The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes
Author(s): Robert Maguire
Source: Journal of Haitian Studies , Fall 2014, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 165-177
Published by: Center for Black Studies Research
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24340372
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The Journal of Haitian Studies, Volume 20 No. 2 © 2014
The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty:
Haiti through Clear Eyes
Robert Maguire
George Washington University
Remarks presented at the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference
of the Haitian Studies Association
November 6-9, 2014
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana
Introduction
I am honored to be a part of this plenary panel. My presentation trave
boundaries of space and time: the former pertaining to Haiti and
United States, and the latter covering elements of my experience in H
and in Washington over the past thirty-plus years. It touches on the issue
how the sovereign right of Haiti's people to improve their lives is limited
the way their country is presented, particularly by its leaders but reinfor
by international actors. My message is that it behooves us, as we keep
eyes on Haiti and, in particular, on policies toward Haiti, to look with c
eyes: not those clouded by wishful thinking.
In Washington, DC, where I live and work, such misleading thinkin
has often been evident—particularly, it seems, over the past several ye
I am quite concerned about this epidemic of wishful or misleading thin
in regard to Haiti, especially as it is linked to development and governa
I have expressed this concern before members of the US Congress an
their staffs, US government executive branch officials, and a variet
advocates and activists. I have also shared my analysis with associates
Haiti and with leaders of Haiti's parliament. This afternoon, I want t
share my thoughts with you.
Then
Let me go back a few years . . .
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166
In
Robert
the
Maguire
late
1970s,
when
Duvalier,
US president Ji
rights. The visits to Hait
Andrew Young, to reinfo
what legendary Haitian r
Haitian Spring," a period
the midst of a dictatorsh
regime clamped down on
the November 1980 elect
States,
their
in
and
those
country,
the
early
faced
officials
believe
certain
We
were
throughout
to
the
February
thos
and,
subs
things
told
paramilitary
up
beatin
1980s,
Haitian
1)
pioneer
abo
that
goon
Haiti
Ha
squa
to
any
departure
7,
1986.
Then
Duvalier Haiti.
2) We were told that Haiti would become a prosperous "Taiwan
of the Caribbean" through the exploitation in assembly factories
of plentiful and cheap labor—sewing clothes and baseballs and
assembling electronic devices. It was not true. Some prospered,
but certainly not the factory workers. Once the Duvalier regime
fell, many companies that brought upwards of 60,000 low-paying
factory jobs to Haiti left the country, looking for low-wage sites
elsewhere. By 1987, the job total was 39,000 and continued to
fall. Unfortunately the number of people flooding into Port-au
Prince did not fall, and slums like Cité Soleil, described by Haitian
economist Camille Chalmers as "the child of the assembly plant
strategy," continued to grow. Off-the-land migrants with dreams
of prosperity in the city—and their children—largely became
trapped in an illusion.
3) We were told that the stability that existed under Duvalier, which
muzzled the voices of ordinary Haitians, was good for the country's
"development." It was not true. Indeed, the stability enforced by
Duvalier's dictatorship only exacerbated the unevenness of Haiti's
development, concentrating more and more wealth in the hands
of a few. In the early 1980s, it was widely stated that one percent
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 167
of Haiti's population captured roughly 50 percent of the gross
national income. The day following the departure ofJean-Claude,
those previously muzzled by the dictatorship took to the streets
rejoicing that "baboukèt-la tonbe" (the muzzle has fallen) and
calling for democracy and elections.
4) And we were told that Haiti was making progress toward
democracy under the repressive rule ofJean-Claude. That, clearly,
was not true in a country whose dictatorship had organized
legislative "elections" in 1984 that banned all candidates except
those it selected.3
In 1981, the bodies of thirty-three Haitians washed ashore at Hillsboro
Beach, Florida. The dead were among those who had begun desperately
to flee Haiti's poverty and renewed repression in boats. It was then that
some in Washington—especially within the US Congress—began to look
at Haiti with clearer eyes.41 had the very sad but unforgettable experience
of attending, with a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, the wake
in Miami of those who perished in that devastating manifestation of Haiti
under Duvalier.
As more and more poor Haitians took equally desperate measures
to flee their country—at times with similar results—it became easier,
indeed, compelling even for those looking at the Duvalier regime through
rose-colored glasses or apologizing for it to reach the conclusion that Haiti
was not moving toward prosperity and democracy under the rule ofjean
Claude. Rather, the country was stuck in repression and "kleptocracy"—
government by thieves.5
On February 7, 1986, Duvalier fled Haiti, ending a twenty-nine
year family dictatorship. The vast majority of Haitians believed that an
opportunity for improved governance and greater prosperity was at hand.
Sadly, for most of them the intervening years have been a rocky road of
dashed hopes and unmet expectations.6
Now
Today, my fear is that once again there is a tendency—not just in
Washington—to look at Haiti through a clouded or rose-colored lens,
and therefore to mislead or deceive through patterns of thinking that
are much too wishful. It is good to accentuate the positive, and there are
positive developments taking place in Haiti today: particularly by stalwart
members of Haitian grassroots organizations and civil society and their
supporters, who confront some of Haiti's chronic social, economic, and
political ailments.7 Yet we must be careful not to diminish Haiti and its
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168
Robert
people
by
Maguire
failing
developments
of
a
we
"Potemkin
behind
it.8
to
recogn
hear
about
village"—a
Yes,
accept
what
way
that places form over
right of Haiti's people to i
1) When the Haitian gov
called "Beauty versus P
shades the façades of h
shanty town above Por
45,000
residents
inside
those
nothing
they
this
2)
to
cannot
homes
improve
live—without
is,
simply
When
f
com
the
water
stated,
putt
international
president of what is me
Supreme Council ofjudic
power
the
over
creation
the
of
Haitian
yet
anot
conduct elections, the E
critically at the largely
Haiti's
leaders
important
who
public
hav
institutio
This issue became particu
was installed in July 201
members
nor
As
identified
independent,
currently
but
in
t
rath
configure
three
members
nominate
three
branches
(executiv
Martelly partisans empa
to the three executive-br
this
means that at least s
independent body that o
are allegedly in the pock
3)
And
called
when
"social
any
of
us
programs"
(
critics)—which bear su
Hunger) and Ti Manma
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 169
grouped under a broader umbrella called Ede Pèp (Help the
People) but are little more than unsustainable politically oriented
handouts to poor people and to associates of those in power as
opposed to efforts that actually address the root problems that
limit opportunity and perpetuate poverty—this too, simply stated,
is putting^örm over substance}'2
Plus ça change
In the aftermath of the January 12, 2010, earthquake, Bill Clinton told
us that Haiti would be "built back better."13 I have reached a different
conclusion; the wisdom of a French dramatist, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin—
better known as Molière—is more applicable to Haiti today. Molière
famously surmised that "the more things change, the more they stay the
same"—plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. When we look at Haiti today
we can see that things have changed over the past several years—but in
such a way that they have also remained the same. Again, some examples:
1) A different government: Yes, Haiti has a different national
government, but Haiti's governance continues to be plagued
by politics of personality and self-aggrandizement, political
polarization, difficulty in consensus-building among political
actors, and struggles over oft-delayed elections that exude
the heavy-handedness of both key political actors and their
international supporters. Elections for one-third of Haiti's senate
and all of its local officials are now three years overdue. In their
absence, municipal officials are now presidential appointees. And,
with the terms of the second third of the senate and the entire
lower house of Haitian parliament expiring in January 2015,
the specter of presidential rule by decree—and a corresponding
consolidation of power in one branch of the government—is at
hand. For years, the United States, United Nations, and other
international actors have been urging Haitian political actors to
organize elections. More recently, and to the probable detriment
of the democratic process and institution-strengthening in Haiti,
these actors have taken to supporting Haitian executive-branch
decisions that defer political consensus-building to the expediency
of simply having an electoral exercise.14
2) Debt relief: Before the quake, the executive and legislative
branches of the Haitian government, working with international
lenders, put in place reforms that resulted in the forgiveness of
much of the country's debt. Following the earthquake, many
international actors including Venezuela wiped the debt slate
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170
Robert
clean.
ago,
Maguire
But
at
a
now,
summit
in Venezuela's
that Haiti had
through
even
years
Haiti
its
Po
Petro C
run up
participati
higher.
and
in
is
for
Almost
what—to
aforementioned patron
on a severely
in accounting for those
they have been and are
fueled and reinvigorate
Band-Aid
3)
Port-au-Prince:
More
rubble has been removed from Port-au-Prince and all but around
100,000 of the estimated 1.3 million people displaced by the quake
have been relocated (sometimes simply to be out of sight) or have
returned to their old neighborhoods.17 But has Port-au-Prince been
"built back better"? No. Rather, the city is back to its ramshackle
self, inadequate in infrastructure and bursting at the seams with
people who have fled the progressive impoverishment of the
countryside for opportunities—real or perceived—in the city.
Haiti's primary city remains a magnet for off-the-land migration
at a pace that averaged 75,000 per year in the decades before the
earthquake. For most of these migrants, Port-au-Prince is a city
of broken dreams. Yet the capital remains the country's economic
hub, with 65 percent of Haiti's economic activity and 85 percent
of its fiscal revenue concentrated there. Rural Haiti—and the
majority of the country's population living there—continues to be
largely ignored.18 There is a reason that Assistance Mortelle, Raoul
Peck's film on post-earthquake recovery and development (or the
lack thereof), focuses exclusively on Port-au-Prince.
4) Aid and investment: Since the earthquake there has been a
flurry of aid, engagement by external organizations, and related
activity—principally in the Port-au-Prince area and principally
managed by externally based nongovernmental organizations
and for-profit contractors with significant overhead costs or profit
margins.19 Because the management of aid has remained the
same, the sovereign ownership of development resources certainly
remains out of Haitian hands. What else remains the same is
that the twin anxieties of cheche lavi (the hustle to survive) and lavi
chè (the high cost of living) continue to plague the vast majority
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 171
of Haiti's people. As before, these twin anxieties hover over the
country as a potentially destabilizing cloud from which lightning
and thunder can descend at any time. Also, a sad but true Haitian
proverb is still at work: Bourik travay, chwalgalonnen (the mules work
so the ponies can play). In other words, the aid and investment
that do reach Haiti continue to accrue in the pockets and bank
accounts of the privileged few, not in the hands of the 80 percent
who somehow survive on $2.00 a day or less.
5) Universal talent - limited opportunities: Former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton remarked in 2009 that in Haiti talent is
universal but opportunities are limited.20 In today's Haiti, this
remains the case, especially for the youth in a country where
43 percent are younger than fifteen years of age and 71 percent
are younger than twenty-nine, and where job creation remains a
rumor. If opportunities for earning a living wage are not expanding
in Haiti, two possible scenarios appear for Haitians desperate
for work: look for opportunities elsewhere or protest the lack of
these opportunities in Haiti. Why is there not more investment
in youth and in Haiti, not as the "poorest country in the Western
hemisphere" but as the "most creative country in the hemisphere"
(or at least in the Caribbean)? The expression of arts, culture, music,
handcraft, and other forms of creativity and entrepreneurship that
Haiti is known for can offer significant opportunity for young
and stifled talent. Before the earthquake, some 400,000 Haitians
worked full- or part-time in craft work, directly supporting some
one million people.21 Instead of sizeable investment in the creative
sector, hundreds of millions in development assistance have been
spent on the construction of an assembly plant zone in Caracol
in northeast Haiti. There a few thousand people might find jobs
behind sewing machines, paid what usually does not add up to a
living wage. Certainly, factory jobs can be part of the equation of
Haiti's development, but this should not be at the cost of denying
Haitians investment in other opportunities for self-actualization
and entrepreneurship.22
6) Voices of the voiceless: Even though Haiti's voiceless voices were
accorded an opportunity to present their views on the country's
development at the March 2010 Haiti Donors' Conference at the
United Nations, those voices remain largely ignored or unheeded in
the planning and implementation of Haiti's development process.
Speaking by way of 156 focus groups conducted throughout Haiti
in the aftermath of the earthquake, the 1,750 "ordinary" Haitian
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172
Robert
citizens
Maguire
polled
stressed
decentralization
responsible
dignity
goals.
aid
for
This
that
all
and
reinf
should
message
h
see
development planners
loudest, shrillest voices
echelons of power and
from the vast majority
No wonder, then, Molièr
more they remain the sa
Conclusion
There is a special urgency today for all of us engaged with Haiti to
the way for looking at it with clear eyes. I urge you who are active in
and in Haitian studies to ask this important, simple question, to yours
your associates, your students, and to your elected representatives and oth
officials engaged with Haiti: Are current policies and practices towa
Haiti doing a disservice to Haiti and its people by accepting Potem
villages as a matter of fact and by placing /örm over substance?
And then follow up by demanding answers to the following questi
1) Are we seeing in Haiti the consolidation of power in one bra
of the government, which is leading to a type of benevol
authoritarianism (at least for now), or will transparent democra
process and a separation of powers among the three branches
government be supported, respected, and strengthened?
2) Is the country experiencing a political, social, and econom
recidivism that is taking it back to a pre-1986 future, or is Ha
really moving forward?
3) Is impunity—the perpetual thorn in the side of Haiti's movem
toward democracy—becoming weaker or stronger? In this rega
I suggest that the respect for human rights, including those
assembly and freedom of speech, and the apparent return
unbridled public kleptocracy serve as important markers.24
4) Is Haiti being run by the workhorses that are needed, who w
devote themselves tirelessly to truly improving the living conditio
of all citizens? Or are show ponies, more interested in their ow
preening, running the country? I would posit that Haiti's curr
push toward "fancy" tourism should be included under t
particular question.25
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 173
5) And, finally, are the changes we are informed of real or cosmetic?
Is Haiti becoming a modern Potemkin village with only a façade
of change, or are the root causes of the poverty and misery of
those 80 percent struggling each and every day to assure their
own survival being forthrightly and incessantly tackled?
To end, I will cite an expression used in a US television show popular
several years ago: "Clear Eyes; Full Hearts: Can't Lose."25 As you sustain
your important engagement with Haiti and its people, keep your eyes clear
and your hearts full and insist that others to do the same. Truly engage
Haiti in an informed manner that does not misrepresent or disrespect
the country and its people, but rather respects the sovereign right of all
Haitians to be able to improve their lives without limitations so that in
the future, all Haitians are winners.
Notes
While this essay concerns the absence of clear-eyed thinking toward Haiti,
similar concerns exist about this absence elsewhere, such as in Burma (Myanmar)
where, as the Washington Post editorialized recently, US policymakers "continue
to engage (the military government) with rose-colored glasses" when "things
are really sliding backwards." See "Telling the Truth about Burma."
These episodes of US Haiti relations are vividly portrayed in the documentary
film on the life and times of Jean Dominique: The Agronomist, dir. Jonathan
Demme, Clinica Estetico Production, 2005.
These and other myths perpetuated about the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier
are elaborated in such works as Michel-Rolph Trouillot's Haiti: State against
Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1990), Alex Dupuy's Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment
since 1700 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989) and Haiti in the New World Order:
The Limits oj the Democratic Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), and
Josh DeWind and David Kinley's Aiding Migration: The Impact of International
Development Assistance on Haiti (New York: Columbia University Center for the
Social Sciences, 1986).
Taylorjr., "Deciding How to Stop Haitians."
Haiti's "kleptocratic" state is examined in Trouillot's State against Nation and
in Robert Fatton's Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
Fatton traces these twenty-eight years of dashed expectations in several of his
books including his most recent, Haiti: Trapped in the Outer Periphery (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).
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174
Robert
Maguire
7
Beverly Bell's Fault Lines: Vie
Press, 2013) provides example
and
8
their
This
built
organizations
phrase,
only
to
9
really
See
10
to
in
Today,
i
deceive
is.
Daniel,
For
built
th
origins
impress.
constructions
it
with
in
the
"Jalousie
applause
see
Slum
US
De
States."
1 ' For more on this issue see, for example, "Le CSIJ manqué de supériorité" and
"Haid—Justice."
12 For a discussion of Haiti's "social programs" see Maguire, "Priorities, Alignment
and Leadership."
13 B. Clinton, "How We Can Help."
14 A veritable encyclopedia of articles, essays and reports have traced this issue over
the past three years. Among those reporting regularly on it is the Miami Herald's
Jacqueline Charles. See Charles, "Obama Administration" for an example
of her work. For a broad overview of the crisis, see Granitz, "Haiti's Political
Crisis."
15 Belt, "PetroCaribe Helps Fight Poverty."
16 For a discussion of Petro Caribe see Maguire, "Priorities, Alignment and
Leadership"; Charles, "Venezuelan Oil Program Uncertainty"; and Baron,
"World Bank Envoy."
17 "Haiti: UN Official."
18 See Maguire, "Rebuild Haiti."
19 See Johnston and Main, "Breaking Open the Black Box."
20 H. Clinton, "Remarks at Haiti Donors' Conference."
21 Daniel and Mendoza, "Artisans Are Thriving Again."
22 On Caracol, see Sontag, "Earthquake Relief" and Katz, "A Glittering Industrial
Park." On the offshore assembly strategy more broadly, see Dupuy, Haiti in the
New World Order.
23 See "A Voice for the Voiceless"; also Johnson and Main, "Breaking Open the
Black Box."
24 Recent marches in Port-au-Prince against the government of Michel Martelly
have reportedly resulted in arrests and widespread use by police of anti-riot
controls against demonstrators. See, for example, Ives, "Haiti: As Police Fatally
Shoot Demonstrators," and "Repression: Un Jeu auquel le pouvoir."
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 175
25 Among articles and reports on Haiti's current tourism strategy see Kolbe,
Brooks, and Muggah, "Is Tourism Haiti's Magic Bullet?"; Armstrong, "After
the Quake"; Adams, "Neglected Islanders Resist Plan"; Charles, "Progress
Slow in Haiti's Isle"; Garcia, "Tourisme et Patrimoine."
26 The show is Friday Night Lights.
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The Limits of Haitian Sovereignty: Haiti through Clear Eyes 177
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