Xi Denies China Turning Artificial Islands into Military Bases,” Reuters, September 25, 2015, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pacific-idUSKCN0RP1ZH20150925 (accessed July 7, 2022), and “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit
to the United States,” The White House, September 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheetpresident-xi-jinpings-State-visit-united-States (accessed July 7, 2022).
8.
Executive Office of the President, National Security Council, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, p. 5, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf (accessed July 7, 2022).
9.
Ibid., p. 13.
10. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf (accessed July 8, 2022). Emphasis in original.

11. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint Statement Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021,
September 16, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultationsausmin-2021 (accessed July 7, 2022).
12. Melissa Mackay, “Work Begins on $270 Million US Fuel Storage Facility on Darwin’s Outskirts,” ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] News,
January 18, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-01-19/work-begins-on-us-jet-fuel-facility-outside-darwin/100764194 (accessed July 7,
2022).
13. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951,” https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus (accessed July 8, 2022).
14. HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, Presented to
Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, CP 403, March 2021, p. 27, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__
Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf (accessed July 7, 2022).
15. Ibid., pp. 60 and 66–67.
16. Peter Ricketts, Hard Choices: What Britain Does Next (London: Atlantic Books, 2021), p. 227.
17. Ibid.
18. Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, p. 14, para. 1.13, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/
publications/2020-defence-strategic-update (accessed July 7, 2022). Emphasis in original.
19. Hugh White, “We Need to Talk About China—and then Actually Do Something About Our Own Security,” The Australian, June 25, 2022, https://
www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/we-need-to-talk-about-china-and-then-actually-do-something-about-our-own-security/news-story/97dcb2
c562d8f81304e1f223306f1b1c (accessed July 8, 2022). Subscription required.
20. Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 90, para. 4.25, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/
publications/2016-defence-white-paper (accessed July 8, 2022). See also ibid., p. 90, para. 4.26.
21. “Readout: Trilateral Meeting of Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom, President Joe Biden, and Prime Minister Scott Morrison
of Australia,” The White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/readout-trilateralmeeting-of-prime-minister-boris-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-president-joe-biden-and-prime-minister-scott-morrison-of-australia/
(accessed July 8, 2022).
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33
22. Adam Creighton, “Australia May Not Get Any Sub from AUKUS Warns Former Trump Official,” The Australian, January 16, 2022, https://www.
theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/australia-may-not-get-any-sub-from-aukus-warns-former-trump-official/news-story/751c928ccc91ebd5d9
19edcff51961ca (accessed July 15, 2022). Subscription required.
23. See Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce: Frequently Asked Questions: What NuclearPowered Submarine Will Australia Be Acquiring?” https://www.defence.gov.au/about/taskforces/nuclear-powered-submarine-task-force/
frequently-asked-questions (accessed July 8, 2022).
24. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report No. 199, Agreement for the Exchange of Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Information, December 2021, p. 14, para. 2.55, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportjnt/024853/
toc_pdf/Report199.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed July 8, 2022).
25. Brendan Nicholson, “Australia Considering Next-Generation US and UK Designs for Nuclear Submarines,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The
Strategist, May 10, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-considering-next-generation-us-and-uk-designs-for-nuclear-submarines/
(accessed July 8, 2022).
26. Press release, “Gallagher, AUKUS Working Group Introduce New Bill to Establish Officer Training Pipeline for Australian Submarines,” Office of
Congressman Mike Gallagher, June 15, 2022, https://gallagher.house.gov/media/press-releases/gallagher-aukus-working-group-introduce-newbill-establish-officer-training (accessed July 8, 2022). See also H.R. 8073, “To direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a joint training pipeline
between the United States Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, and for other purposes,” 117th Cong., Introduced June 15, 2022, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/8073?s=1&r=3 (accessed July 8, 2022).
27. Nicholson “Australia Considering Next-Generation US and UK Designs for Nuclear Submarines.”
28. Ticky Fullerton, “Deeper Defence Ties Vital to Counter China’s Influence, Says Liz Truss,” The Australian, January 19, 2022, https://www.
theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/defence-ties-vital-to-counter-china-truss/news-story/b78943dd035f3d52e604c05e779c124c (accessed
July 8, 2022). Subscription required. See also Peter Jennings, “AUKMIN’s Global View Is Good for Australia,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
The Strategist, January 24, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukmins-global-view-is-good-for-australia/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
29. Peter Dutton, MP, “Opinion Piece for the Australian,” June 8, 2022, https://www.peterdutton.com.au/opinion-piece-for-the-australian/ (accessed
July 8, 2022).

30. “AUKUS Leaders’ Level Statement,” The White House, April 22, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/04/05/aukus-leaders-level-statement/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
31. “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States Partnership (AUKUS),” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-unitedstates-partnership-aukus/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Press release, “Reps. Courtney, Gallagher, Kilmer, and Moore Announce Formation of the New Bipartisan AUKUS Working Group, in Support
of the Undersea Alliance Between the U.S., U.K., and Australia,” Office of Congressman Joe Courtney, April 1, 2022, https://courtney.house.
gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-courtney-gallagher-kilmer-and-moore-announce-formation-new (accessed July 8, 2022). For an
excellent summary of AUKUS developments, see Marcus Hellyer and Ben Stephens, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insights
No. 170, “ASPI AUKUS Update 1: May 2022,” https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2022-05/ASPI%20AUKUS%20update%201.
pdf?VersionId=lB063VndLfT5t5YHsDDwHvxWnKViC4m1 (accessed July 8, 2022).
35. “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States Partnership (AUKUS).”
36. Tom Ravlic, “Election 2022: Dutton Flags Robotic Undersea Warfare Capability,” The Mandarin, May 5, 2022, https://www.themandarin.com.
au/188327-election-2022-dutton-flags-robotic-undersea-warfare-capability/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
37. Andrew McLaughlin, “Anduril & ADF to Partner on Autonomous Undersea Vehicle Development,” Australian Defence Business Review, May 5,
2022, https://adbr.com.au/anduril-adf-to-partner-on-autonomous-undersea-vehicle-development/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
38. Australian Government, Australian Signals Directorate, REDSPICE: A Blueprint for Growing ASD’s Capabilities, p. 18, https://www.asd.gov.au/sites/
default/files/2022-05/ASD-REDSPICE-Blueprint.pdf (accessed July 8, 2022).
39. The Hon. Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister; The Hon. Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Defence; and Senator the Hon. Marise Payne, Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Women, “Australia to Pursue Nuclear-Powered Submarines Through New Trilateral Enhanced Security
Partnership,” joint media statement, September 16, 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australiapursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership (accessed July 8, 2022).
40. “Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to Deliver GWEO,” Australian Defence Magazine, April 5, 2022, https://www.australiandefence.com.au/
defence/joint/raytheon-and-lockheed-martin-to-deliver-gweo#:~:text=Raytheon%20and%20Lockheed%20Martin%20have,weapons%20
manufacturing%20capability%20in%20Australia (accessed July 8, 2022).
41. For a good summary of international reactions to AUKUS, see Hellyer and Stephens, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insights No.
170, “ASPI AUKUS Update 1: May 2022.”
34
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on
September 22, 2021,” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202109/t20210922_9580314.html
(accessed July 8, 2022).
43. Associated Press, “Australia FM Stresses AUKUS Will Not Create Nuclear Weapons,” June 28, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/china-asiaaustralia-global-trade-b3bb95edec2baa9584fb8faead271222 (accessed July 8, 2022).
44. Press release, “IAEA on Trilateral Effort of Australia, United Kingdom, and United States on Nuclear Naval Propulsion,” International Atomic
Energy Agency, September 16, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-on-trilateral-effort-of-australia-united-kingdom-andunited-states-on-nuclear-naval-propulsion (accessed July 8, 2022).
45. Jack Norton, “Japan ‘More than Willing’ to Help Ensure AUKUS Success,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, November 12, 2021,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/japan-more-than-willing-to-help-ensure-aukus-success/ (accessed July 8, 2022).
46. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” p. 7, para. 24, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/
pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf (accessed July 8, 2022).
47. The Hon. Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, “Interview with Peter Stefanovic, Sky News.” Australian
Government, Department of Defence, July 1, 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/transcripts/interview-peter-stefanovicsky-news (accessed July 8, 2022).
48. Natasha Kassam, “Lowy Institute Poll 2022,” Lowy Institute, June 29, 2022, https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2022 (accessed July 8, 2022).
49. Rowena Mason, “Boris Johnson Wins No-Confidence Vote Despite Unexpectedly Large Rebellion,” The Guardian, June 7, 2022, https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2022/jun/06/boris-johnson-wins-no-confidence-vote-despite-unexpectedly-large-rebellion (accessed July 8, 2022);
Jim Pickard, “Boris Johnson Resigns,” Financial Times, July 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/db96be7d-7728-435a-af70-5b1ba3173e83#post55fdb4a7-68ac-40da-8839-92acd6476362 (accessed July 8, 2022); and Owen Amos, “Boris Johnson Resigns: Five Things That Led to the PM’s
Downfall,” BBC News, July 7, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62070422 (accessed July 8, 2022).
50. Latika Bourke, “British Labour Backs AUKUS Alliance but Would Punish Australia for Climate Inaction,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September
28, 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/british-labour-backs-aukus-alliance-but-would-punish-australia-for-climate-inaction20210926-p58uy5.html (accessed July 8, 2022), and BBC News, “Labour Renews Vow to Keep Nuclear Weapons,” February 28, 2021, https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-56198972 (accessed July 8, 2022).
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35

51. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, “Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (as Delivered), U.S.
Department of Defense, June 11, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3059852/remarks-at-the-shangri-la-dialogueby-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-a/ (accessed July 8, 2022).

Recruiting the All-Volunteer Force:
New Approaches for a New Era
Richard Brady
T
We are now seeing some substantial problems.
Changes in American culture, the rise of new technologies used by American youth to interact with
the world around them, and fewer opportunities to
be exposed to the military are making the recruiting effort extraordinarily difficult. Beyond making
it harder to meet annual recruiting goals, this potentially calls into question the AVF’s viability and
demands a number of improvements to and adaptations within the “accessions enterprise” if we are to
continue to have the most competent, professional
military possible.
Military accessions—the process of recruiting,
qualifying, and conducting initial entry training—is
vital to our national security interests. Its operating
environment is constantly evolving, and the organizations involved must respond in kind to remain
relevant and accomplish their missions. This is particularly true of the recruiting portion of the accession environment, as recruiting tends to be the most
visible and significant aspect of accessions. Recruiting is constantly affected by changing applicant demographics and expectations, service requirements
and demands, accession policies, threats and security requirements, and technologies.
The accession enterprise is made up of
three components:
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The service recruiting commands;
The United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM); and
The service recruit training sites.
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37

he National Defense Strategy defines the enduring mission of the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) as providing combat-credible military forces
to deter war and protect the security of our nation.
This requires the fielding of sufficient capable forces
to defeat America’s enemies and protect the American people and our vital national interests.1
In 1973, the U.S. military undertook a dramatic
change in how it populated the services, moving from
a model that relied on a combination of young Americans who wanted to join and those who were drafted
by order of the government. The volunteer or recruited model has been a feature of the military since the
country was founded, and the services have made all
sorts of efforts to attract young men—and later, women—to join the military. Recruiters have appealed to a
sense of patriotism, a desire for experience or education, health care benefits, or even a steady paycheck.
During periods of war, when the size of the military needed to be increased dramatically and very
rapidly, the country employed a draft to fill the ranks,
especially when casualties from combat needed to
be replaced even by the unwilling. But the Vietnam
war, occurring as it did during a period of great social and political upheaval in the U.S., led to a great
rethinking about the military and what it needed to
be. While not always the case, compelling draftees
to serve in a controversial war during a time of domestic discord led to disciplinary problems in the
military and declines in unit cohesion, effectiveness,
and morale. The all-volunteer force (AVF) model
was meant to improve the professionalism of the
force, which it has, but it also depends on success in
convincing young Americans in large numbers to
join the force.

Each component has a vital role in supporting
the DOD mission by ensuring and supporting the
quality and quantity of the AVF. Given some significant changes in the recruiting environment, all
participants in the process must adapt their systems,
processes, organizations, and mindsets to meet the
annual requirement of recruits in an AVF.
The military accession enterprise is experiencing structural, political, social, and technical shifts
on a scale not seen since the all-volunteer force was
adopted in 1973. It has been 50 years since the U.S.
last drafted people, and the military services must
address these shifts if they are to continue to be successful in populating our military with young Americans who are willing to serve our country.
Military recruiting involves actions and activities
taken by a service to identify and attract individuals
in sufficient numbers to meet organizational needs.
These actions include marketing, advertising, influencing, and educating to generate a pool of desirable
candidates, enhance their interest and attraction to
military service, and increase the probability that
these individuals will enlist. Among the organizational needs to be met by this process are the end
strength objective for each service (how large it
needs to be) and personnel with the aptitude and
skills required to serve in technical fields.2
DOD recruiting data highlight the challenge involved in accomplishing the accession mission.3 Service recruiting productivity and resultant USMEPCOM and service recruit training throughput
continue to be challenged by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in limited access to high
school students and large student gatherings. But
the COVID-19 challenges tell only part of the story. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated systemic
issues—changing demographics, propensity, standards, technology, and methods—within the accession environment that had been building for years,
and it will take more than the end of the pandemic
to resolve them.
The services have limited levers to influence
near-term recruiting results. For applicants, these
levers include waiving tattoo policies, weight standards, and education standards and providing higher enlistment bonuses. Recent headlines indicate
that service recruiting commands are attempting
to use a mix of these levers to improve recruiting
outcomes in fiscal year (FY) 2022.4 Similarly, the
services can increase recruiter productivity in the
38
near term through promotion and duty assignment
preferences, monetary incentives, and involuntary
extension of productive recruiters.5
The more important levers reside at the policy
and societal levels where the quality and quantity
of military service inductees can be properly balanced with a focus on long-term outcomes and costs
to the accession enterprise. These levers include
medical policies and standards, testing policies and
standards, and youth propensity to serve. An appreciation for the role these levers play requires an
understanding of the complex interplay of the organizations involved as well as the history of accession standards.
A Balance of Interests: The Accession Triad
The first leg of the accession triad includes the
military service recruiting commands. Under Title
10 of the United States Code:
The Secretary concerned may accept original enlistments in the Regular Army, Regular
Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps,
Regular Space Force, or Regular Coast Guard,
as the case may be, of qualified, effective, and
able-bodied persons who are not less than seventeen years of age nor more than forty-two
years of age.6
The service secretaries carry out this mission
largely through the recruiting force with oversight
from service headquarters.
In terms of a supply chain, the service recruiting
commands are the first step in a long process that
eventually results in military servicemembers being fielded to operational commands and adding to
military readiness. Collectively, the service recruiting commands employ more than 20,000 recruiters
worldwide to meet their annual recruiting requirements. Within the accession triad, service recruiting
results receive the most visibility, as annual goals
are used by both the public and private sectors to
gauge military readiness and the willingness of
young Americans to serve their country in uniform.
In 1976, the Secretary of Defense established the
United States Military Entrance Processing Command, the second leg of the accession triad. Initially
established as a Department of the Army field operating agency under the jurisdiction of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, USMEPCOM was led
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
to meet quality and quantity metrics in most years.
However, when recruiting quantity metrics begin
to fall short, as experienced in FY 2022, the tension builds, upsetting the balance between quality
and quantity.
The military services must enlist a sufficient
quantity of recruits to fill units in the operating
forces and maintain readiness. If the quantity of recruits falls short, then the services must restructure
operational units to ensure combat effectiveness.8 In
terms of cold, hard metrics, quantity is valued more
than quality. This has been true in both peacetime
and in war. But starting in the early 20th century
and as medicine and cognitive testing evolved, it became more difficult to ignore the quality aspects of
recruits and the medical and mental fitness impacts
on readiness.
Evolution of the Accession Process
Today’s modern accession standards originated
with the United States’ entry into World War I. The
declaration of war signed by President Woodrow
Wilson on April 6, 1917, set in motion what would
become by the end of the war the largest coordinated
system of human resource selection, classification,
training, and assignment ever implemented. During
the 18 months the nation participated in World War
I, uniform standards were devised to screen out the
medically unsuitable and to assess the aptitude capabilities of enlistees. Medically, screening for tuberculosis was a priority as TB was a leading cause
of death at the time. Height and weight standards
were also first applied with uniformity during the
World War I era.9 The application of these standards
resulted in far more rejections of prospective servicemembers for underweight than for overweight.
World War I also witnessed the advent of aptitude testing. The Army Alpha test consisted of eight
subtests and served as a prototype for later test development. The Army Beta test was one of the first
paper-and-pencil tests to evaluate the aptitude of
recruits who had little or no schooling or who did not
speak English. Both tests were eventually replaced
by the Army General Classification Test (AGCT).
More than 20 years later, World War II presented
the nation with an even more monumental mobilization effort. By the time the wartime selective service
laws expired in 1947, more than 10 million men had
been inducted into the military services. The physical standards for induction were first published by
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
39

by a commanding general who was also commanding general of U.S. Army Recruiting Command. This
arrangement remained in place until 1979 when
USMEPCOM became a DOD field operating activity reporting to the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. This arrangement gave the Secretary of Defense greater oversight
of the accession process through USMEPCOM’s
mission of evaluating applicants by applying established DOD aptitude, medical, and moral standards
during processing for military service.
The Secretary of Defense’s authority over USMEPCOM and the accession process helps to ensure
equality of opportunity for all eligible applicants for
military service. The DOD uses common entrance
qualification standards for enlistment, appointment,
and induction across all military services. This helps
to avoid inconsistencies and inequities linked to ethnicity, race, religion, or gender. Moreover, this enables the judgment of suitability for military service
on the basis of an applicant’s adaptability, potential
to perform, and conduct.7
The third leg of the accession triad is the service
recruit training mission. The services, including
the U.S. Coast Guard, maintain nine recruit training sites with the mission to transform civilian volunteers into professional servicemembers who are
disciplined, fit, acculturated, and combat ready. To
increase the likelihood of success, the service recruit
training commands desire new recruits who are at
high levels of medical and mental readiness before
the start of training.
All components of the accession triad—recruiting, USMEPCOM, and recruit training—must work
cohesively to enlist approximately 250,000 men and
women into the U.S. armed forces annually. This requires not only the integration of policies and systems, but also the balance of incentives and desired
outcomes at each step of the process. Recruiting has
the dual mission of quantity and quality with the former taking precedent over the latter. USMEPCOM
has a near singular focus on quality and adherence
to accession standards. Recruit training focuses on
individual recruit readiness, which is a function of
quality and training standards.
Because of the divergent incentive structure,
there is a natural tension among the three elements
of the triad: recruiting, USMEPCOM, and recruit
training. This tension has generally led to positive
outcomes for the accession enterprise, allowing it

the War Department in 1940.10 They were used by
local draft board physicians and physicians at Joint
Army and Navy Induction Stations. The physical
standards changed as the war progressed, as medical science advanced, and as the needs of the War
Department evolved. The most extensive changes
involved dental and visual acuity standards and the
PULHES physical classification system, all of which
are still in use today.11
In 1948, an interservice working group was created to develop a single aptitude test for use by all
services. This effort resulted in the introduction in
1950 of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
The AFQT served as a screening device, determining an applicant’s overall capacity to absorb military
training, and provided a uniform yardstick with
which to predict the individual’s potential for success while in service.
The AFQT did not aid in job classification. For
this, the services employed their separate examinations or specialized tests. In 1974, the DOD selected
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) as the single instrument of choice to screen
applicants both for enlistment and for occupational
classification testing. This streamlined the testing
process and enhanced the individual service’s ability
to match applicants with jobs and provide job guarantees to applicants who qualify. In 1976, the same
year USMEPCOM was established, a revised version
of the ASVAB became the enlistment eligibility test
DOD-wide.12 Refined and improved versions of the
ASVAB continue to serve in the 21st century.
Medical fitness standards continue to be refined
to keep pace with current trends in public health and
advances in medical science and military requirements. Audiometric standards were added and hearing tests became routine.13 Screening for HIV was
mandated in the 1980s for all persons entering the
services.14 USMEPCOM incorporated International
Classification of Disease (ICD-10) codes in 2015,15
and updated standards related to transgender applicants and the pandemic diseases were added between 2017 and 2021.16
Today, the DOD regularly evaluates the medical
and testing standards applied to accession based
on emerging science, research, and advances in
technology. These efforts, intended to balance
cost and performance in military enlistments, are
nonetheless influenced by politics and public opinion. The shifts in policy governing military service
40
for transgender individuals between 2018 and 2021
and the COVID-19 medical standards and vaccine
policies of 2020 and 2021 are cases in point. While
these policies are of interest from a societal or public
health perspective, their impact on military readiness is hotly debated. One thing is quite clear, however: They increase both the cost and the level of
effort needed to recruit military personnel.
Levers of Control: Medical,
Testing, and Propensity
The United States Army is projected to miss annual recruiting goals in FY 2022 and FY 2023, falling
short by as many as 40,000 new recruits. General Joseph Martin, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, identified the unprecedented challenges presented by the
COVID-19 pandemic environment, the labor market,
and competition with private companies as key factors that negatively impact recruiting.17 These challenges have affected recruiter productivity by largely prohibiting large group events, curtailing widely
attended sports or school events, and limiting the
impact of traditional incentive schemes like bonuses.
The Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard
are the recruiting bellwether for all of the military
services, accounting for nearly 50 percent of the annual DOD accession goal of 250,000 recruits.
The traditional model of recruiting, which was
effective before the COVID-19 pandemic, will not
suffice in a post-COVID environment. Understanding this requires understanding the structural issues
that determine whether a potential recruit desires to
serve and is qualified to join. Finding medically fit, academically proficient, and motivated men and women is the foundational issue in military recruiting.
Medical. DOD Instruction 6130.03, Volume 1,
“Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction,” establishes baseline accession medical standards.18 All applicants
complete the same accession medical history process, which requires self-disclosure of medical history, authorization given to the military to access personal medical records, and a physical examination
by a licensed medical professional.
Uniform accession medical standards reduce the
risk of long-term negative outcomes both for the
servicemember and for the military services. The
intent is to not aggravate any preexisting physical or
mental health condition that might lead to the injury
or death of the servicemember or a long-term cost
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
of medical history, which led to Existing Prior to Service (EPTS) attrition (early discharge of the servicemember because of undisclosed medical problems
revealed during the servicemember’s first enlistment) and high costs to the DOD at recruit training
and during first-term enlistment.
USMEPCOM data consistently show that almost
50 percent of all EPTS attrition in all services is
due to applicant nondisclosure of medical information.19 The principal reasons for EPTS in all
services are (in order) psychological, orthopedic,
and asthma (pulmonary). Applicants for military
service undergo a USMEPCOM medical screening
that includes a physical exam; urinalysis for protein, glucose, and illicit drugs; hearing; and vision.20
Applicants complete a report of medical history as
well as behavioral questionnaires, both of which
require the applicant to disclose any conditions,
particularly in behavioral health, that would normally be disqualifying.
For various reasons, from willful nondisclosure to poor recall, applicants tend not to reveal
such information. According to a 2016 Accession
Medical Standards Analysis and Research Activity (AMSARA) report, “the great majority of EPTS
discharges are for medical conditions that were not
discovered or disclosed at the time of application for
service, with concealment by the applicant being the
most common scenario.”21 Since these instances of
nondisclosure are not uncommon, obtaining applicant medical and/or prescription records helps
USMEPCOM medical providers to make the appropriate qualification decisions. In addition, the services, through their Service Medical Waiver Review
Authorities (SMWRA), are better informed when
conducting risk assessments during waiver reviews.
In most cases, the relevant military medical authorities are able to acquire this important information,
but the time needed to do so also means that it takes
longer to process the applicant.
Between 1997 and 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) made several recommendations to improve recruit medical screening
processes at USMEPCOM. The GAO’s 1997 report
recommended that DOD develop methods to verify applicant medical history to decrease issues of
nondisclosure that could lead to recruit injury, attrition, or even death.22 Its 2017 report highlighted concern with the lack of electronic interfaces between
USMEPCOM and electronic medical information
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41

to the government from a permanent disability. The
stress of military service can result in a reoccurrence
of some previous condition, whether resolved or unresolved. All components of the accession enterprise
have a shared goal: finding young adults to meet the
mission requirements of the military services and
ensuring that they have every opportunity to pursue
a successful military career.
Accession medical standards are based on advances in medical science, changes in public health,
operational needs, and prerogatives of the DOD and
military services pertaining to sociopolitical or cultural issues. They are designed to ensure that individuals are physically and psychologically qualified
and capable of performing the strenuous military
duties that are often associated with wartime activities. This requires the applicant to be available for
worldwide duty without restriction or delay; able to
tolerate exposure to stressful, dangerous, and harsh
environments; and able to operate dangerous, sensitive, or classified equipment.
Applicants with conditions that would normally
disqualify them are reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the relevant service to determine whether a
medical waiver can be issued. Each service has its
own waiver policy that typically calls for more information about the condition of the individual and
treatments available to mitigate risk associated with
the medical condition. This additional information
helps the service to make a risk-informed decision
on the applicant. Conditions that are more rarely
waived include those involving behavioral health,
including self-mutilation, suicidal attempts or gestures, major depression, bipolar disorder, or other
similar conditions.
As important as the military recruiting and accession processes are, they rely heavily on a patchwork of outdated technology and paper-based data
collection for medical history. Until recently, this
process was seen to serve both the needs of DOD and
those of the services even though it was based on the
assumption that the medical record provided by the
applicant was complete and accurate. Based on this
assumption, the DOD thought it was able to apply
stringent accession medical standards, and this gave
the impression that high quality standards were being met even though the services were recruiting applicants with largely unverifiable medical histories.
Various studies and reports over the years identified this shortfall in validating applicant disclosure
holders that would otherwise make it easier for Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) to obtain
medical history information.23
In 2016, USMEPCOM was directed to gain access
to authoritative health information through a fully automated and electronic health record system
to reduce the number of EPTS discharges and respond to the various problems noted in government
reports. USMEPCOM conducted assessments, pilots,
and initiatives between 2016 and 2020 to obtain this
information and prepare for implementation. These
efforts resulted in a system-of-systems approach
that began with formal pilot programs in 2020 and
an implementation plan in 2021.
Medical modernization in USMEPCOM encompasses multiple systems that collectively provide
access to an applicant’s health information and electronic health records. The systems include:

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MEPCOM Integrated Resource System
(MIRS 1.1). MIRS is a cloud-based, enterprise
processing system that provides centralized
control and interface for accessions.24 Deployed
in 2021, MIRS features increased maintainability, usability, security, and scalability compared
to legacy systems. It supports medical processing through the scheduling and reporting of
medical exams.
Health Artifact and Image Management
Solution (HAIMS). HAIMS provides global
visibility and access to records and images
generated during health care delivery.25 With
access available at all MEPS and service recruit
training sites, HAIMS supports the digitization
and transmission of accession health records
while reducing personally identifiable information (PII) and personal health information
(PHI) exposure.
Joint Longitudinal Viewer (JLV). JLV provides an integrated, read-only view of electronic health records from the DOD, Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), and health information
exchanges.26 JLV primarily contains health
information on prior service applicants and the
dependents (spouses and children) of military
servicemembers. It utilizes electronic health
records held by DOD and VA to provide prescription history for beneficiary populations.
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Prescription Medication Reporting System (PMRS). A commercial application used
primarily by the insurance industry, PMRS provides pharmacy history reports on individuals,
including prescription drug dosage and refill
information.27 PMRS primarily covers insured
applicants who have no prior military affiliation
and is compliant with both the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Military Health System (MHS) GENESIS.
MHS GENESIS is the next-generation DOD,
VA, and Department of Homeland Security (for
U.S. Coast Guard) electronic health record that
covers accession through retirement.28 MHS
GENESIS is a fully digital system that leverages authoritative data and reduces reliance on
paper-based processes.
Collectively, these systems provide end-to-end
electronic health record coverage and access to authoritative health information while fully digitizing
the accession medical process in a cloud-based environment. From an enterprise standpoint, they improve qualification decisions, reduce recruit training
attrition (EPTS), and enhance policy formation at
the DOD and service levels.
In December 2021, USMEPCOM initiated the
Medical Review of Authoritative Data (MROAD)
program as the first step to address the problem of
applicant nondisclosure. MROAD makes it possible
for the military to obtain applicant prescription histories that are used to identify medical conditions
contributing to avoidable attrition.29 MROAD leverages two complementary systems: JLV and PMRS.
The data obtained from JLV and PMRS reports allow for a more comprehensive picture of applicants’
medical histories.
In early 2020, USMEPCOM used MROAD to assess the use and impact of JLV and PMRS in the medical evaluation process. Only records of applicants
already shipped to recruit training were reviewed so
that the assessment did not affect actual qualification decisions. After reviewing the records of 1,545
applicants between April and June 2020, USMEPCOM found that nearly 7 percent of applicants had
a prescription history suggesting non-waiverable
medical conditions.30 Further analysis indicated that
approximately 83 percent of applicants would be
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
fully qualified during the physical exam with an additional 10 percent receiving service medical waivers.
The net impact on qualifications confirmed that
applicants were not disclosing potentially disqualifying conditions, as the disqualification rate increased by nearly 7 percent overall. It was estimated
that the savings associated with better qualification
decisions totaled nearly $1 billion per year for the
DOD and services at a financial cost of only $5 million per year. Interestingly, the results of the review
also revealed that an additional 21,000 applicants
need to be recruited each year to offset the number
that are medically disqualified during prescreening
for the services to meet their annual recruiting goals.
The individual applicant findings were somewhat
more startling. When the prescription history of applicants who had already assessed and shipped to
recruit training during 2020 were reviewed, it was
found that many had undisclosed, significant mental health conditions that would not be compatible
with military service or success at recruit training.
Examples included:
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An applicant with 232 prescription fills for multiple psychiatric medications,
USMEPCOM had processes and procedures in
place to implement the use of PMRS and JLV
when directed. This initiative addressed the
historical problem of applicant nondisclosure
of medical history and would have allowed
USMEPCOM medical providers to make better
informed risk-based decisions. The use of
authoritative health information would also reduce the variance in medical decision-making
and EPTS attrition, nearly 50 percent of which
is due to applicants failing to disclose medically
disqualifying information.
Service recruiting commands were hesitant,
preferring to implement MROAD in FY 2023.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, inability to
gain access to schools and conduct large-scale
events, and a young, less experienced recruiting
force had created challenges to meeting recruitment goals. Recruiting commands were concerned that implementation of more stringent
medical screening practices would decrease
the pool of eligible applicants and increase the
workload for recruiters. Any additional barriers
to entry were seen as counterproductive.

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An applicant with over 100 prescription fills for
ADHD and anti-depressives, and
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An applicant who was prescribed lithium for
bipolar disorder.
The Council on Recruit Basic Training, an organization made up of the commanders and commanding generals of the service recruit training
commands, supported medical modernization
efforts if they reduced EPTS attrition at the
initial entry training sites. Identifying medically disqualifying conditions would arguably
prevent injury or death, minimize attrition
rates, and increase graduation rates. Furthermore, applicants approved through the waiver
process would sustain fewer injuries/illnesses
if preventive measures were available.
Such cases would not normally be granted a waiver for enlistment by the military services, yet they
somehow “slipped through the system.”
The decision to implement MROAD in actual
qualification decisions was made in 2021. DOD developed several courses of action (COA) that balanced the need for medical modernization with the
realities of the recruiting environment. While varyService medical review waiver authorities
ing somewhat in their implementation start date
largely favored the use of authoritative health
and the use of medical history reports during the
information in the accession process because
course of the accession process, all of the COAs recit provided a more holistic picture of an appliommended better use of both electronic and paper
cant's medical history and allowed for better
medical records to determine whether an applicant
determinations in cases involving medical
needed a more comprehensive physical examination.
waiver requests.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the positions of agencies involved in the decision to implement recomThe DOD directed the implementation of
mendations varied greatly, depending on their mis- MROAD beginning in FY 202231 against the strong
sions and roles in the accession supply chain.
reservations of the services. USMEPCOM was
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43

directed to provide implementing procedures to
the services before the initiation of MROAD and
to conduct an assessment of the program after six
months of use. Military applicant medical disqualification rates began to increase immediately following
the implementation of MROAD in December 2021.
Additionally, the increase in the quantity of medical
history that MEPS medical providers needed to review increased the timeline for medical evaluations.
These two factors—higher disqualification rates and
longer timelines—increased the risk of missed recruiting goals for the service recruiting commands.
The services voiced their concerns in early 2022,
and DOD decided to pause the MROAD program in
anticipation of the deployment of MHS GENESIS.32
USMEPCOM deployed MHS GENESIS in the
second and third quarters of FY 2022. Similar to
the deployment of MROAD, the services strongly
objected to the deployment of MHS GENESIS. They
continued to be concerned about the negative impact that increased medical disqualification rates
would have on service recruiting efforts, particularly
in a year when all military services are struggling to
meet their recruiting goals. Despite these concerns,
determining that the improved quality of military
applicants outweighed the services’ concerns about
quantity and given the difficulty of the recruiting
mission in FY 2022 and the likelihood that the services would miss recruiting goals in any event, DOD
determined that FY 2022 was the best time to deploy
MHS GENESIS.
The deployment of MHS GENESIS marked the
most significant change in medical qualification
in a half-century and was the result of decades of
work and research. USMEPCOM moved from a paper-based system to a modern health care system
that provides “a single health record for service
members, veterans, and their families”33 as well
as better, more responsive access to authoritative
health information. Its use not only has the direct
impact of improving the quality of recruits enlisted
in the military, but also provides improved insight
into the overall health of the U.S. armed forces.
These long-term benefits should not be outweighed
by the short-term impacts being experienced by
the service recruiting commands in meeting their
quantity goals.
Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Testing. The
ASVAB is the world’s most widely used multiple-aptitude test battery and became so widely used
44
because of the evolutionary process by which it was
developed and implemented—a process in which the
U.S armed forces have played a central role.
The process of administering standardized tests
at the beginning of the 20th century was time-consuming and costly and required highly trained
administrators. In 1917, American Psychological
Association (APA) President Robert Yerkes urged
the APA to contribute to the war effort by helping
to find a way to assess recruits.34 The APA formed
numerous committees, one of which was charged
with developing a group intelligence test that could
identify men with low intelligence and those who
were well-prepared for special assignments or higher-level training.
Their efforts resulted in the Army Alpha and Beta
tests, introduced in 1917.35 The Army Alpha was a
written test for literate recruits. It had various parts,
including analogy recognition, missing number fillins, and sentence unscrambling. These types of questions are still common in modern IQ tests. The Beta
version was used for men who did not speak English
or were illiterate. It also had several parts, including
a maze, number work, and picture completions. The
Alpha and Beta tests could be administered to large
groups and took less than an hour to complete. By
the end of World War I, more than one million people had taken the Army Alpha and Beta tests.
The Army used the tests for two primary reasons:
to improve the assigning of new recruits and to allow military leaders to gain a better understanding
of their soldiers’ individual abilities. The first tests
were just the beginning of the journey for intelligence and aptitude testing within the U.S. military.
During World War II, each service used its own
assessment procedures before an individual’s induction. The War Department also began to use the
Army General Classification Test and Navy General
Classification Test to classify enlisted personnel.36
These tests included questions on vocabulary, arithmetic, and block counting. More than nine million
people took these tests during the war.
In 1948, Congress passed the Selective Service
Act, which mandated that the newly formed DOD
should develop a uniform screening test to be used
by all of the services. In response, DOD developed
the AFQT.37 DOD began to administer the AFQT in
1950 and continued to administer it until the mid1970s. The AFQT consisted of 100 multiple choice
questions in vocabulary, arithmetic, spatial relations,
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
TABLE 1
Armed Forces
Qualification Test:
Categories and Score
Ranges
SOURCE: Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery, “Understanding ASVAB Scores,”
https://www.officialasvab.com/applicants/
scores/ (accessed August 9, 2022).
Category
Score Range
I
93–99
II
65–92
IIIA
50–64
IIIB
31–49
IVA
21–30
IVB
16–20
IVC
10–15
V
1–9
A
the services will not enlist applicants below Category IIIB without a waiver.
The difficulty involved in finding sufficient numbers of AFQT Category I, II, and IIIA applicants has
led the services to explore non-cognitive testing as
an alternative way to assess American youth for
their potential to succeed in military service. These
non-cognitive tests, the most notable being the
Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System
(TAPAS), identify behavioral skills and attributes
like grit, resilience, or coping that predict success
in an endeavor. Nearly all of the military services
have administered or are administering the TAPAS
test to military applicants, and the Army was administering it on a limited basis as early as 2012.
However, none of the military services has fully integrated the TAPAS scores into its enlistment-related decision-making.
Service recruiting commands and advocacy
groups have asked that applicants be allowed to use
electronic calculators when taking ASVAB tests
and that testing be provided in a language option
other than English (for example, in Spanish). The
thought is that the use of calculators and testing
in a native language will increase the pool of qualified applicants. However, these proposals present
multiple challenges. ASVAB testing questions have
not been developed with calculators in mind, and
the test has not been normed with applicants who
used calculators. As a result, allowing calculators to
be used in ASVAB testing would likely have only a
marginal impact on the number of qualified applicants. In addition, military training is conducted
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
45

and mechanical ability. DOD used the AFQT to measure the “general trainability” of draftees and volunteers for all of the armed services.
In 1966, the DOD began to develop a single battery for all of the services. In 1968, the DOD first
offered the ASVAB at no cost to high schools and
postsecondary schools. By 1976, DOD introduced the
ASVAB as the official aptitude test for all of the services.38 Since that time, the DOD has improved the
ASVAB program, most notably with the inclusion of
the Career Exploration Program (CEP). Administered to over 500,000 high school students annually,
the CEP is used by school counselors to encourage
students to increase their level of self-knowledge
and understand how that information is linked to
military and civilian occupational opportunities.
For recruiters and potential recruits, the ASVAB
test’s most important score is the AFQT, which is
computed using scores from four subtests: Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge. The
AFQT score is a percentile ranging from 1–99 and is
normed based on a sample of 18-year-old through
23-year-old youth that was collected in 1997, resulting in a bell curve in which an AFQT score of 50
represents an average result. The AFQT scores are
further broken into eight categories, as depicted in
the accompanying table.
The military services are required to report the
number of military applicants enlisted under each
category. The service recruiters are strongly encouraged to enlist AFQT Category I, II, and IIIA applicants and to limit AFQT IIIB applicants. Generally,
heritage.org

in English, so applicants who are not proficient in
English would likely struggle with and possibly fail
in training because of their inability to comprehend
the training materials.
The most viable way to increase the pool of qualified applicants would be to use a blend of cognitive
and non-cognitive tests to determine suitability
and enlistment. For example, ASVAB Category IV
applicants who would otherwise not be considered
for enlistment could be granted a waiver if they have
a high TAPAS score. As all the services are currently administering the TAPAS test to prospective recruits, this blended approach could be implemented
quickly and at a fraction of the cost of other options.
The blended approach represents a step-increase in
testing capability, increasing the enlistment eligibility (qualification) of the current and prospective pool
of recruits while also improving the classification of
recruits to improve success rates in military service.
Propensity. While the DOD as a whole and the
military services individually develop and implement policies to identify high-quality prospects for
military service and increase the odds that such service will be successful, they also work to understand
the attitude of youth toward military service. This
is key to marketing efforts that link the military to
American youth.
One of the DOD’s greatest challenges is a significant decline in the propensity to serve among
America’s youth and a corresponding negative trend
in views of the value of military service among key
“influencers” that shape their opinions. This decline has been influenced by a combination of factors such as:
l
l
l
l
46
A shrinking military footprint in many areas of
the country (resulting in less opportunity for
youth to have personal contact with anyone in
the military);
Low unemployment rates (plenty of job opportunities in the civilian sector);
Improved access to college and higher
education; and
Years of prolonged overseas conflict for the military (implying that anyone joining the military
would have a similar experience).
These factors have created conditions in which the
intrinsically motivating elements of military service
have become less self-evident to the youth market
while the sacrifices of service in terms of physical, psychological, and quality-of-life consequences remain
top-of-mind. Today’s youth view military service as
fraught with risk and sacrifice without unique rewards
or advantages. The distinguishing outcomes that youth
associate with joining the military often include physical injury, constant deployment, family separation,
post-service unemployment, and trouble reintegrating
into society. These views are often reinforced by the
media, national headlines, and family influence.
Moreover, the increased political polarization of
America has crept into perceptions of military service. The military is portrayed negatively as either a
breeding ground for racist, extremist, or insurgent
behavior on the one hand or weakened by “woke,”
fragile, and social experimentation policies on the
other. Both portrayals, neither of which is either
true or productive, undermine youth propensity to
serve and therefore military recruiting.
To counter these challenges and help reimage the
military for today’s youth, the DOD initiated a series
of influencer media campaigns. The messaging was
intended to increase awareness of the opportunities
of military service, advocate for the benefits of public service, and overcome the misinformation with
respect to the risks associated with military service.
The Joint Advertising, Market Research and
Studies (JAMRS) program is the DOD office for
military advertising, market research, and studies
related to recruiting.39 JAMRS uses annual surveys
to explore the perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes of
American youth as they relate to joining the military. Understanding these factors is critical to success in sustaining an AVF and helps to ensure that
recruiting efforts are directed in the most efficient
and beneficial manner.
JAMRS survey results show a steady decline
in the general propensity to serve in the military
among youth ages 16–21 between 2018 and 2021,
reaching a low of 10 percent in the summer of 2021.40
At low levels of propensity, all resources supporting
the recruiting mission must work harder for the services and DOD to make annual recruiting goals. For
the first time, a majority of youth have never considered the military as an option, even though economic hardships and uncertainties persisted throughout
the COVID-19 pandemic.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
weekend engagement to achieve recruiting goals.
Individual recruiter engagement with prospective
applicants is therefore extremely important and
must be measured across multiple metrics to ensure that the front end of the accession pipeline remains productive.
Market indications are problematic for military
recruiting in both the short and long terms. Many
youth aspire to a lifestyle that maximizes work–life
alignment, which they do not perceive as being available with military service. The military recruiting
services have not adjusted their messaging to account for this change in youth attitudes. Doing so
will come at increased cost, but it will also help to
attract high-quality, eligible, and diverse youth. Experience has shown that support for AVF recruitment requires adequate and sustained resources.
The services must have the resources to make timely
investments in the number of recruiters, marketing
and advertising efforts, and enlistment bonuses to
mitigate the adverse effects of such a challenging
environment.
Modernizing Military Accessions
The military accession process must evolve to
achieve the quality standards and quantity requirements that are needed to maintain military readiness. Industrial age accession practices, based on
large-scale batch processing, need to be replaced by
data-driven and targeted strategies. The COVID-19
pandemic served as an inflection point for the accession enterprise, highlighting systemic issues in
the accession model while prompting the development of potentially transformational programs
to modernize the process. At present, the military
services are failing to leverage new tools to achieve
their recruiting goals at the very time when American youth are increasingly ineligible to serve and
have less desire to serve.
While challenging, the recruiting environment
does present an opportunity to emerge from the
COVID-19 pandemic with a new accession model
that is built on modern medical standards and technologies, integrated cognitive and non-cognitive
testing, and the ability to adapt to changing youth attitudes and behaviors. The current incentive structure, which tends to favor quantity of recruits over
quality of recruits, does not support this transition.
History has shown that the accession enterprise can
evolve when there is sufficient dissatisfaction with
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
47

Additionally, only 23 percent of America’s youth
are eligible to enlist in the military without a waiver.41 Disqualifying factors include overweight, drug
use, adverse medical conditions/history, adverse
mental health condition/history, low aptitude and
education, poor conduct, and having dependents (a
spouse, child or children, or other family members
who depend on the potential enlistee for support).
Nearly half of all youth who are ineligible are so for
multiple reasons. This situation is exacerbated by
low youth propensity and the difficulties recruiters
have in engaging youth in a fragmented social and
cultural landscape with limited resources.
Most youth do not seek information about serving in the military and are not motivated to look past
the stereotypes presented in our culture. Emergent
concerns around sexual harassment and assault in
the military are at an all-time high: Nearly one-third
of eligible youth cite this as the main reason why
they would not consider joining the U.S. military.
Significant growth in the number of media platforms,
including traditional media, social media, and digital
media, requires outreach resources to work harder
and be targeted so that they reach intended markets
more effectively.
The disconnect between the youth population
and the military has been exacerbated by current
events, creating a perfect storm for military recruiters. The restrictions on in-person engagements imposed because of the COVID-19 pandemic have left
recruiters at a disadvantage in cultivating and maintaining relationships with both the broader market
and the low-propensity segments of that market. As
many recruiters will relate, it is much easier for a
potential applicant to “ghost” them, either by not
responding to efforts to contact them or by ignoring
follow-on efforts once an initial contact is made, if
they have met only online. Additionally, many recruiters lack the social media skills and authorities
to engage with potential applicants in the digital
platforms where they are most likely to be found.
Nonetheless, recruiting remains a very personal business. Unlike transactional sales, recruiting
for military service is more akin to a serial sales
model where a recruit must be sold multiple years
of service. This requires face-to-face interactions
not only with the prospective recruit, but also with
his or her family, friends, and other influencers.
For most successful recruiters, this is not a “9 to 5”
job; it is one that requires significant evening and
Conclusion
The accession enterprise must build the resilience that is similarly expected of military servicemembers. Recruiting the AVF cannot be a reactive
activity; it must be a proactive, initiative-driven
effort that engages American youth and convinces
them of the value and nobility of serving their country in uniform.
Removing impediments is critical to making
progress in this endeavor, and implementing a host
of modern systems within the medical screening
and recruit processing systems is a huge step forward. Similar efforts are needed in the recruiting
system and should receive priority attention not
just from senior defense officials, but also from influencers in education, civic organizations, and the
sports and entertainment industries. These are the
sectors of American society that are in the closest
and most regular contact with our youth. If such
efforts are not made, the viability of the AVF and,
consequently, the security of the country will come
into question.

the current state, when there is a compelling vision
for a future state, and when initial steps are taken
toward that future state.
The medical technologies, in terms of authoritative health information and electronic health records, and the cognitive and non-cognitive testing
methodologies are in place to be fully integrated into
the accession process. The only obstacles that remain are the policy and political will to do so and the
institutional resistance to change. Failure to act at
this moment will delay implementation for at least
another generation and continue to jeopardize military readiness.
Political agendas and public opinion will continue to play a role in the accession process, but their
negative manifestations can be marginalized when
all of the components needed to identify, engage, recruit, and induct new servicemembers are aligned on
outcomes. Understanding the primary levers of control through medical and testing standards, as well
as a deep understanding of changing youth attitudes
and behaviors, will allow the accession enterprise to
achieve its goals in any political, economic, or social
environment.
48
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Endnotes
1.
James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf (accessed August 8, 2022).
2.
Alan M. Saks, “The Impracticality of Recruitment Research,” in The Blackwell Handbook of Personnel Selection, ed. Arne Evers, Neil Anderson,
and Olga Voskuijl (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 47–72).
3.
Press release, “Department of Defense Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for Fiscal Year 2022 Thru February 2022,” n.d., https://
prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/pressreleases/2022/5%20-%20Press%20Release%20February%202022%20FY22.
pdf?ver=a9W-dWRNxTH06HwIvfFu4g%3D%3D (accessed August 8, 2022).
4.
Steve Beynon, “Army Drops Requirement for High School Diploma amid Recruiting Crisis,” Military.com, June 24, 2022, https://www.military.
com/daily-news/2022/06/24/army-drops-requirement-high-school-diploma-amid-recruiting-crisis.html (accessed August 8, 2022), and Joe
Lacdan, “Army Eases Tattoo Restrictions with New Policy,” U.S. Army, June 23, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/257828/army_eases_tattoo_
restrictions_with_new_policy (accessed August 8, 2022).
5.
Steve Beynon, “Army Extending Assignments for Recruiters Involuntarily as Service Scrambles to Fill Ranks,” Military.com, June 10, 2022, https://
www.military.com/daily-news/2022/06/10/army-involuntary-extending-assignments-recruiters-service-scrambles-fill-ranks.html (accessed
August 8, 2022).
10 U.S. Code § 505(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/505 (accessed August 8, 2022).
U.S. Department of Defense, “Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction,” Department of Defense Instruction No.
1304.26, March 23, 2015, Incorporating Change 3, October 26, 2018, p. 2, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/
dodi/130426p.pdf?ver=2018-10-26-085822-050 (accessed August 8, 2022).
8.
Davis Winkie, “Army May Restructure Brigade Combat Teams amid Recruiting Woes,” Army Times, July 29, 2022, https://www.armytimes.com/
news/your-army/2022/07/29/army-may-restructure-brigade-combat-teams-amid-recruiting-woes/ (accessed August 8, 2022).
9.
The standards were first published in Selective Service Regulations in 1917 and were later incorporated into Army Regulation 40-105, “Standards
of Physical Examination for Entrance into the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves,” which included the horse-friendly policy of
barring those exceeding 180 pounds from joining the cavalry. See Selective Service Regulations, Part VIII, “Physical Examination,” 1917, pp. 94–101,
https://centropr-archive.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/military-project/1917%20Draft.pdf (accessed August 8, 2022), and Army Regulation
40-105, “Standards of Physical Examination for Entrance into the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves,” May 29, 1923, in Colonel
William B. Foster, Ida Levin Hellman, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hesford, and Captain Darrell G. McPherson, Physical Standards in World War II,
Department of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General, 1967, pp. 244–248, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA291761.pdf (accessed August 8, 2022).
10. War Department Mobilization Regulation No. 1-9: “Standards of Physical Examination During Mobilization,” August 31, 1940, in Foster et al.,
Physical Standards in World War II, pp. 129–160.
11. The PULHES physical classification standard was adopted from a system already in use by the Canadian Armed Forces. The Canadians had a system
called PULHEMS, which indicated the individual’s suitability for a particular assignment at a glance. (The “M” in the Canadian system stood for
mentality (intelligence) and was eliminated from the U.S. system in favor of AGCT results, which were recorded separately in the individual’s record.)
After experimenting with the Canadian system, the Americans adopted it as PULHES in May 1944. “In a complete profile, an individual received a
grade from 1 to 4 in each of the six body parts or functions; that is, ‘P,’ physical capacity or stamina; ‘U’, upper extremities; ‘L’, lower extremities; ‘H’,
hearing (including ear defects): ‘E’, eyes; and ‘S’, neuropsychiatric.” Each of the letter categories had four numerical grades that could be assigned.
See “The Adoption of PULHES,” in Foster et al., Physical Standards in World War II, pp. 68–72, esp. p. 68. See also U.S. Department of Defense, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction,”
DoD Instruction 6130.03, Volume 1, March 30, 2018, pp. 16–17, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/613003_v1p.
PDF?ver=9NsVi30gsHBBsRhMLcyVVQ%3D%3D (accessed August 8, 2022), and U.S. Department of Defense, “Criteria and Procedure Requirements
for Physical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Armed Forces,” Department of Defense Instruction No. 6130.4, April 2, 2004,
p. 9, https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf/i61304_040204/i61304p.pdf (accessed August 15, 2022).
12. Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, “History of Military Testing,” https://www.officialasvab.com/researchers/history-of-military-testing/
(accessed August 8, 2022). See also Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, “ASVAB Fact Sheet,” n.d., https://www.officialasvab.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/ASVAB-Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed August 8, 2022).
13. National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Medical Follow-up Agency, Committee on Noise-Induced Hearing Loss and Tinnitus
Associated with Military Service from World War II to the Present, Noise and Military Service: Implications for Hearing Loss and Tinnitus,
(Washington: National Academies Press, 2006), p. 190, https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11443/chapter/8 (accessed August 8, 2022).
14. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, “Update: Routine Screening for Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Civilian
Applicants for U.S. Military Service and U.S. Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components, January 2014–June 2019,” U.S. Department
of Defense, Military Health System, last updated January 9, 2020, https://health.mil/News/Articles/2019/08/01/Routine-Screening-forAntibodies?type=Fact+Sheets#:~:text=Infection%20with%20HIV%20is%20medically,detect%20newly%20acquired%20HIV%20infections
(accessed August 8, 2022).
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
49

6.
7.
15. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, ICD-10-CM Official Guidelines for Coding and
Reporting FY 2015, 2014, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/Downloads/icd10cm-guidelines-2015.pdf (accessed August 8, 2022).
16. Daniel Wilson, “DOD Issues Guidance for Recruiting Transgender Troops,” Law360, December 21, 2017, https://www.law360.com/employmentauthority/articles/997304/dod-issues-guidance-for-recruiting-transgender-troops (accessed August 8, 2022). Subscription required. See also
U.S. Department of Defense, “In-Service Transition for Transgender Service Members,” DoD Instruction 1300.28, April 30, 2021, https://www.esd.
whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130028p.pdf (accessed August 9, 2022), and U.S. Department of Defense, “Coronavirus:
Timeline: DOD Response,” last updated August 8, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Coronavirus-DOD-Response/Timeline/ (accessed
August 9, 2022).
17. Testimony of General Joseph M. Martin, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, in hearing, Fiscal Year 2023 Readiness Program Update, Subcommittee
on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives July 19, 2022, 1:03:20 to 1:03:52, https://armedservices.house.gov/
hearings?ID=6D218012-FDB2-47DE-8DCF-9EA14A5D821F (accessed August 8, 2022).
18. See note 11, supra.
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Preventive Medicine Branch, Accession Medical Standards Analysis &
Research Activity, Annual Report 2015: Attrition & Morbidity Data for 2014 Accessions, Published and Distributed 2nd Quarter of Fiscal Year
2016, p. 3, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1005616.pdf (accessed August 15, 2022). U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel:
Improvements Needed in the Management of Enlistees’ Medical Early Separation and Enlistment Information. GAO-17-527, July 2017, pp. 20 and
21, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686352.pdf (accessed August 15, 2022); and “FY18 EPTS Attrition Data (October 2017–September 2018),” in
Colonel Arthur B. Cajigal, “Brief to British Armed Forces Recruiting Programme,” U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Military Entrance Processing
Command, February 3, 2020, p. 15.
20. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, “Your Future Begins Now!” https://www.mepcom.army.mil/ArchivedPages/Enlistment-Processing/ (accessed August 8, 2022).
21. U.S. Department of Defense, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Preventive Medicine Branch, Accession Medical Standards Analysis &
Research Activity, Annual Report 2015: Attrition & Morbidity Data for 2014 Accessions, p. 3.

22. Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, “Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could Save DOD Millions of Dollars,” testimony before the
Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102, March 5, 1997, https://www.gao.gov/assets/tnsiad-97-102.pdf (accessed August 9, 2022).
23. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel: Improvements Needed in the Management of Enlistees’ Medical Early Separation
and Enlistment Information, pp. 20–25. See also U.S. Department of Defense, Walter Reed Institute of Research, Preventive Medicine Branch,
Accession Medical Standards Analysis and Research Activity, Annual Report 2015: Attrition & Morbidity Data for 2014 Accessions, pp. 101–113.
24. Tandem, “U.S. Department of Defense: Modernizing the Military Enlistment Process,” https://madeintandem.com/case-studies/modernizing-themilitary-enlistment-process/ (accessed August 9, 2022).
25. Fact Sheet, “HAIMS: Health Artifact and Image Management Solution,” U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Agency, Solution Delivery
Division, October 2021, https://health.mil/Reference-Center/Fact-Sheets?query=haims&isDateRange=0&broadVector=000&newsVector=00000
000&refVector=0000100000000000&refSrc=1 (accessed August 9, 2022).
26. Fact Sheet, “DoD Healthcare Management System Modernization Joint Longitudinal Viewer,” U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Healthcare
Management System Modernization, Program Management Office, October 2019, https://health.mil/-/media/Files/MHS/Fact-Sheet-Files/
JLV_Factsheet_20191022_508C.ashx (accessed August 9, 2022).
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Health System, “Military Health System Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Procedures,” last updated
December 10, 2021, https://www.health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Access-Cost-Quality-and-Safety/Pharmacy-Operations/PrescriptionMonitoring-Program/Prescription-Drug-Monitoring-Program-Procedures (accessed August 9, 2022).
28. Claudia Sanchez-Bustamante, “New Electronic Health Record Rollout Will Hit Major Milestone in 2022,” U.S. Department of Defense, Military
Health System, January 12, 2022, https://health.mil/News/Articles/2022/01/12/New-Electronic-Health-Records-Rollout-Will-Hit-Major-Milestonein-2022 (accessed August 9, 2022).
29. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, FY2021 Annual Report, p. 3, https://www.mepcom.
army.mil/Portals/112/Documents/Command%20Annual%20Report/Command%20Annual%20Report%20online%20FY2021.
pdf?ver=UGoLTRx6024TEVZosMWD8w%3D%3D#:~:text=Medical%20Review%20of%20Authoritative%20Data,streamline%20the%20
medical%20qualification%20process (accessed August 8, 2022).
30. Slide 6, “MROAD Pilot Results, April–June 2020,” in Stephanie P. Miller and Colonel Rich Brady, “OUSD(P&R) Military Personnel Policy: Accession
Policy Directorate,” U.S. Department of Defense, presented July 2021, p. 6, and Slide 11, “PMRS/JLV Impact on Attrition,” in “Accession Medical
Modernization,” U.S. Department of Defense, presented January 2021.
31. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, FY2021 Annual Report, 2021, p. 3.
32. Private correspondence with the author.
50
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
33. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Health System, “About MHS GENESIS,” https://www.health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/MHS-Transformation/
MHS-GENESIS#:~:text=About%20MHS%20GENESIS,%2C%20veterans%2C%20and%20their%20families (accessed August 10, 2022).
34. Kendra Cherry, “Robert Yerkes Was Influential in Comparative Psychology,” Verywell Mind, updated April 13, 2020, https://www.verywellmind.
com/robert-yerkes-biography-2795531 (accessed August 8, 2022).
35. Joe Ricker, “Army Alpha & Army Beta & Psychology: History, Theories, & Results,” Study.com, updated January 7, 2022, https://study.com/
academy/lesson/army-alpha-army-beta-psychology-history-theories-results.html (accessed August 8, 2022).
36. Andrew Marshall, “What Is the Army General Classification Test?” Boot Camp & Military Fitness Institute, January 15, 2021, https://
bootcampmilitaryfitnessinstitute.com/2021/01/15/what-is-the-army-general-classification-test/ (accessed August 8, 2022).
37. Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, “Historical Importance of Military Testing,” https://asvabmilitarytest.com/history-of-asvab-test
(accessed August 9, 2022).
38. Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, “History of Military Testing.”
39. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies, “Marketing Communications,” https://jamrs.defense.gov/marketingcommunications/ (accessed August 8, 2022).
40. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies, Office of People Analytics, “Summer 2021
Propensity Update,” PowerPoint Presentation, May 18, 2022, p. 2, https://jamrs.defense.gov/Portals/20/Documents/
YP50Summer2021PUBLICRELEASEPropensityUpdate.pdf?ver=gSF5SrE3hRX5lhFwoz7Iqw%3d%3d (accessed August 8, 2022).
41. Matt Seyler, “Military Struggling to Find New Troops as Fewer Young Americans Willing or Able to Serve,” ABC7 Eyewitness News, New York, July
2, 2022, https://abc7ny.com/military-troops-recruitment-war/12011656/#:~:text=Only%2023%25%20of%20Americans%20aged,use%20are%20
common%20disqualifying%20factors (accessed August 8, 2022).

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51

Determining the Real Cost of the Tools of War
John G. Ferrari, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
A
With regard to defense costs, there are four key
problems with respect to both weapons systems
and personnel:
l
The failure to include operating and
support costs,
l
Undefined timelines,
l
Poor or nonexistent updating of estimates, and
l
Abuse of the English language.

popular
‌
low-cost airline advertises one-way
‌flights from New York City to Los Angeles
starting at $61, an undeniable bargain. When you
go to book the flight, you realize it is a 13-hour trip,
compared to the six-hour nonstop advertised by
competitors. Then you notice the five-and-a-halfhour layover in Miami, in a direction the opposite
of where you are traveling.
When you continue with your booking, it becomes clear that to choose your seat, bring any sort
of personal item on the plane, and check a bag, you
will have to spend another $65—four bucks more
than the cost of the flight itself. A carry-on and onetime waived change fee will cost you an additional
$15. Finally, for the right to check in with an agent at
the airport, you will be squeezed for an extra $10. On
the payment page, your $61 flight will have become
nearly triple what you would have paid to be afforded the same amenities provided on most other flights
(with the exception of complimentary in-flight beverages and snacks), and you have become the beneficiary of an unexpected five-and-a-half-hour pit stop
in a Florida airport.
The Department of Defense (DOD) weapons
systems and personnel cost estimates and the unnamed low-cost airline have many commonalities
including misleading up-front and fixed costs, misunderstood timelines, and operational costs that
are often ignored. Why make the comparison? The
American public is consuming information from
various sources that often mix up, confuse, and
make erroneous cost projections for various DOD
programs. Just as they need to be better consumers
of airline flight information, American taxpayers
need to be more well-informed about defense capabilities and better consumers of defense information
and security.
It is clear that some of the most prominent programs and personnel costs in the U.S. military today
suffer from inconsistent and incomplete estimations,
with one prominent exception: the much-maligned
F-35 fighter. As complicated as the estimation process and DOD estimation guidelines are, once he
or she knows where to look, anyone can determine
where programs fall victim to some of the more common estimation pitfalls.
Although submitting incorrect estimations could
eventually lead to bad policy decisions, it is safe to
assume that few to none of these inaccuracies are
the result of malicious intent. Some estimations,
such as those for the F-35 program and the cost of
the Iraq War, have serious political implications that
may incentivize the cherry-picking of numbers, but
consistent problems in DOD estimations result from
a number of systemic and procedural issues. This
analysis is not meant to forgive misguided budgeting
but seeks rather to explain that even the “facts” may
not be accurate in the end, whether miscalculations
are caused by inclusion or by omission of data. As the
U.S. seeks to strengthen the military’s budget, it is
critical that policymakers have the right information
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
53

at the right time so that they can make the best de- complicate the analyses of and justifications for
cisions and Americans can get the most national billions of dollars in national security decisions.
defense for their tax dollars.
One should never be afraid to ask what is meant by
a word: Words matter.
Using and Understanding the
PAUC vs. APUC. Anyone who wants to know
Right Defense Budget Terms
how much specific weapons systems or munitions
How much money does Congress provide for our cost should be prepared to be dazzled by two differnational defense? This is a seemingly easy ques- ent combinations—PAUC and APUC—and be pretion, yet most get it wrong, and they do so mostly pared for both to be used interchangeably or, worse
because there are three different sets of numbers yet, not identified.
that get transposed in normal conversation. What
PAUC stands for Program Acquisition Unit Cost,
the United States spends on national defense is not which is set in statute and used to define cost rethe same as what the Pentagon spends, which is not porting requirements to Congress.2 It is simply calthe same as how much money is appropriated by the culated by adding together all of the developmental
Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of Congress. costs for a program, including program-specific
Understanding the difference between, for example, military construction; adding it to the projected
“basic economy” and merely “economy” is key to un- cost of production; and then dividing that sum by
derstanding what our money is buying.
the total number of systems intended to be proTo start with, the term “national defense”—in the cured throughout the system’s lifetime. If you want
case of resourcing—encompasses much more than to make a system appear affordable, be extremely
the Pentagon and includes programs run by other optimistic in how many you plan to acquire: The
departments such as the nuclear program in the more you “intend” to buy, the more you spread the
Department of Energy. This number is often called development costs, thus driving down the appearthe “050” budget line number and aligns with the ance of the per unit price. In this case, imagine you
National Defense Authorization Act. For the Penta- are the airline, trying to raise money from investors.
gon specifically, its funding is often called “051.” But If you assume lots of people on your aircraft for each
just to make it slightly more confusing, in the con- flight, you can market yourself as a low-cost airline.
gressional appropriation process, the defense appro- However, if the passengers do not show up, you are
priation does not include either the Pentagon funds now a high-cost airline.
for Military Construction/Family Housing, which
Within DOD, analyzing the PAUC is important
are provided by the Appropriations Committee’s for programs with large up-front development costs
Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Relat- and high projected quantities. As a smart consumer
ed Agencies Subcommittee, or the non-Pentagon of DOD acquisition data, never take the PAUC at face
National Defense funds, which are provided by the value without understanding those two factors.
Energy and Water Development and Related AgenThe second acronym is APUC: same letters, but
cies Subcommittee.
this time they stand for Average Per Unit Cost. The
Table 2 is a helpful guide to understanding these APUC is calculated by taking the actual projected
numerical discrepancies and explains why the fol- cost of production and dividing it by the proposed
lowing sentence incorrectly compares budget re- quantity. Since inflating the quantity does not get
sources: “A budget of even $770 billion [051] would you a lower average in this case, how does this numbe a significant increase when compared to the ber get misused? It is called the “learning curve.”
$728.5 billion enacted in law for the Defense Depart- The learning curve occurs when a program assumes
ment in FY22 [defense appropriation less military that the cost of production will magically decrease
construction].”1
over time. Since there is both an art and a science to
This is just one example (albeit a simple one) of forecasting the learning curve effect in forecasted
how the word “defense” has three different mean- pricing, this is an area in which you should be exings depending upon who is using it and when. Now tremely skeptical when comparing different systems.
imagine this playing out across different programs
To see it in practice, consider the recent budget
or in the context of real versus nominal dollars. documents for the F-35 and F-15EX. In 2023, the
Not being specific with defense budget terms can F-35 jets are Block 4 models, and the fly-away cost
54
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
TABLE 2
Funding Provided to the Department of Defense
2021
Enacted
2022
President’s
Budget
2022
Omnibus
DOD, Defense Appropriations
$695.2
$705.2
$728.5
4.8%
DOD, MILCON Appropriations
$8.5
$9.8
$14.9
75.3%
$703.7
$715.0
$743.4
5.6%
$37.1
$37.9
$38.6
4.0%
$740.8
$752.9
$782.0
5.6%
Total DOD (051)
Non-DOD National
Defense (DOE/Other)
National Defense Budget (050)
Change, 2021
Enacted to 2022
Omnibus
SOURCE: Elaine McCuster and John G. Ferrari, “4 Initial Defense Highlights from the 2022 Omnibus Appropriations Bill,” American
Enterprise Institute, AEIdeas Blog, March 11, 2022, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/4-initial-defense-highlights-fromthe-2022-omnibus- appropriations-bill/ (accessed August 11, 2022).
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and funding lines; therefore, it does not go through
the same bureaucratic process that other agencies
must go through inside the Pentagon. Before the
Federal Aviation Administration cracked down on
the airlines, some of them excluded such things as
the Passenger Facility Charge, Flight Segment Tax,
September 11 Security Fee (Passenger Civil Aviation
Security Service Fee), and Transportation Tax from
their advertised fares. Unfortunately, we have no
version of the FAA for program costing; therefore,
as with a resort fee at a hotel, you need to ask about
other costs.
At its core, the MDA is only supposed to procure
systems, and after it is done fielding them, the intent is for the systems and all associated costs to be
transferred to one of the military services. Therefore, MDA estimates tend to be limited to just the
MDA’s costs—not lifetime costs. A February 2022
Missile Defense Agency: How
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
Excluding Costs “Looks” Cheaper
highlights this reality, noting that the U.S. Missile
A common fallacy holds that projected cost esti- Defense Agency’s cost estimates included “a nummates are guided by and adhere to a common set of ber of shortcomings…such as its comprehensiveness,
rules and standards and that they cannot be skewed accuracy, transparency, and traceability.”3
by the agency providing them. The Missile Defense
With regard to cost omissions, one needs to be
Agency (MDA) has its own acquisition authority aware that the MDA is omitting certain operational
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
55

(APUC) is about $91.6 million each or $5 million
more than the Block 3 jets, which is straightforward.
If the Air Force bought 48 jets, the gross weapons
system cost (PAUC) of each fighter would have been
$108 million. By reducing the number of F-35s purchased/denominator to just 33 F-35As, the gross
weapons systems cost (PAUC) increases by almost
$8 million to $115.5 million.
Why would the Air Force do this? Because they
want to buy more F-15EXs. Reducing F-35 quantities makes the $120.2 million PAUC for the F-15EX
seem almost even. In other words, $120.2 million per
plane seems a lot more justifiable to Congress when
the other option is nearly the same price anyway.
Buying only 33 enables the Air Force to level the cost
comparisons. All of the math is accurate, but knowing how the costs are calculated is just as important.

and sustainment costs from its estimates. Why is this
important? Because operations and sustainment
costs can often reach 70 percent of lifetime-program
costs, which means that omitting or adjusting these
estimates has an enormous impact not just on current
funding levels, but also on future funding levels. This
has hampered the MDA because, in reality, the agency
has not transferred many programs to the services.
Therefore, over time, the MDA finds itself spending
more funds on sustainment, which is not in its mission statement, and less on research and development
and procurement, which are why it exists. This error,
in effect, mortgages our future to pay for the present.
The GAO also notes that the MDA is inaccurately
reporting flight test cost estimates. Two recent Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) tests
cost a combined $20 million, but the flight test estimate was only $2 million.4 This discrepancy is not
isolated to the Army’s THAAD system. The GAO also
“found a $1.5 billion increase in development costs
for the Aegis Weapon System Spiral 5.1 program
between 2019 and 2020 baseline reporting,” while
“MDA only reported a $664 million increase—a difference of $851 million.”5 Why is this important?
Because those costs are inaccurately represented
elsewhere in the budget, which means that policymakers are using bad information when assessing
the cost-benefit of one system versus another.
Is the MDA doing anything malicious? Not necessarily. For the most part, it is doing estimates only
for those costs that apply directly to its mission set
rather than after it transfers the program to the services. The MDA will also state that, regarding test
costs, assessing fixed costs across programs may not
be worth the effort. In any event, an observer’s understanding of the costs for various MDA systems
would be just over one-third of the actual cost: $1.3
billion reported by the MDA versus “at least $3.5
billion” uncovered by the GAO.6
However, just because it is not malicious doesn’t
mean it is not a problem. Anticipating ongoing systems costs certainly needs to be included in program
estimates to help the decision-makers prepare for
future years’ defense spending.
costs in the procurement of the first ship for a specific class. Even taking that into account, it appears
that the Navy then engages in a bit of wishful thinking on how costs can be reduced for the new class of
ships, relying on intuition rather than on past data.
This is analogous to someone who checks the price
of an airplane ticket six weeks out and then uses that
estimate to set aside funds for a ticket he intends to
purchase the night before he flies.
In 2020, the Navy estimated that the Constellation-class frigate would cost about $870 million per
ship, or $8.7 billion for the 10-ship project;7 Eric
Labs, one of the top Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) naval analysts, separately predicted that the
program would cost $1.2 billion per ship, or $12.3 billion for the entire program.8 Historically, the Navy
has “almost always” underestimated the cost of its
shipbuilding projects.9 The Navy was able to weave
together a wishful narrative that, according to the
Congressional Research Service, could be true because the “FFG(X) is based on a[n Italian] design
that has been in production [in Italy and France] for
many years” and “[l]ittle if any new technology is
being developed for it.”10 So what actually happened?
From fiscal year (FY) 2021 to FY 2022, the Navy’s
estimate of the cost per ship increased by 14 percent.
Specifically:
In the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the
FFG-62 class ship to be procured in FY2022
(i.e., the third ship in the program) had an estimated procurement cost of $954.5 million. In
the Navy’s FY2022 budget submission, the ship
has an estimated procurement cost of $1,087.9
million—an increase of $133.4 million, or 14.0%,
over the figure in the Navy’s FY2021 budget
submission.11
This increase came about as a result of preparation and testing costs that were not previously
included in the estimates. Looking forward, “if
FFG-62s were to wind up costing about the same
to construct per thousand tons of displacement as
other recent U.S. military surface combatants, then
the third and subsequent FFG-62s could cost 17% to
Constellation-Class Frigate: The
56% more than the estimate for those ships shown
Guide to Wishful Thinking
in the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission.”12
Much like the MDA, the Navy has its own unique
The military services are not immune to wishful
way of calculating costs. The Navy places all of its de- thinking, and they also know that getting the provertailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) bial camel’s nose under the tent is a certain way to
56
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
CHART 1
Pound for Pound: Comparing the Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate
Every surface combatant built since 1970 cost more by weight to produce than the
Navy expects its new FFG(X) to cost. Figures shown below are costs per thousand
tons of displacement in millions of 2020 dollars.
SHIP
YEAR
AVERAGE COST OF LEAD AND FOLLOW-ON SHIPS
DD-963 Spruance
1970
$210
FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry
1973
$249
CG-47 Ticonderoga
1978
$399
DDG-51 Flight I Arleigh Burke
1985
$293
DDG-51 Flight IIA Arleigh Burke
1994
$268
NSC-1 Legend
2004
$180
LCS-3 Fort Worth
2009
$215
LCS-4 Coronado
2009
$260
DDG-51 Flight III Arleigh Burke
2017
$227
FFG(X)
2020
$145
SOURCE: Figure 1, “Cost of the Navy’s Surface Combatants per Thousand Tons of Lightship
Displacement,” in Congressional Budget Ofce, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate,” October 2020, p. 6,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-10/56669-New-Frigate-Program.pdf (accessed August 11, 2022).
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keep a program. Very few people get promoted for
saying that they will run acquisition programs that
cost more than previous programs; therefore, the
inherent bias to “try for” savings is not malicious in
intent but is instead rational inside a large bureaucracy. But that is not to say this rationale doesn’t
desperately need a cleanup.
was closer to $71 million—a 42 percent miscalculation. While the difference between $50 million and
$71 million might seem relatively small, if you account for a 42 percent mistake over a long period of
time for a large fleet of ships, the cost increase gets
very large, very fast.
How did the Navy get this so wrong? It turns
out that outsourcing maintenance to contractors
Littoral Combat Ships: Forgetting
drove up the cost.14 The initial estimate of 40 crew
People and the Price of Having Them
members nearly doubled in reality to about 70, and
The Navy is already decommissioning its initial before the Navy decided to terminate the program,
purchase of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fleet just the number of sailors needed was about to grow even
14 years after the first ship set sail and, amazingly more. Cost projections based on bad assumptions or
enough, even as a ship is finishing construction. What preferred assumptions that turn out to be wrong inwent wrong? A lot. For the purpose of this analysis, troduce flawed data for programs; the result is policy
however, we will confine ourselves to the cost pro- decisions and budget commitments that prove to be
jections for operating costs, which turned out to be terribly costly for the service and the taxpayer.
outdated and inaccurate according to the GAO.13
The initial plan called for the ship to have about Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle:
40 people with maintenance done by contractors. Failing to Account for Uncertainty
The Navy estimated total operating costs per year
One of the Army’s signature modernization proper ship at $50 million. In reality, the cost over time grams is the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
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57

(OMFV). Being optionally manned means that it
could operate autonomously, a task that has never
been accomplished and for which there are almost
no past cost data. To fund this program in the near
term, the Army is slowing down procurement of its
existing systems, in essence trading current combat
power for future combat power.
However, will the Army be able to afford the new
program, or is it doing as it did with the Future Combat Systems and other past efforts to build ground
combat systems: setting itself up for having neither
current nor future ground combat capabilities while
spending tens of billions of dollars? If one is to believe the GAO, the Army is substituting the precision
of point estimates to mask uncertainty, which in the
past has led to failure “due to immature technology
and changing and complex requirements at a cost to
taxpayers of roughly $23 billion.”15 In effect, reality
displaces optimistic projections over time, revealing
the true cost of systems that are consistently higher
than originally presumed.
In the case of the OMFV, the consumer of the
Army’s cost estimates needs to grapple with two
important pieces of uncertainty. First, as discussed
above, the Army has tried this before and failed to
the tune of $23 billion. One has to ask: Why is this
time different? The second question is: If this has
never been done before, as we have never built an
optionally manned combat platform, how can the
cost estimate even be accurate?
Given these complicating factors, it might have
made more sense for the Army to structure this
program as a series of smaller-duration, less risky
demonstration projects that can prove out the cost,
technology, and feasibility of the system. The GAO
did give the Army high marks for following the cost
estimation process, but at $46 billion (the projected
cost of the program), the uncertainty error is enormous.16 As we saw with the Navy LCS, there really
may be no way to know what the actual cost will be.
The equivalent of this, for our airline ticket purchaser, is that you are going to buy an airline ticket
for a flight 10 years from now and agree to pay based
on the purchase price of aircraft that have yet to be
purchased, the future unknown price of jet fuel, and
the potential costs of developing the flight to have
either a real pilot or no pilot at all. At this point, it is
an open-ended commitment to spend money. Maybe
this is less like buying a plane ticket than it is like
buying a ticket to Mars.
58
Reserve Forces: The Cost
of Active vs. Activating
In the past decade, both the U.S. Air Force and
the U.S. Army have had financial disputes with their
National Guard forces that have led to congressionally chartered commissions, both of which were
triggered during periods of declining budgets and
potential force structure reductions.17 The cost
discussions are often difficult to understand, with
both sides making “accurate” statements that lead to
“different” conclusions. How can this be? It depends
on how you blend personnel costs, equipment costs,
and operating costs along with assumptions on Reserve use during peacetime for operational rotation
missions versus wartime surge capacity. These five
different variables can be, and often are, blended
differently and then compared together as if they
were the same.
The first and most frequently used costs are
those for personnel. Since Reserve personnel are
part-time personnel, it is a mathematical fact that
those that are not activated are less expensive than
full-time personnel. However, depending on how often and for what purpose the services activate their
Reserve Component forces, they could cost more
than the equivalent of an Active unit. This is due to
the time—and therefore the resources—needed for
mobilization and post-mobilization efforts. If used
for the occasional surge operation, the costs of the
Reserve over time tend to be less than those of their
Active counterparts. But if used nearly continuously
for operational missions (continuous boots on the
ground), the costs tend to be higher.
Equipment costs, though often not discussed in
relation to Reserve components, are relevant depending upon whether one treats equipment as a
sunk cost because the equipment already exists or
as a procurement cost that should be included in the
Reserve’s total value/expense. The National Commission on the Future of the Army began over a dispute about the Apache helicopter’s force structure.
Because the Army did not have enough Apaches and
needed more funds to buy more aircraft, the price
became a central component of the conversation.
When related to low-density, high-cost weapons
platforms like the Apache, costs become more relevant because they can dwarf other investments like
personnel or operations. To compare, the cost of 100
cargo trucks might be nearly negligible within the
Army’s total budget for accounting purposes, but the
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
cost of additional Apache helicopters at $13 million
apiece mounts up significantly and quickly. (The less
expensive trucks, however, also can add up to significant dollars if the quantity is high enough.) In other
words, it matters what type of Reserve unit one is
discussing, because the equipment within one type
of unit can account for much more in dollar terms
than the equipment in others does.
Emerging from all of these studies over many
years are two fundamental premises when discussing the Active Component/Reserve Component force mix:
l
“Part-time” force structure, meaning the capability delivered by traditional Reservists and
Guardsmen who do not serve continuously on
active duty, costs less than the force structure
provided by “full-time” personnel.
As of March 2021, the Department of Defense
estimated that emergency/overseas contingency
operations (OCO) spending for the wars in Iraq,
Syria, and Afghanistan totaled $1.596 trillion;19 as
of June 2022, it estimated that the total had reached
$1.637 trillion.20
The cost of a war is perhaps the most challenging of all cost estimates. There are, off the bat, many
necessary clarifying questions such as:
l
In what time span do you quantify the war?
l
When do residual costs end?
l
l
l
Reserve Component force structure, especially
traditional Reservists, costs less than that of
the Active Component, but Reserve Component forces are not always less expensive when
conducting operations than are Active Component forces.
l
l
l
The Cost of War: Who’s Asking?
According to the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction’s most recent report:
DOD’s latest Cost of War Report, dated September 30, 2021, said its cumulative obligations
for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan, including U.S.
warfighting and DOD reconstruction programs,
had reached $849.7 billion…. State, USAID, and
other civilian agencies report cumulative obligations of $50.1 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction, which when added to the DOD amount
results in $136.9 billion obligated for Afghanistan
reconstruction through that date….18
l
Does it include personnel costs, which have
to be accounted for regardless of whether the
servicemember is at home or abroad?
Are you measuring what was spent that otherwise would have not been spent, or also the cost
of assets and resources that would still have
been costly without the war? For example, a
plane is flown in peacetime if only for pilots to
maintain their skills and certification.
Is one to account for direct economic costs?
What about costs associated with deaths, the
climate, etc.?
Do you know how you measure those?
Do you count associated medical care for veterans of those wars?
Any estimate that professes to have determined
the actual cost of war involves many subjective decisions about what to count and what not to count.
Estimating the cost of the Iraq War is a chief example of this dilemma. The Brown University Costs of
War Project has estimated that from FY 2001–FY
2022, the wars in Iraq and Syria cost a total of $2.058
trillion (exclusive of future veterans’ care). If one includes future veterans’ care, total costs rise to $3.158
trillion.21 A much less aggressive and comprehensive
estimate by the Congressional Research Service puts
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59

If you are trying to figure out how much it costs
to travel from New York to Los Angeles, it matters
whether you are flying on a private jet or a commercial jet, taking the train, or getting on a bus. For the
discussion of Active versus Reserve Component
costing, it matters whether you are including equipment costs, operational use, and wartime surge, broken out by various types of units.
l
Do you count related but indirect war costs?
For example, do you count related activities in
Syria as part of the Iraq war’s costs?
obligations for Iraq at 51 percent ($759 billion) of
total DOD OCO obligations from 9/11 through FY
2018.22 This would be the simplest number because
it includes the fewest factors in estimated war costs.
This is very similar to trying to calculate externalities into the cost of a flight to differentiate it from
the price you are actually paying. For example:
l
l
l
l

l
l
What is the price of the carbon emissions
from the flight?
What about the cost of the taxpayer-subsidized airport?
If the airline goes bankrupt, what pension
costs will the government have to pay for
in the future?
What about the food stamp costs for the people
cleaning the airplane because they do not make
a living wage?
Have we calculated the environmental damage
caused by production of the jet fuel?
While we are at it, how about the human cost
of extracting the titanium needed in war-torn
countries to build the aircraft?
All of a sudden, the “cost” of your flight diverges
wildly from the “price” you pay for the ticket.
Such is the case with the cost of war. It encompasses not only weapons systems and personnel
costs, but also the accounting difficulties within both.
The question of what to count and what is being accounted for leads to incredible variance between
cost estimates—whether based on projected interest
or whether or not to include veterans’ care. The key
here is transparency: By knowing how it is totaled,
one can better assess the components of that total,
whether and how it compares to others, and what
capabilities the funds physically provide.
F-35: Most Expensive or Most Impressive?
The F-35 aircraft is one of the most advanced and
ambitious programs that DOD has undertaken. It
also is heralded as the most expensive program ever
undertaken. As this is the last of the cases we will examine, it is interesting to see how the F-35 compares
to some of the other programs discussed in this essay.
60
First, the cost is estimated over a 66-year life
cycle, with a current estimate in excess of $1.7 trillion.23 (By contrast, the MDA did not estimate operational costs over the lifetime of the missiles and
supporting systems it purchased.) Of the $1.7 trillion,
the procurement of 2,456 aircraft accounts for just
under $400 billion, while the cost of sustaining the
planes over time hits nearly $1.3 trillion. This is very
important, as no other DOD program has a 66-year
operating cost estimate.
Second, this program has updated its cost estimates more times than almost all other programs
combined. Over the course of the program, the
GAO alone has issued an extensive series of reports
examining the F-35’s ongoing cost estimates and
the “significant challenges DOD faced in sustaining a growing F-35 fleet.”24 In April 2021, for example, the GAO reported that the Air Force needs
to reduce estimated sustainment costs per plane
by $3.7 million by 2036 or face $4.4 billion in costs
beyond estimates.25 Each time the GAO issues a report, the cost estimates are updated. For most programs, the cost estimates are traditionally frozen
in time, so this is likely the first living cost estimate
in DOD’s history.
Many worry that the armed services will be unable to afford the F-35’s sustainment. This should
certainly be worrisome, as this critical project faces a
grim future. But in relation to the thesis of this analysis, the forewarning and guidance on reducing future expenses make this program’s cost accounting
also very impressive. As a result of expansive reporting from DOD and other U.S. government agencies
on current costs and program updates and estimates,
the F-35 program is likely the most well-accounted
major weapons program in DOD history. One cannot
help but wonder what the cost would be for every
other major acquisition program across DOD if the
same criteria and program updates that have been
applied to the F-35 program were applied to them.
Finally, in comparing F-35 procurement costs
with procurement costs for other aircraft, it is obvious that other systems do not have the same in-depth
cost accounting. This makes an apples-to-apples
comparison impossible for anyone but the most
determined budget analyst.
In a recent and relevantly titled article, “Air
Force’s Math on the F-15EX and F-35 Doesn’t Add
Up,”26 a comparison of the two fighter platforms
reveals the impressive nature of F-35 program
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
not on their search engine, while others use techniques like fare ghosting or providing discounted
rates to other sites. In essence, caveat emptor—let
the buyer beware. The same is true when you read
a paper, news story, or official document about how
much anything in DOD costs: Know that what you
read is likely not everything you should know.
First, there is no consistent standard for the updating of lifetime budget costs, which is especially
problematic when actual inflation rates vary heavily from those anticipated numbers. In these cases,
the estimates become obsolete. Lifetime budgets are
sometimes not updated when estimates for the procurement of individual units unexpectedly increase,
as in the case of the FFG-62.
Next, the updated standards for budget estimation are not high enough, and there is no consumer
protection board to hear complaints or to assess
penalties for bad information. Even though services
consistently underestimate initial and lifetime costs
of personnel and weapons systems, there is no system for ensuring adjustments before the release of
official estimates, which are almost always incomplete. Think of this as “in-flight meals not included”
the next time you book your trip. The remedy for
this is firmer definitions regarding budget estimations, something akin to the MSRP sticker on a new
car—which in reality is often much more than the
price you end up paying the dealer.
Perhaps most important, the consumers of this
information should channel their inner “Sy Syms.”
Sy ran a series of discount clothing stores in the
Conclusion
Northeast, and his slogan was “An educated consumWhen you purchase an airline ticket these days, er is our best customer.” From reporters to analysts
sites like Google Flights attempt to standardize the to the American public, asking the right questions,
pricing by allowing you to adjust the ticket price for understanding partial answers—and when the anexpenses like carry-on baggage and picking your swers are only partial—and then acting on the inforseats while also measuring your carbon footprint. mation will ensure that as a nation, we make better
But even that tool is not necessarily sufficient be- decisions and smarter investments regarding our
cause some airlines, such as Southwest, are simply national security.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
61

cost counting. The Administration cuts the F-35
procurement quantities for FY 2023 because the
F-15s are “less expensive to buy and to fly” than the
F-35. The Air Force’s cost data for these two weapons systems prove this to be “patently false.” The
F-35’s “flyaway” cost includes all of the equipment
needed to meet mission requirements. The “cheaper” F-15 estimate provided by DOD fails to include
offensive systems that are included in the F-35’s
“sticker” price to meet the same requirements. And
while the F-35 program might be a record due to
its inclusion of all elements, for FY 2022, the gross
weapons systems cost—including all necessary
packages, equipment, and support depots—brings
the F-15EX to $120 million27 compared to the fully
loaded F-35A’s $98.2 million.
Because of the F-35’s comprehensive cost estimates, the program has been able to see where
changes need to be made. The fighter’s mission-capable rate has continued to rise in recent years, and
DOD has reduced sustainment and readiness expenditures and timelines. Reform efforts include
increasing the availability and production of spare
parts, improving depot-level repair, and decreasing
customer wait times.
Increased transparency may increase the apparent cost, but in the long term, it results in better
decisions and informed savings. The same cannot
be said with any certainty for other aircraft procurement programs because no other such program has
been similarly assessed.
Endnotes
1.
Valerie Insinna, “2023 Budget Drops on March 28, but Details Will Be Missing,” Breaking Defense, March 18, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
com/2022/03/2023-budget-drops-on-march-28-but-details-will-be-missing/ (accessed July 12, 2022).
2.
10 U.S. Code § 4351(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/4351#a_1 (accessed July 24, 2022).
3.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Addressing Cost Estimating and Reporting Shortfalls Could Improve Insight into Full Costs of
Programs and Flight Tests, GAO-22-104344, February 2022, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104344.pdf (accessed July 24, 2022).
4.
Ibid., p. 23.
5.
Ibid., p. 28.
6.
Ibid., p. 34.
7.
Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service
Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R44972, updated March 31, 2022, p. 15, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/
R44972/92 (accessed August 2, 2022).
8.
David B. Larter, “US Navy’s Cost Estimate for New Frigate Won’t Hold Water, Predicts Government Analyst,” Defense News, October 14, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/14/the-us-navys-cost-estimate-for-its-new-frigate-wont-hold-water-analyst-predicts/ (accessed
July 24, 2022).
9.
Ibid.
10. O’Rourke, “Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,“ p. 15.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. Ibid.
13. Anthony Capaccio, “Troubled Littoral Ship Still Can’t Perform Mission, GAO Says,” Bloomberg, February 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2022-02-24/troubled-littoral-ship-still-can-t-perform-its-mission-gao-says (accessed June 13, 2022).

14. David B. Larter, “High Operating Costs Cloud the Future of Littoral Combat ships, Budget Data Reveals,” Defense News, April 12, 2021, https://
www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/04/12/high-operating-costs-cloud-the-future-of-littoral-combat-ships-budget-data-reveals/ (accessed June
13, 2022).
15. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Next Generation Combat Vehicles: As Army Prioritizes Rapid Development, More Attention Needed to
Provide Insight on Cost Estimates and Systems Engineering Risks, GAO-20-579, August 2020, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-579.pdf
(accessed July 26, 2022).
16. Ibid., pp. 1 and 35.
17. See National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, Report to the President and Congress of the United States, January 30, 2014,
https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/hdasa/AFForceStructureCommissionReport01302014.pdf (accessed July 26, 2022), and
National Commission on the Future of the Army, Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016, https://www.
nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/ARNGpdfs/ncfa/NCFA-Full-Final-Report.pdf (accessed July 26, 2022).
18. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2022, p. 36, https://www.
sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2022-04-30qr.pdf (accessed July 11, 2022). See also Figure F.4, “Afghanistan Cost of War and Reconstruction,
Annual and Cumulative Obligations FY 2002 to FY 20021 Q4,” in ibid., p. 37.
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Estimated Cost to Each U.S. Taxpayer for the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Syria,” March 2021, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Estimated_Cost_to_Each_U.S._Taxpayer_
of_Each_of_the_Wars_in_Afghanistan,_Iraq_and_Syria_dated_March_2021.pdf (accessed July 11, 2022).
20. U.S. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Estimated Cost to Each U.S. Taxpayer for the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Syria,” June 2022, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Estimated_Cost_to_Each_U.S._Taxpayer_
of_Each_of_the_Wars_in_Afghanistan,_Iraq_and_Syria_dated_June_2022.pdf (accessed July 11, 2022).
21. Table 2, “Estimated Costs Attributed to the Major War Zones, FY2001–FY2022,” in Neta C. Crawford, “The U.S. Budgetary Costs of the Post-9/11
Wars,” Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Cost of War Project, September 1, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/
costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_U.S.%20Budgetary%20Costs%20of%20Post-9%2011%20Wars_9.1.21.pdf (accessed
July 11, 2022).
22. Christopher T. Mann, “U.S. War Costs, Casualties, and Personnel Levels Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11182, April 18,
2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11182/1 (accessed July 11, 2022).
23. Diana Maurer, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Sustainment: Enhanced Attention
to and Oversight of F-35 Affordability Are Needed,” testimony before the Subcommittees on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO-21-505T, April 22, 2021, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-505t.pdf
(accessed June 13, 2022).
62
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
24. Ibid., pp. 4 and 21–23.
25. Ibid., p. 16.
26. John Venable, “Air Force’s Math on the F-15EX and F-35 Doesn’t Add Up,” Breaking Defense, April 19, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
com/2022/04/air-forces-math-on-the-f-15ex-and-f-35-doesnt-add-up/?_ga=2.116581710.950593788.1650383248-951717084.1641387148
(accessed June 13, 2022).
27. In his original article, the author quoted a price of $136.0 million. It has since been determined that the Eagle Passive Active Warning
Survivability System (EPAWSS) was included in the airframe cost of the F-15EX. Subtracting that cost from the quoted price of $136.0 million
results in a gross weapon systems cost for the F-15EX of $120.2 million.

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63


Global Operating‌
Environment

Assessing the Global Operating Environment
M
provide needed support for future U.S. military operations. The relationships and knowledge gained
through any of these factors would undoubtedly ease
future U.S. military operations in a region and contribute greatly to a positive operating environment.
In addition to U.S. defense relations within a region, additional criteria—including the quality of
the local infrastructure, the area’s political stability,
whether or not a country is embroiled in any conflicts, and the degree to which a nation is economically free—should also be considered.
Then there are low-likelihood, high-consequence
events that occur infrequently but that, when they
do happen, can radically alter conditions in ways
that affect U.S. interests. Massive natural disasters
like Typhoon Tip in 1979 or the explosion of Mount
Tambora in 1816 can displace populations, upend
regional power arrangements, or destroy critical
infrastructure. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo did
just that in 1991, causing so much damage to Clark
Airbase and Subic Bay Naval Station that the cost,
combined with diplomatic frictions between the U.S.
and the Philippines, led the U.S. to abandon these
strategic facilities. A massive solar flare could have a
similar impact on a much larger scale because of the
level of dependence on electrical power across our
world. Scientists, analysts, planners, and officials in
public and commercial ventures study such things
but seldom take concrete action to mitigate their
potential impact.
For the past two years, the world has been shaken
by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has caused governments to spend extraordinary sums of money
not only to manage the public health crisis, but also
to mitigate the economic impact on their countries.
The economic and societal stresses stemming from
the pandemic have put terrific pressures on political
establishments. They also have caused funding for
such essential government functions as defense to
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67

easuring the strength of a military force—defined as the extent to which that force can
accomplish missions—requires examination of the
environments in which the force operates. Aspects
of one environment may facilitate military operations; aspects of another may work against them. A
favorable operating environment presents the U.S.
military with obvious advantages; an unfavorable
operating environment may limit the effect of U.S.
military power. The capabilities and assets of U.S.
allies, the strength of foes, the willingness of friend
or foe to use its military power, the region’s geopolitical environment, and the availability of forward
facilities and logistics infrastructure all factor into
whether an operating environment can support U.S.
military operations.
When assessing an operating environment, one
must pay particular attention to any U.S. treaty obligations with countries in the region. A treaty defense obligation ensures that the legal framework is
in place for the U.S. to maintain and operate a military presence in a particular country. In addition,
a treaty partnership usually yields regular training
exercises and interoperability as well as political and
economic ties. It also obligates the U.S. to commit its
military in support of an ally, which has the effect of
focusing U.S. military leadership on some regions
more than others.
Additional factors—including the military capabilities of allies that might be useful to U.S. military
operations; the degree to which the U.S. and allied
militaries in the region are interoperable and can
use, for example, common means of command, communication, and other systems; and whether the U.S.
maintains key bilateral alliances with nations in the
region—also affect the operating environment. Similarly, nations where the U.S. has stationed assets or
permanent bases and countries from which the U.S.
has launched military operations in the past may
substantially increased their defense budgets and,
among European allies, have contributed equipment,
munitions, and a range of supplies to Ukraine to help
it defend itself.
One consequence of this has been reinvigorated discussions among U.S. allies about the status of
military power and the need to ensure that forces
can work together effectively. But another has been
the consumption of expensive military capabilities,
which has led some countries to start hedging on
their pledges to sustain support to Ukraine or, in
some circumstances, to contribute national power
to collective defense.
All of this to say that conditions evolve from one
year to the next and from one security setting to the
next in ways that affect the ease or difficulty of conducting U.S. military operations. The operating environment assessment is meant to add critical context to complement the threat environment and U.S.
military assessments that are detailed in subsequent
sections of the 2023 Index.
A final note: This Index refers to all disputed territories by the names employed by the United States
Department of State and should not be seen as reflecting a position on any of these disputes.

be reallocated to meet the more immediate demands
of the pandemic and—given the threat of contagion—
mitigation measures to be adopted at the expense of
military exercises, training events, and deployments.
As of mid-2022, most countries appear to have resolved many of the disruptions caused by the pandemic, adapting their economies and adjusting their
policy approaches to deal with the public health crisis. So, too, have populations that have normalized
their routines, mitigating many of the original fears
stemming from the crisis. In similar fashion, military forces have found ways to return to training and
exercises that are necessary to regain proficiency.
Most recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in
early 2022 has affected national and public perspectives with regard to military power. Before Russia
invaded its neighbor, many capitals acknowledged
the importance of military power but often failed
to follow their words with commensurate investments in operationally relevant military forces.
Confronted with the reality of a war in Europe and
the possibility of another one in Asia because of
China’s persistent saber rattling and heavy investment in its ability to project power, Poland, Germany,
Great Britain, and Japan, to name but a few, have
68
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Europe
Daniel Kochis
T
The Russian Federation is the most significant
and direct threat to Allies’ security and to
peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
It seeks to establish spheres of influence and
direct control through coercion, subversion,
aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our
partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric
and proven willingness to use force to pursue
its political goals undermine the rules-based
international order.3
Additionally, the new concept recognizes China
as a major challenge: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies
challenge our interests, security and values,” and
“[t]he deepening strategic partnership between the
People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to
undercut the rules-based international order run
counter to our values and interests.”4
In addition to taking steps to bolster NATO’s collective defense capability, the U.S. and its allies have
made significant investments in arming and training the Ukrainian military. What began as individual
nations supplying arms, ammunition, and supplies
(often surplus) has evolved into a sustained flow of
intelligence, weapons, matériel, and platforms upon
which Ukrainian forces have become entirely reliant.
Some nations have even begun to repair damaged
Ukrainian equipment. In addition to military aid and
intelligence, European nations in particular have accepted millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.
All of this illuminates the reality that war is still
a feature of international relations that cannot be
predicted or always deterred, that is costly both in
preparation and undertaking, and that generates additional costs (such as support for refugees and disruption of economic activity) beyond the straightforward expense of equipment and training.
The 51 countries in the U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) include
approximately one-fifth of the world’s population,
10.7 million square miles of land, and 13 million
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
69

he past year has seen significant and swift
changes in U.S. force posture in Europe and
the trajectory of allied capabilities because of Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February.1 The
scale, scope, and intensity of conventional military
power used by Russia led to a renewed appreciation
for such power in many European capitals that had
neglected their militaries since the end of the Cold
War. In April, a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
spokesperson stated that “[t]he European security environment has changed and will stay changed
as a result of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s
willingness to conduct an unprovoked invasion of a
neighboring state.”2
The U.S. has reintroduced additional manpower
and capabilities into Europe and is reevaluating its
long-term basing posture. European NATO allies
have deployed in support of alliance deterrence
efforts in eastern Europe, and many have renewed
their commitment to NATO spending benchmarks
and rebuilding military capabilities that have atrophied over the past 30 years. In June, NATO invited
Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Also in June,
the alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept at its
Madrid summit. The first new concept since 2010,
it takes into account the comprehensive changes in
the transatlantic security environment that have
taken place during the past 12 years. With respect
to Russia, it states clearly that:

square miles of ocean. Some of America’s oldest
(France) and closest (the United Kingdom) allies are
found in Europe. The U.S. and Europe share a strong
commitment to the rule of law, human rights, free
markets, and democracy. During the 20th century,
millions of Americans fought alongside European
allies to defend these shared ideals—the foundations
on which America was built.
America’s economic ties to the region are likewise
important. A stable, secure, and economically viable
Europe is in America’s economic interest. For more
than 70 years, the U.S. military presence has contributed to regional security and stability, and both
Europeans and Americans have benefited economically. The member states of the European Union
(EU), along with the United States, account for approximately half of the global economy, and the U.S.
and EU member countries are generally each other’s
principal trading partners.
Europe is also important to the U.S. because of its
geographical proximity to some of the world’s most
dangerous and contested regions. From the eastern
Atlantic Ocean to the Middle East, up to the Caucasus through Russia, and into the Arctic, Europe
is enveloped by an arc of instability. The European
region also has some of the world’s most vital shipping lanes, energy resources, and trade choke points.
European basing allows U.S. forces to respond
robustly and quickly to challenges to U.S. economic
and security interests in and near the region. Russia’s brutal effort to remake the borders of Europe by
force has shocked many partners, upended the continent’s strategic picture, and begun a war with implications that are far wider than the sovereignty of
Ukraine itself. Admiral Robert Burke, Commander
of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa,
and Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, for example, has described the European and African theaters as “the forefront of great power competition.”5
Other external threats to European security include Russia’s activity in the Arctic, growing presence in the Mediterranean theater, and efforts to
destabilize Western cohesion in addition to the
possibility that Russia might expand the scope of
its aggression to include the eastern states of NATO.
Added to this is the growing threat to the transatlantic alliance that is posed by Chinese investments,
technology, and propaganda efforts. Russian naval
activity in the North Atlantic and Arctic has necessitated a renewed focus on regional command and
70
control and has led to increased operations by U.S.
and allied air and naval assets in the Arctic, and
Russia’s strengthened position in Syria has led to a
resurgence of Russian activity in the Mediterranean
that has contributed to “congested” conditions.6
Speaking at an Atlantic Council meeting in March
2019, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General
Joseph Dunford explained that the U.S. has two key
advantages over adversaries: “our network of allies
and partners, and the ability to project power where
and when necessary to advance our national interest.”7 Nowhere is the value of allies and U.S. basing
more apparent than it is in the European operating
environment.
U.S. Reinforcements in Europe. Russia’s war
against Ukraine greatly accelerated a trend of U.S.
reinvestment in Europe that had begun following
Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In April
2014, the U.S. launched Operation Atlantic Resolve
(OAR), a series of actions meant to reassure U.S.
allies in Europe, particularly those bordering Russia. Under Operation Atlantic Resolve and funded
through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI),
the U.S. increased its forward presence in Europe;
invested in European basing infrastructure and in
prepositioned stocks, equipment, and supplies; engaged in enhanced multinational training exercises;
and negotiated agreements for increased cooperation with NATO allies.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spurred the U.S. to
increase forces flowing to Europe and ignited a U.S.
and NATO-wide reevaluation of long-term basing
structures and force posture requirements to deter
Russian aggression from spilling over to alliance
member states, especially those like Poland, whose
role as a staging ground for aid to Ukrainian forces
has made it a Russian target.8
In January 2022, the U.S. had approximately
80,000 troops in Europe (permanent and rotational); that number grew to more than 100,000 by
March.9 A month after Russia’s invasion,
[T]he U.S. ha[d] activated about 11,600 troops
for the mission: 4,700 from the 82nd Airborne
Division to Poland; 300 from the XVIII Airborne
Corps to Germany; 1,000 from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to Romania; 800 from the 173rd
Airborne Brigade Combat Team to Latvia; 100
F-35 Lightning II air crew to Estonia, Lithuania
and Romania; 100 AH-64 Apache aircrew to
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
CHART 2
Few U.S. Troops in Europe Are Stationed Near Russia
75,000
72,405
50,000
Germany
42,000
25,000
U.K.
11,500
0
Italy
10,000
12,960
Nations Not
Bordering Russia
Nations
Bordering Russia
12,500
Poland
10,500
SOURCE: U.S. European Command, written response to Heritage Foundation request
for information on U.S. troop levels in Europe, July 7, 2022.
Troops at Sea
A
heritage.org

the Pentagon, “These Growlers…are equipped for a
variety of missions. But they do specialize in flying
electronic warfare missions, using a suite of jamming sensors to confuse enemy radars, greatly aiding in the ability to conduct suppression of enemy
air defense operations.”12 From February through
April, three B-52 Stratofortress aircraft and 300
troops from North Dakota rotated to a base in the
United Kingdom as part of the Bomber Task Force
Mission, flying regularly over European airspace.13
The U.S. has brought additional air assets to EuThe U.S. has also begun to consider new permarope. The U.S. Air Force (USAF), for example, “has nent basing in eastern European NATO member
moved additional fighters, tankers, and intelligence, states. In April 2022, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft into the General Mark Milley voiced his support for permaEuropean theater over the past few months, as well nent U.S. bases in eastern Europe but with troops
as bombers on a rotational basis, all to reassure deployed rotationally “‘[s]o you get the effect of
NATO allies who feel threatened by the invasion permanence’ at a lesser cost because expenses such
of Ukraine.”11 In March 2022, six U.S. Navy EA-18G as family housing and schools are not involved.” “I
Growlers and 240 troops deployed to Spangdahlem believe a lot of our allies, especially those such as
Air Base in Germany from Washington State to the Baltics or Poland or Romania…are very willing
bolster alliance collective defense. According to to establish permanent bases,” Milley noted. “They
Poland and the Baltic states; 3,800 from 1st
Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry
Division and its sustainment unit to Germany; 150 airmen from Fairchild Air Force Base,
Washington; 40 members of an air support
operations unit to Romania and Poland; 300
ordnance and maintenance soldiers to Germany; and 300 members of V Corps to Germany
and Poland.10
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
71
will build them and pay for them.”14 In May, respond- Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
ing to advance questions as part of Senate Armed highlighted the importance of EDI funding in reServices Committee hearings on his nomination turning the United States to a posture of deterrence:
to serve as Commander, U.S. European Command
and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General
EDI enhances our posture to deter adversaries
Christopher Cavoli similarly stated that “permaand compete in a contested logistics environnently assigned forces are more operationally effecment alongside our European defense countive, as they remain fully oriented to the operational
terparts. Increases in forward stationed and
environment and can become interoperable with
rotational forces strengthen our contact, blunt,
15
our Allies and Partners.”
and surge layer capabilities, providing an ability
European Deterrence Initiative. On top of reto compete and win in a multi-domain crisis or
newed investments in Europe, the U.S. has continconflict. EDI investments improve theater infraued with more established efforts to bolster collecstructure and prepositioned stocks. Funding for
tive defense in Europe. The Biden Administration
exercises, training, and building partner capachas requested $4,176.9 billion for the European Deity strengthens the readiness, architecture, and
terrence Initiative in fiscal year (FY) 2023, which
interoperability across the Euro-Atlantic area.
would be a $365.3 million increase from the enacted
These advances enable our deterrence and
FY 2022 EDI budget of $3,811.6 billion.16 EDI funddefense efforts through rapid deployment and
ing requests for FY 2023 include (among others):
sustainment of forces.18
The EDI has supported infrastructure improvements across the region. One major EDI-funded
project is a replacement hospital at Landstuhl, Germany, to be named the Rhine Ordnance Barracks
Medical Center. Originally slated to be completed
in 2022, it is now expected that it will be completed
in 2027. The new permanent facility will “provid[e]
Exercises to “increase[] the overall readiness
primary care, specialized consultative care, hospiand interoperability of U.S. forces across all
talization and treatment for more than 200,000 U.S.
domain” and “improve[] the interoperability
military personnel, DoD and interagency civilians
of U.S. forces with our NATO Allies and theand dependents in Europe.”19 Landstuhl’s imporater partners.”
tance is illustrated by the fact that in early March
2020, it was one of the first two overseas U.S. labInfrastructure improvements that include
oratories to be capable of testing for coronavirus.20
“purchasing new fixed undersea surveillance
In addition to the EDI, as of the end of 2021, the
systems and refurbishment of older, existing
U.S. Department of State had awarded nearly $300
systems already in place throughout the AOR”
million in grants since 2018 through its European
and improving “airfield infrastructure and
Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP) and
prepositioned storage capability to support U.S. repurposed funds to help U.S. allies in Europe reAir Forces in Europe operations, actions, and
place Russian equipment with U.S.-made equipactivities.”
ment. This includes infantry fighting vehicles for
Croatia, Greece, and North Macedonia; helicopters
“Providing our Allies and partners with the
for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania,
capability and capacity to better defend themand Slovakia; and air surveillance radars and fixedselves and to enable or enhance their participa- wing aircraft for Bulgaria. The program helps allies
tion as full operational partners against threatto “modernize their militaries by building NATO
ening actors….”17
interoperable forces and removing Russian and Soviet-legacy equipment from their force structure.”21
Testifying in March 2022, General Tod Wolters,
Forward Presence. In April 2022, the 3rd Armored
Commander, U.S. European Command, and NATO’s Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) of the 4th Infantry

l
“[Continued support for] rotational force deployments, infrastructure investments, and [delivery of ] the right capabilities in key locations
throughout Europe (i.e., Air Force-European
Contingency Air Operations Sets (ECAOS),
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)).”
l
l
l
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[The agreement] covers matters such as the
establishment of a forward division command
in Poznan, stationing of a rotationally-present armoured brigade in Żagań-Świętoszów,
deployment of Reaper UAVs squadron to Łask,
the establishment of a Polish-US combat training centre (CTC) in Drawsko Pomorskie, the
establishment of an airlift cargo hub for USAF
in Wrocław-Starachowice, the establishment of
the presence of an Army Aviation Brigade on a
rotational basis, and a logistics battalion as well
as special ops facility in Powidz, and another
special ops facility in Lubliniec.32
The U.S. Army’s V Corps, which had been deactivated in 2013, was reactivated on November 9, 2020,
and became fully operational in November 2021.33
In June 2022, President Joseph Biden announced
that the U.S. would establish the permanent V Corps
headquarters in Poland.34 In March, the headquarters, then based in Kentucky, was largely deployed
to Europe “to provide additional command and control of U.S. Army forces in Europe” and to “to build
readiness, improve interoperability, reinforce allies
and deter further Russian aggression.”35 By April,
the U.S. had deployed more than 10,000 troops to
Poland including forces helping to aid Ukrainian
refugees and facilitate the flow of weapons and aid
to Ukraine.36 In March 2022, the U.S. Defense Department confirmed that U.S. troops were “liaising”
with Ukrainian forces in Poland as weapons are
handed over but not training “in the classic sense.”37
By the end of April, the Pentagon confirmed that
the U.S. was training Ukrainian forces in Germany
on systems that include armored vehicles, artillery, and radar.38
The U.S. has strengthened its presence in Norway as well. In April 2021, the two nations signed the
Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement,
which allows the U.S. to build additional infrastructure at Rygge and Sola Air Stations in southern Norway as well as Evenes Air Station and Ramsund Naval Station above the Arctic Circle.39 Construction at
Evenes will support the monitoring of Russian submarine activity by Norwegian and allied maritime
patrol aircraft. According to former Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Soereide, “The agreement
reaffirms Norway’s close relationship with the U.S.
and confirms Norway’s key position on the northern flank of NATO.”40 In October 2021, the U.S. Navy
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73

Division from Fort Carson, Colorado, replaced the outgoing BCT in the ninth armored rotation in support
of Operation Atlantic Resolve.22 The BCT consisted in
part of 4,000 troops, 90 tanks, 15 Paladins, and 150 infantry fighting vehicles. Many analysts have noted the
special importance of ground forces for deterrence.
“Land forces provide traditional ‘boots on the ground’
and a visible presence among local populations,” according to one recent analysis. “They can also enhance
the credibility of deterrence through bringing to bear
the heavy ground forces required to defend, seize, and
hold territory in the event of conflict.”23
In addition to back-to-back rotations of armor,
the U.S. has maintained a rotational aviation brigade
in Europe since February 2017.24 The eighth such rotation, lasting from November 2021–July 2022, has
been the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division
from Fort Hood, Texas, with 2,000 troops, 10 CH-47
Chinooks, 25 AH-64 Apaches, and 35 UH-60 and 15
HH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.25
In May 2018, the U.S. began to fly MQ-9 Reaper drones on unarmed reconnaissance flights out
of Miroslawiec Air Base in Poland. The drones became fully operational in March 2019 when U.S. Air
Force officials stated that Poland was chosen for the
MQ-9s because of its “strategic location.”26 In June
2020, runway work at Miroslawiec caused drones to
be moved temporarily to Ämari Air Base in Estonia,
marking the first time that unmanned U.S. aircraft
have operated out of Estonia.27
In January 2021, the U.S. announced that 90
USAF personnel and an unspecified number of MQ9s would be based at Campia Turzii in Romania “to
conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in support of NATO operations.”28
According to General Jeffrey Harrigian, Commander
of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, U.S. Air Forces Africa,
and Allied Air Command, the new permanent base’s
location approximately 300 miles from the coast
“really facilitates our ability to compete in the Black
Sea.”29 In addition to Ämari, Miroslawiec, and Campia Turzii, the U.S. also operates MQ-9s out of Lask
Air Base in Poland.30
In August 2020, the U.S. and Poland signed the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which
entered into force in November 2020. The agreement increased U.S. rotational forces in Poland by
1,000 people and provided for more exercises and infrastructure development to support a deployment
of 20,000 U.S. troops if necessary.31 In addition:

deployed a mobile “Expeditionary Medical Facility
to a cave system near Bogen Bay in northern Norway,
some 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle.”41 According to the operations director for the U.S. Navy Expeditionary Medical Support Command (NEMSCOM),
“Expeditionary Medical Facilities are deployable on
short notice and contain many capabilities of a modern hospital.”42
In August 2020, the Marine Corps announced the
end of heel-to-toe rotations of 700 Marines to Norway, which began in 2017, opting for shorter, more
sporadic deployments.43 The first new deployment
in October 2020 consisted of 400 Marines, and in the
second, 1,000 Marines were deployed to Setermoen,
Norway, from January–March 2021 for Arctic warfare training.44 Major General Patrick J. Hermesmann,
former Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe & Africa, has noted the growing relationship between Norway and the U.S. through “shared hardship
of tough, realistic training in this austere environment.”45 From March–April 2022, Norway hosted NATO’s Cold Response 2022, the largest Norwegian-led
exercise since the Cold War. Among the participants
were 3,000 American Marines.46
In addition to ground forces, in February and
March 2021, four B-1 Lancers were based out of Ørland Air Station in southern Norway, marking the
first time the aircraft have been based in Norway.47
The Lancers conducted training exercises with allies Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Poland
while also practicing landing and refueling at Bodø
Air Base above the Arctic Circle.48
In October 2020, at the behest of the United States, Norway announced the reopening of
Olavsvern bunker, a mountainside submarine
base near Tromsø with “9,800ft of deep water underground docks that can house and refit nuclear
submarines.” The base, which had been closed in
2002, is now open to U.S. Seawolf-class nuclear
submarines.49
The U.S. also continues to rotate a Sustainment
Task Force “comprised of nearly 1,000 personnel
and 200 pieces of equipment” from “11 active duty,
U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units.” The
units that make up the task force are varied and “include ammunition, fuel, movement control, transportation, maintenance, ordnance, supply, and postal services.”50
During the June 2022 NATO Summit, the U.S.
announced additional deployments to Europe
74
including (among others) deployment of a new rotational Brigade Combat Team to Romania; enhanced
rotational deployments of “armored, aviation, air
defense, and special operations forces” to the Baltics; deployment of “two squadrons of F-35s at RAF
Lakenheath”; the forward stationing of an “air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range
air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support
battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade
headquarters” in Germany; and the forward stationing of “a short-range air defense battery” in Italy.51
Operation Atlantic Resolve’s naval component
has consisted partly of increased deployments of U.S.
ships to the Baltic and Black Seas since 2014. In 2021,
the U.S. spent 111 days in the Black Sea, significantly
more than the 82 days it spent there in 2020.52
Russian undersea activity continues at an elevated level. The U.S. Navy reestablished the 2nd Fleet,
which is “responsible for the northern Atlantic
Ocean,” in May 2018 nearly seven years after it had
been disbanded in 2011.53 The 2nd Fleet reached full
operational capability at the end of 2019.54 The fleet
was reestablished because of Russian militarization
of the Arctic.55 “This is where the fight is…where the
competition is,” according to Vice Admiral Andrew
Lewis, former Commander of the 2nd Fleet. “Specifically in the Atlantic [and] the undersea capability
of the Russians.”56 In March 2021, in a statement
exercise, three Russian ballistic missile submarines punched through ice in the Arctic near the
North Pole.57
For Vice Admiral Lewis, “[a]nti-submarine
warfare is a primary mission for everybody in the
United States Navy, regardless of what you wear on
your chest.”58 Admiral Burke has stated that the 6th
Fleet keeps units operating “nearly continuously”
in the Arctic and that U.S. submarines “really dominate that area.”59 The U.S. also has capable partners
in patrolling Arctic waters including the “U.K. and
France to name two extremely reliable [and] capable
partners.” In addition:
Canada…Norway…all contribute significantly to
the theater of undersea warfare fight. Denmark
is expanding their capabilities. Now almost
every one of those nations that I’ve mentioned
now have significant airborne maritime patrol
reconnaissance aircraft, if not the P-8A version, closely resembling the P-8 capabilities.
Many have bought versions similar to the P-8.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Their surface combatants today are incredibly
capable too.60
In the ground domain, we expect to establish
a U.S. division-sized capability through forward-stationed forces, rotational forces, and
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). Continued
In March 2022, NATO opened its first Multinational Ammunition Warehousing Initiative (MAWI)
in Estonia for allies to store munitions for EFP deployments. The alliance plans further MAWI sites
to support EFP deployments and the Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).70 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in June, “if
there’s any lesson to be learned from Ukraine [it]
is the importance of heavy equipment in place, but
also fuel, ammunition, supplies.”71 By April, the U.S.
had deployed Joint Munitions Command experts to
Germany and Poland to provide “expert technical
ammunition and explosives assistance and support
to units stationed in or deployed to Europe.”72
Aid to Ukraine. The U.S. and its allies have provided significant military aid to Ukraine. By early
May, the U.S. had provided Ukraine with $3.8 billion
in security assistance since the beginning of Russia’s
second invasion.73 In April, President Biden stated
that “[t]he United States alone has provided 10 anti-armor systems for every one Russian tank that’s
in Ukraine—a 10-to-1 ratio,” adding that “[w]e’ve
sent thousands of anti-armor and anti-missile helicopters, drones, grenade launchers, machine guns,
rifles, radar systems.”74 By mid-April, according to
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin:
[The U.S. had sent Ukraine] over 1,400 stingers,
over 5,500 Javelins, over 14,000 other anti-armor weapons, over 700 switchblade tactical
unmanned aerial systems, 18 155mm Howitzers,
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75

In recent years, the U.S. has also made a point
of publicly acknowledging the surfacing of nuclear-powered submarines in Arctic waters as a message of deterrence. One such example occurred in
May 2021, when the Virginia-class submarine USS
New Mexico docked in Tromsø, Norway.61
Outside the Arctic, as explained by General Wolters, “Rarely navigated by Russia since the 1990’s,
advances in its submarine fleet and expanding maritime strategic goals have reinvigorated Russia’s access to the broader Atlantic Ocean.”62 These changes
have led officials to state that the U.S. east coast is no
longer “a safe haven.”63
Russia has also increased its naval capabilities in
the Mediterranean, utilizing its naval base in Tartus, Syria. In February 2022, the U.S. and its allies
detected an unusual positioning of three Russian
guided missile cruisers in the Mediterranean near
U.S., French, and Italian Carrier Strike Groups operating in theater.64 One analyst assessed that “Russia
has reinforced its naval presence in the Mediterranean, much more than usual. This can be seen as
an outer defense layer for naval operations in the
Black Sea, off Ukraine. In particular, to deter NATO
involvement, especially from the US and French aircraft carriers.”65
Prepositioned Stocks. The U.S. continues to preposition equipment in Europe across all services. In
February 2022, the U.S. activated its Army Prepositioned Stock-2 across six sites to outfit an armored
brigade combat team deploying from the U.S.66 The
FY 2023 budget request includes $1,273.9 billion to
support enhanced prepositioning for the U.S. Army,
Air Force, and Special Forces.67 With specific respect
to the Army, DOD’s FY 2023 budget request includes
“funding to continue the build of a division-sized set
of prepositioned equipment with corps-level enablers that is planned to contain two ABCTs (one
of which is modernized), two Fires Brigades, air defense, engineer, movement control, sustainment and
medical units.”68
In March 2022, General Wolters testified that:
investment in APS equipment facilitates increased agility and lethality by enabling rapid
integration of rotational combat units into
USEUCOM and NATO operations. During Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 21, U.S. Army Europe
and 26 participating nations demonstrated
readiness to command and control large-scale
operations by exercising at the battalion and
brigade levels while building interoperability. In
Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 24, we plan to assemble a divisional formation on NATO’s eastern flank for the first time since the end of the
Cold War, conducting a multinational command
post exercise with U.S. and multinational divisions and brigades operating under U.S. Army
Europe leadership. These prepositioned stocks
enabled us to respond swiftly in response to
Russia’s aggression in and around Ukraine.69
CHART 3
Nations Hosting Ukrainian Refugees
REFUGEES, IN MILLIONS
HOST NATION
AS % OF HOST NATION POPULATION

Poland
Germany
Czech Republic
Italy
Turkey
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
France
Moldova
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Romania
Austria
Netherlands
Lithuania
Switzerland
Belgium
Estonia
Portugal
Ireland
Sweden
Latvia
Finland
Denmark
Hungary
Georgia
Norway
Greece
Croatia
Cyprus
Belarus
Montenegro
Slovenia
Luxembourg
North Macedonia
Albania
Iceland
Malta
Liechtenstein
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1.2
0.9
0.6
0.3
0.0
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
NOTES: According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, these numbers reflect “the estimated number of individual refugees who
have fled Ukraine since 24 February and are currently present in European countries.” Border crossings are far higher. Russia has been
excluded from the list due to the large number of Ukrainian deportations. Belarus is a belligerent alongside Russia in the war against Ukraine.
SOURCES: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation,” July 6, 2022,
https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed September 8, 2022), and Camilo Montoya Galvez, “U.S. Admits 100,000 Ukrainians in
5 Months, Fulfilling Biden Pledge,” CBS News, July 29, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-admits-100000-ukrainians-in-5-monthsfulfilling-biden-pledge/ (accessed September 8, 2022).
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16 Mi-17 helicopters, 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, 75,000 sets of body armor and
helmets, two air surveillance radars, 14 counter
artillery radars, 4 counter mortar radars, unmanned coastal defense vessels, tactical secure
communications systems, over 7,000 small
arms, and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition.75
This is an historic moment and the very first
time the Alliance has employed these high
readiness forces in a deterrence and defence
role. They represent a flexible, combat credible
force that can be employed in multiple ways,
and we are utilizing fully their inherent agility.

U.S. allies have also donated large amounts of
military hardware. By April, the EU had funded €1.5
billion in military aid to Ukraine.76 In May, it was reported that Estonia and Latvia had donated approximately a third of their military budgets to Ukraine,
Poland had donated around 13 percent, and Slovakia
had donated nearly 12 percent.77 In April, France announced that it was sending Caesar self-propelled
howitzers.78 The French also have trained “Ukrainian
soldiers in France on how to use the powerful guns.”79
Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
and the U.S. have donated U.S. Javelin and Stinger
missiles, leaving holes in their own inventories that
need to be backfilled.80 The rate of system use in
Ukraine, combined with “an aged and insecure production infrastructure, riddled with potential bottlenecks, vulnerabilities, and supply challenges,” could
make this difficult for the U.S.81 By mid-April, for example, the U.S. reportedly had “provided one-third
of its overall stockpile of Javelin anti-tank missiles.
It cannot easily deliver more without leaving its own
armories badly depleted—and it may take months or
years to significantly ramp up production.”82
Air defense is a particular problem for Ukrainian
forces. In April, Slovakia announced that it was
sending an S-300 air defense system to Ukraine, and
the Netherlands deployed Patriot missile batteries
to Slovakia “in order to reinforce the eastern flank
of the NATO area.” A Defence Ministry spokesman
said that the Netherlands “will also send S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine at NATO’s request.”83
The United Kingdom, a particular leader in aiding
Ukraine, has announced its intention to supply
Ukraine with anti-ship missiles.84
The U.S. has trained Ukrainian forces outside of
Ukraine, including a group of around 50 Ukrainian
soldiers that it trained to operate U.S. howitzers.85
The United Kingdom has been training Ukrainians
on the use of AS-90 howitzers and armored vehicles,
principally in Poland but also smaller contingents
of Ukrainian forces inside the U.K.86 In April, the
Czech Republic announced that its defense firms
would begin repairing Ukrainian tanks and armored
vehicles. Czech Defense Minister Jana Cernochova
stated that “[t]he Czech Republic is the first partner country that the Ukrainian side has officially
approached for cooperation in repairing ground
weapons which need to be put into service or were
damaged during combat.”87
In addition to military training and aid, the transatlantic community has accepted large numbers of
Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war. Poland has accepted more than 3,000,000—by far the largest total since the beginning of the war.88 Other nations
have accepted numbers that are far smaller but
still significant in proportion to the receiving nation’s population.
NATO Responses to Russia’s War in Ukraine.
On February 25, 2022, for the first time in its history, NATO activated approximately one-third of its
40,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF).89 In announcing the activation General Wolters stated that:
These deterrence measures are prudent and
enhance our speed, responsiveness and
capability to shield and protect the one billion
citizens we swore to protect.90
In January 2022, the U.S. announced that 8,500
troops would be put on alert for possible deployment
as part of the NRF.91 In February, Canada announced
that 3,400 troops would be placed on standby for the
same purpose.92 In addition to ground forces, NATO
has 130 aircraft on alert and more than 200 ships
operating in theater.93
In June, the alliance announced that the NRF
would be increased in size from 40,000 to 300,000.
Secretary General Stoltenberg noted that “for the
first time since the Cold War, we will have pre-assigned forces to defend specific Allies” and will be
able to “reinforce much faster if needed.”94 It should
be noted, however, that Stoltenberg’s announcement appeared to have caught some NATO members by surprise, leading an unnamed NATO official
to say that “[t]he concept has not been fully worked
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77
MAP 1
NATO Nations Collaborate on Russian Deterrence Measures
Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, NATO has put in place new measures in eastern
Europe to deter Russia. In 2014, it established Enhanced Forward Presence Multinational
Battalions in four member states in the Baltic Sea region. In 2022, additional battalions
were added in four member states in central Europe and the Black Sea region. Most of
those same nations also benefit from NATO air policing operations.
FINLAND
NORWAY
SWEDEN
ESTONIA
RUSSIA
LATVIA
DENMARK
LITHUANIA
NETHERLANDS
BELARUS
U.K.
POLAND
GERMANY
BELGIUM
UKRAINE

CZECH REP.
SLOVAK REP.
AUSTRIA
FRANCE
MOLDOVA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
SERBIA
BULGARIA
ITALY
Black Sea
SPAIN
TURKEY
Mediterranean Sea
Enhanced Forward Presence
Multinational Battalions
■ Established 2014
■ Established 2022
Battalion location
Air Policing Operations
Approximate patrol areas
Air bases
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
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As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must
remain a nuclear Alliance. NATO’s nuclear
capability preserves peace, prevents coercion,
deters aggression, and instills confidence in the
transatlantic bond. The United States continues
to make available its strategic nuclear forces to
the defense of NATO and they are the supreme
guarantee of the security of our Allies.102
It is believed that until the end of the Cold War,
the U.S. maintained approximately 2,500 nuclear
warheads in Europe. Unofficial estimates range
between 150 and 200 warheads spread out across
bases in Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Turkey.103
In October 2019, reports surfaced that the U.S.
was considering moving the approximately 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base in
Turkey in light of ongoing tensions, but this has not
happened. All of these weapons are free-fall gravity
bombs designed for use with U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft. Although tactical nuclear weapons are
forward deployed to Incirlik, “there are no aircraft
capable of delivering the B-61 gravity bombs co-located at Incirlik Airbase.”104 The U.S. has nuclear
sharing agreements with Belgium, Italy, Germany,
and the Netherlands that allow for delivery of U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons by allied aircraft, but no
such agreement is in force with Turkey: “The weapons at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey are solely for use
on U.S. aircraft.”105
The B61 nuclear gravity bomb that is “deployed
from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bases” is undergoing a life extension program that is expected to add at least 20
years to its service life and “improve the B61’s safety, security, and effectiveness.”106 The B61-12 bomb,
according to U.S. officials, is “intended to be three
times more accurate than its predecessors.”107 The
first production unit was completed in February
2022, and the extension program is to be completed
by 2026.108 In October 2021, the Air Force completed
a full weapons system demonstration that was “the
flight test portion of the nuclear design certification
process for the latest B61 series weapon,” allowing
the program to move “into the nuclear operational
certification phase, essentially clearing the [F35-A]
and weapon for frontline service.”109
China. At NATO’s 2019 leaders meeting in London, the alliance “recognize[d] that China’s growing
influence and international policies present both
opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”110 Issues of concern
include Russian and Chinese military cooperation
as well as Chinese technology, propaganda, offensive cyber capabilities, and control of critical infrastructure in Europe, all of which affect NATO’s member states. “We are concerned,” NATO noted in its
Brussels statement, “by recent public comments by
PRC officials and call on China to cease amplifying
the Kremlin’s false narratives, in particular on the
[Russia-Ukraine] war and on NATO, and to promote
a peaceful resolution to the conflict.”111
In an interview, Admiral Burke, noting that Chinese warships and investments are “increasingly
present” in the Mediterranean, highlighted the potential risk to U.S. and alliance interests from Chinese infrastructure acquisitions in Europe:
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up yet” and that “[w]e will have to do more to build
up the model before we can work out what national
commitments can be.”95
In March 2022, the establishment of multinational battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania,
and Slovakia was announced at an extraordinary
NATO summit.
The battle group in Bulgaria consists of “Up to
803” Bulgarian troops supplemented by 135 U.S. and
30 Albanian troops.96
The battle group in Hungary consists of 900
troops: 60 Croatian, 130 U.S., and 710 Hungarian.97
The Czech Republic (133 troops) will lead the
NATO battle group in Slovakia with contributions
from Germany (284); the Netherlands (125); and
Slovenia (101). Both the Dutch and German deployments include air defense.98
France (550 troops) is leading the 1,148-strong
NATO battalion in Romania, which also includes
troops from Belgium (248); Poland (230); and the
U.S. (120).99 The French deployment includes armored vehicles and a naval air group for air defense
and air surveillance.100
NATO also retains “multinational battalion-size
battlegroups” in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Established as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in 2017, they are led, respectively, by
the U.K., Canada, Germany, and the U.S.101
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. In his 2022
EUCOM posture statement, General Wolters reaffirmed that:

Today, the Chinese have a controlling interest in
12 European ports. So, are NATO countries going to be able to count on those ports for Free
Trade, and if NATO has to defend Europe, will
they allow us into those ports to refuel, resupply, do repairs, rearm? We don’t know if we can
count on that. It’s a troubling pattern and our
European partners are increasingly aware and
awakened to this potential threat.112
Important Alliances and
Bilateral Relations in Europe
The United States has a number of important
multilateral and bilateral relationships in Europe.
First and foremost is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world’s most important and arguably
most successful defense alliance.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO
is an intergovernmental, multilateral security organization that was designed originally to defend
Western Europe from the Soviet Union. It anchored
the U.S. firmly in Europe, solidified Western resolve
during the Cold War, and rallied European support
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NATO has been
the bedrock of transatlantic security cooperation
ever since its creation in 1949 and is likely to remain
so for the foreseeable future.
In April 2021, following a U.S. decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan and “recognising
that there is no military solution to the challenges
Afghanistan faces,” NATO ended Operation Resolute Support, a non-combat operation intended to
provide “training, advice and assistance to Afghan
security forces and institutions.”113 The withdrawal
of alliance forces was completed in August 2021, and
the mission was terminated in September 2021.
Two ongoing NATO operations are Kosovo Force
(KFOR), which includes “approximately 3,500 Allied
and partner troops,” and Operation Sea Guardian,
which maintains “maritime situational awareness,
counter-terrorism at sea and support to capacity-building” in the Mediterranean. Additional operations include air policing “to meet Iceland’s
peacetime preparedness needs”; air policing over
the Baltics, Albania, Montenegro, Slovenia, and
the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg; and support for the African Union
Mission in Somalia through occasional airlifts and
sealifts while helping to train and build capacity in
the African Standby Force.114
80
Finally, there is NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a
non-combat mission to train and build the capacity
of Iraqi Security Forces. In February 2021, following
an Iraqi government request in late 2020, NATO defense ministers agreed to increase the size of NMI
and expand the scope of training activities beyond
the Baghdad region. NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg stated that an incremental increase
could raise the number of NATO troops participating in NMI from 500 to around 4,000.115
In recent years, NATO has focused strongly on
military mobility and logistics in line with its 2014
Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The RAP was designed to reassure nervous member states and put
in motion “longer-term changes to NATO’s forces
and command structure so that the Alliance will
be better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises.”116
In June 2018, NATO defense ministers agreed
to the Four 30s plan to improve the movement of
troops in Europe by 2020. “Four 30s” derives from
the plan’s objective that NATO should be able to
respond to any aggression with “30 troop battalions,
30 squadrons of aircraft, and 30 warships within
30 days.”117 In 2019, according to Secretary General
Stoltenberg, “Allies contributed all of the combat
forces required for this initiative” and were “now
working to build and maintain the level of readiness of these forces and organise them into larger
formations.”118
At the 2019 London summit, space was recognized as “the Alliance’s ‘fifth domain’ of operations,
alongside land, sea, air and cyberspace.” Subsequently, in October 2020, “NATO Defence Ministers…agreed to the creation of a space centre at NATO’s Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.”
The center’s mission “is to help coordinate Allied
Space activities, support NATO activities and operations, and help protect Allied Space systems by
sharing information about potential threats.” To
these ends, it “works closely with the Allies’ national Space agencies and organisations and the NATO
Command Structure to fuse data, products and services provided by nations, such as imagery, navigation and early warning.”119
In May 2022, in a historic shift brought about by
Russia’s war against Ukraine, Finland and Sweden
applied for NATO membership. Secretary General
Stoltenberg stated that the alliance would fast-track
their applications.120 Each of the existing 30 NATO
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Tirana Airport
Zeebrugge (Bruges)
Antwerp Gateway
Logistics hub Liège airport
Port of Varna
Port of Burgas
Maersk Container Industry (Tinglev)
Terminal des Flandres (Dunkirk)
Terminal de France (Le Havre)
Terminal du Grant Ouest (Nantes)
Eurofos Terminal (Marseille)
Port of Hamburg
Jade-Weser-Port Logistics Center (Wilhelmshaven)
Frankfurt-Hahn Airport
Schwerin-Parchim
Port of Duisburg
Piraeus Container Terminal
BILK Kombiterminal (Budapest)
Vado Reefer Terminal (Genoa)
Malta Freeport Terminal (Marsaxlokk)
Euromax Terminal (Rotterdam)
Gdynia Container Terminal (Gdynia)
Port of Sines
Port of Constanta
Maribor Airport
Ljubljana Airport
Noatum Container Terminal (Bilbao)
Noatum Container Terminal (Valencia)
Kumport Sea Terminal (Istanbul)
Heathrow Airport
Bulgaria
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
U.K.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
member states must ratify the accession protocols
and are expected to do so. Finland and Sweden’s inclusion in NATO would bring substantial capabilities to the alliance and enhance the security of the
Baltic Sea region.
Enhanced Forward Presence. Historically, the
centerpiece of NATO’s renewed focus on collective
Own
Airport
Port
Port
Airport
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Airport
Airport
Railway
Port
Railway
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Port
Airport
Airport
Port
Port
Port
Airport
Majority
Albania
Belgium
Nearly Half
Site/Location
Less than Half
Type
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Country
Lease
China’s Ownership Stake in European
Ports, Airports, and Railways
Unknown
TABLE 3
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
A
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defense has been the existing four multinational
battalions stationed in Poland and the Baltic States
as part of the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence
(EFP). Different countries serve as lead (framework)
nations, providing overall coordination and the centerpiece force that is augmented by other contributing nations, for different supported countries.
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81
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The U.S. serves as the framework nation in
Orzysz, Poland, near the Suwalki Gap. The
U.S.-led battle group consists of 780 American
troops augmented by four troops from Croatia,
“up to 120” from Romania, and 129 from the
United Kingdom.121
In Estonia, the United Kingdom serves as the
framework nation, headquartered in Tapa with
993 troops in an armored infantry battalion
with main battle tanks and armored fighting
vehicles along with “self-propelled artillery
and air defence assets, engineers, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance group
and logistic support elements,” in addition to
one Icelandic civilian strategic communications specialist, 219 French troops, and 217
Danish troops.122
In Adazi, Latvia, Canada is the framework
nation with “Up to 639” troops and armored
fighting vehicles augmented by “Up to 21”
troops from Albania; “Up to 81” from the Czech
Republic; one civilian communications specialist from Iceland; “Up to 250” troops from Italy
with short-range air defense and a chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear defense
unit; 11 from Montenegro; nine from North
Macedonia; “up to 177” from Poland with tanks;
“up to 152” from Slovakia; 42 from Slovenia; and
“Up to 504” from Spain with tanks and armored
fighting vehicles.123
In Rukla, Lithuania, Germany serves as the
framework nation with 1,031 troops augmented by “Up to 135” from a Czech Republic air
defense unit, 270 from the Netherlands, and
“Up to 188” from Norway with main battle tanks
and infantry fighting vehicles in addition to one
public affairs official from Belgium, another
from Iceland, and a six-person transportation
team from Luxembourg.124
EFP troops are under NATO command and control; a Multinational Division Headquarters Northeast located in Elblag, Poland, which reached full
operational capability in December 2018, coordinates the four battalions.125 In February 2017, the
Baltic States signed an agreement to facilitate the
movement of NATO forces among the countries.126
82
Some EFP host nations have called for additional
assets—importantly, enablers to be added to the
battalions. In April 2022, Lithuanian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis called for
“more armored vehicles, air defense, sea defenses,
and the securing of ports and infrastructure in the
region.”127 Some contributing nations have begun
to deploy new enablers to the region; in Lithuania,
for example, Germany now deploys an Ocelot shortrange air defense system.128
NATO also has established eight Force Integration Units located in Sofia, Bulgaria; Tallinn, Estonia;
Riga, Latvia; Vilnius, Lithuania; Bydgoszcz, Poland;
Bucharest, Romania; Szekesfehervar, Hungary; and
Bratislava, Slovakia. These new units “will help facilitate the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the
Eastern part of the Alliance, support collective defence planning and assist in coordinating training
and exercises.”129
At its July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO agreed to
“develop tailored forward presence in the southeast
part of the Alliance territory.” Specifically:
Appropriate measures, tailored to the Black Sea
region and including the Romanian initiative
to establish a multinational framework brigade
to help improve integrated training of Allied
units under Headquarters Multinational Division
Southeast, will contribute to the Alliance’s
strengthened deterrence and defence posture,
situational awareness, and peacetime demonstration of NATO’s intent to operate without
constraint. It will also provide a strong signal
of support to regional security. Options for a
strengthened NATO air and maritime presence
will be assessed.130
The U.S. and Romania jointly organize the biannual Saber Guardian exercise, which is designed to
“improve the integration of multinational combat
forces” stationed in the region.131 In the 2021 iteration, which took place in Estonia, Bulgaria, and
Romania, “more than 13,000 service members from
19 countries [conducted] live fire and air and missile defense operations, plus a large scale medical
evacuation.”132 Saber Guardian 21 was one of several exercises linked with DEFENDER-Europe 21,
which had a Black Sea regional focus. The purpose
of DEFENDER Europe 2022, which was conducted in May, was to “demonstrate U.S. Army Europe
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
territory covering SACEUR’s (Supreme Allied
Commander Europe) area of operation has atrophied since the end of the Cold War.”141 Former U.S.
Commander of European Command Lieutenant
General Ben Hodges has described the importance
of military mobility: “We need to think how fast the
Russians are moving. We must be able to move as
fast or faster than them so that they do not make the
mistake of thinking that they could launch an attack
of some sort in an area before we could respond.”142
Continued shortfalls in the alliance’s ability to
move soldiers and equipment swiftly and efficiently
include “limitations of road surface weight capacity,
bridges capacity and railway traffic limits” as well
as differences in rail gauges and continued legal,
procedural, and regulatory slowdowns.143 NATO
has focused heavily on overcoming these barriers,
working with the European Union, which retains
competencies that are critical to improving military
mobility, particularly with regard to overcoming legal and regulatory hurdles. In May 2021, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană underscored
the importance of continued cooperation with the
EU on military mobility, noting that continued improvements are needed in such areas as “regulations for swift border-crossing, close coordination
between military forces and civil government bodies,
access to necessary transport capabilities, and ensuring that national transport infrastructure is fit
for purpose.”144
In April 2022, the alliance established the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic
(DIANA). With a $1.1 billion “innovation fund” that
will invest in “deep-tech startups” over a 15-year period and working through “more than 10 accelerator
sites and over 50 test centers,” DIANA is “tasked to
bring innovative civilian and military organizations
closer together to develop cutting-edge solutions in
the realms of emerging and disruptive technologies.”
Among these “emerging and disruptive technologies”
are artificial intelligence, autonomy, big-data processing, biotechnology, hypersonic technology, new
materials, propulsion, quantum-enabled technologies, and space-related systems.145
Cyber Capabilities. “A secure cyberspace is
essential to everything the Alliance does,” according to NATO’s secretary general. “This is why cyber
defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective
defence. NATO has made clear that a severe cyber attack could lead it to invoke Article 5 of the
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83

and Africa’s ability to aggregate US-based combat
power quickly in Eastern Europe” and to “increase
the lethality of the NATO alliance through long-distance fires, build unit readiness in a complex joint,
multinational environment and leverage host nation
capabilities to increase the command’s operational
reach.” The exercise included “3,437 U.S. and 5,193
multi-national service members from 11 Allied and
Partner nations.”133
NATO continues air policing missions over Bulgarian and Romanian airspace. In September and
October of 2020, six U.S. F-16s took part in a fourweek air policing mission over Bulgaria with Bulgarian air force units and Canadian F-18s flying from
Romania.134 In 2021, NATO jets were scrambled 370
times, and 290 of these incidents involved Russian
military aircraft (down from 350 in 2020).135
In October 2019, addressing a NATO capability
gap in aerial refueling, the Czech Republic, Belgium,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway jointly procured A330 air-to-air refueling aircraft, to be deployed from 2020–2024. The fifth of
nine aircraft ordered was delivered in August 2021.136
Five of the aircraft will operate out of Eindhoven air
base in the Netherlands, and three will operate out
of Germany’s Cologne–Wahn air base.137
Additionally, in November 2019, NATO announced a $1 billion package to upgrade its Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes. The
upgrades, which “will provide AWACS with sophisticated new communications and networking
capabilities, including upgrades to the NE-3A’s
data link and voice communications capabilities,
and enhanced Wide-Band Beyond Line-of-Sight
airborne networking capability,” will extend the
aircrafts’ service life to 2035.138 NATO’s Alliance
Ground Surveillance force, which consists of five
RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft based out
of Sigonella, Italy, along with ground command and
control stations, achieved initial operating capability in February 2021.139
In 2018, NATO established two new commands
with a combined total of 1,500 personnel: a joint
force command for the Atlantic based in Norfolk,
Virginia, and a logistics and military mobility command headquartered in Ulm, Germany.140 Logistics
has been a significant alliance focus in recent years.
An internal alliance assessment in 2017 reportedly
concluded that NATO’s “ability to logistically support rapid reinforcement in the much-expanded
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NOTE: Figures are estimates
for 2022. Iceland is not listed
because it has no military.
SOURCE: Graph 3, “Defence
Expenditure as a Share of GDP
(%),” and Graph 4, “Equipment
Expenditure as a Share of
Defence Expenditure (%,),” in
press release, “Defence
Expenditure of NATO Countries
(2014–2022),” North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, June 27,
2022, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/
pdf/2022/6/pdf/220627-defexp-2022-en.pdf (accessed
August 3, 2022).
In Europe, NATO
members closer to
Russia and the
Middle East spend,
in general, more on
defense than those
further away.
Threat Proximity
Largely Dictates
Military Spending
MAP 2
PORTUGAL
IRELAND
SPAIN
U.K.
N. MACEDONIA
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
CYPRUS
MOLDOVA
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAQ
ARMENIA
GEORGIA
RUSSIA
<1.25%
1.25%–1.74%
1.75%–1.99%
2%+
DEFENSE
SPENDING AS
PERCENTAGE
OF GDP
Black Sea
UKRAINE
BELARUS
LATVIA
ESTONIA
FINLAND
LITHUANIA
GREECE
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
ITALY
HUNGARY
CROATIA
AUSTRIA
SLOVAK
REP.
POLAND
CZECH REP.
SWEDEN
SLOVENIA
SWITZERLAND
Mediterranean Sea
FRANCE
GERMANY
LUX.
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
DENMARK
NORWAY

Washington Treaty.”146 Ultimately, the decision to
invoke Article 5 will be a political decision.
As noted, NATO recognized cyberspace as a
domain of operations at its 2016 Warsaw summit.
Subsequently:
l
On August 31, 2018, NATO established a Cyberspace Operations Centre (CYOC) in Mons, Belgium, that will include 70 cyber experts when it
becomes fully operational in 2023. The CYOC
“supports military commanders with situational
awareness to inform the Alliance’s operations
and missions.”147
and partner countries boost their capabilities
in areas such as cyber defence.”152 In November
2021, the Communication and Information
Agency “organised a first NATO counter-drone
exercise in the Netherlands…to ensure that
commercial systems from different NATO
nations can work together, interoperably, to
counter threats posed by drones.”153
With respect to the likely effects of Chinese 5G
technology on the sharing of intelligence in Europe, U.S. officials have said that utilizing Chinese
state-controlled companies for next-generation
wireless networks would be “nothing short of madIn 2020, NATO published its first cyber doctrine.148 ness.”154 A Chinese presence in European telecommunications networks could decisively compromise
In 2021, at the NATO summit in Brussels, “Althe communications integrity of both the military
lies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Deand the intelligence community. The Brussels Statefence Policy, which supports NATO’s core tasks ment notes that “NATO and Allies, within their reand overall deterrence and defence posture to
spective authority, will maintain and enhance the
enhance further the Alliance’s resilience.”149
security of our critical infrastructure, key industries,
supply chains, and communication information
Through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, networks, including 5G.”155 In March 2022, General
NATO has also invested in a stronger relationship Wolters testified that:
with industry. “This partnership,” as described by
NATO, “includes NATO entities, national ComputThe PRC’s efforts to expand 5G networks
er Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Allies’
throughout Europe via state-backed firms, such
industry representatives. Information-sharing, exas Huawei and ZTE, pose significant security
ercises, and training and education are just a few
risks to the interests and military forces if the
examples of areas in which NATO and industry are
U.S., Allies, and Partners. These networks place
working together.”150
intellectual property, sensitive information,
Cooperation within NATO is also facilitated by
technology, and private personal information at
two other entities.
heightened risk of acquisition and exploitation
by the Chinese government.156
The NATO Intelligence on Cyberspace Community of Interest was created “to more regularly
Many nations have taken decisions in recent
exchange information, assessments and best
years to restrict Chinese vendors from 5G networks,
practices—improving NATO’s ability to prevent but these threat perceptions are not uniform, and
and respond to cyber threats.”151
implementation of these decisions will remain
crucially important. The impact of the emerging
The NATO Communications and Information
patchwork approach toward Chinese 5G technoloAgency “is responsible for ensuring NATO has
gy on the European operating environment should
the secure networks, communications and soft- become clearer in the coming years.
ware needed to guarantee peace and stability
At the June 2019 NATO summit:
for one billion citizens” and “runs the NATO
Cyber Security Centre, which defends NATO’s
Allies reaffirmed that secure access to space
networks around the clock from cyber attacks
services, products and capabilities is essential
and malicious activity, monitoring, identifyfor the Alliance’s operations, missions and
ing and preventing potential threats.” When
activities. They agreed that attacks to, from or
requested to do so, “the Agency also helps Allies
within space present a clear challenge to the
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85

l
and we have infrastructure in place to be able
to house all six in Rota, Spain.”161 In June 2022,
DOD announced that “the United States is
working with the government to increase the
number of destroyers stationed at Rota from
four to six.”162

security of the Alliance, could be as harmful
to modern societies as a conventional attack
and could lead to the invocation of the mutual
defence clause (Article 5) of the North Atlantic Treaty.
To implement space as an operational domain,
the Alliance is enhancing its space domain
awareness and common understanding of
the space environment. To that end, NATO
announced plans in 2021 to develop a Strategic Space Situational Awareness System at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In addition,
NATO’s military authorities have accepted an
offer from France to establish a NATO Centre
of Excellence devoted to space in Toulouse.
NATO also agreed on a roadmap for further
implementation of NATO’s Space Policy in the
upcoming years to guide NATO’s efforts in a
number of areas, including science and technology, resilience and exercises. In 2021, space
operational activities were integrated into
several exercises, including Steadfast Jupiter,
Ramstein Ambition and Steadfast Leda. These
exercises involved the development and management of space effects and the integration
of space products.157
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A second Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, that broke ground in May 2016 has faced
delays but was commissioned in September
2020. It is supposedly nearing completion,
but whether it will begin operations in 2022
remains unclear.163
Ramstein Air Base in Germany hosts the command center.164
The U.K. operates an early warning BMD radar
at RAF Fylingdales in England. The U.K. also
continues to consider upgrades to its Type 45
Destroyers with BMD-capable missiles.165
In May and June 2021, 10 nations—Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—took part in the biannual BMD exercise
Formidable Shield. Formidable Shield 21 featured 15
ships, 10 aircraft, and 3,300 participants and “[was]
Ballistic Missile Defense. NATO’s ballistic designed to improve allied interoperability in a livemissile defense (BMD) achieved initial operational fire joint IAMD [Integrated Air and Missile Defense]
capability in July 2016, offering a stronger capability environment, using NATO command and control
to defend alliance populations, territory, and forces reporting structures.”166
across the southern portion of Europe from a potenIn January 2017, the Russian embassy in Norway
tial ballistic missile attack. For example:
threatened that if Norway contributed ships or radar
to NATO BMD, Russia “[would] have to react to deAn Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania,
fend our security.”167 Norway operates four Fridtjof
became operational in May 2016, and upgrades
Nansen–class Aegis-equipped frigates that are not
158
were completed in August 2019.
currently BMD-capable.168 A fifth Aegis-equipped
frigate, the Helge Ingstad, collided with an oil tanker
An AN/TPY-2 forward-based early-warning
and sustained so much damage that the government
BMD radar is located at Kürecik, Turkey, purdecided to scrap it.169
suant to the U.S. European Phased Adaptive
Denmark, which agreed in 2014 to equip at least
Approach (EPAA).159
one of its Iver Huitfeldt–class frigates with radar
to contribute to NATO BMD, reaffirmed this comBMD-capable U.S. Aegis-equipped ships are
mitment in the Defence Agreement 2018–2023.170
forward deployed at Rota, Spain.160 General
Russia’s ambassador in Copenhagen responded by
Wolters has characterized Rota’s four current
publicly threatening Denmark: “I do not believe that
destroyers as the “workhorses of deterrence,”
Danish people fully understand the consequences
adding that “[w]e currently have a set number
of what may happen if Denmark joins the Ameriof four and the request is for two additional
can-led missile defense system. If Denmark joins,
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Quality of Armed Forces in the Region
Article 3 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document, states that at a minimum,
members “will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”181
Regrettably, only a handful of NATO members are
living up to their Article 3 commitments.
In 2022, only nine countries will spend the required minimum of 2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) on defense: Croatia (2.03 percent);
Estonia (2.34 percent); Greece (3.76 percent); Latvia (2.10 percent); Lithuania (2.36 percent); Poland
(2.42 percent); the Slovak Republic (2.00); the United Kingdom (2.12 percent); and the United States
(3.47 percent). Romania is just below the threshold
at 1.99 percent.182 However, NATO defense spending
is trending upward overall. According to the NATO
Secretary General’s annual report for 2021:
In 2021, eight Allies met the guideline of spending 2% of their GDP on defence, up from just
three Allies in 2014. The United States accounted for 51% of the Allies’ combined GDP and
69% of combined defence expenditure. Total
NATO military spending in 2021 was estimated
to exceed USD 1 trillion.
Allies also made progress on their pledge to
invest 20% or more of defence expenditures
in major new capabilities. In 2021, 21 Allies met
the NATO-agreed 20% guideline, compared to
only seven in 2014, and 20 Allies spent more in
real terms on major equipment than they did in
2020.Allies also made progress on their pledge
to invest 20% or more of defence expenditures
in major new capabilities.183

Danish warships become targets for Russian nuclear missiles.”171
In March 2019, the first of four Dutch De Zeven
Provinciën–class frigates received a SMART-L
Multi-Mission/Naval (MM/N) D-band long-range
radar upgrade that is “capable of BMD mission
(surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles) up
to 2000 km while simultaneous[ly] maintaining the
air defence capability.”172 All four Dutch frigates will
receive the radar upgrade and carry SM-3 surfaceto-air missiles.173 In May 2021, as part of NATO’s
Formidable Shield exercise, radar aboard the HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën “was used to eliminate
a ballistic missile, marking a first in Europe.”174 In
December 2020, the Royal Netherlands and German navies signed an agreement to work jointly
to develop a replacement for the Dutch De Zeven
Provinciën–class frigate and Germany’s three F124
Sachsen-class frigates.175
Belgian Admiral Jan de Beurme stated in April
2021 that “we are studying the feasibility of integrating ballistic missile defense shooter capabilities into
the new frigates.”176 A contract to develop a weapons
suite for a joint Belgian and Dutch procurement of
two multipurpose frigates apiece was awarded in
February 2019, and the vessels are expected to enter
service beginning in 2024.177
Spain currently operates four Aegis-equipped
F-100 Alvaro de Bazan–class frigates, but they are
not yet BMD-capable.178 In April 2019, Spain signed
an agreement to procure five F-110 multi-mission
frigates, the first of which will likely be deployed
in 2026. The Aegis-equipped frigates “will host
the first naval solid-state S-band radar for the
Spanish Navy.”179
The Italian Navy is procuring seven multi-role
offshore patrol vessels (PPAs) that are to be delivered from 2021–2026. The first of two BMD-capable
PPAs in full configuration is scheduled for delivery in 2024.180
In 2022, 24 Allies met the NATO-agreed 20 percent guideline, compared to only seven in 2014 and
21 in 2021.184
Germany. Germany has long been an economic
powerhouse with mismatched military capabilities,
but Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine sparked
major changes in the government’s thinking about
military power. In 2022, Germany will spend 1.44
percent of GDP on defense and 20.9 percent of its
defense budget on equipment, meeting one of two
benchmarks.185 In February 2022, Chancellor Olaf
Scholz “vow[ed] to anchor a 100 billion (US $113 billion) euro defense fund in the country’s constitution
and exceed a NATO-wide annual spending goal.”186
In announcing the policy change, Scholz stated that
“[i]t’s clear we need to invest significantly more in
the security of our country in order to protect our
freedom and our democracy.”187
In February, Germany also sent an additional 380
troops, including “artillery soldiers, reconnaissance
specialists, medics [and] nuclear and biological
warfare specialists,” to Lithuania where it serves as
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87
CHART 4
Less than Half of NATO Members Follow Defense Spending Guidelines
NATO members are expected to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense,
and at least 20 percent of their defense spending is supposed to go to equipment.
Only the U.S. and eight other nations do both.
DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2022
4%
NATO GUIDELINE: 20%
3%
U.S.
Greece
U.K.
Poland
Lithuania
Estonia
Latvia Slovak Rep.
Croatia
2%
NATO GUIDELINE: 2%
Netherlands Romania
France
North Macedonia
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Albania
Norway
Italy
Portugal
Germany
Denmark
Czech Rep.
Slovenia
Belgium
Turkey
Canada
Spain

1%
Hungary
Luxembourg
0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
EQUIPMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 2022
NOTE: Figures are estimates for 2022. Iceland is not listed because it has no military.
SOURCE: Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” and Graph 4, “Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence
Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 27,
2022, p. 3, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220627-def-exp-2022-en.pdf (accessed August 3, 2022).
A
the framework nation for NATO’s EFP battalion.188
These forces joined the 543 German troops already
stationed in Rukla.189 In early April, Germany deployed Ozelot short-range self-propelled air defense
systems with Stinger missiles.190 Germany also spent
$110 million through 2021 to upgrade facilities in
Lithuania that include barracks used by the multinational battalion.191 The Luftwaffe has taken part
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in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing 13 times—more than
any other nation’s armed forces—most recently out
of Šiauliai air base in Lithuania in the summer of
2020 and Ämari Air Base in Estonia from September
2020 to May 2021.192
Germany also maintains 70 troops in Kosovo as
part of NATO’s Kosovo Force.193 In March 2022, the
Bundestag extended the mandate for Germany’s
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
equipment, manpower shortages, and an outdated
and slow procurement structure.204
In March 2022, Germany announced a deal to
purchase 35 F-35A fighters “as replacement for the
Tornado in the role of nuclear sharing.” The Tornados are to be phased out between 2025 and 2030.
The Luftwaffe also announced the purchase of 15
Eurofighter Typhoons “equipped for electronic warfare.”205 Germany has stated that these purchases
do not change its commitment to take part in the
Future Combat Air System (FCAS). The Luftwaffe
is also reportedly moving toward procurement of an
anti-ballistic missile system—either the Israeli-produced Arrow 3 system along with corresponding radar installed at three locations in Germany or the
U.S.-produced THAAD system—to defend against
attacks from Russian Iskander missiles.206 In March
2021, the Ministry of Defence announced plans to
upgrade its Patriot missiles to keep them in service
until 2030 and to invest in drone technology rather
than a next-generation air defense platform.207
Germany operates the largest fleet of heavy transport aircraft in Europe and has taken delivery of 37
of 53 A400M cargo aircraft ordered.208 In May 2018,
the U.S. approved the sale of six C-130J Hercules
aircraft and three KC-130J tankers to France and
Germany, which were planning to create a joint
capability.209 A new joint training center for both
aircraft in Normandy broke ground in 2021 and is
scheduled to begin operations in 2024.210 The aircraft will be based at Évreux, France, where “this binational air transport squadron will have unrestricted exchange of aircraft, air crews, and maintainers,
as well as technical and logistical support based on
a common pool of spare parts and a common service
support contract.”211
Germany announced the end of its P-3C ORION
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) modernization program in June 2020. In July 2021, Germany’s Defense
Ministry signed a letter of offer and acceptance to
procure five P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft
under the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales
process.212 In September, Boeing signed a contract
with the U.S. Navy to produce the five planes at a “total price tag” of $1.6 billion with deliveries to begin
in 2024.213 Other planned air force procurements include replacement of the country’s heavy transport
helicopter fleet.214
In April 2022, an agreement was struck for the
procurement of 140 missiles for Germany’s five
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89

participation in NATO’s Sea Guardian maritime security operation, for which 210 troops are currently
deployed, and approved a one-year extension of Germany’s participation in the United Nations Mission
in South Sudan.194 In May, Germany announced the
end of its participation in the EU Training Mission
Mali (EUTM), where 300 soldiers had served, but
indicated a willingness to extend the mandate for
the 1,000 German troops taking part in the U.N.’s
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA) if “the UN made sure the shortfalls created by the French withdrawal were filled to
ensure the safety of German soldiers.”195
In the Middle East, German forces participate in
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission, the mandate for which
extends through June 2022.196 In January 2022,
Germany extended its non-combat training mission
in Iraq and its air-to-air refueling, air surveillance
radar, and air transport missions in support of the
counter-ISIS coalition through the end of October.197
In April 2017, the Bundeswehr established a
new cyber command with a staff of approximately
14,500.198 Germany also led NATO’s VJTF in 2019
and will do so again in 2023 with “the earmarked
units prioritised for modernisation and upgrades.”199
In June 2022, Germany announced that it would
contribute “15,000 soldiers, 65 aeroplanes, 20 navy
units, and other formations to the New Force Model,”
greatly increasing the size of the NRF.200
Although Germany’s forces have taken on additional roles in recent years, its military continues
to suffer serious equipment and readiness issues
overall. The Bundeswehr was recently described
as “more or less bare” by Chief of the Army Alfons
Mais and in an “alarming” state by Defense Commissioner Eva Hoegl.201 Major weapons systems
have an operational readiness rate of 77 percent.202
However, despite some improvements such as the
71 percent readiness rate for combat vehicles, less
than half of Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks are ready
for action, only 35 of 400 Puma infantry fighting
vehicles are “fit for war,” less than 30 percent of the
Navy’s ships are “fully operational in the sense that
all of the ship’s major systems [are] functional and
up to high-intensity operations,” and the readiness
rate for helicopters is only 40 percent.203 Challenges
to the rebuilding of Germany’s military capabilities
include a lack of domestic industry capacity, a need
to rely on manufacturers for repair and upgrade of

Heron TP unmanned aerial vehicles.215 Armed
drones have been a contentious political issue for
years in Germany, resisted in large part by the Social
Democrats. That the decision has now been taken is
a significant shift. Germany, France, Italy, and Spain
plan to acquire a collective fleet of Eurodrones at
an estimated total cost of $7.5 billion. Germany will
have seven systems, each of which will include two
ground stations and three aircraft.216
Germany continues to work with France on development of the Main Ground Combat System
(MGCS), which will replace both nations’ main
battle tanks.217 However, other funding priorities
reportedly include “air transport capabilities, frigates and landing platform,” along with €20 billion
for munitions, and it is not expected that the project
will be completed before 2035.218
Germany’s troubled F-125 Baden-Württemberg–
class frigate procurement has been completed. In
December 2017, the frigate failed sea trials because
of “software and hardware defects.”219 It reportedly
had “problems with its radar, electronics and the
flameproof coating on its fuel tanks,” was “found
to list to the starboard,” and lacked sufficiently robust armaments as well as the ability to add them.220
In addition, there are concerns about whether the
frigate’s ability to defend against aerial attack is so
deficient that the ship is fit only for “stabilization
operations,” and the lack of sonar and torpedo tubes
makes the ship vulnerable to attack by submarines.221
Germany returned the ship to the shipbuilder following delivery.222 The redesigned Baden-W
​ ürttemberg
was belatedly commissioned in June 2019, and Germany took delivery of the fourth and final F-125 in
January 2022.223 In January 2020, Germany awarded
a $6.7 billion contract to the Dutch Damen Shipyards
for the next-generation F-126 frigate.224 Damen is
building the frigates “together with its [German]
partners Blohm+Voss and Thales,” and the first of
four ordered (with the possibility of another two)
is to be delivered in 2028.225
In July 2021, Germany and Norway signed an
agreement for a joint program to construct six Type
212CD submarines (two for Germany and four for
Norway), the first of which are to be delivered to
the Norwegian Navy in 2029 with Germany taking
delivery of its submarines in 2032 and 2034.226 Germany’s five K130 Corvettes are due to be delivered
by 2025, and the first of the class is undergoing sea
trials this year.227
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In addition to procurements, Germany is seeking
to improve readiness by having a combat-ready army
division by 2025 rather than the originally planned
target of 2027. Germany currently does not have a
combat-ready division.228
Deployments often strain the military for years.
In one example, “the concentration of all available
resources in training, personnel, special tools and
spare parts” during the 15-month deployment of TIGER combat helicopters to Mali in 2017 and 2018
“halted the process chain in domestic operations
to such an extent that this continued to have a significant disruptive impact on materiel readiness in
2020.” Even Germany’s robust contribution to Baltic Air Policing “takes everything it has, often at the
expense of training initiatives.”229
The navy is not much better off. Problems with
submarines include “long yard periods, difficulties
with main batteries and the practice of ‘controlled
removal’ from some submarines in order to keep
others operational.”230 Reports surfaced in March
2021 that more than 100 German vessels including
submarines rely on a Russian navigation system that
does not meet NATO standards and that “[d]uring
a worst-case cyberattack, navigation data could be
hacked and the ship could fully lose operability.”231
And according to one analyst, the six-month deployment of the frigate Bayern to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific theater beginning in August
2021 “came ‘at the price of gutting the fleet,’ with
ship maintenance plans and training schedules altered to accommodate the Bayern mission.”232
There is also a shortage of personnel. The number of personnel on active duty in Germany’s army
rose from 176,000 in 2016 to 183,695 by the end of
2021. However, “20,412 of the 116,974 military posts
above the ranks of junior-ranking personnel were
vacant [by the end of 2021]. This is the equivalent
of 17.5 per cent.” In addition, “at the end of 2019
the average age was 32.4 (32.9 for career soldiers
and temporary-career volunteers, 20.1 for military
service volunteers)” and “had risen to 33.1 by the
first half of 2021 (33.8 for career soldiers and temporary-career volunteers, 20.7 for military service
volunteers).”233 In April 2021, Germany started a
year-long “voluntary military service in homeland
security” program that mixes combat training with
specialist training to prepare 1,000 young Germans
per year to deal with pandemics or natural disasters
and protect critical infrastructure.234
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
In January 2019, France signed a $2.3 billion
agreement with Dassault Aviation for development
of the F4 Standard upgrade to the Rafale fighter aircraft. The upgrade includes “a number of new features, the most important of which is an improvement in the aircraft’s connectivity in both national
and allied contexts, through software-defined radio,
new links, and satellite communications.”243 The 28
Rafales to be delivered in 2025 “will include some
F4 functionalities.”244 An additional 30 Rafales at
full F4 configuration will be delivered by 2030. It
is expected that “[t]he F4 version will significantly
improve the 4.5-generation fighter’s stealth capabilities, which although present in earlier versions to
some extent failed to compete with fifth-generation
combat aircraft.”245
In February 2021, France signed a contract to
procure an additional 12 Rafales at the F3R standard
by 2025 to replace fighters that had recently been
sold to Greece.246 In May 2021, France, Germany,
and Spain signed an agreement to develop a flying
demonstrator aircraft for the Future Combat Air
System, which is to begin entering service in 2040.247
As of March 2022, because of ongoing disputes between defense companies on technology sharing,
the program had yet to enter research and development.248 Executives at Dassault, one of the main
defense firms working on the program, stated that
“development work on FCAS had in effect ground
to a halt, with the company taking its engineers off
the programme until it was able to agree [on] a way
forward with Airbus.”249 Further complicating the
picture, France now worries that Germany’s plan to
buy the F-35 places the two countries on diverging
timelines for the new aircraft.250 In March, France
announced that it would upgrade 42 of 67 Tiger
MkIII attack helicopters at a cost of $3.06 billion
with delivery expected in 2029.251
France established a 220-person Space Command under the Air Force in September 2019 and
has committed to investing $4.78 billion in its space
capabilities by 2025.252 In January 2021, NATO approved a Center of Excellence for Military Space
to be located alongside French Space Command in
Toulouse. The first researchers arrived in 2021, and
the center is to be fully staffed by 2025.253
France intends to have a “fully capable” system to
defend its space assets in place by 2030. “If our satellites are threatened,” Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly has said, “we intend to blind those of our
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91

France. France has one of NATO’s most capable
militaries and retains an independent nuclear deterrent capability. France rejoined NATO’s Integrated
Command Structure in 2009 but remains outside
the alliance’s nuclear planning group.
In 2022, France will spend 1.90 percent of GDP
on defense and 28.6 percent of defense spending on
equipment, narrowly missing meeting both NATO
benchmarks.235 France will spend at least $45.1 billion on defense in 2022, which is about $1.8 billion
more than it spent in 2021. Incumbent President
Emmanuel Macron has promised further increases,
but the scale of those increases remains unclear.236
France’s defense budget for 2022, according to an
Armed Forces Ministry spokesman, “reflects the
nation’s commitment to increase its defense funds
by €1.7 billion year over year since 2019” and “represents a €9 billion increase over the 2017 budget.”
All told, the “French government has invested a
cumulative €26 billion on defense over the past
five years.”237
Following the Cold War, France drew down the
capabilities needed for peer-to-peer conflict. Between 1991 and 2021, “the number of battle tanks
dropped from 1,349 to 222, the number of fighters
from 686 to 254, the number of large surface ships
from 41 to 19 and its active-duty manpower from
453,000 to 203,000.” “Today, the French Army is
beautiful,” French General Eric Laval has said, “but
in a high intensity conflict, would it be able to hold
beyond 48 hours? High intensity would imply potentially very tough battles which could last between 72 to 96 hours and which we are not allowed
to lose.” Chief of the Army General Pierre Schill has
described the current transformation process as the
“most important modernization undergone since
World War II.”238
Air Force procurements include an upgrade to
the aerial refueling and airlift fleet. In February
2020, France received the second of two KC-130J
Super Hercules.239 It also has been introducing new
A330 MRTT (Multi-Role Tanker Transport) aircraft
and as of April 19, 2022, had received six of a dozen
ordered.240 France received its 18th A400M Atlas
military transport aircraft in April 2021 and plans
to have 25 in service by 2025.241 In October 2020,
the government announced that the final 10 NH90
Tactical Troop Helicopters on order for delivery in
2025 and 2026 would be upgraded to meet special
forces requirements.242

adversaries. We reserve the right and the means to be
able to respond: that could imply the use of powerful
lasers deployed from our satellites or from patrolling
nano-satellites.”254 In March 2021, with German and
U.S. space forces also participating, France launched
its first military exercise (AsterX) in space “to evaluate its ability to defend its satellites and other defense
equipment from an attack.”255 AsterX 2022 took place
in February and March with the U.S. participating.256
In 2022, in addition to personnel and infrastructure,
“[t]he Air and Space Force will receive a number of anti-drone jammer guns, and the service plans to deploy
an experimental counter-UAS laser weapon aboard a
warship at sea next year.”257
Army procurements include Kochi HK416 Assault Rifles, more than 50 percent of which had
been delivered as of March 2022; 300 ANAFI USA
micro-drones; and 364 Serval Armored Vehicles, 108
of which are to be delivered by the end of 2022.258
The Army will receive 50 upgraded Leclerc tanks
in 2022 and plans to invest €58 million in the Main
Ground Combat System, a next-generation tank that
is being developed jointly with Germany.259
One major project is an upgrade to the French
sea-based and air-based nuclear deterrent. The nation test-fired the M51.2, the current three-stage,
sea-land strategic ballistic missile (without a warhead), in April 2021 as part of a development program for the M51.3, which is expected in 2025.260
France’s sea-based deterrent is provided by
four Le Triomphant–class ballistic missile submarines.261 In March, in response to Russian aggression and threats, France reportedly had three of its
four ballistic missile submarines at sea at the same
time—something that has not happened in decades.
Similar messaging was behind the successful test
of the ASMP-A air-launched nuclear weapon in
March 2022.262 The government launched France’s
third-generation ballistic missile submarine program in February 2021. Delivery of the first submarine is planned for 2035 with three additional subs
to be delivered every five years thereafter. Armed
Forces Minister Parly has described the third-generation submarines in colorful terms as able to “hear
better and defend themselves better whilst at the
same time being more silent: They will not make
more noise than a school of shrimp.”263
Other major naval procurements include $1.09
billion through 2025 for the design phase of a new
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that will deploy
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30 Future Combat Air Systems and is planned to
enter service in 2038.264 The carrier procurement
will account for 20 percent of French naval vessel
procurement spending during the next decade.265
In December 2021, the U.S. Department of State’s
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
cleared a potential $1.3 billion sale to France of an
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS),
an Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system, and related equipment for its new carrier, which will incorporate two or three EMALs and relatively new
electromagnetic catapult systems. According to the
DSCA, “[t]he proposed sale will result in a continuation of interoperability between the United States
and France.”266 The Suffren, the first of six new
fifth-generation Barracuda-class nuclear-powered
attack submarines, was commissioned in November
2020.267 The second vessel, the Duguay-Trouin will
be delivered by the end of the year.268
France is procuring five defense and intervention frigates, the first of which is due in 2024 and
the second and third due in 2025.269 The Alsace, a
FREMM multi-mission frigate delivered in April
2021, and the Lorraine, which underwent sea trials
in February and will be delivered by year’s end, will
have enhanced air defense capabilities in addition to
the focus on anti-submarine warfare that characterizes the six FREMMs that were delivered between
2012 and 2019.270
In November 2020, Armed Forces Minister Parly
announced the overhaul of the entire mine countermeasures systems by 2029.271 In the same month,
France and the U.K. signed a production contract for
the joint Maritime Mine Counter Measure (MMCM)
autonomous minehunting system.272 Identical unmanned mine-hunting demonstrators were delivered to France and the U.K. in December 2021 and
have begun capability development trials.273
In December 2016, France opened a cyber-operational command.274 The French Military Programming Law for 2019–2025, enacted in the summer of
2018, added “an additional 1.6 billion euros for cyber
operations along with 1,500 additional personnel
for a total of 4,000 cyber combatants by 2025,” and
in January 2019, France issued its “first doctrine for
offensive cyber operations.”275 This year, France will
spend “€11 million to develop a sovereign combat
cloud capability.”276
France, which has NATO’s third-largest number
of active-duty personnel,277 withdrew the last of its
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
the EU-led Operation Irini, which has as its chief
mission the enforcement of a U.N. arms embargo
on Libya.288 Operation Irini organized the April
2021 Le Pérouse naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal,
which also included ships from Australia, Japan, India, and the U.S.289 France also conducts occasional
freedom-of-navigation operations in the Pacific. In
2021, for example, it sent a nuclear-propelled attack
submarine and warship on an eight-month mission
to the Indian and Pacific Oceans.290
France is keenly aware of and concerned about
Chinese activity in the Pacific. In June 2021, French
Admiral Pierre Vandier said that France faced “a
logic of suffocation” in the region because of China’s activities:
We have a lot of evidence showing a change in
posture. Our boats are systematically followed,
sometimes forced to maneuver in front of
Chinese ships to avoid a collision, in defiance of
the rules of freedom of navigation that we defend. Some of our stopovers in countries in the
region where we used to pass are canceled at
the last moment, without clear explanations.291
The French-led, Abu Dhabi–based Awareness
Strait of Hormuz initiative to help patrol the waters
near Iran became operational on February 25, 2020.
France continues to contribute to the initiative’s
military mission, Operation Agenor.292
Operation Sentinelle, launched in January 2015
to protect the country from terrorist attacks, is the
largest operational commitment of French forces.
Sentinelle and Operation Resilience, launched in
March 2020 to help combat the coronavirus,293 together represent a domestic commitment of 13,000
French forces.
Frequent deployments, especially in Operation
Sentinelle, have placed significant strains on French
forces and equipment. According to one analyst:
Firstly, the conjunction of Opération Sentinelle
and operations Inherent Resolve and Barkhane
led to reduced training time for land forces and
for pilots of combat aircraft, helicopters and
especially transport aircraft, with the training
shortfall amounting to nearly one-third of the
intended flight hours. These personnel were
on active duty and no longer receiving sufficient training.
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93

troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, although
all of its combat troops had left in 2012. France continues to remain engaged in the fight against the
Islamic State, deploying 600 troops in Operation
Chammal.278 In February 2022, the Charles de Gaulle
Carrier Strike Group undertook a three-month operational deployment to the Mediterranean that
included support for Operation Chammal. During
the deployment, the CSG took part in “‘tri carrier
operations’ with the Italian Navy (Marina Militare)’s
Cavour CSG and the U.S. Navy’s Truman CSG” to
maintain interoperability and train with new assets
like F-35Bs and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft.279
France’s contributions to NATO deterrence
missions in Eastern Europe have included the deployment of approximately 337 soldiers to Estonia
as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.280
France also has deployed 500 troops to Romania
“to further increase its contribution to reassurance
for the Allies most exposed to Russia’s threatening
actions” in Ukraine and has taken part in Baltic Air
Policing nine times, most recently flying out of Estonia from March 31 to August 1, 2022, with “four
Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft and a 100-strong air
force detachment.”281 In addition, four Rafale fighters along with air-to-air refuelers fly combat air patrol missions over Poland from bases in France as
part of NATO’s “enhanced Vigilance Activities.”282
France, which led NATO’s VJTF in the first half of
2022,283 is preparing for high-intensity warfare with
a full-scale divisional exercise Orion for 2023 that
could involve up to 10,000 troops in addition to air
and naval units.284
On February 17, 2022, President Macron announced that “France will withdraw its [2,400]
troops from Mali nine years after it first intervened
to drive Islamic extremists from power but intends
to maintain a military presence in neighboring West
African nations.” France also plans to reduce its
Barkhane force in the Sahel region, which includes
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, from
4,300 to 2,500–3,000 troops.285 The French military has more than 1,600 troops stationed in Djibouti, 900 in Côte d’Ivoire, 350 in Gabon, and 400
in Senegal.286 France also has 650 troops stationed in
the United Arab Emirates,287 and a 15-year defense
agreement between the two countries has been in
effect since 2012.
In the Mediterranean, French Rear Admiral Jean
J. de Muizon is Deputy Operation Commander of

Secondly, the equipment was in intensive use
and wearing out more quickly, but the budgets
allocated for maintenance proved to be insufficient, which meant that equipment-readiness
rates fell. Readiness rates were very low for
transport and attack helicopters in particular—
just over 50% in 2017—and for the armoured
vehicles used in the Sahel, only three-quarters of which were serviceable during the
same period.294
The United Kingdom. America’s most important bilateral relationship in Europe is its Special
Relationship with the United Kingdom. From the
sharing of intelligence to the transfer of nuclear
technology, a high degree of military cooperation
has helped to make this relationship unique.
In 2022, the U.K. will spend 2.12 percent of GDP
on defense and 28.1 percent of its defense budget on
equipment.295 In November 2020, the government
announced plans to spend “a projected total of nearly $22 billion” on defense across the next four years
“on top of a previous commitment to add $2 billion
more to the country’s defense budget, with the combined planned increase being approximately $24.1
billion through 2024.” The new funding will be used
in part for acquisitions, including frigates, Type 32
warships, and the U.K.’s Future Combat Air System.
The U.K. is also standing up a Space Command and
an Artificial Intelligence Center.296
In March 2021, the U.K. released its Integrated
Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy as well as a Defence Command Paper.297
The Defence Ministry’s Command Paper, which lays
out a plan for military modernization, includes plans
for “a new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance capability to safeguard the critical undersea national infrastructure on which our prosperity depends” and a
new special operations Army Ranger Regiment that
“will be able to operate in complex, high-threat environments, taking on some tasks traditionally done
by Special Forces.”298
The paper also specifies significant cuts in capability, including retirement of Mine Counter Measures Vessels, and the early retirement of C-130J
transport aircraft.299 The army would be reduced
“from the current Full Time Trade Trained strength
of 76,000 to 72,500 by 2025”—the smallest it has
been since 1714.300 One analysis argues that the Army
reduction “is less than might appear” because “the
94
Army has been well below its planned personnel
numbers for some years,” but the loss of the C-130J
will be felt as “[t]hese aircraft had been particularly favoured for Special Forces roles, which will
now fall to the considerably larger A400M Atlas.”301
Additionally:
[T]the Army will invest around £1.3bn in our
armoured capability by upgrading 148 of our
main battle tanks to ensure the Challenger III
will become one of the most protected and
most lethal in Europe. The remaining fleet will
be retired. We will no longer upgrade Warrior
but it will remain in service until replaced by
Boxer, which we expect to happen by the middle of this decade.302
Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine has raised
questions about plans detailed in the Integrated Review: “Among the changes to be implemented was a
pivot to the Asia–Pacific region and a transformation of the military towards hi-tech capabilities like
space, cyber, and artificial intelligence, away from
conventional weapons like main battle tanks.”303
The U.K.’s Defence Equipment Plan 2021–2031
details spending of £238 billion (approximately $310
billion), across 10 years, an increase of 25 percent
(£48 billion) from the previous year’s plan.304 Navy
Command will receive £38.1 billion; Army Command,
£41.3 billion; Air Command, £36.2 billion; Strategic
Command, £35.0 billion; the Defence Nuclear Organisation, £58.1 billion; and the combined Strategic
and Combat Air Programmes, £21.5 billion.305 According to U.K. Secretary of State Ben Wallace MP:
[W]e have also made the significant investments required to address new threats and to
ensure that our armed forces remain capable
and credible. This includes continuing to deliver
the Dreadnought class of submarines to renew
the nuclear deterrent, building new ships for
the Royal Navy, a major modernisation and
upgrade programme for the Army, developing
the Future Combat Air System, and investing in
space, cyber and digital.306
It remains unclear whether the Ministry of
Defence will be able to cover the costs of the proposed equipment plan. The National Audit Office
has warned that “in this year’s Plan, risks remain
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
of over-optimistic assumptions about future budgets, costs and the likely achievement of savings
targets.” As a consequence, “[t]here is a real risk
that, despite the additional funding it has received,
the Department’s ambition outstrips the resources
available to it.”307
Although the number of its active-duty servicemembers is small in comparison to the militaries of
France and Germany, the U.K. maintains European
NATO’s most effective armed forces. Nevertheless,
the Army admitted in October 2020 that it would
miss targets set down in the 2015 Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) and that “[a] fully capable division including a new Strike brigade will not
be available for fielding until the early 2030s.” By
2025, the Army will “only be able to deploy a combat division consisting of just a single armoured infantry brigade and an interim manoeuvre support
brigade.”308 As explained by Ben Barry of the IISS:
In early 2021, the Defence Ministry announced
that it had been granted observer status for the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System program,
which is slated to replace French and German Main
Battle Tanks “around 2035.”310 In April 2019, the U.K.
reported that it was planning to upgrade only 148 of
its 227 remaining Challenger II main battle tanks,
cutting its fleet by one-third.311 The 79 other tanks
would be scavenged for spare parts.312 Because Challenger tanks are not currently manufactured, sourcing spare parts is a continual problem.313 The British
Army had previously cut its tank forces by 40 percent in 2010.314 The Defence Command Paper laid
out plans to spend £1.3 billion on upgrades to “148
of our main battle tanks to ensure the Challenger
III will become one of the most protected and most
lethal in Europe.”315 One former U.K. tank officer recently wrote that the small number of available U.K.
tanks means that “our armoured brigades can only
play a bit part in someone else’s military in alliance
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95

The Army was mandated [in the 2015 review]
to deliver two armored infantry brigades,
whereas they are now saying they can only
generate one. They have enough vehicles for
three infantry armored brigades, but my very
strong suspicion is they haven’t been spending
money on spares. If they haven’t got sufficient
spare parts they will only risk sending one
brigade on operations.309
or coalition.”316 Production of the Challenger IIIs
began in March, and initial operating capability is
expected in 2027.317
In March 2021, the U.K. announced that it would
no longer upgrade its Warrior armored vehicles but
that they would remain in service through the mid2020s.318 In 2019, the U.K. signed a £2.8 billion deal
to procure around 523 Boxer armored vehicles.319 As
a result of the decision to stop upgrading the heavier
Warriors, the Army is “conducting an analysis on potential lethality enhancements of Boxer vehicles.”320
The Army announced a purchase of 100 additional
Boxers (for a total of 623) in April 2022 with the first
units expected to enter service next year.321
As of February 2022, the U.K. had taken delivery
of 25 of 48 F-35Bs ordered with delivery of three
more expected by the end of 2022.322 Although the
total number of F-35s that will be procured may not
be known until “the 2025 time frame,” the Defense
Command Paper states an ambition to “grow the
[F-35] Force, increasing the fleet size beyond the 48
aircraft that we have already ordered.”323 RAF F-35s
based at Akrotiri, Cyprus, flew operational sorties
for the first time in June 2019.324
In 2019, the U.K. took delivery of the last of 160
Typhoon aircraft, all of which were expected to stay
in service until 2040.325 However, in March 2021, the
U.K. announced that 24 Tranche 1 Typhoons will be
retired by 2025.326 Project Centurion, a $515.83 million Typhoon upgrade to integrate additional Storm
Shadow long-range cruise missiles and Brimstone
precision attack missiles, was completed in 2018
and enabled the U.K. to retire its fleet of Tornado
aircraft.327 The U.K. recently detailed a £2 billion
investment over the next four years to develop the
Tempest, a sixth-generation fighter to be delivered
in 2035, and is partnering with Italy, Japan, and Sweden on the project.328
The RAF operates the largest fleet of air-to-air
refuelers in Europe, which is noteworthy because
of the severe shortage of this capability on the continent.329 Along with the U.K., the U.S. has produced
and jointly operated an intelligence-gathering platform, the RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft, which has seen
service in Mali, Nigeria, and Iraq and is now part of
the RAF fleet.330
The U.K. operates seven C-17 cargo planes and
has started to bring the European A400M cargo aircraft into service after years of delays. Britain has
taken delivery of 20 of 22 A400M heavy transport
aircraft ordered, with the final two set for delivery by
the end of 2022, and appears to be planning to order
additional A400Ms later in this decade.331
The Sentinel R1, an airborne battlefield and
ground surveillance aircraft, flew its last operational
flight in February 2021.332 In January 2021, the U.K.
took delivery of the last of nine P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) that are to be based at
RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland.333 In 2018, retired
Air Vice-Marshal Andrew Roberts testified to Parliament that “capable though the P-8 may be, the
number of aircraft planned is undoubtedly inadequate to fulfil even the highest priority tasks likely to
be assigned to the force in tension and hostilities.”334
The U.K. also plans to procure approximately 45
medium helicopters to remain in service until the
mid-2040s. This platform will replace four different
helicopter platforms currently in service.335
The Royal Navy has lost 40 percent of its fleet
since the end of the Cold War.336 Of the 55 ships lost
since the early 1980s, half are frigates, and the U.K.
now operates only 12.337 Overall:

Budget cuts have delayed crucial procurement programmes. The Type 23 frigates and
Trafalgar class submarines should have been
replaced years ago, and it is becoming increasingly challenging and expensive to maintain
aging vessels. The Navy has also taken too long
to rectify major problems with vessels. One
notable example is the issue with the Type 45
destroyers’ propulsion system: the six vessels
are not scheduled to be fixed until 2028, and
there are already signs that this target may be
slipping. As a result of these failures too many
of our high-end warships spend too much of
their time unavailable for operations.338
However, as construction of destroyers and frigates picks up steam, “the ambition is to rebuild to
more than 20 by the end of the decade.”339
The Royal Navy’s surface fleet is based on the new
Type-45 destroyer and the older Type-23 frigate.
The latter will be replaced by eight Type-26 Global
Combat Ships sometime in the 2020s.340 The Type26 Global Combat Ships are meant to handle a flexible range of tasks; weaponry will include “the Sea
Ceptor missile defence system, a 5-inch medium calibre gun, flexible mission bay, Artisan 997 Medium
Range Radar, and towed array sonars” as well as “the
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Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FCASW) from
2028.”341 In September 2021, construction began on
the first of five T31e frigates, which are scheduled
to enter service in 2027.342 One of the U.K.’s oldest
Type-23 frigates, HMS Monmouth, was retired early
at the end of 2021, and a second, HMS Montrose, is
being retired this year. The projected savings of £100
million ($133 million) “will be invested into the development of the follow-on capabilities of the Type
26 anti-submarine warfare frigate and Type 31 general purpose frigate.”343
From May 2021–December 2021, the HMS Queen
Elizabeth conducted its first operational deployment
that included time in the Mediterranean Sea and the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, “working alongside ships
from 17 countries and participating in 18 major exercises.”344 The Carrier Strike Group deployment
included a U.S. destroyer and a Dutch frigate. The
Queen Elizabeth’s embarked F-35s “undertook 1,278
sorties in total during the deployment, with more
than 2,200 hours of flying, including 44 combat
missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve
against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria.”345
In November, the Carrier Strike Group took part
in interoperability exercises with Italian F-35Bs.
According to Commodore Steve Moorhouse, commander of the U.K. Carrier Strike Group, “The fact
that US, Italian, and UK F-35Bs are able to fly to and
from one another’s decks offers tactical agility and
strategic advantage to NATO.”346
The U.K.’s Queen Elizabeth–class carriers are the
largest operated in Europe. A second in this class,
HMS Prince of Wales, will be the larger of the two
carriers and was commissioned in December 2019.347
However, the Prince of Wales has been beset by a series of leaks that have cost £3.3 million to correct and
necessitated the cancellation of planned fixed-wing
sea trials with F-35s off the U.S. east coast that were
scheduled for January 2021.348 The Prince of Wales returned to the sea in May 2021 after five months of repairs.349 Each carrier is capable of supporting 36 F-35s,
but the U.K. currently plans to procure only 48.350 In
March 2022, the Prince of Wales led NATO’s Maritime
High Readiness Force, serving as command ship for
Exercise Cold Response, in which 35,000 troops from
28 nations converged in Norway and the surrounding
seas through April for cold-weather exercises.351
The Royal Navy is also introducing seven Astute-class attack submarines as it phases out its
older Trafalgar-class subs. The fifth Astute-class
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
The Royal Air Force has taken part in Baltic Air
Policing six times since 2004, most recently in May–
August 2020.362 In March 2022, four RAF Typhoons
were deployed to Romania to take part in NATO’s
enhanced Air Policing (eAP), the fourth time the
RAF has participated in eAP since 2017.363 That same
month, the RAF announced that F-35s flying from
RAF Marham were taking part in patrols of Polish
and Romanian airspace as part of NATO’s Enhanced
Vigilance Activity.364 From November–December
2019, four U.K. typhoons and 120 personnel took
part in Icelandic Air Policing.365
Before its withdrawal early in 2021, the U.K.
maintained a force of 895 troops in Afghanistan
as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.366 It
also contributes to NATO’s Kosovo Force;367 the
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group
One, Standing NATO Maritime Group One, and
Standing NATO Maritime Group Two;368 and, as
an active part of the anti-ISIS coalition, Operation
Shader.369 In February 2021, the U.K. announced
that it planned to increase the number of British
troops (currently “about 100 soldiers”) engaged in
training Iraqi security forces.370
Italy. Italy hosts some of the U.S.’s most important bases in Europe, including the headquarters of
the 6th Fleet. It also has NATO’s fifth-largest military371 and one of its more capable despite continued
lackluster defense investment. In 2022, Italy will
spend 1.54 percent of its GDP on defense and 22.7
percent of its defense budget on equipment, meeting
the second NATO spending benchmark.372 Spending
in 2021 represented a 9.6 percent or $1.7 billion yearover-year increase from 2020.373 In April, Prime
Minister Mario Draghi announced that Italy would
attain the 2 percent benchmark in 2028 rather than
2024, “a member of his ruling coalition, the Five
Star party, [having] threatened to oppose a pending parliamentary vote on the matter over concerns
the cash would be better used on social programs.”374
As indicated in the Defense Ministry’s Multi-year
Planning Document 2021–2023, released in August
2021, overall defense spending will decline ”to about
1.23% [of GDP] by 2023 moving further away from
the 2% that European NATO countries agreed to aim
for at the 2014 NATO summit.”375 Italy spends the
alliance’s second-highest total on salaries (60.5 percent of its defense budget), “leaving proportionally
less cash for military procurement, training, maintenance and infrastructure.”376
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submarine was launched in April 2021.352 Crucially,
the U.K. maintains a fleet of 13 Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs) that deliver world-leading capability. As a supplement, the U.K. began minehunting and survey operations using unmanned surface
vessels (USVs) in March 2020.353 In February 2022,
the U.K. ordered a fifth ATLAS Remote Combined
Influence Minesweeping System.354
Perhaps the Royal Navy’s most important contribution is its continuous-at-sea, submarine-based
nuclear deterrent based on the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine and the Trident missile. In
July 2016, the House of Commons voted to renew
Trident and approved the manufacture of four replacement submarines to carry the missile. The
U.K.’s Integrated Review announced plans to raise
the ceiling on the nation’s nuclear-warhead stockpile because of “the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats.”355
The U.K. plans to procure four new Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines, which are
expected to have a 30-year life span, at a cost of £31 billion (plus an additional contingency funding stream
of £10 billion for any potential cost overruns) with the
first, HMS Dreadnought, to be completed in the early
2030s.356 Construction on a second submarine, HMS
Valiant, is ongoing, and construction on the third and
fourth, HMS Warspite and HMS King George VI, is in
its initial phases. In May 2021, the Ministry of Defence
ordered a review of the program because of delays that
continue to push back the date of completion.357
Despite these issues, the U.K. remains a leader in NATO, serving as the framework nation for
NATO’s EFP in Estonia and a contributing nation
for the U.S.-led EFP in Poland with 150 troops.358
In February 2022, the U.K. announced that it was
doubling its troop presence in Estonia to more than
1,700 troops along with 48 Warrior Infantry Fighting
Vehicles and 24 Challenger II Main Battle Tanks.359
The U.K. also deployed 140 armed forces engineers
to Poland in December 2021 “in response to the
pressures from irregular migration at the Belarus
border” and 350 Marines to Poland in February
2022 to assist “Polish Armed Forces with joint exercises, contingency planning and capacity building
in the face of ongoing tensions on the Ukrainian border.” Both deployments are on a bilateral basis.360 In
March 2022, the U.K. announced that more than 150
troops would be joining a new NATO multinational
battalion in Bulgaria with 150 troops.361

Air Force procurements include (among others)
T-345 and T-346 jet trainers; three MC-27J Praetorians “in the special operations configuration” and
the EC-27J JEDI (Jamming and Electronic Defense Instrumentation) electronic warfare aircraft,
both of which are variants of the C-27J Spartan;
loitering munitions; and two KC-767 air-to-air refuelers.377 Italy plans to purchase 60 F-35As for the
Air Force and 30 F-35Bs, the F-35Bs to be divided
equally between the Air Force and Navy.378 A government-owned plant for final assembly of the F-35 is
located in Cameri, Italy. Italy has thus far received
18 aircraft: 14 F-35As and one F-35B for the Air Force
and three F-35Bs for the Navy.379 The Air Force will
continue funding development of the Eurodrone in
conjunction with France, Germany, and Spain and is
planning upgrades to its fleet of MQ-9 reaper drones,
which Italy may be intending to arm.380
In December 2020, Italy signed the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Cooperation agreement
with Sweden and the U.K. The agreement covers
“the cooperation for research, development, and
‘joint-concepting’” of the sixth-generation Tempest
fighter.381 According to the planning document, Italy
has allocated an initial €2 billion for the program.382
In April 2021, Military Chief of Staff General Enzo
Vecciarelli suggested that the Tempest might possibly employ directed energy weapons to defeat hypersonic missiles.383
Key Army procurements include the planned acquisition of 150 Centauro II tank destroyers, with
delivery of the first tranche to be completed by the
end of 2022; 650 Lince 2 light multi-role vehicles;
156 VBM Freccia 8x8 infantry combat vehicles; and
upgrades to the Ariete Main Battle Tank (MBT). The
Army plans to upgrade 125 Ariete MBTs, extending
their operational timeline to 2040. However, analysts have noted that not enough money has been
allocated to upgrade all 125, so either future allocations will be necessary or plans will be scaled down.
Because of inadequate funding, other non-priority
Army acquisition projects are not likely to come into
service until the end of the decade.384
Key naval procurements include plans for four
U212A submarines, the first of which is scheduled
for delivery in May 2030; “a special operations &
diving operations/Submarine Rescue Ship”; and the
Teseo Mk2/E anti-ship missile, which is in development.385 Italy launched the last of 10 new FREMM
frigates in January 2020 and has funded “two-year
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feasibility and risk-reduction studies” with a view to
replacing two aging destroyers with two 10,000-ton
DDX destroyers by 2028.386
Italy’s focus is the Mediterranean region where
it participates in a number of stabilization missions
including NATO’s Sea Guardian, the EU’s Operation
Irini and Operation Atalanta, and the Italian Navy’s
own Operation Mare Sicuro (Safe Sea) off the Libyan
coast.387 Additionally, “Italy has 400 men, 142 land
vehicles and 2 air vehicles in Libya” as part of the
bilateral Mission of Assistance of Support in both
Misrata and Tripoli.388
Despite a southern focus, Italy contributes to
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group
Two, as well as the EFP battalion in Latvia (250
troops) and Operation Prima Parthica (600 troops,
partly to help train Iraqi Security Forces), and is
leading NATO Mission Iraq in 2022.389 Italian air
assets including Tornado jets operating out of the
Ahmed Al Jaber air base in Kuwait are performing
reconnaissance missions in support of the coalition
to defeat the IS.390 With 621 troops, Italy is the second-largest contributor to KFOR after the United
States.391 In March 2022, Italy announced that it
was sending two mine countermeasures vessels
to Romania.392
The Italian Air Force is a strong contributor to
Baltic Air Policing and participated in a 15-month
mission from September 2020–December 2021.
Italian Typhoons first operated out of Lithuania
from September 2020–April 2021.393 In April 2021,
Italy deployed four F-35As to Estonia, marking the
first time the F-35 has taken part in Baltic Air Policing.394 In September 2021, four Italian Typhoons
took over flying out of Ämari air base in Estonia until
December 1, 2021.395 From December 2021–March
2022, the Air Force took part in NATO’s enhanced
Air Policing in Romania with four typhoons and 140
troops.396 Italy previously participated in air policing
out of Romania in 2019 and “a four-month enhanced
Air Policing deployment to Bulgaria in 2017.”397 The
Italian Air Force has deployed to Iceland to perform air patrols six times since 2013, most recently
in June–July 2020 when six F-35As were deployed
to Iceland.398
Poland. Situated in the center of Europe, Poland shares a border with four NATO allies, a long
border with Belarus and Ukraine, and a 144-mile
border with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian
enclave between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
defense from 2030 to 2024.411 A law passed by the
lower house of Parliament in March 2022 would increase defense spending to 3 percent of GDP in 2023
and increase the size of the armed forces to 300,000,
50,000 of whom would be members of territorial defense units).412
Poland is making major investments in military
modernization and is planning to spend $133 billion
on new capabilities by 2035 as envisioned in the Defense Ministry’s Technical Modernization Plan for
2021–2035, which was signed in October 2019.413 In
addition, several major acquisitions have been announced in recent years. For example:
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In February 2018, Poland joined an eight-nation “coalition of NATO countries seeking
to jointly buy a fleet of maritime surveillance aircraft.”414
In March 2018, in the largest procurement
contract in its history, Poland signed a $4.75
billion deal for two Patriot missile batteries,
which are scheduled for delivery between
2022 and 2025.415
In February 2019, Poland signed a $414 million deal to purchase 20 high-mobility artillery rocket systems from the U.S. for delivery by 2023.416

Sea. Poland also has a 65-mile border with Lithuania, making it the only NATO member state that
borders any of the Baltic States. NATO’s contingency
plans for liberating the Baltic States in the event of
a Russian invasion reportedly rely heavily on Polish
troops and ports.399
Poland is ground zero for supplies and military
equipment from Western allies reaching Ukraine. In
early March 2022, it was reported that an average of
14 wide-bodied aircraft with matériel and weapons
arrive at the Rzeszow airport each day.400 The U.S.
reportedly deployed two Patriot missile batteries
at the airport, thereby underscoring its importance,
in mid-March.401
Poland has an active military force of 114,050 that
includes a 58,500-person army with 797 main battle tanks.402 It also has a Territorial Defense Force
(TDF) that is intended “to increase the strength of
the armed forces and the defense capabilities of the
country,” according to former Minister of Defense
Antoni Macierewicz, and “is also the best response
to the dangers of a hybrid war like the one following
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.”403 The TDF is mostly volunteer; “its personnel combine their civilian
careers with limited military service of a minimum
of two days twice a month and an annual two-week
camp.”404 Its planned 17 brigades will be distributed across the country.405 The force, which will number 53,000 by 2026,406 constitutes the fifth branch
of the Polish military, subordinate to the Minister
of Defense.407 National Defense Minister Mariusz
Blaszczak has stated that the TDF’s performance
combating COVID-19 has “impeccably proved their
importance and effectiveness.”408
Poland is also investing in cyber capabilities. Its
new Cyberspace Defense Force was established in
February 2022 with a mission of “defense, reconnaissance and, if need be, offensive actions to protect Poland’s Armed Forces from cyberattacks.”409
In November 2020, the U.S. and Poland signed an
enhanced defense cooperation agreement that
increased the number of U.S. forces stationed in
Poland. The U.S. further expanded its footprint
in Poland in 2022 following Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine.
In 2022, Poland will spend 2.42 percent of GDP
on defense and 20.4 percent of its defense budget on
equipment, surpassing both NATO benchmarks.410
Poland’s 2020 National Security Strategy accelerated the timeline for spending 2.5 percent of GDP on
In April 2019, it signed a $430 million deal to
buy four AW101 helicopters that will provide
anti-submarine warfare and search-and-rescue capabilities and are to be delivered by the
end of 2022.417
In April 2020, it was announced that Poland
had concluded negotiations for the purchase
of 60 Javelin Command Launch Units (CLUs)
and 180 Javelin anti-tank missiles and that
“[a] formal agreement to this effect will be
signed soon.”418
In January 2020, Poland signed a $4.6 billion
deal to purchase 32 F-35As, with “deliveries from 2026,” to be based at Poland’s Lask
Air Base. A group of 24 Polish pilots completed F-35 simulator training in Arizona
early in 2021.419
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In April 2021, the U.S. and Poland signed an
agreement for Poland to acquire five retrofitted
C-130H Hercules transport aircraft (decommissioned by the U.S. in 2017) by 2024, with the
first arriving in 2021.420
In July 2021, Poland announced a deal to
procure 250 M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 tanks with
deliveries beginning by the end of 2022.421
In April, Poland announced that it had “significantly accelerated the delivery of the Narew
short-range air defense system” with the first of
two fire modules to be delivered in September
2022 and the second to be delivered “on the
turn of 2022 and 2023” rather than in 2027 as
originally planned.422
Although Poland’s focus is territorial defense, it
had 290 troops deployed in Afghanistan as part of
NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.423 Poland’s Air
Force has taken part in Baltic Air Policing 10 times
since 2006, most recently operating four F-16s out
of Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania from December
2021–March 2022.424 From August–October 2021,
four Polish F-16s and 140 troops took part in Icelandic Air Policing, marking the first time that Poland
has taken part in that mission.425 In 2020, Poland
was the lead for NATO’s VJTF, and approximately
half of the 6,000 troops in the VJTF’s Spearhead
Force were Polish.426 Poland also is part of NATO’s
EFP in Latvia and has 247 troops in NATO’s KFOR
mission in Kosovo.427
In addition, 150 troops are deployed to Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar as part of Operation Inherent
Resolve, and 30 are deployed as part of NATO Mission Iraq.428 In April 2021, about 80 Polish soldiers
deployed to Turkey as part of a NATO assurance
mission to assist Turkey by providing additional
maritime patrols over the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.429 Poland also continues to take part in
NATO’s tailored forward presence in Bulgaria and
Romania with 220 troops.430 Finally, a tank company
with 177 troops is deployed to Latvia as part of the
NATO EFP battalion in that nation, and Poland reportedly is contributing 100 soldiers to a new NATO
EFP battalion in Slovakia.431
Turkey. Turkey remains an important U.S. ally
and NATO member. Autocratic President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s efforts to warm relations with
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Russia have strained U.S.–Turkish bilateral relations,
but Russia’s war in Ukraine and Turkey’s support for
Ukrainian forces are helping relations move forward
on a more positive track. Turkey has been an important U.S. ally since the closing days of World War II.
During the Korean War, it deployed 15,000 troops
and suffered 721 killed in action and more than
2,000 wounded. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, one
of only two NATO members (the other was Norway)
that had a land border with the Soviet Union. Today,
it continues to play an active role in the alliance, but
not without difficulties.
Following an attempted coup in July 2016, thousands of academics, teachers, journalists, judges,
prosecutors, bureaucrats, and soldiers were fired
or arrested. Since 2016, 321,000 people have been
detained in Turkey.432 Opposition politicians and
civil society leaders continue to be jailed. Turkey
has built 131 new prisons since the attempted coup
and is thinking of building another 100. In addition,
Turkey’s prison population reached 300,000 in
2020, up from 180,000 in 2016, and political dissidents have been barred from being released under
COVID-19 amnesties.433
The post-coup crackdown has had an especially negative effect on the military. As of July 2021,
23,364 military personnel had been dismissed, and
“[t]he effect on officer morale of these continuing
purges,” according to the IISS, has been “exacerbated by the widespread suspicion that promotions and
appointments were increasingly politicised, with
outspoken supporters of Erdogan fast-tracked for
promotion.”434 In April 2021, Turkish authorities detained 10 former admirals who were part of a group
of more than 100 retired naval officers that issued
an open letter criticizing a government plan to construct a canal in Istanbul.435
Turkey’s military is now suffering from a loss
of experienced generals and admirals as well as an
acute shortage of pilots. The dismissal of 680 of 1,350
pilots greatly exacerbated existing pilot shortages.436
A third of the dismissed pilots were in the leadership
echelon, commanding squadrons, fleets, or bases.437
A request to the U.S. to send trainers was denied, as
was a Turkish plan to utilize Pakistani trainers to
fly the F-16.438 Furthermore, as one analyst notes,
“[t]he shortage of pilots was not the only problem.
Many of the veteran staff members, especially at the
operations and logistics centers that help pilots fly
successful missions, were also removed, hampering
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
In his posture statement to Congress, General Wolters downplayed the lasting potential of the
Turkish–Russian rapprochement:
Turkey possesses the second largest military in
NATO, borders a volatile region, and retains a
pivotal role in countering Russia. The Turkish
and Russian government’s [sic] relationship
remains competitive and transactional, with
Turkish engagement often aimed at constraining Russian behavior. Both nations view the
Black Sea region within their natural spheres
of influence, and each continues to oppose the
other in Ukraine, Libya, and Syria. Turkey can
best counter Russia through close cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. We laud Turkey’s
strong support to Ukraine up to and during
Russia’s invasion, and we will continue to find
ways to increase our cooperation with Turkey
bilaterally and within NATO.452
Turkey has been a key supporter of Ukraine. In
addition to $7.4 billion worth of trade with Kyiv in
2021, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones have
proven particularly effective on the battlefield in
Ukraine, and Turkey has continued to resupply
Ukrainian forces “despite warnings from Moscow.”453
In February, Turkey closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to warships, blocking Russian warships operating in the Mediterranean from entering
the Black Sea to join in the assault on Ukraine.454
Turkey remains reliant on Western companies,
including for its drones. “While Turkish companies have assembled the drones,” according to the
Congressional Research Service, “they apparently
rely on Western countries for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.”455
Turkey is also seeking ways to modernize its
manned aircraft. In October 2021, Turkey requested to purchase 40 F-16 fighters and 80 modernization kits for its older fleet of F-16s, and in a March
2022 letter to Congress, the State Department found
“compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security,
economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with
Turkey.”456 In May, the Biden Administration asked
Congress to approve the sale of electronics, missiles,
and radar to Turkey for F-16 upgrades. Following
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the close coordination between the air and land elements of the air force. Hundreds of engineers on the
ground were also removed.”439
The dilapidated condition of its air force is partly why Turkey has decided to acquire new groundbased air defense systems.440 In December 2017, Turkey signed a $2.5 billion agreement with Russia to
purchase two S-400 air defense systems. Delivery
of the first system, consisting of two S-400 batteries and 120 missiles, was completed in September
2019, but delivery of a second system has been delayed by the inability of the two countries to agree
on technology transfer and co-production.441 “The
decision to purchase two S-400 air-defence systems
from Russia,” reports the IISS, “was made by the
president without detailed consultation with the
armed forces about the possible technical and strategic repercussions.”442 U.S. officials have expressed
grave concerns about this purchase and suspended
Turkey from the F-35 program in July 2019, stating
that “[t]he F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn
about its advanced capabilities.”443
Turkey tested the system against its F-16s in November 2019 and further tested the system at Sinop
near the Black Sea in October 2020.444 In December,
a U.S. official stated that “[w]e object to Turkey’s purchase of the system and are deeply concerned with
reports that Turkey is bringing it into operation.”445
That same month, in response to Turkey’s purchase
of the S-400 systems, the U.S. announced sanctions
that took effect in April 2021.446 Fearful of the effect
of these sanctions, Turkey had been stockpiling
spare F-16 parts since 2019.447
Turkish defense firms make “more than 800
components…for the F-35 as part of a nine-nation
consortium,” and Turkey’s suspension from the program could cost Turkish defense industry as much as
$10 billion.448 (The U.S. Government Accountability
Office has specified more precisely that 1,005 parts
are produced by Turkish firms.449) As of April 2021,
it was reported that “the Pentagon [had] hoped to
remove all Turkish suppliers from the program by
2020, but it will take until 2022 for all contracts
with Turkish companies to come to a close.”450 Both
sides have floated proposals to end the dispute, with
Turkey suggesting that it “not keep the S-400s operational at all times” and the U.S. suggesting that
Turkey transfer its S-400s to Ukraine—a suggestion
that Ankara rejected as “quite unrealistic.”451

Turkey’s announcement in June that it was lifting
its objections to Finland and Sweden joining NATO,
the Administration reiterated its support both for
the modernization kits and for the sale of new F-16s
to Turkey: “The United States supports Turkey’s
modernization of its fighter fleet because that is a
contribution to NATO security and therefore American security.”457
Whether the equipment to modernize Turkey’s
fleet of F-16s or the purchase of new F-16s materializes remains to be seen, but the Administration’s favorable position undoubtedly reflects a
thawing trend because of Turkey’s robust support
for Ukraine and support for Finnish and Swedish
membership. Absent modernization kits, however,
Turkey will have to rely on its own domestic industry
to modernize its aging fleet.458
In October 2019, Turkey launched a major offensive in Syria against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), partly to create a buffer zone
near the Turkish border. The largest Kurdish armed
faction within the SDF is the People’s Protection
Units (YPG), an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist group that
has waged war against Turkey off and on since 1984.
The offensive led to the creation of a buffer zone
jointly patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces following an agreement between Presidents Erdogan
and Putin in Sochi.
In February 2020, Russian-backed Syrian regime
forces launched an attack on Idlib, the last remaining stronghold of forces opposed to Bashar al-Assad.
Turkish forces opposed the offensive and lost 36 soldiers before Turkey and Russia agreed to a cease-fire.
The cease-fire was extended in February 2021 and,
despite violations by the Syrian Army and rebel factions, has held because of a détente in Syria between
Turkey and Russia.
Turkish threats to renege on a 2016 agreement
with the EU under which the EU paid Turkey to stop
the flow of migrants to Europe are a consistent and
enduring source of friction (perhaps at least partly
because Turkey did in fact renege on the agreement
in 2020).459 Turkey and Greece remain at odds over
maritime boundaries and drilling rights between
their two nations in the eastern Mediterranean in
addition to drilling rights off the Cypriot coast and
migration.460 Maritime talks between Turkey and
Greece are ongoing despite a flare-up of tensions
in 2020.461 Turkey is reportedly planning to build a
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naval base in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and began flying UAVs out of Geçitkale Airport
in December 2019.462 Recent upgrades to the base
have further heightened tensions.463 In March 2021,
Turkey and Qatar signed a deal for Qatari pilots to
train in Turkey, leading to speculation that Turkey
had “decided to train its fighter pilots on Rafale jets
of the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QeAF) so as to counter
the Rafale fleet of its adversary, Greece.”464
U.S. security interests in the region lend considerable importance to America’s relationship with
Turkey. Turkey is home to Incirlik Air Base, a major
U.S. and NATO facility, but it was reported early in
2018 that U.S. combat operations at Incirlik had been
significantly reduced and that the U.S. was considering permanent reductions. In January 2018, the
U.S. relocated an A-10 squadron from Incirlik to
Afghanistan to avoid operational disruptions; these
aircraft have since returned to their home base in
Missouri following the U.S. withdrawal. Restrictions
on the use of Incirlik for operations in Syria have
proven problematic. “[The] American operation to
kill Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in
Syria,” for example, “saw U.S. forces use a base in
Iraq instead of the much closer Incirlik, requiring
a round trip of many hours.”465 The U.S. reportedly began reviewing plans to remove nuclear weapons from Incirlik in 2019, but no such decision has
yet been taken.
Turkey’s Konya Air Base continues to support
NATO AWACS aircraft involved in counter-ISIS operations and Spain’s operation of a Patriot system
in the Turkish city of Adana under NATO auspices.466 Turkey also hosts a crucial AN/TPY-2 radar at
Kürecik, which is part of NATO’s BMD system with
a range of up to 1,800 miles.467
In 2021, Turkey commanded NATO’s Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force, making investments in
their units assigned to the VJTF. “Turkey has made
substantial investments into the unit—amongst the
most mobile in NATO—particularly in its logistics
and ammunition requirements planning,” according to NATO. “The latest models of Turkish armed
vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers have been
allocated to the force.”468
Early in 2021, Turkey maintained “a 600-strong
contingent” in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.469 The Turks also have contributed to a number of peacekeeping missions in
the Balkans, still maintain 316 troops in Kosovo,470
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
and have participated in counterpiracy and counterterrorism missions off the Horn of Africa in addition
to deploying planes, frigates, and submarines during
the NATO-led operation in Libya. Turkey currently
contributes to the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two and Standing NATO Maritime
Group Two.471 It has taken part in Baltic Air Policing twice, most recently from May–September 2021
when four F-16s and 80 troops deployed to Malbork,
Poland, for the mission.472 In February 2022, Turkey closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits
to warships—a decision that was made even more
significant in April when Russia’s Black Sea fleet
flagship the Moskva was sunk by Ukrainian forces.473
Turkey’s closure of the Black Sea will prevent Russia
from replacing this ship.
Turkey has a 355,200-strong active-duty military,474 which is NATO’s second largest after that of
the United States. However, in June 2019:
assault ships, which officials say will be able to
carry 30 to 50 drones.477
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In June 2021, Turkey test-fired its “first domestically produced long-range anti-ship cruise missile.”
For many platforms, however, despite some successes, Turkey continues to rely on foreign components,
including “US-made engines in the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, German guns for the Altay tank, and
German air-independent propulsion systems for its
new Reis-class submarines.”478
Turkey’s procurement of 250 new Altay main
battle tanks has been delayed for years because of
the need to acquire foreign components. The tank
had relied on a German-made engine and transmission, as well as French armor, but the technology
transfer was not approved. In March 2022, Turkey
announced an agreement with two South Korean
manufacturers to produce the engine and transmission for the tank.479 Even the Bayraktar drone relies
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ratified a new
on “optical/infrared imaging and targeting sensor
law that reduced the length of compulsory milsystems” from a Canadian company.480
itary service from 12 to six months. On payment
In January 2022, Pakistan cancelled a $1.5 billion
of a fee, compulsory service can be reduced
deal for 30 T129 ATAK helicopters, which had been
further to one month of basic training. The
signed in 2018, after years of delays.481 The helicopchanges were expected to reduce the overall
ter’s engine is produced by American and British
size of the armed forces by around 35%, as part
firms, and Turkey has yet to field a domestic replaceof Turkey’s long-term plan to create compact
ment. In April 2021, the U.S. granted export licenses
and fully professional armed forces.475
for the sale of six T129s to the Philippines; its refusal
to issue export licenses for the sale to Pakistan led to
Turkey, which in 2022 will spend 1.22 percent the deal’s cancellation.482 In February 2022, Turkey
of GDP on defense and 30.8 percent of its defense announced that a Ukrainian-developed engine for its
budget on equipment,476 has become increasingly larger T929 helicopter gunship would be produced in
self-reliant with respect to its defense capabilities. Turkey. The helicopter is supposed to make its first
A particular success has been its Bayraktar drone flight equipped with the new engine in 2023, although
program, and the nation is investing further in au- the war could cause the flight to be delayed.483
tonomous systems. Specifically:
Additionally, the French government has blocked
development of anti-ballistic missiles because of
It has begun mass production of the Akıncı, a
Turkey’s actions in Syria.484 President Erdogan has
larger unmanned combat aircraft with a paypersonally lobbied French President Macron to
load of 1.5 tons, and has started sea trials for
allow Turkey to purchase the French–Italian EUthe ULAQ, an unmanned surface vessel armed
ROSAM consortium’s SAMP/T missile-defense syswith six guided missiles. Four kinds of armed
tems.485 In March 2022, France and Italy reportedly
unmanned ground vehicles are competing for a
agreed to “explore reviving the steps for the SAMP/T
Turkish government contract.
missile defense system.”486
Having been removed from the F-35 program,
Turkey also has plans for a “mobile naval mine”
Turkey is purportedly planning to produce a domesthat can be used for surveillance and to attack
tic fifth-generation jet, the TF-X National Combat
ships, as well as for unmanned fighter jets and
Aircraft, with the goal of a prototype by 2023 and
strike aircraft to be used on its amphibious
the first flight by 2025.487

Another major procurement is for six Type-214
submarines, the first of which was launched in May
2021 and will enter service in 2022 and the last of
which is to be delivered in 2027.488 In February 2019,
Turkey announced upgrades of four Preveze-class
submarines, to take place from 2023–2027.489 According to reports in February 2022, “sea acceptance
trials of the early delivered systems and the Critical
Design Phase of the Preveze Mid-Life Modernisation Project have been successfully completed.”490
In February 2019, Turkey launched an intelligence-gathering ship, the TCG Ufuk, which President Erdogan has described as the “eyes and ears of
Turkey in the seas.”491 In December 2019, Turkey’s
Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) released its
Strategic Plan 2019–2023, which sets targets of 75
percent of Turkish military needs being supplied
domestically by 2023 and defense exports being increased to $10.2 billion by 2023. Turkey is forecasted
to fall short of its indigenous production target of 71
percent in 2023.492 Turkish exports declined by 17
percent to $2.28 billion in 2020, down from $2.74
billion in 2019, but they rebounded in 2021 at more
than $3 billion.493
The Baltic States. The U.S. has a long history of
championing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic States that dates back to the interwar
period of the 1920s. Since regaining their independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the
Baltic States have been staunch supporters of the
transatlantic relationship. Although small in absolute terms, the three countries contribute significantly to NATO in relative terms.
Estonia. Estonia has been a leader in the Baltics
in terms of defense spending. In 2022, it will spend
2.34 percent of GDP on defense and 21.6 percent
of its defense budget on new equipment.494 Estonia will increase defense spending by €476 million
(US$523 million) in 2022 and plans to spend an
estimated €350 million to acquire short-range and
medium-range air defense systems by 2025.495 In October 2021, Estonia signed a contract to purchase
the Blue Spear 5G coastal shore-to-ship mobile defense system.496
Some of the planned investments in Estonia’s
Ministry of Defence Development Plan 2031, released in December 2021, details investments in
ammunition stocks along with renovation of Ämari
airfield, a modern War and Disaster Medicine Centre in Tartu, “mid-range anti-tank weapons for all
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infantry brigades,” R-20 Rahe assault rifles, a midrange air surveillance radar, CV-9035 armoured
combat vehicle upgrades, and naval mines.497 In February 2022, Estonia announced its largest defense
procurement, a $794 million joint Estonia–Latvia
purchase of such logistics vehicles as “cranes, loaders and aircraft loaders.”498
Although the Estonian armed forces total only
7,200 active-duty personnel (including the army,
navy, and air force),499 they are held in high regard
by their NATO partners and punch well above their
weight inside the alliance. Between 2003 and 2011,
455 Estonians served in Iraq. Perhaps Estonia’s most
impressive deployment has been to Afghanistan:
More than 2,000 Estonian troops were deployed
between 2003 and 2014, and they sustained the second-highest number of deaths per capita among all
28 NATO members.
In 2015, Estonia reintroduced conscription for
men ages 18–27, who must serve eight or 11 months
before being added to the reserve rolls.500 The number of Estonian conscripts will increase from 3,200
to 4,000 by 2025.501
Estonia has demonstrated that it takes defense
and security policy seriously, focusing on improving defensive capabilities at home while maintaining the ability to be a strategic actor abroad. Estonia is acquiring a total of 18 South Korean–built K9
self-propelled howitzers at a total cost of €66 million.502 It received the first units in October 2020,
and the remaining units are scheduled to arrive by
2023.503 Estonia has prioritized anti-tank weapons
and has sent Ukraine significant numbers of Javelin
anti-tank weapons from its own stocks.
In October 2020, Estonia withdrew from a joint
armored vehicle development program with Latvia
and Finland for financial reasons, deferring the acquisition of new armored vehicles until the end of
the decade.504 In 2019, it received two C-145A tactical
transport aircraft donated by the U.S.505 In July 2019,
Estonia signed a $24 million deal to purchase 16,000
rifles from an American arms company, allowing it
to phase out older Soviet and Israeli weapons.506
Estonia’s cyber command became operational in
August 2018 and is expected to include 300 people
when it reaches full operational capability in 2023.507
U.S. and Estonian cyber commands train together.
In the fall of 2020, for example, they trained in Estonia to help search for and block incoming cyber
threats from Russia.508 Estonia also participated in
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
on equipment, exceeding both NATO benchmarks.518
It also plans to increase defense spending “in 2025
and subsequent years” to “not less than 2.5 percent
of the forecasted GDP.”519
In November 2018, Latvia signed a deal for four
UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, to be delivered
in 2022. The Michigan National Guard began
training Latvian maintainers on the helicopters
in December.520
In 2018, Latvia signed a $133 million agreement
to purchase Spike precision-guided tactical missiles
from Israel, the first of which were delivered in February 2020.521 A new team trainer for the missiles
was installed in October 2020.522 Latvia has also
expressed interest in procuring a medium-range
ground-based air defense system (GBADS). Joint
procurements include (with Estonia) logistics vehicles and (with Finland) 200 armored vehicles for
Latvian forces, the first two of which were delivered
in March 2022 and all of which are to be delivered
by 2029.523 Latvia is looking to upgrade temporary
fencing along its border with Belarus into permanent fencing to stem the flow of migrants “illegally
pushed into Latvia from Belarus.”524 The U.S. continues to aid the Latvian border guard including
through delivery of tactical vehicles.525
Lithuania. Lithuania is the largest of the three
Baltic States, and its armed forces total 23,000 active-duty troops.526 It reintroduced conscription in
2015 and lowered the age for compulsory service in
December 2019.527
Lithuania has shown a steadfast commitment to
international peacekeeping and military operations.
Between 2003 and 2011, it sent 930 troops to Iraq.
From 2002–2021, around 3,000 Lithuanian troops
served in Afghanistan, and Lithuania continues to
contribute to NATO’s KFOR and NATO Mission Iraq.
In 2022, Lithuania will spend 2.36 percent of
GDP on defense and 30.5 percent of its defense budget on equipment.528 It also “plans to reach 2.5% [of
GDP] by 2030.”529
In April 2019, the U.S. and Lithuania signed a fiveyear “roadmap” defense agreement.530 According to
the Pentagon, the agreement will help “to strengthen
training, exercises and exchanges” and help Lithuania “to deter and defend against malicious cyber intrusions and attacks.” The two nations also pledged
“to support regional integration and procurement of
warfighting systems,” including “integrated air and
missile defense systems and capabilities to enhance
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U.S. Cyber Command’s CYBER FLAG 21-1 exercise
in November 2021.509
In 2017, Estonia and the U.S. strengthened their
bilateral relationship by signing a defense cooperation agreement that builds on the NATO–Estonia
Status of Forces Agreement, further clarifying the legal framework for U.S. troops in Estonia.510 Estonian
forces have participated in a number of operations.
These involvements include, for example, 45 soldiers in Resolute Support before its end, a vessel as
part of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures
Group One, and special forces as part of France’s
Task Force Takuba in the Sahel, which began in the
latter half of 2020.511 Estonian troops also take part
in NATO Mission Iraq and the U.S.-led Operation
Inherent Resolve in Iraq.512 In February 2022, Estonia announced the withdrawal from Mali of 95
troops who had been taking part in the French-led
Operation Barkhane.513
Latvia. Latvia’s recent military experience has
been centered on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with NATO and U.S. forces. Latvia deployed
more than 3,000 troops to Afghanistan and between
2003 and 2008 deployed 1,165 troops to Iraq. It also
has contributed to a number of other international
peacekeeping and military missions.
A recent IISS analysis notes that “Latvia has no
requirement and therefore no capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond its national boundaries, although the armed forces have
taken part in a range of NATO and EU missions.”514
Nevertheless, despite a military that consists of only
8,750 full-time servicemembers, Latvia deployed
troops to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission until
the mission’s completion; participates in Operation
Inherent Resolve in Iraq, where the mandate for the
approximately 30 Latvian soldiers taking part was
extended in March 2022 and now runs until February 2024; and has 136 troops deployed in NATO’s
KFOR mission.515
Latvia’s State Defence Concept states that “the
size of the National Guard must grow to 10,000
troops by 2024 and reach 12,000 troops by 2027.”516
Latvia “is investing $56 million annually through
2022 on military infrastructure, with two-thirds
of this amount being spent to upgrade Ādaži military base, headquarters of the Canadian-led EFP
battlegroup.”517
In 2022, Latvia will spend 2.10 percent of GDP
on defense and 24.6 percent of its defense budget

maritime domain awareness.”531 A Mobilisation
and Host Nation Support law took effect in January
2021.532 In December 2021, the U.S. and Lithuania
signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement that U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin stated
“will improve conditions for the acquisition of defense items and increase military interoperability.”533
In November 2020, Lithuania signed a $213 million deal to purchase four UH-60M Black Hawk
helicopters beginning in late 2024; the U.S. is contributing approximately $30 million to help with the
acquisition.534 In October 2020, Lithuania received
two Norwegian-made NASAMS mid-range air defense batteries armed with U.S.-made missiles.535
In March 2022, Lithuania announced a $40 million
purchase of additional Javelin anti-tank weapons.536
In April 2021, the U.S. donated $10 million worth of
M72 Light-Armor Weapons to Lithuania.537 Additional procurements include Boxer Infantry Fighting Vehicles and €145 million for 200 U.S.-made Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV).538 The
first 50 JLTVs were delivered in October 2021 with
50 more to be delivered per year through 2024.539 In
January 2022, it was reported that Saab had recently
“signed a framework agreement with the Lithuanian
Ministry of Defence to provide the country with
several Carl-Gustaf M4 recoilless weapons and ammunition” and that Lithuania’s “Defence Materiel
Agency has placed a $16.7 million ammunition order
as part of the framework agreement.”540
execute a battle rhythm to support decision-makers as well as 24/7 engagement and coordination
around the globe with about 40 to 60 people at any
given time.”542
EUCOM “executes a full range of multi-domain
operations in coordination with Allies and partners
to support NATO, deter Russia, assist in the defense
of Israel, enable global operations, and counter
trans-national threats in order to defend the Homeland forward and fortify Euro-Atlantic security.”543
It is supported by four service component commands (U.S. Naval Forces Europe [NAVEUR]; U.S.
Army Europe and Africa [USAREUR-AF]; U.S. Air
Forces in Europe [USAFE]; and U.S. Marine Forces
Europe [MARFOREUR]) and one subordinate unified command (U.S. Special Operations Command
Europe [SOCEUR]).
U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NAVEUR is responsible for providing overall command, operational
control, and coordination for maritime assets in the
EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM) areas of
responsibility. This includes more than 20 million
square nautical miles of ocean and more than 67 percent of the Earth’s coastline.
This command is currently provided by the
U.S. 6th Fleet, based in Naples, and brings critical
U.S. maritime combat capability to an important
region of the world. Some of the more notable U.S.
naval bases in Europe include the Naval Air Station in Sigonella, Italy; the Naval Support Activity
Base in Souda Bay, Greece; and the Naval Station at
Current U.S. Military Presence in Europe
Rota, Spain.
At its peak in 1953, because of the Soviet threat
The USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group
to Western Europe, the U.S. had approximately deployed to the European theater in 2022 to demon450,000 troops in Europe operating across 1,200 strate the U.S. commitment to NATO. In January, the
sites. During the early 1990s, both in response to a CSG took part in NATO exercise Neptune Strike 22
perceived reduction in the threat from Russia and under direct NATO operational control.544 Examples
as part of the so-called peace dividend following the of activities during the exercise include (among othend of the Cold War, U.S. troop numbers in Europe ers) “airborne patrols with Allied aircraft through
were slashed. Today, the U.S. has fewer than 66,000 a series of missions spanning enhanced vigilance,
active-duty forces permanently stationed in Europe. training and NATO enhanced Air Policing (eAP),
However, increased rotational forces deployed to supporting the Alliance’s cohesive defence and colEurope to bolster deterrence in eastern NATO mem- lective resolve,” and the refueling of F/A-18E Super
ber states have increased total U.S. deployments to Hornets by German Air Force A400M Tankers in
around 100,000.541
February and participation by HST squadrons in “a
In response to Russia’s second invasion of series of training missions with the Romanian Air
Ukraine, EUCOM created Control Center Ukraine Force” in March.545
(ECCU) to coordinate defense assistance to Ukraine.
U.S. Army Europe and Africa. In November
One official has described ECCU as “a combination 2020, U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Africa were
of a call center, a watch floor, meeting rooms. They consolidated into U.S. Army Europe and Africa
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
(USAREUR-AF), headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany. According to the Army, “The consolidation
of these two Army service component commands
under one four-star commander will play a vital role
in supporting missions across two interconnected
theaters of operation” and will “enhance efficiency
by streamlining the headquarters’ ability to execute
functions and improving global and regional contingency response efforts.”546
The former USAREUR was established in 1952.
Then, as today, the U.S. Army formed the largest portion of U.S. forces in Europe. USAREUR-AF includes
“approximately 73,000 U.S. Army personnel assigned
and deployed throughout Europe and Africa.” Permanently deployed forces include the 2nd Cavalry
Regiment, based in Vilseck, Germany; the 173rd
Airborne Brigade in Italy; the 12th Combat Aviation
Brigade out of Ansbach, Germany; and the 41st Field
Artillery Brigade, with headquarters in Grafenwoehr,
Germany. In addition:
Reactivated in September 2019, the 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, 41st Field Artillery
Brigade is currently the only U.S. rocket artillery
brigade in Europe and represents the first time
in 13 years that USAREUR has had the Multiple
Launch Rocket System in its command; a second
field artillery battalion was reactivated in the fall
of 2020.548 The 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, was activated in November 2018
and is now based in Ansbach. 549 The Army announced plans to outfit a complete battalion with
the Maneuver-Short-Range Air Defense System
(M-SHORAD) by the end of 2022; currently, only
a platoon within the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense
Artillery Regiment is equipped with M-SHORAD.550
Finally, each year, USAREUR-AF takes part in
more than 60 exercises with 80,000 multinational
participants from 75 countries.551
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107

Operational and theater enablers such as the
21st Theater Sustainment Command, 10th Army
Air and Missile Defense Command, 7th Army
Training Command, 79th Theater Sustainment
Command, 66th and 207th Military Intelligence
Brigades, 2nd Theater Signal Brigade, U.S.
Army NATO Brigade, Installation Management Command-Europe and Regional Health
Command-Europe provide essential skills and
services that support our entire force.547
U.S. Air Forces in Europe. USAFE provides a
forward-based air capability that can support a wide
range of contingency operations. It originated as the
8th Air Force in 1942 and flew strategic bombing
missions over the European continent during World
War II. USAFE describes itself as “direct[ing] air operations in a theater spanning three continents, covering more than 19 million square miles, containing
104 independent states, and possessing more than a
quarter of the world’s population and more than a
quarter of the world’s Gross Domestic Product.”552
Headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, USAFE has
seven main operating bases along with 114 geographically separated locations. The main operating bases
include the RAF bases at Lakenheath and Mildenhall
in the U.K., Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in
Germany, Lajes Field in the Azores, Incirlik Air Base
in Turkey, and Aviano Air Base in Italy.553 Terrorist
attacks against these installations remain a threat.
In March and April 2020, five Tajik nationals who
had come to Germany seeking refugee status were
arrested for plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. Air
Force bases and personnel on behalf of ISIS.554
Strategic bomber deployments continue periodically. In March 2021, U.S. B-1 and B-2 bombers flying from the U.S. deployed out of Orland Air Base in
Norway and Lajes Field in Portugal, respectively.555
According to the U.S. Air Force, “[s]trategic bomber
deployments to Europe provide theater familiarization for aircrew members and demonstrate U.S.
commitment to allies and partners.”556
U.S. Marine Forces Europe. MARFOREUR was
established in 1980. It was originally a “designate”
component command (only a shell during peacetime
but able to bolster its forces during wartime). Its initial staff was 40 personnel based in London. By 1989,
it included more than 180 Marines in 45 separate
locations in 19 countries throughout the European
theater. Today, the command is based in Boeblingen, Germany, and approximately 300 of the more
than 1,500 Marines based in Europe are assigned to
MARFOREUR.557 It was also dual-hatted as Marine
Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF), under U.S. Africa Command in 2008.
MARFOREUR supports the Norway Air Landed
Marine Air Ground Task Force, the Marine Corps’
only land-based prepositioned stock. As of June 2017,
the U.S. had enough prepositioned stock in Norway
“to equip a fighting force of 4,600 Marines, led by a
colonel, with everything but aircraft and desktop

computers.”558 The Norwegian government covers
half of the costs of the prepositioned storage, and
the stock’s proximity to the Arctic region makes it
particularly important geostrategically. In March–
April 2022, these prepositioned stocks were a factor
in the Cold Response 22 exercise, which included
30,000 troops from 27 countries including 3,000
U.S. Marines.559
In the fall of 2021, Special-Purpose Marine
Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Response–Africa
(SPMAGTF–CR–AF), based in Moron, Spain, and
created in the wake of the Benghazi embassy attack
to respond to crises in the Middle East and North Africa, was shut down.560 Subsequently, Marines have
participated in training exercises conducted by AFRICOM’s North and West Africa Response Force.561
U.S. Special Operations Command Europe.
SOCEUR is the only subordinate unified command
under EUCOM. Its origins are in the Support Operations Command Europe, and it was based initially in
Paris. This headquarters provided peacetime planning and operational control of special operations
forces during unconventional warfare in EUCOM’s
area of responsibility.
SOCEUR has been headquartered in Panzer
Kaserne near Stuttgart, Germany, since 1967. It also
operates out of RAF Mildenhall in the U.K. In 2018,
it was announced that the U.S. was planning to relocate tactical United States special operations forces
from Stuttgart to Baumholder. The move has yet to
occur, but the Administration’s FY 2022 Special Operations budget request included funding to support
“three major renovation projects” as part of “the initiative to restation SOF to Baumholder in order to
alleviate overcrowding in Stuttgart, Germany.”562
Due to the sensitive nature of special operations,
publicly available information is scarce. However, it
has been documented that SOCEUR elements participated in various capacity-building missions and
civilian evacuation operations in Africa and took an
active role in the Balkans in the mid-1990s and in
combat operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
SOCEUR also plays an important role in joint
training with European allies and since June 2014
has maintained an almost continuous presence in
the Baltic States and Poland in order to train special
operations forces in those countries. A new special
operations base in Latvia that opened in December
2020, for example, “includes a vehicle servicing
facility, ammunition storage and two helipads for
108
U.S. CV-22 aircraft from the United Kingdom-based
352nd Special Operations Wing,” all of which “are
designed to allow special operations forces to
move rapidly in and out of the area and conduct
maintenance.”563
According to General Wolters:
Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) work with
European Allies and Partners to build capacity,
counter malign activity, and improve resilience.
These unique capabilities enable USEUCOM to
identify, attribute, and counter Russian malign
influence. Furthermore, our Special Operations
personnel provide invaluable contributions in
sensing the operational environment, enhancing our ability to deter through indications
and warnings.564
The FY 2023 DOD EDI budget request includes
$26,760,000 in declared special operations funding
for “Increased SOF Partnership Activities in Central/Eastern Europe” ($491,000) and “SOF Staging
Capabilities and Prepositioning” ($26,269,000).565
Key Infrastructure and Warfighting Capabilities
One of the major advantages of having U.S. forces
in Europe is access to logistical infrastructure. EUCOM, for example, supports the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) with its array of air
bases and access to ports throughout Europe. One
of these bases is Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania, which “began as a major refueling and supply
route for U.S. troops in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as well as a hub to neighboring countries
in both EUCOM and CENTCOM,” and from which
“[n]ations, allies, and partners…leverage and promote
an increasingly interoperable force and posture in
coordination to deter further Russian aggression.”566
Europe is a mature and advanced operating environment. Because of its decades-long presence in
Europe, the U.S. benefits from tried and tested systems that involve moving large numbers of matériel
and personnel into, within, and out of the continent.
This offers an operating environment that is second to none in terms of logistical capability. There
are more than 166,000 miles of rail line in Europe
(not including Russia), an estimated 90 percent of
the roads in Europe are paved, and the U.S. enjoys
access to a wide array of airfields and ports across
the continent.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
U.S. has increased its investment in Europe, and its
military position on the continent is stronger than it
has been for some time. Russia’s second invasion of
Ukraine served to underscore the importance both
of continued U.S. reinvestment in Europe and of efforts (which in many cases were already underway)
by the U.S. and its allies to improve their defense
capabilities.
The military, economic, political, and societal
impact of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, including
China’s support for and enablement of the regime in
Moscow, will have to be reckoned with for years to
come. Though Russia is experiencing significant battlefield losses, it will be prudent for defense planners
to assume that Russia will replace those losses of old
equipment with modern, improved items, thereby
sustaining the challenge to U.S. and NATO-partner
security interests.
NATO’s renewed focus on collective defense has
resulted in a focus on logistics, newly established
commands that reflect a changed geopolitical reality,
and a robust set of exercises. NATO’s biggest challenges derive from potential spillover from Ukraine,
the need to arm and assist Ukrainian forces while
also swiftly backfilling stocks, continued capability and readiness gaps for many European nations,
continuing improvements and exercises in the realm
of logistics, and the need to establish the ability to
mount a robust response to both linear and nonlinear forms of aggression.
Scoring the European Operating Environment
As noted at the beginning of this section, various 2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating enviconsiderations must be taken into account in assessronment for military operations is marked by
ing the regions within which the U.S. may have to
inadequate infrastructure, weak alliances, and
conduct military operations to defend its vital narecurring political instability. The U.S. military
tional interests. Our assessment of the operating enis inadequately placed in the region.
vironment utilized a five-point scale, ranging from
“very poor” to “excellent” conditions and covering 3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorable
four regional characteristics of greatest relevance
operating environment is characterized by adeto the conduct of military operations:
quate infrastructure, a moderate alliance structure, and acceptable levels of regional political
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for military
stability. The U.S. military is adequately placed.
operations. Physical infrastructure is insufficient or nonexistent, and the region is political- 4. Favorable. A favorable operating environment
ly unstable. The U.S. military is poorly placed or
includes good infrastructure, strong alliances,
absent, and alliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
and a stable political environment. The U.S.
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109

Conclusion
Overall, the European region remains a largely
stable, mature, and friendly operating environment.
Russia remains the preeminent military threat, both
conventionally and unconventionally, but Chinese
propaganda, influence operations, and investments
in key sectors present an additional—and serious—
threat. The past year has proven to be an inflection
point for transatlantic security with many European allies reinvesting in defense and capabilities. The
long-term capacity of allies to sustain a commitment
to defense remains to be seen, as does the outcome
of the Russia–Ukraine war, which is dramatically reshaping the threat perception in Europe and necessitating operational planning that takes into account
what is transpiring on a daily basis.
America’s closest and oldest allies are located in
Europe, and the region is incredibly important to
the U.S. for economic, military, and political reasons.
Perhaps most important, the U.S. has treaty obligations through NATO to defend the European members of that alliance. If the U.S. needs to act in or near
the European region, there is a history of interoperability with allies and access to key logistical infrastructure that makes the operating environment in
Europe more favorable than the environment in other regions in which U.S. forces might have to operate.
The past year saw continued U.S. reengagement
with the continent, both militarily and politically,
along with continued increases in European allies’
defense budgets and capability investments. The
military is well placed in the region for future operations.
(presumably) achieve successes in critical “first
battles” more quickly. Being routinely present
in a region also helps the U.S. to maintain familiarity with its characteristics and the various
actors that might try to assist or thwart U.S.
actions. With this in mind, we assessed whether
or not the U.S. military was well positioned in
the region. Again, indicators included bases,
troop presence, prepositioned equipment, and
recent examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian) launched
from the region.
5. Excellent. An extremely favorable operating
environment includes well-established and
well-maintained infrastructure; strong, capable
allies; and a stable political environment. The
U.S. military is exceptionally well placed to
defend U.S. interests.
The key regional characteristics consist of:

a. Alliances. Alliances are important for interoperability and collective defense, as allies are
more likely to lend support to U.S. military
operations. Various indicators provide insight
into the strength or health of an alliance. These
include whether the U.S. trains regularly with
countries in the region, has good interoperability with the forces of an ally, and shares intelligence with nations in the region.
b. Political Stability. Political stability brings
predictability for military planners when
considering such things as transit, basing,
and overflight rights for U.S. military operations. The overall degree of political stability
indicates whether U.S. military actions would
be hindered or enabled and considers such
questions as whether transfers of power are
generally peaceful and whether there have
been any recent instances of political instability
in the region.
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having military forces based or equipment and supplies
staged in a region greatly enhances the ability
of the United States to respond to crises and
d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, and suitable
infrastructure is essential to military operations. Airfields, ports, rail lines, canals, and
paved roads enable the U.S. to stage, launch operations from, and logistically sustain combat
operations. We combined expert knowledge of
regions with publicly available information on
critical infrastructure to arrive at our overall
assessment of this metric.
For Europe, scores this year remained steady,
with an increase in the Strength of Alliances spurred
by the enhanced threat to common interests resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
l
Alliances: 5—Excellent
l
Political Stability: 4—Favorable
l
U.S. Military Positioning: 4—Favorable
l
Infrastructure: 4—Favorable
Leading to a regional score of: Favorable
Operating Environment: Europe
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
FAVORABLE
Alliances
110
EXCELLENT
%
Political Stability
%
U.S. Military Posture
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Endnotes
1.
Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine occurred in 2014 when Russia seized and illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and ignited a war in
Ukraine’s Donbas region, fought with regular Russian forces and aid to proxies created in the region, so called “Russian backed separatist forces.”
Deutsche Welle, “Russian Court Says Country’s Soldiers Stationed in Ukraine,” December 16, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/russian-court-sayscountrys-soldiers-stationed-in-ukraine/a-60153034 (accessed May 26, 2022).
2.
John A. Tirpak, “U.S. Military Posture Changes Needed in Europe, Pentagon Says,” Air Force Magazine, April 18, 2022, https://www.airforcemag.
com/u-s-military-posture-changes-needed-in-europe-pentagon-says/ (accessed May 26, 2022).
3.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” p. 4, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/ (accessed July 6, 2022).
4.
Ibid., p. 5.
5.
Peter Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic,” Naval News, February 20, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/
u-s-navy-reports-on-arctic-and-north-atlantic/ (accessed May 26, 2022).
6.
Trisha Thomas, “NATO: Russia Uses Syrian War to Boost Mediterranean Presence,” Associated Press, May 7, 2018, https://apnews.com/
article/391be5ea4450452caa7d84458806b9e9 (accessed May 26, 2022).
7.
David A. Wemer, “US Joint Chiefs Chairman Makes the Case for Keeping US Troops in Europe,” Atlantic Council, New Atlanticist Blog, March
21, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-joint-chiefs-chairman-makes-the-case-for-keeping-us-troops-in-europe
(accessed May 26, 2022).
8.
Agence France-Presse, “‘Top Target for Putin’: Residents in Polish Town Worried over US Missile Facility,” March 18, 2022, https://www.firstpost.
com/world/top-target-for-putin-residents-in-polish-town-worried-over-us-missile-facility-10469751.html (accessed May 26, 2022).
9.
Zachary Basu, “Where 100,000 US Troops Are Stationed in Europe,” Axios, March 22, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/03/23/where-100000us-troops-are-stationed-europe (accessed June 16, 2022) .
10. Meghann Myers, “Pentagon Reconsidering Troop Levels in Europe amid Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Military Times, March 25, 2022, https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/03/25/pentagon-reconsidering-troop-levels-in-europe-amid-russias-invasion-ofukraine/ (accessed May 27, 2022).
11. Tirpak, “U.S. Military Posture Changes Needed in Europe, Pentagon Says.”
13. Press release, “Bomber Task Force Europe: Strategic Bombers Soar Through NATO's Eastern Flank, Complete Successful 2-Month Rotation,” U.S.
European Command, April 18, 2022, https://www.eucom.mil/pressrelease/42017/bomber-task-force-europe-strategic-bombers-soar-throughnatos-eastern-flank-complete-succe (accessed May 27, 2022).
14. Dan Lamothe, “As Ukraine War Drags on, Pentagon Makes Long-Term Plans for Europe,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2022, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/05/us-troops-europe-russia-ukraine/ (accessed June 8, 2022).
15. “Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Policy Questions for General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA, Nominee for Appointment to the Position
of Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,” pp. 8–9, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Cavoli%20APQ%20responses.pdf (accessed July 6, 2022).
16. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2023:
European Deterrence Initiative, April 2022, p. 3, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_EDI_JBook.
pdf (accessed June 9, 2022).
17. Ibid., pp. 2, 9, 17, and 17.
18. General Tod D. Wolters, U.S. Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, March 29, 2022, pp. 10–11, https://www.eucom.mil/document/42003/sasc-29-mar-2022-eucom-statement-gen-wolterspdf (accessed
May 27, 2022).
19. “Contract Awarded for Largest Overseas U.S. Military Hospital,” U.S. Army, January 20, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/253398/contract_
awarded_for_largest_overseas_u_s_military_hospital (accessed June 17, 2022).
20. Phil Stewart, “Military Deploys First Coronavirus Test Kits, Though Capacity Is Limited,” Task & Purpose, March 6, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.
com/news/military-deploys-coronavirus-test-kits (accessed May 28, 2022).
21. Fact Sheet, “European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP),” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, December 6,
2021, https://www.state.gov/european-recapitalization-incentive-program-erip/ (accessed May 28, 2022).
22. Press release, “Ninth Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation Set to Begin Mission,” U.S. Army Europe and Africa, March 21, 2022, https://www.
europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2972096/press-release-ninth-atlantic-resolve-armored-rotation-set-to-begin-mission/
(accessed May 28, 2022).
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111

12. C. Todd Lopez, “6 Navy ‘Growler’ Aircraft Headed to Germany to Support Deterrence Mission,” Spangdahlem Air Base, March 28, 2022, https://
www.spangdahlem.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2980758/6-navy-growler-aircraft-headed-to-germany-to-support-deterrence-mission/
(accessed May 27, 2022).
23. Sean Monaghan, Andrew Lohsen, and Pierre Morcos, “Designing New Battlegroups: Advice for NATO Planners,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies Commentary, April 15, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/designing-new-battlegroups-advice-nato-planners (accessed
May 28, 2022).
24. This was announced early in 2016. See Reuters, “U.S. to Deploy Armored Brigade Combat Teams to Europe,” March 30, 2016, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-military-europe-idUSKCN0WW23P (accessed May 28, 2022). In early 2017, the Army initiated a program to rotate units from
CONUS to Europe and back, emphasizing the heel-to-toe aspect, meaning that the replacing unit would arrive before departure of the current
unit so as to achieve a constant presence in Europe. The program began in January 2017 with the 10th CAB, followed by the 1st CAB in November
2017 and the 4th CAB in June 2018. See Spc. Thomas Scaggs, “10th Combat Aviation Brigade Returns from Successful Rotation in Europe,” U.S.
Army, November 15, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/196979/10th_combat_aviation_brigade_returns_from_successful_rotation_in_europe
(accessed May 28, 2022), and Staff Sgt. Adrian Patoka, “Third Atlantic Resolve Aviation Brigade Arrives in Europe,” U.S. Department of Defense,
June 22, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1558059/third-atlantic-resolve-aviation-brigade-arrives-in-europe/ (accessed May
28, 2022).
25. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa Support to Atlantic Resolve,” as of November 8, 2021, https://
www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/Atlantic%20Resolve%20Fact%20Sheet%2011082021.pdf?ver=jTsgqzycQIh3TgpPuZg-g%3d%3d (accessed May 28, 2022).
26. Kyle Rempfer, “Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Drones Based in Poland Are Now Fully Operational,” Air Force Times, March 5, 2019, https://www.
airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/03/05/air-force-mq-9-reaper-drones-based-in-poland-are-now-fully-operational/ (accessed May
28, 2022).
27. David Cenciotti, “US Air Force M-9 Reaper Drones Have Deployed to Estonia for the First Time in History,” Business Insider, July 13, 2020,
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medium=referral (accessed June 16, 2022).
28. Press release, “U.S. Air Force Establishes Enduring Presence in Romania,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, January 4, 2021, https://
www.usafe.af.mil/News/Press-Releases/Article/2461113/us-air-force-establishes-enduring-presence-in-romania/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
29. Oriana Pawlyk, “With Fewer US Troops in Europe, MQ-9 Reaper Drones Are Filling the Gap,” Military.com, February 26, 2021, https://www.military.
com/daily-news/2021/02/26/fewer-us-troops-europe-mq-9-reaper-drones-are-filling-gap.html (accessed May 27, 2022).

30. Brian W. Everstine, “US, Poland Finish Negotiations on Troop Increase, Drones,” Air Force Magazine, August 3, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.
com/us-poland-end-negotiations-on-troop-increase-drones/ (accessed May 28, 2022).
31. BBC News, “Pompeo Signs Deal to Redeploy Troops from Germany to Poland,” August 15, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-53792019 (accessed May 28, 2022).
32. Jędrzej Graf and Jakub Palowski, “Defence24 Reveals Details of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement [EXCLUSIVE],” Defence24.com,
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May 28, 2022).
33. Pvt. Devin Klecan, “Victory in Europe: V Corps Reaches Major Milestone,” U.S. Army, November 4, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/251719/
victory_in_europe_v_corps_reaches_major_milestone (accessed May 28, 2022).
34. “Permanent HQ for US Army's V Corps to Be Set up in Poland Says Biden,” The First News, June 29, 2022, https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/
permanent-hq-for-us-armys-v-corps-to-be-set-up-in-poland-says-biden-31386 (accessed July 6, 2022).
35. U.S. Army, V Corps Public Affairs, “Press Release: Victory Corps Deploys Main Headquarters to Europe,” March 3, 2022, https://www.vcorps.army.
mil/Newsroom/Articles/Article-Display/Article/2954021/press-release-victory-corps-deploys-main-headquarters-to-europe/ (accessed July 6,
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36. Natalie Liu, “US Visit Highlights Poland’s Rising Military Capabilities,” Voice of America, April 21, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-visithighlights-poland-s-rising-military-capabilities-/6538941.html (accessed May 28, 2022), and Shannon Pettypiece, “Biden Travels to Poland as the
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37. Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “U.S. Liaising with Ukrainian Forces in Poland, Pentagon Says,” Reuters, March 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/
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38. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Troops Train Ukrainians in Germany,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/NewsStories/Article/Article/3015610/us-troops-train-ukrainians-in-germany/#:~:text=U.S.%20service%20members%20in%20Germany,Kirby%20
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39. Thomas Nilsen, “U.S. Navy to Build Airport Infrastructure in North Norway to Meet Upped Russian Submarine Presence,” Radio Canada
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40. Reuters, Terje Solsvik, and Nerijus Adomaitis, “Norway to Allow U.S. Military to Build on Its Soil in New Accord,” Reuters, April 16, 2021, https://
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112
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
41. Christopher Woody, “The US Navy Is Going Underground as NATO Increases Its Focus on Its Northern Border with Russia,” Business Insider, October
29, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-deploys-hospital-to-norway-caves-amid-russia-tension-2021-10 (accessed May 28, 2022).
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48. Ibid. and Thomas Nilsen, “U.S. B-1 Bomber Makes First Landing Inside Norway’s Arctic Circle,” The Barents Observer, March 9, 2021, https://
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50. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa Support to Atlantic Resolve.”
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52. Heritage Foundation research.
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58. McLeary, “How the US Is Preparing to Hunt New Chinese, Russian Subs.”
59. Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic.”
60. Ibid.
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62. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, p. 8.
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naval,US%20and%20French%20aircraft%20carriers (accessed May 26, 2022).
66. Hope Seck, “The Army Just Activated Its Massive Gear Stockpile in Europe. Here’s What That Means,” Sandboxx, March 4, 2022, https://www.
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67. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2023: European
Deterrence Initiative, pp. 3 and 13–14. “Navy funding for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Preparedness in the amount of $3.8
million was not coded as EDI and is not included in this budget overview document.” Ibid., p. 14, note.
68. Ibid., p. 13.
69. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, pp. 14–15.
70. News release, “NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Receives First Multinational Ammunition Warehouse,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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87. Agence France-Presse, “Czech Arms Firms to Repair Damaged Ukrainian Tanks,” The Defense Post, April 20, 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.
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88. Liu, “US Visit Highlights Poland’s Rising Military Capabilities.”
89. Ellen Mitchell, “NATO Activates Response Force for First Time in History,” The Hill, February 25, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/595876nato-activates-response-force-for-first-time-in-history/ (accessed May 28, 2022), and Abraham Mahshie, “NATO Activates Response Force;
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90. News release, “SACEUR Statement on the activation of the NATO Response Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 25, 2022,
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91. Phil Stewart, “U.S. Puts 8,500 Troops on Alert to Deploy amid Ukraine Tensions,” Reuters, January 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/
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92. Steven Chase, “Another 3,400 Canadian Troops Placed on Standby to Deploy to Europe if Necessary, Defence Minister Says,” The Globe and Mail,
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93. Paul Belkin, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: NATO Response,” Congressional Research Service Insight No. IN11866, updated March 21, 2022, p. 1,
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94. Alexandra Ma, “NATO to Boost Rapid-Response Unit from 40,000 to over 300,000 Troops in Apparent Response to Putin’s War,” Business
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95. Michael Birnbaum and Emily Rauhala, “Those 300,000 High-Readiness NATO Troops? ‘Concept,’ not Reality,” The Washington Post, June 29,
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97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. SHAPE Public Affairs Office, “France Sends Troops and Equipment to Romania,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 8, 2022, https://shape.
nato.int/news-archive/2022/france-sends-troops-and-equipment-to-romania (accessed May 28, 2022).
101. News release, “NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance,” last updated June 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_136388.htm#:~:text=This%20enhanced%20forward%20presence%20was,robust%20and%20combat%2Dready%20forces (accessed June
10, 2022).
102. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, p. 14.
103. Joseph Trevithick, “Air Force Shows Off Squadron Logo Highlighting Stockpile of Nuclear Bombs in Belgium,” The War Zone, March 31, 2021,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40008/air-force-shows-off-squadron-logo-highlighting-stockpile-of-nuclear-bombs-in-belgium
(accessed May 27, 2022).
104. Abhijnan Rej, “US Sanctions Turkey over Russian Air Defense System, Raising Questions and Concerns,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2020,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-air-defense-system-raising-questions-and-concerns/ (accessed May 28,
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105. Trevithick, “Air Force Shows Off Squadron Logo Highlighting Stockpile of Nuclear Bombs in Belgium.”
106. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “B61-12 Life Extension Program,” November 2021, https://www.energy.gov/
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107. Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Advances Testing of New Nuclear Gravity Bomb: General,” Military.com, May 1, 2018, https://www.military.com/
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108. News release, “KCNSC Celebrates Completion of ‘B61-12 Life Extension Program’ First Production Unit,” U.S. Department of Energy, Kansas City
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96. Factsheet, “NATO’s Forward Presence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
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109. Thomas Newdick, “F-35A Completes Final Inert Drop Test of New B61-12 Nuclear Bomb,” The War Zone, October 5, 2021, https://www.thedrive.
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110. Press release, “London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
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112. Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic.”
113. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015–2021),” last updated May 30, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/
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114. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Operations and Missions: Past and Present,” last updated June 8, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
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115. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Relations with Iraq,” last updated June 1, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_88247.htm
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116. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Readiness Action Plan,” last updated July 15, 2021, http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/topics_119353.htm
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117. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO Agrees to ‘Four 30s’ Plan to Counter Russia,” updated June 7, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/natoministers-expected-to-okay-four-thirties-initiative-stoltenberg/29275979.html (accessed May 29, 2022).
118. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2019, p. 16, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
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119. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Space Centre,” https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-capabilities2/nato-space-centre (accessed May 29,
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120. Bruno Waterfield, “Nato Fast-Tracks Membership of Finland and Sweden to Minimise Threat from Russia,” The Sunday Times, May 15, 2022,
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121. Factsheet, “NATO’s Forward Presence.”
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Mariusz Błaszczak, “Poland’s Defense Minister: Making the Constant Effort to Strengthen Defense,” Defense News, December 9, 2018, https://
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126. Baltic News Service, “Baltic Countries Sign Agreement on Fast Movement of NATO Forces,” Latvian Information Agency, February 15, 2017, http://
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127. Deutsche Welle, “Germany's Baerbock calls for stronger NATO strategy in Baltics,” April 22, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-baerbockcalls-for-stronger-nato-strategy-in-baltics/a-61557467 (accessed May 29, 2022).
128. Ibid.
129. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), “NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Fact Sheet,” https://jfcbs.nato.int/
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130. Press release, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
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131. Capt. Brian Anderson, “Michigan Units Dash Hopes at Saber Guardian 19,” U.S. Army, June 20, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/223457/
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132. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Press Release—DEFENDER-Europe 21 Activities Begin This Month, Include Two Dozen Nations,” March 15, 2021,
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133. U.S. European Command, “DEFENDER-Europe 22 Fact Sheet,” as of May 3, 2022, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/
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135. Deutsche Welle, “NATO Scrambled Jets 290 Times Due to Russian Planes in 2021,” December 28, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/nato-scrambledjets-290-times-due-to-russian-planes-in-2021/a-60271618 (accessed May 29, 2022).
136. News release, “Multinational MRTT Fleet Continues to Grow,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Support and Procurement Agency,
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137. Gareth Jennings, “Czech Republic Joins EU/NATO MMF Tanker Group,” Janes, October 24, 2019, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/newsdetail/czech-republic-joins-eunato-mmf-tanker-group (accessed May 27, 2022).
138. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eyes in the Sky,’” last updated March 3, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
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140. Jim Garamone, “NATO Approves Norfolk Joint Force Command, Defense Readiness Initiative,” U.S. Army, June 8, 2018, https://www.army.mil/
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141. Christopher Woody, “A Convoy of US Army Howitzers Got Stopped by German Police, and It Points to a Major Problem NATO Has in Europe,”
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142. Octavian Manea, “A Tour of Horizon Interview with Lieutenant General Ben Hodges on NATO Adaption and the Russian Way of War,” Small Wars
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143. Maciej Szopa, “Military Mobility—A Key in Defending the NATO Eastern Flank,” Defence24.com, March 31, 2020, https://www.defence24.com/
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144. News release, “Deputy Secretary General Discusses NATO–EU Cooperation at Military Mobility Symposium,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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145. Vivienne Machi, “NATO Unveils Tech Accelerator Footprint, with Plans for over 60 Sites,” Defense News, April 6, 2022, https://www.defensenews.
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146. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 23, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
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147. Robin Emmott, “NATO Cyber Command to Be Fully Operational in 2023,” Reuters, October 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-natocyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9 (accessed May 29, 2022), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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148. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 23. See also press release, “Statement by the North Atlantic
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149. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Cyber Defence.”
150. Ibid.
151. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 24.
152. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2021, p. 125, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
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153. Ibid.
154. Dan Sabbagh, “Using Huawei in UK 5G Networks Would Be ‘Madness’, US Says,” The Guardian, January 13, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
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156. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, p. 4.
157. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2021, p. 28.
158. Dorian Archus, “NATO Has Completed AEGIS Upgrade at Romania,” Naval Post, August 11, 2019, https://navalpost.com/nato-has-completedaegis-upgrade-at-romania/ (accessed May 30, 2022).
159. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Ballistic Missile Defence,” last updated January 26, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.
htm (accessed May 30, 2022).
160. Ibid.
161. Testimony of General Tod D. Wolters, USAF, Commander, U.S. European Command, in hearing, National Security Challenges and U.S. Military
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162. United States Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet—U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe.”
163. “US Navy Commissions NSF Redzikowo in Poland,” Naval Technology, September 4, 2020, https://www.naval-technology.com/ news/us-navycommissions-nsf-redzikowo-in-poland/ (accessed May 30, 2022), and Jen Judson, “Construction of Aegis Ashore in Poland Nearing Completion,”
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164. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Ballistic Missile Defence.”
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230. Ibid., p. 81.
231. Deutsche Welle, “German Submarines Fitted with Russian Technology: Report,” March 28, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/german-submarinesfitted-with-russian-technology-report/a-57030819 (accessed May 31, 2022).
232. Daniel Kochis, “Winds of Change in Berlin? A Road Map for U.S.–German Relations,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3655,
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234. Alex Berry, “Germany Launches New Voluntary Military Service Program,” Deutsche Welle, April 6, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germanylaunches-new-voluntary-military-service-program/a-57105974 (accessed May 31, 2022).
235. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph
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236. Christina Mackenzie, “Seven European Nations Have Increased Defense Budgets in One Month. Who Will Be Next?” Breaking Defense, March
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237. Vivienne Machi, “Next-Gen Tech Investments, Platform Upgrades Lead France’s 2022 Defense Budget,” Defense News, September 22, 2021,
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238. Murielle Delaporte, “France Wants to Transform Its ‘Beautiful’ Army for High-Intensity Warfare,” Breaking Defense, December 16, 2021, https://
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239. Agence France-Presse, “France Receives Second Lockheed KC-130J, Completing Delivery of 4 Super Hercules Aircraft,” The Defense Post,
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241. Table, “Orders, Deliveries, in Operation Military Aircraft by Country—Worldwide,” summary to May 31, 2022, in Airbus, “A400M.”
242. Christina Mackenzie, “France Orders Beefed-Up NH90 Choppers for Special Operations,” Defense News, October 12, 2020, https://www.
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245. Younis Dar, “New F4 Rafale Fighter Jets to Have Advanced Stealth & EWS; Is India a Potential Customer?” The EurAsian Times, April 5, 2021,
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247. “France, Germany Spain Reach FCAS Agreement,” Defense Brief, May 17, 2021, https://defbrief.com/2021/05/17/france-germany-spain-reachfcas-agreement/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
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249. Pfeifer and White, “Divisions Risk Undermining Windfall for Europe’s Defence Industry.”
250. Ibid.
251. Christina Mackenzie, “France, Spain Ink Deals to Upgrade Tiger Attack Helicopters,” Breaking Defense, March 11, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
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252. Christina Mackenzie, “France Plans to Boost Its Self-Defense Posture in Space,” Defense News, July 26, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
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254. Lauren Chadwick and Jeremy Wilks, “‘May the Force Be with Vous’: France Unveils Space Weapons Plan,” Euronews, updated July 26, 2019,
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257. Machi, “Next-Gen Tech Investments, Platform Upgrades Lead France’s 2022 Defense Budget.”
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259. Machi, “Next-Gen Tech Investments, Platform Upgrades Lead France’s 2022 Defense Budget.”
260. Christina Mackenzie, “See France Test-Fire an M51 Strategic Missile into the Atlantic,” Defense News, April 28, 2021, https://www.defensenews.
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261. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
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262. Thomas Newdick, “France Has Increased Its Ballistic Missile Submarine Patrols for the First Time in Decades,” The War Zone, March 24, 2022,
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263. Christina Mackenzie, “France to Begin Building New Ballistic Missile Subs,” Defense News, February 22, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/
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264. Christina Mackenzie, “Macron Kicks off French Race to Build a New Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier,” Defense News, December 8, 2020, https://
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265. Maritime Fairtrade, “France’s Aircraft Carriers to Account for 20% of Naval Vessel Spend over Next 10 Years,” December 17, 2021, https://
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266. Michael Peck, “France Is Still Mad at the US over a Lost Submarine Deal, But That Isn’t Keeping It from Buying US Gear for Its New
Aircraft Carrier,” Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/france-buying-emals-for-aircraft-carrier-despite-us-aukus-ire-202112#:~:text=EMALS%20and%20AAG%20will%20be,%2Dgeneration%20aircraft%20carrier%20program.%22&text=Electromagnetic%20
catapults%20such%20as%20EMALS,kicking%20jets%20off%20floating%20airfields (accessed June 1, 2022).
122
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268. Dylan Malyasov, “France Rolls Out New Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine,” Defence Blog, modified November 29, 2021, https://defence-blog.
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269. “France Accelerates the FDI Frigates Program,” Navy Recognition, March 2021, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defencenews/2021/march/9901-france-accelerates-the-fdi-frigates-program.html (accessed June 1, 2022).
270. Xavier Vavasseur, “France’s Final FREMM Frigate ‘Lorraine’ Starts Sea Trials,” Naval News, February 22, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2022/02/frances-final-fremm-frigate-lorraine-starts-sea-trials/ (accessed June 1, 2022), and Christina Mackenzie, “Naval Group Delivers
French Frigate with Bolstered Capabilities,” Defense News, April 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/04/16/naval-groupdelivers-french-frigate-with-bolstered-capabilities/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
271. Christina Mackenzie, “French Navy Begins Broad Revamp of Its Mine-Hunting Abilities,” Defense News, November 6, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/11/06/french-navy-begins-broad-revamp-of-its-mine-hunting-abilities/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
272. Harry Lye, “UK, France to Sign Autonomous Minehunting Production Contract,” Naval Technology, November 3, 2020, https://www.navaltechnology.com/news/contract-news/uk-france-to-sign-autonomous-minehunting-production-contract/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
273. “France, UK Take Delivery of New Unmanned Minehunting Demonstrators,” Defense Brief, December 8, 2021, https://defbrief.com/2021/12/08/
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274. Marine Pennetier, “Under Threat, France Grooms Army Hackers for Cyber Warfare,” Reuters, April 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/usfrance-cyber/under-threat-france-grooms-army-hackers-for-cyber-warfare-idUSKBN1771B2 (accessed June 1, 2022).
275. Arthur P. B. Laudrain, “France’s New Offensive Cyber Doctrine,” Lawfare, February 26, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/frances-newoffensive-cyber-doctrine (accessed June 1, 2022).
276. Machi, “Next-Gen Tech Investments, Platform Upgrades Lead France’s 2022 Defense Budget.”
277. Chapter Four, “Europe,” in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, pp. 64–163.
279. Martin Manaranche, “French Carrier Strike Group Begins ‘Clemenceau 22’ Deployment,” Naval News, February 1, 2022, https://www.navalnews.
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280. Factsheet, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” and ERR [Estonian Public Broadcasting], “France Sending More Forces to Estonia,” February 25,
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281. Government of France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “France Diplomacy: France and NATO,” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/
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and news release, “French Air and Space Force Employs Assets for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied
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282. Government of France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “France Diplomacy: France and NATO,” and news release, “French Air and Space
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283. News release, “France Sends Troops and Equipment to Romania,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
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284. Archyde, “French Armed Forces Prepare for High Intensity War,” March 30, 2021, https://www.archyde.com/french-armed-forces-prepare-forhigh-intensity-war/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
285. Associated Press, “France and EU to Withdraw Troops from Mali, Remain in Region,” U.S. News & World Report, February 17, 2022, https://www.
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286. Infographic, “Déploiements Opérationnels des Forces Armées Françaises [Operational Deployments of the French Armed Forces],” in
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287. Ibid.
288. European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), Operation IRINI, “About Us,” https://www.operationirini.eu/about-us/ (accessed
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289. Abhijnan Rej, “France-Led Multination Naval Exercise Commences in Eastern Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat, April 5, 2021, https://thediplomat.
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278. Infographic, “Opération CHAMMAL,” in Government of France, Ministry of the Armed Forces, “Operations: Operation CHAMMAL,” https://www.
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290. Reuters, “French Nuclear Submarine Patrolled in South China Sea—Navy,” February 9, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/southchina-seafrance-submarine-idUSL1N2KF1J7 (accessed June 1, 2022).
291. Nathalie Guibert and Elise Vincent, “Admiral Pierre Vandier: In the Indo-Pacific, ‘We Face a Stifling Logic of Suffocation,’” Le Monde, June
10, 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/06/10/amiral-pierre-vandier-en-indo-pacifique-nous-affrontons-une-logique-detouffement_6083594_3210.html (accessed June 1, 2022).
292. “Two Years of Operation AGENOR in Gulf and Strait of Hormuz,” SeaWaves Magazine, March 1, 2022, https://seawaves.com/?p=19597 (accessed
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293. France 24, “Macron Launches Army Operation Resilience to Support Fight Against Coronavirus,” March 25, 2020, https://www.france24.com/
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294. Jean-Pierre Maulny, Deputy Director, French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, “Lessons Learned from France’s Military
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295. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph
4, “Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),”
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296. Joseph Trevithick, “Everything We Know About the United Kingdom's Big New Defense Spending Plan,” The War Zone, November 19, 2020,
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297. Her Majesty’s Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,
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298. U.K. Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, pp. 49 and 52.
299. Ibid., pp. 48 and 56.
300. Ibid., p. 53, and Daniel Kochis, “European Defense Spending Still Rising, but COVID-19 Poses Retrenching Risk,” Heritage Foundation
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301. Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, and Nick Childs, “The UK’s New Model Forces,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Analysis Blog,
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302. U.K. Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, p. 54.
303. Andrew Chuter, “Did Russia’s War Sink the Latest British Defense Strategy?” Defense News, April 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/
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304. U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Defence Equipment Plan 2021–2031, 2022, p. 5, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
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parallel with a review by the National Audit Office (NAO), who review our plans each year and provide feedback on areas for improvement.” Ibid.,
p. 7. See National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2021 to 2031, Ministry of Defence, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 1105,
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305. U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Defence Equipment Plan 2021–2031, 2022, pp. 36, 36, 38, 40, 42, and 44.
306. The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, Secretary of State for Defence, “Secretary of State Foreword,” in ibid., p. 2.
307. National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2021 to 2031, p. 12. See also Figure 10, “Our Audit Approach,” in ibid., p. 45.
308. Andrew Chuter, “British Army Admits More Delays in Fielding Enough Combat Forces,” Defense News, October 12, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/12/british-army-admits-more-delays-in-fielding-enough-combat-forces/ (accessed June 14, 2022).
309. Ibid. See also Ben Barry, “British Army Heavy Division Comes up Light,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance Blog,
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310. Andrew Chuter and Sebastian Sprenger, “British Military Looks to the ‘Eurotank’ as It Weighs Its Hardware Options,” Defense News, January
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124
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311. Samuel Cranny-Evans, “UK to Reduce Operational Challenger 2 Tank Fleet,” Janes, April 23, 2019, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/newsdetail/uk-to-reduce-operational-challenger-2-tank-fleet (accessed June 2, 2022).
312. David Axe, “British Army Is Planning to Upgrade Just 148 of Its 227 Challenger 2 Tanks,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, April 21, 2019,
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313. David Axe, “British Army, German Tanks. London Might Not Like It, but It Needs to Buy Leopard 2s,” Forbes, November 11, 2020, https://www.
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314. Cranny-Evans, “UK to Reduce Operational Challenger 2 Tank Fleet.”
315. U.K. Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, p. 54.
316. Stuart Crawford, “The Future UK Main Battle Tank Fleet,” UK Defence Journal, March 22, 2021, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-future-ukmain-battle-tank-fleet/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
317. Caleb Larson, “Production of the British Challenger 3 Tank Has Begun,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, March 29, 2022, https://
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318. Andrew Chuter, “British Army Wants More Punch in Its Boxer Vehicle Fleet,” Defense News, April 6, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/
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319. Shephard News, “British Army Orders 100 More Boxer Armored Vehicles,” April 11, 2022, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/
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320. Chuter, “British Army Wants More Punch in Its Boxer Vehicle Fleet.”
321. Shephard News, “British Army Orders 100 More Boxer Armored Vehicles.”
322. George Allison, “More F-35B Jets Being Delivered to the UK,” UK Defence Journal, February 15, 2022, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/more-f35b-jets-being-delivered-to-the-uk/#:~:text=The%20aircraft%20are%20being%20flown,by%20the%20end%20of%202025 (accessed June 2,
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323. Aaron Mehta, “New British Plan Looks to Boost F-35 Numbers, but Is It Still Aiming for 138?” Defense News, March 22, 2021, https://www.
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325. Ed Adamczyk, “Britain’s Royal Air Force Receives Last Typhoon Fighter on Order from BAE,” United Press International, September 27, 2019,
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326. George Allison, “24 Typhoon Aircraft to Be Retired by 2025,” UK Defence Journal, March 22, 2021, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/24-typhoonaircraft-to-be-retired-by-2025/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
327. Andrew Chuter, “The British Air Force Is Upgrading Its Typhoon Fighter Jets to Keep Them Fighting Until 2040,” Business Insider, August 9, 2019,
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329. Alan Warnes, “NATO Air-to-Air Refuelling,” European Security & Defence, December 13, 2019, https://euro-sd.com/2019/12/articles/15526/natoair-to-air-refuelling/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
330. Royal Air Force, “Aircraft: RC-135W Rivet Joint: About the RC-135W Rivet Joint,” https://www.raf.mod.uk/aircraft/airseeker-rc-135w-rivet-joint/
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331. George Allison, “UK Planning to Purchase Additional A400M Transport Aircraft,” UK Defence Journal, January 6, 2022, https://ukdefencejournal.
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332. News release, “RAF Sentinel R1 Aircraft Conducts Last Operational Flight,” Royal Air Force, February 26, 2021, https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/
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333. News release, “Final Poseidon Aircraft Delivered to RAF Lossiemouth,” U.K. Ministry of Defence, January 12, 2021, https://des.mod.uk/poseidonaircraft-delivered-raf-lossiemouth/#:~:text=The%20ninth%20and%20final%20Poseidon,multi%2Drole%20maritime%20patrol%20aircraft
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334. David Axe, “The Royal Air Force Needs More Patrol Planes,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, January 1, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/
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324. ITV News, “UK’s F-35 Fighter Jets Join Operations Against IS Above Iraq and Syria,” June 25, 2019, https://www.itv.com/news/2019-06-25/uks-f35-fighter-jets-join-operations-against-is-above-iraq-and-syria (accessed June 3, 2022).
335. Harry Lye, “UK’s New Medium Helicopter to Fly into 2040s,” Army Technology, April 8, 2021, https://www.army-technology.com/news/ukmedium-helicopter-requirement/ (accessed June 3, 2022).
336. David B. Larter, “In a Naval Confrontation with Iran, Great Britain Can Find Neither Ships nor Friends,” Defense News, July 25, 2019, https://www.
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337. Ibid. and Table 4, “Availability of Royal Navy Vessels by Class,” in U.K. House of Commons Defence Committee, “We’re Going to Need a
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338. U.K. House of Commons Defence Committee, “We’re Going to Need a Bigger Navy,” p. 3.
339. Barrie et al., “The UK’s New Model Forces.”
340. Seaforces.org, “City (Type 26) Class Frigate (Global Combat Ship Programme),” https://www.seaforces.org/marint/Royal-Navy/Frigate/City-Type26-class.htm (accessed June 3, 2022).
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342. Bahtić, “UK’s First Type 26 Frigate to Hit the Water Later This Year.”
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346. Atlamazoglou, “The UK’s New Aircraft Carrier Wrapped up Its Maiden Deployment with 2 More Milestones—One Good and One Bad.”
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439. Bozkurt, “Turkish Air Force Crippled After Mass Purge of Pilots by Erdoğan Government.”
440. Michael Peck, “Bad Idea: In 2016, Turkey Destroyed Its Own Air Force,” The National Interest, The Reboot Blog, March 18, 2021, https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/bad-idea-2016-turkey-destroyed-its-own-air-force-180427 (accessed June 3, 2022).
130
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
441. Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey Failed to Convince Russia to Share Missile Technology, Agree to Co-production,” Nordic Monitor, December 29, 2021,
https://nordicmonitor.com/2021/12/turkey-failed-to-convince-russia-to-share-missile-technology-co-production/ (accessed June 3, 2022).
442. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 82. Turkey has pushed ahead with this acquisition. The 2022 edition of
The Military Balance notes tension with NATO allies because of this acquisition and reports that Turkey now has 32 S-400 missiles in its inventory.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, pp. 155 and 157.
443. Aaron Mehta, “Turkey Officially Kicked Out of F-35 Program, Costing US Half a Billion Dollars,” Defense News, July 17, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/ (accessed June 3, 2022).
444. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Transports S-400 Air Defense System for Black Sea Tests,” Defense News, October 9, 2020, https://www.defensenews.
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445. Amanda Macias, “U.S. Sanctions Turkey over Purchase of Russian S-400 Missile System,” CNBC, updated December 15, 2020, https://www.cnbc.
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446. “US Sanctions on Turkish Officials over S-400s Come into Force,” Daily Sabah, April 6, 2021, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/ussanctions-on-turkish-officials-over-s-400s-come-into-force (accessed June 3, 2022).
447. Thomas Newdick, “Turkish F-16 Knocks Down Target Drone with New Indigenous Air-to-Air Missile,” The War Zone, April 15, 2021, https://www.
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40193/turkish-f-16-knocks-down-target-drone-with-new-indigenous-air-to-air-missile (accessed May 27, 2022).
448. David Welna, “U.S.–Turkey Standoff over F-35 Escalates as Each Side Waits for the Other to Blink,” NPR, April 3, 2019, https://www.npr.
org/2019/04/03/709222963/u-s-turkey-standoff-over-f-35-escalates-as-each-side-waits-for-the-other-to-blin (accessed May 27, 2022), and
Burak Ege Bekdil, “How Turkey’s Industry Could Suffer from the S-400 Deal with Russia,” Defense News, April 11, 2019, https://www.defensenews.
com/industry/2019/04/11/how-turkeys-industry-could-suffer-from-the-s-400-deal-with-russia/ (accessed May 27, 2022).
449. According to the GAO, “the F-35 program office and the prime contractors have identified and are contracting with alternative suppliers to
produce the 1,005 parts that are currently made in Turkey.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to
Update Modernization Schedule and Improve Data on Software Development, GAO-21-226, March 2021, p. 5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21226.pdf (accessed May 27, 2022).
450. Valerie Insinna, “Turkey’s Removal from F-35 Program to Cause Hike in Engine Price,” Defense News, April 23, 2021, https://www.defensenews.
com/air/2021/04/23/turkeys-removal-from-f-35-program-to-cause-hike-in-engine-price/ (accessed June 3, 2022).
452. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, p. 19.
453. Dorian Jones, “Turkey Steps Up Support for Ukraine, Risking Russian Retaliation,” Voice of America, March 3, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/
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454. Heather Mongilio, “Turkey Closes Bosphorus, Dardanelles Straits to Warships,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 28, 2022, https://news.usni.
org/2022/02/28/turkey-closes-bosphorus-dardanelles-straits-to-warships (accessed May 27, 2022).
455. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees
of Congress No. R41368, updated November 9, 2020, p. 29, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf (accessed June 3, 2022).
456. Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. Says Potential F-16 Sale to Turkey Would Serve U.S. Interests, NATO—Letter,” Reuters, April 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.
com/world/us-says-potential-f-16-sale-turkey-would-serve-us-interests-nato-letter-2022-04-06/ (accessed June 3, 2022).
457. Humeyra Pamuk and Andrea Shalal, “Biden Administration Throws Support Behind Potential F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Reuters, June 29, 2022, https://
www.reuters.com/world/biden-administration-throws-support-behind-potential-f-16-sale-turkey-2022-06-29/ (accessed June 29, 2022). See
also Jared Szuba, “Pentagon ‘Fully Supports’ F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/
pentagon-fully-supports-f-16-sale-turkey (accessed July 6, 2022).
458. Ahval, “Fate of Turkish Air Force May Resemble Iran’s—Analyst,” February 10, 2021, https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-military/fate-turkish-air-forcemay-resemble-irans-analyst (accessed June 3, 2022).
459. Kemal Kirisçi, “As EU–Turkey Migration Agreement Reaches the Five-Year Mark, Add a Job Creation Element,” The Brookings Institution, Order
from Chaos Blog, March 17, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/17/as-eu-turkey-migration-agreement-reachesthe-five-year-mark-add-a-job-creation-element/ (accessed June 15, 2022), and Vice Admiral Patrick Chevallereau, “The Worm Is in the Fruit:
A Rising Strategic Foe Inside NATO,” RUSI [Royal United Services Institute] Europe Commentary, July 31, 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-ourresearch/publications/commentary/worm-fruit-rising-strategic-foe-inside-nato (accessed June 3, 2022).
460. Al Jazeera, “Twelve Refugees Found Frozen to Death near Turkey–Greece Border,” February 3, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2022/2/3/12-migrants-found-frozen-to-death-near-turkey-greece-border (accessed June 3, 2022).
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451. Umut Uras, “Analysis: Turkey’s New S-400 Proposal Offers Olive Branch to US,” Al Jazeera, February 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/2/10/turkey-proposes-model-to-resolve-s-400-dispute-with-us (accessed June 3, 2022), and “Turkey Says Idea to Send Its S-400s
to Ukraine ‘Quite Unrealistic,’” Daily Sabah, March 24, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkey-says-idea-to-send-its-s400s-to-ukraine-quite-unrealistic (accessed June 3, 2022).
461. Associated Press, “Leaders of Turkey, Greece Hold Talks in Rare Meeting,” U.S. News & World Report, March 13, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/
news/business/articles/2022-03-13/leaders-of-turkey-greece-hold-talks-in-rare-meeting (accessed June 3, 2022).
462. Nikos Stelgias, “Kibris Postasi: Plan for a Turkish Naval Base in Karpasia,” News in Cyprus, October 18, 2021, http://www.newsincyprus.com/
news/351462/kibris-postasi-plan-for-a-turkish-naval-base-in-karpasia (accessed May 23, 2022), and Reuters, “Turkish Drones Escorting Drill
Ships to Fly from Turkish Cypriot Airport: Report,” December 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-defence-cyprus/turkishdrones-escorting-drill-ships-to-fly-from-turkish-cypriot-airport-report-idUSKBN1YH2DZ (accessed June 3, 2022).
463. Associated Press, “Turkey’s Drone Base in Northern Cyprus Hightens [sic] Regional Tensions,” Haaretz, August 25, 2021, https://www.haaretz.
com/middle-east-news/turkey/turkey-s-drone-base-in-northern-cyprus-hightens-regional-tensions-1.10149930 (accessed June 3, 2022).
464. Sakshi Tiwari, “Rafale Fighter Jets: Turkey to Train Its Pilots on French-Origin Warplane Operated by Qatari Air Force—Reports,” The EurAsian
Times, December 22, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/rafale-fighter-jets-turkey-could-train-its-pilots-operated-by-qatar-air-force/ (accessed
June 15, 2022); Ragip Soylu, “Qatar to Train Air Force in Turkey Under New Deal,” Middle East Eye, July 1, 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/
news/turkey-qatar-military-training-airforce-agreement (accessed May 23, 2022); and Leone, “Turkey Could Soon Train Its Fighter Pilots on
Qatar’s Rafales to Learn How to Counter Greek Rafales.”
465. Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America, November 26, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/europe/usmilitary-base-turkey-has-uncertain-future (accessed June 3, 2022).
466. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, “FOB Konya,” https://awacs.nato.int/organisation/forwardoperating-bases--location/fob-konya (accessed June 3, 2022), and Kalev Stoicescu and Hille Hanso, “Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An
Indispensable and Difficult Ally,” International Center for Defence and Security Policy Paper, January 2022, p. 9, https://icds.ee/wp-content/
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467. Infographic, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Architecture as of 2019,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pictures/2016_07_160711a-infographics-bmd/20170907_170907-bmd03.jpg (accessed July 3, 2021), and Joseph Trevithick, “The U.S.
Army Wants to Expand a Secretive Missile Defense Site in Turkey,” The War Zone, May 25, 2017, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/10638/
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468. News release, “Turkey Takes Charge of NATO High Readiness Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated December 30, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180627.htm (accessed June 5, 2022).

469. News release, “Turkey Continues Its Efforts for Afghanistan’s Lasting Security, Through the NATO-Led Resolute Support Mission,” North Atlantic
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470. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force, “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures.”
471. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Maritime Command, “Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG2), and North
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472. Ed Adamczyk, “Turkish F-16s, Troops Join NATO Air Policing,” United Press International, July 7, 2021, https://www.upi.com/DefenseNews/2021/07/07/nato-turkey-poland-airpolicing/8551625672900/ (accessed June 5, 2022).
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474. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 155.
475. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
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476. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph
4, “Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),”
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477. Benjamin Brimelow, “Turkey Is Building New Ships, Tanks, and Missiles to Boost Its Military and Send a Message to the Rest of NATO,” Business
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478. Ibid.
479. Ashish Dangwal, “The ‘Power of Panther’—Dumped by France & Germany, Turkey’s Long-Delayed Altay Main Battle Tanks Get Korean Thrust,” The
EurAsian Times, March 18, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/turkeys-long-delayed-altay-tanks-to-get-s-korean-engine/ (accessed June 5, 2022).
480. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey to Export T129 Helos to Philippines Despite Block on Pakistani Order,” Defense News, May 25, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/air/2021/05/25/turkey-to-export-t129-helos-to-philippines-despite-block-on-pakistani-order/ (accessed June 5, 2022).
481. Gastón Dubois, “Pakistan Cancels Purchase of Turkish T129 ATAK Helicopters, and Seeks Replacement from China,” Aviacionline, January 5,
2022, https://www.aviacionline.com/2022/01/pakistan-cancels-purchase-of-turkish-t129-atak-helicopters-and-seeks-replacement-from-china/
(accessed June 7, 2022).
132
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
482. Bekdil, “Turkey to Export T129 Helos to Philippines Despite Block on Pakistani Order.”
483. Linda Kay, “Ukrainian-Origin ATAK-II Helicopter Engines to Be Produced in Turkey,” Defense World, posted February 23, 2022, https://www.
defenseworld.net/2022/02/23/ukrainian-origin-atak-ii-helicopter-engines-to-be-produced-in-turkey.html (accessed June 17, 2022).
484. Sevil Erkuş, “France ‘Hampers Eurosam Missile System Due to Political Reasons,’” Hürriyet Daily News, January 6, 2020, https://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/france-hampers-eurosam-missile-system-due-to-political-reasons-150657 (accessed June 7, 2022).
485. Selcan Hacaoglu, Firat Kozok, and Ania Nussbaum, “Turkey Pushes Macron to Allow Purchase of Missile System,” Financial Post, September 25,
2020, https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/turkey-pushes-macron-to-allow-purchase-of-missile-system (accessed June 7, 2022).
486. “Turkey, France, Italy to Revive Steps on SAMP/T Missiles: Erdoğan,” Daily Sabah, March 25, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/
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487. Sakshi Tiwari, “Turkey’s 5th-Gen TF-X Stealth Fighter Jet to Be Rolled Out by 2025; Mega Engineering Complex Inaugurated,” The EurAsian Times,
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488. Tayfun Ozberk, “Turkey Floats Out Its First AIP Submarine ‘Piri Reis,’” Naval News, March 25, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2021/03/turkey-floats-out-its-first-aip-submarine-piri-reis/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
489. Xavier Vavasseur, “Turkish Industry to Conduct Mid-life Upgrade of Preveze-Class Submarines,” Naval News, February 10, 2019, https://www.
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490. “STM Completes Sea Trials of Turkish Preveze-Class Modernized Submarines,” Navy Recognition, February 14, 2022, https://www.navyrecognition.
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491. “Turkey Launches Test and Evaluation Ship TCG Ufuk,” Naval Today, February 11, 2019, https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/11/turkey-launches-testand-evaluation-ship-tcg-ufuk/ (accessed June 7, 2022), and Can Kasapoglu, “‘The Blue Homeland’: Turkey’s Largest Naval Drill,” Anadolu Agency
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492. Press release, “Serial Production of Turkey’s Hurjet Not Enough to Help Meet 2023 Indigenous Production Goal, Says GlobalData,” GlobalData,
January 19, 2022, https://www.globaldata.com/serial-production-turkeys-hurjet-not-enough-help-meet-2023-indigenous-production-goal-saysglobaldata/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
494. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph
4, “Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),”
Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022), p. 3.
495. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Estonia Increases Defense Spending to Buy Air Defense Systems, More Weapons,” Defense News, March 25, 2022,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/25/estonia-increases-defense-spending-to-buy-air-defense-systems-more-weapons/
(accessed June 7, 2022).
496. ERR [Estonian Public Broadcasting], “Estonia Signs Contract for Coastal Defense System Acquisition,” October 6, 2021, https://news.err.
ee/1608361155/estonia-signs-contract-for-coastal-defense-system-acquisition (accessed June 7, 2022).
497. Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence, “National Defence Development Plan 2031,” last updated December 14, 2021, https://kaitseministeerium.
ee/en/national-defence-development-plan-2031 (accessed June 7, 2022).
498. Georgia Wilson, “Estonia Announces Largest Defense Procurement Worth US$794mn,” Procurement, February 7, 2022, https://procurementmag.
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499. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 100.
500. Simon Newton, “Why NATO’s Military Might Is Focused on Estonia,” Forces.net, May 11, 2015, https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/why-natosmilitary-might-focused-estonia (accessed June 7, 2022).
501. Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence, “National Defence Development Plan 2031.”
502. ERR [Estonian Public Broadcasting], “Paper: More Military Equipment to Be Bought from South Korea,” October 3, 2019, https://news.err.
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503. “Estonia Receives First K9 Howitzers from South Korea,” Defense Brief, October 10, 2020, https://defbrief.com/2020/10/10/estonia-receives-firstk9-howitzers-from-south-korea/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
504. ERR [Estonian Public Broadcasting], “Finland and Latvia to Build Armored Vehicles Together,” January 10, 2021, https://news.err.ee/1234201/
finland-and-latvia-to-build-armored-vehicles-together (accessed June 7, 2022).
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493. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Reports 17% Drop in Defense Exports,” Defense News, January 19, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/
europe/2021/01/19/turkey-reports-nearly-15-drop-in-defense-exports/ (accessed June 7, 2022), and “Turkey’s Defense Industry Targets More
than $4 billion in Exports This Year: Official,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 6, 2022, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-defense-industrytargets-more-than-4-billion-in-exports-this-year-official-172005 (accessed June 7, 2022).
505. Gareth Jennings, “Estonia Receives First of Two Donated C-145As,” Janes, March 19, 2019, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/
estonia-receives-first-of-two-donated-c-145as (accessed June 7, 2022).
506. Paul McLeary, “Estonia Inks ‘Big’ New US Defense Deal, Eyes on Russia,” Breaking Defense, July 9, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/
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507. Monica M. Ruiz, “To Bolster Cybersecurity, the US Should Look to Estonia,” Wired, February 14, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-tobolster-cybersecurity-the-us-should-look-to-estonia/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
508. Eric Tucker, “US, Estonia Partnered to Search out Cyber Threat from Russia,” Associated Press, December 3, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/
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509. News release, “Dept. of Defense’s Largest Multinational Cyber Exercise Yet Focuses on Collective Defense,” U.S. Cyber Command, December 3,
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(accessed June 7, 2022).
510. News release, “Signing of Defense Cooperation Agreement—Remarks by Ambassador James D. Melville,” U.S. Embassy in Estonia, January 17,
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511. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures”; North Atlantic Treaty
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512. Republic of Estonia, Defence Forces, “Operations Abroad,” last updated July 23, 2021, https://mil.ee/en/defence-forces/operations-abroad/#tnato-mission-iraq-nmi (accessed June 7, 2022).
513. James Tasamba, “Estonia to Withdraw Its Troops from Mali,” Anadolu Agency [Ankara, Turkey], February 15, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/
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514. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 122.
515. Ibid., p. 123; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures”; press
release, “Saeima Extends Participation of Latvian Troops in International Coalition Military Operation ‘Inherent Resolve,’” Latvijas Republikas
Saeima [Parliament of the Republic of Latvia], March 17, 2022, https://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/30783-saeima-extendsparticipation-of-latvian-troops-in-international-coalition-military-operation-inherent-resolve?phrase=iraq (accessed June 7, 2022); and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force, “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures.”
516. Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, The State Defence Concept, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on August 18, 2020, and adopted
by the Saeima [Parliament of the Republic of Latvia] on September 24, 2020, p. 24, https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/
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Concept,” Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, September 28, 2020, https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/news/saeima-approves-national-defenceconcept#:~:text=National%20Guard%20are%20indispensable%20to,long%2Dterm%20protection%20of%20Latvia (accessed June 7, 2022).
517. Viktors Domburs, “Latvia: Armed to the Teeth,” The Independent, December 8, 2019, https://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/
details/226969/2019-12-08 (accessed June 7, 2022), and news release, “Latvia Plans to Invest the Average of €50 Million a Year in the
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gov.lv/en/news/latvia-plans-invest-average-eu50-million-year-development-military-infrastructure-over-next (accessed June 7, 2022).
518. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph 4,
“Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” p. 3.
519. LETA [Latvian National News Agency], “Latvian Government Confirms Increased Defense Spend,” March 30, 2022, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/
society/defense/latvian-government-confirms-increased-defense-spend.a450233/ (accessed May 27, 2022).
520. Staff Sgt. Tristan Viglianco, “Michigan National Guard Trains First Latvian UH-60 Black Hawk Maintainer,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces
Africa, December 17, 2021, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2877557/michigan-national-guard-trains-first-latvian-uh-60black-hawk-maintainer/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
521. Military Leak, “Latvian National Armed Forces Takes Delivery of New Spike Precision-Guided Tactical Missiles,” February 24, 2020, https://militaryleak.
com/2020/02/24/latvian-national-armed-forces-takes-delivery-of-new-spike-precision-guided-tactical-missiles/#:~:text=The%20Latvian%20
National%20Armed%20Forces%20purchased%20a%20new%20delivery%20of,Spike%20LR2%2C%20and%20Spike%20ER2 (accessed June 7, 2022).
522. “Latvia Installs Team Trainer for Spike Missiles,” Army Technology, October 9, 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/news/latvia-teamtrainer-spike-missiles/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
523. Eng.lsm.lv [Latvian Public Broadcasting] and ReTV, “Latvia Gets First ‘Patria’ Armored Vehicles,” March 8, 2022, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/
defense/latvia-gets-first-patria-armored-vehicles.a446891/ (accessed June 16, 2022).
524. Eng.lsm.lv [Latvian Public Broadcasting] and Linda Spundina, “Latvia–Belarus Border Construction Costs Rise by €15 Million,” March 16, 2022,
https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/defense/latvia-belarus-border-construction-costs-rise-by-15-million.a448215/ (accessed June 16, 2022).
134
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
525. Eng.lsm.lv [Latvian Public Broadcasting] and Dāvids Friedenfelds, “Latvian Border Guard Gets Tactical Vehicles from USA,” eng.lsm.lv, March 9,
2022, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/defense/latvian-border-guard-gets-tactical-vehicles-from-usa.a447151/ (accessed May 27, 2022).
526. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 123.
527. LRT [Lithuanian National Television and Radio], “Lithuania Lowers Conscription Age,” December 12, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-inenglish/19/1124775/lithuania-lowers-conscription-age#:~:text=Young%20men%20between%2018%20and,called%20up%20for%20military%20
service (accessed June 7, 2022).
528. Graph 3, “Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP (%),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” and Graph 4,
“Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defence Expenditure (%,),” in press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2022),” p. 3.
529. Tim Fish, “As Russia Threatens Ukraine, Baltic Nations Work to Update Armored Vehicle Fleets,” Breaking Defense, January 31, 3022, https://
breakingdefense.com/2022/01/as-russia-threatens-ukraine-baltic-nations-work-to-update-armored-vehicle-fleets/ (accessed July 6, 2022).
530. Sebastian Sprenger, “Lithuania Is First Baltic Nation to Sign US Defense-Cooperation Pact,” Defense News, April 3, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/04/03/lithuania-is-first-baltic-nation-to-sign-us-defense-cooperation-pact/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
531. News release, “U.S., Lithuania Detail Roadmap for Cooperation Through 2024,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 2, 2019, https://www.defense.
gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1803578/us-lithuania-detail-roadmap-for-cooperation-through-2024/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
532. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 122.
533. Jim Garamone, “U.S., Lithuania Sign Agreement to Further Military Interoperability,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2021, https://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2871726/us-lithuania-sign-agreement-to-further-military-interoperability/ (accessed June
7, 2022).
534. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Lithuania Signs Deal for Its First American Military Helicopters,” Defense News, November 13, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/11/13/lithuania-signs-deal-for-its-first-american-military-helicopters/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
535. Press release, “NASAMS Medium-Range Air Defence System Officially Handed Over to the Lithuanian Armed Forces,” Republic of Lithuania,
Ministry of National Defence, October 30, 2020, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/214069/lithuania-takes-deliveryof-nasams-air-defense-system.html (accessed June 5, 2021), and Airforce Technology, “Lithuania to Buy Additional NASAMS Air Defence Missiles
from Norway,” January 4, 2019, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lithuania-nasams-defence-missiles-norway/ (accessed June 1, 2022).
536. Baltic News Service, “Lithuanian Military to Purchase More Javelin Missiles from US,” LRT [Lithuanian National Television and Radio], March 10,
2022, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1641039/lithuanian-military-to-purchase-more-javelin-missiles-from-us (accessed June 7, 2022).

537. Joe Saballa, “US Donates $10M in Anti-Tank Weapons to Lithuania,” The Defense Post, April 20, 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.
com/2021/04/20/us-donates-lithuania-anti-tank-weapons/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
538. “Lithuania Will Procure 200 US JLTV Joint Light Tactical Vehicles from Oshkosh Defense,” Army Recognition, November 24, 2019, https://www.
armyrecognition.com/november_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/lithuania_will_procure_200_us_jltv_joint_light_
tactical_vehicles_from_oshkosh_defense.html (accessed June 7, 2022).
539. Fish, “As Russia Threatens Ukraine, Baltic Nations Work to Update Armored Vehicle Fleets.”
540. Joe Saballa, “Saab Supplying Carl-Gustaf M4 Ammunition to Lithuania,” The Defense Post, January 13, 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.
com/2022/01/13/saab-gustaf-m4-lithuania/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
541. Basu, “Where 100,000 US Troops Are Stationed in Europe;”
542. Abraham Mahshie, “What Is EUCOM’s Ukraine Control Center?” Air Force Magazine, April 29, 2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/what-iseucoms-ukraine-control-center/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
543. U.S. European Command, “Commander’s Priorities: Mission,” https://www.eucom.mil/organization/commanders-priorities (accessed June 16,
2022).
544. C. Todd Lopez, “Neptune Strike ’22 Kicks off Monday in Mediterranean,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 21, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/
News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2906812/neptune-strike-22-kicks-off-monday-in-mediterranean/ (accessed June 8, 2022).
545. “NATO Forces Conduct Air Operations with USS Harry S. Truman CSG,” Naval News, March 11, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2022/03/nato-forces-conduct-air-operations-with-uss-harry-s-truman-csg/ (accessed June 8, 2022).
546. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commands Consolidate,” November 20, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/241094/u_s_
army_europe_and_africa_commands_consolidate (accessed June 8, 2022). See also press release, “US Army Europe, Africa Now Consolidated,”
U.S. Army Europe and Africa, November 23, 2020, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2424126/press-releaseus-army-europe-africa-now-consolidated/ (accessed June 7, 2022).
547. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa,” as of March 8, 2021, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/
documents/Infographics/USAREURAF%20Fact%20Sheet%2003082021.pdf?ver=2RoIT5wSRaHhBRpUz26yvw%3D%3D (accessed July 7, 2022).
548. Kinsey Lindstrom, “Rockets Return to Europe,” U.S. Army, January 10, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/231553/rockets_return_to_europe
(accessed July 7, 2022).
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135
549. 10th Army Air & Missile Defense Command, “Units of 10th AAMDC: 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery,” https://www.10thaamdc.army.mil/54ADA/ (accessed June 8, 2022).
550. Jen Judson, “US Army’s Short-Range Air Defense Capability Will Grow to a Battalion by Year’s End,” Defense News, March 30, 2022, https://www.
defensenews.com/land/2022/03/30/us-armys-short-range-air-defense-capability-will-grow-to-a-battalion-by-years-end/ (accessed June 8,
2022).
551. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa.”
552. U.S. Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, “USAFE–AFAFRICA,” https://www.usafe.af.mil/About-Us/Mission-and-Organization/ (accessed June
2, 2022).
553. Fact sheet, “U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa,” U.S. Air Force, July 2015, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/
Article/609838/united-states-air-force-in-europe/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
554. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Germany Arrests Four Tajik Nationals Suspected of Plotting Terrorist Attack,” April 15, 2020, https://www.rferl.
org/a/germany-arrests-four-tajik-nationals-suspected-of-plotting-terrorist-attack/30555712.html (accessed June 8, 2022).
555. Brian W. Everstine, “B-1s, B-2s Wrap up European Bomber Task Force Deployment,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/b-1s-b-2swrap-up-european-bomber-task-force-deployment/ (accessed June 2, 2022).
556. U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, “U.S. Air Force B-2s Return to Europe,” Air Force Global Strike Command, March 10, 2020, https://
www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2106854/us-air-force-b-2s-return-to-europe/ (accessed May 27, 2022).
557. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa, “About: History,” https://www.marforeur.marines.mil/About/History/ (accessed May 27,
2022).
558. See Military.com, “Marines May Move Even More Combat Gear into Norwegian Caves,” June 16, 2017, https://www.military.com/
defensetech/2017/06/16/marines-combat-gear-norwegian-caves (accessed May 27, 2022).
559. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Exercise Cold Response 2022—NATO and Partner Forces Face the Freeze in Norway,” and Larson, “The U.S.
Marine Corps Is Keeping an Eye on Russia and Europe.”

560. Philip Athey, “Marine Corps Ends All 3 of Its Crisis Response Deployments,” Marine Corps Times, March 18, 2022, (accessed June 17, 2022).
561. See, for example, Maj. Cain Claxton, “Response Force Hones Capability in Air–Ground Integration Exercise,” United States Africa Command,
December 10, 2021, https://www.africom.mil/article/34235/response-force-hones-capability-in-air-ground-integration-exercise (accessed June 17,
2022), and Maj. Cain Claxton, “AFRICOM Response Force Keeps Skills Sharp,” U.S. Army, February 22, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/254151/
usafricom_response_force_keeps_skills_sharp (accessed June 17, 2022).
562. U.S. Special Operations Command, Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, United States Special Operations Command, May 2021, p. 114, 129 https://
comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_
PART_1/SOCOM_OP-5.pdf (accessed June 17, 2022).
563. Military Leak, “US Special Forces Open Site in Latvia,” December 5, 2020, https://militaryleak.com/2020/12/05/us-special-forces-openoperations-site-in-latvia/ (accessed June 17, 2022). See also Stavros Atlamazoglu, “NATO Has Opened a New Special Operations Facility in
Latvia,” The National Interest, The Reboot Blog, January 14, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/nato-has-opened-new-specialoperations-facility-latvia-199400 (accessed June 17, 2022).
564. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2022, p. 17.
565. Table 3, “EDI Funding by Appropriation,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of
Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2023: European Deterrence Initiative,” pp. 28, 31, and 32.
566. Michael Beaton, “MEDDAC Bavaria Reaches East to Romania to Support U.S., Multinational Forces,” U.S. Army, April 17, 2017, https://www.army.
mil/article/185409/meddac_bavaria_reaches_east_to_romania_to_support_u_s_multinational_forces (accessed June 8, 2022), and Capt.
Moriamo Sulaiman, “Romanian President Welcomes NATO Allied Troops at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase,” March 7, 2022, https://www.dvidshub.
net/news/416710/romanian-president-welcomes-nato-allied-troops-mihail-kogalniceanu-airbase (accessed June 7, 2022).
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Middle East
Nicole Robinson
S
death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD.2 Sunni
Muslims, who form the majority of the world’s Muslim population, hold power in most of the region’s
Arab countries.
However, viewing the Middle East’s current instability through the lens of a Sunni–Shia conflict
does not reveal the full picture. The cultural and
historical division between Arabs and Persians has
reinforced the Sunni–Shia split. The mutual distrust between many Sunni Arab powers and Iran,
the Persian Shia power, compounded by clashing
national and ideological interests, has fueled instability in such countries as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Sunni extremist organizations like
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have exploited
sectarian and ethnic tensions to gain support by
posing as champions of Sunni Arabs against Syria’s
Alawite-dominated regime and other non-Sunni
governments and movements.
Regional demographic trends also are destabilizing factors. The Middle East contains one of the
world’s youngest and fastest-growing populations.
This would be viewed as an advantage in most of
the West, but not in the Middle East. Known as
“youth bulges,” these demographic tsunamis have
overwhelmed many countries’ inadequate political,
economic, and educational infrastructures, and the
lack of access to education, jobs, and meaningful political participation fuels discontent. Because almost
two-thirds of the region’s inhabitants are less than
30 years old, this demographic bulge will continue
to undermine political stability across the region.3
The Middle East has more than half of the world’s
oil reserves and is the world’s chief oil-exporting region.4 As the world’s largest producer and consumer of oil,5 the U.S., even though it actually imports
relatively little of its oil from the Middle East, has
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trategically situated at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Middle East has long
been an important focus of United States foreign
policy. U.S. security relationships in the region are
built on pragmatism, shared security concerns,
and economic interests that include large sales of
U.S. arms to help countries in the region to defend
themselves. The U.S. also has a long-term interest
that derives from the region’s economic importance
as the world’s primary source of oil and gas.
The region is home to a wide array of cultures,
religions, and ethnic groups, including Arabs, Jews,
Kurds, Persians, and Turks among others. It also is
home to the three Abrahamic religions of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam as well as many smaller religions like the Bahá’í, Druze, Yazidi, and Zoroastrian faiths. The region contains many predominantly Muslim countries as well as the world’s only
Jewish state.
The Middle East is deeply sectarian, and these
long-standing divisions, exacerbated by religious
extremists’ constant vying for power, are central to
many of its current challenges. In some cases, these
sectarian divides have persisted for centuries. Contemporary conflicts, however, have less to do with
these histories than they do with modern extremist
ideologies and the fact that today’s borders often
do not reflect cultural, ethnic, or religious realities.
Instead, they are often the results of decisions taken by the British, French, and other powers during
and soon after World War I as they dismantled the
Ottoman Empire.1
In a way that many in the West do not understand,
religion remains a prominent fact of daily life in the
modern Middle East, and the friction within Islam
between Sunnis and Shias is at the heart of many of
the region’s conflicts. This friction dates back to the

a vested interest in maintaining the free flow of oil
and gas from the region. Oil is a fungible commodity,
and the U.S. economy remains vulnerable to sudden
spikes in world oil prices.
During the COVID-19 crisis, oil prices plunged to
below zero in April 2020 after stay-at-home orders
caused a severe imbalance between supply and demand. This unprecedented drop in demand sparked
an oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia,
both of which tried to maintain revenue by increasing the price of the reduced amount of oil sold. Although both countries eventually agreed to reduce
production by 12 percent, the plummet in oil prices
during 2020 caused significant shocks for both exporters and importers.6
U.S. energy policies during 2021 exacerbated the
problem. The new Administration’s decisions to
shutter some existing energy production and refuse
permission for new exploration made the U.S. more
sensitive to energy market volatility originating from
the Middle East. Then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
made matters worse. The price of oil jumped to more
than $139 a barrel while gas prices doubled—the highest levels for both in almost 14 years.7 In November
2021 and February 2022, Saudi Arabia declined the
U.S. request to increase oil production, choosing instead to abide by the April 2020 agreement between
OPEC and Russia to cut production.8
Because many U.S. allies depend on Middle East
oil and gas, there is also a second-order effect for
the U.S. if supply from the Middle East is reduced
or compromised. For example, Japan is the world’s
third-largest economy and largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG).9 The U.S. might not have
to depend on Middle East oil or LNG, but the economic consequences arising from a major disruption of supplies would ripple across the globe. Thus,
tensions and instabilities continue to affect global
energy markets and directly affect U.S. national security and economic interests.
Financial and logistics hubs are growing along
some of the world’s busiest transcontinental trade
routes, and one of the region’s economic bright
spots in terms of trade and commerce is in the
Persian Gulf. The emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with
Qatar, are competing to become the region’s top financial center.
The region’s economic situation is part of
what drives its political environment. The lack of
138
economic freedom helped to fuel the popular discontent that led ultimately to the Arab Spring uprisings,
which began in early 2011 and disrupted economic
activity, depressed foreign and domestic investment,
and slowed economic growth. Sustained financial
and economic growth could lead to greater opportunities for the region’s people, but tensions will
persist as countries compete for this added wealth.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had massive repercussions for the entire region, affecting economies
and shaking political systems in the aftermath of the
crisis. Regional gross domestic product (GDP) did
rise by 3 percent last year after contracting 5 percent
in 2020, but most Middle Eastern economies will not
exceed their pre-pandemic GDP per capita in 2022
according to economic projections.10 Countries that
were already facing economic challenges before the
pandemic are now facing a long road to recovery, increasing the likelihood of political instability in an
already fragile region.
The political environment has a direct bearing
on how easily the U.S. military can operate in the
region. The political situation in many Middle Eastern countries remains fraught with uncertainty. The
Arab Spring uprisings of 2010–2012 formed a sandstorm that eroded the foundations of many authoritarian regimes, erased borders, and destabilized
many of the region’s countries,11 but the popular
uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria,
and Yemen did not usher in a new era of democracy
and liberal rule as many in the West were hoping. At
best, they made slow progress toward democratic
reform; at worst, they added to political instability,
exacerbated economic problems, and contributed
to the rise of Islamist extremists.
Today, the region’s economic and political outlooks remain bleak. In some cases, self-interested
elites have prioritized regime survival over real investment in human capital, aggravating the material deprivation of youth as issues of endemic corruption, high unemployment, and the rising cost of
living remain unresolved. Since 2019, large-scale
protests have called attention to the region’s lack of
economic and political progress. COVID-19 lockdowns and curfews temporarily disrupted protests
in Lebanon and Iraq, but demonstrations resumed
in 2020. They failed to gain momentum, but more
recently, the spike in food and gas prices caused in
part by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked
demonstrations in both countries that, alongside
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
surrogate militias. These Iran-backed militias have
carried out terrorist campaigns against U.S. forces
and allies in the region for many years. On January
2, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered an air
strike that killed General Qassem Suleimani, leader
of the Iranian Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of an Iraqi Shia paramilitary group,
both of whom had been responsible for carrying out
attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Suleimani’s
and Muhandis’s deaths were a huge loss for Iran’s
regime and its Iraqi proxies. They also were a major operational and psychological victory for the
United States.19
In Afghanistan, Tehran’s influence on some Shiite
groups is such that thousands have volunteered to
fight for Bashar al-Assad in Syria.20 Iran also provided arms to the Taliban after it was ousted from power
by a U.S.-led coalition21 and has long considered the
Afghan city of Herat near the Afghan–Iranian border
to be within its sphere of influence. The Biden Administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan paved the way for a Taliban takeover and may
deepen ties between Tehran and Kabul, increasing
Iran’s growing alliances in the region.
Iran already looms large over its weak and divided Arab rivals. Iraq and Syria have been destabilized by insurgencies and civil war and may never
fully recover; Egypt is distracted by its own internal
problems, economic imbalances, and the Islamist
extremist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula; and
Jordan has been inundated by a flood of Syrian refugees and is threatened by the spillover of Islamist
extremist groups from Syria.22 Meanwhile, Tehran
has continued to build up its missile arsenal, now the
largest in the Middle East; has intervened to prop
up the Assad regime in Syria; and supports Shiite
Islamist revolutionaries in Yemen and Bahrain.23
In Syria, the Assad regime’s brutal repression
of peaceful demonstrations early in 2011 ignited a
fierce civil war that killed more than half a million
people and created a major humanitarian crisis: according to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, “13.4 million people in need of humanitarian and protection assistance in Syria”; “6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million
hosted in countries near Syria” like Turkey, Lebanon,
and Jordan; and “6.7 million internally displaced
persons” within Syria.24 The large refugee populations created by this civil war could become a source
of recruits for extremist groups. For example, both
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139

ongoing socioeconomic deterioration, will fuel further discontent.12 If similar protests were to break
out across the region, the operational environment
for U.S. forces could well be affected.
There is no shortage of security challenges for the
U.S. and its allies in this region. Using the breathing space and funding afforded by the July 14, 2015,
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),13 for
example, Iran exploited Shia–Sunni tensions to
increase its influence on embattled regimes and
undermine adversaries in Sunni-led states. In May
2018, the Trump Administration left the JCPOA after European allies failed to address many of its serious flaws, including its sunset clauses, and imposed
crippling economic sanctions in a “maximum pressure campaign.”14 The sanctions are meant to force
changes in Iran’s behavior, particularly with regard
to its support for terrorist organizations and refusal
to renounce a nascent nuclear weapons program.15
Many of America’s European allies publicly denounced the Trump Administration’s decision to
withdraw from the JCPOA, but most officials agree
privately that the agreement is flawed and needs to
be fixed. America’s allies in the Middle East, including Israel and most Gulf Arab states, supported the
U.S. decision and welcomed a harder line against the
Iranian regime.16
However, the Biden Administration’s efforts to
resurrect the JCPOA threaten to disrupt the gains
made by the Trump Administration. Iran has been
mounting its own maximum-pressure campaign to
force President Joseph Biden to lift sanctions and
return to the 2015 agreement without imposing
conditions. Indirect talks brokered by the European
Union between U.S. and Iranian diplomats in Vienna
resumed in April 2021, but as this study was being
prepared, talks had stalled and a deal had not been
reached.17 Despite Iran’s insistence, the Biden Administration has rightly refused to lift the terrorist
designations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC).18
Tehran attempts to run an unconventional empire by exerting great influence on sub-state entities
like Hamas in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah
in Lebanon, the Mahdi movement and other Shia
militias in Iraq, and the Houthi insurgents in Yemen.
The Iranian Quds Force, the special-operations wing
of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has
orchestrated the formation, arming, training, and
operations of these sub-state entities as well as other

the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly known
as the al-Qaeda–affiliated Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and
before that as the al-Nusra Front, and the self-styled
IS, formerly known as ISIS or ISIL and before that
as al-Qaeda in Iraq, used the power vacuum created
by the war to carve out extensive sanctuaries where
they built proto-states and trained militants from a
wide variety of other Arab countries, Central Asia,
Russia, Europe, Australia, and the United States.25
At the height of its power, with a sophisticated
Internet and social media presence and by capitalizing on the civil war in Syria and sectarian divisions
in Iraq, the IS was able to recruit more than 25,000
fighters from outside the region to join its ranks
in Iraq and Syria. These foreign fighters included
thousands from Western countries, among them
the United States. In 2014, the U.S. announced the
formation of a broad international coalition to defeat the Islamic State. By early 2019, the territorial
“caliphate” had been destroyed by a U.S.-led coalition
of international partners. However, the socioeconomic meltdown of Lebanon and ongoing fighting
in Syria present an environment that the IS can exploit to reconstitute itself. Multiple reports indicate
that the IS is recruiting young men in Tripoli, Lebanon.26 There is a real danger that IS or other Islamic
extremists could capitalize on the security vacuum
created by that country’s ongoing deterioration.27
Arab–Israeli tensions are another source of regional instability. The repeated breakdown of Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations has created
an even more antagonistic situation. Hamas, the
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that
has controlled Gaza since 2007, seeks to transform
the conflict from a national struggle over sovereignty and territory into a religious conflict in which
compromise is denounced as blasphemy. Hamas
invokes jihad in its struggle against Israel and seeks
to destroy the Jewish state and replace it with an
Islamic state.
The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020
caused a brief spark of hope. These U.S.-brokered
agreements normalizing relations between Israel
and the UAE and between Israel and Bahrain have
created new opportunities for trade, investment,
and defense cooperation.28 They are also important
milestones in the diplomatic march toward a broader Arab–Israeli peace.29
However, Israeli–Palestinian tensions have only
worsened over the past two years. In April 2022,
140
tensions escalated after nearly a month of deadly
violence and attacks in Jerusalem’s old city. Hamas
fired a barrage of rockets into Israel from Gaza, and
Israel responded with air strikes.30 This escalation is
remarkably similar to the 11-day war that took place
around the same time in 2021.31 Increased violence
threatens the unity of Israel’s ideologically divided
coalition government led by Naftali Bennett. Members of the coalition, including the country’s Arab
minority Ra’am party, have suspended their support
as a result of violence at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, causing the coalition to lose its slim majority in parliament.32 As this study was being prepared, the situation remained tense.
Important Alliances and Bilateral
Relations in the Middle East
The U.S. has strong military, security, intelligence,
and diplomatic ties with several Middle Eastern
nations, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the six
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC):
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. Because the historical and
political circumstances that led to the creation of
NATO have been largely absent in the Middle East,
the region lacks a similarly strong collective security
organization.
When it came into office, the Trump Administration proposed the idea of a multilateral Middle East
Strategic Alliance with its Arab partners.33 The initial U.S. concept, which included security, economic
cooperation, and conflict resolution and deconfliction, generated considerable enthusiasm, but the
project has since been sidelined. Middle Eastern
countries traditionally have preferred to maintain
bilateral relationships with the U.S. and generally
have shunned multilateral arrangements because
of the lack of trust among Arab states.
This lack of trust manifested itself in June 2017
when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and several other Muslim-majority
countries cut or downgraded diplomatic ties with
Qatar after Doha was accused of supporting terrorism in the region.34 These nations severed all
commercial land, air, and sea travel with Qatar and
expelled Qatari diplomats and citizens. In January
2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt
agreed to restore ties with Qatar during the 41st Gulf
Cooperation Council Summit. Per the agreement,
Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies lifted the economic
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
participate in the annual Hajj pilgrimage to the
holy city of Mecca. Riyadh has been a key partner
in efforts to counter the influence of Iran. The U.S.
is also the largest provider of arms to Saudi Arabia
and regularly, if not controversially, sells munitions
needed to resupply stockpiles expended in the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.
Under the Biden Administration, bilateral relations have shown signs of deterioration because
the Administration has turned a blind eye to Houthi
aggression. For example, the Biden Administration
lifted the Trump Administration’s designation of the
Houthi Ansar Allah (Supporters of God) movement
as a terrorist organization despite Houthi drone and
ballistic missile attacks against military and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both Saudi
Arabia and the UAE have called for a redesignation
of the Houthis, but as this book was being prepared,
no such designation had been imposed.39
Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC’s member countries are located in an oil-rich region close
to the Arab–Persian fault line and are therefore
strategically important to the U.S.40 The root of
Arab–Iranian tensions in the Gulf is Tehran’s ideological drive to export its Islamist revolution and
overthrow the traditional rulers of the Arab kingdoms. This ideological clash has further amplified
long-standing sectarian tensions between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. Tehran has sought to radicalize Shia Arab minority groups to undermine Sunni
Arab regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and
Bahrain. It also sought to incite revolts by the Shia
majorities in Iraq against Saddam Hussein’s regime and in Bahrain against the Sunni al-Khalifa
dynasty. Culturally, many Iranians look down on
the Gulf States, many of which they see as artificial
entities carved out of the former Persian Empire
and propped up by Western powers.
GCC member countries often have difficulty
agreeing on a common policy with respect to matters of security. This reflects both the organization’s intergovernmental nature and its members’
desire to place national interests above those of the
GCC. The 2017 dispute regarding Qatar illustrates
this difficulty.
Another source of disagreement involves the
question of how best to deal with Iran. The UAE
and Saudi Arabia, states that once opposed the Iran
nuclear deal, were courting Tehran through diplomatic engagements in 2021.41 Bahrain still maintains
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and diplomatic blockade of Qatar, reopening their
airspace, land, and sea borders. This diplomatic
détente paves the way for full reconciliation in the
GCC and, at least potentially, a more united front
in the Gulf.35
Military training is an important part of these
relationships. Exercises involving the United
States are intended principally to ensure close and
effective coordination with key regional partners,
demonstrate an enduring U.S. security commitment
to regional allies, and train Arab armed forces so that
they can assume a larger share of responsibility for
regional security.
Israel. America’s most important bilateral relationship in the Middle East is with Israel. Both countries are democracies, value free-market economies,
and believe in human rights at a time when many
Middle Eastern countries reject those values. With
support from the United States, Israel has developed
one of the world’s most sophisticated air and missile
defense networks.36 No significant progress on peace
negotiations with the Palestinians or on stabilizing
Israel’s volatile neighborhood is possible without a
strong and effective Israeli–American partnership.
Ties between the U.S. and Israel improved significantly during the Trump Administration, encouraged by the relocation of America’s embassy
from Tel Aviv to western Jerusalem in 2018 and the
Administration’s role in facilitating the Abraham
Accords, which were signed in 2020, and so far have
shown no signs of deteriorating under the Biden Administration.37 However, beyond “floating the idea of
a White House meeting between senior Israeli and
Palestinian officials,”38 the Biden Administration has
shown little interest in taking an active role in Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations. If the conflict
between the two sides continues to escalate, President Biden may find himself pressured to become
more involved.
Saudi Arabia. After Israel, the U.S. military relationship is deepest with the Gulf States, including
Saudi Arabia, which serves as de facto leader of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. America’s relationship
with Saudi Arabia is based on pragmatism and is important for both security and economic reasons, but
it has come under intense strain since the murder of
Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi
by Saudi security services in Turkey in 2018.
The Saudis enjoy huge influence across the Muslim world, and approximately 2 million Muslims

a hawkish view of the threat from Iran. Oman prides
itself on its regional neutrality, and Qatar shares
natural gas fields with Iran, so it is perhaps not surprising that both countries view Iran’s activities in
the region as less of a threat and maintain cordial
relations with Tehran. Kuwait tends to fall somewhere in the middle. Intra-GCC relations also can
be problematic.
Egypt. Egypt is another important U.S. military
ally. As one of six Arab countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel (the others are Jordan,
Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco), Egypt is
closely enmeshed in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
and remains a leading political, diplomatic, and military power in the region.
Relations between the U.S. and Egypt have been
difficult since the 2011 downfall of President Hosni
Mubarak after 30 years of rule. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was elected president in
2012 and used the Islamist-dominated parliament
to pass a constitution that advanced an Islamist
agenda. Morsi’s authoritarian rule, combined with
rising popular dissatisfaction with falling living
standards, rampant crime, and high unemployment,
led to a massive wave of protests in June 2013 that
prompted a military coup in July. The leader of the
coup, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, pledged to
restore democracy and was elected president in 2014
and again in 2018 in elections that many considered
to be neither free nor fair.
Sisi’s government faces major political, economic,
and security challenges. However, because of Egypt’s
ban on anti-government demonstrations and Sisi’s
tight control of internal security, there was only one
outbreak of protests in 2018.42 Internal security may
deteriorate if bread prices continue to rise—a development that could trigger a new wave of anti-government protests—or if the Islamic State resurges
inside Egypt.
Historically, figures on Middle East defense
spending have been very unreliable, and the lack of
data has worsened. For 2020, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, there
were no available data for Qatar, Syria, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.44
Different security factors drive the degree to
which Middle Eastern countries fund, train, and
arm their militaries. For Israel, which fought and
defeated Arab coalitions in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973,
and 1982, the chief potential threat to its existence
is now an Iranian regime that has called for Israel to
be “wiped off the map.”45 States and non-state actors
in the region have invested in asymmetric and unconventional capabilities to offset Israel’s military
superiority.46 For the Gulf States, the main driver of
defense policy is the Iranian military threat combined with internal security challenges; for Iraq, it
is the internal threat posed by Iran-backed militias
and Islamic State terrorists.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are considered
the most capable military forces in the Middle East.
Iran and other Arab countries have spent billions of
dollars in an effort to catch up with Israel, and the
resulting “arms race,” supplied in part by the U.S.,
could threaten Israel’s qualitative military effectiveness (QME). Iran is steadily improving its missile
capabilities and, due to the expiration of the U.N.
conventional arms embargo in October 2020, now
has access to the global arms trade.47 In response,
Arab countries are upgrading their weapons capabilities while establishing officer training programs
to improve military effectiveness.48
Israel funds its military sector heavily and has a
strong national industrial capacity that is supported by significant funding from the U.S. Combined,
these factors give Israel a regional advantage despite
limitations of manpower and size. In particular, the
IDF has focused on maintaining its superiority in
missile defense, intelligence collection, precision
Quality of Armed Forces in the Region
weapons, and cyber technologies.49 The Israelis reThe quality and capabilities of the region’s armed gard their cyber capabilities as especially important
forces are mixed. Some countries spend billions of and use cyber technologies for a number of purposes,
dollars each year on advanced Western military including defending Israeli cyberspace, gathering
hardware; others spend very little. Saudi Arabia’s intelligence, and carrying out attacks.50
military budget is by far the region’s largest, but in
In 2010, Israel signed a $2.7 billion deal with
2020 (the most recent year for which data are avail- the U.S. to acquire approximately 20 F-35I “Adir”
able), Oman spent the region’s highest percentage Lightning fighter jets (the F-35I is a heavily modof GDP on defense at 11 percent, followed by Saudi ified version of the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth
Arabia at 8.4 percent.43
fighter).51 In the 2021 conflict with Hamas, these
142
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
on arm sales by the Biden Administration, the sale
moved forward in April 2021.57 The sale is somewhat
controversial because of Israeli concerns about other regional powers also possessing the most modern
combat aircraft, potentially challenging an important Israeli advantage.
Middle Eastern countries have shown a willingness to use their military capability under certain
and limited circumstances. The navies of GCC member countries rarely deploy beyond their Exclusive
Economic Zones, but Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE,
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have participated in and in
some cases have commanded Combined Task Force
152, formed in 2004 to maintain maritime security
in the Persian Gulf.58 The UAE and Qatar deployed
fighters to participate in NATO-led operations over
Libya in 2011, although they did not participate in
strike operations. To varying degrees, all six GCC
members also joined the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition
with the UAE contributing the most in terms of air
power.59 Air strikes in Syria by members of the GCC
ended in 2017.
With 438,500 active personnel and 479,000 reserve personnel, Egypt has the region’s largest Arab
military force.60 It possesses a fully operational military with an army, air force, air defense, navy, and
special operations forces. Until 1979, when the U.S.
began to supply Egypt with military equipment,
Cairo relied primarily on less capable Soviet military technology.61 Since then, its army and air force
have been significantly upgraded with U.S. military
weapons, equipment, and warplanes. Egypt’s naval
capabilities have also grown with the opening of a
naval base at Ras Gargoub and the commissioning
of a fourth Type-209/1400 submarine and a second
FREMM frigate.62
Egypt has struggled with increased terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula, including attacks on
Egyptian soldiers, attacks on foreign tourists, and
the October 2015 bombing of a Russian airliner departing from the Sinai. The Islamic State’s “Sinai
Province” terrorist group has claimed responsibility
for all of these actions.63 Although the Egyptian army
regained control of two IS-controlled villages, militant attacks against army affiliates in different parts
of North Sinai and the kidnapping of tribal leaders
threaten the stability of the area.64
Jordan is a close U.S. ally and has small but effective military forces. The principal threats to
its security include terrorism, turbulence spilling
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143

jets were deployed in a major combat operation
that targeted dozens of Hamas rocket launch tubes
in northern Gaza.52
Israel maintains its qualitative superiority in medium-range and long-range missile capabilities and
fields effective missile defense systems, including
Iron Dome and Arrow, both of which the U.S. helped
to finance. However, because Congress has yet to
pass legislation to restock the interceptors for the
Iron Dome, Israel is vulnerable to ongoing threats
across its border.53 Israel also has a nuclear weapons
capability (which it does not publicly acknowledge)
that increases its strength relative to other powers in
the region and has helped to deter adversaries as the
gap in conventional capabilities has been reduced.
After Israel, the most technologically advanced
and best-equipped armed forces are found in the
GCC countries. Previously, the export of oil and
gas meant that there was no shortage of resources
to devote to defense spending, but the collapse of
crude oil prices has forced oil-exporting countries
to adjust their defense spending patterns. Nevertheless, GCC nations still have the region’s best-funded (even if not necessarily its most effective) Arab
armed forces. All GCC members boast advanced
defense hardware that reflects a preference for U.S.,
U.K., and French equipment.
Saudi Arabia maintains the GCC’s most capable
military force. It has an army of 75,000 soldiers and
a National Guard of 130,000 personnel reporting
directly to the king. The army operates 1,010 main
battle tanks including 500 U.S.-made M1A2s. Its
air force is built around American-built and British-built aircraft and consists of more than 456
combat-capable aircraft that include F-15s, Tornados, and Typhoons.54
In fact, air power is the strong suit of most GCC
members. Oman, for example, operates F-16s and
Typhoons. In 2018, the U.S. government awarded
Lockheed Martin a $1.12 billion contract to produce
16 new F-16 Block 70 aircraft (Lockheed Martin’s
newest and most advanced F-16 production configuration) for the Royal Bahraini Air Force.55 Qatar operates French-made Mirage fighters and is buying 24
Typhoons from the U.K.56
In November 2020, the U.S. Department of State
notified Congress that it had approved the sale of a
$23.4 billion defense package of F-35A Joint Strike
Fighters, armed drones, munitions, and associated
equipment to the UAE. After a temporary freeze

over from Syria and Iraq, and the resulting flow of
refugees. Although Jordan faces few conventional
threats from its neighbors, its internal security is
threatened by Islamist extremists returning from
fighting in the region who have been emboldened by
the growing influence of al-Qaeda and other Islamist
militants. As a result, Jordan’s highly professional
armed forces have focused on border and internal
security in recent years.
Considering Jordan’s size, its conventional capability is significant. Jordan’s ground forces total 86,000 soldiers and include 182 British-made
Challenger 1 tanks and four French-made Leclerc
tanks. Forty-seven F-16 Fighting Falcons form the
backbone if its air force,65 and its special operations
forces are highly capable, having benefitted from
extensive U.S. and U.K. training. Jordanian forces
have served in Afghanistan and in numerous U.N.led peacekeeping operations.
Iraq has fielded one of the region’s most dysfunctional military forces. After the withdrawal of
U.S. troops in 2011, Iraq’s government selected and
promoted military leaders according to political criteria.66 Shiite army officers were favored over their
Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish counterparts, and
former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chose top
officers according to their political loyalties. Politicization of the armed forces also exacerbated corruption within many units with some commanders
siphoning off funds allocated for “ghost soldiers”
who never existed or had been separated from the
army for various reasons.67
The promotion of incompetent military leaders,
poor logistical support because of corruption and
other problems, limited operational mobility, and
weaknesses in intelligence, reconnaissance, medical
support, and air force capabilities have combined to
undermine the effectiveness of Iraq’s armed forces. In
June 2014, for example, the collapse of as many as four
divisions that were routed by vastly smaller numbers
of Islamic State fighters led to the fall of Mosul.68 The
U.S. and its allies responded with a massive training
program for the Iraqi military that led to the liberation of Mosul on July 9, 2017.69 Since 2017, the capabilities and morale of Iraq’s armed forces have improved,
but there is still concern about Baghdad’s ability to
sustain operational effectiveness in the face of the
current U.S. drawdown and redeployment of forces.
The continued presence of armed militias presents
the biggest obstacle to force unity.70
144
Current U.S. Military Presence
in the Middle East
Before 1980, the limited U.S. military presence
in the Middle East consisted chiefly of a small naval
force that had been based in Bahrain since 1958. The
U.S. “twin pillar” strategy relied on prerevolutionary
Iran and Saudi Arabia to take the lead in defending
the Persian Gulf from the Soviet Union and its client
regimes in Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen,71 but the
1979 Iranian revolution demolished one pillar, and
the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
increased the Soviet threat to the Gulf.
In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed in a commitment known as the Carter
Doctrine that the United States would take military
action to defend oil-rich Persian Gulf States from
external aggression. In 1980, he ordered the creation
of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),
the precursor to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which was established in January 1983.72
Until the late 1980s, according to USCENTCOM,
America’s “regional strategy still largely focused on
the potential threat of a massive Soviet invasion of
Iran.”73 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime became the chief threat
to regional stability. Iraq invaded Kuwait in August
1990, and the United States responded in January
1991 by leading an international coalition of more
than 30 nations to expel Saddam’s forces from Kuwait. CENTCOM commanded the U.S. contribution
of more than 532,000 military personnel to the coalition’s armed forces, which totaled at least 737,000.74
This marked the peak U.S. force deployment in the
Middle East.
Confrontations with Iraq continued throughout the 1990s as Iraq continued to violate the 1991
Gulf War cease-fire. Baghdad’s failure to cooperate
with U.N. arms inspectors to verify the destruction
of its weapons of mass destruction and its links to
terrorism led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
During the initial invasion, U.S. forces numbered
nearly 192,000,75 joined by military personnel from
coalition forces. Apart from the “surge” in 2007,
when President George W. Bush deployed an additional 30,000 personnel, the number of American
combat forces in Iraq fluctuated between 100,000
and 150,000.76
In December 2011, the U.S. officially completed
its withdrawal of troops, leaving only 150 personnel attached to the U.S. embassy in Iraq.77 Later, in
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
MAP 3
U.S. Access to Bases and
Facilities in the Middle East
COUNTRY U.S. TROOPS
TURKEY
SYRIA
Med.
Sea
ISRAEL
13,500
8,000–10,000
7,000
Kuwait
Qatar
Bahrain
UAE
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Oman
2
3,500
3,145
2,700
2,500
A few hundred
IRAQ
1
JORDAN
KUWAIT
4
5
PAK.
7
8
6
EGYPT
AFG.
IRAN
3
BAHRAIN
QATAR
Persian
9
Gulf
11
10
12
U.A.E.
SAUDI
ARABIA
Gulf of Aden
13 14
OMAN
16
Red
Sea
Arabian
Sea
17
18

SUDAN
15
YEMEN
ERITREA
JORDAN
1 Muwaffaq Salti Airbase
BAHRAIN
7 Khalifa bin Salman Port
8 Shaykh Isa Air Base
IRAQ
13
14
15
QATAR
9 Al Udeid Air Base
2 al-Asad Air Base
KUWAIT
3 Ali al-Salem Air Base
4 Ahmad al-Jabir Air Base
5 Camp Arifjan
16
17
18
OMAN
Musnanah Air Base
Muscat International Airport
RAFO Masirah
Al Duqm Port
RAFO Thumrait
Salalah Port
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
10 Al-Dhafra Air Base
11 Jebel Ali Port
12 Fujairah Naval Base
SAUDI ARABIA
6 Eskan Village Air Base
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
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A
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the aftermath of IS territorial gains in Iraq, the U.S.
redeployed thousands of troops to the country to
assist Iraqi forces against IS and help to build Iraqi
capabilities. In July 2021, the Biden Administration
announced that America’s combat mission in Iraq
would come to a close by the end of the year and that
the remaining U.S. forces would transition to an advisory role. U.S. force levels in Iraq declined from
5,200 in 2020 to 2,500 in January 2021.78
The U.S. also continues to maintain a limited
number of forces in other locations in the Middle
East, primarily in GCC countries. Rising naval tensions in the Persian Gulf prompted the additional
deployments of troops, Patriot missile batteries, and
combat aircraft to the Gulf in late 2019 to deter Iran,
but most were later withdrawn.79
By January 2022, CENTCOM deployed an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 U.S. troops in 21 countries
within its area of responsibility.80 Although the exact
disposition of U.S. forces is hard to triangulate because of the fluctuating nature of U.S. military operations in the region,81 information gleaned from
open sources reveals the following:

l
Kuwait. More than 13,500 U.S. personnel are
based in Kuwait and spread among Camp Arifjan, Ahmad al-Jabir Air Base, and Ali al-Salem
Air Base. A large depot of prepositioned equipment and a squadron of fighters and Patriot
missile systems are also deployed to Kuwait.82
l
5,000 aircraft overflights, 600 aircraft landings, and 80 port calls annually. The number of
U.S. military personnel in Oman has fallen to
a few hundred, mostly from the U.S. Air Force.
According to the Congressional Research Service, “the United States reportedly has access
to Oman’s military airfields in Muscat (the capital), Thumrait, Masirah Island, and Musnanah”
as well as (pursuant to a March 2019 Strategic
Framework Agreement) the ports of Al Duqm
and Salalah.84
l
l
UAE. About 3,500 U.S. personnel are deployed
at Jebel Ali port, Al Dhafra Air Base, and naval
facilities at Fujairah. Jebel Ali port is the U.S.
Navy’s busiest port of call for aircraft carriers.
U.S. Air Force personnel who are stationed in
the UAE use Al Dhafra Air Base to operate fighters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), refueling
aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. In addition,
the United States has regularly deployed F-22
Raptor combat aircraft to Al Dhafra and in April
2021 deployed the F-35 combat aircraft because
of escalating tensions with Iran. Patriot and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile systems are deployed for air and missile defense.83
l
l
146
Oman. In 1980, Oman became the first Gulf
State to welcome a U.S. military base. Today, it
provides important access in the form of over
Bahrain. Approximately 7,000 U.S. military
personnel are based in Bahrain. Because Bahrain is home to Naval Support Activity Bahrain
and the U.S. Fifth Fleet, most U.S. military
personnel there belong to the U.S. Navy. A
significant number of U.S. Air Force personnel operate out of Shaykh Isa Air Base, where
F-16s, F/A-18s, and P-8 surveillance aircraft are
stationed. U.S. Patriot missile systems also are
deployed to Bahrain. The deep-water port of
Khalifa bin Salman is one of the few facilities
in the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers.85
Saudi Arabia. In June 2021, President Biden
reported to Congress that approximately 2,700
U.S. military personnel were deployed in Saudi
Arabia “to protect United States forces and
interests in the region against hostile action
by Iran or Iran-backed groups.” The President
confirmed that these troops, “operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, provide air and missile defense
capabilities and support the operation of United States fighter aircraft.”86 The six-decade-old
United States Military Training Mission to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the four-decade-old
Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi
Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, and the Office of the Program Manager–Facilities Security Force are based in Eskan
Village Air Base approximately 13 miles south
of the capital city of Riyadh.87
Qatar. The number of U.S. personnel, mainly
from the U.S. Air Force, deployed in Qatar “has
ranged from about 8,000 to over 10,000.”88 The
U.S. operates its Combined Air Operations
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Center at Al Udeid Air Base, which is one of the
world’s most important U.S. air bases. It is also
the base from which the anti-ISIS campaign
was headquartered. Heavy bombers, tankers,
transports, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance) aircraft operate from Al
Udeid Air Base, which also serves as the forward headquarters of CENTCOM. The base
houses prepositioned U.S. military equipment
and is defended by U.S. Patriot missile systems.
The recent tensions between Qatar and other
Arab states have not affected the United States’
relationship with Qatar.
l
l
l
l
l
U.S. Army Forces Central Command. USARCENT is USCENTCOM’s land component.
Based in Kuwait, it is responsible for land operations in an area that totals 4.6 million square
miles (1.5 times larger than the continental
United States).
U.S. Air Forces Central Command. USAFCENT is USCENTCOM’s air component. Based
in Qatar, it is responsible for air operations and
for working with the air forces of partner countries in the region. It also manages an extensive
supply and equipment prepositioning program
at several regional sites.
U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.
MARCENT is USCENTCOM’s designated
Marine Corps service component. Based in
Bahrain, it is responsible for all Marine Corps
forces in the region.
U.S. Special Operations Command Central.
SOCCENT is a subordinate unified command
under USCENTCOM. Based in Qatar, it is
responsible for planning special operations
throughout the USCENTCOM region, planning
and conducting peacetime joint/combined special operations training exercises, and orchestrating command and control of peacetime and
wartime special operations.
CENTCOM “directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of
enduring U.S. interests.”91 Execution of this mission
is supported by four service component commands
(U.S. Naval Forces Middle East [USNAVCENT]; U.S.
Army Forces Middle East [USARCENT]; U.S. Air
Forces Middle East [USAFCENT]; and U.S. Marine
Forces Middle East [MARCENT]) and one suborIn addition to the American military presence in
dinate unified command (U.S. Special Operations the region, two NATO allies—the United Kingdom
Command Middle East [SOCCENT]).
and France—play an important role.
The U.K.’s presence in the Middle East is a legaU.S. Naval Forces Central Command. UScy of British imperial rule. The U.K. has maintained
NAVCENT is USCENTCOM’s maritime compo- close ties with many countries that it once ruled
nent. With its forward headquarters in Bahrain, and has conducted military operations in the reit is responsible for commanding the afloat
gion for decades. As of 2020, approximately 1,350
units that rotationally deploy or surge from the British service personnel were based throughout the
United States in addition to other ships that are region. This number fluctuates with the arrival of
based in the Gulf for longer periods. USNAVvisiting warships.92
CENT conducts persistent maritime operations
The British presence in the region is dominated
to advance U.S. interests, deter and counter
by the Royal Navy. Permanently based naval assets
disruptive countries, defeat violent extreminclude four mine hunters and one Royal Fleet
ism, and strengthen partner nations’ maritime
Auxiliary supply ship. In addition, there generally
l
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147

Jordan. According to CENTCOM, Jordan “is
one of [America’s] strongest and most reliable
partners in the Levant sub-region.”89 Although
there are no U.S. military bases in Jordan, the
U.S. has a long history of conducting training
exercises out of Jordanian air bases. Due to
recent events in neighboring Syria, in addition
to other military assets like fighter jets and
air defense systems, “approximately 3,147 U.S.
military personnel are deployed to Jordan to
‘counter-ISIS operations, enhance Jordan’s
security, and promote regional stability.’”90
capabilities in order to promote a secure maritime environment in an area that encompasses
approximately 2.5 million square miles of water.

are frigates or destroyers in the Gulf or Arabian
Sea performing maritime security duties,93 and (although such matters are not the subject of public
discussion) U.K. attack submarines also operate
in the area. In April 2018, as a sign of its long-term
maritime presence in the region, the U.K. opened a
base in Bahrain—its first overseas military base in
the Middle East in more than four decades.94 The
U.K. has made a multimillion-dollar investment in
modernization of the Duqm Port complex in Oman
to accommodate its new Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft carriers.95
The U.K. also has a sizeable Royal Air Force (RAF)
presence in the region, mainly in the UAE and Oman.
A short drive from Dubai, Al-Minhad Air Base is
home to a small contingent of U.K. personnel, and
small RAF detachments in Oman support U.K. and
coalition operations in the region. Although considered to be in Europe, the U.K.’s Sovereign Base Areas
of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus have supported
U.S. military and intelligence operations in the past
and are expected to continue to do so.
The British presence in the region extends beyond soldiers, ships, and planes. A British-run staff
college operates in Qatar, and Kuwait chose the U.K.
to help run its own equivalent of the Royal Military
Academy at Sandhurst.96 The U.K. also plays a very
active role in training the Saudi Arabian and Jordanian militaries.
The French presence in the Gulf is smaller than
the U.K.’s but still significant. France opened its first
military base in the Gulf in 2009. Located in the
emirate of Abu Dhabi, it was the first foreign military installation built by the French in 50 years.97
The French have 650 personnel based in the UAE,
along with seven Rafale jets and an armored battlegroup, as well as military operations in Kuwait and
Qatar.98 French ships have access to the Zayed Port
in Abu Dhabi, which is big enough to handle every
ship in the French Navy except the aircraft carrier
Charles De Gaulle.
Military support from the U.K. and France has
been particularly important in Operation Inherent
Resolve, a U.S.-led joint task force that was formed
to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. As of
May 2021, France had between 600 and 650 troops
stationed in the UAE, 600 stationed in Syria and Iraq,
and 700 stationed in Lebanon.99 The U.K. temporarily redeployed troops back to the U.K. because of
COVID-19 but announced in February 2021 that the
148
500 troops would be sent back along with an additional 3,500 troops to boost its counterterrorism training mission in Iraq.100 The additional troops will help
both to prevent the IS from returning and to manage
threats from Iran-backed militias more effectively.
Another important actor in Middle East security
is the small East African country of Djibouti. Djibouti sits on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which an
estimated 6.2 million barrels of oil a day transited in
2018 (the most recent year for which U.S. Energy Administration data are available) and which is a choke
point on the route to the Suez Canal.101 An increasing
number of countries recognize Djibouti’s value as
a base from which to project maritime power and
launch counterterrorism operations. The country is
home to Camp Lemonnier, which can hold as many
as 4,000 personnel and is the only permanent U.S.
military base in Africa.102
China is also involved in Djibouti and has established its first permanent overseas base there. This
base can house 10,000 troops, and Chinese marines
have used it to stage live-fire exercises featuring armored combat vehicles and artillery. France, Italy,
and Japan also have presences of varying strength
in Djibouti.103
Key Infrastructure and Warfighting Capabilities
The Middle East is critically situated geographically. Two-thirds of the world’s population lives
within an eight-hour flight from the Gulf region,
making it accessible from most other regions of the
globe. The Middle East also contains some of the
world’s most critical maritime choke points, including the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.
Although infrastructure is not as developed in
the Middle East as it is in North America or Europe,
during a decades-long presence, the U.S. has developed systems that enable it to move large numbers
of matériel and personnel into and out of the region.
According to the Department of Defense, at the
height of U.S. combat operations in Iraq during the
Second Gulf War, the U.S. presence included 165,000
servicemembers and 505 bases. Moving personnel
and equipment out of the country was “the largest
logistical drawdown since World War II” and included redeployment of “the 60,000 troops who remained in Iraq at the time and more than 1 million
pieces of equipment ahead of their deadline.”104
The condition of the region’s roads varies from
country to country. The most recent available data
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
reflect that 100 percent of the roads in Israel, Jordan, that these shipping lanes offer to America and her
and the UAE are paved. Other nations—for example, allies. The major shipping routes include:
Oman (49.3 percent); Saudi Arabia (21.5 percent);
and Yemen (8.7 percent)—have poor paved road
The Suez Canal. In 2021, more than 20,000
coverage.105 Rail coverage is also poor. China’s Belt
ships transited the Suez Canal—an average of
and Road Initiative has targeted ports, roads, and
55 ships per day.110 Considering that the canal
railway development in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and many
itself is 120 miles long but only 670 feet wide,
other countries, and the result could be improved
this is an impressive amount of traffic. The Suez
transportation conditions across the region at the
Canal is important to Europe because it proexpense of U.S. interests.106
vides access to oil from the Middle East. It also
The U.S. has access to several airfields in the reserves as an important strategic asset, as it is
gion. The primary air hub for U.S. forces is Al Udeid
used routinely by the U.S. Navy to move surface
Air Base in Qatar. Other airfields include Ali Al Salem
combatants between the Mediterranean Sea
Air Base, Kuwait; Al Dhafra, UAE; Al Minhad, UAE;
and the Red Sea. Thanks to a bilateral arrangeIsa, Bahrain; Eskan Village Air Base, Saudi Arabia;
ment between Egypt and the United States, the
Muscat, Oman; Thumrait, Oman; and Masirah IsU.S. Navy enjoys priority access to the canal.111
land, Oman, in addition to the commercial airport
at Seeb, Oman. In the past, the U.S. has used major
The journey through the narrow waterway is
airfields in Iraq, including Baghdad International
no easy task for large surface combatants. The
Airport and Balad Air Base, as well as Prince Sultan
canal was not constructed with the aim of acAir Base in Saudi Arabia.
commodating 100,000-ton aircraft carriers and
The fact that a particular air base is available to
therefore exposes a larger ship to attack. For this
the U.S. today, however, does not necessarily mean
reason, different types of security protocols are
that it will be available for a particular operation in
followed, including the provision of air support
the future. For example, because of their more corby the Egyptian military.112 These security prodial relations with Iran, Qatar and Oman probably
tocols, however, are not foolproof. In April 2021,
would not allow the U.S. to use air bases in their terthe Suez Canal was closed for more than 11 days
ritory for strikes against Iran unless they were first
after a container ship blocked the waterway, creattacked themselves.
ating a 360-ship traffic jam that disrupted almost
The U.S. also has access to ports in the region,
13 percent of global maritime traffic. This crisis
perhaps the most important being the deep-water
proves that ever-larger container ships transitport of Khalifa bin Salman in Bahrain and naval
ing strategic choke points are prone to accidents
facilities at Fujairah in the UAE.107 The UAE’s comthat can lead to massive disruptions of both globmercial port of Jebel Ali is open for visits from U.S.
al maritime trade and U.S. maritime security.113
warships and the prepositioning of equipment for
operations in theater.108 In March 2019, “Oman and
Strait of Hormuz. According to the U.S. Enthe United States signed a ‘Strategic Framework
ergy Information Administration, the Strait
Agreement’ that expands the U.S.–Oman facilities
of Hormuz, which links the Persian Gulf with
access agreements by allowing U.S. forces to use
the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, “is the
the ports of Al Duqm and Salalah.”109 The location
world’s most important oil chokepoint because
of these ports outside the Strait of Hormuz makes
of the large volumes of oil that flow through
them particularly useful. Approximately 90 percent
the strait.”114 In 2020, its daily oil flow averaged
of the world’s trade travels by sea, and some of the
“around 18 million barrels” per day, or the equivbusiest and most important shipping lanes are loalent of about “[o]ne fifth of global oil supply.”115
cated in the Middle East. Tens of thousands of cargo
Given the extreme narrowness of the passage
ships travel through the Strait of Hormuz and the
and its proximity to Iran, shipping routes
Bab el-Mandeb Strait each year.
through the Strait of Hormuz are particularGiven the high volume of maritime traffic in the
ly vulnerable to disruption. Iran attacked oil
region, no U.S. military operation can be undertaken
tankers repeatedly in April and May 2021 and
without consideration of the opportunity and risk
continues to harass U.S. naval ships.116
l
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149

l
l
Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Bab el-Mandeb
Strait is a strategic waterway located between
the Horn of Africa and Yemen that links the
Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Exports from the
Persian Gulf and Asia destined for Western
markets must pass through the strait en route
to the Suez Canal. Because the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point,
passage is limited to two channels for inbound
and outbound shipments.117

Maritime Prepositioning of Equipment and
Supplies. The U.S. military has deployed noncombatant maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) containing large amounts of military equipment and
supplies in strategic locations from which they can
reach areas of conflict relatively quickly as associated U.S. Army or Marine Corps units located elsewhere arrive in the area. The British Indian Ocean
Territory of Diego Garcia, an island atoll, hosts the
U.S. Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, which supports prepositioning ships that can supply Army or
Marine Corps units deployed for contingency operations in the Middle East.
Conclusion
For the foreseeable future, the Middle East region
will remain a key focus for U.S. military planners.
Once considered relatively stable, mainly because
of the ironfisted rule of authoritarian regimes, the
area is now highly unstable and a breeding ground
for terrorism.
Overall, regional security has deteriorated in recent years. Even though the Islamic State (or at least
its physical presence) appears to have been defeated, the nature of its successor is unclear. Iraq has
restored its territorial integrity since the defeat of
ISIS, but the political situation and future relations
between Baghdad and the U.S. will remain difficult
as long as Iran retains control of powerful Shia militias that it uses to intimidate Iraqi political leaders.118
Although the regional dispute with Qatar has been
resolved, U.S. relations in the region will remain
complex and difficult to manage. U.S. military operations, however, continue uninterrupted.
Many of the borders created after World War I
are under significant stress. In countries like Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the supremacy
of the nation-state is being challenged by non-state
actors that wield influence, power, and resources
comparable to those of small states. The region’s
principal security and political challenges are linked
to the unrealized aspirations of the Arab Spring,
surging transnational terrorism, and meddling by
Iran, which seeks to extend its influence in the Islamic world. These challenges are made more difficult by the Arab–Israeli conflict, Sunni–Shia sectarian divides, the rise of Iran’s Islamist revolutionary
nationalism, and the proliferation of Sunni Islamist
revolutionary groups.
Thanks to its decades of military operations in
the Middle East, the U.S. has developed tried-andtested procedures for operating in the region. Bases and infrastructure are well established, and the
logistical processes for maintaining a large force
forward deployed thousands of miles away from
the homeland are well in place. Moreover, unlike
in Europe, all of these processes have been tested
recently in combat. The personal links between
allied armed forces are also present. Joint training
exercises improve interoperability, and U.S. military
educational courses that are regularly attended by
officers (and often royals) from the Middle East give
the U.S. an opportunity to influence some of the region’s future leaders.
America’s relationships in the region are based
pragmatically on shared security and economic concerns. As long as these issues remain relevant to both
sides, the U.S. is likely to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests
require that it do so.
Scoring the Middle East Operating Environment
As noted at the beginning of this section, various aspects of the region facilitate or inhibit the
ability of the U.S. to conduct military operations to
defend its vital national interests against threats.
Our assessment of the operating environment
150
uses a five-point scale that ranges from “very poor”
to “excellent” conditions and covers four regional
characteristics of greatest relevance to the conduct
of military operations:
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for military operations. Physical infrastructure is
insufficient or nonexistent, and the region is
politically unstable. In addition, the U.S. military is poorly placed or absent, and alliances are
nonexistent or diffuse.
2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating environment for military operations is marked by
inadequate infrastructure, weak alliances, and
recurring political instability. The U.S. military
is inadequately placed in the region.
3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorable
operating environment is characterized by adequate infrastructure, a moderate alliance structure, and acceptable levels of regional political
stability. The U.S. military is adequately placed.
4. Favorable. A favorable operating environment
includes good infrastructure, strong alliances,
and a stable political environment. The U.S.
military is well placed for future operations.
The key regional characteristics consist of:
a. Alliances. Alliances are important for interoperability and collective defense, as allies are
more likely to lend support to U.S. military
operations. Indicators that provide insight into
the strength or health of an alliance include
whether the U.S. trains regularly with countries
in the region, has good interoperability with the
forces of an ally, and shares intelligence with
nations in the region.
b. Political Stability. Political stability brings
predictability for military planners when
considering such things as transit, basing, and
overflight rights for U.S. military operations.
The overall degree of political stability indicates whether U.S. military actions would be
hindered or enabled and reflects, for example,
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having military
forces based or equipment and supplies staged
in a region greatly facilitates the ability of the
United States to respond to crises and, presumably, achieve success in critical “first battles”
more quickly. Being routinely present in a
region also helps the U.S. to remain familiar
with its characteristics and the various actors
that might either support or try to thwart U.S.
actions. With this in mind, we assessed whether
or not the U.S. military was well positioned in
the region. Again, indicators included bases,
troop presence, prepositioned equipment, and
recent examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian) launched
from the region.
d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, and suitable
infrastructure is essential to military operations.
Airfields, ports, rail lines, canals, and paved roads
enable the U.S. to stage, launch, and logistically
sustain combat operations. We combined expert
knowledge of regions with publicly available
information on critical infrastructure to arrive at
our overall assessment of this metric.119
The U.S. has developed an extensive network of
bases in the Middle East region and has acquired
substantial operational experience in combatting
regional threats. At the same time, however, many
of America’s allies are hobbled by political instability,
economic problems, internal security threats, and
mushrooming transnational threats. Although the
region’s overall score remains “moderate,” as it was
last year, it is in danger of falling to “poor” because
of political instability and growing bilateral tensions
with allies over the security implications of the proposed nuclear agreement with Iran and how best to
fight the Islamic State.
With this in mind, we arrived at these average
scores for the Middle East (rounded to the nearest
whole number):
l
Alliances: 3—Moderate
l
Political Stability: 2—Unfavorable
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151

5. Excellent. An extremely favorable operating
environment includes well-established and
well-maintained infrastructure, strong and capable allies, and a stable political environment.
The U.S. military is exceptionally well placed to
defend U.S. interests.
whether transfers of power are generally peaceful and whether there have been any recent
instances of political instability in the region.
l
U.S. Military Positioning: 3—Moderate
l
Infrastructure: 3—Moderate
Leading to a regional score of: Moderate
Operating Environment: Middle East
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
Alliances
Political Stability
MODERATE
%
%
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%

U.S. Military Posture
152
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
FAVORABLE
EXCELLENT
Endnotes
1.
For example, during a 1916 meeting in Downing Street, Sir Mark Sykes, Britain’s lead negotiator with the French on carving up the Ottoman
Empire in the Middle East, pointed to the map and told the Prime Minister that for Britain’s sphere of influence in the Middle East, “I should
like to draw a line from the e in Acre [modern-day Israel] to the last k in Kirkuk [modern-day Iraq].” See James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain,
France, and the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (London: Simon & Schuster U.K., 2011), pp. 7–20. See also Margaret McMillan, Paris 1919: Six
Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003).
2.
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economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19/ (accessed May 4, 2022).
3.
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35. Nicole Robinson, “Qatar’s Normalization with Gulf States Could Pave the Way Toward a Secure and Stable Persian Gulf,” Heritage Foundation
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36. Pieter D. Wezeman, “Conventional Strategic Military Capabilities in the Middle East,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Background Paper, July
2011, p. 8, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/Conventional-strategic-military-capabilities-in-the-Middle-East.pdf (accessed May
5, 2022). Prepared for “EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and
means of delivery in the Middle East,” Brussels, July 6–7, 2011.
37. Isabel Kershner, “9 Things to Know About Jerusalem as U.S. Embassy Opens,” The New York Times, May 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/13/world/middleeast/israel-jerusalem-us-embassy.html (accessed May 5, 2022), and Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the
Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People, The White House, January 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/
Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
38. Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. Floated White House Meeting of Israelis and Palestinians,” Axios, April 7, 2022, https://www.axios.com/white-housemeeting-israelis-palestinians-c12d7e66-2680-411d-b5c1-289890113189.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
154
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
39. James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “Time to Hold the Houthis Accountable in Yemen,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5261, April 7, 2022,
https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/time-hold-the-houthis-accountable-yemen.
40. The GCC was founded in 1981 to offset the threat from Iran, which became hostile to Sunni-led Arab states after its 1979 revolution.
41. Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly, “Gulf Arab States that Opposed the Iran Nuclear Deal Are Now Courting Tehran,” The Washington Post, December 11,
2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/uae-saudi-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal/2021/12/11/8c51edae-586c-11ec-8396-5552bef55c3c_story.
html (accessed May 5, 2022).
42. Declan Walsh, “Rare Protests Against Egypt’s Leader Erupt in Cairo and Elsewhere,” The New York Times, September 20, 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/09/20/world/middleeast/anti-government-protests-egypt.html (accessed May 5, 2022), and Vivian Yee and Nada Rashwan,
“Egypt’s Harsh Crackdown Quashes Protest Movement,” The New York Times, October 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/
middleeast/egypt-protest-sisi-arrests.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
43. Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Marksteiner, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020,” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute Fact Sheet, April 2021, p. 12, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
44. Ibid., p. 9, note 1, which specifies that the “[c]ountries included in the estimate are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.”
45. Nazila Fathi, “Wipe Israel ‘Off the Map’ Iranian Says,” The New York Times, October 27, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/
africa/26iht-iran.html?_r=0 (accessed May 5, 2022).
46. Ibid.
47. The embargo “limited all U.N. member states from selling weaponry—including battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems and spare parts—to the Islamic Republic.” United States
Institute of Peace, “Part 1: History of Arms Embargo on Iran,” The Iran Primer, updated October 21, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/
may/11/part-1-us-arms-embargo (accessed May 5, 2022), and Nasser Karimi, “UN Arms Embargo on Iran Expires,” Defense News, October 19,
2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2020/10/19/un-arms-embargoes-on-iran-expires/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
48. Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Gemunder Center U.S.–Israel Security Policy Project, “Arming Israel to Defeat Iranian
Aggression: Frontloading Weapons Delivery,” November 2019, https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Arming-Israel-to-Defeat-IranianAggression-1.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
49. T. S. Allen, “Here Is How Israel’s Military Dominates the Battlefield,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, February 27, 2018, http://nationalinterest.
org/blog/the-buzz/here-how-israels-military-dominates-the-battlefield-24679 (accessed May 5, 2022).
51. Lynn Adler and Jim Wolf, “Update 1—Israel, U.S. Sign $2.75 Billion F-35 Deal,” Reuters, October 7, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/israelusa-f-35-idUSN0717986420101008 (accessed May 5, 2022), and Defense Industry Daily Staff, “Adir Who? Israel’s F-35i Stealth Fighters,” Defense
Industry Daily, August 11, 2021, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-plans-to-buy-over-100-f35s-02381/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
52. Judah Ari Gross, “IDF Says It Launched Major Offensive on Dozens of Rocket Launch Tubes in Gaza,” The Times of Israel, May 11, 2021, https://
www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-launched-major-offensive-on-dozens-of-rocket-launch-tubes-in-gaza/ (accessed May 5,
2022).
53. Blaise Misztal and Patty-Jane Geller, “Congress Overdue to Help Fund Israel’s Iron Dome,” The Washington Times, February 15, 2022, https://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2022/feb/15/congress-overdue-to-help-fund-israels-iron-dome/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
Economics (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 366–369.
55. News release, “Lockheed Martin Awarded Contract to Build F-16 Block 70 Aircraft for Bahrain,” Lockheed Martin, June 25, 2018,
https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2018-06-25-Lockheed-Martin-Awarded-Contract-to-Build-F-16-Block-70-Aircraft-for-Bahrain?_
ga=2.3223408.1543096780.1588692655-1467716092.1546629521 (accessed May 5, 2022).
56. Reuters, “Qatar Goes Ahead with $6.7 Billion Typhoon Combat Jets Deal with UK’s BAE Systems,” December 10, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-britain-qatar-typhoons/qatar-goes-ahead-with-6-7-billion-typhoon-combat-jets-deal-with-uks-bae-systems-idUSKBN1E40QM
(accessed May 5, 2022).
57. James Phillips, Nicole Robinson, and John Venable, “F-35 Sale to UAE Advances U.S. Security Interests,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No.
6032, December 10, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/f-35-sale-uae-advances-us-security-interests.
58. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Combined Maritime Forces—U.S. 5th Fleet, “Combined Maritime Forces,” https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/
Combined-Maritime-Forces/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
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50. See, for example, Gil Press, “6 Reasons Israel Became a Cybersecurity Powerhouse Leading the $82 Billion Industry,” Forbes, July 18,
2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/07/18/6-reasons-israel-became-a-cybersecurity-powerhouse-leading-the-82-billionindustry/#d458614420aa (accessed May 5, 2022), and NoCamels Team, “Israel Is a Small Country, but a Cyber Superpower, Says Ex-CIA Director
at CyberTech 2018,” NoCamels, January 20, 2018, http://nocamels.com/2018/01/israel-cyber-superpower-cia-cybertech-2018/ (accessed May 5,
2022).
59. Helene Cooper and Anne Barnard, “Jordan and Emirates Carry out Airstrikes in Syria Against ISIS,” The New York Times, February 10, 2015, www.
nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-resume-airstrikes-against-isis.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
60. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 336.
61. GlobalSecurity.org, “Egypt Military Guide: Introduction,” last modified April 4, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/intro.
htm (accessed May 5, 2022).
62. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 319.
63. Reuters and Jack Khoury, “Isis Claims Responsibility for Attack That Killed 15 Egyptian Military Personnel,” Haaretz, February 16, 2019, https://www.
haaretz.com/middle-east-news/egypt/15-egyptian-military-personnel-killed-or-wounded-in-sinai-attack-army-says-1.6938947 (accessed May 5,
2022), and Jason Hanna, Michael Martinez, and Jennifer Deaton, “ISIS Publishes Photo of What It Says Is Bomb that Downed Russian Plane,” CNN,
updated November 19, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/middleeast/metrojet-crash-dabiq-claim/index.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
64. MEE Correspondent in Cairo, “Egypt: Sinai Residents Asked to Return as Army and Tribes Curb Islamic State Group,” Middle East Eye, April 21,
2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-sinai-residents-return-army-tribes-curb-is-presence (accessed May 5, 2022).
65. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022, p. 351.
66. See, for example, Florence Gaub, “An Unhappy Marriage: Civil–Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, January 13, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR-Gaub-final.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
67. Reuters, “Iraq Says It Found 50,000 ‘Ghost Soldiers’ on Payroll,” December 1, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraqsoldiers-idUSKCN0JF2RZ20141201 (accessed May 5, 2022).
68. Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul Fell—An Iraqi General Disputes Baghdad’s Story,” Reuters, October
14, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi-special-report/special-report-how-mosul-fell-an-iraqi-general-disputesbaghdads-story-idUSKCN0I30Z820141014 (accessed May 5, 2022).
69. Tim Arango and Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Prime Minister Arrives in Mosul to Declare Victory over ISIS,” The New York Times, July 9, 2017, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
70. Nicole Robinson and Eric Feely, “What a Firebrand Cleric’s Growing Strength Means for American Policy in Iraq,” The Daily Signal, December 2,
2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/12/02/what-a-firebrand-clerics-growing-strength-means-for-american-policy-in-iraq.

71. During 1967 and 1990, South Yemen, officially known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, was a socialist state in the southeastern
provinces of the present-day Republic of Yemen.
72. U.S. Central Command, “About Us: U.S. Central Command History,” https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
73. Ibid.
74. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Englehardt, Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Special Report AD-A234 743, March 25, 1991, p. 5, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234743.
pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
75. Associated Press, “A Timeline of Iraq War, Troop Levels,” Internet Archive, updated May 25, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20141023033147/
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/07/a-timeline-of-iraq-war-tr_n_95534.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
76. BBC News, “Iraq War in Figures,” December 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739 (accessed May 5, 2022).
77. Reuters, “Timeline: Invasion, Surge, Withdrawal; U.S. Forces in Iraq,” December 18, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-pullout/
timeline-invasion-surge-withdrawal-u-s-forces-in-iraq-idUSTRE7BH08E20111218 (accessed May 5, 2022).
78. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10404, updated January 20, 2022, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10404 (accessed May 5, 2022).
79. Gordon Lubold and Michael C. Bender, “U.S. to Remove Patriot Missile Batteries from Saudi Arabia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated May 7,
2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-remove-patriot-missile-batteries-from-saudi-arabia-11588867916 (accessed May 5, 2022).
80. J. P. Lawrence, “US Troop Level Reduction in Middle East Likely as Focus Shifts Elsewhere,” Stars and Stripes, January 14, 2022, https://www.
stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2022-01-14/centcom-central-command-drawdown-iraq-afghanistan-kuwait-saudi-arabia-4289137.html
(accessed May 5, 2022).
81. Matthew Wallin, “U.S. Bases and Military Facilities in the Middle East,” American Security Project Fact Sheet, June 2018, https://www.
americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
82. Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of
Congress No. RS21513, updated May 12, 2021, pp. 8–11, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21513.pdf (accessed May 10, 2022).
83. Kenneth Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees
of Congress No. RS21852, updated October 28, 2021, pp. 14–16, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS21852.pdf (accessed May 10, 2022).
84. Kenneth Katzman, “Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress
No. RS21534, updated May 19, 2021, p. 14, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534 (accessed May 10, 2022).
156
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
85. Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RS951013, updated March 10, 2022, pp. 10–11, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/95-1013 (accessed May 10, 2022).
86. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees
of Congress No. RL33533, updated October 5, 2021, pp. 25-26, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33533 (accessed May 10, 2022).
87. Captain Marie Harnley, “Wing Leadership Visits Eskan Village,” U.S. Air Forces Central, July 5, 2013, http://www.afcent.af.mil/
Units/379thAirExpeditionaryWing/News/Display/tabid/5382/Article/350180/wing-leadership-visits-eskan-village.aspx (accessed May 5, 2022).
88. Kenneth Katzman, “Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of
Congress No. R44533, updated April 11, 2022, pp. 13–14, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533 (accessed May 10, 2022).
89. U.S. Army Central, “Eager Lion,” STAND-TO! The Official Focus of the U.S. Army, April 11, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-04-11
(accessed May 5, 2022).
90. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No.
RL33546, updated May 5, 2022, pp. 15–16, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33546 (accessed May 10, 2022).
91. U.S. Central Command, “About Us: CENTCOM Mission and Command Priorities,” https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
92. Louisa Brook-Holland, “UK Forces in the Middle East Region,” House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 08794, January 14, 2020, p. 2,
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8794/CBP-8794.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
93. Ibid., p. 3.
94. Malak Harbarb), “U.K. Opens Persian Gulf Military Base in Bahrain,” Associated Press, April 5, 2018, https://apnews.com/
article/403eea90b7054edaa978c0e51fd182c4 (accessed May 5, 2022).
95. U.K. Ministry of Defence and The Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Fallon, MP, “Multi-Million Pound Joint Venture Announced Between Britain and Oman,”
March 30, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/multi-million-pound-joint-venture-announced-between-britain-and-oman (accessed
May 5, 2022).
96. Frank Gardner, “‘East of Suez’: Are UK Forces Returning?” BBC News, April 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22333555 (accessed May 5, 2022).
97. Harriet Alexander, “Where Are the World’s Major Military Bases?” The Telegraph, July 11, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
defence/10173740/Where-are-the-worlds-major-military-bases.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
99. French Defense Attaché Office, Embassy of France to the United States, “French Armed Forces Update,” May 2021, https://franceintheus.org/
IMG/pdf/FAFU/FAFU_008b.pdf (accessed May 5, 2022).
100. James Hirst, “UK to Increase Military Training Presence in Iraq,” Forces.Net, February 18, 2021, https://www.forces.net/news/iraq/uk-increasemilitary-training-presence-iraq (accessed May 5, 2022).
101. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and
Natural Gas Shipments,” August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073 (accessed May 5, 2022).
102. U.S. Navy, Commander, Navy Installations Command, “Welcome to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Installation Information,” https://www.cnic.navy.
mil/regions/cnreurafcent/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html (accessed May 5, 2022).
103. Associated Press, “The New Military Powerhouse on the Red Sea: Tiny Djibouti,” Haaretz, April 10, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/the-new-military-powerhouse-on-the-red-sea-tiny-djibouti-1.5990505 (accessed May 5, 2022).
104. Donna Miles, “Centcom Undertakes Massive Logistical Drawdown in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, June 21, 2013, https://defence.pk/
pdf/threads/centcom-undertakes-massive-logistical-drawdown-in-afghanistan.259682/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
105. Percentages calculated based on data in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Country Comparisons—Roadways,” https://www.
cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/roadways/country-comparison/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
106. Zvi Mazel, “China’s Growing Economic Impact on the Middle East,” Geopolitical Intelligence Services Report, April 21, 2022, https://www.
gisreportsonline.com/r/china-middle-east/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
107. Katzman, “Bahrain: Issues for U.S. Policy,” pp. 11 and 20, and Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” p. 19.
108. Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” p. 18.
109. Katzman, “Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy,” p. 14.
110. Martin Placek, “Number of Ships Passing Through the Suez Canal from 1976 to 2021,” Statista, March 31, 2022, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/1252568/number-of-transits-in-the-suez-cana-annually/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
111. Michael Wahid Hanna, “Getting over Egypt: Time to Rethink Relations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6 (November/December 2015), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/getting-over-egypt (accessed May 5, 2022).
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98. Government of France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Country Files: United Arab Emirates,” updated May 14, 2019, https://www.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/united-arab-emirates/# (accessed May 5, 2022), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2022), p. 376.
112. Associated Press, “US Carrier Crosses Suez Canal into Red Sea,” The Times of Israel, November 8, 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-carriercrosses-suez-canal-into-red-sea/ (accessed May 5, 2022).
113. Brent Sadler, “What the Closing of the Suez Canal Says About U.S. Maritime Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 12, 2021, https://
www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/what-the-closing-the-suez-canal-says-about-us-maritime-security.
114. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,”
December 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42338 (accessed May 10, 2022).
115. Statista Research Department, “Oil Flows Through the Strait of Hormuz Between 2014 and 2020 (in Million Barrels per Day),” April 6, 2022,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277157/key-figures-for-the-strait-of-hormuz/ (accessed May 10, 2022).
116. United States Institute of Peace, “Timeline: U.S.–Iran Naval Encounters,” The Iran Primer, updated November 15, 2021, https://iranprimer.usip.org/
blog/2021/may/05/timeline-us-iran-naval-encounters#:~:text=The%20most%20recent%20incidents%20were,and%20Iran%20in%20a%20year
(accessed May 4, 2022).
117. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: Three Important Oil Trade Chokepoints Are Located Around
the Arabian Peninsula,” August 4, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352 (accessed May 10, 2022).
118. Seth J. Frantzman, “Is Iran’s Influence in Iraq Growing, or Has It Reached a Plateau?” The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2019, https://www.jpost.
com/Middle-East/Is-Irans-influence-in-Iraq-growing-or-has-it-reached-a-plateau-576104 (accessed May 4, 2022).

119. See, for example, World Bank, “Logistics Performance Index: Quality of Trade and Transport-Related Infrastructure (1=Low to 5=High),”
2007–2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/lp.lpi.infr.xq (accessed May 4, 2022).
158
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Asia
Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner,
and Walter Lohman
E
l
China (third);
l
Japan (fourth);
l
South Korea (sixth);
l
Taiwan (eighth);
l
India (ninth); and
l
Vietnam (10th).
America’s economic connections with these
countries and others in the region and beyond
contribute to a closely integrated global economy
characterized by ties in production, finance, services, information, and investment. When one part
of the system sneezes, other parts of the economic
body get sick—as demonstrated recently and most
starkly by the COVID-19 pandemic. The impact of
that crisis on both supply and demand, especially
with respect to technology, continues to affect defense planning, budgeting, and production in the
United States and across the region. Tensions in
the U.S.–China economic relationship have had a
similar impact.
Economics is central to understanding political
dynamics in Asia, but that is not the only important consideration. Several of the world’s largest
militaries are there, including those of China, India,
North and South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Vietnam. The United States also maintains a network of
treaty alliances and security partnerships, as well
as a significant military presence, in Asia, and five
Asian states (China, North Korea, India, Pakistan,
and Russia) possess nuclear weapons.
The region is a focus of American security concerns both because of its substantial military forces
and because of its legacy of conflict. Both of the two
major “hot” wars fought by the United States during
the Cold War (Korea and Vietnam) were fought in
Asia. Moreover, the Asian security environment is
unstable. For one thing, the Cold War has not ended
in Asia. Of the four states divided between Communism and democracy by the Cold War, three (China,
Korea, and Vietnam) are in Asia. Neither the Korean
situation nor the China–Taiwan situation has been
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
159

ver since the founding of the American Republic,
Asia has been a key U.S. area of interest for both
economic and security reasons. One of the first ships
to sail under an American flag was the aptly named
Empress of China, which inaugurated America’s participation in the lucrative China trade in 1784. In the
more than 235 years since then, the United States
has held to the strategic assumption that allowing
any single nation to dominate Asia would be inimical
to American interests. Asia is too important a market and too great a source of key resources for the
United States to be denied access. Thus, beginning
with U.S. Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door”
policy toward China in the 19th century, the United
States has worked to prevent the rise of a regional
hegemon in Asia, whether it was imperial Japan or
the Soviet Union.
In the 21st century, Asia’s importance to the United States will continue to grow. Asia is a key source
of vital natural resources and a crucial part of the
global value chain in areas like electronic components. Through 2021, six of America’s top 10 trading
partners were found in Asia:1
resolved despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Cold War itself was an ideological conflict
layered atop long-standing—and still lingering—
historical animosities. Asia is home to several major territorial disputes, among them disputes between or among:
l
l
l
l
l
l

l
Japan and Russia (Northern Territories/
Southern Kurils);
Japan, China, and Taiwan (Senkakus/Diaoyutai/Diaoyu Dao);
Korea and Japan (Dok-do/Takeshima);
Vietnam, China, and Taiwan
(Paracels/​Xisha Islands);
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and
the Philippines (Spratlys/Nansha Islands);
India and Pakistan (Kashmir); and
India and China (Aksai Chin and parts of the
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh).
Several of these unresolved differences could
devolve into war. Chinese air and sea incursions
around Taiwan—especially since Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine—have generated increased concern about
Taiwan’s survival as an independent nation. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is perpetually tense.
And China’s increasingly aggressive presence at sea
is bringing Beijing ever closer to conflict with the
U.S. military and the forces of its treaty allies and
security partners. On the China–India border, the
two sides have come to blows in recent years.
It is in light of this instability and the reluctance
of many states in the region to align with great powers that one should weigh the region’s lack of a political–security architecture. There is no Asian equivalent of NATO despite an ultimately failed mid-20th
century effort to forge a parallel multilateral security architecture through the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO). Regional security entities
like the Five Power Defense Arrangement (involving
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore in a peacetime “arrangement”
rather than an alliance) or discussion forums like
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the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and groupings
like the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus) have been far weaker. There also is
no Asian equivalent of the Warsaw Pact.
Instead, Asian security has been marked by a
combination of bilateral alliances, mostly centered
on the United States, and individual nations’ efforts
to maintain their own security. In recent years, these
core aspects of the regional security architecture
have been supplemented by “minilateral” consultations like the U.S.–Japan–Australia and India–Japan–
Australia trilaterals and the U.S.–Japan–Australia–
India quadrilateral dialogue (popularly known as
“the Quad”).
Nor is Asia undergirded by any significant economic architecture. Despite substantial trade and
expanding value chains among the various Asian
states, as well as with the rest of the world, formal
economic integration is limited. There are many
trade agreements among the nations of the region
and among these nations and countries outside
of Asia, most prominently the 15-nation Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and
11-nation Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), but
there is no counterpart to the European Union or
even to the European Economic Community or the
European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor
to European economic integration.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) is a far looser agglomeration of disparate
states, although they have succeeded in expanding
economic linkages among themselves over the past
50 years through a range of economic agreements
like the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The South
Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC),
which includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, has
been less important to regional stability. It is largely ineffective, both because of the lack of regional
economic integration and because of the historical
rivalry between India and Pakistan.
Important Alliances and
Bilateral Relations in Asia
The keys to America’s position in the Western
Pacific are its alliances with Japan, the Republic of
Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, supplemented by very close security relationships with New Zealand and Singapore, an emerging
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Japan. The U.S.–Japan defense relationship is
the linchpin of America’s network of relations in the
Western Pacific. The U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960, provides
for a deep alliance between two of the world’s largest
economies and most sophisticated military establishments. Changes in Japanese defense policies are
now enabling an even greater level of cooperation on
security issues, both between the two allies and with
other countries in the region.
Since the end of World War II, Japan’s defense
policy has been distinguished by Article 9 of the
Japanese constitution, which states in part that “the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes.”2 In effect,
this article prohibits the use of force by Japan’s governments as an instrument of national policy. It also
has led to several other associated policies.
One such policy was a prohibition against “collective self-defense.” Japan recognized that nations
have a right to employ their armed forces to help
other states defend themselves (in other words, to
engage in collective defensive operations) but rejected that policy for itself: Japan would employ its forces only in defense of Japan. This changed in 2015.
Japan passed legislation that enabled its military to
exercise limited collective self-defense in certain
cases involving threats to both the U.S. and Japan
as well as in multilateral peacekeeping operations.
In recent years, Japan has increased its security
cooperation with other Indo-Pacific democracies.
This cooperation has included enhancing security agreements, participating in more multilateral
military exercises, and providing ships to Southeast
Asian coast guard forces.
Tokyo relies heavily on the United States—and
Washington’s extended deterrence guarantee of
nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces—
for its security. Japan has developed a formidable
military by implementing significant changes in
security legislation and procuring an impressive
array of sophisticated weapons. Yet because of its
pacifist constitution and the devastation wrought
by its quest for regional dominance in World War
II, progress in altering Japan’s security posture has
always lagged behind faster-moving regional threats.
The Japanese people remain deeply suspicious of
any use of the military as a policy instrument—and
fearful that any easing of constraints will lead Japan
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strategic partnership with India, and evolving relationships with Southeast Asian partners like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The U.S. also has a
robust unofficial relationship with Taiwan.
The United States also benefits from the interoperability gained from sharing common weapons and
systems with many of its allies. Many nations, for
example, have equipped their ground forces with
M-16/M-4–based infantry weapons and share the
same 5.56 mm ammunition; they also field F-15
and F-16 combat aircraft and employ LINK-16 data
links among their naval forces. Australia, Japan, and
South Korea are partners in production of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, and all three countries have taken delivery of the aircraft. Partners like India and
Australia operate American-made P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft and C-17 transport aircraft.
Consequently, in the event of conflict, the region’s
various air, naval, and even land forces would be able
to share information in such key areas as air defense
and maritime domain awareness. This advantage is
enhanced by the constant ongoing range of both bilateral and multilateral exercises, which acclimate
various forces to operating together and familiarize
both American and local commanders with each other’s standard operating procedures (SOPs), as well
as training, tactics, and (in some cases) war plans.
In addition, “enabling” military agreements allow
the United States and several of its regional partners to access each other’s military facilities, share
intelligence and encrypted communications and
equipment, and refuel each other’s warships at sea.
While it does not constitute a formal alliance,
in November 2017, Australia, Japan, India, and the
U.S. reconstituted the Quad. Officials from the four
countries agreed to meet in the quadrilateral format
twice a year to discuss ways to strengthen strategic
cooperation and combat common threats. In 2019,
the group held its first meeting at the ministerial level and added a counterterrorism tabletop exercise
to its agenda. In 2020, officials from the four countries participated in a series of conference calls to
discuss responses to the COVID-19 pandemic that
also included government representatives from New
Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. In March 2021,
the leaders of the four nations held their first virtual
summit, marking a new level of interaction. In September 2021, the four leaders held the first in-person
Quad summit; it is expected that a second will be
held in Japan during 2022.

into military conflict. Each incremental step in expanding the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces has
therefore been immensely controversial.
As part of its relationship with Japan, the United
States maintains some 54,000 military personnel
and another 8,000 Department of Defense (DOD)
civilian employees in Japan under the rubric of U.S.
Forces Japan (USFJ).3 These forces include, among
other things, a forward-deployed carrier battle
group centered on the USS Ronald Reagan; an amphibious ready group at Sasebo centered on the
LHA-6 America, an aviation-optimized amphibious
assault ship; and the bulk of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa. U.S. forces
exercise regularly with their Japanese counterparts,
and this collaboration has expanded in recent years
to include joint amphibious exercises in addition to
air and naval exercises.
The American presence is supported by a substantial American defense infrastructure throughout Japan, including Okinawa. These major bases
provide key logistical and communications support
for U.S. operations throughout the Western Pacific, cutting travel time substantially compared with
deployments from Hawaii or the West Coast of the
United States. They also provide key listening posts
for the monitoring of Russian, Chinese, and North
Korean military operations. This capability is supplemented by Japan’s growing array of space systems, including new reconnaissance satellites.
The Japanese government “pays roughly $2
billion per year to defray the cost of stationing U.S.
military personnel in Japan.”4 These funds cover
approximately 75 percent of the cost of deployed
U.S. forces,5 including the costs of utility and labor at U.S. bases, improvements in U.S. facilities in
Japan, and relocation of training exercises away
from populated areas in Japan. Japan paid nearly
all of the cost of new U.S. military facilities at Futenma and Iwakuni as well as a third of the cost of
new facilities in Guam. It also purchases 90 percent of its weapons and defense systems from the
United States.6
During bilateral Special Measures Agreement negotiations, the Trump Administration sought a 400
percent increase in Japanese contributions for remuneration above the cost of stationing U.S. troops
in Japan. In January 2022, the Biden Administration
reached an agreement with Japan on a new five-year
cost-sharing agreement that includes incremental
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increases in Japanese funding, thereby resolving a
major irritant in the bilateral relationship.7
The United States has long sought to expand Japanese participation in international security affairs.
Japan’s political system, grounded in the country’s
constitution, legal decisions, and popular attitudes,
has generally resisted this effort. However, in recent years, Tokyo has become increasingly alarmed
by China’s surging defense expenditures, rapidly
expanding and modernizing military capabilities,
and escalating aerial and maritime incursions into
Japan’s territorial waters and contiguous areas. In
response, Japan has reoriented its forces so that they
can better counter the Chinese threat to its remote
southwest islands. It also has acquired new capabilities, built new facilities, deployed new units and
augmented others, improved its amphibious warfare
capabilities, increased its air and sea mobility, and
enhanced its command-and-control capabilities for
joint and integrated operations.
Recently, the growing potential for a Taiwan crisis has led senior Japanese officials to issue increasingly bold public statements of support for Taipei
and more directly align Japan’s national interests
with the protection of Taiwan’s security. As yet, however, there have been no declared Japanese policy
changes and no pledge to intervene directly in a military conflict to defend Taiwan or even to allow U.S.
defense of Taiwan from bases in Japan.
Similarly, heightened Japanese concern about
the growing North Korean missile and nuclear
threats has triggered a resurgence of debate about
whether the country should augment its defenses
by acquiring strike capabilities, which would enable Japan to conduct an attack against targets in
an opponent’s country. Japan’s legal interpretation
of what is allowed under its peace constitution is
not static. It has evolved in response to increasing
regional threats, Japan’s improving military capabilities, and Tokyo’s perception of the strength of its
alliance with Washington.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has stated that
Japan should consider building a missile-strike capability as a “viable option” against China and North
Korea, to be implemented in response to initial attacks.8 Pursuing strike capabilities would be the
subject of great controversy—both among the Japanese people and among the people of neighboring
countries—and would require deft public diplomacy
to overcome strong resistance to such a significant
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
centered mainly on the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division,
rotating brigade combat teams, and a significant
number of combat aircraft.
The U.S.–ROK defense relationship involves
one of the more integrated and complex command-and-control structures. A United Nations
Command (UNC) established in 1950 was the basis for the American intervention and remained in
place after the armistice was signed in 1953. UNC
has access to seven bases in Japan to support U.N.
forces in Korea. In concrete terms, however, it oversaw only South Korean and American forces as other
nations’ contributions were gradually withdrawn or
reduced to token elements.
Although the 1953 armistice ended the Korean
War, UNC retained operational control (OPCON) of
South Korean forces until 1978, when it was transferred to the newly established Combined Forces
Command (CFC). Headed by the American Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who is also Commander, U.N. Command, CFC reflects an unparalleled degree of U.S.–South Korean military integration. CFC
returned peacetime OPCON of South Korean forces
to Seoul in 1994. If war became imminent, South Korean forces would become subordinate to the CFC
commander, who in turn remains subordinate to
both countries’ national command authorities.
In 2007, then-President Roh Moo-hyun requested that the United States return wartime OPCON of
South Korean forces to Seoul. This decision engendered significant opposition within South Korea and
raised serious military questions about the transfer’s
impact on unity of command. Faced with various
North Korean provocations, including a spate of missile tests as well as attacks on South Korean military
forces and territory in 2010, Washington and Seoul
agreed in late 2014 to postpone wartime OPCON
transfer and adopt a conditions-based rather than
timeline-based policy. After wartime OPCON transfer, the CFC commander would be a South Korean
general with a U.S. general as deputy commander.
The U.S. general would continue to serve as commander of UNC and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). The
CFC commander, regardless of nationality, would
always remain under the direction and guidance of
U.S. and South Korean political and military national
command authorities.
President Moon Jae-in advocated for an expedited OPCON transition during his administration, but
critical conditions, including improvement in South
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163

shift in Japan’s post–World War II security posture.
Although this is now being discussed more openly by
politicians, Japanese strike capability is still only at
the theoretical debate stage. Tokyo has yet to articulate strike policy, strategy, a doctrine of employment,
triggering events, procurement, deployment, or how
offensive systems would train in Japan.
Contentious historical issues from Japan’s brutal 1910–1945 occupation of the Korean Peninsula
have been serious enough to torpedo efforts to improve defense cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. South Korean–Japanese relations took a major
downturn in 2018 when the South Korean Supreme
Court ruled that Japanese companies could be
forced to pay occupation reparations. In December
2018, an incident between a South Korean naval ship
and a Japanese air force plane further exacerbated
tensions. Japan responded in July 2019 by imposing restrictions on exports to South Korea of three
chemicals that are critical to the production of semiconductors and smartphones.9 Seoul then threatened to withdraw from the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA),
which enables the sharing of classified intelligence
and military information on the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. The Moon Jae-in administration relented and maintained the agreement, but
there was public criticism of U.S. pressure.
The election of new leaders in South Korea and
Japan has raised hopes that it might be possible to
reduce tensions by separating difficult historic issues from the necessity of addressing present-day
security threats. Prime Minister Kishida was responsible for two Japanese–South Korean agreements10 while he served as foreign minister, and
South Korean President Yoon Seok-youl, elected in
March 2022, has vowed to build a “future-oriented
relationship” with Japan.11
Republic of Korea. The United States and the
Republic of Korea signed their Mutual Defense
Treaty in 1953. That treaty codified the relationship that had grown from the Korean War, when
the United States dispatched troops to help South
Korea defend itself against invasion by Communist
North Korea. Since then, the two states have forged
an enduring alliance supplemented by a substantial
trade and economic relationship that includes a free
trade agreement.
The U.S. is committed to maintaining 28,500
troops on the Korean Peninsula. This presence is

Korean forces and a decrease in North Korea’s nuclear program, have yet to be met.12 President Yoon
Seok-youl, elected in March 2009, criticized Moon’s
push for a premature return of wartime OPCON
from United Nations Command before Seoul had
fulfilled the agreed-upon conditions.
The domestic political constraints under which
South Korea’s military operates are less stringent
than those that govern the operations of the Japanese military. South Korea has fought alongside the
United States in every conflict since the Korean War.
Seoul sent 300,000 troops to the Vietnam War, and
5,000 of them were killed. At one point, it fielded
the third-largest troop contingent in Iraq after the
United States and Britain. It also has conducted anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and has
participated in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, East Timor, and elsewhere.
South Korean defense planning remains focused
on North Korea, especially as Pyongyang has deployed its forces in ways that optimize a southward
advance and has carried out several penetrations
of ROK territory by ship, submarine, commandos,
and drones. The sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan and shelling of Yongpyeong-do in 2010,
which together killed 48 military personnel, wounded 16, and killed two civilians, have only heightened
concerns about North Korea.
In response to Pyongyang’s expanding nuclear
strike force, South Korea created a “3K” tiered defense strategy comprised of Kill Chain (preemptive
attack); the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD)
system; and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) system. The South Korean military is a sizeable force with advanced weapons and
innovative military education and training. South
Korean military spending has increased, and Seoul
appears to be procuring the right mix of capabilities. U.S.–South Korean interoperability has improved, partly because of continued purchases of
U.S. weapons systems.
Over the past several decades, the American
presence on the peninsula has slowly declined. In
the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon withdrew
the 7th Infantry Division, leaving only the 2nd Infantry Division on the peninsula. Those forces have
been positioned farther back so that few Americans
are now deployed on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Traditionally, U.S. military forces have engaged regularly in major exercises with their ROK
164
counterparts, including the Key Resolve and Foal
Eagle series, both of which involved the deployment
of substantial numbers of forces and were intended
partly to deter Pyongyang as well as to give U.S. and
ROK forces a chance to practice operating together.
However, after the 2018 U.S.–North Korean Summit,
President Donald Trump announced unilaterally that
he was cancelling major bilateral military exercises
because he thought they were provocative and expensive.13 The President made this decision without
consulting the DOD, U.S. Forces Korea, or allies South
Korea and Japan. During the next four years, the U.S.
and South Korea cancelled numerous exercises and
imposed constraints on additional exercises.
North Korea did not reciprocate with any diplomatic gesture or military constraints in response
to this unilateral U.S. concession. The outbreak of
COVID-19 in South Korea in 2020 led to the additional curtailment of training activity, raising the
possibility that allied deterrence and defense capabilities could be further degraded. In March 2022,
the U.S. conducted its first aircraft carrier exercise
near Korea since 2018, and the Biden Administration appears likely to resume large-scale allied military exercises in South Korea.14
The ROK government provides substantial resources to defray the costs of U.S. Forces Korea. The
bilateral, cost-sharing Special Measures Agreement
has offset the non-personnel costs of stationing U.S.
forces in South Korea since 1991 and is renegotiated every five years. In February 2019, South Korea
agreed to increase its share of the cost by approximately 8 percent to $924 million. Later in 2019,
President Trump demanded a fivefold increase of
$5 billion a year and threatened to reduce or remove
U.S. forces from South Korea. In April 2021, the
Biden Administration signed an agreement accepting an incremental increase in Seoul’s contribution
in line with previous agreements, thereby defusing
tensions within the alliance.
South Korea spends 2.6 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—more than is
spent by any European ally. Seoul absorbs costs not
covered in the cost-sharing agreement, including
$10 billion, or 93 percent, of the cost of constructing
Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. base on foreign
soil. During the past four years, South Korea has purchased $13 billion in arms from the United States.15
The Philippines. America’s oldest defense
relationship in Asia is with the Philippines. The
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P), ended during
the first part of 2015.
The U.S. presence in Mindanao continued at
a reduced level until the Trump Administration,
alarmed by the terrorist threat there, began Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE–P). The presence of 200–300 American advisers proved very
valuable to the Philippines in its 2017 battle against
Islamist insurgents in Marawi.16
Continued on-the-ground military assistance
for the counterterrorism challenge in Mindanao
and other security cooperation in the Philippines
received a boost in July 2021 when the Philippines,
during a visit by American Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin, retracted its intention to abrogate
the 1998 U.S.–Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Since February 2020, the VFA has
operated on serial six-month extensions offered by
the Philippine President. An instrument of the MDT,
the VFA specifies the procedures governing the deployment of U.S. forces and equipment to the Philippines. It also governs the application of domestic
Philippine law to U.S. personnel, which is the most
substantive part of the VFA and historically its most
controversial.
The VFA undergirds approximately 280 U.S.–
Philippine annual exercises—more than are conducted with any other military in Southeast Asia.
Its abrogation would have slowed the rate of these
interactions, conditioned their composition, and exposed each element of them to political pressures in
the Philippines. Its preservation, on the other hand,
not only sheds these constraints, but also enables the
expansion of cooperation. The most recent example
was the conduct of annual Balikatan exercises, billed
by both sides as the largest ever held.17 The U.S. embassy reported deployment of “nearly 9,000” troops,
“more than 50 aircraft, four ships, 10 amphibious
craft, four HIMARS rocket system launchers, and
four Patriot missile systems” as well as “approximately 40 personnel from the Australian Defense
Force.”18 The U.S. and the Philippines have also
resumed plans for base improvement and sharing
arrangements under the 2014 U.S.–Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).19
The U.S. government has long made it clear
that any attack on Philippine government ships
or aircraft or on the Philippine armed forces—for
example, by China—would be covered under the
U.S.–Philippine mutual defense treaty.20 This makes
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165

United States seized the Philippines from the
Spanish more than a century ago as a result of the
Spanish–American War and a subsequent conflict
with indigenous Philippine nationalist forces. Unlike other colonial powers, however, the U.S. put
in place a mechanism by which the Philippines
could transition through a period as a commonwealth until receiving full independence in 1946.
Just as important, substantial numbers of Filipinos
fought alongside the United States against Japan
in World War II, establishing a bond between the
two peoples. Following World War II and after assisting the newly independent Filipino government
against the Communist Hukbalahap movement in
the 1940s, the United States and the Philippines
signed a mutual defense treaty (MDT).
For much of the period between 1898 and the end
of the Cold War, the largest American bases in the
Pacific were in the Philippines, centered on the U.S.
Navy base in Subic Bay and the complex of airfields
that developed around Clark Field (later Clark Air
Base). While the Philippines have never had the
ability to provide substantial financial support for
the American presence, the unparalleled base infrastructure provided replenishment and repair facilities and substantially extended deployment periods
throughout the East Asian littoral.
These bases, being reminders of the colonial era,
were often centers of controversy. In 1991, a successor to the Military Bases Agreement between the U.S.
and the Philippines was submitted to the Philippine
Senate for ratification. After a lengthy debate, the
Philippines rejected the treaty, thereby compelling
American withdrawal from Philippine bases. Given
the effects of the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo,
which devastated Clark Air Base and damaged many
Subic Bay facilities, and the end of the Cold War, it
was not felt that closure of the bases would fundamentally damage America’s posture in the region.
Moreover, despite the closing of the American
bases and consequent slashing of American military assistance, U.S.–Philippine military relations
remained close, and assistance began to increase
again after 9/11 as U.S. forces supported Philippine
efforts to counter Islamic terrorist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), in the South of
the archipelago. From 2002–2015, the U.S. rotated
500–600 special operations forces regularly through
the Philippines to assist in counterterrorism operations. That operation, Joint Special Operations

it incumbent on the U.S., consistent with its constitutional procedures, to come to the defense of the
Philippines. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
reiterated this commitment in two separate calls
with the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs in
January and April 2021.21 Secretary of Defense Austin made a similar statement in September, also reiterating the treaty’s application to the South China
Sea, an issue that was once subject to some doubt.22
Thailand. The U.S.–Thai security relationship
is built on the 1954 Manila Pact, which established
the now-defunct SEATO, and the 1962 Thanat–Rusk
agreement.23 These were supplemented by the Joint
Vision Statements for the Thai–U.S. Defense Alliance of 2012 and 2020.24 In addition, Thailand gained
improved access to American arms sales in 2003
when it was designated a “major, non-NATO ally.”
Thailand’s central location has made it an important part of the network of U.S. alliances in Asia.
During the Vietnam War, American aircraft based
in Thailand ranged from fighter-bombers and B-52s
to reconnaissance aircraft. In the first Gulf War and
again in the Iraq War, some of those same air bases
were essential for the rapid deployment of American forces to the Persian Gulf. Access to these bases
remains critical to U.S. global operations.
U.S. and Thai forces exercise together regularly,
most notably in the annual Cobra Gold exercises,
which were initiated in 1982. This builds on a partnership that began with the dispatch of Thai forces
to the Korean War, during which Thailand lost more
than 1,200 of the approximately 6,000 troops it had
deployed. The Cobra Gold exercise is the world’s
longest-running international military exercise25
and one of its largest. The most recent, in 2022, although again scaled back because of concern for the
COVID pandemic, involved 1,200 American troops
and 2,000 Thai troops26 as well as participants from
a range of other countries, including India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.27 For many
years, a small number of Chinese personnel have
also participated. Because of pandemic concerns,
“[a]ctivities like live fire drills, amphibious landings
and evacuation operations” were excluded.28
In contrast to the close relations between their
militaries, U.S.–Thailand political relations have
been strained since 2006. A coup that year and another in 2014 limited military-to-military relations
for more than 10 years. This was due partly to standing U.S. law prohibiting assistance to governments
166
that result from coups against democratically elected governments and partly to policy choices by the
U.S. government.
The U.S. and Thailand, however, have managed to
salvage much of their military-to-military cooperation and now look to normalize relations. This has
been made possible by two developments: elections
in 2019, which led to a new civilian government, and
Washington’s new strategic focus on great-power
competition with China. As a result, the U.S. accepted the flawed Thai electoral model as an opportunity
to encourage the relationship. This encompassed
high-level engagement and arms transfers to the
Thai military of major systems like Stryker armored
vehicles and Black Hawk helicopters. Under the
Biden Administration, this trend may lead to the
sale of the F-35.29
Over several decades, amid uncertainty in the U.S.
commitment to the relationship, Thailand has been
drifting geopolitically away from the U.S. and toward
China. This process has been accelerating partly
because of expanding economic relations between
the two states and partly because of complications
in U.S.–Thai relations arising from the political situation in Thailand and a general difference in threat
perception concerning China. The U.S. considers
China its greatest long-term security challenge;
Thailand has no such concern.
Relations between the Thai and Chinese militaries have improved steadily over the years. Intelligence officers began formal meetings in 1988. Thai
and Chinese military forces have engaged in joint
naval exercises since 2005, joint counterterrorism
exercises since 2007, and joint marine exercises
since 2010 and conducted their first joint air force
exercises in 2015.30 The Thais conduct more bilateral exercises with the Chinese than are conducted by
any other military in Southeast Asia.31
The Thais also have been buying Chinese military equipment for many years. Purchases in recent
years have included significant buys of battle tanks
and armored personnel carriers.32 According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), from 2006–2021, China has been a significantly bigger supplier than the U.S.33 These deals,
however, have not been without difficulty. Thailand’s 2017 acquisition of submarines, for example,
has been stalled first by a combination of budget
restraints, the priority of COVID-19 response, and
public protest34 and more recently by Germany’s
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
include “fifth generation integration, aircraft maintenance integration, aeromedical evacuation (AME)
integration, refuelling certification, and combined
technical skills and logistics training.”41 It has been
accompanied by the buildout of related infrastructure at Australian bases and, of note most recently,
a massive fuel storage facility in Darwin.42 Other
improvements are underway at training areas and
ranges in Australia’s Northern Territories.43
In 2021, the U.S., Australia, and the U.K., which
already enjoyed close security cooperation, moved
bilaterally and in the context of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement to formalize and deepen
these ties through the Australia–United Kingdom–
United States partnership (AUKUS). This trilateral
partnership is focused on current defense-related
technology. Central to and most immediate among its
stated priorities is support for Australia’s acquisition
of “a conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capability at the earliest possible date, while
upholding the highest nonproliferation standards.”44
The White House has reported either “strong progress” or “recently initiated work” in several areas
beyond submarine technology, which is already underway. These areas include (among others) undersea
robotic autonomous systems, quantum technologies,
artificial intelligence, and hypersonic capabilities.45
This new, cutting-edge cooperation under the
USFPI and AUKUS comes on top of long-standing
joint U.S.–Australia training, the most prominent
example of which is Talisman Saber. These biannual exercises involve U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines as well as almost two-dozen ships, multiple civilian agencies, and participants embedded
from other partner countries.46 COVID forced the
2021 iteration to downsize, but the 2019 version
included more than 34,000 personnel from the U.S.
and Australia.
Singapore. Singapore is America’s closest
non-ally partner in the Western Pacific. The agreements that support this security relationship are the
2015 U.S.–Singapore Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which is an update of a similar 2005
agreement, and the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in
Singapore, which was renewed in 2019 for another
15 years. Pursuant to these agreements and other
understandings, Singapore hosts U.S. naval ships
and aircraft as well as the principal logistics support
node for the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
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refusal to allow export of the engines the boats require.35 Submarines could be particularly critical to
Sino–Thai relations because their attendant training
and maintenance will require a greater Chinese military presence at Thai military facilities.
Australia. Australia is one of America’s most important allies in the Indo-Pacific. U.S.–Australia security ties date back to World War I when U.S. forces
fought under Australian command on the Western
Front in Europe, and they deepened during World
War II when, after Japan commenced hostilities in
the Western Pacific (and despite British promises),
Australian forces committed to the North Africa
campaign were not returned to defend the continent.
As Japanese forces attacked the East Indies and secured Singapore, Australia turned to the United
States to bolster its defenses, and American and Australian forces cooperated closely in the Pacific War.
Those ties and America’s role as the main external
supporter of Australian security were codified in the
Australia–New Zealand–U.S. (ANZUS) pact of 1951.
Today, the two nations’ chief defense and foreign
policy officials meet annually (most recently in August 2020) in the Australia–United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) process to address such issues of
mutual concern as security developments in the
Asia–Pacific region, global security and development,
and bilateral security cooperation.36 Australia also
has long granted the United States access to a number of joint facilities, including space surveillance
facilities at Pine Gap, which has been characterized
as “arguably the most significant American intelligence-gathering facility outside the United States,”37
and naval communications facilities on the North
West Cape of Australia.38
In 2011, cooperation and U.S. access were expanded with the U.S. Force Posture Initiatives (USFPI),
which included Marine Rotational Force–Darwin
and Enhanced Air Cooperation. The rotation of up
to 2,500 U.S. Marines for a set of six-month exercises near Darwin, Australia, began in 2012. The
current rotation is comprised of 2,200 Marines39
and an Army detachment.40 In the past, these forces have deployed with assets including a tilt-rotor
MV-22 Osprey squadron, UH-1Y Venom utility
and AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters, and RQ-21A
Blackjack drones.
The USFPI’s Enhanced Air Cooperation component began in 2017 building on preexisting schedules of activity. New activities under the initiative

Singapore trains approximately 1,000 military
personnel in the United States each year on such
American-produced equipment as F-15SG and
F-16C/D fighter aircraft and CH-47 Chinook and
AH-64 Apache helicopters.47 Along with American
allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea, Singapore
also has ordered and been approved to buy the F-35.48
Like others of its assets, the F-35s will be housed at
training facilities in the U.S.49 and perhaps on Guam
under an agreement reached in 2019.50
New Zealand. For much of the Cold War, U.S. defense ties with New Zealand were similar to those
between America and Australia. In 1986, however,
as a result of controversies over U.S. Navy employment of nuclear power and the possible deployment
of U.S. naval vessels with nuclear weapons, the U.S.
suspended its obligations to New Zealand under the
1951 ANZUS Treaty.
Defense relations improved in the early 21st century as New Zealand committed forces to Afghanistan and dispatched an engineering detachment
to Iraq. The 2010 Wellington Declaration and 2012
Washington Declaration, while not restoring full
security ties, allowed the two nations to resume
high-level defense dialogues.51 As part of this warming of relations, New Zealand rejoined the multinational U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval
exercise in 2012 and has participated in each iteration since then.
In 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
and New Zealand Defense Minister Jonathan Coleman announced the resumption of military-to-military cooperation, and in July 2016, the U.S. accepted an invitation from New Zealand to make a single
port call, reportedly with no change in U.S. policy to
confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on
the ship.52 At the time of the visit in November 2016,
both sides claimed to have satisfied their respective
legal requirements.53 The prime minister expressed
confidence that the vessel was not nuclear-powered
and did not possess nuclear armaments, and the U.S.
neither confirmed nor denied this.
The November 2016 visit occurred in a unique
context, including an international naval review and
a relief response to the Kaikoura earthquake. Since
then, there have been several other ship visits by the
U.S. Coast Guard, and in 2017, New Zealand lent the
services of one its naval frigates to the U.S. Seventh
Fleet following a deadly collision between the destroyer USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine container
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ship that killed seven American sailors. Another
U.S. naval warship did not visit New Zealand until
November 2021, when the guided-missile destroyer
USS Howard made a port call.54
New Zealand is a member of the elite Five Eyes
intelligence alliance with the U.S., Canada, Australia,
and the U.K.55
Taiwan. When the United States shifted its
recognition of the government of China from the
Republic of China (on Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC, the mainland), it also declared
certain commitments concerning the security of
Taiwan. These commitments are embodied in the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the subsequent “Six
Assurances.”
The TRA is an American law, not a treaty. Under
the TRA, the United States maintains programs,
transactions, and other relations with Taiwan
through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).
Except for the Sino–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty,
which had governed U.S. security relations with Taiwan and was terminated by President Jimmy Carter following the shift in recognition to the PRC, all
other treaties and international agreements made
between the Republic of China and the United States
remain in force.
Under the TRA, it is U.S. policy “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.”56 The TRA
also states that the U.S. “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”57 The U.S.
has implemented these provisions of the act through
sales of weapons to Taiwan.
The TRA states that it is also U.S. policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan
by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of
the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States” and “to maintain the capacity of the
United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan.”58 To this end:
The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or
the social or economic system of the people on
Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the
United States arising therefrom. The President
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to
any such danger.59
Supplementing the TRA are the “Six Assurances” issued by President Ronald Reagan in a secret
July 1982 memo, later publicly released and the
subject of hearings held by the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs in August 1982.60 These assurances
were intended to moderate the third Sino–American communiqué, itself generally seen as one of the
“Three Communiqués” that form the foundation
of U.S.–PRC relations. These assurances of July 14,
1982, were that:
In negotiating the third Joint Communiqué with
the PRC, the United States:
1.
Although the United States sells Taiwan a variety of military equipment and sends observers to its
major annual exercises, it does not engage in joint
exercises with Taiwan’s armed forces. Some Taiwan military officers, however, attend professional
military education institutions in the United States.
There also are regular high-level meetings between
senior U.S. and Taiwan defense officials, both uniformed and civilian.
The United States does not maintain any bases in
Taiwan. However, in late 2021, after reports of an uptick in the number of U.S. military advisers in Taiwan,
Taiwan’s President acknowledged their presence,62
going back at least to 2008.63 The numbers involved
are in the dozens64 with most of these advisers involved in the provision of training on U.S.-sourced
military equipment.
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has not agreed to set a date for ending
arms sales to Taiwan;
2. has not agreed to hold prior consultations
with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;
3. will not play any mediation role between
Taipei and Beijing;
4. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan
Relations Act;
5. has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;
6. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.61
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. On a region-wide basis, the U.S. has two major ongoing defense-related initiatives to expand its relationships
and diversify the geographical spread of its forces.
The Maritime Security Initiative is intended to improve the security capacity of U.S. partners, and the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) bolsters America’s military presence and makes it more accountable. Among the most important of the bilateral
partnerships in this effort, beyond those listed above,
are Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. None of these
relationships is as extensive and formal as America’s
relationship with Singapore, India, and U.S. treaty
allies, but all are of growing significance.
Since shortly after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1995,
the U.S. and Vietnam also have gradually normalized
their defense relationship. The relationship was codified in 2011 with a Memorandum of Understanding Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation. In
2015, the MOU was updated with the Joint Vision
Statement on Defense Cooperation, which includes
references to such issues as “defense technology exchange,”65 and was implemented under a three-year
2018–2020 Plan of Action for United States–Viet
Nam Defense Cooperation that was agreed upon in
2017.66 According to USINDOPACOM’s 2022 command posture statement, the U.S. and Vietnam “are
expected to issue a new Defense Cooperation Plan of
Action for 2022–2024 and an updated Defense MOU
Annex codifying new cooperation areas, including
defense trade, pilot training, cyber, and personnel
accounting (POW/MIA).”67
The most significant development with respect
to security ties over the past several years has been
relaxation of the ban on sales of arms to Vietnam.
The U.S. lifted the embargo on maritime security–related equipment in the fall of 2014 and then ended
the embargo on arms sales completely in 2016. The
embargo had long served as a psychological obstacle
to Vietnamese cooperation on security issues; lifting
it, however, has not changed the nature of the articles that are likely to be sold.
Transfers to date have been to the Vietnamese
Coast Guard. These include provision under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program of two decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters, with a possible
third on the way,68 and 24 Metal Shark patrol boats
as well as infrastructure support.69 Vietnam is scheduled to take delivery of six unmanned Boeing-made

Scan Eagle aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its Coast
Guard.70 The U.S. is also providing T-6 turboprop
trainer aircraft.71 Agreement has yet to be reached
with respect to sales of bigger-ticket items like refurbished P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, although they
have been discussed.
The U.S.–Vietnam Cooperative Humanitarian
and Medical Storage Initiative (CHAMSI) is designed to enhance cooperation on humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief by, among other things,
prepositioning related American equipment in Da
Nang, Vietnam.72 This is a sensitive issue for Vietnam and is not often referenced publicly, but it was
emphasized during Vietnamese Prime Minister
Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to Washington in 2017 and
again during Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s
visit to Vietnam in 2018. In the same year, Vietnam
participated in RIMPAC for the first time. It did
not participate in the exercise in 2020, when it was
scaled down because of COVID-19,73 or in 2022.
There have been two high-profile port calls to
Vietnam since 2018. Early that year, the USS Carl
Vinson visited Da Nang with its escort ships in the
first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier since the Vietnam War, and another carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, visited Da Nang in March 2020. These are
significant signals from Vietnam about its receptivity to partnership with the U.S. military—messages
underscored very subtly in Vietnam’s 2019 Viet Nam
National Defence white paper.74
Nevertheless, significant limits on the U.S.–Vietnam security relationship persist, including a Vietnamese defense establishment that is very cautious
in its selection of defense partners, party-to-party
ties between the Communist Parties of Vietnam and
China, and a Vietnamese foreign policy that seeks
to balance relationships with all major powers. The
U.S., like others among Vietnam’s security partners,
remains officially restricted to one port call a year
with an additional one to two calls on Vietnamese
bases being negotiable.
The U.S. and Malaysia, despite occasional political differences, “have maintained steady defense
cooperation since the 1990s.” Examples of this cooperation include Malaysian assistance in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and involvement in anti-piracy operations “near the Malacca Strait and…off the
Horn of Africa” as well as “jungle warfare training
at a Malaysian facility, bilateral exercises like Kris
Strike, and multilateral exercises like Cobra Gold,
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which is held in Thailand and involves thousands
of personnel from several Asian countries plus the
United States.”75 The U.S. has occasionally flown
P-3 and/or P-8 patrol aircraft out of Malaysian bases in Borneo.
The U.S. relationship with Malaysia was strengthened under President Barack Obama and continued
on a positive trajectory under the Trump Administration. In addition to cooperation on counterterrorism, the U.S. is focused on helping Malaysia to ensure
maritime domain awareness. In 2020, then-Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia Reed B. Werner summarized recent U.S. assistance in this area:
[M]aritime domain awareness is important for
Malaysia, given where it sits geographically.
Since 2017, we have provided nearly US$200
million (RM853 million) in grant assistance
to the Malaysian Armed Forces to enhance
maritime domain awareness, and that includes
ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
maritime surveillance upgrades, and longrange air defence radar.76
The upgrading of its F-18 fleet is the most significant U.S. defense program currently underway with
Malaysia.77 Malaysia reportedly also “is hoping to
buy Kuwait’s entire fleet of Boeing F/A-18 Hornet
multi-role fighter jets, although discussions between
both governments over the sale have yet to begin.”78
The U.S.–Indonesia defense relationship was
revived in 2005 following a period of estrangement
caused by American concerns about human rights. It
now includes regular joint exercises, port calls, and
sales of weaponry. Because of their impact on the
operating environment in and around Indonesia, as
well as the setting of priorities in the U.S.–Indonesia
relationship, the U.S. has also worked closely with
Indonesia’s defense establishment to reform Indonesia’s strategic defense planning processes.
U.S.–Indonesia military cooperation is governed
by the 2010 Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense and the
2015 Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation79 as well as the 2010 Comprehensive
Partnership. These agreements have encompassed
“more than 200 bilateral military engagements a
year” and cooperation in six areas: “maritime security and domain awareness; defense procurement
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government. In February 2020, Ambassador Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and chief negotiator Abdul Ghani Baradar signed a tentative peace agreement in which the Taliban agreed that it would not
allow al-Qaeda or any other transnational terrorist
group to use Afghan soil. It also agreed not to attack
U.S. forces as long as they provided and remained
committed to a withdrawal timeline, eventually set
at May 2021.
In April 2021, President Joseph Biden announced
that the U.S. would be withdrawing its remaining
2,500 soldiers from Afghanistan by September 11,
2021, remarking that America’s “reasons for remaining in Afghanistan are becoming increasingly
unclear.”87 As the final contingent of U.S. forces was
leaving Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban
launched a rapid offensive across the country, seizing provincial capitals and eventually the national
capital, Kabul, in a matter of weeks. During the Taliban offensive, President Ghani fled the country for
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Afghan
security forces largely abandoned their posts.88
Having left the air force base at Bagram in July,
the U.S. and other countries were left trying to evacuate their citizens and allies from the Kabul International Airport as the Taliban assumed control
of the capital. Amid the chaos, a suicide bombing
attack on the airport perimeter on August 26 killed
13 U.S. military personnel and nearly 200 Afghans.
IS-K, the local branch of ISIS, claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Biden Administration
subsequently launched drone strikes on two IS-K
targets.89 The last U.S. forces were withdrawn on
August 30, 2021.
Early in September, the Taliban formed a new
government comprised almost entirely of hardline elements of the Taliban and Haqqani Network,
including several individuals on the U.S. government’s Specially Designated Global Terrorists list.90
Sirajuddin Haqqani, arguably the most powerful
figure in the new Afghan government, carries a $10
million U.S. bounty. Since seizing power, the Taliban
government has hunted down and executed hundreds of former government officials and members
of the Afghan security forces. It also has cracked
down on Afghanistan’s free press, banned education
for girls beyond sixth grade while the daughters of
several Taliban leaders attend school in Pakistan
and the UAE, and curtailed the rights of women
and minorities.
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and joint research and development; peacekeeping operations and training; professionalization;
HA/DR [High Availability/Disaster Recovery]; and
countering transnational threats such as terrorism
and piracy.”80
In 2021, the agreements framed new progress in
the relationship that included breaking ground on
a new coast guard training base,81 inauguration of a
new Strategic Dialogue,82 and the largest-ever U.S.–
Indonesia army exercise.83 This exercise, Garuda
Shield, involved a combined 4,500 troops. In a major
2022 development, the U.S. agreed to sell Indonesia
up to 36 F-15s and related equipment and munitions
worth $14 billion.84 As of March 2021, the U.S. “ha[d]
$1.88 billion in active government-to-government
sales cases with Indonesia under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.”85
The U.S. and Indonesia also have signed two of
the four foundational information-sharing agreements that the U.S. maintains with its closest partners: the General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).
Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, U.S. forces
invaded Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.
This marked the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom to combat al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. The U.S., in alliance with the U.K. and the
anti-Taliban Afghan Northern Alliance forces, ousted the Taliban from power in December 2001. Most
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders fled across the border
into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
where they regrouped and initiated an insurgency in
Afghanistan in 2003.
In August 2003, NATO joined the war in Afghanistan and assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2011, at the
height of the war, there were 50 troop-contributing
nations and nearly 150,000 NATO and U.S. forces on
the ground in Afghanistan. On December 28, 2014,
NATO formally ended combat operations and relinquished responsibility to the Afghan security forces,
which numbered around 352,000 (including army
and police).86
In 2018, U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad initiated talks with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, in an
attempt to find a political solution to the conflict and
encourage the group to negotiate with the Afghan

Like most of the world’s other governments, the
U.S. government has refused to offer the new Taliban government diplomatic recognition. In October
2021, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin
Kahl admitted that both al-Qaeda and ISIS-K were
operating in Afghanistan with the intent to conduct
terrorist attacks abroad, including against the U.S.
Specifically, Kahl estimated that “[w]e could see
ISIS-K generate that capability in somewhere between 6 or 12 months” and that “Al Qaeda would take
a year or two to reconstitute that capability.”91
Pakistan. During the early stages of the war in
Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO relied heavily on
logistical supply lines running through Pakistan to
resupply anti-Taliban coalition forces. Supplies and
fuel were carried on transportation routes from the
port at Karachi to Afghan–Pakistani border crossing
points at Torkham in the Khyber Pass and Chaman
in Baluchistan province. For roughly the first decade
of the war, approximately 80 percent of U.S. and
NATO supplies traveled through Pakistani territory.
Those amounts progressively decreased as the U.S.
and allied troop presence shrank.
By the late 2000s, tensions emerged in the relationship over accusations by U.S. analysts and officials that Pakistan was providing a safe haven to
the Taliban and its allies as they intensified their
insurgency in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s leadership
council or “shura” was located in Quetta, the capital
of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. With relations
already tense, U.S.–Pakistan relations suffered an
acrimonious rupture in 2011 when U.S. special forces conducted a raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout
in Abbottabad less than a mile from a prominent
Pakistani military academy. Relations deteriorated
further in 2017 when President Donald Trump suspended billions of dollars of U.S. military assistance
to Pakistan and declared that “[w]e can no longer be
silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose
a threat to the region and beyond.”92
Between 2001 and 2016, Pakistan received approximately $30 billion in aid and “reimbursements”
from the U.S. in the form of coalition support funds
(CSF) for its military deployments and operations
along the border with Afghanistan. In 2016, reflecting the growing congressional resistance to military
assistance for Pakistan, Congress blocked funds for
the provision of eight F-16s. According to the Congressional Research Service, U.S. aid appropriations
172
and military reimbursements have fallen continuously since fiscal year (FY) 2013; CSF reimbursements fell to zero in FY 2017 and remained at that
level through FY 2020.93
Since 2015, U.S. Administrations have refused to
certify that Pakistan has met requirements to crack
down on the Haqqani Network, an Afghan terrorist
group with known links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Agency.94 In addition to suspending
aid, the Trump Administration supported the addition of Pakistan to the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) “grey list” for failing to fulfill its obligations
to prevent the financing of terrorism and its designation as a “Countr[y] of Particular Concern under
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for
having engaged in or tolerated ‘systematic, ongoing,
[and] egregious violations of religious freedom.”95
Pakistan remains on the grey list in 2022.
Despite harboring and supporting a variety of
known terrorist groups that operate in Afghanistan and Kashmir, Pakistan has also been the victim of terrorism from anti-state extremist groups,
including the Pakistani Taliban or TTP. In the late
2000s and early 2010s, the TTP engaged in a bloody
campaign of terrorism against the Pakistani state;
from 2008–2013, approximately 2,000 civilians
were killed in terrorist attacks each year.96 The
Pakistan military launched a series of operations
against these groups in 2014 and succeeded in progressively reducing terrorist violence in the years
that followed.97
However, since the Afghan Taliban assumed
power in Kabul, the number of attacks on Pakistan
civilian and military targets has spiked dramatically98 with the TTP and the local affiliate of the Islamic
State taking credit for most of these attacks. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban government
in Kabul of harboring these groups or failing to rein
in their activities. Tensions reached a tipping point
in April 2022 when the Taliban accused Pakistan of
launching cross-border raids into Afghanistan to
target these militant groups, causing dozens of civilian casualties in the process.99
Pakistan–U.S. relations improved modestly from
2018–2021 as Pakistan involved itself as a key player in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating
table with the U.S. government. However, relations
remained generally frosty and have improved little under the Biden Administration, with President Biden reportedly refusing to engage in direct
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Initiative (NTI) in 2018, with only Iran’s and North
Korea’s ranking less secure at 21st and 22nd, respectively.102 In its 2020 report, the NTI assessed that the
“[m]ost improved among countries with materials in
2020 is Pakistan, which was credited with adopting
new on-site physical protection and cybersecurity
regulations, improving insider threat prevention
measures, and more.”103
There is the additional (though less likely) scenario of extremists gaining access through a collapse
of the state. While Pakistan remains unstable because of its weak economy, regular terrorist attacks,
sectarian violence, civil–military tensions, and the
growing influence of religious extremist groups, a
total collapse of the Pakistani state is highly unlikely. The country’s most powerful institution, the
550,000-strong army that has ruled Pakistan for
almost half of its existence, would almost certainly
intervene and assume control once again if the political situation began to unravel. The potential breakup of the Pakistani state would have to be preceded
by the disintegration of the army, which currently
is not plausible.
Pakistan–India Conflict. India and Pakistan
have fought four wars since partition in 1947, including conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. Deadly
border skirmishes across the Line of Control (LoC)
in Kashmir, a disputed territory claimed in full by
both India and Pakistan, are commonplace.
With terrorist groups operating relatively freely in Pakistan and maintaining links to its military
and intelligence services, there is a moderate risk
that the two countries might eventually engage in
all-out conflict. Pakistan’s recent focus on incorporating tactical nuclear weapons into its warfighting
doctrine has also raised concern that conflict now
involves a higher risk of nuclear exchange. In early
2019, Pakistan conducted several tests of its nuclear-capable, short-range NASR ballistic missiles.104
The military and strategic dynamic between
India and Pakistan has grown more volatile since
the May 2014 election of Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) leader Narendra Modi as India’s prime minister. Modi invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony, but in August
2014, the two sides engaged in intense firing and
shelling along their international border and the
Line of Control that divides Kashmir. A similar escalation in border tensions occurred again in October 2014 when a series of firing incidents claimed
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communications with Prime Minister Imran Khan
and Pakistan declining an invitation to attend President Biden’s December 2021 Summit for Democracy.
Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman visited
Pakistan in October 2021 to discuss “the importance
of holding the Taliban accountable to the commitments they have made.” Days earlier, she noted: “We
don’t see ourselves building a broad relationship
with Pakistan. And we have no interest in returning
to the days of hyphenated India–Pakistan.”100
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. In
September 2021, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
estimated that Pakistan “now has a nuclear weapons
stockpile of approximately 165 warheads.” The report added that “[w]ith several new delivery systems
in development, four plutonium production reactors,
and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, however, Pakistan’s stockpile…could grow to
around 200 warheads by 2025, if the current trend
continues.”101
The possibility that terrorists could gain effective access to Pakistani nuclear weapons is contingent on a complex chain of circumstances. Concern
about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons increases when India–Pakistan tensions
increase. If Pakistan were to move its nuclear assets
or (worse) take steps to mate weapons with delivery
systems, the likelihood of theft or infiltration by terrorists could increase.
Increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons
(TNWs) is of particular concern because launch
authorities for TNWs are typically delegated to
lower-tier field commanders far from the central
authority in Islamabad. Another concern is the possibility that miscalculations could lead to regional
nuclear war if India’s leaders were to lose confidence that nuclear weapons in Pakistan are under
government control or, conversely, were to assume
that they were under Pakistani government control
after they ceased to be.
There are additional concerns that Islamist extremist groups with links to the Pakistan security
establishment could exploit those links to gain access to nuclear weapons technology, facilities, and/
or materials. The realization that Osama bin Laden stayed for six years within a mile of Pakistan’s
premier defense academy has fueled concern that
al-Qaeda can operate relatively freely in parts of
Pakistan. Pakistan’s weapons-grade materials were
ranked the 19th least secure by the Nuclear Threat

more than a dozen casualties with several dozen
more injured.105
On December 25, 2015, Modi made an impromptu visit to Lahore—the first visit to Pakistan by an Indian leader in 12 years—to meet with Sharif. The visit
created enormous goodwill between the two countries and raised hope that official dialogue would
soon resume. Again, however, violence marred the
new opening. One week after the meeting, militants
attacked an Indian airbase at Pathankot, killing seven Indian security personnel.106
A comprehensive India–Pakistan dialogue has
remained frozen ever since, although the two governments still regularly communicate with one
another. New Delhi has insisted that Pakistan take
concrete verifiable steps to crack down on terrorist
groups before a comprehensive dialogue covering
all outstanding issues—including the Kashmir dispute—can resume. Unfortunately, the past few years
have been marred by additional terrorist attacks and
cross-border shelling.
The Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
terrorist group was responsible for a January 2, 2016,
attack on the Indian airbase at Pathankot, a February 2018 attack on an Indian army camp in Kashmir,
and a February 2019 attack on Indian security forces
in Kashmir—the deadliest single terrorist attack in
the disputed region since the eruption of an insurgency in 1989.107
Following a deadly attack on Indian security
forces in Pulwama, Kashmir, in February 2019, India launched an even more daring cross-border raid.
For the first time since the Third India–Pakistan
War of 1971, the Indian air force crossed the LoC
and dropped ordnance inside Pakistan proper (as
opposed to disputed Kashmir), targeting several
JeM training camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.108 Delhi stressed that the “non-military” operation was designed to avoid civilian casualties and
was preemptive in nature because India had credible
intelligence that JeM was attempting other suicide
attacks in the country.
In response, Pakistan launched fighter jets to conduct their own strike on targets located on India’s
side of the LoC in Kashmir, prompting a dogfight
that resulted in the downing of an Indian MiG-21.
Pakistan released the captured MiG-21 pilot days later, ending the brief but dangerous crisis. Nevertheless, both militaries continued to engage in artillery
attacks along the disputed border throughout 2019.
174
Pakistan reported more than 45 casualties, including
14 soldiers, from Indian shelling between January
2019 and October 2019. India reported 21 casualties and over 2,000 cease-fire violations during the
same period.109
Skirmishes at the LoC continued and even accelerated in 2020 with India’s Home Ministry registering “5,133 instances of ceasefire violations along the
Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan last year, which
resulted in 46 fatalities.”110 In early 2021, however,
India and Pakistan experienced at least a partial
diplomatic thaw as both countries combated the
COVID-19 global pandemic. In February, both countries agreed to observe a strict cease-fire along the
LOC,111 and in March, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff,
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, declared in a speech
that “it is time to bury the past and move forward.”112
In March 2022, India accidentally fired a cruise
missile into Pakistan. The unarmed missile flew
roughly 100 kilometers into Pakistan and crashed
harmlessly without casualties. The Indian government blamed a “technical malfunction” during
“routine maintenance.”113 Pakistan called the launch
irresponsible and demanded a “joint probe to accurately establish the facts” in a response that one correspondent characterized as “measured.”114
India. During the Cold War, U.S.–Indian military
cooperation was minimal except for a brief period
during and after the China–India border war in 1962
when the U.S. provided India with supplies, arms,
and ammunition. The rapprochement was shortlived, and the U.S. suspended arms and aid to India
following the Second Indo–Pakistan War of 1965. The
relationship was largely characterized by mistrust in
the 1970s under the Nixon Administration. America’s
ties with India hit a nadir during the Third Indo–Pakistan war of 1971 when the U.S. deployed the aircraft
carrier USS Enterprise toward the Bay of Bengal in a
show of support for Pakistani forces. Months earlier,
India had signed a major defense treaty with Moscow.
India’s close defense ties to Russia and America’s
close defense ties to Pakistan left the two countries
estranged for the duration of the Cold War.
Military ties between the U.S. and India have
improved significantly over the past two decades
(particularly since the signing of a 10-year defense
partnership and civil nuclear deal in 2005) as the
two sides have established a robust strategic partnership based on mutual concerns about China’s
increasingly belligerent behavior and converging
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Operations from Ships Other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) and an Industrial Security Annex
(ISA) that allows the U.S. to share classified information with private Indian defense firms. During
the Trump Administration, the two countries also
initiated a new 2+2 defense and foreign ministers
dialogue while reviving the Quad grouping (which
joins India and the U.S. with Australia and Japan)
in 2017.117 In 2020, the four countries held the first
Quad naval exercise since 2007. When a deadly crisis erupted at the China–India border in 2020, the
Trump Administration provided India with two advanced surveillance drones and cold-weather gear
for Indian soldiers.
In recent years, India has made additional purchases of U.S. military hardware, including C-17
transport aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, MH60R Seahawk multi-mission helicopters, Sig Sauer
assault rifles, and M777 ultralight howitzer artillery
guns. It also is reportedly considering the purchase
of 30 armed MQ-9 reaper drones (10 each for the
three branches of its military) for $3 billion and a
half-dozen highly capable P-8I maritime aircraft (to
supplement the dozen currently in operation) for
nearly $2 billion.
New Delhi and Washington regularly hold joint
annual military exercises across all services. They
include the Yudh Abhyas army exercises, Red Flag
air force exercises, and Malabar naval exercise,
which added Japan and Australia as permanent
participants in 2012 and 2020, respectively. In late
2019, India and the U.S. held their first-ever tri-service military exercise, nicknamed “Tiger Triumph.”
At the April 2022 2+2 defense and foreign policy
dialogue, which was held in Washington, the two
sides signed “a Space Situational Awareness arrangement” and “agreed to launch an inaugural Defense
Artificial Intelligence Dialogue.” They also committed to exploring the coproduction of Air-Launched
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles under the Defense Trade
and Technology Initiative (DTTI). In addition, India
agreed “to join the Combined Maritime Forces Task
Force…to expand multilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean,” and the two sides agreed to “explore
possibilities of utilizing Indian shipyards for repair
and maintenance of ships of the U.S. Maritime Sealift Command to support mid-voyage repair of U.S.
Naval ships.”118 The U.S. Department of Defense assessed that these initiatives “will allow the U.S. and
Indian militaries to work more seamlessly together
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interests in countering regional terrorism and promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”115 The U.S. has
supplied India more than $25 billion worth of U.S.
military equipment since 2008, including C-130J
and C-17 transport aircraft, P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, Chinook airlift helicopters, Apache
attack helicopters, artillery batteries, and Firefinder
radar. The two countries also have several information-sharing and intelligence-sharing agreements
in place, including one that covers “white” or commercial shipping in the Indian Ocean.
Defense ties have advanced at an accelerated rate
since the election of Prime Minister Modi in 2014.
In 2015, the U.S. and India agreed to renew and upgrade their 10-year Defense Framework Agreement.
In 2016, the two governments finalized the text of
the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA), which allows each country to access the
other’s military supplies and refueling capabilities
through ports and military bases, and the U.S. designated India a “major defense partner,” a designation unique to India that is intended to facilitate its
access to American defense technology. Since then,
Indian and U.S. warships have begun to offer each
other refueling and resupply services at sea.116 In October 2020, U.S. P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft
were refueled for the first time at an Indian military
base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
America’s strategic and defense ties with India
advanced in several important ways during the
Trump Administration. In 2018, India was granted
STA-1 status, easing controls on exports of advanced
defense technology. India is only the third Asian
country after Japan and South Korea to be granted
STA-1 status. In the same year, India established a
permanent naval attaché representative to U.S. Central Command in Bahrain, fulfilling a long-standing
request from New Delhi.
In 2018, the two countries also signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA), which will allow the U.S. to sell India
encrypted communications equipment and create
secure channels for communication between the Indian and U.S. militaries. In 2020, the U.S. and India
signed the Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement
(BECA), which creates a framework for the sharing
of geospatial intelligence.
Beyond these “foundational” or “enabling” military agreements, in recent years, the two countries have also signed an agreement on Helicopter

across all domains of potential conflict” and “jointly
meet the challenges of this century.”119
Quality of Key Allied or Partner
Armed Forces in Asia
Because Asia lacks an integrated, regional security architecture along the lines of NATO, the United
States partners with most of the region’s nations on
a bilateral basis. This means that there is no single
standard to which all local militaries aspire; instead,
the region is characterized by a wide range of capabilities that are influenced by local threat perceptions, institutional interests, physical conditions,
historical factors, and budgetary considerations.
Moreover, most Asian militaries have limited
combat experience, particularly in high-intensity
air or naval combat. Some, like Malaysia, have never
fought an external war since gaining independence
in the mid-20th century. The Indochina wars, the
most recent high-intensity conflicts, are now more
than 50 years in the past. It is therefore unclear how
well Asia’s militaries have trained for future warfare
and whether their doctrine will meet the exigencies
of wartime realities.
Based on examinations of equipment, however,
we assess that several Asian allies and friends have
substantial potential military capabilities that are
supported by robust defense industries and significant defense spending. The defense budgets of
Japan, South Korea, and Australia are estimated to
be among the world’s 15 largest, and the three countries’ military forces field some of the world’s most
advanced weapons, including F-15s in the Japan Air
Self Defense Force and ROK Air Force; airborne early warning (AEW) platforms; Aegis-capable surface
combatants and modern diesel-electric submarines;
and third-generation main battle tanks. As noted, all
three nations are also involved in the production and
purchase of F-35 fighters.
At this point, both the Japanese and Korean militaries arguably are more capable than most European militaries, at least in terms of conventional forces.
Japan’s Self Defense Forces, for example, field more
tanks, principal surface combatants, and combat-capable aircraft than their British counterparts field.
Similarly, South Korea fields more tanks, principal
surface combatants, and combat-capable aircraft
than Germany fields.
Both the ROK and Japan are also increasingly interested in developing missile defense capabilities,
176
including joint development and coproduction in
the case of Japan. After much negotiation and indecision, South Korea deployed America’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system on the peninsula in 2017. It is also
pursuing an indigenous missile defense capability.
As for Japan, its Aegis-class destroyers are
equipped with SM-3 missiles, and it decided in 2017
to install the Aegis Ashore missile defense system to
supplement its Patriot missile batteries.120 In June
2020, Tokyo unexpectedly cancelled plans to build
two Aegis Ashore missile defense sites, citing the
potential for the interceptor missile’s first-stage
booster to fall onto populated areas. Other likely
factors in the decision include the overall cost of
the program, inept handling of the site-selection
process, and government unwillingness to press national objectives over local resistance.121 Currently,
Tokyo plans to build an additional two Aegis-capable
ships to compensate for the cancellation of the Aegis
Ashore project.
Australia also has very capable armed forces.
They are smaller than NATO militaries but have major operational experience, having deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan as well as to help the Philippines
with its Southern insurgency. Australia’s military
has several operations underway in the region from
the Southwest Pacific islands, which are so critically
important to it, to its partnership with Malaysia in
the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea, to the
Korean Peninsula.122
Singapore’s small population and physical borders limit the size of its military, but in terms of
equipment and training, it has Southeast Asia’s largest defense budget123 and fields some of the region’s
highest-quality forces. Singapore’s ground forces
can deploy third-generation Leopard II main battle
tanks, and its fleet includes four conventional submarines (to be replaced by four new, more capable
submarines from Germany)124 and six frigates and
eight missile-armed corvettes. Its air force has F-15E
Strike Eagles and F-16s as well as one of Southeast
Asia’s largest fleets of airborne early warning and
control aircraft (G550-AEW aircraft) and a squadron of KC-130 tankers that can help to extend range
or time on station.125 In January 2020, the U.S. Department of State cleared Singapore to purchase
“four short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing F-35 variants with an option for eight more of the ‘B’ models.”
Delivery is scheduled to begin in 2026.126
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
50 percent of the world’s population and include
two of the three largest economies and nine of the
10 smallest; the most populous nation (China); the
largest democracy (India); the largest Muslim-majority nation (Indonesia); and the world’s smallest
republic (Nauru). The region is a vital driver of the
global economy and includes the world’s busiest international sea-lanes and nine of its 10 largest ports.
By any meaningful measure, the Indo-Pacific is also
the world’s most militarized region, with “seven of
the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of
the world’s declared nuclear nations.”133
INDOPACOM has several “component and
sub-unified commands”134 that include:
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Current U.S. Presence in Asia
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Established in
1947 as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), USINDOPACOM is the oldest and largest of America’s
unified commands. According to its website:
USINDOPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the
territory of the United States, its people, and its
interests. With allies and partners, USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the
Asia–Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development,
responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This
approach is based on partnership, presence,
and military readiness.132
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USINDOPACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR)
includes not only the expanses of the Pacific, but also
Alaska and portions of the Arctic, South Asia, and the
Indian Ocean. Its 36 nations represent more than
U.S. Army Pacific. USARPAC is the Army’s
component command in the Pacific. Headquartered in Hawaii and with approximately 80,000
soldiers, it supplies Army forces as necessary
for various global contingencies and “has sent
peacekeeping forces to the Sinai Peninsula,
Haiti, East Timor and Bosnia.”135 Among its 12
subordinate commands are U.S. Army Japan,
the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, and
U.S. Army Alaska.

At the other extreme, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are among the region’s weakest military
forces. Having long focused on waging counterinsurgency campaigns while relying on the United
States for its external security, the Philippines spent
only 1.0 percent of GDP on its military in 2020.127
The most modern ships in the Philippine navy are
three former U.S. Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutters. It has also taken delivery of new South Korean–built frigates and is set to buy two more smaller
South Korean naval vessels.128 The Philippines also
has purchased 12 light attack fighter aircraft from
South Korea129 and has been cleared to acquire 12
new American F-16s.130
The armed forces of American allies from outside
the region, particularly those of France and the United Kingdom, should also be mentioned. France has
overseas bases in New Caledonia and the South Pacific, locally based assets, and 2,900 personnel in the
region.131 It also conducts multiple naval deployments
each year out of Metropolitan France. The U.K. is likewise very active in the region and, given its unparalleled integration with U.S. forces, can employ its capability directly in pursuit of shared objectives. It has
a naval logistics facility in Singapore and Royal Gurkhas stationed in Brunei and has been an integral part
of a U.S.-led mission to monitor seaborne evasions.
U.S. Pacific Air Force. PACAF is responsible
for planning and conducting defensive and
offensive air operations in the Asia–Pacific region. It has three numbered air forces under its
command: 5th Air Force in Japan; 7th Air Force
in Korea; and 11th Air Force, headquartered in
Alaska. These air forces field two squadrons of
F-15s, two squadrons of F-22s, five squadrons
of F-16s, and a single squadron of A-10 ground
attack aircraft as well as two squadrons of E-3
early-warning aircraft, tankers, and transports.
Other forces that regularly come under PACAF
command include B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers.
In 2020, PACAF activated two F-35A squadrons
at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. It completed the integration of 54 “combat-coded” F-35A
aircraft in April 2022, increasing the number of
squadrons to four.136
U.S. Pacific Fleet. PACFLT normally controls all U.S. naval forces committed to the
Pacific, which usually represents 60 percent
of the Navy’s fleet. It is organized into Seventh
Fleet, headquartered in Japan, and Third Fleet,
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headquartered in California. Seventh Fleet
comprises the forward-deployed element of
PACFLT and includes the only American carrier strike group (CTF-70, ported at Yokosuka,
Japan) and amphibious group (CTF-76, ported
at Sasebo, Japan) that are home-ported abroad.
The Third Fleet’s AOR spans the West Coast
of the United States to the International Date
Line and includes the Alaskan coastline and
parts of the Arctic. In recent years, the involvement of the Third Fleet’s five carrier strike
groups in the Western Pacific has been eased by
the blurring of this boundary between the two
fleets’ areas of operation under a concept called
“Third Fleet Forward.” Beginning in 2015, the
conduct of Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPS) that challenge excessive maritime
claims (a part of the Navy’s mission since 1979)
has assumed a higher profile as a result of
several well-publicized operations in the South
China Sea. Under the Trump Administration,
the frequency of these operations increased
significantly.

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U.S. Marine Forces Pacific. With its headquarters in Hawaii, MARFORPAC controls elements of the U.S. Marine Corps operating in the
Asia–Pacific region. Because of its extensive responsibilities and physical span, MARFORPAC
controls two-thirds of Marine Corps forces: the
I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), centered
on the 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Air
Wing, and 1st Marine Logistics Group, and the
III Marine Expeditionary Force, centered on
the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Wing,
and 3rd Marine Logistics Group. The I MEF is
headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California,
and the III MEF is headquartered on Okinawa, although each has various subordinate
elements deployed at any time throughout the
Pacific on exercises, to maintain presence, or
engaged in other activities. MARFORPAC is
responsible for supporting three different commands: It is the U.S. Marine Corps component
of USINDOPACOM, provides the Fleet Marine
Forces to PACFLT, and provides Marine forces
for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific.
SOCPAC has operational control of various
special operations forces, including Navy
SEALs; Naval Special Warfare units; Army
Special Forces (Green Berets); and Special
Operations Aviation units in the Pacific region,
including elements in Japan and South Korea.
It supports the Pacific Command’s Theater
Security Cooperation Program as well as other
plans and contingency responses. SOCPAC
forces also support various operations in the
region other than warfighting, such as counterdrug operations, counterterrorism training, humanitarian assistance, and demining activities.
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U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Eighth Army.
Because of the unique situation on the Korean
Peninsula, two subcomponents of USINDOPACOM—U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S.
Eighth Army—are based in Korea. USFK, a joint
headquarters led by a four-star U.S. general, is
in charge of the various U.S. military elements
on the peninsula. U.S. Eighth Army operates
in conjunction with USFK as well as with the
United Nations presence in the form of United
Nations Command.
Other forces, including space capabilities, cyber capabilities, air and sealift assets, and additional combat forces, may be made available to
USINDOPACOM depending on requirements and
availability.
Key Infrastructure That Enables
Expeditionary Warfighting Capabilities
Any planning for operations in the Pacific will be
dominated by the “tyranny of distance.” Because of
the extensive distances that must be traversed in
order to deploy forces, even Air Force units will
take one or more days to deploy, and ships measure
steaming time in weeks. For instance, a ship sailing
at 20 knots requires nearly five days to get from San
Diego to Hawaii. From there, it takes seven more
days to get to Guam; seven days to Yokosuka, Japan;
and eight days to Okinawa—if ships encounter no
interference along the journey.137
China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities, ranging from an expanding fleet of modern submarines to anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, increase the operational risk for deployment
of U.S. forces in the event of conflict. China’s capabilities not only jeopardize American combat forces
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
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that would flow into the theater for initial combat, attractive potential target in the event of conflict.
but also would continue to threaten the logistical The increasing reach of Chinese and North Korean
support needed to sustain American combat power ballistic missiles reflects this growing vulnerability.
during the subsequent days, weeks, and months.
Guam and Saipan. The U.S. military has nonAmerican basing structure in the Indo-Pacific combatant maritime prepositioning ships (MPS),
region, including access to key allied facilities, is which contain large amounts of military equipment
therefore both necessary and increasingly at risk.
and supplies, in strategic locations from which they
can reach areas of conflict relatively quickly as asAmerican Facilities
sociated U.S. Army or Marine Corps units located
Hawaii. Much as it was in the 20th century, Ha- elsewhere arrive in the areas. U.S. Navy units on
waii remains the linchpin of America’s ability to sup- Guam and in Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northport its position in the Western Pacific. If the United ern Marianas, support prepositioning ships that
States cannot preserve its facilities in Hawaii, both can supply Army or Marine Corps units deployed
combat power and sustainability become moot. The for contingency operations in Asia.
United States maintains air and naval bases, communications infrastructure, and logistical support on Allied and Other Friendly Facilities
Oahu and elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii
For the United States, access to bases in Asia has
is also a key site for undersea cables that carry much long been a vital part of its ability to support military
of the world’s communications and data, as well as operations in the region. Even with the extensive
for satellite ground stations.
aerial refueling and replenishment skills of the U.S.
Guam. The American territory of Guam is located Air Force and U.S. Navy, it is still essential that the
4,600 miles farther west. Obtained from Spain as a United States retain access to resupply and replenresult of the Spanish–American War, Guam became ishment facilities, at least in peacetime. The ability
a key coaling station for U.S. Navy ships. It was seized of those facilities to survive and function will directby Japan in World War II, was liberated by U.S. forces ly influence the course of any conflict in the Westin 1944, and after the war became an unincorporat- ern Pacific region. Moreover, a variety of support
ed, organized territory of the United States. Key U.S. functions, including communications, intelligence,
military facilities on Guam include U.S. Naval Base and space support, cannot be accomplished without
Guam, which houses several attack submarines and facilities in the region.
possibly a new aircraft carrier berth, and Andersen
Today, maintaining maritime domain awareness
Air Force Base, one of a handful of facilities that can or space situational awareness would be extraorhouse B-2 bombers. U.S. task forces can stage out of dinarily difficult without access to facilities in the
Apra Harbor, drawing weapons from the Ordnance Asia–Pacific region. The American alliance network
Annex in the island’s South Central Highlands. The is therefore a matter both of political partnership
Marine Corps is working to expand a major facility, and of access to key facilities on allied soil.
Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz, activated on OctoJapan. In Japan, the United States has access
ber 1, 2020.138 Upon completion in 2025, the base will to more than 100 different facilities, including
host 5,000 Marines comprising various aviation and communications stations, military and dependent
ground combat, combat support, logistics, and head- housing, fuel and ammunition depots, and weapons
quarters units.139 There is also a communications and and training ranges in addition to such major basdata relay facility on the island.
es as the air bases at Misawa, Yokota, and Kadena
Guam’s facilities have improved steadily over and naval facilities at Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo.
the past 20 years. B-2 bombers, for example, began The naval facilities support the USS Ronald Reagan
to operate from Andersen Air Force Base in March carrier strike group (CSG), which is home-ported in
2005.140 These improvements have been accelerated Yokosuka, and a Navy-Marine Expeditionary Strike
and expanded even as China’s A2/AD capabilities Group (ESG) centered on the USS America, homehave raised doubts about the ability of the U.S. to ported at Sasebo. The skilled workforce at places like
sustain operations in the Asian littoral. The con- Yokosuka is needed to maintain American forces and
centration of air and naval assets as well as logis- repair equipment in time of conflict. Replacing them
tical infrastructure, however, makes the island an would take years if not decades.

This combination of facilities and workforce, in
addition to physical location and political support,
makes Japan an essential part of any American
military response to contingencies in the Western
Pacific. Japanese financial support for the American presence also makes these facilities some of the
most cost-effective in the world.
The status of one critical U.S. base has been a matter of public debate in Japan for many years. The U.S.
Marine Corps’ Third Marine Expeditionary Force,
based on Okinawa, is the U.S. rapid reaction force
in the Pacific. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force,
comprised of air, ground, and logistics elements,
enables quick and effective response to crises or
humanitarian disasters. To improve the political
sustainability of U.S. forces by reducing the impact
on the local population in that densely populated
area, the Marines are relocating some units to Guam
and less-populated areas of Okinawa. The latter includes moving a helicopter unit from Futenma to a
new facility in a more remote location in northeastern Okinawa. Because of local resistance, construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp
Schwab will not be complete until at least 2025, but
the U.S. and Japanese governments have affirmed
their support for the project.
South Korea. The United States also maintains
an array of facilities in South Korea. The Army’s
footprint in South Korea is larger than its footprint
in Japan because the United States and South Korea
remain focused on deterring North Korean aggression and preparing for any possible North Korean
contingencies. The Army maintains four major facilities (which in turn control a number of smaller
sites) at Daegu, Yongsan in Seoul, and Camps Red
Cloud/Casey and Humphreys. These facilities support the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, which is based
in South Korea. Other key facilities include air bases at Osan and Kunsan and a naval facility at Chinhae near Pusan.
The Philippines. In 1992, the United States ended a nearly century-long presence in the Philippines
when it withdrew from its base in Subic Bay as the
base’s lease ended. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo had already forced the closure of Clark Air Base;
the costs of repairing the facility were deemed too
high to be worthwhile. In 2014, however, spurred by
China’s growing assertiveness in the South China
Sea, including against Philippine claims such as Mischief Reef (seized in 1995) and Scarborough Shoal
180
(2012), the U.S. and the Philippines negotiated the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which
allowed for the rotation of American forces through
Philippine military bases.
In 2016, the two sides agreed on an initial list of
five bases to be used in the Philippines. Geographically distributed across the country, they are Antonio
Bautista Air Base in Palawaan, closest to the Spratlys;
Basa Air Base, located on the main Philippine island
of Luzon and closest to the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal; Fort Magsaysay, also on Luzon and the
only facility on the list that is not an air base; Lumbia
Air Base in Mindanao, where Manila remains engaged
in low-intensity combat with Islamist insurgents; and
Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in the central Philippines.141 In 2018, construction was completed on a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief warehouse
located at Basa Air Base.142 American F-16s based in
South Korea deployed there for a 12-day exercise with
Philippine fighter jets in 2019143 and exercised there
again in 2020.144 With the resolution of disputes over
the status of America’s Visiting Forces Agreement
with the Philippines, it is expected that building out
of the other EDCA sites will begin as well.
It remains unclear precisely which additional
forces would be rotated through the Philippines as
a part of this agreement, which in turn affects the
kinds of facilities that would be most needed. The
base upgrades and deployments pursuant to the
EDCA are part of a broader expansion of U.S.–Philippine defense ties begun under the Aquino government and continued under President Duterte with
some adjustments.
Singapore. The United States does not have bases in Singapore, but it is allowed access to several key
facilities that provide essential support for American forward presence. Since the closure of its facilities at Subic Bay, the United States has been allowed
to operate the principal logistics command for the
Seventh Fleet out of the Port of Singapore Authority’s Sembawang Terminal. The U.S. Navy also has
access to Changi Naval Base, one of the few docks in
the world that can handle a 100,000-ton American
aircraft carrier. A small U.S. Air Force contingent
operates out of Paya Lebar Air Base to support U.S.
Air Force combat units visiting Singapore and Southeast Asia, and Singapore hosts Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS) and rotating P-8 aircraft.145
Australia. The most prominent element of the
U.S. presence in Australia is the deployment of U.S.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Specifically, “MPF ships deliver a forward presence
and rapid crisis response capability by pre-positioning equipment and supplies to various locations at
sea.”149 Several elements of the U.S. global space
surveillance and communications infrastructure,
as well as basing facilities for the B-2 bomber, are
also located on the island.
Conclusion
The Asian strategic environment is extremely
expansive. It includes half the globe and is characterized by a variety of political relationships among
states that possess wildly varying capabilities. The
region includes long-standing American allies with
relationships dating back to the beginning of the
Cold War as well as recently established states and
some long-standing adversaries such as North Korea.
American conceptions of the region must therefore recognize the physical limitations imposed by
the tyranny of distance. Moving forces within the
region (never mind to it) will take time and require
extensive strategic lift assets as well as sufficient infrastructure (such as sea and aerial ports of debarkation that can handle American strategic lift assets)
and political support. At the same time, the complicated nature of intra-Asian relations, especially
unresolved historical and territorial issues, means
that the United States, unlike Europe, cannot necessarily count on support from all of its regional allies
in responding to any given contingency.
Scoring the Asia Operating Environment
As with the operating environments of Europe 2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating enviand the Middle East, we assessed the characterisronment for military operations is marked by
tics of Asia as they could be expected to facilitate or
inadequate infrastructure, weak alliances, and
inhibit America’s ability to conduct military operrecurring political instability. The U.S. military
ations to defend its vital national interests against
is inadequately placed in the region.
threats. Our assessment of the operating environment utilized a five-point scale that ranges from 3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorable
“very poor” to “excellent” conditions and covers four
operating environment is characterized by aderegional characteristics of greatest relevance to the
quate infrastructure, a moderate alliance strucconduct of military operations:
ture, and acceptable levels of regional political
stability. The U.S. military is adequately placed.
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for military
operations. Physical infrastructure is insuffi4. Favorable. A favorable operating environment
cient or nonexistent, and the region is politicalincludes good infrastructure, strong alliances,
ly unstable. The U.S. military is poorly placed or
and a stable political environment. The U.S.
absent, and alliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
military is well placed for future operations.
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181

Marines to Darwin in northern Australia. In keeping with Australian sensitivities about permanent
American bases on Australian soil, however, the
Marines do not maintain a permanent presence in
the country.146 Similarly, the United States jointly
staffs the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap and the
Joint Geological and Geophysical Research Station
at Alice Springs and has access to the Harold E. Holt
Naval Communication Station, including its space
surveillance radar system, in the western part of
the country.147
Finally, the United States is granted access to a
number of facilities in Asian states on a contingency
or crisis basis. Thus, U.S. Air Force units transited
Thailand’s U-Tapao Air Base and Sattahip Naval
Base during the first Gulf War and during the Iraq
War, but they do not maintain a permanent presence
there. Additionally, the U.S. Navy conducts hundreds
of port calls throughout the region.
Diego Garcia. The American facilities on the
British territory of Diego Garcia are vital to U.S.
operations in the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan
and provide essential support for operations in the
Middle East and East Asia. The island is home to the
Military Sealift Command’s Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-2 (MPSRON-2), which works with
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-3 (MPSRON-3)
“to deliver a strategic power-projection capability
for the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force, known
as the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).”148
5. Excellent. An extremely favorable operating
environment includes well-established and
well-maintained infrastructure, strong and capable allies, and a stable political environment.
The U.S. military is exceptionally well placed to
defend U.S. interests.
presumably, achieve successes in critical “first
battles” more quickly. Being routinely present also helps the United States to maintain
familiarity with a region’s characteristics and
the various actors that might act to assist or
thwart U.S. actions. With this in mind, we
assessed whether or not the U.S. military was
well positioned in the region. Again, indicators
included bases, troop presence, prepositioned
equipment, and recent examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian)
launched from the region.
The key regional characteristics consist of:

a. Alliances. Alliances are important for interoperability and collective defense, as allies would
be more likely to lend support to U.S. military
operations. Indicators that provide insight into
the strength or health of an alliance include
whether the U.S. trains regularly with countries
in the region, has good interoperability with the
forces of an ally, and shares intelligence with
nations in the region.
b. Political Stability. Political stability brings
predictability for military planners when
considering such things as transit, basing, and
overflight rights for U.S. military operations.
The overall degree of political stability indicates whether U.S. military actions would be
hindered or enabled and reflects, for example,
whether transfers of power in the region are
generally peaceful and whether there have
been any recent instances of political instability
in the region.
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having military
forces based or equipment and supplies staged
in a region greatly facilitates the ability of
the United States to respond to crises and,
d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, and suitable
infrastructure is essential to military operations. Airfields, ports, rail lines, canals, and
paved roads enable the U.S. to stage, launch operations from, and logistically sustain combat
operations. We combined expert knowledge of
regions with publicly available information on
critical infrastructure to arrive at our overall
assessment of this metric.150
For Asia, we arrived at these average scores
(rounded to the nearest whole number):
l
Alliances: 4—Favorable
l
Political Stability: 3—Moderate
l
U.S. Military Positioning: 4—Favorable
l
Infrastructure: 4—Favorable
Aggregating to a regional score of: Favorable
Operating Environment: Asia
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
Alliances
Political Stability
182
FAVORABLE
%
%
U.S. Military Posture
%
Infrastructure
%
OVERALL
%
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
EXCELLENT
Endnotes
1.
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Foreign Trade: Top Trading Partners—December 2021,” https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/statistics/highlights/top/top2112yr.html (accessed May 13, 2022).
2.
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
Constitution of Japan, Article 9, promulgated November 3, 1946, came into effect May 3, 1947, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_
government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed May 13, 2022).
3.
U.S. Forces, Japan, “About USFJ: Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan,” https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
4.
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Brock R. Williams, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, and Caitlin Campbell, “U.S.–Japan Relations,” Congressional
Research Service In Focus No. 10199, updated March 30, 2022, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10199.pdf (accessed May 13, 2022).
5.
Bruce Klingner, James Jay Carafano, and Walter Lohman, “Don’t Break Alliances over Money,” The National Interest, Korea Watch Blog,
November 22, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/don’t-break-alliances-over-money-98967 (accessed May 13, 2022).
6.
Bruce Klingner, Jung Pak, and Sue Mi Terry, “Opinion: Trump Shakedowns Are Threatening Two Key U.S. Alliances in Asia,” Los Angeles Times,
December 16, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-16/how-trump-is-threatening-alliances-in-asia (accessed June 20, 2021).
7.
Press release, “Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee 2+2,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 6, 2022, https://
thepressreleaseengine.com/Joint+Statement+of+the+U+S+-Japan+Security+Consultative+Committee+2+2+-id210220-1068297 (accessed May 13,
2022).
8.
Yukio Tajima, Rintaro Tobita, and Junnosuke Kobara, “Japan PM Hopefuls Kono, Kishida Join Call to Hike Defense Budget,” Nikkei Asia, September 14,
2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-election/Japan-PM-hopefuls-Kono-Kishida-join-call-to-hike-defense-budget (accessed May 13, 2022).
9.
Bruce Klingner and Riley Walters, “The U.S. Must Limit Damage from the Japan–South Korea Trade Dispute,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
No. 3429, August 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-us-must-limit-damage-the-japan-south-korea-trade-dispute.
10. The December 2015 “Comfort Women Agreement” (referring to the women forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army during
World War II) and the 2016 GSOMIA.
11. Kyodo News, “South Korea’s Next Leader Yoon Vows Future-Oriented Ties with Japan,” March 10, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/
news/2022/03/3af347bb3857-urgent-s-koreas-yoon-vows-to-build-future-oriented-relations-with-japan.html (accessed May 13, 2022).
13. NPR, “President Trump’s Press Conference on North Korea Summit, Annotated,” June 12, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/12/619192513/
president-trumps-press-conference-on-north-korea-summit-annotated (accessed May 13, 2022).
14. Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin, “U.S., S.Korea Seen Resuming Major Military Drills as N.Korea Tensions Rise,” Reuters, March 31, 2022, https://
wtvbam.com/2022/03/31/u-s-s-korea-seen-resuming-major-military-drills-as-n-korea-tensions-rise/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
15. Klingner, Carafano, and Lohman, “Don’t Break Alliances over Money.”
16. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General; U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General; and U.S. Agency for International
Development, Office of Inspector General, Overseas Contingency Operations: Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines,
Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2017–December 31, 2017, pp. 99–100, https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Jun/18/2001932643/-1/-1/1/FY2018_LIG_OCO_OIR_Q1_12222017_2.PDF (accessed May 13, 2022).
17. Sebastian Strangio, “Philippines, US Kick Off Large-Scale Balikatan Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, March 29, 2022, https://thediplomat.
com/2022/03/philippines-us-kick-off-large-scale-balikatan-military-exercise/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
18. Press release, “U.S. and Philippine Forces Successfully Conclude 37th Balikatan,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 8, 2022, https://
ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-and-philippine-forces-successfully-conclude-37th-balikatan/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
19. Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, statement on “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture” before the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 10, 2022, pp. 21–22, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/INDOPACOM%20
Statement%20(ADM%20Aquilino)%20_SASC2.PDF (accessed May 13, 2022).
20. Walter Lohman, “Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3603, May 14, 2012, p. 2, http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/south-china-sea-dispute-between-china-and-the-philippines-safeguarding-americas-interests.
21. Press release, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2021, https://www.
state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/ (accessed May 13, 2022), and press release, “Secretary
Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” U.S. Department of State, January 27, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretaryblinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/ (accessed May 13, 2022). See also former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s
remarks in transcript, “Remarks with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability,” Manila, Philippines, March 1, 2019,
https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html (accessed May 13, 2022).
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183

12. Bruce Klingner, “Enhance South Korean Military Capabilities Before OPCON Transfer,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3452, December 2,
2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/enhance-south-korean-military-capabilities-opcon-transfer.
22. Press release, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Meeting With Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana,”
U.S. Department of Defense, September 10, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2771441/readout-of-secretary-ofdefense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-meeting-with-philippine-sec/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
23. Named for Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
24. “2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai–U.S. Defense Alliance,” Bangkok, Thailand, November 15, 2012, in Bangkok Post, November 16, 2012,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/321551/text-of-thailand-us-joint-vision-statement (accessed May 13, 2022).
25. 1st Lt. Timothy Hayes, “Cobra Gold 20: Opening Ceremony,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, February 25, 2020, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/
News/News-Article-View/Article/2094057/cobra-gold-20-opening-ceremony/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
26. Reuters, “Thai, U.S. Troops Prepare for Scaled Down ‘Cobra Gold’ Exercises,” February 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thaius-troops-prepare-scaled-down-cobra-gold-exercises-2022-02-18/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
27. Wassana Nanuam, “Cobra Gold Lite Kicks off in Thailand,” Bangkok Post, February 23, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/
general/2268331/cobra-gold-lite-kicks-off-in-thailand (accessed May 13, 2022).
28. Reuters, “Thai, U.S. Troops Prepare for Scaled Down ‘Cobra Gold’ Exercises.”
29. RFA and BenarNews Staff, “Thai Plan to Acquire F-35 Fighter Jets Poses Dilemma for Washington,” Radio Free Asia, February 2, 2022, https://
www.rfa.org/english/news/china/thailand-f35-02162022155156.html (accessed May 31, 2022).
30. Phuong Nguyen and Brittany Billingsley, “China’s Growing Military-to-Military Engagement with Thailand & Myanmar,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Asia Program, cogitASIA blog, September 12, 2013, http://cogitasia.com/chinas-growing-military-to-militaryengagement-with-thailand-and-myanmar/ (accessed May 13, 2022); Patpicha Tanakasempipat and Jutarat Skulpichetrat, “China, Thailand
Joint Air Force Exercise Highlights Warming Ties,” Reuters, November 14, 2015, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-thailand-militaryidUKKBN0TD0CB20151124 (accessed May 13, 2022); and Ian Storey, “Thailand’s Military Relations with China; Moving from Strength to Strength,”
Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, Issue: 2019, No. 43, May 27, 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_43.pdf
(accessed May 13, 2022).

31. Zachary Abuza, “America Should Be Realistic About Its Alliance with Thailand,” War on the Rocks, January 2, 2020, https://warontherocks.
com/2020/01/america-should-be-realistic-about-its-alliance-with-thailand/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
32. Ibid.; Mike Yeo, “Thailand to Buy More Chinese Tanks, Reportedly for $58M,” Defense News, April 4, 2017, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/
thailand-to-buy-more-chinese-tanks-reportedly-for-58m (accessed May 13, 2022); and Reuters, “Thailand in $67-Million Deal to Buy Armored
Personnel Carriers from China,” June 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-china-defence-idUSKBN1950IH (accessed May 13,
2022).
33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: Trade Registers: Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with
Deliveries or Orders Made for 2006 to 2021,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed May 13, 2022). Data for Thailand are a
product of user query whereby the country and years of interest are selected. Query results generate a table that shows countries supplying
arms to Thailand. The top five include Sweden, China, Ukraine, South Korea, and the U.S. in descending order.
34. Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Shelves Chinese Submarine Deal After Public Backlash,” Nikkei Asia, August 31, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
Turbulent-Thailand/Thailand-shelves-Chinese-submarine-deal-after-public-backlash (accessed May 13, 2022).
35. Zsombor Peter, “Thai–China Submarine Deal Runs Aground on EU Arms Embargo,” Voice of America, March 31, 2022, https://www.voanews.
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36. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Countries, Economies and Regions: United States of America: AUSMIN—
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37. Kim Beazley, “Pine Gap at 50: The Paradox of a Joint Facility,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, August 30, 2017, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/pine-gap-50-paradox-joint-facility/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
38. Stephen Smith, Minister of Defence and Deputy Leader of the House, Ministerial Statement on “Full Knowledge and Concurrence,”
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41. Australian Government, Department of Defence, “United States Force Posture Initiatives: Enhanced Air Cooperation,” https://defence.gov.au/
Initiatives/USFPI/EAC.asp (accessed May 13, 2022).
184
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
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2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-needs-a-clear-plan-for-investment-in-northern-australia/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
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2021,” U.S. Department of State, September 16, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultationsausmin-2021/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
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2017, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1233790/exercise-talisman-saber-2017-highlights-enduring-us-australiaalliance/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
47. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, April 20, 2021, https://www.
state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
48. Valerie Insinna, “Singapore Gets the Green Light to Buy F-35s,” Defense News, January 9, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/01/09/
singapore-gets-the-green-light-to-buy-f-35s/ (accessed May 13, 2022), and Mike Yeo, “Singapore Moves to Buy Four F-35s, Possibly Eight More
Afterward,” Defense News, March 1, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/avalon/2019/03/01/singapore-moves-to-buy-fourf-35s-possibly-eight-more-afterward/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
49. Mike Yeo, “US Approves Location for Singaporean F-16, F-35 Training,” Defense News, June 4, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/trainingsim/2021/06/04/us-approves-location-for-singaporean-f-16-f-35-training/ (accessed May 13, 2022).
50. Mike Yeo, “Singapore to Launch Fighter Jet Training Detachment on Guam,” Defense News, December 9, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
smr/reagan-defense-forum/2019/12/09/singapore-to-launch-fighter-jet-training-detachment-on-guam/ (accessed May 13, 2022), and Linette
Lai, “Two US Airbases Shortlisted to Host New RSAF F-35B Aircraft,” The Straits Times, June 4, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
two-us-air-bases-shortlisted-to-host-new-rsaf-f-35b-aircraft (accessed May 13, 2022).
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Agency, October 28, 2013, https://www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/us-new-zealand-announce-expanded-defense-cooperation
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55. See J. Vitor Tossini, “The Five Eyes—The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere,” UK Defence Journal, April 14, 2020, https://ukdefencejournal.
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56. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Cong., approved April 10, 1979, Section 2, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/
key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/ (accessed May 14, 2022). Section 18 specifies that “This Act shall be effective as
of January 1, 1979.”
57. Ibid., Section 3.
58. Ibid., Section 2.
59. Ibid., Section 3.
60. See hearing, U.S. Policy Toward China and Taiwan, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 17, 1982,
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185

51. See “Text of the Wellington Declaration,” November 5, 2010, http://usnzcouncil.org/us-nz-issues/wellington-declaration/ (accessed May 13, 2022),
and “Text of the Washington Declaration on Defense Cooperation Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and
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61. Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” Congressional
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62. Erin Hale, “US Nearly Doubled Military Personnel Stationed in Taiwan This Year,” Voice of America, December 2, 2021, https://www.voanews.
com/a/pentagon-us-nearly-doubled-military-personnel-stationed-in-taiwan-this-year-/6337695.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
63. Jack Detsch, “The U.S. Is Getting Taiwan Ready to Fight on the Beaches,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/08/
us-taiwan-military-presence-china-biden-porcupine/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
64. Hale, “US Nearly Doubled Military Personnel Stationed in Taiwan This Year.”
65. News release, “United States–Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,” The White House, July 7, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/07/07/united-states-%E2%80%93-vietnam-joint-vision-statement (accessed May 16, 2022).
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May 16, 2022).
67. Aquilino, statement on “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” March 10, 2022, p. 27.
68. Ridzwan Rahmat, “Vietnam’s Request for Third ex-USCG Cutter Receives Support of Biden Administration,” Janes, August 26, 2021, https://www.
janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/vietnams-request-for-third-ex-uscg-cutter-receives-support-of-biden-administration (accessed May 14, 2022).
69. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” U.S. Department of State, August 16, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-securitycooperation-with-vietnam/index.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
70. Mike Yeo, “Asia-Pacific Militaries Bet on Unmanned Systems to Meet Regional Challenges,” Defense News, November 30, 2020, https://www.
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2022).
71. Jon Grevatt, “Vietnam to Procure T-6 to Boost Pilot Training,” Janes, June 7, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/vietnam-toprocure-t-6-to-boost-pilot-training (accessed May 14, 2022).

72. “Joint Statement: Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” The White House, May 23, 2016, https://
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73. Wyatt Olson, “Winnowed in Scope by Coronavirus, a Smaller RIMPAC Maritime Exercise Begins Monday,” Stars and Stripes, August 14, 2020,
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74. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence, completed and registered October
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pdf (accessed May 14, 2022). Two earlier versions of this report dated May 23, 2014, and November 19, 2015, list Ian E. Rinehart, Analyst in Asian
Affairs, as the author.
76. Bernama [Malaysian National News Agency], “US Committed to Stronger Defence Ties with Malaysia,” Malay Mail, July 10, 2020, https://www.
malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/07/10/us-committed-to-stronger-defence-ties-with-malaysia/1883290 (accessed May 14, 2022).
77. U.S. Embassy in Malaysia, “Office of Defense Cooperation: Foreign Military Sales,” https://my.usembassy.gov/embassy/government-agencies/
office-of-defense-cooperation/ (accessed May 14, 2022), and “Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet Fleet to Undergo Depot Maintenance and Upgrade in
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78. Mike Yeo, “Malaysia Keen on Buying Kuwait’s Hornet Fighter Jets,” Defense News, December 23, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/
asia-pacific/2021/12/23/malaysia-keen-on-buying-kuwaits-hornet-fighter-jets/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
79. News release, “Joint Statement Between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United
States of America,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 31, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1863375/jointstatement-between-the-ministry-of-defense-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-an/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
80. U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked
Region, June 1, 2019, p. 37, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGYREPORT-2019.PDF (accessed May 14, 2022).
81. BenarNews, “US, Indonesia Building Maritime Training Base on Batan,” Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/
base-06282021182525.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
186
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
82. Remarks to the Press, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi Before Their Meeting,” U.S. Department of
State, August 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting/
(accessed May 14, 2022).
83. Koya Jibiki, “US and Indonesia to Hold Largest Island Defense Drills,” Nikkei Asia, July 30, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Internationalrelations/Indo-Pacific/US-and-Indonesia-to-hold-largest-island-defense-drills (accessed May 14, 2022).
84. Associated Press, “US Approves Major $14 Billion Arms Sale to Indonesia,” Voice of America, February 10, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/usapproves-major-14-billion-arms-sale-to-indonesia-/6436765.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
85. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Indonesia,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, March 23, 2021, https://www.
state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia/ (accessed May 18, 2022).
86. U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/Afghanistan-1225-Report-December-2016.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
87. “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” The White House, April 14, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
88. Natasha Turak and Amanda Macias, “Ousted Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Resurfaces in UAE After Fleeing Kabul, Emirati Government Says,”
CNBC, August 18, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/18/afghan-president-ashraf-ghani-is-in-uae-after-fleeing-afghanistan.html (accessed
May 14, 2022).
89. Sandi Sidhu, Nick Paton Walsh, Tim Lister, Oren Liebermann, Laura Smith-Spark, and Saskya Vandoorne, “Ten Family Members, Including
Children, Dead After US Strike in Kabul,” CNN, updated August 30, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/29/asia/afghanistan-kabul-evacuationintl/index.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
90. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Taliban Unveil New Afghan Government,” The Wall Street Journal, updated September 7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
taliban-crack-down-on-protest-led-by-women-in-kabul-11631014019 (accessed May 14, 2022).
91. Stenographic transcript of Hearing to Receive Testimony on Security in Afghanistan and the Regions of South and Central Asia, Committee on
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92. Nahal Toosi, “Pakistan Terrorism Crackdown ‘Necessary’ to Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy,” Politico, August 22, 2017, https://www.politico.com/
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94. “Figures in the CSF row reflect actual payments by appropriation year. The FY2015 NDAA authorized up to $1 billion in additional CSF to Pakistan,
$300 million of which was subject to Haqqani Network-related certification requirements that cannot be waived by the Administration. The
FY2016 NDAA authorized $900 million, with $350 million ineligible for waiver. The FY2017 NDAA again authorized $900 million, but with $400
million ineligible for waiver. The FY2018 NDAA authorized $700 million, with $350 million ineligible for waiver. The Administration did not issue
certifications for FY2015-FY2018. The NDAA for FY2019 revamped the CSF program, authorizing $350 million to support security enhancement
activities along Pakistan’s western border, subject to certification requirements that have not been met to date. The Pentagon has requested
$450 million for global CSF for FY2020.” Table, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–
FY2020,” note g.
95. Press statement by Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, “United States Takes Action Against Violators of Religious Freedom,” U.S. Mission
to International Organizations in Geneva, December 20, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/12/20/united-states-takes-action-againstviolators-of-religious-freedom/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
96. Madiha Afzal, “Terrorism in Pakistan Has Declined, but the Underlying Roots of Extremism Remain,” Brookings Institution, Initiative on Nonstate
Armed Actors, January 15, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-has-declined-but-theunderlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
97. Ibid.
98. Daud Khattak, “The Pakistani Taliban Is Back,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-pakistani-taliban-is-back/
(accessed May 14, 2022).
99. Ayaz Gul, “Taliban Condemn Pakistan for Alleged Cross-Border Attacks in Afghanistan,” Voice of America, April 16, 2022, https://www.voanews.
com/a/taliban-condemn-pakistan-for-alleged-cross-border-attacks-in-afghanistan/6532351.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
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93. Table, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2020,” Prepared by the Congressional
Research Service for distribution to multiple congressional offices, March 12, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf (accessed May 14,
2022). DOD’s “FY 2021 budget request for support for coalition forces,” however, “include[d] $180 million for the Coalition Support Fund (CSF)….
The FY 2021 CSF request of $180 million reflect[ed] a $45 million (20 percent) decrease from the FY 2020 enacted level of $225 million due
to the continuing suspension of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan based on the President’s January 4, 2018, guidance.” U.S. Department of
Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021
Budget Request: Defense Budget Overview, revised May 13, 2020, p. 6-6, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
100. Ayaz Gul, “US Official Slams Taliban for Falling Short on Public Pledges,” Voice of America, October 8, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/usdiplomat-discusses-afghanistan-bilateral-ties-with-pakistan-leaders/6262799.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
101. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Pakistan Have in 2021?” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, September 7, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-pakistan-havein-2021/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
102. Table, “Theft Ranking: Countries with Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Security Index, Theft/
Sabotage: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action, September 2018, p. 10, https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_2018_
Index_FINAL.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
103. Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Security Index, Theft/Sabotage/Radiological, July 2020, p. 9, https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/01/2020_NTI-Index_Report.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
104. Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Equips Military with Tactical Nuke-Capable Missile,” Voice of America, updated January 25, 2019, https://www.voanews.
com/a/pakistan-equips-military-with-tactical-nuke-capable-missile-/4757719.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
105. Associated Press, “Worst Fighting in Years over Disputed Kashmir,” CBS News, October 9, 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-pakistanfighting-kashmir-thousands-civilians-flee-border-violence/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
106. Ralph Ellis, Euan McKirdy, and Harmeet Shah Singh, “Indian Prime Minister Urges Pakistan to Investigate Attack on Military Base,” CNN, updated
January 5, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/asia/india-air-base-gunmen/index.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
107. Ravi Krishnan Khajuria, “Jammu Army Camp Attack: Two Soldiers Killed as JeM Militants Storm into Sunjuwan Base,” Hindustan Times, updated
February 10, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/terrorists-attack-army-camp-in-jammu-soldier-and-daughter-injured/story20lLSRP8tuSE6UM2nvxt1O.html (accessed June 21, 2021), and BBC News, “Pulwama Attack: Nine Killed in Kashmir Gun Battle,” February 18, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47275072 (accessed May 14, 2022).
108. Joanna Slater, “India Strikes Pakistan in Severe Escalation of Tensions Between Nuclear Rivals,” The Washington Post, February 26,
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-says-indian-fighter-jets-crossed-into-its-territory-and-carried-out-limitedairstrike/2019/02/25/901f3000-3979-11e9-a06c-3ec8ed509d15_story.html (accessed May 14, 2022).

109. BBC News, “India and Pakistan Blame Each Other over Kashmir Shelling,” October 21, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-50120613 (accessed May 14, 2022).
110. Special Correspondent, “Parliament Proceedings: 5,133 Ceasefire Violations Along LoC Last Year: Government,” The Hindu, updated February 9,
2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/parliament-proceedings-46-security-personnel-killed-in-ceasefire-violations-by-pakistan-in2020-rajnath-singh/article33782464.ece (accessed May 14, 2022).
111. Press release, “Joint Statement,” Government of India, Ministry of Defence, February 25, 2021, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.
aspx?PRID=1700682 (accessed May 14, 2022).
112. “Read: Full Text of Gen Bajwa’s Speech at the Islamabad Security Dialogue,” Dawn, March 18, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1613207/readfull-text-of-gen-bajwas-speech-at-the-islamabad-security-dialogue (accessed May 14, 2022).
113. Press release, “Statement on Accidental Firing of Missile,” Government of India, Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2022, https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1805148 (accessed May 14, 2022).
114. Umair Jamal, “Pakistan Alarmed over India’s Accidental Missile Firing,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/
pakistan-alarmed-over-indias-accidental-missile-firing/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
115. See Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” January 5, 2021, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf (accessed May 18, 2022), and Indo-Pacific
Strategy of the United States, The White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-PacificStrategy.pdf (accessed May 18, 2022). See also Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, K. Alan Kronstadt, Susan V. Lawrence, Thomas
Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Ronald O’Rourke, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45396, updated October 3, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R45396 (accessed May 18, 2022).
116. Jeff M. Smith, “Modi 2.0: Navigating Differences and Consolidating Gains in India–U.S. Relations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3425,
August 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/modi-20-navigating-differences-and-consolidating-gains-india-us-relations.
117. Jeff Smith, “Austin Goes to India: An Agenda for India–U.S. Defense Consultations,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6067, March 18, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/austin-goes-india-agenda-india-us-defense-consultations.
118. Press release, “Fourth Annual U.S.–India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” U.S. Department of State, April 11, 2022, https://www.state.gov/fourth-annualu-s-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/ (accessed May 18, 2022), and press release, “Readout of U.S.–India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” U.S. Department
of Defense, April 11, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2996350/readout-of-us-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/#.
YlTOVV8flao.twitter (accessed May 18, 2022).
119. Press release, “Readout of U.S.–India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue.”
188
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120. Megan Eckstein, “Japan Cabinet Approves Aegis Ashore Buy to Supplement DDGs in Ballistic Missile Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute News,
December 22, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/12/22/japan-cabinet-approves-aegis-ashore-buy-supplement-ddgs-ballistic-missile-defense
(accessed May 14, 2022).
121. Masaya Kato, “Japan Stuck with $1.6bn Bill After Scrapping Aegis Ashore System,” Nikkei Asia, June 18, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Politics/International-relations/Japan-stuck-with-1.6bn-bill-after-scrapping-Aegis-Ashore-system (accessed May 14, 2022), and Kyodo
News, “Japan Suspends Plan to Deploy Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” The Japan Times, June 15, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2020/06/15/national/japan-halt-deploy-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-system/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
122. Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Operations: Current Operations,” https://www1.defence.gov.au/operations (accessed May 14,
2022).
123. Table, “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2019) US$ m., 1988–2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021, https://
sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932020%20in%20constant%20%282019%29%20
USD%20%28pdf%29.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
124. Jeremy Koh, “Made for Singapore: First of Four Custom-Built RSN Submarines Launched in Germany,” CNA, February 19, 2019, https://www.
milipolasiapacific.com/news-post/made-for-singapore-first-of-four-custom-built-rsn-submarines-launched-in-germany/#:~:text=%2D%20
September%202021-,Made%20for%20Singapore%3A%20First%20of%20four%20custom%2Dbuilt,RSN%20submarines%20launched%20in%20
Germany&text=KIEL%2C%20Germany%3A%20The%20first%20of,on%20Monday%20(Feb%2018) (accessed May 14, 2022).
125. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
Economics (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 303-305.
126. Mike Yeo, “US Approves Location for Singaporean F-16, F-35 Training,” Defense News, June 4, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/trainingsim/2021/06/04/us-approves-location-for-singaporean-f-16-f-35-training/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
127. Table, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
2021, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932020%20as%20a%20share%20of%20
GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
128. Raissa Robles, “Philippine Navy Seeks ‘Dream Fleet’ in South China Sea, Buys Two South Korean Warships to Ramp Up Maritime Defences,”
South China Morning Post, December 29, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3161455/philippine-navy-seeks-dream-fleetsouth-china-sea-buys-two-south (accessed May 14, 2022).

129. Frances Mangosing, “PH, South Korea Discuss Corvettes, Light Fighter Jet Upgrades,” Inquirer.net, December 16, 2020, https://globalnation.
inquirer.net/192725/ph-south-korea-discuss-corvettes-light-fighter-jet-upgrades (accessed May 19, 2022).
130. Mike Yeo, “Philippine Air Force Modernizes Fleet Following Financial Troubles, Historical Inaction,” Defense News, February 14, 2022, https://
www.defensenews.com/air/2022/02/14/philippine-air-force-modernizes-fleet-following-financial-troubles-historical-inaction/ (accessed May 19,
2022).
131. Government of France, Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, updated May 2019,
pp. 6 and 8, https://franceintheus.org/IMG/pdf/France_and_Security_in_the_Indo-Pacific_-_2019.pdf (accessed May 14, 2022).
132. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “About USINDOPACOM,” http://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
133. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Area of Responsibility,” last updated March 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Areaof-Responsibility/ (accessed May 19, 2022).
134. Ibid.
135. MyBaseGuide, “Hawaii—Army Community: Brief History: U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC),” https://mybaseguide.com/installation/hawaii-army/
community/brief-history-6/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
136. 354th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, “Eielson Completes F-35A Lightning II Fleet,” Eielson Air Force Base, April 15, 2022, https://www.eielson.af.mil/
News/Articles/Article/3001623/eielson-completes-f-35a-lightning-ii-fleet/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
137. Steaming times calculated using Marine Vessel Traffic, “Sea Distance Calculator,” http://www.marinevesseltraffic.com/2013/07/distance-calculator.
html (accessed May 14, 2022).
138. U.S. Marine Corps, “History: Historical Summary of Marines on Guam," https://www.mcbblaz.marines.mil/History/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
139. Alex Wilson, “Contracts for Marines Corps’ New Base on Guam Are Nearing $1.5 billion,” Stars and Stripes, April 20, 2022, https://www.stripes.
com/theaters/asia_pacific/2022-04-20/marine-corps-base-camp-blaz-guam-construction-okinawa-5742329.html (accessed May 14, 2022).
140. Air Force Technology, “B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber,” April 24, 2020, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/b2/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
141. Press release, “Sixth United States–Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” U.S. Department of State, March 18, 2016,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/254833.htm (accessed May 14, 2022).
142. News release, “U.S., Philippines Cut the Ribbon on Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Project,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, January
30, 2019, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1744271/us-philippines-cut-the-ribbon-on-enhanced-defensecooperation-agreement-project/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
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143. Staff Sgt. Anthony Small, “US, Philippine AF Concludes [sic] Bilateral Air Contingency Exchange,” U.S. Air Force, February 6, 2019, https://www.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1749908/us-philippine-af-concludes-bilateral-air-contingency-exchange/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
144. Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Commentary,
December 3, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-alliance-philippines (accessed May 14, 2022).
145. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, April 20, 2021, https://www.
state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/ (accessed May 14, 2022).
146. See, for example, Wyatt Olson, “Deal Likely to Bring More US Assets to Australia,” Stars and Stripes, June 20, 2014, https://www.stripes.com/
news/deal-likely-to-bring-more-us-military-assets-to-australia-1.289846 (accessed May 14, 2022).
147. Smith, Ministerial Statement on “Full Knowledge and Concurrence.”
148. Grady Fontana, “Military Sealift Command’s USNS Pililaau Delivers Cobra Gold 18 Essentials,” U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Visual
Information Distribution Service, February 9, 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/265236/military-sealift-commands-usns-pililaau-deliverscobra-gold-18-essentials (accessed May 14, 2022).
149. Ibid. See also Rear Adm. (Ret.) Michael McDevitt, “America’s Interest in Diego Garcia,” War on the Rocks, June 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.
com/2020/06/americas-interest-in-diego-garcia/ (accessed May 14, 2022).

150. For an example of a very accessible database, see World Bank, “Logistics Performance Index: Quality of Trade and Transport-Related
Infrastructure (1=Low to 5=High),” 2007–2018, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/LP.LPI.INFR.XQ (accessed May 14, 2022).
190
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Conclusion: Scoring the Global
Operating Environment
T
of the Russian government’s ability to conduct the
war in Ukraine. Both NATO and many non-NATO
European countries have reason to be increasingly
concerned about the behavior and ambitions of both
Russia and China, although agreement on a collective response to these challenges remains elusive.
The past year saw continued U.S. military and political reengagement with the continent along with
increases in European allies’ defense budgets and
capability investment. Additional deployments to
Europe following the invasion of Ukraine have made
the U.S. military presence in Europe the strongest it
has been for several years. The economic, political,
and societal impacts of the invasion are only beginning to be felt and will undoubtedly have to be reckoned with for years to come. However, NATO has
maintained its collective defense posture throughout despite the draining of its material resources
as the alliance sends equipment and munitions
into Ukraine to strengthen that country’s ability to
defend itself.
It is difficult to predict whether NATO’s renewed
emphasis on collective defense and its reinvigorated
defense spending will continue over the long term
or is merely a short-term response to Russia’s invasion. Given the potential for Russia to replace its
Global Operating Environment
VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
FAVORABLE
Europe
Middle East
EXCELLENT
%
%
Asia
%
OVERALL
%
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191

he United States is a global power with global
security interests, and threats to those interests
can emerge from any region. Consequently, the U.S.
military must be ready to operate in any region when
called upon to do so and must account for the range
of conditions that it might encounter when planning for potential military operations. These considerations necessarily inform its decisions about
the type and amount of equipment it purchases
(especially to transport and sustain the force); the
location or locations from which it might operate;
and how easily it can or cannot project and sustain
combat power when engaged with the enemy.
Aggregating the three regional scores provides
a global operating environment score of FAVORABLE in the 2023 Index.
Europe. Overall, the European region remains a
stable, mature, and friendly operating environment.
Russia remains the preeminent military threat to
the region, both conventionally and unconventionally, and its invasion of Ukraine marks a serious escalation of its efforts to exert influence on its periphery.
China continues to have a significant presence in Europe through its propaganda, influence operations,
and investments in key sectors. By mitigating the
effect of sanctions, it also has been a key enabler
Global Operating Environment: Summary

VERY POOR
UNFAVORABLE
MODERATE
battlefield losses with newer, more modern equipment, NATO defense spending on capability will be
an important issue in the medium to long terms.
Scores for Europe remained steady this year as
they did in 2021 (assessed in the 2022 Index), with
no substantial changes in any individual categories
or average scores. The 2023 Index again assesses the
European operating environment as “favorable.”
The Middle East. The Middle East region is
now highly unstable, in large measure because of
the erosion of authoritarian regimes and the fact
that the region remains a breeding ground for terrorism. Overall, regional security has continued to
deteriorate. Although Iraq has restored its territorial integrity since the defeat of ISIS, the political
situation and future relations between Baghdad and
the United States will remain difficult as long as a
government that is sympathetic to Iran is in power.
U.S. relations in the region will remain complex, but
this has not stopped the U.S. military from operating as needed.
The supremacy of the nation-state is being challenged in many countries by non-state actors that
wield influence and power comparable to those of
small states. The region’s primary challenges—continued meddling by Iran and surging transnational
terrorism—are made more difficult by Sunni–Shia
sectarian divides, the more aggressive nature of
Iran’s Islamist revolutionary nationalism, and the
proliferation of Sunni Islamist revolutionary groups.
COVID-19 exacerbated these economic, political,
and regional crises during 2020 and 2021 and continued to do so throughout 2022. The result could
well be further destabilization of the post-pandemic
operational environment for U.S. forces.
In the Middle East, the U.S. benefits from operationally proven procedures that leverage bases,
infrastructure, and the logistical processes needed
to maintain a large force that is forward deployed
thousands of miles away from the homeland. The
personal links between allied armed forces are also
present, and joint training exercises improve interoperability and provide an opportunity for the
U.S. to influence some of the region’s future leaders.
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FAVORABLE
EXCELLENT
America’s relationships in the region are based
pragmatically on shared security and economic concerns. As long as these issues remain relevant to both
sides, the U.S. is likely to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests
require that it do so.
Although circumstances in all measured areas
vary throughout the year, in general terms, the 2023
Index assesses the Middle East operating environment as “moderate,” but the region’s political stability continues to be “unfavorable” and will remain a
dark cloud over everything else.
Asia. The Asian strategic environment includes
half of the globe and is characterized by a variety of
political relationships among states with wildly varying capabilities. This makes Asia far different from
Europe, which in turn makes America’s relations
with the region different from its relations with Europe. American conceptions of Asia must recognize
the physical limitations imposed by the tyranny of
distance and the need to move forces as necessary to
respond to challenges from China and North Korea.
The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations
and the lack of an integrated, regional security architecture along the lines of NATO make defense of
U.S. security interests in Asia more challenging than
many Americans appreciate. However, the U.S. has
strong relations with allies in the region, and their
willingness to host bases helps to offset the vast distances that must be covered.
The militaries of Japan and the Republic of Korea
are larger and more capable than European militaries, and both countries are becoming more interested in developing missile defense capabilities that
will be essential in combatting the regional threat
posed by North Korea. In Japan, there is a growing
public awareness of the need to adopt a more “normal” military posture in response to China’s increasingly aggressive actions. This indicates a break with
the pacifist tradition among the Japanese that has
lasted since the end of World War II and could lead
to improved military capabilities and the prospect
of joining the U.S. in defense measures beyond the
immediate vicinity of Japan.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
We continue to assess the Asia region as “favorable” to U.S. interests in terms of alliances, overall
political stability, militarily relevant infrastructure,
and the presence of U.S. military forces.
Summarizing the condition of each region enables us to get a sense of how they compare in terms
of the difficulty that would be involved in projecting
U.S. military power and sustaining combat operations in each one. As a whole, the global operating
environment maintains a score of “favorable,” which
means that the United States should be able to project military power anywhere in the world to defend
its interests without substantial opposition or high
levels of risk.

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193


Threats to U.S.‌
Vital Interests

Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
B
ecause the United States is a global power with
global interests, scaling its military power to
threats requires judgments with regard to the importance and priority of those interests, whether the
use of force is the most appropriate and effective way
to address the threats to those interests, and how
much and what types of force are needed to defeat
such threats.
This Index focuses on three fundamental, vital
national interests:
l
l
Defense of the homeland;
l
l
Preservation of freedom of movement within
the global commons: the sea, air, outer space,
and cyberspace domains through which the
world conducts business.
The geographical focus of the threats in these areas is further divided into three broad regions: Asia,
Europe, and the Middle East.
Obviously, these are not America’s only interests.
Among many others are the growth of economic freedom in trade and investment, the observance of internationally recognized human rights, and the alleviation of human suffering beyond our borders. None
of these other interests, however, can be addressed
principally and effectively by the use of military force,
and threats to them would not necessarily result in
material damage to the foregoing vital national interests. Therefore, however important these additional
American interests may be, we do not use them in
assessing the adequacy of current U.S. military power.
There are many publicly available sources of information on the status, capabilities, and activities
l
The Military Balance is an excellent, widely
consulted source, but it is primarily a count of
military hardware, often without context in
terms of equipment capability, maintenance
and readiness, training, manpower, integration
of services, doctrine, or the behavior of competitors that threaten the national interests of the
U.S. as defined in this Index. Each edition of the
publication includes topical essays and a variety of focused discussions about some aspect
of a selected country’s capabilities, but there is
no overarching assessment of military power
referenced against a set of interests, potential
consequences of use, or implications for the
interaction of countries.
The ODNI’s “Annual Assessment” omits many
threats, and its analysis of those that it does address is limited. Moreover, it does not reference
underlying strategic dynamics that are key to
the evaluation of threats and that may be more
predictive of future threats than is a simple
extrapolation of current events.
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197

Successful conclusion of a major war that has
the potential to destabilize a region of critical
interest to the U.S.; and
of countries with respect to military power. Perhaps the two most often cited as references are
The Military Balance, published annually by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS),1 and the “Annual Threat Assessment
of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”2 The former is
an unmatched resource for researchers who want to
know, for example, the strength, composition, and
disposition of a country’s military services. The latter serves as a reference point produced by the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
Comparison of our detailed, peer-reviewed analysis of specific countries with The Military Balance
and the ODNI’s “Annual Assessment” reveals two
stark limitations in these external sources.

Threat Categories
Behavior
HOSTILE
AGGRESSIVE
TESTING
ASSERTIVE
BENIGN
Capability
FORMIDABLE
GATHERING
CAPABLE
ASPIRATIONAL
MARGINAL
We suspect that this is a consequence of the U.S.
intelligence community’s withholding from public
view its very sensitive assessments, which are derived from classified sources and/or result from
analysis of unclassified, publicly available documents with the resulting synthesized insights being classified because of what they reveal about U.S.
determinations and concerns. The need to avoid the
compromising of sources, methods of collection, and
national security findings makes such a policy understandable, but it also causes the ODNI’s annual
threat assessments to be of limited value to policymakers, the public, and analysts working outside of
the government. Consequently, we do not use the
ODNI’s assessment as a reference, given its quite
limited usefulness, but trust that the reader will
double-check our conclusions by consulting the
various sources cited in the following pages as well
as other publicly available reporting that is relevant
to the challenges to core U.S. security interests that
are discussed in this section.
Measuring or categorizing a threat is problematic because there is no absolute reference that can
be used in assigning a quantitative score. Two fundamental aspects of threats, however, are germane
to this Index:
l
l
The threatening entity’s desire or intent to
achieve its objective and
Its physical ability to do so.
Physical ability is the easier of the two to assess;
intent is quite difficult. A useful surrogate for intent
is observed behavior because this is where intent becomes manifest through action. Thus, a provocative,
belligerent pattern of behavior that seriously threatens U.S. vital interests would be very worrisome.
Similarly, a comprehensive ability to accomplish objectives even in the face of U.S. military power would
be of serious concern to U.S. policymakers, and weak
or very limited abilities would lessen U.S. concern
even if an entity behaved provocatively vis-à-vis U.S.
198
interests. It is the combination of the two—behavior
and capability—that informs our final score for each
assessed actor.
Each categorization used in the Index conveys
a word picture of how troubling a threat’s behavior
and set of capabilities have been during the assessed
year. The five ascending categories for observed
behavior are:
l
Benign,
l
Assertive,
l
Testing,
l
Aggressive, and
l
Hostile.
The five ascending categories for physical capability are:
l
Marginal,
l
Aspirational,
l
Capable,
l
Gathering, and
l
Formidable.
As noted, these characterizations—behavior and
capability—form two halves of an overall assessment
of the threats to U.S. vital interests.
The most current and relatable example of this
interplay between behavior and capability is Russia’s
brutal assault on Ukraine. Throughout its buildup of
forces along Ukraine’s border during 2021, Russia
consistently downplayed observers’ concerns that
its actions were a prelude to war. Regardless of its
protestations, however, one could not dismiss the
potential for grievous harm that was inherent in
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Russia’s forces and their disposition. Russia’s behavior, combined with the military capability it had
deployed in posture and geographic position, belied
its official pronouncements.
The same thing can be said about China, Iran, and
North Korea. Like Russia, each of these countries
typically tries to refute observers’ concerns that
its military activities, posturing, and investments
threaten the interests of neighbors, as well as distant competitors like the U.S., but no rational country can ignore the potential that is inherent in the
forces that each country fields, the investments it is
making to improve and expand its capabilities, and
a pattern of behavior that reveals its regime’s preference for intimidation and coercion over diplomacy
and mutually beneficial economic interaction. It is
therefore in the core interest of the United States
to take stock of the capabilities and behaviors of its
chief adversaries as it considers the capacity, capability, and readiness of its own military forces.
We always hold open the possibility of adding to
or deleting from our list of threat actors. The inclusion of any state or non-state entity is based solely
on our assessment of its ability to present a meaningful challenge to a critical U.S. interest during the
assessed year.

Endnotes
1.
For the most recent of these authoritative studies, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022: The Annual
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2022).
2.
See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” February 7, 2022,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf (accessed July 13, 2022). Issued before 2021 as
“Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.”
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199

China
Dean Cheng
I
n its 2021 Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, the Biden Administration made clear
that it sees China as a major and growing threat:
“China…has rapidly become more assertive” and “is
the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a
stable and open international system.1
While this is labeled an interim guidance, it
probably will be reflected eventually in the Administration’s full National Security Strategy when
it is issued.
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201

Threats to the Homeland
Both China and Russia are seen as revisionist
powers, but they pose very different challenges to
the United States. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has the world’s second-largest gross domestic product (GDP), and its economy as measured in
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is far larger than the U.S. economy.2 China is also an integral
and important part of the global supply chain for
crucial technologies, especially those relating to
information and communications technology. As
a result, it has the resources to support a comprehensive military modernization program that has
been ongoing for more than two decades and spans
the conventional, space, and cyber realms as well as
weapons of mass destruction, an area that includes a
multipronged nuclear modernization effort.
At the same time, the PRC has been acting more
assertively—even aggressively—against a growing
number of its neighbors. Unresolved land and maritime disputes have led Beijing to adopt an increasingly confrontational attitude toward territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, in the East China
Sea, and along the China–India border, and Beijing’s
reaction to the Democratic Progressive Party’s victories in Taiwan’s 2016 and 2020 elections has heightened cross-Strait tensions.
In May 2020, the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission reported that, “[w]ith the
world distracted by COVID-19, China also intensified its multi-faceted pressure campaign against
Taiwan. Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait three times in the
early months of 2020 after only one such incursion
in 2019.” The commission further noted that China conducted several provocative military exercises around the island and “continued its efforts to
poach Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies as the
virus spread.”3 Since then, China has been intruding
regularly across the median line of the Taiwan Strait
with ever-larger groups of aircraft.
Meanwhile, China’s attempts to obscure the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and stifle international investigations into the matter have undermined global health efforts. Beijing has also sought
to exclude Taiwan from multilateral efforts to combat the pandemic.
Growing Conventional Capabilities. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains one of
the world’s largest militaries, but its days of largely
obsolescent equipment are in the past. Nearly two
decades of officially acknowledged double-digit
growth in the Chinese defense budget have resulted
in a comprehensive modernization program that has
benefited every part of the PLA. This has been complemented by improvements in Chinese military
training and, in 2015, the largest reorganization in
the PLA’s history.4 The PLA has lost 300,000 personnel since those reforms, but its overall capabilities
have increased as newer, much more sophisticated
systems have replaced older platforms.

A major part of the 2015 reorganization was the
establishment of a separate ground forces headquarters and bureaucracy; previously, the ground
forces had been the default service providing staffs
and commanders. Now the PLA Army (PLAA), responsible for the PLA’s ground forces, is no longer
automatically in charge of war zones or higher headquarters functions. At the same time, the PLAA has
steadily modernized its capabilities, incorporating
both new equipment and a new organization. It has
shifted from a division-based structure toward a brigade-based one and has been improving its mobility,
including heliborne infantry and fire support.5 These
forces are increasingly equipped with modern armored fighting vehicles, air defenses, both tube and
rocket artillery, and electronic support equipment.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is Asia’s largest navy “and
within the past few years…has surpassed the U.S.
Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the
types of ships that count toward the quoted size of
the U.S. Navy).”6 According to the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD):
The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with
a battle force of approximately 355 platforms,
including major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going amphibious
ships, mine warfare ships, and fleet auxiliaries.
This figure does not include 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs). The PLAN’s overall battle
force is expected to grow to 420 ships by 2025
and 460 ships by 2030.7
Although the total number of ships has dropped,
the PLAN has fielded increasingly sophisticated and
capable multi-role ships. Multiple classes of surface
combatants are now in series production, including
the Type 055 cruiser and the Type 052C and Type
052D guided missile destroyers, each of which fields
long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-ship cruise missile systems, as well as the Type
054 frigate and Type 056 corvette.
The PLAN has similarly been modernizing its
submarine force. Since 2000, the PLAN has consistently fielded between 50 and 60 diesel-electric submarines, but the age and capability of the force have
been improving as older boats, especially 1950s-vintage Romeo-class boats, are replaced with newer designs. These include a dozen Kilo-class submarines
202
purchased from Russia and domestically designed
and manufactured Song and Yuan classes. All of
these are believed to be capable of firing both torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.8 The Chinese
have also developed variants of the Yuan, with an
air-independent propulsion (AIP) system that reduces the boats’ vulnerability by removing the need
to use noisy diesel engines to recharge batteries, and
are “expected to produce a total of 25 or more Yuan
class submarines by 2025.”9
The PLAN has been expanding its amphibious assault capabilities as well. The PLA Marine Corps, for
example, is China’s counterpart to the U.S. Marine
Corps. According to the DOD:
The PLANMC previously consisted of two
brigades (approximately 10,000 personnel)
and was limited in geography and mission to
amphibious assault and defense of South China
Sea outposts. In 2020, the PLANMC continued
to mature an enlarged force structure of eight
brigades intended to be scalable and mobile,
modernize its capabilities for joint expeditionary
operations—including operations beyond the
First Island Chain—and become more proficient
in conventional and irregular warfare. Throughout 2020, the PLANMC continued to work towards fully equipping and training its four newly
established maneuver brigades (in addition to
its two previously existing brigades), a SOF brigade, and an aviation (helicopter) brigade.10
To move this force, the Chinese have begun to
build more amphibious assault ships, including
Type 071 amphibious transport docks.11 Each can
carry about 800 naval infantrymen and move them
to shore by means of four air-cushion landing craft
and four helicopters.
Supporting these expanded naval combat forces
is a growing fleet of support and logistics vessels. The
2010 PRC defense white paper noted the accelerated
construction of “large support vessels.” It also noted
specifically that the navy is exploring “new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time
maritime missions.”12 These include tankers and
fast combat support ships that extend the range of
Chinese surface groups and allow them to operate
for more prolonged periods away from main ports.
Chinese naval task forces dispatched to the Gulf of
Aden have typically included such vessels.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
the American F-22 fighter. The J-31 appears to resemble the F-35 but with two engines rather than
one. The production of advanced combat aircraft
engines remains one of the greatest challenges to
Chinese fighter design.
The PLAAF is also deploying increasing numbers
of H-6 bombers, which can undertake longer-range
strike operations including operations employing
land-attack cruise missiles. Although the H-6, like
the American B-52 and Russian Tu-95, is a 1950s-era
design copied from the Soviet-era Tu-16 Badger
bomber, the latest versions (H-6K) are equipped
with updated electronics and engines and are made
of carbon composites. In addition, China is developing the H-20, a flying wing–type stealth bomber that
is probably similar to the U.S. B-2.17
Equally important, the PLAAF has been introducing a variety of support aircraft, including airborne early warning (AEW), command and control
(C2), and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. These
systems field state-of-the-art radars and electronic surveillance systems that allow Chinese air
commanders to detect potential targets, including
low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles, more quickly
and gather additional intelligence on adversary radars and electronic emissions. China’s combat aircraft are also increasingly capable of undertaking
mid-air refueling, which allows them to conduct extended, sustained operations, and the Chinese aerial
tanker fleet, which is based on the H-6 aircraft, has
been expanding.
At the biennial Zhuhai Air Show, Chinese comAlthough they currently have limited power
panies have displayed a variety of unmanned aerial
projection capability, both the PLAAF and
vehicles that reflect substantial investments and rePLAN Aviation are seeking to extend their
search and development efforts. The surveillance
reach. The PLAAF, in particular, has received
and armed UAV systems include the Xianglong
repeated calls from its leadership to become a
(Soaring Dragon) and Sky Saber systems. The DOD’s
truly “strategic” air force, able to project power
2019 report on Chinese capabilities stated that
at long distances and support Chinese national
China had “successfully tested the AT-200, which
interests wherever they extend.15
it claims is the ‘world’s first large cargo UAV,’” and
further specified that “[t]his drone can carry up to
The PLAAF currently has more than 700 1.5 tons of cargo and… may be especially suited to
fourth-generation fighters that are comparable to provide logistic support to PLA forces in the South
the U.S. F-15, F-16, and F-18. They include the do- China Sea.”18 Chinese UAVs have been included in
mestically designed and produced J-10 as well as the various military parades over the past several years,
Su-27/Su-30/J-11 system, which is comparable to suggesting that they are being incorporated into
the F-15 or F-18 and dominates both the fighter and Chinese forces, and the DOD’s 2021 report on Chistrike missions.16 China is also believed to be pre- nese capabilities states that “The PLAAF continues
paring to field two stealthy fifth-generation fighter to modernize with the delivery of domestically built
designs. The J-20 is the larger aircraft and resembles aircraft and a wide range of UAVs.”19
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203

The PLAN has also been expanding its naval aviation capabilities, the most publicized element of
which has been the growing Chinese carrier fleet.
This currently includes not only the Liaoning, purchased from Ukraine over a decade ago, but a domestically produced copy, the Shandong, that completed
its first exercise in 2021.13 Both of these ships have
ski jumps for their air wing, but the Chinese are also
building several conventional takeoff/barrier landing (CATOBAR) carriers (like American or French
aircraft carriers) that will employ catapults and
therefore allow their air complement to carry more
ordnance and/or fuel.14
The PLAN’s land-based element is modernizing
as well, with a variety of long-range strike aircraft,
anti-ship cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entering the inventory. In addition
to more modern versions of the H-6 twin-engine
bomber (a version of the Soviet/Russian Tu-16 Badger), the PLAN’s Naval Aviation force has added a
range of other strike aircraft to its inventory. These
include the JH-7/FBC-1 Flying Leopard, which can
carry between two and four YJ-82 anti-ship cruise
missiles, and the Su-30 strike fighter.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), with more than
1,700 combat aircraft, is Asia’s largest air force. It has
shifted steadily from a force focused on homeland
air defense to one that is capable of power projection,
including long-range precision strikes against both
land and maritime targets. The DOD’s 2021 report
on Chinese capabilities notes that:

The PLAAF is also responsible for the Chinese
homeland’s strategic air defenses. Its array of surface-to-air missile batteries is one of the world’s
largest and includes the Russian S-300 (SA-10B/
SA-20) and its Chinese counterpart, the Hongqi-9
long-range SAM. The S-400 series of Russian longrange SAMs, delivery of which began in 2018, mark
a substantial improvement in PLAAF air defense
capabilities, as the S-400 has both anti-aircraft and
anti-missile capabilities.20 China has deployed these
SAM systems in a dense, overlapping belt along its
coast, protecting the nation’s economic center of
gravity. Key industrial and military centers such as
Beijing are also heavily defended by SAM systems.
China’s airborne forces are part of the PLAAF.
The 15th Airborne Corps has been reorganized from
three airborne divisions to six airborne brigades in
addition to a special operations brigade, an aviation
brigade, and a support brigade. These forces have
been incorporating indigenously developed airborne mechanized combat vehicles for the past decade, giving them more mobility and a better ability
to engage armored forces.
Nuclear Capability. Chinese nuclear forces
are the responsibility of the PLA Rocket Forces
(PLARF), one of the three new services created on
December 31, 2015. China’s nuclear ballistic missile
forces include land-based missiles with a range of
13,000 kilometers that can reach the U.S. and CSS4 and submarine-based missiles that can reach
the U.S. when the submarine is deployed within
missile range.
The PRC became a nuclear power in 1964 when
it exploded its first atomic bomb as part of its “two
bombs, one satellite” effort. China then exploded
its first thermonuclear bomb in 1967 and orbited its
first satellite in 1970, demonstrating the capability to
build a delivery system that can reach the ends of the
Earth. China chose to rely primarily on a land-based
nuclear deterrent instead of developing two or three
different basing systems as the United States did.
Unlike the United States or the Soviet Union,
China chose to pursue only a minimal nuclear deterrent. The PRC fielded only a small number of nuclear
weapons: 100–150 weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles and approximately 60 intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Its only ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) conducted relatively few deterrence patrols (perhaps none),21 and its first-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),
204
the JL-1, if it ever attained full operational capability
had limited reach. The JL-1’s 1,700-kilometer range
makes it comparable to the first-generation Polaris
A1 missile fielded by the U.S. in the 1960s.
After remaining stable for several decades, China’s nuclear force became part of Beijing’s two-decade modernization effort. The result has been
both modernization and expansion of the Chinese
nuclear deterrent. The core of China’s ICBM force
is the DF-31 series, a solid-fueled, road-mobile system, along with a growing number of longer-range,
road-mobile DF-41 missiles that may already be in
the PLA operational inventory. The DOD’s 2019 report on Chinese capabilities characterized the DF-41
as “a new MIRV-capable, road-mobile ICBM,”22 and
its 2021 report (as have previous reports) again
states that “China appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-mobile
and silo basing.”23 China’s medium-range nuclear
forces have similarly shifted to mobile, solid-rocket
systems so that they are both more survivable and
more easily maintained.
This past year has seen a sudden inflation in the
number of strategic nuclear warheads available to
the PLA Rocket Force. Imagery analysts at several
think tanks discovered at least three fields of silos
under construction in western China.24 Each appears to contain around 100 silos, indicating that
China could expand its land-based nuclear deterrent
component by more than an order of magnitude.
Notably, the Chinese are also expanding their ballistic missile submarine fleet. Replacing the one Type
092 Xia-class SSBN are six Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs,
all of which are operational. Equipped with the longer-range JL-2 SLBM, “the PLAN’s six operational
Jin class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible
sea-based nuclear deterrent.” In addition, “[e]ach
Jin class SSBN can carry up to 12 JL-2 SLBMs.”25
There is some possibility that the Chinese nuclear arsenal now contains land-attack cruise missiles.
The CJ-20, a long-range, air-launched cruise missile carried on China’s H-6 bomber, may be nuclear-tipped, although there is not much evidence that
China has pursued such a capability. China is also
believed to be working on a cruise missile submarine that, if equipped with nuclear cruise missiles,
would further expand the range of its nuclear attack options.26
As a result of its modernization efforts, China’s
nuclear forces appear to be shifting from a minimal
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
(FOBS) could allow attacks from southern trajectories (that is, from over the South Pole) or even the
placement of warheads in orbit, which would make
them almost impossible to intercept. Even without
a nuclear warhead, an orbiting hypersonic vehicle
could do enormous damage to a city or a military
facility such as an air base or an ICBM silo. Notably, because of the strategic instability that FOBS
programs would introduce, neither the U.S. nor the
Soviet Union ever pursued them.
Cyber and Space Capabilities. The PLA’s major
2015 reorganization included creation of the PLA
Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which brings
the Chinese military’s electronic, network (including cyber), and space warfare forces under a single
service umbrella. Previously, these capabilities had
been embedded in different departments across
the PLA’s General Staff Department and General
Armaments Department. By consolidating them
into a single service, the PLA has created a Chinese
“information warfare” force that is responsible for
offensive and defensive operations in the electromagnetic and space domains.
Chinese network warfare forces are known to
have conducted a variety of cyber and network reconnaissance operations as well as cyber economic
espionage. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice
charged PLA officers from Unit 61398, then of the
General Staff Department’s 3rd Department, with
the theft of intellectual property and implanting of
malware in various commercial firms.29 Members
of that unit are thought also to be part of Advanced
Persistent Threat-1, a group of computer hackers
believed to be operating on behalf of a nation-state
rather than a criminal group. In 2020, the Department of Justice charged several PLA officers with
one of the largest breaches in history: stealing the
credit ratings and records of 147 million people
from Equifax.30
The PRC has been conducting space operations
since 1970 when it first orbited a satellite, but its space
capabilities didn’t gain public prominence until 2007
when the PLA conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test
in low-Earth orbit against a defunct Chinese weather
satellite. The test became one of the worst debris-generating incidents of the space age: Many of the several thousand pieces of debris that were generated will
remain in orbit for more than a century.
Equally important, Chinese counter-space efforts
have been expanding steadily. The PLA not only has
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205

deterrent posture, suited only to responding to an attack and then with only limited numbers, to a more
robust but still limited deterrent posture. While
the PRC will still likely field fewer nuclear weapons
than either the United States or Russia, it will field
a more modern and diverse set of capabilities than
India, Pakistan, or North Korea, its nuclear-armed
neighbors, are capable of fielding. If there are corresponding changes in doctrine, modernization will
enable China to engage in limited nuclear options
in the event of a conflict.
This assessment changes, however, if the missiles
going into the newly discovered silos are equipped
with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). With five MIRVs atop each missile,
for example, 300 new ICBMs would have some 1,500
warheads—equivalent to the U.S. and Russian numbers allowed under New START. Even with fewer
than 300 ICBMs, the new SLBMs and new bombers
would enable China, within a few years, to field as
large a nuclear force as the United States or Russia
is capable of fielding.
In addition to strategic nuclear forces, the PLARF
has responsibility for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM and IRBM)
forces. These include (among others) the DF-21
MRBM, which has a range of approximately 1,500
kilometers, and the DF-26 IRBM, which has a range
of approximately 3,000 kilometers and “is capable
of conducting precision conventional or nuclear
strikes against ground targets, such as U.S. military
bases on Guam, as well as against maritime targets.”27
It is believed that Chinese missile brigades equipped
with these systems may have both nuclear and conventional responsibilities, making any deployment
from garrison much more ambiguous from a stability perspective. The expansion of these forces also
raises questions about the total number of Chinese
nuclear warheads.
While it is unclear whether they are nuclear-armed, China’s hypersonic glide vehicles also
pose a growing threat to the United States and its
allies. Hypersonic glide vehicles are slower than
ICBMs—Mach 5 for a hypersonic vehicle as opposed
to Mach 25 for an ICBM warhead—but are designed
to maneuver during their descent, making interception far more difficult. During a Chinese test in
August 2021, a hypersonic vehicle apparently went
into orbit.28 This creates a fundamentally different
threat, as a fractional orbital bombardment system

tested ASATs against low-Earth orbit systems, but
also is believed to have tested a system designed to
attack targets at geosynchronous orbit (GEO) approximately 22,000 miles above the Earth. As many
vital satellites are at GEO, including communications and missile early-warning systems, China’s
ability to target such systems constitutes a major
threat. In early 2022, China’s Shijian-22 towed a
dead Chinese satellite into a “graveyard” orbit above
the GEO belt.31 While this was officially touted as a
servicing operation, the ability to attach one satellite
to another and then tow it also has potential military
implications.
The creation of the PLASSF, incorporating counter-space forces, reflects the movement of counter-space systems, including direct-ascent ASATs,
out of the testing phase to fielding with units. In
2018, for example, the U.S. National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC) noted that “China has
military units that have begun training with anti-satellite missiles.”32
Threats to the Commons
The U.S. has critical sea, air, space, and cyber interests at stake in the East Asia and South Asia international common spaces. These interests include an
economic interest in the free flow of commerce and
the military use of the commons to safeguard America’s own security and contribute to the security of
its allies and partners.
Washington has long provided the security backbone in these areas, and this in turn has supported
the region’s remarkable economic development.
However, China is taking increasingly assertive
steps—including the construction of islands atop
previously submerged features—to secure its own
interests, and two things seem obvious: China and
the United States do not share a common conception
of international space, and China is actively seeking
to undermine American predominance in securing
international common spaces.
In addition, as China expands its naval capabilities, it will be present farther and farther away from
its home shores. As part of this effort, it established
its first formal overseas military base in 2017 pursuant to an agreement with the government of Djibouti.
Dangerous Behavior in the Maritime and
Airspace Common Spaces. The aggressiveness of
the Chinese navy, maritime law enforcement forces, and air forces in and over the waters of the East
206
China Sea and South China Sea, coupled with ambiguous, extralegal territorial claims and assertion of
control there, poses an incipient threat to American
and overlapping allied interests. Chinese military
writings emphasize the importance of establishing
dominance of the air and maritime domains in any
future conflict.
Although the Chinese do not necessarily have
sufficient capacity to prevent the U.S. from operating in local waters and airspace, the ability of the
U.S. to take control at acceptable costs in the early
stages of a conflict has become a matter of greater
debate.33 A significant factor in this calculus is the
fact that China has “fully militarized at least three of
several islands it built in the disputed South China
Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft
missile systems, laser and jamming equipment and
fighter jets in an increasingly aggressive move that
threatens all nations operating nearby.”34 China also
has been intensifying its challenges to long-standing
rivals Vietnam and the Philippines and has begun to
push toward Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and into
waters claimed by Malaysia.
It is unclear whether China is yet in a position to
enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ)
consistently, but the steady two-decade improvement
of the PLAAF and PLAN naval aviation will eventually
provide the necessary capabilities. Chinese observations of recent conflicts, including wars in the Persian
Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, have emphasized
the growing role of airpower and missiles in conducting “non-contact, non-linear, non-symmetrical” warfare.35 This growing parity, if not superiority, constitutes a radical shift from the Cold War era when the
U.S. and its allies clearly would have dominated air
and naval operations in the Pacific.
China has also begun to employ nontraditional
methods of challenging foreign military operations
in what Beijing regards as its territorial waters and
airspace. It has employed lasers, for example, against
foreign air and naval platforms, endangering pilots
and sailors by threatening to blind them.36
Increased Military Space Activity. One of
the key force multipliers for the United States is its
extensive array of space-based assets. Through its
various satellite constellations, the U.S. military can
track opponents, coordinate friendly forces, engage
in precision strikes against enemy forces, and conduct battle-damage assessments so that its munitions are expended efficiently.
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
mode.42 Before it was finally brought under control,
it had drifted through a portion of the geosynchronous belt, forcing other satellite owners to move
their assets and juggle frequencies. A deliberate
such attempt by China (or any other country) could
prove far harder to handle, especially if conducted
in conjunction with attacks by kinetic systems or
directed-energy weapons.
Most recently, China has landed an unmanned
probe at the lunar south pole on the far side of the
Moon. This is a major accomplishment because the
probe is the first spacecraft ever to land at either
of the Moon’s poles. To support this mission, the
Chinese deployed a data relay satellite to Lagrange
Point-2, one of five points where the gravity wells
of the Earth and Sun “cancel out” each other, allowing a satellite to remain in a relatively fixed location with minimal fuel consumption. While the
satellite itself may or may not have military roles,
the deployment highlights that China will now be
using the enormous volume of cis-lunar space (the
region between the Earth and the Moon) for various
deployments. This will greatly complicate American space situational awareness efforts by forcing
the U.S. to monitor a vastly greater area of space for
possible Chinese spacecraft. The Chinese Chang’e-5
lunar sample retrieval mission in 2020 and the recent Chinese landing on Mars underscore China’s
effort to move beyond Earth orbit to cis-lunar and
interplanetary space.
Cyber Activities and the Electromagnetic
Domain. As far back as 2013, the Verizon Risk Center identified China as the “top external actor from
which [computer] breaches emanated, representing
30 percent of cases where country-of-origin could be
determined.”43 Given the difficulties of attribution,
country of origin should not necessarily be conflated
with perpetrator, but forensic efforts have associated at least one Chinese military unit with cyber
intrusions, albeit many years ago.44 The Verizon report similarly concluded that China was the source
of 95 percent of state-sponsored cyber espionage
attacks. Since the 2015 summit meeting between
Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President
Barack Obama, during which the two sides reached
an understanding to reduce cyber economic espionage, Chinese cyber actions have shifted. Although
the overall level of activity appears to be unabated,
the Chinese seem to have moved toward more focused attacks mounted from new sites.
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207

Because the American military is expeditionary—meaning that its wars are fought far from the
homeland—its reliance on space-based systems is
greater than that of many other militaries. Consequently, it requires global rather than regional reconnaissance, communications and data transmission, and meteorological information and support.
At this point, only space-based systems can provide
this sort of information on a real-time basis. No other country is capable of leveraging space as the U.S.
does, and that is a major advantage. However, this
heavy reliance on space systems is also a key American vulnerability.
China fields an array of space capabilities, including its own BeiDou/Compass system of navigation
and timing satellites, and has claimed a capacity to
refuel satellites.37 It has four satellite launch centers.
China’s interest in space dominance includes not
only accessing space, but also denying opponents
the ability to do the same. As one Chinese assessment notes, space capabilities provided 70 percent
of battlefield communications, more than 80 percent of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance,
and 100 percent of meteorological information
for American operations in Kosovo. Moreover, 98
percent of precision munitions relied on space for
guidance information. In fact, “[i]t may be said that
America’s victory in the Kosovo War could not [have
been] achieved without fully exploiting space.”38
To this end, the PLA has been developing a range
of anti-satellite capabilities that include both hardkill and soft-kill systems. The former include direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles (DA-KKV) such as
the system famously tested in 2007, but they also
include more advanced systems that are believed
to be capable of reaching targets in mid-Earth orbit
and even geosynchronous orbit.39 The latter include
anti-satellite lasers for either dazzling or blinding
purposes.40 This is consistent with PLA doctrinal
writings, which emphasize the need to control space
in future conflicts. “Securing space dominance has
already become the prerequisite for establishing information, air, and maritime dominance,” says one
Chinese teaching manual, “and will directly affect
the course and outcome of wars.”41
Soft-kill attacks need not come only from dedicated weapons, however. The case of Galaxy-15, a
communications satellite owned by Intelsat Corporation, showed how a satellite could disrupt communications simply by always being in “switched on”

China’s cyber espionage efforts are often aimed
at economic targets, reflecting China’s much more
holistic view of both security and information. Rather than creating an artificial dividing line between
military security and civilian security, much less information, the PLA plays a role in supporting both
aspects and seeks to obtain economic intellectual
property as well as military electronic information.
This is not to suggest that the PLA has not emphasized the military importance of cyber warfare.
Chinese military writings since the 1990s have emphasized a fundamental transformation in global military affairs. Future wars will be conducted
through joint operations involving multiple services,
not through combined operations focused on multiple branches within a single service, and will span
not only the traditional land, sea, and air domains,
but also outer space and cyberspace. The latter two
arenas will be of special importance because warfare
has shifted from an effort to establish material dominance (characteristic of industrial age warfare) to
establishing information dominance. This is due to
the rise of the information age and the resulting introduction of information technology into all areas
of military operations.
Consequently, according to PLA analysis, future
wars will most likely be “informationized local wars.”
That is, they will be wars in which information and
information technology will be both widely applied
and a key basis of victory. The ability to gather, transmit, analyze, manage, and exploit information will
be central to winning such wars: The side that is
able to do these things more accurately and more
quickly will be the side that wins. This means that
future conflicts will no longer be determined by platform-versus-platform performance and not even by
system against system: Conflicts are now clashes between rival systems of systems.45
Chinese military writings suggest that a great
deal of attention has been focused on developing an
integrated computer network and electronic warfare
(INEW) capability. This would allow the PLA to reconnoiter a potential adversary’s computer systems
in peacetime, influence opponent decision-makers
by threatening those same systems in times of crisis,
and disrupt or destroy information networks and
systems by cyber and electronic warfare means in
the event of conflict. INEW capabilities would complement psychological warfare and physical attack
efforts to secure “information dominance,” which
208
Chinese military writings emphasize as essential for
fighting and winning future wars.
It is essential to recognize, however, that the
PLA views computer network operations as part
of information operations, or information combat.
Information operations are specific operational activities that are associated with striving to establish
information dominance. They are conducted in both
peacetime and wartime with the peacetime focus on
collecting information, improving its flow and application, influencing opposing decision-making, and
effecting information deterrence.
Information operations involve four
mission areas:
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Command and Control Missions. An essential part of information operations is the ability
of commanders to control joint operations by
disparate forces. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance structures therefore
constitute a key part of information operations
by providing the means for collecting, transmitting, and managing information.
Offensive Information Missions. These are
intended to disrupt the enemy’s battlefield
command and control systems and communications networks, as well as to strike the
enemy’s psychological defenses.
Defensive Information Missions. Such
missions are aimed at ensuring the survival and continued operation of information
systems. They include deterring an opponent
from attacking one’s own information systems,
concealing information, and combating attacks
when they do occur.
Information Support and Information-Safeguarding Missions. The ability
to provide the myriad types of information
necessary to support extensive joint operations
and to do so on a continuous basis is essential
to their success.46
Computer network operations are integral to all
four of these overall mission areas. They can include
both strategic and battlefield network operations
and can incorporate both offensive and defensive
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
measures. They also include protection not only of
Chinese fighters, along with airborne early
data, but also of information hardware and operatwarning aircraft, have increased their exercises
ing software.
southwest of Taiwan, demonstrating a growing
Finally, computer network operations will not
ability to conduct flexible air operations and
stand alone; they will be integrated with electronic
reduced reliance on ground-based control.50
warfare operations as reflected in the phrase “network and electronics unified.” Electronic warfare
For at least six months in 2021, the Chioperations are aimed at weakening or destroying ennese maintained a warship between Taiwan
emy electronic facilities and systems while defendand the string of Japanese islands south47
ing one’s own. The combination of electronic and
west of Kyushu.51
computer network attacks will produce synergies
that affect everything from finding and assessing the
The PLA has undertaken sustained joint
adversary, to locating one’s own forces, to weapons
exercises to simulate extended air operations,
guidance, to logistical support and command and
employing both air and naval forces including
control. The creation of the PLASSF is intended to
its aircraft carriers.52
integrate these forces and make them more complementary and effective in future “local wars under
These activities continued unabated and, in some
informationized conditions.”
ways, even intensified in the wake of China’s struggle
with COVID-19.53
Threat of Regional War
Regardless of the state of the relationship at any
Three issues, all involving China, threaten Amer- given time, Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping and
ican interests and embody the “general threat of re- Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping have consistently emphagional war” noted at the outset of this section: the sized the importance of ultimately reclaiming Taistatus of Taiwan, the escalation of maritime and wan. The island—along with Tibet—is the clearest
territorial disputes, and border conflict with India. example of a geographical “core interest” in Chinese
Taiwan. China’s long-standing threat to end the policy. China has never renounced the use of force,
de facto independence of Taiwan and ultimately to and it continues to employ political warfare against
bring it under the authority of Beijing—by force if Taiwan’s political and military leadership.
necessary—is both a threat to a major American seFor the Chinese leadership, the failure to effect
curity partner and a threat to the American interest unification, whether peacefully or by using force,
in peace and stability in the Western Pacific.
would reflect fundamental political weakness. For
After easing for eight years, tensions across the this reason, China’s leaders cannot back away from
Taiwan Strait have worsened as a result of Beijing’s the stance of having to unify the island with the
reaction to the outcome of Taiwan’s 2016 and 2020 mainland, and the island remains an essential part
presidential elections. Beijing has suspended most of the PLA’s “new historic missions,” shaping its acdirect government-to-government discussions with quisitions and military planning.
Taipei and is using a variety of aid and investment
It is widely posited that China’s anti-access/
efforts to deprive Taiwan of its remaining diplo- area-denial (A2/AD) strategy—the deployment
matic partners.
of an array of overlapping capabilities, including
Beijing has also undertaken significantly es- anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines,
calated military activities directed at Taiwan. and long-range cruise missiles, satellites, and cyber
For example:
weapons—is aimed largely at forestalling American intervention in support of friends and allies
In 2021, China sent more than 150 aircraft into
in the Western Pacific, including Taiwan. By holdTaiwan’s air defense identification zone.48
ing at risk key American platforms and systems
(for example, aircraft carriers), the Chinese seek
In 2022, 39 Chinese aircraft, including fightto delay or even deter American intervention in
ers, bombers, and support aircraft, conducted
support of key friends and allies, thereby allowing
the largest single incursions into Taiwanthe PRC to achieve a fait accompli. The growth of
ese airspace.49
China’s military capabilities is specifically oriented
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l
MAP 4
Maritime Boundaries
in the Taiwan Strait
Territorial baseline
Contiguous zone
Taipei
CHINA
TAIWAN
Taiwan
Strait
M
ed
Lin ian
e
Philippine
Sea

SOURCE: “America and China Spar over the
Taiwan Strait,” The Economist, June 23, 2022,
https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/23/
america-and-china-spar-over-the-taiwan-strait
(accessed August 18, 2022).
A
heritage.org
toward countering America’s ability to assist in the
defense of Taiwan.
Moreover, China’s efforts to reclaim Taiwan are
not limited to overt military means. The “three warfares” highlight Chinese political warfare methods,
including legal warfare/lawfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare. The PRC employs
such approaches to undermine both Taiwan’s will to
resist and America’s willingness to support Taiwan.
The Chinese goal would be to “win without fighting”—to take Taiwan without firing a shot or with
only minimal resistance before the United States
could organize an effective response.
Escalation of Maritime and Territorial Disputes. The PRC and other countries in the region
see active disputes over the East and South China
Seas not as differences regarding the administration
of international common spaces, but rather as matters of territorial sovereignty. As a result, there exists the threat of armed conflict between China and
210
American allies that are also claimants, particularly
Japan and the Philippines.
Because its economic center of gravity is now
in the coastal region, China has had to emphasize
maritime power to defend key assets and areas. This
need is exacerbated by China’s status as the world’s
foremost trading state. China increasingly depends
on the seas for its economic well-being. Its factories are powered by imported oil, and its diets contain a growing percentage of imported food. China
relies on the seas to move its products to markets.
Consequently, it not only has steadily expanded its
maritime power, including its merchant marine and
maritime law enforcement capabilities, but also has
acted to secure the “near seas” as a Chinese preserve.
Beijing prefers to accomplish its objectives quietly and through nonmilitary means. In both the
East China Sea and the South China Sea, China has
sought to exploit “gray zones,” gaining control incrementally and deterring others without resorting to
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
confrontation. This volatile situation has led to a
variety of confrontations between China and other
claimants, as well as with Indonesia, which is not
claiming territory or rights disputed by anyone except (occasionally) China.
China–Vietnam tensions in the region, for example, were on display again in 2020 when CCG vessels
twice rammed and sank Vietnamese fishing boats
near the disputed Paracel islands.59 Vietnam has
also protested China’s decision to create additional
administrative regions for the South China Sea, one
centered on the Paracels and the other centered on
the Spratlys.60 This is part of Beijing’s “legal warfare”
efforts, which employ legal and administrative measures to underscore China’s claimed control of the
South China Sea region. For this reason, conflict
often occurs around Chinese enforcement of unilaterally determined and announced fishing bans.61
Because of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States, tensions between
Beijing and Manila are the most likely to lead to
American involvement in these disputes. There have
been several incidents going back to the 1990s. The
most contentious occurred in 2012 when a Philippine naval ship operating on behalf of the country’s
coast guard challenged private Chinese poachers
in waters around Scarborough Shoal. The resulting
escalation left Chinese government ships in control
of the shoal, after which the Philippines successfully
challenged Beijing in the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding its rights under the U.N. ConIn June 2016, a Chinese fighter made an “unvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). There is
safe” pass near a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance
no indication that the Chinese have reclaimed land
aircraft in the East China Sea area.
around the shoal as they did in the Spratlys, but they
continue to control access to the reef, and the presIn March 2017, Chinese authorities warned the
ence of the Chinese Coast Guard remains a source
crew of an American B-1B bomber operating
of confrontation.62
in the area of the ADIZ that they were flying
In March and April of 2021, a similar dispute
illegally in PRC airspace. In response to the
seemed to be simmering around Whitsun Reef in
incident, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called
the Spratlys. The presence of more than two hunfor the U.S. to respect the ADIZ.57
dred Chinese fishing boats, among them known assets of China’s maritime militia,63 sparked protests
In May 2018, the Chinese intercepted an Amer- from Manila. After a stay of a few weeks—which
ican WC-135, also over the East China Sea.58
Beijing claimed was necessary because of the poor
weather—most of the ships departed. The unprecThere have been no publicly reported ADIZ-​related edented gathering of fishing boats and maritime
confrontations since then.
militia could be an attempt to establish a basis
In the South China Sea, overlapping Chi- within the Philippines exclusive economic zone
nese, Bruneian, Philippine, Malaysian, Vietnam- (EEZ) for a subsequent return backed by the Chiese, and Taiwanese claims raise the prospect of nese Coast Guard.
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the lethal use of force. It uses military and economic threats, bombastic language, and enforcement
through legal warfare (including the employment
of Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels) as
well as military bullying. Chinese paramilitary-implemented, military-backed encroachment in support of expansive extralegal claims could lead to an
unplanned armed clash.
The growing tensions between China and Japan
and among a number of claimants in the South China
Sea are especially risky. In the former case, the most
proximate cause is the dispute over the Senkakus.
China has intensified its efforts to assert claims
of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands of Japan in
the East China Sea. Beijing asserts both exclusive
economic rights within the disputed waters and recognition of “historic” rights to dominate and control
those areas as part of its territory.54 Chinese fishing
boats (often believed to be elements of the Chinese
maritime militia) and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG)
vessels have been encroaching steadily on the territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the uninhabited islands. In 2020, CCG or other government
vessels repeatedly entered the waters around the
Senkakus.55 In the summer of 2016, China deployed
a naval unit (as opposed to the CCG) into the area.56
Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ declaration was just part of
a broader Chinese pattern of using intimidation and
coercion to assert expansive extralegal claims of sovereignty and/or control incrementally. For example:
MAP 5
The Scope of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
■ Exclusive
Economic
Zone
RUSSIA
U.S.
Pacific
Ocean
AFRICA
SOUTH
AMERICA

As shown in the map
above, EEZs and other
waters under national
jurisdiction account for 40
percent of the world’s
oceans. U.S. freedom of
navigation worldwide
would be compromised if
national governments were
granted expansive
authority to restrict foreign
militaries from operating in
their EEZs. The South China
Sea, virtually all of which is
covered by various EEZ
claims (see map at right),
has become a particular
flashpoint as China has
sought to restrict freedom
of navigation for U.S.
military vessels there.
Pacific
Ocean
CHINA
Atlantic
Ocean
Indian
Ocean
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
TAIWAN
BURMA
LAOS
PHILLIPINES
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
South China
Sea
MALAYSIA
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
212
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
heritage.org
MAP 6
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Claims in the South China Sea
Vietnam
Taipei
CHINA
Philippines
TAIWAN
BURMA
Malaysia
Hong Kong
Hanoi
Brunei
Indonesia
20°N
LAOS
THAILAND
Paracel Islands
VIETNAM
Itu Aba
Island
Gaven Reefs
130°E
110°E
Singapore
Swallow
Reef
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA

Natuna
Islands
PHILIPPINES
Hughes Reef
Fiery Cross Reef
Cuarteron Reef
Kuala
Lumpur
10°N
Mischief Reef
Spratly Islands
Ho Chi
Minh
City
Philippine Sea
120°E
CAMBODIA
Phnom Penh
100°E
Manila
South
Thitu Island
ChinaSouthwest
Subi Reef
Sea Cay
Bangkok
MALAYSIA
Scarborough
Shoal
Woody Island
Duncan Island
China’s
“Nine-Dash
Line”
Reclamation work done by:
China Taiwan Philippines
Vietnam Malaysia
Airstrip 0°
SOURCE: “China Has Militarised the South China Sea and Got Away with It,” The Economist, June 23, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
asia/2018/06/21/china-has-militarised-the-south-china-sea-and-got-away-with-it (accessed July 23, 2021).
Jakarta
Surabaja
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heritage.org
10°S
In each of these cases, the situation is exacerbated by rising Chinese nationalism.64 In the face
of persistent economic challenges, nationalist
themes are becoming an increasingly strong undercurrent and affecting policymaking. Although
the nationalist phenomenon is not new, it is gaining force and complicating efforts to maintain regional stability.
Governments may choose to exploit nationalism
for domestic political purposes, but they also run the
risk of being unable to control the genie that they
have released. Nationalist rhetoric is mutually reinforcing, which makes countries less likely to back
down than they might have been in the past. The
increasing power that the Internet and social media provide to the populace, largely outside of government control, adds elements of unpredictability
to future clashes. China’s refusal to accept the 2016
Permanent Court of Arbitration findings, which
overwhelmingly favored the Philippines, despite
both Chinese and Philippine accession to UNCLOS
is a partial reflection of such trends.
20°S
In case of armed conflict between China and the
Philippines or between China and Japan, either by
intention or because of an accidental incident at
sea, the U.S. could be required to exercise its treaty
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213
MAP 7
Chinese Fault Lines
KAZ.
MONGOLIA
RUSSIA
SOUTH
KOREA
JAPAN
CHINA
China-India
Border
Paracel
Islands
PAK.
BURMA
INDIA
Arabian
Sea
Bay of
Bengal
East
China
Sea
East China Sea
Taiwan
Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands
30°N
South China Sea
Spratly
Islands
PHILIPPINES
South
China
Sea
Philippine
Sea
0°
China-India Border. The Line of
Actual Control represents one
of the world’s longest
disputed borders and has
been the site of several
standoffs between the
Chinese and Indian militaries
in recent years, including a
border crisis in 2020 that
resulted in the first casualties
from hostilities at the border
in more than 40 years.
East China Sea. China claims
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, which are currently
administered by Japan. In
recent years, Chinese aircraft
120°E
90°E

Indian Ocean
and naval vessels have
entered the airspace and
territorial sea around the
islands with growing
frequency.
30°S
Taiwan. The sovereignty of
Taiwan remains unsettled.
The People’s Republic of
China disputes this status and
regularly conducts
provocative military
maneuvers near Taiwan.
South China Sea. The South
China Sea hosts several
territorial disputes between
China and Taiwan and its
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
214
Southeast Asian neighbors.
China's unlawful claims in the
sea and attempts to restrict
freedom of navigation there
have also produced tensions
with the U.S., which has sent
aircraft and naval vessels
through the South China Sea
to signal its objections to the
nature of China's claims. This
has resulted in a number of
confrontations between
Chinese and U.S. vessels.
A
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
heritage.org
MAP 8
Disputed Borders Between India and China
TAJIKISTAN
Xinjiang
Line of
Control
Aksai
Chin
Islamabad
Jammu and
Kashmir
PAKISTAN
Ladakh
CHINA
Qinghai
Western Sector
Eastern Sector
Himachal
Pradesh
Middle Sector
Uttarakhand
TIBET
AUTONOMOUS
REGION
Lhasa
New Delhi
Uttar
Pradesh
Sichuan
h
des
Pra
l
a
h
ac
Arun
NEPAL
BHUTAN
Sikkim
INDIA
Yunnan
BANGLADESH
Dhaka
BURMA
Disputed borders
Disputed territories
Middle Sector. The Middle
Sector, where the Indian states
of Uttarakhand and Himachal
Pradesh meet the Tibet
Autonomous Region, is the
least contentious of the three
main disputed “sectors,” with
the least amount of territory
contested. It is also the only
sector for which the Chinese
and Indian governments have
formally exchanged maps
delineating their claims.
Eastern Sector. China claims
nearly the entire Indian state
of Arunachal Pradesh, which
Beijing calls South Tibet. The
McMahon Line, which has
served as the de facto Line of
Actual Control since 1962, was
established in 1914 by the
British and Tibetan
representatives and is not
recognized by China. The U.S.
recognizes Arunachal Pradesh
as sovereign Indian territory.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
commitments.65 Escalation of a direct U.S.–China incident is also not unthinkable. Keeping an inadvertent incident from escalating into a broader military
confrontation would be difficult. This is particularly
true in the East and South China Seas, where naval
as well as civilian law enforcement vessels from both
China and the U.S. operate in what the U.S. considers
to be international waters.

Western Sector. Aksai Chin, a
barren plateau that was part
of the former princely state of
Jammu and Kashmir, has been
administered by the Chinese
since they seized control of
the territory in the 1962
Sino–Indian border conflict.
One of the main causes of
that war was India’s discovery
of a road China had built
through the region, which
India considered its territory.
Bay of Bengal
A
heritage.org
The most significant development in the South
China Sea during the past three years has been Chinese reclamation and militarization of seven artificial islands or outposts. In 2015, President Xi promised President Obama that China had no intention of
militarizing the islands. That pledge has never been
honored.66 In fact, as described by Admiral John
Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
215
in his March 2022 posture statement to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services:

[T]he PLA has deployed anti-ship cruise
missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and jamming
equipment to its artificial Spratly Islands features since 2018 and flown aircraft from those
locations since 2020. The PLA has emplaced
expansive military infrastructure in the SCS by
building aircraft hangars sufficient to accommodate multiple fighter brigades, protective
shelters for surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles,
and significant fuel storage facilities.67
territory on the Depsang Plains in Ladakh. A visit to
India by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September
2014 was overshadowed by another flare-up in border tensions when hundreds of Chinese PLA forces
reportedly set up camps in the mountainous regions
of Ladakh, prompting Indian forces to deploy to forward positions in the region. This border standoff
lasted three weeks until both sides agreed to pull
their troops back to previous positions.
In 2017, Chinese military engineers were building a road to the Doklam plateau, an area claimed by
both Bhutan and China, and this led to a confrontation between Chinese and Indian forces, the latter
requested by Bhutanese authorities to provide assistance. The crisis lasted 73 days; both sides pledged
to pull back, but Chinese construction efforts in
the area have continued.70 Improved Chinese infrastructure not only would give Beijing the diplomatic advantage over Bhutan, but also could make the
Siliguri corridor that links the eastern Indian states
with the rest of the country more vulnerable.
In June 2020, the situation escalated even further. Clashes between Indian and Chinese troops
using rocks, clubs, and fists led to at least 20 Indian
dead and (as the Chinese authorities recently admitted) at least four Chinese killed in the Galwan Valley area of Ladakh.71 In September, reports of shots
exchanged near the Pangong Lake region signaled
further potential escalation.72
India claims that China occupies more than
14,000 square miles of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin along its northern border in Kashmir, and
China lays claim to more than 34,000 square miles
of India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The issue is also closely related to China’s concern
for its control of Tibet and the presence in India of
the Tibetan government in exile and Tibet’s spiritual
leader, the Dalai Lama.
China is building up military infrastructure and
expanding a network of road, rail, and air links in
its southwestern border areas. To meet these challenges, the Indian government has committed to
expanding infrastructure development along the
disputed border, although China currently holds a
decisive military edge.
According to the DOD’s 2021 annual report on
the Chinese military, “[n]o substantial land has been
reclaimed at any of the outposts since the PRC completed its extensive artificial manipulation in the
Spratly Islands in late 2015, after adding more than
3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies
in the Spratlys.”68 This would seem to suggest that
the process has been completed.
There is the possibility that China will ultimately
try to assert its authority over the entire area by declaring an ADIZ above the South China Sea.69 There
also are concerns that under the right circumstances, China will move against vulnerable targets like
Philippines-occupied Second Thomas Shoal or Reed
Bank, where a Chinese fishing boat in 2019 rammed
and sank a Philippine boat, causing a controversy in
Manila. There is also consistent speculation in the
Philippines about when the Chinese will start reclamation work at Scarborough. This development
in particular would facilitate the physical assertion
of Beijing’s claims and enforcement of an ADIZ, regardless of the UNCLOS award.
Border Conflict with India. The possibility
of armed conflict between India and China, while
currently remote, poses an indirect threat to U.S. interests because it could disrupt the territorial status quo and raise nuclear tensions in the region. A
border conflict between India and China could also
prompt Pakistan to add to regional instability by trying to take advantage of the situation.
Long-standing border disputes that led to a Sino–
Indian war in 1962 have again become a flashpoint in
recent years. In April 2013, the most serious border Conclusion
incident between India and China in more than two
China presents the United States with the redecades occurred when Chinese troops settled for gion’s most comprehensive security challenge. It
three weeks several miles inside northern Indian poses various threat contingencies across all three
216
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
areas of vital American national interests: homeland; regional war, including potential attacks on
overseas U.S. bases as well as against allies and
friends; and international common spaces. China’s
provocative behavior is well documented. It is challenging the U.S. and its allies such as Japan at sea, in
the air, and in cyberspace; it has raised concerns on
its border with India; and it is a standing threat to
Taiwan. Despite a lack of official transparency, publicly available sources shed considerable light on
China’s rapidly growing military capabilities.
The Chinese launched their first homegrown
aircraft carrier during the past year and are fielding
large numbers of new platforms for their land, sea,
air, and outer-space forces as well as in the electromagnetic domain. The PLA has been staging larger
and more comprehensive exercises, including major
exercises in the East China Sea near Taiwan, that
are improving the ability of the Chinese to operate
their abundance of new systems. It also has continued to conduct probes of both the South Korean
and Japanese ADIZs, drawing rebukes from both
Seoul and Tokyo.
This Index assesses the overall threat from China,
considering the range of contingencies, as “aggressive” for level of provocation of behavior and “formidable” for level of capability.
Threats: China
HOSTILE
Behavior
TESTING
ASSERTIVE
BENIGN
CAPABLE
ASPIRATIONAL
MARGINAL
%
FORMIDABLE
Capability
AGGRESSIVE
GATHERING
%

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
217

Endnotes
1.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House, March 2021, p. 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
2.
The size of a country’s economy can be measured in nominal terms as adjusted for underlying differences in the cost to produce a good—an
adjustment known as purchasing power parity (PPP). In nominal GDP, the U.S. economy is larger than China’s; adjusted for PPP, China’s economy
is larger than that of the U.S. See Graham Allison, Nathalie Kiersznowski, and Charlotte Fitzek, “The Great Economic Rivalry: China vs the U.S.,”
Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Avoiding Great Power War Project, March 23, 2022, https://www.
belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/GreatEconomicRivalry_Final_2.pdf (accessed September 30, 2022).
3.
Anastasia Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “Beijing’s Deadly Game: Consequences of Excluding Taiwan from the World Health Organization During the
COVID-19 Pandemic,” U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission Issue Brief, May 12, 2020, p. 2, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-05/Beijings_Deadly_Game_Excluding_Taiwan_from_WHO_during_COVID-19_Pandemic.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
4.
Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, National Defense
University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China Strategic Perspectives No. 10, March
2017, passim, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
5.
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, pp. 58–60, https://
apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1066163.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
6.
Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL33153, updated March 8, 2022, p. 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33153.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022). See also Table 2, “Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000–2030,” in ibid., p. 9.
7.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 49, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINA L.PDF (accessed May 23,
2022).
8.
Dennis Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,” Joint Force
Quarterly No. 75 (4th Quarter 2014), pp. 98–105, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq-75_98-105_Gormley-et-al.pdf
(accessed May 23, 2022).
9.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, pp. 49.
10. Ibid., p. 52.
11. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, p. 70.
12. Section II, “National Defense Policy,” in People’s Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, White Paper, China’s National Defense in 2010,
March 2011, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2021-06/23/content_4887922.htm (accessed May 23, 2022).
13. Kristin Huang, “Shandong Aircraft Carrier Group Concludes South China Sea Exercise,” South China Morning Post, May 2, 2021, https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/military/article/3131977/shandong-aircraft-carrier-group-concludes-south-china-sea (accessed May 23, 2022).
14. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Use Advanced Jet Launch System,” The Diplomat, November 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.
com/2017/11/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-to-use-advanced-jet-launch-system/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
15. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 61.
16. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
Economics (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 260–261.
17. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 145.
18. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 58, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.
pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 55.
20. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Delivers 1st S-400 Missile Defense Regiment to China,” The Diplomat, April 3, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/
russia-delivers-1st-s-400-missile-defense-regiment-to-china/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
21. Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 9,
Issue 12 (June 12, 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35120#.U5G0OSjb5NQ (accessed May 23, 2022).
218
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
22. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 45.
23. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 62.
24. Brad Lendon, “China Is Building a Sprawling Network of Missile Silos, Satellite Imagery Appears to Show,” CNN, updated July 2, 2021, https://
www.cnn.com/2021/07/02/asia/china-missile-silos-intl-hnk-ml/index.html (accessed May 23, 2022); Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China
Is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/
security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/ (accessed May 23, 2022); and Shannon Bugos and Julia Masterson, “New
Chinese Missile Silo Fields Discovered,” Arms Control Today, September 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/news/new-chinesemissile-silo-fields-discovered (accessed May 23, 2022).
25. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 49.
26. For more information on China’s cruise missile program, see Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility
Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2014), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/
Portals/68/Documents/Books/force-multiplier.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022). Published by the NDU Press for the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, “established as an integral part of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies on March
1, 2000.”
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021, pp. 61 (DF-21) and 78 (DF-26).
28. Chandelis Duster, “Top Military Leader Says China’s Hypersonic Missile Test ‘Went Around the World,’” CNN, updated November 18, 2021, https://
www.cnn.com/2021/11/17/politics/john-hyten-china-hypersonic-weapons-test/index.html (accessed May 23, 2022).
29. Press release, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for
Commercial Advantage,” U.S. Department of Justice, May 19, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackerscyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor (accessed May 23, 2022).
30. BBC News, “Equifax: US Charges Four Chinese Military Officers over Huge Hack,” February 11, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-51449778 (accessed May 23, 2022).
32. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Competing in Space,” December 2018, p. 21, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF (accessed May 23, 2022).
33. Gregory B. Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong,” War on the Rocks, January 10, 2020, https://
warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-conventional-wisdom-on-chinas-island-bases-is-dangerously-wrong/ (accessed May 23, 2022), and J. Michael
Dahm, “Beyond ‘Conventional Wisdom’: Evaluating the PLA’s South China Sea Bases in Operational Context,” War on the Rocks, March 17,
2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/beyond-conventional-wisdom-evaluating-the-plas-south-china-sea-bases-in-operational-context/
(accessed May 23, 2022).
34. Associated Press, “U.S. Admiral Says China Has Fully Militarized Islands,” Politico, March 20, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/20/
china-islands-militarized-missiles-00018737 (accessed May 23, 2022).
35. “Building an Active, Layered Defense: Chinese Naval and Air Force Advancement,” interview with Andrew S. Erickson, U.S. Naval War College,
by Greg Chaffin, National Bureau of Asian Research, September 10, 2012, https://www.nbr.org/publication/building-an-active-layered-defensechinese-naval-and-air-force-advancement/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
36. Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/
countering-chinas-laser-offensive/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
37. Xinhua, “China Announces Success in Technology to Refuel Satellites in Orbit,” June 30, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/201606/30/content_38784419.htm (accessed May 23, 2022).
38. Mei Lianju, Space Operations Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Publishing House, 2013), p. 65.
39. See, for example, Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space, Secure World
Foundation, March 17, 2014, https://swfound.org/media/167224/through_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
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Institute, 2009, pp. 4–5, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf (accessed
May 23, 2022).
41. Mei Lianju, Space Operations Teaching Materials, p. 69.
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
219

31. Andrew Jones, “China’s Shijian-21 Towed Dead Satellite to a High Graveyard Orbit,” SpaceNews, January 27, 2022, https://spacenews.com/chinasshijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
42. Peter B. de Selding, “Runaway Zombie Satellite Galaxy 15 Continues to Pose Interference Threat,” Space.com, October 15, 2010, http://www.
space.com/9340-runaway-zombie-satellite-galaxy-15-continues-pose-interference-threat.html (accessed May 23, 2022). Article “provided
by SpaceNews.”
43. Verizon, 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, pp. 21–22, https://cybersecurity.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/87/2019/04/data-breachinvestigations-report-2013.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022). See also Elise Ackerman, “New Verizon Security Report Finds a Growing Number of
Attacks by China’s Hacker Army,” Forbes, April 23, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/04/23/new-verizon-security-reportfinds-a-growing-number-of-attacks-by-chinas-hacker-army/#11429f622c49 (accessed May 23, 2022), and Lucian Constantin, “Verizon: One in
Five Data Breaches Are the Result of Cyberespionage,” PC World, April 23, 2013, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036177/one-in-five-databreaches-are-the-result-of-cyberespionage-verizon-says.html (accessed May 23, 2022).
44. Mike Lennon, “Unit in China’s PLA Behind Massive Cyber Espionage Units,” SecurityWeek, February 18, 2013, https://www.securityweek.com/
cyber-unit-chinas-pla-behind-massive-cyber-espionage-operation-report (accessed May 23, 2022). For the full report, see Mandiant, APT1:
Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf (accessed May
23, 2022).
45. Bai Bangxi and Jiang Lijun, “‘Systems Combat’ Is Not the Same as ‘System Combat,’” China National Defense Newspaper, January 10, 2008,
cited in Dean Cheng, “U.S.–China Competition in Space,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, September 27, 2016, p. 2, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/SY16/20160927/105387/HHRG-114SY16-Wstate-ChengD-20160927.pdf (accessed May 23, 2022).
46. Guo Ruobing, Theory of Military Information Security (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2013), pp. 12–21.
47. Tan Rukan, Building Operational Strength Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Publishing House, 2012), p. 204.
48. Helen Davidson, “China Sends Largest Incursion of Warplanes into Taiwan Defence Zone Since October,” The Guardian, January 24, 2022, https://
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23, 2022).
49. Reuters, “Taiwan Reports New Large-Scale Chinese Air Force Incursion,” January 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwanreports-new-large-scale-chinese-air-force-incursion-2022-01-23/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
50. Reuters, “Taiwan Air Force Scrambles Again to Warn off Chinese Jets,” Al Jazeera, March 16, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/
taiwan-airforce-scrambles-warn-chinese-jets-200317003712908.html (accessed May23, 2022).

51. Davidson, “China Sends Largest Incursion of Warplanes into Taiwan Defence Zone Since October.”
52. Kristin Huang, “Chinese Air Force’s Drill ‘Aimed at Signalling Deterrent Around Taiwan,’” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2020, https://www.
scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3077997/chinese-air-forces-drill-aimed-signalling-deterrent-around (accessed May 23, 2022).
53. Erin Hale, “In Shadow of Coronavirus, China Steps up Manoeuvres Near Taiwan,” Al Jazeera, April 23, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2020/04/shadow-coronavirus-china-steps-manoeuvres-taiwan-200422011542456.html (accessed May 23, 2022), and Yew Lun Tian and
Ben Blanchard, “China Rattles Sabres as World Battles Coronavirus Pandemic,” Reuters, April 21, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinasecurity/china-rattles-sabres-as-world-battles-coronavirus-pandemic-idUSKBN2230GC (accessed May 23, 2022).
54. See Chapter 10, “The South China Sea Tribunal,” in Tufts University, The Fletcher School, Law of the Sea: A Policy Primer, https://sites.tufts.edu/
lawofthesea/chapter-ten/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
55. Kyodo News, “Japan Lodges Protests Against Chinese Maritime Intrusions Near Senkakus,” The Japan Times, April 22, 2020, https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/22/national/japan-protest-chinese-intrusions-senkakus/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
56. Ankit Panda, “Japan Identifies Chinese Submarine in East China Sea: A Type 093 SSN,” The Diplomat, January 16, 2018, https://thediplomat.
com/2018/01/japan-identifies-chinese-submarine-in-east-china-sea-a-type-093-ssn/ (accessed May 23, 2022); Howard Wang, “China vs. Japan:
Is the East China Sea Showdown Back on?” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, June 7, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-vsjapan-east-china-sea-showdown-back-61492 (accessed May 23, 2022); and Ankit Panda, “China Patrol Ships Sustain Presence Near Senkaku
Islands: Report,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/china-patrol-ships-sustain-presence-near-senkaku-islandsreport/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
57. Jason Le Miere, “China Claims U.S. Military Plane ‘Illegally’ Entered Chinese Air Defense Zone,” Newsweek, March 24, 2017, http://www.newsweek.
com/china-claims-us-military-plane-illegally-entered-chinese-air-defense-zone-573711 (accessed May 23, 2022).
58. Hans Nichols and Courtney Kube, “Two Chinese Fighter Jets Intercept U.S. Plane over East China Sea, Officials Say,” NBC News, updated May 18,
2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/two-chinese-fighter-jets-intercept-u-s-plane-officials-say-n761931 (accessed May 23, 2022).
59. Khanh Vu, “Vietnam Protests Beijing’s Sinking of South China Sea Boat,” Reuters, April 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnamchina-southchinasea/vietnam-protests-beijings-sinking-of-south-china-sea-boat-idUSKBN21M072 (accessed May 23, 2022), and “Chinese Vessel
Rams Vietnamese Fishing Boat in S. China Sea,” The Maritime Executive, June 14, 2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/reportchinese-vessel-rams-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-s-china-sea (accessed May 23, 2022).
60. Reuters, “Vietnam Protests Beijing’s Expansion in Disputed South China Sea,” April 19, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-chinasouthchinasea/vietnam-protests-beijings-expansion-in-disputed-south-china-sea-idUSKBN2210M7 (accessed May 23, 2022).
220
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
61. Tam Anh, “Vietnam Rejects China’s Illegal Fishing Ban,” Vn Express International, April 29, 2021, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamrejects-china-s-illegal-fishing-ban-4270611.html (accessed May 23, 2022).
62. Andreo Calonzo, “Philippines Slams China’s ‘Dangerous’ Move in Disputed Sea,” Bloomberg, updated May 3, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-05-03/philippines-dials-up-protest-on-china-s-dangerous-sea-maneuver?sref=InMWfBxD (accessed May 23, 2022), and
Reuters and Bloomberg, “Philippines Foreign Minister Issues Expletive-Laced Tweet over South China Sea Dispute,” The Straits Times, updated
May 4, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippines-slams-china-for-dangerous-manoeuvre-in-disputed-south-china-sea
(accessed May 23, 2022).
63. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Transparency Initiative, “Caught on Camera: Two Dozen Militia Boats at Whitsun Reef
Identified,” April 21, 2021, https://amti.csis.org/caught-on-camera-two-dozen-militia-boats-at-whitsun-reef-identified/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
64. “Philippines Has Ulterior Motives to Suddenly Hype up the Matter over Niu’e Jiao,” Global Times, April 5, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202104/1220284.shtml (accessed May 23, 2022).
65. Although it has long been a matter of U.S. policy that Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea lie outside the scope of American
treaty commitments, the treaty does apply in the event of an attack on Philippine “armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”
Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, August 30, 1951, Article V, http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/20th_century/phil001.asp (accessed May 23, 2022). In any event, Article IV of the treaty obligates the U.S. in case of such an attack to
“meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Regardless of formal treaty obligations, however, enduring U.S.
interests in the region and perceptions of U.S. effectiveness and reliability as a check on growing Chinese ambitions would likely spur the U.S. to
become involved.
66. See, for example, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to
the Spratly Islands,” May 9, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/ (accessed May 23, 2022).
67. Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, statement on “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture” before the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 10, 2022, p. 7, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/INDOPACOM%20
Statement%20(ADM%20Aquilino)%20_SASC2.PDF (accessed May 23, 2022).
68. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p.
104.
69. Kelvin Chen, “China to Set up ADIZ in South China Sea,” Taiwan News, May 5, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3928503
(accessed May 23, 2022).
71. BBC News, “Ladakh: China Reveals Soldier Deaths in India Border Clash,” February 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56121781
(accessed May 23, 2022).
72. BBC News, “China Says Indian Troops Fired ‘Provocative’ Shots in Border Dispute,” September 8, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-54067400 (accessed May 23, 2022).
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221

70. Joel Wuthnow, Satu Limaye, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Doklam, One Year Later: China’s Long Game in the Himalayas,” War on the Rocks, June
7, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/doklam-one-year-later-chinas-long-game-in-the-himalayas/ (accessed May 23, 2022).

Russia
Alexis Mrachek
O
Military Capabilities. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):
l
l
Among the key weapons in Russia’s inventory are 339 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs); 2,927 main battle tanks; 5,180 armored infantry fighting vehicles; more than
6,050 armored personnel carriers; and more
than 4,894 pieces of artillery.
The navy has one aircraft carrier; 49 submarines (including 11 ballistic missile submarines); four cruisers; 11 destroyers; 16 frigates;
and 129 patrol and coastal combatants.
l
The air force has 1,172 combat-capable aircraft.
l
The army has 280,000 soldiers.
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There is a total reserve force of 2,000,000 for all
armed forces.1
Russia has suffered significant losses of tanks and
other military hardware as a result of its assault on
Ukraine, but in the coming years, it will come back
with a vengeance in rebuilding its military. It will
be replacing the destroyed tanks and equipment
with newly developed versions, not the old Soviet
versions. In addition, Russian deep-sea research vessels include converted ballistic missile submarines,
which hold smaller auxiliary submarines that can
operate on the ocean floor.2
In recent years, Russia has increasingly deployed
paid private volunteer troops trained at Special
Forces bases and often under the command of Russian Special Forces in order to avoid political blowback from military deaths abroad. It has used such
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223

n February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.
Employing a force of nearly 200,000 troops replete with armor, rocket and conventional artillery,
and combat aircraft, President Vladimir Putin ordered a “special military operation” to seize Ukraine,
destabilize if not overthrow its government, and
neutralize its military. In addition to the tremendous losses borne by both sides, the war has depleted
the military inventories of countries providing material support to Ukraine. The assault on Ukraine is
glaring proof that Putin’s Russia is a profound threat
to the U.S., its interests, and the security and economic interests of its allies, particularly in Europe
but also more broadly given the reach of Russia’s
military and the destructive ripple effect its use is
having and can have across countries and regions of
special importance to the United States.
From the Arctic to the Baltics, Ukraine, and the
South Caucasus, and increasingly in the Mediterranean, Russia continues to foment instability in
Europe. Despite its economic problems, Russia continues to prioritize the rebuilding of its military and
funding for its military operations abroad. Russia
remains antagonistic to the United States both militarily and politically, and its efforts to undermine
U.S. institutions and the NATO alliance continue unabated. In Europe, Russia uses its energy position
along with espionage, cyberattacks, and information
warfare to exploit vulnerabilities in an effort to divide the transatlantic alliance and undermine faith
in government and societal institutions.
Overall, Russia possesses significant conventional and nuclear capabilities and remains the principal
threat to European security. Its aggressive stance in
a number of theaters, including Ukraine, Georgia,
the Balkans, and Syria, continues to encourage destabilization and threaten U.S. interests.

volunteers in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine because they
help the Kremlin to “keep costs low and maintain a
degree of deniability,” and “[a]ny personnel losses
could be shrouded from unauthorized disclosure.”3
In January 2019, reports surfaced that 400 Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group were in
Venezuela to prop up the regime of Nicolás Maduro.4 Russian propaganda in Venezuela has supported the regime and stoked fears of American
imperialism. In March 2022, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Venezuelan Vice
President Delcy Rodriguez to discuss “their countries’ strategic alliance,”5 and after Russia invaded
Ukraine, Maduro “assured Vladimir Putin of his
‘strong support.’”6
During the past few years, as the crisis has metastasized and protests against the Maduro regime
have grown, Russia has begun to deploy troops and
supplies to strengthen Maduro’s security forces.7 In
March 2019, for example, Russia deployed approximately 100 troops and military staff to Caracas.8 Russia also exports billions in arms to Venezuela (and
has loaned the regime money to purchase Russian
arms) along with $70 million–$80 million yearly in
nonmilitary goods.9
In July 2016, Putin signed a law creating a National Guard with a total strength (both civilian and military) of 340,000, controlled directly by him.10 He created this force, which is responsible for “enforcing
emergency-situation regimes, combating terrorism,
defending Russian territory, and protecting state
facilities and assets,” by amalgamating “interior
troops and various law-enforcement agencies.”11 In
November 2020, the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) and the Belarusian Ministry of the Interior
signed an official cooperation deal specifying that
either side “may carry out law-enforcement-type operations on the other’s territory.”12 Rosgvardia also
has been involved in the war in Ukraine. In March
2022, Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov stated that
“National Guard units are not only involved in the
fight against [the so-called Ukrainian] nationalists,
[but] also fight to ensure public order and security in liberated localities, guard important strategic
facilities, [and] protect humanitarian aid convoys.”
Specifically, Rosgvardia was sent to seize control of
various Ukrainian cities.13
The Russian economy rebounded during the
latter part of the COVID-19 pandemic,14 but after
Moscow launched its second invasion of Ukraine in
224
February 2022, Western sanctions had a significant
effect on the economy.15
In 2021, Russia spent $65.9 billion on its military—6.37 percent more than it spent in 2020—and
remained one of the world’s top five nations in terms
of defense spending.16 Much of Russia’s military expenditure has been directed toward modernization
of its armed forces. The U.S. Intelligence Community “expect[s] Moscow to sustain military modernization and enhance its armed forces, enabling it to
defend Russia’s national security while projecting
influence globally and challenging the interests
of the United States and its allies.”17 From 2010 to
2019 (the most recent year for which data are publicly available), close to 40 percent of Russia’s total
military spending was on arms procurement.18 Taking into account total military expenditure, Russia
spent 3.77 percent of its GDP on defense in 2021, a
slight decrease from 2020.19 This will surely increase
as combat losses and consumption of war materiel
in Ukraine continue to mount.
In early 2018, Russia introduced its new State Armament Program 2018–2027, a $306 billion investment in new equipment and force modernization.
According to the IISS, the program continues its
predecessor’s emphasis on modernization, but some
of its aims are more modest than they were.20 The
extent to which modernization efforts are affected
by the Russo–Ukraine war cannot yet be known, but
it seems reasonable to assume that Russia will not
be content with a reduced and damaged military
regardless of the outcome of the war. Consequently, general defense expenditures and investments
in modernization programs are likely to increase,
especially as they are enabled by historically high
energy revenues.
Russia has prioritized modernization of its nuclear capabilities and claims that its nuclear trifecta is more than 89 percent of the way through its
modernization from the Soviet era.21 Russia has been
planning to deploy the RS-28 (Satan 2) ICBM as a
replacement for the RS-36, which is being phased
out in the 2020s.22 In June 2022, Putin announced in
a speech that the missile had been “successfully tested” and, “with nuclear capability, will be deployed
by the end of 2022.” In a television interview, Alexei
Zhuravlyov, a member of the Russian State Duma,
boasted “that the [RS-28] would reduce the United
States to ‘nuclear ashes’ if they ‘think Russia should
not exist.’”23
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
April 2020, it was reported that Russia’s Severnoye
Design Bureau had halted development of the frigates because of financial setbacks.37
In November 2018, Russia sold four Admiral
Grigorovich–class frigates to India, which should
take delivery of all four by 2026.38 The ships had
been intended for the Black Sea Fleet, but Russia
found itself unable to produce a replacement engine
following the imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions. Of the planned 14 frigates, Russia had engines
for only two, but in January 2021, India procured gas
turbine engines from Ukraine “and handed [them]
over to Russia to install them on the Admiral Grigorovich-class guided-missile stealth frigates that are
being made for the Indian Navy by a Russian shipyard as part of $2.5 billion deal.”39
Russia’s naval modernization continues to prioritize submarines. In June 2020, the first Project 955A
Borei-A ballistic-missile submarine, the Knyaz Vladimir, was delivered to the Russian Northern Fleet as
an addition to the three original Project 955 Boreis.40
In December 2021, Russia launched Knyaz Oleg and
Novosibirsk, part of the Borei-A and Yasen-M submarine classes, respectively,41 in addition to Generalissimo Suvorov, the third of the upgraded Borei-A
class submarines.42 The Novosibirsk is equipped with
Kalibr cruise missiles.43 Russia reportedly will construct a total of 10 Borei-A class submarines; so far,
five have been delivered.44
The Laika-class submarines (previously called
Khaski) are planned fifth-generation stealth nuclear-powered submarines. They are slated to begin
construction in 2023 and to be armed with Zircon
hypersonic missiles, which have a reported speed
of from Mach 5 to Mach 6.45 According to a Russian
vice admiral, these submarines will be two times
quieter than current subs.46 Construction of the first
Laika is scheduled for the end of 2030.47
Russia also continues to upgrade its diesel electric Kilo-class subs.48 It reportedly inducted the first
improved Project 636.6 Kilo-class submarine into its
Pacific Fleet in November 2019.49 Russia launched
the third of six Project 06363 improved Kilo-class
subs in March 2021, and all six are to be built by
2024.50 According to one assessment, the submarines’ improved noise reduction has caused them
to be nicknamed “Black Holes,” but “the submarine
class lacks a functioning air-independent propulsion system, which reduced the boats’ overall stealth
capabilities.”51
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225

In April 2020, the Kremlin stated that it had begun state trials for its T-14 Armata main battle tank
in Syria.24 After a series of delays, Russian troops
allegedly will receive more than 40 Armata tanks in
2023.25 Aside from the T-14 Armata, 10 new-build
T-90M main battle tanks, contracted in 2017, were
delivered to the 2nd Motor-Rifle Division in the
Moscow region in 2020.26 At the Army-2021 Forum,
according to TASS, the Russian Defense Ministry
“signed a contract with the Uralvagonzavod plant
(part of the Rostec state corporation) stipulating the
delivery of another batch of T-90M Proryv tanks and
modernization of T-90 tanks to T-90M level.”27
Russia’s fifth-generation Su-27 fighter has fallen
short of expectations, particularly with regard to
stealth capabilities. In May 2018, the government
cancelled mass production of the Su-27 because of
its high costs and limited capability advantages over
upgraded fourth-generation fighters.28 Russia lost
one of its Su-27 jets near the Crimean coast during
a planned mission in March 2020.29 In July 2021,
Russia premiered the prototype for its Su-75 LTS
Checkmate, which will be “the world’s second single-engine fighter plane to incorporate the most sophisticated radar-evasion and command systems.”30
The only other plane in this category is the F-35.
In December 2019, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier,
the Admiral Kuznetsov, caught on fire during repair
work.31 The carrier was scheduled to begin sea trials in 2022,32 but the addition of a propeller-rudder
system, hull repairs, and an assortment of delays in
other maintenance work have caused the trials to
be delayed until 2024.33 In May 2019, reports surfaced that Russia is seeking to begin construction of
a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in 2023 for
delivery in the late 2030s, but the procurement’s
financial and technological feasibility remains
questionable.34
Following years of delays, the Admiral Gorshkov
stealth guided missile frigate was commissioned in
July 2018. According to one report, the Russian Navy
is expected to add 10 new Gorshkov-class frigates
and 14 Steregushchiy-class corvettes by 2027. Russia
is also significantly upgrading its nuclear-powered
battle cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which is expected
to become the “most powerful surface vessel in the
Russian Navy” and be ready for sailing in 2023.35
Russia plans to procure eight Lider-class guided
missile destroyers for its Northern and Pacific Fleets,
but procurement has faced consistent delay.36 In

Transport remains a nagging problem, and Rus- 2021, it was revealed that three Voronezh radars will
sia’s defense minister has stressed the paucity of be modernized as part of Russia’s missile attack eartransport vessels. According to a RAND report:
ly warning system by 2028.57
Military Exercises. Russian military exercises,
In 1992, just after the collapse of the Soviet
especially snap exercises, are a source of serious conUnion, the Russian Federation military had
cern because they have masked real military operamore than 500 transport aircraft of all types,
tions in the past. Their purpose is twofold: to project
which were capable of lifting 29,630 metric
strength and to improve command and control. In
tons. By 2017, there were just over 100 available
March 2022, Air Force General Tod D. Wolters, then
transport aircraft in the inventory, capable of
Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM),
lifting 6,240 metric tons, or approximately onetestified that:
fifth of the 1992 capacity.52
Russia maintains a large conventional force
That number is even lower now. At least two Ruspresence along NATO’s borders and conducts
sian transport aircraft were shot down right after
snap exercises to increase instability. Russia
Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, which began
employs unconventional tools, ranging from
on February 24, 2022.53
disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber
Although budget shortfalls have hampered modactivities, and the manipulation of energy
ernization efforts overall, Russia continues to focus
markets to support Moscow’s efforts at political
on development of such high-end systems as the
subversion and economic intimidation. These
S-500 surface-to-air missile system. As of March
tools and others are intended to coerce, weak2021, the Russian Ministry of Defense was consideren, and divide our Allies and Partners in the
ing the most fitting ways to introduce its new S-500
European theater and beyond.58
Prometheus surface-to-air missile system, which
can detect targets at up to 1,200 miles and uses a
Concerns were heightened and eventually valimissile with a range of approximately 250 miles, dated when Russia used such exercises in the spring
“as part of its wider air-defense modernization.” Ac- and fall of 2021 to position forces close to Ukraine’s
cording to one report, the S-500 system will enter borders with Russia and Belarus—forces that it ulfull service by 2025.54
timately used to invade Ukraine.
Russia’s counterspace and countersatellite capaExercises in the Baltic Sea in January 2022 amid
bilities are formidable. According to the U.S. Intelli- heightened tensions between Moscow and the West
gence Community:
over Russia’s military buildup on the Ukrainian border were meant as a message. Twenty Russian navy
Russia continues to train its military space
vessels performed “exercises focused on naval and
elements and field new antisatellite weapons
anti-aircraft defence.”59 Right before the exercises
to disrupt and degrade U.S. and allied space
occurred, the U.S. announced that it might send excapabilities, and it is developing, testing, and
tra troops to NATO’s eastern flank.60 It is possible
fielding an array of nondestructive and dethat Moscow used this announcement as its reason
structive counterspace weapons—including
for initiating the exercises.
jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed
Russia’s snap exercises are conducted with little
energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and
or no warning and often involve thousands of troops
ground-based ASAT capabilities—to target U.S.
and pieces of equipment.61 In April 2021, for exam55
and allied satellites.
ple, between 150,000 and 300,000 Russian troops
massed at the Ukrainian border and in Crimea to
In November 2021, Russia conducted an anti-sat- conduct snap exercises that also involved approxellite missile test that reportedly “endangered the imately 35,000 combat vehicles, 900 aircraft, and
crew aboard the International Space Station (ISS)” 190 navy ships.62 In February 2022, just before Mosbecause it created more than 1,500 pieces of track- cow’s second invasion of Ukraine, Russia and Belarable orbital debris and “hundreds of thousands of us held joint snap exercises reportedly with 30,000
pieces of smaller orbital debris.”56 In September combat troops and special operation forces, fighter
226
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
jets, Iskander dual-capable missiles, and S-400 air
defense systems.63
Threats to the Homeland
Russia is the only state adversary in the Europe
region that possesses the capability to threaten the
U.S. homeland with both conventional and nonconventional means. Although there does not currently
appear to be a strong likelihood that Russia will use
its nuclear capabilities against the United States directly, Putin “casts the war [in Ukraine] as an inevitable confrontation with the United States, which
he accuses of threatening Russia by meddling in its
backyard and enlarging the NATO military alliance,”
and CIA Director William Burns has said that “none
of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential
resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons” in Ukraine.64
Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy
does not mention NATO directly, but it does assert
that the U.S. is planning to deploy medium-range
and short-range missiles in Europe—a possibility
that NATO firmly denies. The same document also
clearly states that Russia will use every means at its
disposal to achieve its strategic goals. Among its “basic concepts” is “ensuring national security—the implementation by public authorities in cooperation
with civil society institutions and organizations of
political, legal, military, socio-economic, informational, organizational and other measures aimed at
countering threats to national security.”65
Russia’s nuclear arsenal and strike capability
The most recent Russian military doctrine, which
remains an enduring, existential threat to the
Putin signed in December 2014, specifically emphaUnited States, democracy, and our peaceful Alsizes the threat allegedly posed by NATO and global
lies and Partners. A central concern is Russia’s
strike systems.66
non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and
Strategic Nuclear Threat. Russia possesses
the Kremlin’s potential to use these weapons in
the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons (including
crisis or conflict.
short-range nuclear weapons) among the nuclear
powers.67 It is one of the few nations with the capaRussia pursues malign activities, including milibility to destroy many targets in the U.S. homeland
tary aggression, aimed at undermining democraand in U.S.-allied nations as well as the capability to
cy, the rules-based international order, and has a
threaten and prevent free access to the commons
willingness to use force to achieve its aims. Rusby other nations.
sia pursues these activities despite widespread
Russia has both intercontinental-range and
international condemnation and economic
short-range ballistic missiles and a varied arsenal
sanctions. President Putin leverages coercive and
of nuclear weapons that can be delivered by sea, land,
aggressive policies to counter Western influence
and air. It also is investing significant resources in
and threaten peace and stability in Europe.72
modernizing its arsenal and maintaining the skills of
its workforce, and “modernization of Russia’s straItem 19 in Putin’s June 2020 executive ortegic nuclear triad is expected to remain a priority” der, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the
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227

under the new state armament program.68 Modern
weapons and equipment allegedly now constitute
89 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad.69
Russia currently relies on its nuclear arsenal to
ensure its invincibility against any enemy, intimidate European powers, and deter counters to its
predatory behavior in its “near abroad,” primarily
in Ukraine, where it uses the threat of nuclear attack
to deter other countries from supporting Ukraine’s
defense, but also in the Baltic States.70 This arsenal
serves both as a deterrent to large-scale attack and
as a protective umbrella under which Russia can
modernize its conventional forces at a deliberate
pace, but Russia also needs a modern and flexible
military to fight local wars such as those against
Georgia in 2008 and the renewed offensive against
Ukraine that began in 2022.
Under Russian military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons in conventional local and regional
wars would be de-escalatory because it would cause
an enemy to concede defeat. In April 2022, for example, “Russia's Foreign Minister said…that if the U.S.
and Ukraine's other Western allies continue to arm
the country as it battles Moscow’s invading forces,
the risk of the war escalating into a nuclear conflict
‘should not be underestimated.’”71
General Wolters discussed the risks presented by
Russia’s possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in
his 2022 EUCOM posture statement:
Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” outlines four “conditions specifying the possibility of
nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation.”
They include:
fully deployed the SSC-8 cruise missile in violation
of the INF Treaty early in 2017 and has deployed battalions with the missile at the Kapustin Yar missile
test site in southern Russia; at Kamyshlov near the
border with Kazakhstan; in Shuya east of Moscow;
The “arrival of reliable data on a launch of
and in Mozdok in occupied North Ossetia.77 U.S. ofballistic missiles attacking the territory of the
ficials consider the banned SSC-8 cruise missiles to
Russian Federation and/or its allies”;
be fully operational.78
In December 2018, in response to Russian vioThe “use of nuclear weapons or other types
lations, the U.S. declared Russia to be in material
of weapons of mass destruction by an adverbreach of the INF Treaty, a position with which
sary against the Russian Federation and/or
NATO allies were in agreement.79 The U.S. providits allies”;
ed its six-month notice of withdrawal from the INF
treaty on February 2, 2019, and officially withdrew
An “attack by [an] adversary against critical
from the treaty on August 2.80
governmental or military sites of the Russian
Russia’s sizable nuclear arsenal remains the only
Federation, disruption of which would underthreat to the existence of the U.S. homeland emamine nuclear forces response actions”; and
nating from Europe and Eurasia. While the potential for use of this arsenal remains low, the fact that
“[A]ggression against the Russian Federation
Moscow continues to threaten Europe with nuclear
with the use of conventional weapons when the attack demonstrates that this substantial nuclear
very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”73
capability will continue to play a central strategic
role in shaping both Russian military and political
Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons is based thinking and the level of Russia’s aggressive behavior
partly on their small cost relative to the cost of con- with respect to other countries.
ventional weapons, especially in terms of their effect,
and on Russia’s inability to attract sufficient num- Threat of Regional War
bers of high-quality servicemembers. In other words,
Many U.S. allies regard Russia as a genuine threat.
Russia sees its nuclear weapons as a way to offset the At times, this threat is of a military nature, as seen
lower quantity and quality of its conventional forces. in Russia’s war against Ukraine. At other times, it inJust as it is doing to deter Western support for volves less conventional tactics such as cyberattacks,
Ukraine, Moscow has repeatedly threatened U.S. al- exploitation of Russia’s status as a source of energy,
lies in Europe with nuclear deployments and even and propaganda. Today, as in the days of Imperial
preemptive nuclear strikes.74 The Russians justify Russia, Moscow uses both the pen and the sword to
their aggressive behavior by pointing to deploy- exert its influence. Organizations like the Collective
ments of U.S. missile defense systems in Europe. In Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurthe past, these systems were not scaled or postured asian Economic Union (EEU), for example, embody
to mitigate Russia’s advantage in ballistic missiles Russia’s attempt to bind regional capitals to Moscow
and nuclear weapons to any significant degree, through a series of agreements and treaties.
but Pentagon officials have said that laser-armed
Russia also uses espionage in ways that are damStrykers are set to arrive by September 2022 and aging to U.S. interests. For example:
that new Eastern European batteries and sea-based
interceptors are set to arrive by 2023.75
In October 2019, the U.S. released and deported
Russia continues to violate the Intermedito Russia Maria Butina, a convicted Russian
ate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which
operative who had infiltrated American conbans the testing, production, and possession of inservative political groups to interfere with the
termediate-range missiles.76 Russia first violated the
2016 presidential election.81
treaty in 2008 and then systematically escalated its
violations, moving from testing to producing to deIn February 2022, the U.S. expelled 12 officials
ploying the prohibited missile into the field. Russia
from Russia’s mission to the United Nations.
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2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
MAP 9
Russian Interference Zones
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
Transnistria
MOLDOVA
Donbas
ROMANIA
Abkhazia and
South Ossetia
Crimea
Black Sea
Caspian
Sea
BULGARIA
GEORGIA
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
NagornoKarabakh
GREECE
TURKEY
IRAN

Transnistria 1992
Nagorno-Karabakh
1994
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
2008
Crimea
2014
Donbas
2014
Ukraine
2022
1990
Transnistria. Russia has stationed
troops in Transnistria since 1992
when a cease-fire ended the
Moldovan civil war.
Nagorno-Karabakh. In
September 2020, major
fighting broke out in the
Nagorno–Karabakh region,
which Armenia had been
occupying since 1994. The
fighting ended in November
2020 when Armenia and
1995
2000
2005
Azerbaijan signed a
Russian-brokered cease-fire.
Russian peacekeeping troops
remain in Nagorno–Karabakh
for now.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russian troops have been
stationed in both Abkhazia
and South Ossetia since
Russia’s 2008 invasion of
Georgia and the subsequent
five-day war.
2010
2015
2020
Ukraine. In February 2022, Russia
launched a full-scale invasion
of Ukraine. Early on, Russian
forces attempted to capture
Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv but
failed. Russia maintains control
of Crimea and parts of Donbas
while fighting continues across
Eastern Ukraine with a large
contingent of Russia’s army
engaged in the conflict.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
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According to the U.S. Mission to the U.N., the
officials had “abused their privileges of residency in the U.S. by engaging in espionage activities
that are adverse to our national security.”82
In 2019, the European External Action Service,
diplomatic service of the European Union (EU),
estimated that 200 Russian spies were operating
in Brussels, which is the headquarters of NATO.83
In March 2022, Brussels expelled 21 Russian diplomats for “alleged threats and posing threats to
security.”84 According to one report, Russian spies
are becoming harder to track because they infiltrate
companies, schools, and even the government.85 In
addition, the expulsion of Russian spies is not a permanent solution for Western nations because “Russia tends to send back new spies to replace the ones
who have left.”86
On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian GRU colonel who was convicted in 2006 of selling secrets to the United Kingdom and freed in a spy
swap between the U.S. and Russia in 2010, and his
daughter Yulia were poisoned with Novichok nerve
agent by Russian security services in Salisbury, U.K.
Hundreds of residents could have been contaminated, including a police officer who was exposed to the
nerve agent after responding.87 It took a year and the
work of about 190 U.K. Army and Royal Air Force
personnel, supported by “specialist contractors,”
to complete the physical cleanup of Salisbury.88 U.S.
intelligence officials have reportedly linked Russia
to the deaths of 14 people in the U.K. alone, many of
them Russians who ran afoul of the Kremlin.89
Russian intelligence operatives are reportedly
mapping U.S. telecommunications infrastructure
around the United States, focusing especially on fiber-optic cables.90
l
l
In March 2022, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that Russian military spy hackers were
responsible for a multifaceted cyberattack on
satellite broadband service, administered by
U.S.-based Viasat, in Ukraine and Europe at the
onset of Russia’s renewed offensive in Ukraine.91
In March 2017, the U.S. charged four people, including two Russian intelligence officials, with
directing hacks of user data involving Yahoo
and Google accounts.92
230
l
Undersea cables in the United States are also
at risk of being tapped for valuable intelligence.
Fourteen Russian sailors who died aboard a
submarine that caught fire in July 2019 were
suspected of attempting to tap information
flowing from American undersea cables.93
Russia has also used its relations with friendly nations—especially Nicaragua—for espionage
purposes. In April 2017, Nicaragua began using a
Russian-provided satellite station at Managua that,
even though the Nicaraguan government denies it
is intended for spying, is of concern to the U.S.94 In
November 2017, the Russian-built “counter-drug”
center at Las Colinas opened, its future purpose being to support “Russian security engagement with
the entire region.”95 According to a Foreign Policy
Research Institute report, “Aside from the center,
Russian forces have participated in joint raids and
operations against drug trafficking [in Nicaragua],
capturing as many as 41 presumed traffickers in one
particular operation” since 2017.96 Moscow also has
an agreement with Nicaragua, signed in 2015, that
“facilitate[s] Russian access to the ports of Corinto
and Bluefields.”97
Pressure on Central and Eastern Europe.
Moscow poses a security challenge to members of
NATO that border Russia. Until recently, a conventional Russian attack against a NATO member was
thought unlikely, but Russia’s assault on Ukraine and
its threatening of NATO members that are supporting Ukraine raise the specter of a larger conflict involving NATO. Russia continues to use cyberattacks,
espionage, its significant share of the European energy market, and propaganda to sow discord among
NATO member states and undermine the alliance.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s International Security and Estonia 2019 report states clearly
that “[t]he only serious threat to regional security,
including the existence and sovereignty of Estonia
and other Baltic Sea states, emanates from Russia. It
involves not only asymmetrical, covert or political
subversion, but also a potential military threat.”98
After decades of Russian domination, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe factor Russia
into their military planning and foreign policy formulation in a way that is simply unimaginable in
many Western European countries and North America. Estonia and Latvia have sizable ethnic Russian
populations, and there is concern that Russia might
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
exploit this as a pretext for aggression—a view that
is not without merit in view of Moscow’s irredentist
rhetoric and Russia’s use of this technique to invade
Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
According to Lithuania’s National Threat Assessment 2022:
Russia is and will remain the greatest and
potentially existential threat to Lithuania and
other countries of the region. By threatening to
invade Ukraine and spark a conflict in Europe,
Russia seeks to force the West to acknowledge
its right to determine political choices of other
independent states to decide on the ways
how to ensure national and regional security.
Moscow is also taking advantage of instability
generated by [Belarusian dictator Alexander]
Lukashenka and together with Beijing further
challenging the West….
In language that still applies today, Lithuania’s
National Threat Assessment 2019 states that Russia
“exploits democratic freedoms and rights for its subversive activity” and “actually promotes its aggressive foreign policy” while “pretending to develop
cultural relations” in Lithuania.100
Latvian authorities describe the means used
by Russia to claim that it is defending the rights of
citizens or Russian “compatriots” in similar terms.
“[O]ne of the priorities of Russian propaganda,” for
example, “has been promoting the ‘correct’ interpretation of historical events [including the Second
World War] in line with the interests of the Kremlin.” Other means include “spread[ing] lies at [the]
international level about the Latvian government’s
policies, which are allegedly aimed at restricting
Russian-speakers’ rights,” as well as “a series of
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231

Moscow attempts to persuade the country's
population that the West is to blame for the
economic and social problems and society’s
discontent with the regime; however, it is clearly an outcome of ineffective political system
and poor management of national resources
and priorities. Therefore, the regime employs
increasingly aggressive tactics in fighting
against the perceived internal and external
opponents, escalates military threats to neighbouring states and the West thus seeking to
allegedly prevent threats to Russia.99
measures to attract new leaders for the ‘compatriot’
policy” and “expanded…efforts to consolidate young
people who could potentially become the next promoters of the Kremlin’s worldview in Latvia.” The
principal “directions of Russia’s ‘compatriot’ policy
[are] consolidation of the Russian diaspora abroad,
protection of the rights of ‘compatriots’, support
for ‘compatriot’ youth organisations, [and] the protection of the Russian language and ‘ethnocultural
identity.’”101
In March 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, then
Commander, U.S. European Command, and NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testified that
Russian propaganda and disinformation should be
viewed as an extension of Russia’s military capabilities: “The Russians see this as part of that spectrum
of warfare, it’s their asymmetric approach.”102 In
2020, for example, “Russian -sponsored actors released a forged letter online where Polish Brigadier
General Ryszard Parafianowicz appeared to criticize openly the American presence in his country
during the US-led exercise Defender-Europe 20.”103
Today, “[t]he threat of influence no longer exists only
during deployment but also in garrison because of
‘the collapsed nature of communication…and…porous boundaries between war and everyday life,’
which means geography is no longer enough to act
as a defense.”104
Russia also has sought to use disinformation to
undermine NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence
(eFP) in the Baltics. A disinformation campaign
nicknamed “ghostwriter,” for example, has been
ongoing since 2017. Russian hackers often have leveraged “website compromises or spoofed email accounts to disseminate fabricated content.”105 In one
case in 2019, a fake message published on the Polish
War Studies Academy website, purportedly from the
organization’s commander, called for troops “to
fight against ‘the American occupation.’”106 In 2020,
hackers falsified an interview transcript, claiming
that Lieutenant General Christopher Cavoli, then
Commander of U.S. Army Europe, was criticizing the
Baltic states’ militaries.107
U.S. troops stationed in Poland for NATO’s eFP
have been the target of similar Russian disinformation campaigns.108 A fabricated interview with General Cavoli that was published online was meant to
undermine NATO’s reputation among the public.109
One report summarized that “Russia’s state propaganda channels RT and Sputnik remain very keen to

exploit to the maximum any incidents involving eFP
personnel, and to repeat the Kremlin’s anti-NATO
and anti-eFP narrative.”110 In particular, more recent
Russian propaganda has focused on portraying eFP
as an “occupying force.”111
In February 2022, the Baltics and Poland together urged the largest social media companies to
restrict Russian disinformation about the war in
Ukraine from “spreading across [their] platforms.”
The Baltic states also banned a number of Russian
and Belarusian channels that allegedly were disseminating propaganda to justify Moscow’s war.112
Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to
use military force to change the borders of modern Europe. When Kremlin-backed Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych failed to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in 2013, months
of street demonstrations led to his ouster early in
2014. Russia responded by sending troops, aided by
pro-Russian local militia, to occupy the Crimean
Peninsula under the pretext of “protecting Russian
people.” This led to Russia’s eventual annexation of
Crimea, the first such forcible annexation of territory in Europe since the Second World War.113 Then,
in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine a second
time, presumably with the goal of bringing the entire nation under Putin’s control. At the time this
book was being prepared, Russia occupied one-fifth
of Ukraine, an area that includes most of Ukraine’s
industrial sector, its port cities on the Black Sea, and
the major transport corridors for grain exports. It is
likely that Russia will not relinquish by negotiation
what it has taken by force, preferring instead to formalize ownership of the area it controls by simply
annexing it.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea effectively cut
Ukraine’s coastline in half, and Russia has claimed
rights to underwater resources off the Crimean Peninsula.114 In May 2018, Russia inaugurated the first
portion of a $7.5 billion, 11.8-mile bridge connecting
Russia with Kerch in occupied Crimea.115 The effect
on Ukraine’s regional economic interests can be
seen in the fact that 30 percent of the cargo ships
that served Mariupol could not clear the span.116 In
December 2019, Russia completed a new rail bridge
over the Kerch Strait that the EU condemned as “yet
another step towards a forced integration of the illegally annexed peninsula.”117
Russia has deployed 30,000 troops to Crimea and
has embarked on a major program to build housing,
232
restore airfields, and install new radars there.118 The
Monolit-B radar system, for instance, has a passive
range of 450 kilometers, and its deployment “provides the Russian military with an excellent real-time picture of the positions of foreign surface
vessels operating in the Black Sea.”119 In addition,
“Russian equipment there includes 40 main battle
tanks, 680 armored personnel carriers and 174 artillery systems of various kinds” along with 113 combat aircraft.120 These numbers may well be different
now given Russia’s renewed war in Ukraine and the
losses of Russian personnel and equipment from
Ukrainian defensive actions.121
Control of Crimea has allowed Russia to use the
Black Sea as a platform to launch and support naval
operations along the Ukrainian coastline as part of
the renewed offensive against Ukraine.122 Russia
also has been using the naval base at Sevastopol
for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, but
Turkey’s closure of the Bosporus Strait to military
traffic in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine
has ended this option, at least temporarily.123 Before Turkey closed the Strait, the Black Sea fleet
had received six Kilo diesel submarines and three
Admiral Grigorovich–class frigates equipped with
Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles.124 Russia was
also planning to add 10 Gorshkov-class frigates and
14 Steregushchiy-class corvettes to its Black Sea
fleet.125 Kalibrs have a range of at least 2,500 kilometers, placing cities from Rome to Vilnius within
range of Black Sea–based cruise missiles.126 In April
2022, in a significant operational and symbolic loss
for Russia, Ukrainian forces sank Russia’s Moskva
guided missile cruiser, which had been the flagship
of its Black Sea Fleet.127
Russia has deployed five S-400 air defense systems with a potential range of approximately 250
miles to Crimea.128 Russia’s new S-350 air defense
systems also could be deployed to Crimea, but that
is somewhat unlikely.129 In addition, “local capabilities [in Crimea] have been strengthened by the
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) short-to-mediumrange surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery weapons system, which particularly
complements the S-400.”130 Russia also deploys the
Bastion P coastal defenses armed with the P-800
Oniks anti-ship cruise missile, which “has a range
of up to 300 kilometers and travels at nearly Mach
2.5, making it extraordinarily difficult to defeat with
kinetic means.”131
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
In Moldova, Russia supports the breakaway
enclave of Transnistria, where yet another frozen
conflict festers to Moscow’s liking. According to the
Congressional Research Service:
Russia stations about 1,500 soldiers in Transnistria, a few hundred of which Moldova accepts
as peacekeepers. In 2017, Moldova’s Constitutional Court ruled that Russia’s non-peacekeeping troop presence was unconstitutional.
In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its
troops from Moldova “unconditionally and
without further delay.”
Russia continues to occupy 12 percent of Moldova’s territory. On January 22, 2019, in an effort to
enhance its control of the breakaway region, Russia
opened an office in Moscow for the Official Representation of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
in the Russian Federation.133 In February 2022, a few
weeks before Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine,
Russian armed forces staged military drills in Transnistria. The exercises followed a Ukrainian warning
that “Russian special services could be preparing
‘false flag provocations’ against Russian troops stationed in [Transnistria] to justify a broader invasion
of Ukraine.”134 Concerns that Russian troops stationed in Transnistria could be mobilized for the
war in Ukraine persist.135
Russia’s permanent stationing of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in 2018 occurred a year to the
day after NATO’s eFP deployed to Lithuania.136 Russia reportedly has deployed tactical nuclear weapons,
the S-400 air defense system, and P-800 anti-ship
cruise missiles to Kaliningrad.137 Additionally, Russia established a new tank regiment, comprised of
approximately 93 tanks, after 2018.138 According to
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233

A conflict resolution process operates in a “5+2”
format under the chairpersonship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), with the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine as
mediators and the EU and the United States as
observers. The EU also supports conflict management through the EU Border Assistance
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which seeks
to help the two countries combat transborder
crime, facilitate trade, and resolve the conflict
over Transnistria.132
the IISS, the majority of Russian air force pilot graduates in 2019 were sent to Kaliningrad “to improve
staffing” in the air force units located there.139
Russia also has outfitted a missile brigade in
Luga, Russia, just 74 miles from the Estonian city
of Narva, with Iskander missiles.140 It also has deployed Iskanders to the Southern Military District at
Mozdok near Georgia, and Russian military officials
have reportedly asked manufacturers to increase the
Iskander missiles’ range and improve their accuracy.141 In addition, Russia has been firing Iskanders
with “mystery munitions,” described as “decoys
meant to trick air-defense radars and heat-seeking
missiles,” at targets in Ukraine.142
Nor is Russia deploying missiles only in Europe.
In September 2019, Russia announced its plans to
deploy additional missile systems on Paramushir
and Matua, two islands in the northern portion of
the Kuril Island chain claimed by Japan.143 In December 2020, Russia announced the deployment of
S-300V4 air defense missile systems on Iturup.144 In
December 2021, Russia deployed Bastion coastal defense missile systems to Matua.145 In March 2022,
Russia conducted military drills on the Kuril Islands
that involved more than 3,000 troops and hundreds
of pieces of army equipment.146
Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat to NATO member countries in Eastern
and Central Europe. In addition to its aggression
in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has threatened
countries that provide support to Ukraine. It also
has threatened Finland and Sweden for moving to
join NATO. Given this pattern of aggressive behavior, the possibility of a conventional attack against
a NATO member cannot be discounted. In all likelihood, however, Russia will continue to use nonlinear
means in an effort to pressure and undermine the
NATO alliance and any non-NATO country that opposes Moscow’s political objectives.
Militarization of the High North. Russia has
a long history in the Arctic and, as an Arctic nation,
has interests there. However, Russia’s ongoing militarization of the region, coupled with its bellicose
behavior toward its neighbors, makes the Arctic a
security concern.
Because nationalism is on the rise in Russia,
Vladimir Putin’s Arctic strategy is popular among
the population. For Putin, the Arctic is an area that
allows Russia to flex its muscles without incurring
any significant geopolitical risk.

Russia is also eager to promote its economic
interests in the region. Half of the world’s Arctic
territory and half of the Arctic region’s population
are located in Russia. It is well known that the Arctic is home to large stockpiles of proven but unexploited oil and gas reserves. Most of these reserves
are thought to be located in Russia. In particular,
Russia hopes that the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
will become one of the world’s most important
shipping lanes.
Russia has invested heavily in the Arctic region,
opening a series of Arctic bases and investing in
cold-weather equipment, coastal defense systems,
underground storage facilities, and specialized
training. According to one report, “[t]he Kremlin’s
dominance due to its unique topography and overwhelming military presence has made it impregnable in the Arctic.”147 Additionally, “Russian hardware in the High North area includes bombers and
MiG31BM jets, and new radar systems close to the
coast of Alaska.”148
Russia also has staged a series of statement activities in the Arctic. In 2007, Artur Chilingarov, then
a member of the Russian Duma, led a submarine
expedition to the North Pole and planted a Russian
flag on the seabed. Later, he declared: “The Arctic is
Russian.”149 In July 2017, Russia released a new naval
doctrine citing the alleged “ambition of a range of
states, and foremost the United States of America
and its allies, to dominate the high seas, including
in the Arctic, and to press for overwhelming superiority of their naval forces.”150
In May 2017, Russia announced that its buildup of
the Northern Fleet’s nuclear capacity is intended “to
phase ‘NATO out of [the] Arctic.’”151 In a March 2021
statement exercise, three Russian ballistic missile
submarines punched through the Arctic ice near the
North Pole.152 In June 2022, Russia withdrew from a
nuclear safety program in the Arctic region, raising
concerns in the West “about a new period of heightened nuclear risks.”153 Russia also has stationed a
floating nuclear power plant on the northern coast
of Siberia. “If the venture is successful,” according
to one account, “it will represent another milestone
in Moscow’s efforts to tame the melting Northern
Sea Route, which…could become a direct trade route
between Europe and Asia.”154
Although the Arctic region has been an area
of low conflict among the Arctic powers, NATO
should consider the implications of Russia’s recent
234
aggressive military behavior. NATO is a collective
security organization that is designed to defend
the territorial integrity of its members. Five NATO
members (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and
the United States) are Arctic countries, and all five
have territory above the Arctic Circle. Two closely
allied nations, Finland and Sweden, are awaiting
NATO membership and also have Arctic territory.
NATO ambassadors signed the necessary Accession
Protocols, the first step in ratification of both countries’ membership in the alliance, on July 5, 2022.155
In recent years, the U.S. has begun to pay increased attention to the Arctic theater in Europe.
One way it has done this is by maintaining an enhanced presence in Norway. In April 2021, the two
nations signed the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement, which in part allows the U.S. to
build additional infrastructure at Rygge and Sola air
stations in southern Norway as well as Evenes air
station and Ramsund naval station above the Arctic
Circle.156 Construction at Evenes will support Norwegian and allied maritime patrol aircraft in their
monitoring of Russian submarine activity.
Because Russia is an Arctic power, its military
presence in the region is to be expected, but it should
be viewed with some caution because of Russia’s pattern of aggression. In the Arctic, sovereignty equals
security. Respecting national sovereignty in the Arctic would ensure that the chances of armed conflict
in the region remain low. Since NATO is an intergovernmental alliance of sovereign nation-states
built on the consensus of all of its members, it has a
role to play in Arctic security. In the words of NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg:
Russia’s military build-up is the most serious
challenge to stability and Allied security in the
High North…. A strong, firm and predictable
Allied presence is the best way to ensure stability and protect our interests. We cannot afford
a security vacuum in the High North. It could
fuel Russian ambitions, expose NATO, and risk
miscalculation and misunderstandings.157
In March 2017, a decree signed by Putin gave
the Federal Security Service (FSB), which controls
law enforcement along the Northern Sea Route,
an Arctic shipping route linking Asia and Europe
as well as additional powers to confiscate land “in
areas with special objects for land use, and in the
2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength
Recently released photos and video show
MiG-31BM Foxhound interceptors in action
at Rogachevo Air Base in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, above the Arctic Circle, an
increasingly strategic region that’s home to a
resurgent Russian military presence. Russia’s
Ministry of Defense provided the imagery as
a new rotation of MiG-31BMs arrived at the
base, undertaking what the defense ministry
describes as “experimental combat duty to
protect the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic airspace.”171
In March 2019, Mayor General Igor Kozhin,
head of the Russian Naval Air Force, claimed that
Russia had successfully tested a new airstrip cover
that is effective in “temperatures down to minus 30
centigrades.”172
Russia resumed regular fighter jet combat patrols in the Arctic in 2019.173 The Ministry of Defense, for example, announced that in January 2019,
two Tu-160 bombers flew for 15 hours in international airspace over the Arctic.174 Over the course of
one week in April 2019, Russian fighter and bomber jets flew near the coast of Norway twice. In one
instance, two Tu-60 bombers and a MiG-31 flew
13 hours over the Barents, Norwegian, and North
Seas. British and Danish jets scrambled to meet the
Russian aircraft.175
In 2017, Russia activated a new radar complex
on Wrangel Island.176 In 2019, it announced plans to
lay a nearly 8,000-mile fiber-optic cable across its
Arctic coast, linking military installations along the
way from the Kola Peninsula through Vladivostok.177
Construction of the cable began in August 2021 and
is due to be completed in 2026.178
In November 2019, Russia announced rocket firings in the Norwegian Sea 20 to 40 nautical miles
from the Norwegian coast. The test firings, with little advance notice, were designed to send a message
as they took place in an area through which NATO
ships were sailing during the Trident Juncture exercise.179 In March 2021, Russia’s Admiral Gorshkov frigate successfully “launched an Oniks cruise
missile and hit a coastal target on Novaya Zemlya,
about 300 kilometers from launch position.”180 In
September 2021, it was reported that “Russia’s
Northern Fleet had begun preparations to deploy
the air-launched ballistic missile Kh-47M2 Kinzhal
on MiG-31K carriers.”181
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235

border areas.”158 Russia’s Arctic territory is included
within this FSB-controlled border zone. The FSB
and its subordinate coast guard have added patrol
vessels and have built up Arctic bases, including a
coast guard base in Murmansk that was opened in
December 2018.159
The Russian National Guard, which reports to
Putin, is likewise taking on an increased role in the
Arctic and is now charged with protecting infrastructure sites that are deemed to be of strategic
importance, including a new liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export terminal at Sabetta that was opened
in December 2017.160 In April 2021, shareholders of
Novatek, Russia’s second-largest natural gas producer, “approved external financing of $11 billion for the
Arctic LNG 2 project, which [was] expected to start
production of [LNG] in 2023.”161 However, the imposition of Western sanctions against Russian banks
because of the war in Ukraine could force Novatek
to halt development of the Arctic LNG 2 terminal.162
In May 2018, Putin issued a presidential degree
setting a target of 80 million tons shipped across the
NSR by 2024.163 However, in October 2021, Russian
Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev announced
that Russia “plans to begin year-round shipping via
the Northern Sea Route…in 2022 or 2023,”164 even
earlier than previously planned.
Russia also has been investing in military bases
in the Arctic. Its Arctic Trefoil base on Alexandra
Land Island, commissioned in 2017, can house 150
soldiers for up to 18 months.165 In addition, old Soviet-era facilities have been reopened.
In September 2018, the Northern Fleet announced construction plans for a new military complex to house a 100-soldier garrison and anti-aircraft
units at Tiksi. In January 2019, Russian authorities
claimed that the base was 95 percent completed,166
But in March 2020, Russia appeared to be “significantly behind in its plans for Tiksi.”167 In 2018, Russia also opened an Arctic airfield at Nagurskoye that
is equipped with a 2,500-meter landing strip and
a fleet of MiG-31 or Su-34 Russian fighters.168 The
landing strip “can handle all types of aircraft, including nuclear-capable strategic bombers.”169
Air power in the Arctic is increasingly important
to Russia, which has 14 operational airfields in the
region along with 16 deep-water ports, “a new command, and roughly 50 icebreakers…some of which
are nuclear powered.”170 In February 2021, it was
reported that:

Russia’s ultimate goal is encapsulated in a June in the region mean that the posture of players will
2019 study published by the Royal Institute of In- continue to evolve. It is clear that Russia intends to
ternational Affairs:
exert a dominant influence. According to a U.S. Department of State official:
Since the mid-2010s, the Kremlin has deployed
substantive force and capabilities along the
[The U.S. has] concerns about Russia’s milcoast of its northern border in the AZRF [Arctic
itary buildup in the Arctic. Its presence has
Zone of the Russian Federation]. Parts of the
grown dramatically in recent years with the
armed forces are now Arctic-capable, and have
establishments of new Arctic commands, new
developed concepts of operations tailored to
Arctic brigades, refurbished airfields and other
that environment. With the creation of OSK
infrastructure, deep water ports, new miliSever [Joint Strategic Command North] in 2013,
tary bases along its Arctic coastline, an effort
the Russian armed forces have been slowly
to establish air defense and coastal missile
reshaping their Arctic command structure. The
systems, early warning radars, and a variety of
Arctic forces are primarily focused on air and
other things along the Arctic coastline. We’ve
naval operations, with the aim of creating an inseen an enhanced ops [operations] tempo of
tegrated combined-arms force for the region.182
the Russian military in the Arctic, including
last October one of the largest Russian military
For a few years, Russia was developing three new
exercises in the Arctic since the end of the Cold
nuclear icebreakers, and in May 2019, it launched
War. So there is some genuine and legitimate
its third and final Arktika.183 The Arktika, currently
concern there on the part of the United States
the world’s largest and most powerful nuclear iceand our allies and partners about that behavior
breaker, sailed straight to the North Pole in October
in the Arctic.193
184
2020. In January 2022, the Arktika completed its
first sail across the eastern part of the NSR.185 That
Destabilization in the South Caucasus. The
same month, Russia’s newest nuclear-powered ice- South Caucasus sits at a crucial geographical and
breaker, the Sibir, the second of Project 22220, ar- cultural crossroads and has been strategically imrived at its home port of Murmansk.186
portant, both militarily and economically, for centuRussia’s Northern Fleet is also building newly ries. Although the countries in the region (Armenia,
refitted submarines, including a newly convert- Georgia, and Azerbaijan) are not part of NATO and
ed Belgorod nuclear-powered submarine that was therefore do not receive a security guarantee from
launched in April 2019.187 The Belgorod is expected the United States, they have participated to varying
to carry six Poseidon drones, also known as nuclear degrees in NATO and U.S.-led operations. This is estorpedoes, and will carry out “a series of special mis- pecially true of Georgia, which aspires to join NATO.
sions.”188 The submarine will have a smaller miniRussia views the South Caucasus as part of its
sub that will potentially be capable of tampering natural sphere of influence and stands ready to exwith or destroying undersea telecommunications ert its influence by force if necessary. In August 2008,
cables.189 According to Russian media reports, the Russia invaded Georgia, coming as close as 15 miles
Belgorod “will be engaged in studying the bottom of to the capital city of Tbilisi. A decade later, several
the Russian Arctic shelf, searching for minerals at thousand Russian troops occupied the two Georgian
great depths, and also laying underwater communi- regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
cations.”190 Two similar submarines, the Khabarovsk
Russia has sought to deepen its relationship with
and Ulyanovsk, which will also carry Poseidon the two occupied regions. In 2015, it signed so-called
drones, are scheduled to be commissioned in 2024 integration treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhaand 2025, respectively.191 In addition, the Northern zia that, among other things, call for a coordinated
Fleet received 13 new ships in 2021, adding to the foreign policy, creation of a common security and
“more than four dozen already in service.”192
defense space, and implementation of a streamlined
Russia continues to develop and increase its mil- process for Abkhazians and South Ossetians to reitary capabilities in the Arctic region. The likelihood ceive Russian citizenship.194 The Georgian Foreign
of armed conflict remains low, but physical changes Ministry criticized the treaties as a step toward
236
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Nagorno–Karabakh region and seven surrounding
districts. A cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994,
and the conflict has been described as frozen since
then. In 2020, major fighting broke out along the
front lines. After six weeks of fighting, Azerbaijan
liberated its internationally recognized territory,
“which had been under Armenian occupation since
the early 1990s.”205
The conflict ended on November 9, 2020, when
Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered
cease-fire agreement.206 As part of the nine-point
cease-fire plan, nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeeping
soldiers were deployed to certain parts of Nagorno–
Karabakh that are populated largely by ethnic Armenians. In May 2021, tensions rose again in the region
but for a different reason—the demarcation of the
Armenian–Azerbaijani border.207
The Nagorno–Karabakh conflict offers another
opportunity for Russia to exert malign influence and
consolidate power in the region. Russia “has long
been Azerbaijan’s main arms supplier” but “also provides military equipment to Armenia.” Additionally:
In conjunction with controlling the negotiation process on the Armenian–Azerbaijani
conflict over Karabakh, Moscow exploits its
role as a major supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan in order to maintain its influence over
Baku. In this realm, Russia plays a unique role
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a main
arms supplier of both, Moscow is also the main
power broker between the two South Caucasus rivals.208

“annexation of Georgia’s occupied territories,”195
both of which are still internationally recognized
as part of Georgia.
In January 2018, Russia ratified an agreement
with the de facto leaders of South Ossetia to create
a joint military force—an agreement that the U.S.
condemned.196 South Ossetia’s former leader, Anatoli Bibilov, had planned to hold a referendum on
whether the region should join Russia on July 17,
2022, but his successor, Alan Gagloev, has cancelled
the plebiscite as “premature.”197 Russia’s “creeping
annexation” of Georgia has left towns split in two
and families separated by military occupation and
the imposition of an internal border (known as
“borderization”).198 In May 2020, the U.S. embassy
in Tbilisi reported that Russian-led security forces
were continuing to erect unauthorized fences and
reinforcing existing illegal “borderization” efforts
near a number of Georgian villages.199
Moscow continues to exploit ethnic divisions and
tensions in the South Caucasus to advance pro-Russian policies that are often at odds with America’s or
NATO’s goals in the region, but Russia’s influence is
not restricted to soft power. In the South Caucasus,
the coin of the realm is military might. It is a dangerous neighborhood surrounded by instability and
insecurity that is reflected in terrorism, religious fanaticism, centuries-old sectarian divides, and competition for natural resources.
Russia maintains a sizable military presence in
Armenia based on an agreement that gives Moscow
access to bases in that country at least until 2044.200
The bulk of Russia’s forces, consisting of 3,500 soldiers, dozens of fighter planes and attack helicopters, 74 T-72 tanks, and an S-300 air defense system, are based around the 102nd Military Base.201
Russia and Armenia have also signed a Combined
Regional Air Defense System agreement. Despite
the election of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan
in 2018 following the so-called Velvet Revolution,
Armenia’s cozy relationship with Moscow remains
unchanged.202 Armenian troops even deployed
alongside Russian troops in Syria to the dismay of
U.S. policymakers.203
Another source of regional instability is the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988 when
Armenia made territorial claims to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno–Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.204 By 1992,
Armenian forces and Armenian-backed militias had
occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan, including the
As noted by Eurasia expert Eduard Abrahamyan,
“for years, Moscow has periodically sought to use the
local authorities in Karabakh as a proxy tool of coercive diplomacy against both Baku and Yerevan.”209
The South Caucasus might seem distant to many
American policymakers, but the spillover effect of
ongoing conflict in the region can have a direct impact both on U.S. interests and on the security of
America’s partners, as well as on Turkey and other
countries that depend on oil and gas transiting the
region. Russia views the South Caucasus as a vital
theater and uses a multitude of tools that include
military aggression, economic pressure, and the
stoking of ethnic tensions to exert influence and
control, usually to promote outcomes that are at
odds with U.S. interests.
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Increased Activity in the Mediterranean.
Russia has had a military presence in Syria for decades, but in September 2015, it became the decisive actor in Syria’s ongoing civil war, having saved
Bashar al-Assad from being overthrown and having
strengthened his hand militarily, thus enabling government forces to retake territory lost during the
war. Although conflicting strategic interests cause
the relationship between Assad and Putin to be
strained at times, Assad still needs Russian military
support to take back Idlib province, a goal that he
and Putin probably share.210 Russia’s Hmeymim Air
Base is located close to Idlib, making it vulnerable to
attacks from rebel fighters and terrorist groups, and
Moscow instinctively desires to protect its assets.
Assad’s only goal is to restore sovereignty over all
of Syria; Russia generally is more focused on eliminating terrorism in the region and must manage its
relationship with Turkey.
In January 2017, Russia signed an agreement with
the Assad regime to “expand the Tartus naval facility,
Russia’s only naval foothold in the Mediterranean,
and grant Russian warships access to Syrian waters
and ports…. The agreement will last for 49 years and
could be prolonged further.”211 According to a May
2020 report, Russia is reinforcing its naval group in
the Mediterranean Sea with warships and submarines armed with Kalibr cruise missiles.212 In May
2021, the Voice of America reported that Russia is
expanding its navy base at Tartus and “planning to
construct a floating dock to boost the port’s ship repair facilities.”213
The agreement with Syria also includes upgrades
to the Hmeymim air base at Latakia, including repairs to a second runway.214 Russia is extending one
of its two runways by 1,000 feet, which would “allow the base to support more regular deployments
of larger and more heavily-laden aircraft.”215 Russia
deployed the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system to
Hmeymim in late 2015.216 It also has deployed the
Pantsir S1 system. “The two systems working in
tandem provide a ‘layered defense,’” according to
one account, “with the S-400 providing long-ranged
protection against bombers, fighter jets, and ballistic
missiles, and the Pantsir providing medium-ranged
protection against cruise missiles, low-flying strike
aircraft, and drones.”217 Russia currently operates
out of Hmeymim air base on a 40-year agreement
and continues to entrench its position there, as
demonstrated by its recent building of reinforced
238
concrete aircraft shelters.218 In August 2020, Syria
agreed to give Russia additional land and coastal
waters to expand its Hmeymim air base.219
According to Lieutenant General Ben Hodges,
former Commander, U.S. Army Europe, Russia has
used its intervention in Syria as a “live-fire training
opportunity.”220 The IISS similarly reports that Russia has used Syria as “a test bed for the development
of joint operations and new weapons and tactics.”221
In fact, Russia has tested hundreds of pieces of new
equipment in Syria. In December 2018:
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov
detailed to local media…the various new weapons systems [that] have been introduced to the
conflict. These included the Pantsir S1 anti-aircraft and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems
on the ground, Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic strategic bombers, Tu-22M3 supersonic bombers
and Tu-95 propeller-driven bombers, as well as
Mikoyan MiG-29K fighters and Ka-52K Katran
helicopters in the air.222
Overall, Russia reportedly sold $28 billion worth
of weaponry to 45 countries, including Syria, between 2016 and 2020.223
Russian pilots have occasionally acted dangerously in the skies over Syria. In May 2017, for example, a Russian fighter jet intercepted a U.S. KC-10
tanker, performing a barrel roll over the top of the
KC-10.224 That same month, Russia stated that U.S.
and allied aircraft would be banned from flying over
large areas of Syria because of a deal agreed to by
Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The U.S. responded that
the deal does not “preclude anyone from going after
terrorists wherever they may be in Syria.”225
The U.S. and Russia have a deconfliction hotline
to avoid midair collisions and incidents, but incidents have occurred on the ground as well as in the
air. In November 2018, Ambassador James Jeffrey,
U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement,
told news media that “American and Russian forces have clashed a dozen times in Syria—sometimes
with exchanges of fire.”226 In February 2022, U.S.
F-16 fighter jets and other coalition aircraft escorted three Russian aircraft in eastern Syria when the
Russians flew into coalition-restricted airspace.227
In October 2018, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi signed a strategic cooperation treaty
with Russia.228 In November 2018, Russia sought to
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based on religious and ethnic differences remains
an ongoing possibility. These tensions are exacerbated by sluggish economies, high unemployment,
and political corruption.
Russia’s interests in the Western Balkans are at
odds with the ongoing desire of the U.S. and its European allies to encourage closer ties between the
region and the transatlantic community.
Russia seeks to sever the transatlantic bond
forged with the Western Balkans…by sowing
instability. Chiefly Russia has sought to inflame preexisting ethnic, historic, and religious
tensions. Russian propaganda magnifies this
toxic ethnic and religious messaging, fans
public disillusionment with the West, as well
as institutions inside the Balkan nations, and
misinforms the public about Russia’s intentions
and interests in the region.242
Senior members of the Russian government
have alleged that NATO enlargement in the Balkans is one of the biggest threats to Russia.243 NATO
now includes four Balkan countries: Albania and
Croatia, both of which became member states in
April 2009; Montenegro, which became NATO’s
29th member state in June 2017; and North Macedonia, which became NATO’s 30th member state
in March 2020.
Russia stands accused of being behind a failed
plot to break into Montenegro’s parliament on election day in 2016, assassinate its former prime minister, and install a pro-Russian government. In May
2019, two Russian nationals who were believed to be
the masterminds behind the plot were convicted in
absentia along with 12 other individuals for organizing and carrying out the failed coup.
The presiding trial judge, Suzan Mugosa, said
on May 9 that [Eduard] Shishmakov and [Vladimir] Popov “pursued a joint decision to make
intentional attempts to contribute significantly
to the carrying out of the planned criminal
actions with the intention to seriously threaten
the citizens of Montenegro, to attack the lives
and bodies of others, and to seriously threaten
and damage Montenegro's basic constitutional,
political, and social structures in order to stop
Montenegro from joining the NATO alliance.”244
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solidify its relations with Egypt, approving a fiveyear agreement for the two countries to use each
other’s air bases.229 Russia is a major exporter of
arms to Egypt, which agreed to purchase 20 Su-35
fighter jets in 2018 for $2 billion.230 Production of
the Su-35 jets began in May 2020.231 In August 2021,
Russia and Egypt signed an additional bilateral strategic cooperation treaty.232
In Libya, Russia continues to support Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar with weapons and military advisers.233 According to the U.S. Department of Defense,
Russia’s Wagner Group continues to be involved militarily in Libya.234 Despite its ties to Haftar, Russia
has also focused on expanding business ties with the
Libyan government in Tripoli.235
Russia has stepped up its military operations in
the Mediterranean significantly, often harassing U.S.
and allied vessels involved in operations against the
Islamic State. In April 2020, for example, a Russian
Su-35 jet intercepted a U.S. Navy aircraft flying over
the Mediterranean Sea. It was the second time in
four days that “Russian pilots [had] made unsafe maneuvers while intercepting US aircraft.”236 The Russian jet had taken off from Hmeymim air base in Syria. In April 2022, “three P-8A maritime patrol and
reconnaissance aircraft ‘experienced unprofessional
intercepts by Russian aircraft’ while ‘flying in international airspace over the Mediterranean Sea.’”237
From April–August 2017, the U.S. along with British, Dutch, and Spanish allies tracked the Krasnodar,
a Kilo-class submarine, as it sailed from the Baltic
Sea to a Russian base in occupied Crimea. The submarine stopped twice in the eastern Mediterranean
to launch cruise missiles into Syria and conducted
drills in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Libya.238
In February 2020, General Wolters revealed that
Russian submarines are becoming more active and
harder for the United States to track.239 On February
24, 2022, the day Russia launched its second invasion of Ukraine, two Russian submarines were seen
in the eastern Mediterranean.240 In March 2022, the
Russian Navy allegedly “deployed an Akula-class nuclear submarine in the Mediterranean.”241
Russia’s position in Syria, including its expanded
area-access/area-denial capabilities and increased
warship and submarine presence, underscores the
growing importance of the Mediterranean theater
in ensuring Europe’s security.
The Balkans. Security has improved dramatically in the Balkans since the 1990s, but violence

After Russia annexed Crimea, the Montenegrin
government backed European sanctions against
Moscow and even implemented its own sanctions.
Nevertheless, Russia has significant economic influence in Montenegro and in 2015 sought unsuccessfully to gain access to Montenegrin ports for the
Russian navy to refuel and perform maintenance.
Russia was the largest investor in Montenegro until October 2020 when it was surpassed by China.245
In March 2022, the Montenegrin government
joined European sanctions on Russia, “without
specifying what they were,” after Russia’s second
invasion of Ukraine.246 In April 2022, Montenegro’s
government suspended broadcasting by Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik in coordination with EU sanctions on Russia.247
North Macedonia’s accession to NATO was similarly targeted by Russia, which had warned the
nation against joining the alliance and sought to
derail the Prespa agreement that paved the way for
membership by settling long-standing Greek objections to Macedonia’s name.248 In 2018, after North
Macedonia was invited to join NATO, Russia’s ambassador to the EU stated that “there are errors
that have consequences.”249 In July 2018, Greece
expelled two Russian diplomats and banned entry
by two Russian nationals because of their efforts to
undermine the name agreement; Russian actions
in Macedonia included disinformation surrounding
the vote, websites and social media posts opposing
the Prespa agreement, and payments to protestors
as well as politicians and organizations that opposed
the agreement.250
Serbia in particular has long served as Russia’s
foothold in the Balkans.
Russia’s influence in the Balkans centers on
Serbia, a fellow religiously orthodox nation with
whom it enjoys a close economic, political, and
military relationship. Serbia and Russia have an
agreement in place allowing Russian soldiers
to be based at Niš airport in Serbia. The two
countries signed a 15-year military cooperation
agreement in 2013 that includes sharing of intelligence, officer exchanges, and joint military
exercises. In October [2017], Russia gave Serbia
six MiG-29 fighters (which while free, will
require Serbia to spend $235 million to have
them overhauled). Additionally, Russia plans
to supply Serbia with helicopters, T-72 tanks,
240
armored vehicles, and potentially even surfaceto-air missile systems.251
The so-called Russian–Serbian Humanitarian
Center at Niš is “widely believed to be a Russian spy
base” and is located “only 58 miles from NATO’s
Kosovo Force mission based in Pristina.”252
In February 2020, Serbia purchased the Pantsir S1 air-defense system from Russia despite objections and potential sanctions from the United
States.253 Russia has used its cultural ties to increase
its role in Serbia, positioning itself as the defender
of orthodoxy and investing funds in the refurbishing
of orthodox churches. It also has helped to establish
more than 100 pro-Russian non-governmental organizations and media outlets in Macedonia.254
Serbia and Russia have signed a strategic partnership agreement that is focused on economic issues. Russia’s inward investment is focused on the
transport and energy sectors. Except for those in
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Serbia
is the only country in Europe that has a free trade
deal with Russia. In January 2019, Serbia and Russia signed 26 agreements relating to energy, railway
construction, and strategic education cooperation.255
Further proof of Belgrade’s loyalty to Moscow is seen
in Serbia’s unwillingness or inability to “take a firm
stand against Russia’s war on Ukraine.”256
In a January 2019 state visit to Serbia, Vladimir
Putin expressed a desire for a free trade agreement
between Serbia and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. An agreement between the two countries was signed in October 2019 “following veiled
warnings from the European Union.”257 Russia also
has held out the possibility of $1.4 billion in infrastructure aid to Serbia aimed at building the TurkStream pipeline and increasing Russia’s energy
leverage in the region. In May 2022, Serbia reached
a three-year agreement with Russia for natural gas
supplies at “the most favorable price in Europe.”258
However, Serbia still participates in military
exercises far more often without Russia than with
Russia. In 2017, for example, “Serbian forces participated in 2 joint exercises with Russia and Belarus
but held 13 exercises with NATO members and 7
with U.S. units.”259 Like Russia, Serbia is a member
of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Additionally, Serbia has partnered with the State of Ohio in
the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program since 2006.
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base to defend the Serbian entity. It has been reported that “[s]ome of its members fought as mercenaries alongside the Kremlin’s proxy separatists
in Ukraine.”267 Veterans organizations in Russia and
Republika Srpska have developed close ties.268
Russia has cultivated strong ties with the security
forces of Republika Srpska. Russian police take part
in exchanges with the security forces, and Russian
intelligence officers reportedly teach at the police
academy and local university. On April 4, 2018, the
Republika Srpska authorities opened a new $4 million training center “at the site of a former army
barracks in Zaluzani, outside Banja Luka.” The site
serves as the headquarters for “anti-terrorist units,
logistics units, and a department to combat organized crime.”269
Russia also has continued to oppose the recognition of Kosovo as an independent sovereign
country270 and has condemned Kosovo’s creation
of its own army. Moscow does not want Kosovo to
be seen as a successful nation pointed toward the
West. Rather, it seeks to derail Kosovo’s efforts to
integrate into the West, often by exploiting the Serbian minority’s grievances. In the most jarring example, a train traveling from Belgrade to Mitrovica,
a heavily Serb town in Kosovo, in January 2017 was
stopped at the Kosovar border. The Russian-made
train was “painted in the colors of the Serbian flag
and featured pictures of churches, monasteries, and
medieval towns, as well as the words ‘Kosovo is Serbian’ in 21 languages.”271
The U.S. has invested heavily in the Balkans since
the end of the Cold War. Tens of thousands of U.S.
servicemembers have served in the Balkans, and
the U.S. has spent billions of dollars in aid there, all
in the hope of creating a secure and prosperous region that eventually will be part of the transatlantic community.
The foremost external threat to the Balkans is
Russia. Russia’s interests in the Balkans are at odds
with the U.S. goal of encouraging the region to progress toward the transatlantic community. Russia
seeks to sever the transatlantic bond forged with the
Western Balkans by sowing instability and increasing its economic, political, and military footprint
in the region.
Threats to the Commons
Other than cyberspace and (to some extent)
airspace, the commons are relatively secure in the
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241

Russia is also active in Bosnia and Herzegovina—
specifically, the ethnically Serb Republika Srpska,
one of two substate entities inside Bosnia and Herzegovina that emerged from that country’s civil war
in the 1990s. Moscow knows that exploiting internal
ethnic and religious divisions among the country’s
Bosniak, Croat, and Serb populations is the easiest
way to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from entering the transatlantic community.
Republika Srpska’s current unofficial leader, Milorad Dodik, has long advocated independence for
the region and has enjoyed a very close relationship with the Kremlin. President Željka Cvijanović
also claims that Republika Srpska will continue to
maintain its partnership with Russia.260 Events in
Ukraine, especially the annexation of Crimea, have
inspired more separatist rhetoric in Republika Srpska, but Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine allegedly
has delayed Republika Srpska’s plans to withdraw
from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions.261
In June 2022, in an interview with the public broadcaster of Republika Srpska, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that Dodik is “a friend
of Russia.”262
In many ways, Russia’s relationship with Republika Srpska is akin to its relationship with Georgia’s
South Ossetia and Abkhazia occupied regions: more
like a relationship with another sovereign state than
a relationship with a semiautonomous region inside
Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Putin visited Serbia in October 2014, Dodik was treated like a head
of state and invited to Belgrade to meet with him. In
September 2016, Dodik was treated like a head of
state on a visit to Moscow just days before a referendum that chose January 9 as Republika Srpska’s
“statehood day,” a date filled with religious and ethnic symbolism for the Serbs.263 In October 2018, just
days before elections, Dodik was hosted by Putin as
they watched the Russian Grand Prix in a VIP box.264
In December 2021, Dodik again visited Moscow.
The Kremlin refrained from announcing this latest meeting ahead of time, but Russian presidential
spokesman Dmitry Peskov asserted that “this by no
means belittle[d] the importance of the meeting.”265
Republika Srpska continues to host its “statehood
day” in defiance of a ruling by Bosnia’s federal constitutional court that both the celebration and the
referendum establishing it are illegal.266
Russia has reportedly trained a Republika Srpska paramilitary force in Russia at the nearby Niš air

European region. Despite Russia’s periodic aggressive maneuvers near U.S. and NATO vessels—and
with the significant exception of the Kerch Strait—
this remains largely true with respect to the security of and free passage through shipping lanes. The
maritime domain is heavily patrolled by the navies
and coast guards of NATO and NATO partner countries, and except in remote areas in the Arctic Sea,
search and rescue capabilities are readily available.
Moreover, maritime-launched terrorism is not a significant problem, and piracy is virtually nonexistent.
Sea. In May 2018, 17 Russian fighter jets buzzed
the HMS Duncan, which was serving as the flagship
of Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2),
operating in the Black Sea. Commodore Mike Utley, who was leading SNMG2, stated that the ship
was “probably the only maritime asset that has seen
a raid of that magnitude in the last 25 years,” and
then-British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson
described the pilots’ behavior as “brazen Russian
hostility.”272 In June 2021, Russian fighter jets repeatedly harassed a Dutch frigate in the Black Sea.273
Russian threats to the maritime theater also
include activity near undersea fiber-optic cables.
In July 2019, a Russian submarine reportedly was
trying to tap information flowing through undersea
cables near Russia’s northern shore in the Barents
Sea. The cables “carry 95 percent of daily worldwide
communications” in addition to “financial transactions worth over $10 trillion a day.”274 Thus, any disruption would cause a catastrophic reduction in the
flow of capital.
The Yantar, a mother ship to two Russian mini
submersibles, is often seen near undersea cables,
which it is capable of tapping or cutting, and has
been observed collecting intelligence near U.S. naval
facilities including the submarine base at Kings Bay,
Georgia.275 In September 2021, it was caught loitering in the English Channel.276 The Russian spy ship
Viktor Leonov was spotted collecting intelligence
within 30 miles of Groton, Connecticut, in February
2018 and off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia
in December 2019.277
Airspace. Russia has continued its provocative
military flights near U.S. and European airspace in
recent years. In April 2021, Lieutenant General David Krumm from Joint Base Elmendorf–​Richardson,
Alaska, revealed that during the previous year, there
was a large increase in Russian activity and that the
U.S. had intercepted more than 60 Russian aircraft
242
in the “most action the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone—a region spanning 200 nautical miles
that reaches past U.S. territory and into international airspace—ha[d] seen since the Soviet Union fell in
1991.”278 In October 2020, F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jets scrambled “to intercept Russian long-range
bombers and fighters flying off Alaska’s coast” in
“the 14th such incident off Alaska’s coast in 2020.”279
In March and April 2019, the Royal Air Force
scrambled fighters twice in five days to intercept
Russian bombers flying near U.K. airspace off the
Scottish coast while the U.S., Australia, and 11 NATO
allies were taking part in the Joint Warrior exercise
in Scotland.280 In February 2022, U.S. fighter jets and
Norwegian and British military planes intercepted
Russian aircraft flying near NATO-allied airspace
over the North Atlantic.281
Aggressive Russian flying has occurred near
North American airspace as well. In January 2019,
two U.S. F-22s and two Canadian CF-18 fighters
scrambled when two Russian Tu-160 Blackjack
bombers flew into Arctic airspace patrolled by the
Royal Canadian Air Force.282
Russian flights have also targeted U.S. ally Japan.
In March 2022, Japan scrambled a fighter jet to
“warn off a helicopter believed to be Russian” that
entered Japanese airspace.283 In May 2022, when the
QUAD284 was meeting in Tokyo, Japan again scrambled jets to warn off Russian and Chinese warplanes
as they neared Japanese airspace.285 Nor is it only
maritime patrol aircraft that fly near Japan; Russian
Su-24 attack aircraft, for example, were intercepted
in December 2018 and January 2019 incidents.286 Between April 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, Japan had
to scramble jets 343 times to intercept Russian aircraft, although that was 47 times less than had been
necessary in the preceding year.287
The main threat from Russian airspace incursions, however, remains near NATO territory in
Eastern Europe, specifically in the Black Sea and Baltic regions. In March 2021, NATO fighter jets scrambled 10 times in one day “to shadow Russian bombers and fighters during an unusual peak of flights
over the North Atlantic, North Sea, Black Sea and
Baltic Sea.”288 In February 2022, near NATO allied
airspace over the Baltic Sea, U.S. F-15Es scrambled
and intercepted Russian fighter jets. That same day,
“Norwegian and British aircraft intercepted Russian
aircraft in flying from the Barents [Sea] into the
North Sea.”289 In April 2022, around both the Baltic
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impact is overwhelming and can paralyse all of the
enemy state’s power structures.’”294
Russia continues to probe U.S. critical infrastructure. The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that:
Russia is particularly focused on improving its
ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control
systems, in the United States as well as in allied
and partner countries, because compromising
such infrastructure improves and demonstrates its ability to damage infrastructure
during a crisis.295
Russia continued to conduct cyberattacks on
government and private entities in 2020 and 2021.
In 2020, Russian hackers “reportedly infiltrated
several US government agencies,” including the
Defense, Treasury, Commerce, State, Energy, and
Homeland Security Departments and the National Nuclear Security Administration, as well as
private-sector companies like Microsoft and Intel. SolarWinds, the company whose software was
compromised, “told the [Securities and Exchange
Commission] that up to 18,000 of its customers installed updates that left them vulnerable to hackers.” It was estimated that “it could take months
to identify all [the hackers’] victims and remove
whatever spyware they installed.”296
In April 2021, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Russia for the SolarWinds hack. It also sanctioned 32
Russian “entities and individuals” that had carried
out “Russian government-directed attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election, and other
acts of disinformation and interference.”297
In May 2021, a Russia-based hacking group
known as DarkSide launched a cyberattack against
Colonial Pipeline, “the operator of one of the nation’s largest fuel pipelines.”298 The 5,500-mile pipeline, “responsible for carrying fuel from refineries
along the Gulf Coast to New Jersey,” was down for
six days.299 Colonial Pipeline paid DarkSide $90 million in Bitcoin as a ransom payment, but the Department of Justice was able to recover approximately
$2.3 million of that amount a few weeks later.300 In
June 2021, REvil, a Russian cybercriminal group,
launched a ransomware attack on JBS, “the world’s
largest meat processing company.”301 As a result of
the cyberattack, JBS was forced to shut down all
nine of its U.S. plants for a brief period.302
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and Black Seas, NATO fighter jets scrambled multiple times over the span of four days “to track and
intercept Russian aircraft near Alliance airspace.”290
There have been several incidents involving Russian military aircraft flying in Europe without using their transponders. In April 2020, two maritime
Tu-142 reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare
planes flew over the Barents, Norwegian, and North
Seas but had switched off their transponders. As a
result, two Norwegian F-16s were scrambled to
identify the planes.291 In September 2019, a Russian
Air Force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter flew over Estonian
airspace without filing a flight plan or maintaining
radio contact with Estonian air navigation officials
because the plane’s transponder had been switched
off. This was the second violation of Estonia’s airspace by a Russian aircraft in 2019.292 In August 2019,
two Russian Su-27 escort jets flew over the Baltic Sea
without a flight plan and without turning on their
transponders.293
Russia’s violation of the sovereign airspace of
NATO member states is a probing and antagonistic
policy that is designed both to test the defense of the
alliance and as practice for potential future conflicts.
Similarly, Russia’s antagonistic behavior in international waters is a threat to freedom of the seas.
Russia’s reckless aerial activity in the region also
remains a threat to civilian aircraft flying in European airspace. That the provocative and hazardous behavior of the Russian armed forces or Russian-sponsored groups poses a threat to civilian aircraft in
Europe was amply demonstrated by the July 2014
downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing
all 283 passengers and 15 crewmembers, over the
skies of southeastern Ukraine.
Cyberspace. Russian cyber capabilities are sophisticated and active, regularly threatening economic, social, and political targets around the world.
Moscow also appears to be increasingly aggressive
in its use of digital techniques, often employing
only the slightest veneer of deniability in an effort
to intimidate targets and openly defy international
norms and organizations.
Russia clearly believes that these online operations will be essential to its domestic and foreign
policy for the foreseeable future. As former Chief of
the Russian General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky
has observed, “a victory in information warfare ‘can
be much more important than victory in a classical
military conflict, because it is bloodless, yet the

However, the United States is not Russia’s only
target. In February 2020, the U.S. and its key allies
accused Russia’s main military intelligence agency,
the GRU, of a broad cyberattack against the Republic
of Georgia “that disrupted ‘several thousand Georgian government and privately-run websites and
interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations.’”303 It was hoped that the accusation
would help to deter Moscow from intervening in the
2020 presidential election.
In February 2022, “[t]he European Union and
its Member States, together with its international
partners, strongly condemned the malicious cyber activity conducted by the Russian Federation
against Ukraine, which targeted the satellite KASAT network, owned by Viasat.”304 The attack “interrupted service for tens of thousands of broadband
customers across Europe,” including in Ukraine, and
“reportedly disrupted service for thousands of European wind turbines.”305
In addition to official intelligence and military
cyber assets, Russia employs allied criminal organizations (so-called patriotic hackers) to help it engage in cyber aggression. Using these hackers gives
Russia greater resources and can help to shield its
true capabilities. Patriotic hackers also give the
Russian government deniability. In June 2017, for
example, Putin stated that “[i]f they (hackers) are
patriotically-minded, they start to make their own
contribution to what they believe is the good fight
against those who speak badly about Russia. Is that
possible? Theoretically it is possible.”306
Russia’s cyber capabilities are advanced and
of key importance in realizing the state’s strategic aims. Russia has used cyberattacks to further
the reach and effectiveness of its propaganda and
disinformation campaigns, and its ongoing cyberattacks against election processes in the U.S. and
European countries are designed to undermine citizens’ belief in the veracity of electoral outcomes
and erode support for democratic institutions
in the longer term. Russia also has used cyberattacks to target physical infrastructure including
electrical grids, air traffic control, and gas distribution systems.
Russia’s increasingly bold use of cyber capabilities, coupled with the sophistication of those capabilities and Moscow’s willingness to use them aggressively, presents a serious challenge both to the
U.S. and to its interests abroad.
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Conclusion
Overall, the threat to the U.S. homeland originating from Europe remains low, but the threat to
America’s interests and allies in the region remains
significant, especially given Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Although Russia has the military capability to harm
and (in the case of its nuclear arsenal) to pose an
existential threat to the U.S., it has not conclusively
demonstrated the intent to do so.
The situation is different with respect to America’s allies in the region. Through NATO, the U.S. is
obliged by treaty to come to the aid of the alliance’s
European members. Russia continues its efforts to
underm