JUDICIAL AND LEGAL ETHICS
JUDGE ROMEO M. ATILLO
Name: Bianca Danica R. Ugay
Year: JD-1
C.Y. 2021-2022
CASE DIGEST FOR MIDTERMS
1. HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES DELFIN
MENDOZA AND SOLITA SANTOS AND SPOUSES FELIX SANTOS AND DEMETRIA
PACHECO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 95625; 202 SCRA 543; October 4, 1991
Facts:
Private respondents deposited in court two treasury checks in satisfaction of judgment favoring Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank in a civil case. The amount of P428,600 was applied by the petitioner as attorney’s
fees. However, petitioner filed an amended motion for execution. Petitioner claimed that the total liability of the
private respondents was P448,941.92. Hence, there was still an unsatisfied balance which it claimed to be
P20,250.38 as 10% of attorney’ fee from the interest of principal obligation. The motion was denied and
dismissed by CA.
Issue:
WON the attorney’s fee will only be based to 10% of the principal amount due
Held:
Yes.
There is no an ambiguity as regards the amount of attorney’s fees awarded. It is clear that the final and
executory decision of the Regional Trial Court awarded ten percent (10%) of the amount due as attorney’s
fees. Since there was no qualification that the ten percent attorney’s fees shall be taken only from the principal,
the ordinary and literal meaning of the words should prevail, that is, from the amount due which is the total
amount due on the loan obligation (principal + interest). Had the decision really intended that the attorney’s
fees shall be ten percent (10%) of the principal only, it could have so provided.
Courts are cautioned to be careful in writing their decisions, to be clear and precise in the use of words,
especially in the dispositive portion.
2. ELNORA S. PANGANIBAN, Complainant, v. JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 34, Calamba, Laguna, Respondent.
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-94-1200; 242 SCRA 11; March 1, 1995.
Facts:
Respondent judge having heaped abusive language at complainant Panganiban or having committed
any offensive act against her. Respondent also having criticized her by calling her attention to her
shortcomings in her work, but he hastens to add that, contrary to Panganiban's assertions, he in fact called her
attention to her inadequacies with an altogether pleasant disposition. He concludes that complainant may very
well have resented his criticisms and probably took his statements out of context as embarrassing and
humiliating.
Issue:
WON respondent judge guilty for such misconduct?
Held:
Yes, respondent judge guilty for such misconduct.
A judge's official conduct should be free from and be untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and
his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Respondent judge has not been exactly scrupulous in
exemplifying such high ideals, as earlier narrated. One improvident act committed in an unguarded moment
could have been understandable, but not a regrettable series thereof.
It need only be said that public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. What is worse in the case of respondent judge is that the hapless recipient of his deplorable
behavior was a subordinate fellow worker in government and a lady to boot. Certainly, nothing could be more
demoralizing to an employee than an insensitive and unkind colleague who is her superior at that.
3. LOLITA QUE LIM, Complainant, v. JUDGE ROGER A. DOMAGAS, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-899; 227 SCRA 258; October 15, 1993
Facts:
Respondent Judge Domagas issued an order requiring Lolita Que Lim and Daniel Que Lim to appear
before the court, to produce and bring before the court the three (3) minor children subject of the proceedings
and to explain the cause of their restraint over the said minors however the latter the said order was not
complied without having been given an opportunity to rebut the charges and without having been notified by
service of summons of the hearing of the Habeas Corpus case. Considering the Sheriff’s report and return, the
non-appearance of respondent Daniel Que Lim and non-production by him of the three (3) minor children the
Court hereby penalizes Daniel Que Lim and Lolita Que Lim for contempt and hereby sentences them to prison
until they produce before this court said three (3) minor children.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge guilty in ignorance of law
Held:
Yes.
Under section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt which
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court; or injunction
granted by a court or judge.
Here, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. However,
while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of
judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the one involved here.
4. BEN MEDINA, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE LETICIA MARIANO DE GUIA, RTC-BALANGA, BATAAN,
BRANCH 3, Respondent.
219 SCRA 153
Facts:
Judge De Guia tried three adoption cases. The charge states that notices of hearing were published
without the benefit of a raffle conducted by the executive judge. It was also shown that the copies of the orders
intended for the parties were not released through or by Bascarra, but were given to the parties by Process
Server Ricardo Flores and Deputy Sheriff Navarro. The notations of these two employees to that effect were
written on the back of the orders. The different orders were published to different publishing company.
Judge De Guia denies the allegations and conducted an inquiry. She found out that it was the parties
themselves or their counsels who requested for copies either from Process Server Flores or Deputy Sheriff
Navarro, and caused their publication.
Issue:
Whether Judge De Guia is guilty of charge in publication of notice of hearing without the benefit of a
raffle
Ruling:
Yes, Judge De Guia is guilty of charge in publication of notice of hearing without the benefit of a raffle.
The Court noted Justice Pronove Jr. careful investigation of the foregoing evidences; Justice Pronove
Jr. states that the testimony of Estela Bacarra directly links the respondent Judge to the publication of the
orders containing the notices of hearing and Justice Pronove Jr. finds her testimony credible and deserving of
weight. It is also shown that only Judge De Guia had the power to authorize the release of the orders to the
parties on the three cases. She alone could change the usual procedure of releasing orders by directing the
process server and deputy sheriff to give to the parties the copies intended for the clerk of court. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that the two minor court process servers would act the way they did without the prior
authorization of Judge De Guia.
The publication of the orders was a legal requirement well-known to the parties and their lawyers, no
one among them would have dared to publish the orders without the go signal of the court. And with these,
only Judge De Guia could have given that approval and it is shown by the fact that she directed her process
server and deputy sheriff to give copies of the orders to the petitioners and their lawyers. The act of giving said
copies could not have been for any purpose other than publication because as testified to by Estela Bascarra,
she had already mailed to the parties their copies of the orders.
5. EDUARDO PANES, JR., JOSEPHINE J. COSEP, ROGER M. ROSAL, LOURDES G. SOLATORIO, AMY
P. AGUIRRE, JUANCHO B. HOLGADO, Complainants, vs. JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, Respondent.
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ; February 12, 2013
Facts:
Complainants, all employees of KWD, alleged that the manner of service of the assailed twin Orders
was violent, and that the disturbance that ensued caused all KWD personnel in the Del Pilar office to scamper
and hide for fear of arrest. The office was then ransacked by the allies of Gomba who took the things from the
Del Pilar and the Arellano offices, as well as the motor vehicles owned by KWD. The windows and doors were
also destroyed. In response, respondent judge alleged that complainants were not employees of KWD.
Issue:
Whether constitutes gross ignorance of the law
Held:
Yes.
Under Section 8 of the Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states to be held administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but
must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.
In the instant case, Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. He
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
He shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. At the outset, respondent failed to
provide any legitimate reason for the issuance of the Orders on a Saturday evening when the courts were
already closed. As pointed out by the CA, if indeed there was robbery or looting happening in the premises,
arrests could be affected by the police officers who were already in the vicinity of the KWD office.
The findings of the OCA that respondent’s defenses neither justify his failure to comply with due
process requirements nor do they demonstrate good faith on his part that would exculpate him from
administrative liability. Respondent violated the most basic requirements for the proper observance of due
process, resulting in the unwarranted arrest and incarceration of powerless individuals.
6. ANONYMOUS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (2/27/13)
Facts:
The Court received an anonymous letter-complaint alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a
judge against Judge Rio C. Achas. The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge
Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a
woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his
connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his
cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling. Judge Achas denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only
separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra
income, having inherited such from his forefathers.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Achas was immoral?
Held:
Yes, Judge Achas was immoral
Under Canon 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary states that Integrity
is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges
and also the Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
Here, even if he was separated de factor from his legal wife for 26 years, the fact remains that he is still
legally married to his wife. It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with
a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. For
going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide
7. OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR COURT vs. JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial
Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 (3/6/13)
Facts:
A judicial audit was conducted presided over by Judge Fernando G. Fuentes III. The judicial audit
report of the team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) revealed the aforementioned court and
breakdown those number of cases therein. In his defense, Judge Fuentes III explained that he is offering no
justification for the adverse findings of the audit team. He alleged that the cases submitted for decision have
always been reflected in the monthly reports of cases he is submitting to the Court. Judge Fuentes III partially
complied by submitting copies of his decisions/orders however, circumstances came up and he asked the
Court for extensions for a couple of times. The OCA received a verified complaint from Paulino Butal, Sr.
(complainant), charging Judge Fuentes III with delay in rendering a decision in in his case. The OCA
recommended that Judge Fuentes III be: a) found guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period, and resolve 27 incidents submitted for resolution; b) fined in the amount of P50,
000.00 to be deducted from his salaries; and c) sternly warned that the commission of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
Issue:
WON Judge Fuentes III is guilty of gross inefficiency.
Held:
Yes, Judge Fuentes III is guilty of gross inefficiency.
Under constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.
The Court held that trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from
submission for decision or resolution. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to
motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in
resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency
that warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. An inexcusable
failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting
judge.
8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and MR. REYNALDO S.
TEVES, Branch Clerk of Court, same court, Respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (3/12/13)
Facts:
The Case is a disbarment complaint, an offshoot to Court’s decision in the case Office of Court
Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al. Judicial Supervisor led the judicial audit team created by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) to investigate branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages. OCA found respondent judges connived with
court personnel who acted as “fixers” and judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriage despite irregularities in
the requirements provided under law. Tormis together with Judge Edgemelo Rosales filed a Memorandum of
Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. Court LIFTED the suspension
of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages.
Issue:
Whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in solemnization of marriages, where she
was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law constitute gross
misconduct warranting her disbarment?
Held:
Yes, such respondent found guilty.
Under CANON 1 provides that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and for legal processes that specifically to Rule 1.01 which a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and CANON 7 provides A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession that specifically to Rule 7.03 which A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law Respondent’s act of heedlessly
solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law ad jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross misconduct.
Here, repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer’s oath,
which mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. She must be the first to abide by the
law and weave an example for the other to follow. Respondent’s conduct has fallen short of the strict standards
required by the legal profession. Her repeated failure to live up to the values expected of her as an officer of
the court renders her unfit to be a member of the bar.
9. SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners, vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 (4/8/13)
Facts:
During an administrative hearing involving Dr. Malanyaon, where she was represented by her daughter,
Atty. Ma. Kristina Malanyaon as her counsel, Judge Nilo Malanyaon sat down beside Atty. Ma. Kristina, his
daughter during the proceedings. On several occasions, Atty. Ma. Kristina made manifestations while glancing
on the paper handed by her father, Judge Malanyaon. The counsel for the complainant questioned the
propriety of Judge Malanyaon to be sitting and assisting his daughter during the proceedings. Judge
Malanyaon justified that he was merely assisting his daughter who just recently passed the bar. The
complainant invoked that the actuation of the respondent is a conduct unbecoming of a judge in violation of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct where judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law or
giving professional advice to the clients.
Issue:
Is the respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge?
Held:
The respondent was guilty for conduct unbecoming of a judge.
It was held that the act of the respondent of sitting beside his daughter on a seat reserved for lawyers
during a hearing manifests the presumption and of his intention to exert influence as a judge on the case. In
addition, the respondent also admitted that he needs to guide his daughter during the proceedings where he
coached and advised her and also admitted that it was his filial duty to be there for his wife and daughter. His
conduct constitutes private practice of a lawyer. The respondent should have restrained himself from acting the
same for these are not enough reasons for his to forsake the ethical conducted expected of him as a judge.
The court also found that it was clear that the respondent engaged in a private practice of a lawyer when he
coached his daughter in open court in making manifestations, posing motions, and preparing questions for his
daughter to ask before the proceedings. He did so willingly and deliberately and after announcing when
questioned about his presence that he is the counsel of his daughter.
10. MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 (6/5/13)
Facts:
Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and damages.
She complaints that the case is only involves a claim for the payment of a loan plus interest and a claim for
damages, but the case has remained unresolved from the time it was filed. Despite receipt of the Resolution,
however, Judge Torres neither complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine. In recommending the penalty of
dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative cases, it was found liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases11 filed
by different litigants against respondent judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted the
four instances under the present administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with
directives/orders issued by this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Torres should be held administratively liable
Held:
Respondent judge should be held administratively liable.
Under Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual
in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that
justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the
time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a
bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that
her position required. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of Supreme Court. WHEREFORE,
respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the less serious charges of undue delay in resolving
and violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the amount or P20,000 for the first offense and
another P10,000 for the second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
11. COL. DANILO E. LUBATON (RETIRED, PNP), COMPLAINANT, vs. JUDGE MARY JOSEPHINE P.
LAZARO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 74, ANTIPOLO CITY, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320 (9/2/13)
Facts:
Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of the Motion to dismiss a civil case
considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the
purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period
Issue:
WON Judge Lazaro committed undue delay.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case
or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be
allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide the
case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an
awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific to
this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations
and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large
volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for the extension of
the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Judge Lazaro is FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and is REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties
particularly in the prompt disposition of cases pending and/or submitted for decision before her court.
12. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, vs. HON. SANTIAGO E. SORIANO,
FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA
UNION, AND PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, NAGUILIAN, LA UNION, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683 (9/11/13)
Facts:
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Soriano to decide the enumerated cases
submitted for decision which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide. However, thereafter of
deciding some cases as directed, Judge Soriano submitted tabulated report of the cases in his letter that he
requested for an extension of to decide and resolve the remaining cases and unresolved motions, which the
OCA granted. Then, Judge Soriano apologized to the Court through his letter, explaining that he neglected to
submit the report on the undecided cases but Judge Soriano eventually submitted to the Court, with the
request that the contempt charge against him be dismissed and the ₱40,000 deducted from his retirement
benefits be returned. However, the result of the verification of the status of the cases earlier found to have
been left undecided by retired Judge Soriano.
Issue:
Is the respondent found GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency and Gross Ignorance of the Law and be fined
which to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits
Held:
Yes, the respondent is guilty and a fined which be taken from her benefits.
Under Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
judges to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness." Similarly, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods.
In this case, that clearly, Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties.
Judge Soriano’s unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to
decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be
tolerated. As held in numerous cases, inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Furthermore, a judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity. Judge Soriano failed in this respect. And, for gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, the
Court finds sufficient the OCA’s recommended fine which will be taken from the amount previously withheld
from Judge Soriano’s retirement benefits.
13. RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 100113; 201 SCRA 210; September 3, 1991
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Commission on
Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and challenged the nomination and the
subsequent confirmation of the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC.
Held:
Yes, Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position.
Under the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In this case, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of both the rich and the poor
— verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
14. FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH
28, respondent.
G.R. No. 82760; 189 SCRA 217; August 30, 1990
Facts:
People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag was filed before then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, charging petitioner with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under
Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code. Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the
charge. Petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of
the Bureau of Lands, and that he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office. On
preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year. A Second
Amended Information was filed this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M.
Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)." Records show that:
1. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case
No. 639;
2. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died in the vicinity of his
residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and
3. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter's death
assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means thereof,
he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of
Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar. By this
guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands."
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case against Culanag
considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands.
Held:
No.
Under section 9, Rule 126 of rules of court states that The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio,"
as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date and a Warrant of Arrest remains
valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.
Here, petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions;
and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two
false petitions He explained that he thought that the Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which
reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given
another chance. And, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, the Court adjudged him guilty of indirect
contempt of Court.
15. SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
A.M. No. 3249; 179 SCRA 680; November 29, 1989
Fact:
Laurence Cordova got married but frequently came home drunk and failed to support his family. One
time, Salvacion, his wife discovers that Laurence had their home for another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and
had taken their other daughter, Melanie with him. Salvacion submitted her complaint against Atty. Laurence
Cordova for immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the bar. Laurence Cordova was found to be in
default for failure to file an answer to Salvacion’s complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Laurence Cordova was guilty for immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the
bar?
Held:
Yes. He was suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has continued supporting his
family, and has given up immoral conduct.
Under Mortel v. Aspiras, following the rule held that "the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " It is
important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship
with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
"reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
Therefore, he Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
16. KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding
Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
G.R. No. 90083; 190 SCRA 306; October 4, 1990
Facts:
A petition for certiorari entitled Maglasang v. People was filed with the Court. Due to non-compliance
with the requirements of the Court, specifically the non- payment legal fees and the non-attachment of with the
requirements of the Court. Atty. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing the petition.
Thereafter, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint filed with the Office of the
President whereby Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five
Justices of the Court’s Second Division with “biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
judgments or resolution. By reason of the strong language of the with the Office of the President, complaint
and its improper filing Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint “was a
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Castellano should be punished for contempt.
Held:
Yes, Atty. Castellano should be punished for contempt
Under CANON 11 states that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. To be specific, RULE 11.03 which a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts and RULE 11.04
which a lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the
case.
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to
the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the
hope of salvaging his reputation before his client as an officer of the Court.
17. IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 491; 178 SCRA 398; October 6, 1989
Facts:
National officers of the IBP were elected by the House Delegates and were proclaimed as officers. The
newly elected officers were set to take their oath of office the following day before the Supreme Court en banc
but was suspended as the same due to the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from
lawyers who had witnessed or participated In the proceeding and the adverse comments published in the
columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by
the 3 principal candidates for the office of the President of the Association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeto Drilon. Hence, the Supreme Court, in exercising its powers of supervision over the
IBP, inquiries into the veracity of the reports. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the
investigating committee ten (10) violations were established.
Issue:
Is the IBP by-laws are violated during the 1989 election of the IBP officers?
Ruling:
Yes. IBP by-laws are violated during the 1989 election of the IBP officers
Under Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility states that the duty to "promote respect
for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Here, the Supreme Court ruled that the candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with
which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal
profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not
uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
18. ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
A.M. No. 162; 182 SCRA 151; February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Angel Bautista together with Alfaro, Nestor and Editha Fortunado entered into an agreement
with with Atty. Gonzales, transferring 50% of the property in litigation in consideration for the latter’s legal
services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent committed serious misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent Atty. Gonzales committed serious misconduct. The court finds that the agreement
between the respondent and the Fortunados is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation.
Although a lawyer may in good faith advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce client’s
rights is champertous. The agreement between Bautista, Fortunados and Gonzales does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. The attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of the same bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The
execution of champertous contracts violates the relationship and his client. Considering the nature of the
offenses committed by the respondent and the facts of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO RIO, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No.
90294; 201 SCRA 702; September 24, 1991
Facts:
Accused-appellant Ricardo Rio convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua interposed his
appeal which he Solicitor General to comment on the appellant’s manifestation to withdraw the appeal. through
the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the appointment of a counsel de oficio on appeal, in view
of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should not preclude
anyone from pursuing a cause. Upon recommendation of such counsel, the Court in a resolution denied the
appellant’s motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason
offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de parte on
account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any forum.
Issue:
Whether the lawyer discharge of his duties proper
Held:
No.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he is expected to take such reasonable precaution
in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to
uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates
of their clients’ causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest requires that an attorney exert
his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client’s cause." Lawyers are an indispensable
part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor
to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar and to the public.
20. MARIA TIANIA complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2285; 200 SCRA 427; August 12, 1991
FACTS:
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent Amado Ocampo who has been her
"retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases has always had her unqualified faith and
confidence. One Mrs. Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment from a parcel of land. Tiania confronted Ocampo
about this but the latter reassured Tiania that he will take care of everything and that there was no need for
Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment
case and a Compromise Agreement, which Tiania signed which later on, Tiania received an order to vacate
the property in question. Ocampo also appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania.
He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could
not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and more so the preparation of the
answer in the said case.
Issue:
WON respondent Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests?
Held:
Yes, Atty. Ocampo is guilty.
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The Court prohibits the representation of conflicting interest not only because the relation of attorney and client
is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.
The aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising
Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and
her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case,
whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. Wherefore,
respondent is suspended for a period of one year.
21. CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
A.C. No. 3923; 220 SCRA 512; March 30, 1993
FACTS;
Garcia, complainant claims that Lee’s counsel, Francisco, commenced various suits before different
courts to thwart Garcia’s right to regain her property and all of these proceedings were decide against Lee. The
proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issue and parties, thus violating the
proscription against forum-shopping. Respondent said that he inserted in his defense of his client’s right only
such remedies as were authorized by law.
Issue:
WON the respondent is guilty of violation of Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility
Held:
Yes, respondent is guilty in such violation.
Under Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent’s client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact
when he willfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently
denied, as he should have expected. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of
arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain
only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him
by law as an officer of the Court.
22. Antonio Tan, complainant, vs. Court of Appeals, respondent.
G.R. No. 116285; October 19, 2001; 199 SCRA 212
Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Tan obtained two loans each in the principal amount of P2 mio (P4 mio in total)
from respondent CCP, said petitioner defaulted but after a few partial payments, respondent restructured his
loans, which he also failed to pay but proposed to respondent CCP a mode of paying the restructured loan.
Respondent instead demanded full payment within 10 days from receipt of said letter. Now, the respondent
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money, which obtained a decision in its favor. On appeal, the
petitioner asked for the reduction of the penalties and charges on his loan obligation, and eliminating the
attorney’s fee, which was all denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether there are contractual and legal bases for the imposition of the penalty, interest on the penalty
and attorney’s fees.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court finds their bases in accordance with the Promissory Note that the petitioner
executed in favor of the respondent, and the Article 1226 of the New Civil Code.
First, there is an express stipulation in the promissory note permitting the compounding of interest as
provided in the 5th paragraph of the said promissory note: "Any interest which may be due if not paid shall be
added to the total amount when due and shall become part thereof, the whole amount to bear interest at the
maximum rate allowed by law." Thus, any penalty interest not paid, when due, shall earn the legal interest of
12% per annum.
Second, Art. 1226 provides that in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the
fulfillment of the obligation.
In the case at bar, the promissory note and the law both expressly provide for the imposition of interest and
penalties in case of default on the part of the petitioner in the payment of the subject restructured loan.
23. ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant, vs. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A.
UMALI, respondent.
A.C. No. 2837; 237 SCRA 375; October 7, 1994
Facts:
Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to investigate to
determine the author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a result of which, the NBI charged
respondents Attys. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for obstruction of justice. The case was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. In view of NBI’s report that Umali’s signature in the complaint in the
civil case was not his, the case was dismissed with respect to him.
Issue:
W/N respondent violated Code of Ethics
Held:
Yes, such was violated by the respondent.
Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
Here, after the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP,
the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case
indubitably reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of
the lawyer’s oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer’s
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by
ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
24. MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
A.C. No. 3294; 219 SCRA 44; February 17, 1993
Facts:
Mario S. Mariveles filed an administrative complaint against his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C.
Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged to handle his charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Mariveles
instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent
did. However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, Attorney Mallari failed to file the
appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.
Issue:
WON respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under Rule 12.03 provides that a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or explaining his failure to do so and
Rule 18.03 states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the instant case, It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the
dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the
negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting
his defense, especially where the appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the
trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in the case at bar. On the first aspect, the failure of
petitioner's former counsel to file the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to petitioner,
amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent due
consideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel.
25. Vill Transport Service Inc. vs. CA (G.R. No. 76232, 1/18/91)
Facts:
Vill Transport Service, Inc. was held liable for damages for breach of contract in favor of the plaintiff
Energy Corporation. a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to Atty. Amante Pimentel, counsel of
record of Vill Transport. However, it was returned to the court with the notation that the addressee had moved
out of his given address without leaving a forwarding address. It held that petitioner's counsel was duty-bound
to notify the trial court of any change of address and his failure to do so could not be excused.
Issues:
Whether or not who did not leave a forwarding address after he had moved from his address of record,
is a valid service thereby making the decision
Held:
Yes.
Under section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is complete
upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within 5 days from the
date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
In the instant case, the Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures. And, in the observance
thereof for the orderly administration of justice, it cannot countenance the negligence and ineptitude of lawyers
who wantonly jeopardize the interests of their clients. On his part, a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Thus, a lawyer should so arrange matters that official and judicial communications sent by mail will reach him
promptly and should he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the consequence of his
negligence. Failure to claim registered mail of which notice had been duly given by the postmaster is not
excusable negligence that would warrant the reopening of a decided case. The same rule applies in cases like
the instant one where the counsel, through his negligence, caused the no delivery of a judicial notice.
26. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner vs. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 91391; 193 SCRA 282; January 24, 1991
Facts:
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint against
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and
damages. Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. In the case, the
counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself. Thereafter, all the PCGG officials
filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided by law. The petitioner
comes to the Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit against Enrile.
Held:
Yes. The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on
the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit.
The court stated that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a
multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such
officers are acting in good faith and in the performance of their duty. If the acts done are tainted with bad faith
or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages.
In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing
baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of
another. Thus, he is made liable from his actions in the opinion of the court. Yes, it is not suggested that a
lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should
not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party.
27. GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners, vs. ATTY. HAROLD M.
HERNANDO, respondent. A.C. No. 1359; 203 SCRA 1; October 17, 1991
Facts:
The respondent Atty. Hernando claims that his lawyer-client relationship towards the complainant
spouses was terminated. The common heirs of Abadilla who happen to be the registered co-owners in the
original certificate of title seeks cancellation of the Transfer certificate of Title issued to the complaint spouses.
Without the latter’s consent, respondent Hernando filed a petition on the behalf of the common heirs and even
appeared in cadastral proceedings against the complaint spouses.
Issue:
whether or not the respondent had a conflict interest
Held:
Hernando was in a conflict of interest situation
Under one of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
In the instant case, the obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. There
is no necessity furrowing the actual transmission of confidential information to an attorney in the course of his
employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting employment. The prohibition
on conflict of interest was designed not only to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.
28. JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-863; 234 SCRA 29; July 11, 1994
FACTS:
Judge Renato E. Abastillas was the presiding judge, where Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno are
defendants. Judge Abastillas solicited a money from Atty. Chua to secure a favorable decision on the said
criminal cases, which he communicated to his clients. Johnson Lee then financed a money as a down payment
and was delivered by Atty, Chua to Judge Abastillas.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Abastillas has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct?
HELD:
Yes, Judge Abastillas has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence He should administer justice impartially and without delay and
under Rule 2.01 states that he should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Here, it is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a
high degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesar’s wife, must
not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the high
standard of moral ethics required of judges.
29. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A.
MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 105909; 233 SCRA 484; June 28, 1994
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to
pay the municipality of Pililla business taxes and other fees. In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty
felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross sale for the
purpose of computing its business taxes.
A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for appropriate actions
PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty Mendiola to represent the municipality. The CA
dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of the law and
jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the proper provincial or
municipal legal officer
Issue:
WON a private counsel has the authority to file an action for in behalf of the said municipality
Held:
No, Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name of the
Municipality of Pililla.
Under Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provide that the provincial fiscal shall represent
the province or any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court except (a) in case whereof original
jurisdiction vested in the SC or (2) in case where the municipality or municipal district is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some municipality or municipal district in the same provinces. When the provincial
fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council.
In the instant case, even assuming that Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to
have been revoked when the municipality entered into a compromise agreement with PCC with regard to the
execution of the judgment in its favor.
30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XIV, and REY CHRISTOPHER PACLIBAR, and NERO
DESAMPARADO alias TOTO DESAMPARADO alias WALDAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 81389; 170 SCRA 487; February 21, 1989
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to
pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business taxes and other fees. The judgment was affirmed by the
SC and became final and executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution. In connection with the
execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of
PPC’s gross sales for the purpose of computing its business taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC
to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it a full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by the
release and quit claim documents executed by the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty.
Mendiola’s motion for examination and execution of judgment. He asserted that the mayor cannot waive the
balance of the judgment over which his law firm had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services and
attorney’s fees. The RTC, however, denied his MR. A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which
was referred to the CA for appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to
represent the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation
of the law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the
proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in court for and in behalf of
the municipality of Pililla
Held:
No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name of the
Municipality of Pililla.
1. Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Sec. 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall represent the province or any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or (b)
in cases where the municipality or municipal district is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special
attorney may be employed by the municipal council.
Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits.
The provision is mandatory. The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial
fiscal was disqualified must appear on record.
1. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of
private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal cannot refuse to
perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of
engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to
appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its
case in court.
3. The legality of a private counsel’s representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.
31. JOSE V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DE DIOS MARIKINA
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 98149; 237 SCRA 39; September 26, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner suffered physical injuries, when he fell from, and then was dragged along the asphalted road
by, a passenger bus operated by private respondent transportation company. after the reception of evidence,
the trial court, rendered its decision which dismissing defendant De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc.'s
counterclaim for lack of merit and ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff Jose V. Del Rosario: (a) the sum of
P76,944.41, as actual and compensatory damages; (b) the sum of P15,000.00, as moral and exemplary
damages; and (c) the sum of P33,641.50, as attorney's fees, a s well as to pay the costs of suit; and, as
regards the third-party complaint herein, ordering third-party defendant First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. to
indemnify third-party plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the reduction of attorney’s fees proper
Held:
Yes.
Under the Court provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance in determining the
reasonableness of such fees, such:
a) the quantity and character of the services rendered;
b) the labor, time and trouble involved;
c) the nature and importance of the litigation;
d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;
e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;
f) the responsibility imposed on counsel;
g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;
h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services;
j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client;
k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher fee
when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and
l) the results secured.
In this instance, following the refusal of private respondent to settle petitioner's claim, and the decision
thereon was promulgated by the court a quo only. Several pleadings were filed and no less than twenty
appearances were made by petitioner's counsel, not counting the various other pleadings ultimately filed with
the Court of Appeals and now before this Court. Given the nature of the case, the amount of damages
involved, and the evident effort exerted by petitioner's counsel, the trial court's award of attorney's fees for
P33,641.50 would appear to us to be just and reasonable.
32. SOLID HOMES, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC.,
and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR RIZAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 117501; 235 SCRA 299; July 8, 1997
Facts:
Private respondents Angela Perez Staley and Antonio Staley of INVESTCO sold 6 parcels of to SOLID
HOMES INC. Solid Homes paid the agreed down payment as well as the first four subsequent payments on the
balance. But on the 5th installment, SOLID HOMES failed to comply. As stipulated in the contract entered
between the two, the balance shall be payable in ten (10) semi-annual installments for a period of five (5) years
and shall earn interest at the rate of twelve (12%) per annum. Private respondents averred that SOLID HOMES
violated the terms of agreement, refused to pay the installments on their due dates and failed to negotiate a
settlement
with
the
tenants
and
squatters
of
the
property.
The trial court rendered judgement ordering SOLID HOMES to pay the balance with interest, until fully
paid; pay the representing cost of science and transfer taxes and attorney’ fees and litigation.
Issue:
WON the COURT OF APPEALS has justification in the award of attorney’s fees?
Held:
NO.
Under article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to be awarded by a court when its claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act
or omission of the party from whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an award thereof
demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable justification.
In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for attorney's fees
and to adjudge its payment by petitioner. On the contrary, the appellate court itself has found that petitioner's act
of withholding payment could not be said to be all that unjustified. The disagreement of the parties on the demand
ability of the amount still due and the accrual date of interest has persisted largely because of supervening
circumstances and the perceived inexplicitness of the contract itself.
33. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86100-03; 181 SCRA 367; January 23, 1990
Facts:
During the pendency of the suits that the parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation,
Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby
Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same properties with Banco de
Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and
transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said
parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter
in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties
as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of
which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's
liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land. Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees,
based on quantum merit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fee.
Held:
NO. Private respondent is not entitled
On the matter of attorney's liens, under Section 37, Rule 138 provides he shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused
a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees
by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when
something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed
upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."
34. The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit, petitioner, Vs. Court of Appeals and Bengson Commercial
Building, Inc., respondents.
G.R. No. 154559; 202 SCRA 16; October 05, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner was the legal counsel of Bengson Commercial Building Inc. (BCBI) when the latter filed an
action against GSIS to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of its real estate and chattel mortgages, which were
used to secure a loan that it had taken out with the GSIS. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent BCBI,
prompting GSIS to appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling and ordered GSIS to reimburse BCBI the amount
of P2,760,000 as rentals earned by one of its properties. Atty. Armovit sought the execution thereof.
Subsequently however, BCBI directed Armovit not to take part in the execution proceedings and ignored his
billings. Armovit thus moved for the entry of an attorney's lien in the case records, but he later on withdrew this
due to ongoing efforts to amicably settle with BCBI. The Court approved the withdrawal, and directed the
parties to faithfully comply with their duties. However, BCBI only paid Armovit the amount of P300,000, which
the Court nonetheless deemed to be faithful compliance with its obligation. The SC granted it, upholding
Armovit's claim for the balance of P252,000 more, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement. Particularly, the
body of its decision stated that a claim for 20% of all recoveries is not unreasonable, while the fallo ordered the
payment to petitioner. The bone of contention in this case is the amount of the contingent fee petitioner firm is
entitled to.
Issue:
Whether the lower courts erred in ruling that the petitioner's attorney's fees are limited to 20% of rental
arrearages only, excluding the rest of the recoveries made by BCBI
Held:
the Court ordered the payment of the sum of P252,000.00, nothing more, nothing less. While the body
of the Decision quoted the agreement of the parties stating the compensation as "20% contingent fee
computed on the value to be recovered by favorable judgment on the cases," this Court specifically ordered
BCBI to pay the Armovit Law Firm the aforementioned sum only, in addition to the P300,000.00 already paid.
BCBI was therefore held to be liable for the total amount of P552,000.00, representing 20% of the
P2,760,000.00 received by BCBI as rental payments from GSIS. Significantly, the order upon GSIS to
reimburse BCBI for rental payments constitutes the only monetary award in favor of BCBI.
35. BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767
NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents
G.R. No. L-104776; 238 SCRA 721; December 5, 1994
Facts:
Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf
of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by
AIBC and employment by BRII. BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to
recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals. The
amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of
the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
remitted to the BIR.
Issue:
Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of
these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no
such abuse of discretion. NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employeremployee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of
Labor Code which the petitioners failed to comply.
Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the
contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
CASE DIGEST FOR FINALS
1. TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 5832, February 22, 2011)
Facts:
The case originated from an administrative complaint filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling the former case of the complainant, Santeco, an action to declare a deed
of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed. The Court
found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others, abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith and
persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to
complainant, which the latter paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
which she never filed.
Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, that
respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty.
Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding
her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she
was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted.
The Court, required respondent two resolutions to answer. Respondent, however, failed to file the required
comment despite notice.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Avance should be disbarred for gross misconduct and repeated defiance of Court
orders?
Held:
Yes. In view of the foregoing, the Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or
disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment.
Under Section 27 of 138 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court are, which a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as
she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she
continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself
to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on
her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions
from this Court. Also, she agrees to take up the cause of her client, she owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in her. She must serve his client with competence and
diligence and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
2. ATTY. JESSIE TULDAGUE and ATTY. ALFREDO BALAJO JR., Complainants, vs. JUDGE MOISES
PARDO and JAIME CALPATURA Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge Regional Trial Court Branch
32 Cabarroguis Quirino, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962 (10/17/13)
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 1427, entitled People v. Rosendo Discipulo, Judge Pardo allegedly asked and
received P6,000.00 from Rosendo Discipulo, in exchange for a favorable decision on his application for
probation which Rosendo was convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and Rosendo went to Judge
Pardo’s house, had a “drinking spree” with him and stayed there for more than two hours. Balajo alleged that
after the promulgation of the decision, Rosendo’s counsel immediately filed a written application for probation
accurately quoting the penalty imposed.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge liable for gross misconduct.
Held:
Yes. Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Under Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that the behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary and Section 1, Canon 4 of the Code states that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Here, the Court held that a judge’s acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond
office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct.
Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and
received benefits given by the litigant.
3. MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, Complainant, v. HON. BAGUINDA ALI PACALNA, Presiding Judge, HON.
PUNDAYA A. BERUA, Acting Presiding Judge, HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, Clerk of Court and MANDAG
U. BATUA-AN, Court Stenographer, all of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Municipality of Balindong,
Province of Lanao del Sur, Respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505 (11/27/13)
Facts:
A Petition for judicial clemency was filed by Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, former Presiding Judge of the MCTC
of Balindong in Lanao del Sur. Respondent Pacalna was previously found administratively liable for dishonesty,
serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and also violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
which enjoins judges to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
in all activities and to perform their official duties honestly and diligently. Subsequently, another administrative
complaint was filed against Pacalna by members of the Marawi City Police and was held liable for grave
misconduct and meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension, converted to forfeiture of the corresponding
amount of his salary. Pacalna resigned while he was being investigated by the OCA but now seeks to rejoin the
judiciary and filed his application for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 9. He was already
interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in Cagayan de Oro City and that the only hindrance to his
nomination for the said judicial position was the penalty imposed on him in the present case.
Issue:
Whether or not Pacalna should be allowed to rejoin the judiciary.
Held:
No.
Under A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency)7 laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges’ associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance. His
appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention to go back to the judiciary on his personal belief
that "he can be an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in the Province of Lanao del Sur because of his
seventeen (17) years of experience," and on his "promise before the Almighty God and the High Court that he
will never repeat the acts or omissions that he had committed as a Judge." He claims having learned "enough
lessons" during the three years he became jobless and his family had "suffered so much because of his
shortcoming."
4. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE RAYMUNDO D. LOPEZ and
EDGAR M. TUTAAN, former Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court, respectively, Municipal Trial Court,
Palo, Leyte, Respondents.,
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1790 (12/11/13)
Facts:
The OCA audit team conducted a judicial audit in connection with the compulsory retirement of Judge
Raymundo D. Lopez, former presiding judge of the trial court. The audit team examined all pending cases
which the audit team found that gross dereliction of duty/gross inefficiency for his failure to decide such cases,
failure to resolve pending motions/incidents, delay in deciding a case.
Issue:
Whether respondent guilty of gross inefficiency
Held:
Yes.
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice and decide cases promptly and expeditiously because
justice delayed is justice denied. The 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters be decided or
resolved by the lower courts within three months from date of submission. Judges are expected to perform all
judicial duties, including the rendition of decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
In this case, Judge Lopez failed to decide a total of 32 cases and resolve pending incidents in 16 cases
within the 90-day reglementary period. Time and again, this Court reminds judges to decide cases with
dispatch. The Court has consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period
is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, and non-observance of this rule is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.
5. SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D. LORICA, Complainants, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC A.
CACATIAN-BELTRAN, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TUGUEGARAO CITY,
CAGAYAN, Respondent., A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 (1/13/14)
Facts:
Junio and Lorica an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01,
3.02, and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, alleging that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint
motion to withdraw information after almost four (4) months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They
claimed that four months was beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the resolution of simple motions.
Issue:
Whether Jude Beltran is administratively liable for the delay?
Held:
No.
Under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to decide a case within
the period of ninety (90) days. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise holds that judges
should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts’ business promptly
within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases.
In the present case, the City Prosecutor’s joint motion to withdraw informations was deemed submitted
for resolution. Judge Cacatian-Beltran, however, did not act on the motion within the prescribed three (3)
month period. In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a
follow-up of the motions to dismiss where the records of the criminal cases were retained, and that the staff
failed to inform her of any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. However, she should have kept
her own record of cases and noted therein the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective action. To
do this, Judge Cacatian-Beltran should have adopted a record management system and organized her docket
– an approach that she appears not to have done.
6. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Presiding
Judge and Acting, and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012
Facts:
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and
orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. It was alleged that Judge Indar made
it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.
To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit where Judge Indar
Acting Presiding Judge where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by
RTC-Shariff Aguak. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch
14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars
are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTCCotabato. More over the judicial audit team also found out that Judge Indar affirmed in writing before the
Australian Embassy the validity of decision he alleged rendered, when in fact does not appear in the court’s
record.
Issue:
whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty
Held:
Yes, Judge Indar is guilty.
Under the jurisprudence of Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, the Court explained the
difference between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct as "a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
Here, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulments of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned
annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the
statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross
misconduct. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but
likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indar’s gross
misconduct greatly undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the
courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary.
7. STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUÑEGALAGMAN, Complainants, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
36, CALAMBA CITY, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012
Facts:
Prosecutor Comilang assisted in a certain case. He appeared before Judge Belen and moved for the
deferment of the hearing of a case because he has a schedule for preliminary investigation on that day. Instead
of granting the same, the Judge required him to submit an explanation and to pay a fine. The Prosecutor
complied, but the judge directed him again to explain on why he should not be held for contempt. The prosecutor
again complied, but nevertheless, the judge held him liable for contempt and to pay a fine. The prosecutor filed
with the CA that he be granted TRO to stay the execution of the decision. Instead of obeying the TRO issued,
the judge held the Prosecutor for indirect contempt.
Issue:
Did the judge show grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of law?
Held:
Yes.
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal
norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the
law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm
of a judge’s hands.
This Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal
commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is
excused, and surely not a judge.
8. IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R due to forum shopping and decreed that the Buddha
statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately released to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas. Judge
Pamintuan set the case for hearing for the purpose of releasing the statute of the golden Buddha to its rightful
owners. The court subpoenaed Marcos, as one of the interested parties. The Court also ruled that the statute
will be awarded to the estate of late Rogelio Roxas, but it will be under custodia legis until the administration of
Roxas estate is resolved. Further, the court ruled that the statute is a replica or a fake one.
Marcos, charges Judge Pamintuan of Gross Ignorance of the law for moto propio reversing the 1996 final
and executory decision of Judge Reyes. Respondent Judge replied that instead of filing administrative case,
Marcos should have filed an MR. Marcos fired back that Sec. 1, Rule 37 provides that only the aggrieved party
may file a motion or MR. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be
dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled
corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Issue:
Whether Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law
Held:
Yes.
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules
or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly
crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone
is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges.
In the instant case, The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high
standards of competence required of judges
9. VICTORIANO SY, Complainant, vs. Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Victoriano Sy filed a case against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the RTC in South Cotabato for Conduct
Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of the Law. This is in regards to the Civil Case
No. 1403-24 involving Mr. Sy wherein Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case on the
ground that he received a call, from a ranking officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf
of the defendant bank and an earlier call from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the
plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.
However, Sy found out that, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a matter closely intertwined
with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was
pending in Judge Dinopol’s sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials
to be used in the construction of the judge’s house. Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity
loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from him on various occasions including the judge
borrowing his multi cab.
Issue:
Whether Judge Dinopol committed a serious impropriety.
Held:
Yes.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, the Court find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his family’s financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge’s impartiality provides, inter alia, as
follows:
Sec. 2. – Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances
the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. – Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on
which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for the
building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his position as a judge.
Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the
businessman, he should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The sphere of
Sy’s business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, "it is neither impossible
nor remote that a case might be filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent)
business and financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in
deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court."32
In addition, the Court find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties, thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of
the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions which integrity is
essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
10. ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 5, 2011
Facts:
Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in criminal case No. 1136-03 of the Regional Trial Court in
Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a prosecution for murder arising from the killing of
Felomino O. Occasion, charges Judge Jaime Infante, Presiding Judge of the said case to whose was raffled
for arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for the
latter’s failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after
allowing bail.
Issue:
Whether respondent guilty for gross ignorance of the law
Held:
Yes.
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His role in the
administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the
Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was
inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its
requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter
of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the
accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the
accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
11. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE UYAG P. USMAN, Presiding
Judge, Shari'a Circuit Court, Pagadian City, Respondent.
A.M. No. SCC 08-12, October 19, 2011
Facts:
Judge UsMan’s financial capability was questioned because of the SUV he allegedly acquired worth 1
million, 526,000, even tho he had just been recently appointed as a judge. It was alleged that since he just
assumed his post, he seldom reported for work and could not be located within the court’s premises during office
hours, moreover, he was only receiving a very small take home pay because of his salary and policy loans.. and
he is also the sole bread winner of his family with 7 children, two of whom were college students at the Medina
College School of Nursing, which is a private school. Judge Usman explained that he was hesitant to buy the
vehicle, but his mother, a US veteran pensioner was the one who paid for the SUV. Judge Usman also asserted
that there was never a single day that he failed to report for work; that he often arrived ahead of his staff
considering that he lived near the court; and that his conduct as a judge was beyond reproach and this could be
attested to by his staff and employees.
However, The OCA, held Judge Usman liable for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for failing to file his Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 2004-2008.
Issue:
Whether or not judge Usman violated the laws mentioned.
Held:
Yes. The court said that it is imperative that every public official or government employee must make and
submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth.
This serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public
officials and employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote
transparency in government, and to ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest
lives, with the end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated the laws mentioned when he failed to file his SALN for
the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation either why he failed to file his SALN for five (5) consecutive years.
While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated
to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain
the faith of our people in the administration of justice.
12. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF FELIX M. SULIT. FELIX M.
SULIT, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JOEL P. TIANGCO, Judge, Circuit Criminal Court of Batangas, and
JOSE AQUINO, Chief of Police of Batangas City, respondents.,
G.R. No. L-35333; 115 SCRA 207; July 20, 1982
Facts:
The use of language characterized as "insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous," resulting in
respondent Judge, now deceased, being compelled to suspend the session, but not deterring, so the order for
contempt recited, petitioner Felix M. Sulit, a member of the bar and private prosecutor in the case, from
continuing to address the people present in Court "in a very loud voice," charging the presiding judge with
proceeding in utter disregard "of the rules and law," was the basis for petitioner being "summarily adjudged in
contempt of court."
Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty for direct contempt
Held:
Under the jurisprudence of People v. Estenzo, 16 states the guiding principle in cases of this nature.
Thus: "It cannot be denied either that unless exercised with restraint and judiciousness, this power lends itself
to manifestations of whim, caprice, and arbitrariness. There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for
judges to take the utmost care lest prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality of counsel, or previous
incidents lead them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the
court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the dividing line that should separate the
prosecutor from the judge, when both roles are merged in the same person. The infusion of personal element
may go unnoticed. Even if such were not the case, objectively viewed, such an impression may be difficult to
avoid by laymen. That is a consideration that cannot be overlooked. It is important that public confidence in
judicial impartiality and fairness be not impaired. 'The power to punish for contempt,' as was pointed out by
Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 'should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindicative
principle. Only occasionally should the Court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail.'
13. Libet vs. Oliva (237 SCRA 375)
Facts:
Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to conduct an
investigation to determine the author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a result of which, the NBI
charged respondents Attys. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for obstruction of justice. The case was referred
to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. In view of NBI’s report that Umali’s signature in the complaint
in the civil case was not his, the case was dismissed with respect to him. With respect to Atty. Edelson G.
Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation: There is ample evidence extant in the
records to prove that Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the
Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
Issue:
W/N respondent violated Code of Ethics
Held:
Yes.
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the
Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by
the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably
reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s
oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer’s responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions against the other party. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their
first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the
courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests
of their clients.
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer
that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
14. ELENA VDA. DE ECO, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 1647 (1/20/95)
FACTS:
De Eco's went to the office of Communications Insurance Co., Inc. to follow up the case. Complainant
and her daughter Beata Elona were met by Benjamin Ramirez, who asked them to wait a while. Afterward, he
told them that the insurance company was not liable for her husband's death but the company will help by giving
them "P650.00 as limos." He asked her to get a residence certificate in order for her to receive the money only
after she thumb marked a blank piece of paper and her daughter signed as witness.
The Workmen's Commission decided the case in favor of Vda. de Eco and ordered the Hapseng Bakery and the
Communications Insurance Co. jointly and severally to pay the sum of P4,880.00.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Ramirez made it appear that complainant signed a receipt as full payment for the
complainant's claim.
RULING:
The respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year from receipt of this
Resolution. By preponderance of evidence, it has been amply proved that Benjamin Ramirez deceived
complainant by making it appear in a document that she received more than what she actually received.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office. Respondent's act of defrauding an illiterate complainant of the monetary award for her husband's death,
for which she waited nearly ten years, is deplorable and should not be viewed lightly. Not only does respondent
degrade himself as a lawyer but he thereby besmirches the honorable profession to which he belongs.
15. ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.,
A.M. No. 1334; 179 SCRA 653; November 28, 1989
Facts:
Complainant, a second-year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge
of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to
respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through
a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any
personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of
special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Aznar is guilty for grossly immoral conduct
Held:
Yes.
Under the jurisprudence of Arciga v. Maniwang, this Court had occasion to define the concept of
immoral conduct, a lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity. Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Where an unmarried
female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer
who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified.
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in
all her subjects in case she refused.
16. LUIS G. CONSTANTINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PRUDENCIO G. SALUDARES, Respondent.,
A.C. No. 2029; 228 SCRA 223; December 7, 1993
Facts:
Complainant Luis G. Constantino charged respondent Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares with conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis
Constantino, Jr. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation promising to pay it
back promptly the following day but he failed to comply with his promise. Subsequent demands for payment
were made but to no avail. Meanwhile Luis, Jr. left the country and wrote his father, authorizing the latter to
collect the sum of money owed by respondent. Yet despite complainant's repeated demands respondent
persistently refused to pay back the said amount. A complaint was filed against respondent. It was alleged that
there was abuse of trust and confidence; that his act constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer of the court
and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office.
Issue:
WON Atty. Saludares is guilty of acts unbecoming of a lawyer
Held:
Yes.
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityy clearly provides that a lawyer must not
engage in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must act with integrity, honesty and
professional decorum. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect and
confidence of the public.
Here, there is no doubt that respondent borrowed the subject money; he admitted said indebtedness
but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay. It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him, he must meet the issues
and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity which is at all times expected of him In this case, respondent failed to demonstrate that he still
possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Granting arguendo that he failed to
meet Luis, Jr. at the appointed place of payment, respondent does not deny the fact that he has refused and
still refuses to repay despite repeated demands. Had respondent intended to settle his indebtedness, he could
have done so in several instances. Clearly, respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt. Such
a conduct, to say the least, is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
17. JULIAN C. DINOY, Complainant, v. ATTY. JESUS ROSAL, Respondent.
A.C. No. 3721; 235 SCRA 419; August 17, 1994
FACTS:
The Petioner, Julian C. Dinoy sent an unverified letter to the Secretary of Justice charging the
Respondent, Atty. Jesus Rosal for having notarized a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Estela Gentacutan,
at the time the pricipals mentioned in the document were already dead.
The letter was indorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline and Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Mr. Dinoy submitted a “Supplementary Affidavit” where he declared
that the act complained is “illegal and unlawful and that the respondent should be punished by DISBARMENT
from the practice of law. Respondent filed a verified answer and asserted that there was heavy workload of
documents to be notarized when he dealt with the document in question. He was able to interview each of the
persons who executed the SPA regarding their personal circumstances and the consequences of their act and
was satisfied with the persons who signed the documents were the ones who represented themselves to be
such.
Respondent asked the complaint to be DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. Atty Legaspi promulgated a
resolution finding the respondent failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the identities and capacities of
individuals who executed the documents dated May 8, 1989. Atty Legaspi observed that there is no proof that
the respondent acted with malice, ill-will or bad faith in committing the negligent act complained of. Hence, the
complainant cannot insist upon the disbarment of the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the respondent must be punished by DISBARMENT from the practice of law.
RULING:
No, the act complained by the complainant does not satisfy a penalty of disbarment from practice of the
law.
It is true that it is the duty of the notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his presence by
the real parties and that the notarial officer must observe “utmost care” to comply with the elementary formalities
in the performance of his duties. In this case, the respondent did not act with malice, ill-will or bad faith in
committing the negligent act filed by the complainant. Instead, he notarized the document with his honest belief
that the persons who signed the documents were the ones representing themselves to be such.
The Bar Discipline IBP recommends six (6) months suspension from practice of law due to
NEGLIGENCE. However, the Court states that the IBP recommendation is unduly harsh considering that the
respondent had deliberately acknowledged and recorded a falsehood when he notarized the document dated 8
May 1989 and that the further complaint relates to the notarization on one (1) document only.
18. MAXIMINO GAMIDO
OFFICIALS, respondents.,
G.R. No. 114829, 3/1/95
Y
BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,
vs.
NEW
BILIBID
PRISONS
(NBP)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea made it appear that Petitioner Maximino Gamido y Buenaventura
in the jurat of this petition that the latter subscribed the verification and swore before him. Respondent alleges
that he did it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an acknowledgement, it would be satisfactory. He
has known the Petitioner (Gamido) since he has been in and out of NBP not only because his office is across
the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, but also because he had handled several cases involving prisoners and
guards of the NBP as well as some of its personnel. That on 13 December 1994, Respondent received a letter
from Petitioner. Respondent continues to apologize to the court and that henceforth he would be more careful.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Icasiano M. dela’s actions constituted falsehood, a direct violation of Canon 10 Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he agreed to prepare the jurat in the petition case in
absence of Petitioner Gamido.
Held:
Yes.
Under Canon 10 Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice”
Here, respondent’s act of making it appear to the court that in the jurat it was made to appear that Petitioner
subscribed the verification and swore before him. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides that “the
acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public, or an officer duly authorized by the law of the country
to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.” It is obvious that
the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take
acknowledgements of instruments or documents. The Court finds respondent’s explanation unsatisfactory, as
evidenced by the fact that his questioned jurat is indicated to have been entered in Book 45 of his notarial
register, and that he should know the similarities and differences of a jurat and an acknowledgement. In the case
at bar, it is clear that Respondent Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea committed grave misconduct when he agreed to
prepare the jurat in the petition case in absence of Petitioner Gamido.
19. ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES
MEDICAL CENTER, complainants, vs. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993 223 SCRA 425
Facts:
Atty. Damaso B. Aves brought an action for damages against Luke's Medical Center and St Luke's
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome for the death of his 7-month pregnant
wife, Fe Linda Aves. St Luke's produced in court the medical records of the late Mrs Aves as requested by
Atty. Benjamin Grecia, the counsel of Atty. Aves. and the St Luke's Medical Center filed a disbarment
complaint against Atty. Grecia. Respondent Atty. Grecia is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in
connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which is material evidence in the damage suit
againstthe complainants.
Issue:
WON Atty. Benjamin Grecia's name should be removed from the Roll of Attorneys after the Court found
out that he stole 2 pages from the medical records of the late Mrs. Aves and gave them to his driver.
Held:
Yes.
Under the Rules of Professional Responsibility and canon thereof which provide that Canon 1, Rule
1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. – A lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
20. In re: Tranquilino Rovero, 101 SCRA 799
Facts:
The Court, upon a finding that the respondent Tranquilino Rovero had been found guilty by a
competent court of a violation of Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Smuggling
and sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500.00.on July 7, 1956, the said respondent filed a petition for
reinstatement, claiming that his disbarment had caused him untold misery and mental anguish, and that he had
been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime and restored to full civil and political rights,
and pledged, "on banded knees", "not to commit the same or similar mistake in the future nor to involve himself
further in any transaction which might tend to drag down his name as lawyer and as an ordinary dignified
citizen. The Court denied his petition.
On March 10, 1958, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero again implored the Court to be readmitted to
the practice of law, but the Court turned a deaf ear to his plea. The respondent Tranquilino Rovero, "now in his
twilight years (71 years old)" asks humbly and earnestly of the Court to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
"before crossing the bar to the great beyond. To be reinstated to the practice of law, it is necessary that the
respondent must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law.
ISSUE:
WON he has been disciplined long enough to render his punishment lifted
HELD:
It appears that since his disbarment in 1952, the respondent 'Tranquilino Rovero has honorably dealt
with his citizens. He had demonstrated his moral rehabilitation and reformation as to be fit, once more, to
engage in the practice of law. Mr. Rovero has also held high positions of trust in commercial establishments.
He had been elected the president of the Filipino Industrial Corporation; the vice-president of the Meteor
Company, Inc., and the president of the Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), a position which he holds up to the
present.
Testimonials have been presented regarding the high esteem accorded him in the community to which
he belongs. His good conduct is certified to by the president of the Aklan Bar Association and the parish priest
of Christ the King Church. His conduct has also merited the approval of the late Pres. Ramon Magsaysay who
granted him an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime. Under the circumstances, and considering
that more than 28 years had already passed since he was disbarred, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero has
been sufficiently punished and disciplined.
21. EMMA J. CASTILLO, complaint, v. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-90-447; July 12, 1991; 239 SCRA 268
Facts:
A sworn complaint was filed by Emma Castillo about her relationship and son with the married RTC Judge Man
uel Calanog Jr. This is due to the failure of the judge to support them financially. According to her, it all started
when the judge was referred to her for the early termination of the intestate proceedings of estate of her comm
on law husband in his favor. And judge Calanog persuaded her to become a mistress to which she said yes. In
the course of investigation, Castillo submitted a formal “Affidavit of Desistance” totally denying all the allegatio
ns of her complaint. However, there are witnesses who stood firm in their testimonies like the Court interpreter
Jose Javier who used to bring weekly allowance to Castillo and pay monthly electric and water bills of the cond
ominium unit allegedly given by Judge Calanog to Castillo.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances shown are sufficient to convict the respondent judge for immorality and cond
uct unbecoming of a public official considering that the complainan submitted an affidavit of desistance.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her “Affidavit of
Desistance,” the Court would not have been swayed solely by her allegations, and it found from the testimony
of Jose Javier that the former’s charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds. Aside from this, there were
evidences adduced to support the allegations, like the birth certificate of their alleged son where stated that the
father is Judge Calanog. Also, the child is listed in the Brgy census record, and it was a verified from NHA that
the condominium unit was owned by the judge, although not yet fully paid.
22. KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L.
ESGUERRA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.,
A.C. No. 8010 (6/16.2009)
Facts:
Complainant was led to believe by respondent that he can legally acquire properties in the Philippines.
Atty. Mas processed all the paperwork but instead run away with the 400,000 payment and 3.8 million
payment. On top of that, the land was also inalienable. Atty. Mas ran away with the money and was nowehere
to be heard of.
Issue:
WON the respondent was properly given notice of the disbarment proceedings against him.
Held:
YES.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City,
after he committed the embezzlement. Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act.
He can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability
by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts.
Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was sufficient
notice to him. Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. In this connection, lawyers must
update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their respective chapters of any
change in office or residential address and other contact details. In case such change is not duly updated,
service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall
constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.
23. JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant, v. MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9612, March 13, 2013
FACTS:
Johnny Pesto, a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct unbecoming an officer
of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the
performance of his duty as a lawyer. Johnny averred that his wife Abella retained the services of Atty. Millo to
handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece; that among other
transgressions, Atty. Millo repeatedly gave them false information to explain his inability to complete the transfer
of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the tax for the property had been paid, but they found out
that he had not yet paid the tax. Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered
closed due to two years of inaction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Millo violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes.
Under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable
Here, the Supreme Court stated that Atty. Millo’s acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and
Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client
relationship between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render professional service to
them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the
professional service he had assumed required him to do. The Supreme Court further explained that Atty. Millo
had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence.
24. FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 6148, January 22, 2013)
Facts:
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him
despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he started
courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which
was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the
latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon
City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Further
respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant
and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious
living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that complainant was
fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a “sham
wedding” to protect her and her family’s reputation since she was then three-months pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Here, while the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband and
wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such
first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good
moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even
assuming that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the
following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited
with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross
immorality and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.
25. EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent. (A.C. No. 9387,
June 20, 2012)
Facts:
Complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them. The RTC
ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan, attorney’s fees and moral damages. Complainant and her husband filed their
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief.
But the respondent instead of an Appellants’ Brief filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief.
Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution. Complainant and
her husband failed to file an appeal on the Resolution, because respondent never informed them of the adverse
decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent “several times” about the status of the appeal,
but “despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response,” to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. Hence,
Complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP seeking the
disbarment of respondent on grounds of deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral
damages in the amount of ₱350,000. The Director of Bar Discipline ordered respondent to submit an answer to
the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint. He
explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by
the IBP he had never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Padilla is guilty of malpractice, deceit and grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes
Atty. Padilla is found guilty of violating the Rules and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity
to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with
competence and diligence. In the instant case, respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. Regardless of the pleading
his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in
appeals from RTC decisions. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know the procedure and this is
embodied in Canon 5 of the Code. Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted. The supposed
lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His
failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code. Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the
proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the
Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case. Lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he
engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.
26. ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent. (A.C.
No.6116, August 1, 2012)
Facts:
According to complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of
the attorney’s fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Yap whom he referred, in an action for par
tition of the estate of the spouses relative. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995. Ho
wever, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounti
ng to 17% of the total estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 199
7 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees from 25%
to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his profes
sion for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and cohabited with another with who
m he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in moneylending business without the require
d authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Issue:
Whether respondent guilty of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
Held:
Yes.
Under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. And Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
states A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except: (a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement;
Here, Respondent’s defense that forgery of the 11 August 1995 letter was belied by his 16 July 1997
admitting to have undertaken the payment of the complaint’s commission but passing on the responsibility to
the Spouses Yap. Clearly, the respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Furthermore, the respondent did not deny the accusation
that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children.
27. FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. PABLO S.
BERNARDO, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012)
Facts:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar, and violation of duties and oath as a lawyer.
From 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and illegally
committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against the complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful
words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City,
who are the acquaintance of the complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP 495,000.00
as advanced money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by
presenting himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the land. He also led complaints
to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation he
well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said
amount. Upon receipt of the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but
instead use the money for personal use. The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held:
Yes.
Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 states that a lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He, himself, admitted in
his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling
of land supposedly purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing
that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money
given by the complainants in the amount of PhP 495,000.00.
28. PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA,
RESPONDENT.
(A.C. No.6655, October 11, 2011)
Facts:
Respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Lope Caalim with Sale. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in
the notarial portion. Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs' signatures were
falsified.
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of
their existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates in her name and in the
names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously
simulated deed of sale purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said
deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still
single. Respondent denies complainant's assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that
as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him.
Issues:
Whether respondent guilty of such act
Ruling:
Yes.
Under the Rule 1.02 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Here, by respondent's own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of
the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint are
insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have
previously ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless
binding between the parties and their successors in interest. With his admission that he drafted and notarized
another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other
taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public
document for an unlawful purpose.
Moreover, while respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant
and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.
29. JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011
Facts:
Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that on 24 July 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge
Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. While
other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt of court for the second
time. After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a
fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building. Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent
left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Issue:
Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent was guilty of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under the respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Here, the respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the
impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. The litigants and counsels, particularly the latter
because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and
disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that
he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner
tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases.
Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and
bring the justice system into disrepute
30. RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A.
OMAÑA, Respondent
A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011
Facts:
Complainants alleged that Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice
on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña
then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract). Complainants alleged that Marantal
and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of
most of the property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,
complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid.
Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
Issue:
Whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Yes.
Under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, the Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of
a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. Omaña's allegation that it was her part-time
office staff who notarized the contract. Thee IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña's negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register
and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of
his staff.
31. SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS, Complainants, vs. ATTY. RICARDO G.
BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010
FACTS:
The complainants were the plaintiffs in CiviL case of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos
City, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. The case was assigned to Judge Dizon, Jr. The
complainants were represented by Atty. Ricardo Barrios. The Atty. Barrios visited the complainants at their
residence and informed complainant Manuel that respondent judge wanted to talk to him. Atty Barrios and
Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. Atty. Barrios
introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The judge likewise
said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could
deliver P150,000.00 to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct
HELD:
Yes.
The acts of respondent in demanding and receiving money from litigants before his court for a favorable
judgment constitute a "serious charge" as defined in Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Specifically,
respondent committed direct bribery and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
both of which are enumerated in that provision.
By demanding and receiving money from a litigant before his court in consideration of a favorable
judgment, respondent performed acts of impropriety which did violence to the integrity of the judiciary and
degraded public confidence in the courts.
32. WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5704, May 8, 2009
Facts:
Willem Kupers filed an administrative case against respondent Atty. Hontanosas for allegedly preparing
and notarizing contracts that are both invalid and violates the limitations on aliens leasing private lands under
P.D. 471. He knowingly indicated that the contract shall be enforced for 49 years, instead of 25 years, and
renewable for another 49 years. He failed to inform his clients of the limitations of the aforesaid law and by his
acts, deliberately prepared a document contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Hontanosas violated the Lawyer’s Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts.
Held:
Yes.
In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney's Oath and
several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-atlaw is to "obey the laws of the Philippines." Under Canon 1, which provides that a lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal process. Also Canons 15 which
a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients and Canon
17 states a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
33. TANU REDDI, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7027, January 30, 2009
Facts:
Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and a practicing endodontist in New
York, seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly deceiving her into giving
him a total of US$ 3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things, purchasing several real estate properties
for resale.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent shall be disbarred on the ground of dishonest and deceitful conduct
RULING
Yes. The respondent shall be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that respondent's dishonest and deceitful
conduct with respect to the intended transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is
sufficiently established.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
a member of the bar.43 If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning
34. DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009
FACTS:
Chua, friend of Dolores referred Atty. Macasa, for legal services in connection with the arrest of her son
for Violation of RA 9165. Atty. Macasa agreed to handle the case for P30,000.00. Dolores made 3 partial
payments on different occasions and P18,000 purpose of posting a bond to secure the liberty of his son, however
no receipt was issued by Atty. Macasa. Dolores found out that Atty. Macasa did not remit the amount to the court
supposed to be intended for the provisional liberty of her son. She demanded the return of P18,000 several times
but respondent ignored her. Moreover, Atty. Macasa failed to act on the case of complainant’s son and
complainant was forced to avail the services of a PAO lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Macasa grossly neglected his duties for the cause of his client?
RULING:
Yes.
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with
competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must
bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses
the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his
best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable
care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he
will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.
A lawyer’s negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client
may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus,
from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyer’s lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client
is both unprofessional and unethical.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainant’s son and receiving his attorneys’ fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and
purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Respondents lackadaisical
attitude towards the case of complainant’s son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainant’s son, it
also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him
for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latter’s
constitutional right to bail.
35. ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 8392, June 20, 2010)
FACTS:
After respondent hired complainant as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law
wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where
he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the
leader. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured,
brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape, the members of the group tied her spreadeagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day
by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale
and walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial
Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious
group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3
Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Velasquez should be disbarred from the practice of law
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. When
a lawyer's moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.
Moreover, as reflected in the Resolution of the Prosecutor in the criminal complaint against respondent
for Serious Illegal Detention, his therein co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant's witnesses,
and that the allegations against him remained unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly
preponderant evidence. In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute
gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.
36. EUGENIA MENDOZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009)
FACTS:
Complainant, a postal employee, is a creditor of respondent in the amount of P 20,000payable in 6
months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks. Complainant although not faithfully paying her obligation,
but made remittances in the amount of P12,910 in respondent's Metrobank account. Not satisfied with the
remitted amount, respondent filled up two postal checks she issued in blank, in the amount of P50,000 each in
which respondent claimed was for the P100,000 cash that complainant received in Nov. 15,1999. Complainant
denied having borrowed the P100, 000 from respondent and claimed that respondent victimized other employees
of Postal Office by filling up without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans. The case
was referred to the IBP where it was initially found out in the Report dated Sept. 6, 2002, finding respondent
guilty of dishonesty. The Supreme Court remanded the case and a second Report was made by Commissioner
Funa stating among others, that respondent's allegations are mere fabrications for there were contradicting
allegations. The loan alleged by respondent to have happened on November 15, 1999never took place as it was
respondent's modus operandi to demand a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of estafa complaints
against his borrowers. The IBP in its Resolution indefinitely suspended Deciembre from practice of law.
ISSUE:
Is the indefinite suspension against Deciembre proper?
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 states that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. And Canon 7 provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by
respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability. A lawyer may
be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide
his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.In this case, evidence abounds that
respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession
37. ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
(A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of
law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply
with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be a notarized
document executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer. Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty.
Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet before the start of a
hearing.
ISSUE:
Did the IBP err in finding respondent guilty of the charges against him and if the penalty imposed was
justified
HELD:
The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner. The practice of law is
a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Under Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Here, Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of an affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed been falsified.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive
and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified
language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several disinterested persons
confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing and Atty.
Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence denying the said charge against him.
38. FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7055, July 31, 2006
Facts:
Foodsphere, Inc. a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and
distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO". Alberto Cordero (Cordero)
purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. They filed a complained before the BFAD. After conciliation
meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty.
Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness.
Later respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract asking complainant to advertise his television
program kakampi mo ang batas in tabloids and spot advertisements. Later respondent wrote in his columns in
the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light and aired in several episodes of his television program
Kakampi Mo ang Batas repeatedly maligning the complainant. Complainant filed criminal complaints against
respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints
were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the pendency of the civil
case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against
complainant and its products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP
found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance
his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids
and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against
a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of
CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal
profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandate, viz: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using
intemperate language.
39. AVELINO O. ANGELES, LAURO O. ANGELES, MARIA O. ANGELES, ROSALINA O. ANGELES,
CONNIE M. ANGELES, Complainants, v. ATTY. AMADO O. IBA EZ, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009)
FACTS
Avelino O. Angeles, Maria O. Angeles, Lauro O. Angeles, Rosalina O. Angeles, and Connie M. Angeles
in representation of the deceased Loreto Angeles against Atty. Amado O. Ibanez (respondent) for disbarment
for notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence
of the affiants in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979, and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p.
157 and Book No. II, Series of 1979.
The complainants denied that they executed the said document or that they ever appeared before
respondent Atty. Ibanez for this purpose. They further contend that respondent Atty. Ibanez's act of notarizing
the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without requiring the presence of the parties, and despite his
alleged lack of a notarial commission, constitutes professional misconduct for which reason he should be
disbarred. Respondent Atty. Ibanez averred that the complainants are guilty of forum-shopping they filed the
same complaint, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3581, which was eventually dismissed by then IBP CBD
Comm. Victor Fernandez.
The respondent admitted notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" as Notary Public of
the Province of Cavite, with a notarial commission issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 1, Trece
Martires City. He also blamed his former legal secretary for the mistake in the designation of "Manila" as the
place of execution of the said document.
ISSUE
Whether Atty iBanez guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
"Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants.
HELD
Yes.
Under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law, provides: Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement
shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
state.
In the instant case, notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial
degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as
notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. Respondent's
notarial commission should not only be suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of
law.
40. WILBERTO C. TALISIC, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014)
Facts:
This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against Atty. Primo
R. Rinen1(Atty. Rinen), charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale2 which allowed
the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia (Spouses Durante) of a parcel of land formerly
owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora Corpuz (Aurora). The property, measuring 3,817 square meters and situated
in Barangay Langgas, Infanta, Quezon, was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4875 under
Aurora's name.3After Atty. Rinen filed his comment on the complaint, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty of such act
Held:
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat
is sacrosanct." "The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private
document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity.Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree." It must then be stressed that, "a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a
notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.
The fact that Atty. Rinen was a trial court judge during the time that he administered the oath for the
subject deed did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon other
commissioned notaries public. He also could not have simply relied on his clerk of court to perform the
responsibilities attached to his function, especially as it pertained to ensuring that the parties to the document
were then present, performing an act that was of their own free will and deed.
41. CARLITO ANG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014)
Facts:
Carlito Ang (complainant) filed an administrative action against Atty. Gupana (respondent) for the latter’s
alleged participation in the commission of forgeries and falsification to certain documents causing damage on
the part of the former. Said acts involved notarization of an instrument or document not in the presence of the
affiant as the latter had already been dead at the time of notarization. It was also shown from the record that in
effecting the notarization of documents and instruments, the clerical staff of the respondent was the one who
investigates the completeness of the documents and the identity of the parties. The clerical staff would later
forward the said documents to the respondent for verification. It was also the said staff who made entries in
respondent’s notarial report. The IBP Commissioner held the respondent administratively liable which decision
was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
WON respondent is administratively liable.
RULING:
YES.
The Court found the respondent administratively liable. The Court finds respondent administratively liable
for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when
he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before
respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991.
Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed, respondent averred in his position
paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization
24 thus admitting that Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing." Respondent averred in his position paper that
it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said
clerical staff investigates whether the documents are complete as to the fundamental requirements and inquires
as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto.
As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that the persons who signed the documents are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of documents brought to him
for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring about the identities of the
persons appearing before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for
misconduct.