lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Module 1 PFR Digests compilation
Persons and Family Relations (San Beda University)
StuDocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Compilation of Case Digests (Digests not mine)
Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L 63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446
Justice Teehankee
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada et al. asked the court to compel respondents Juan Tuvera (Executive Assistant
to the President) and Joaquin Venus (Deputy Executive Assistant to the President) to publish several
Presidential Decrees. The respondents argued that while publication is as necessary as a rule, according to
Article 2 of the Civil Code
“Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,”
it is not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when decrees themselves they were to become effective
upon their approval.
The Supreme Court initially ordered respondents to publish all presidential issuances with general
application to be published in the Official Gazette and unless so published, shall have no binding force
and effect.
Petitioners then asked the Supreme Court to move for reconsideration/clarification of its earlier decision.
Specifically, they are asking the following: (a) what is meant by law of public nature or general
applicability? (b) Must there be a distinction between laws with general applicability and those which are
not? (c) What is meant by “publication”, where, and when should laws be published?
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith the Official Gazette.
Issue:
Whether or not laws and decrees need to published in the official gazette or a newspaper of general for it
to be effective?
Ruling:
Yes, publication is an indispensable requirement. Contrary to the argument of the respondents, the
Supreme Court ruled that clause “otherwise provided” on Article 2 of the civil code refers to the refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. Interpretative and
those internal in nature, regulating only personnel of the administrative agency, need not be published.
This rule will not apply to internal rules of a government agency such as assignments of workload or
wearing of office uniforms, municipal ordinances not covered by this rule but by the Local government
code. EO 200 uses the world “laws”, referring including those local and private laws.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all. Publication should be made either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter
as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code
Other notes:
If the law provides for a period shorter or longer than the usual fifteen-day period, then such shorter or
longer period, shall prevail. If the law provides that it shall take effect immediately, it means that it shall
take effect immediately after publication with the fifteen-day period being dispensed with.
De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
Justice Fernan
Facts:
Firewall of a burned-out building owned by the petitioners Felicia De Roy and Virgilio Ramos collapsed
resulting to injuries to the private respondents Luis Bernal et al. and the death of their daughter Marissa
Bernal. Private respondents had been warned by the petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
Regional Trial Court First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987
(which petitioners received in August 25, 1987). On September 9, 19987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.
SC finds that the RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment, and denied their motion
for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R.
No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended.
There was a one-month grace period within which this rule (rule barring extensions of time to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration) is not yet strictly enforceable but that expired on June 30, 1986.
The Petitioner’s motion to file for an extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year
after the said grace period.
Petitioners argue that the said rule should not apply to the case at bar owing to the fact that the Habaluyas
decision was not published in the Official Gazette as of the time the decision of the CA was promulgated.
Issue:
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette required before SC decisions can become binding
and effective?
Ruling:
No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
Other notes:
SC finds no grave abuse of discretion in affirming trials court’s decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse. Nor was there error in rejecting
petitioner’s argument of the doctrine of last clear chance, which only applies to vehicular accidents.
People vs., Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
Justice Bengzon (en banc)
Facts:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Central Bank Circular No. 20 states that all receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central
Bank by those authorized to deal in foreign exchange.
Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S.
money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange
Appeal is based on the claim that said Circular was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, hence, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and
subject violators to its corresponding penalties.
Ruling:
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
It was held by the Supreme Court, in its en banc decision, that the said circular, particularly its penal
provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or
after November 1951. Circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this,
on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he
was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
The Supreme Court reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio
NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.
Justice Corona
Facts:
Petitioner NPC (National Power Corporation) published a public bidding for its scrap ASCR cables, of
which one aspiring bidder is the respondent Pinatubo Commercial. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial’s
submitted a pre-qualification form for the bidding but was later informed that respondent NPC denied on
the basis of following circular 99-75. Pinatubo asked for reconsideration, but NPC denied it.
Pinatubo then filed a petition to the RTC to declare the items 3 and 3.1of the Circular 99-75
unconstitutional. RTC ruled in favor of the Respondent and declared that items 3 and 3.1of NPC Circular
99-75 as unconstitutional for being violative of substantial process, and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.
Issue:
Whether or not NPC Circular 99-75 had to be published
Ruling:
No, circular in question was of general application was merely an internal regulation/rule within the staff
of the NPC, thus it need not be published.
Supreme court granted the petition. RTC decision was reversed and set aside. Civil case for the annulment
of NPC Circular 99-75 is dismissed.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008
Followed up
directed to prioritize
directed to approve
PGMA revoked EO 464 - is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O.
464?
Garcillano vs. House of Rep., GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008
Hello Garci tapes
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies
of the resource persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech
XXX
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
XXX
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he
is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of
the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud.
The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped communication of then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never
been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is a
substantial compliance of the constitutional requirement of publication.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
D.M Consuji vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Juego
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not
to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in
Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to
have waived the other.
It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights
or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis
upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts
basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash
when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner
filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her
rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. 42
This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance,
does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a
choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be
held against her.
XXX
Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in
total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial
court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial
court’s award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether
the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court
be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Valeroso vs. People GR No. 164815, February 22, 2008
Mercado (Petitioner) v. Ongpin, G.R. 207324, September 30, 2020
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Rene Ongpin married Alma Mantaring in 1972 in Quezon City. Later, Mantaring obtained a divorce
decree in the USA. Believing that he was divorced from Mantaring, Ongpin married Elizabeth Mercado
in the USA in 1989. However, Ongpin and Mercado separated in 2000. In 2003, Ongpin obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage to Mantaring. Ongpin also filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his second marriage to Mercado on the ground that it is a bigamous marriage
based on Article 35 (4) of the Family code (instances where marriages are void from the beginning:
bigamous or polygamous marriages). Ongpin claims that he discovered that his first wife was still a
Filipino citizen when she obtained a divorce decree in the US, and as such, his marriage to her was still
valid and subsisting when he married his second wife.
On the other hand, Mercado argued that their marriage was valid under the Article 26 of the Family Code
(Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law) and not prohibited by Article 35(4). She
claims that the petition was Ongpin’s scheme to evade liability in a separate civil case she previously filed
for separation of their property.
The RTC rendered a judgement finding the marriage between Mercado and Ongpin null and void on the
ground that Ongpin was incapacitated to marry at the time he married Mercado and found Ongpin liable
for moral damages for contracting marriage despite his first marriage not yet being annulled. The CA
reversed the award of moral and exemplary damages and modified the RTC decision by deleting the
award of damages and attorney’s fees because Ongpin did not deliberately contract a second marriage
despite knowing that his first marriage subsisted, since he believed in good faith that the divorce decree
was valid and his first wife a US citizen. Petitioner Mercado brought the case to the Supreme Court. She
argues that she did not anything wrong, she had the capacity to marry and lived with Ongpin for ten years
before their separation. As such, she is entitled to moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not moral and exemplary damages may be awarded in cases of bigamy?
Ruling:
The court held yes, this Court has sanctioned the award of moral damages m cases of bigamy based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. However, in this case, the petition got denied. Ongpin’s bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, was not established. For there to be a finding of an abuse
of rights under Article 19, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) the
right is exercised or the duty is performed in bad faith; and (3) the sole intent of the exercise or
performance is to prejudice or injure another. It must be shown that the exercise of the right or
performance of the duty was done with bad faith.
Indeed, had they known that Ongpin’s first marriage to Mantaring was still in existence because it later
turned out that Mantaring was still a Filipino when the divorce decree was issued, they would not have
married each other under pain of being indicted for bigamy. So Ongpin should not be held liable for
damages as he did not act in bad faith when he married Mercado. Bad faith does not simply mean
negligence or bad judgment. It involves a state of mind dominated by ill will or motive. In fact, Mercado
knew that there existed some issue regarding Ongpin’s first marriage which might adversely affect the
validity of her marriage to him. Yet she did not institute any action to protect her civil status and appeared
complacent with the uncertainty that hovered over the validity of her marriage with Ongpin. So, there
being no entitlement to moral damages, no exemplary damages can likewise be awarded to Mercado.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Decision:
Petition for review denied, CA decision affirmed.
Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006
The possessor of a motorcycle, Quiamco, acquired the same by virtue of an amicable settlement of the
civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery that Quiamco filed against one accused, Juan Davalan et al. The
original certificate of registration was never surrendered to Quiamco because the accused never came to
see him again. It turned out that one of the accused in the robbery case had purchased the motorcycle
from Uypitching on installment basis, the payment of which was secured by a chattel mortgage in favor
of the latter. When the accused defaulted on his payment, the collectors for Uypitching were informed as
to the location of the motorcycle.
Nine years later, Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to recover the motorcycle. During the
encounter, Uypitching called Quiamco (who was not present) a thief and instructed the policemen to take
the motorcycle. Later, Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft or violation of the AntiFencing Law (PD 1612 - The crime of fencing punishes the act of buying, receiving, possessing, or
selling an item that a person knows, or should know, was derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft).
against Quiamco, which case was however dismissed.
Quiamco thus filed an action for damages against Uypitching in the RTC. He sought to hold the
petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory
remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint.
These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity. The trial
court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when
he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the
CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision. Petitioners raised their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent's
establishment in an abusive manner. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals,and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself
to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. In this case, the manner by
which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement,
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
respondent.
Decision:
Petition Denied. CA resolution affirmed. Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.
Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding including making and
sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.
On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to attend the
wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent
another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon.
But Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default. On April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events.
He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer
because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.
Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
Ruling:
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.” And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.
Decision:
In favor of plaintiff-appellant, lower court’s judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Guevarra, et al., v. Banach, G.R. No, 214016, November 24, 2021
Facts:
Petitioner Jhona Guevarra and Jan Banach met through a pastor, and the latter subsequently courted the
former until they became a couple. Both agreed to get married, with Banach giving Guevarra P500,000 to
buy a lot for their conjugal home. However, Guevarra broke up with Banach after she found out that he
was not a divorcee, as he led her to believe, but was actually still married to his third wife.
This prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and her parents before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of
Banach and awarded moral damages and attorney’s fee. On appeal, the CA issued a Decision on January
29, 2007 similarly ordering Guevarra and her parents to return the money under the principle of unjust
enrichment. However, it deleted the awards of moral damages and attorney’s fees, as it ruled that
Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did not have the purest intentions in
expressing his desire to marry Guevarra. Both parties sought reconsideration of the CA’s 2007 Decision.
On July 14, 2014, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Motions for Reconsideration. The case was
then elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Main issue being whether or not the Order to return the P500,000 is proper.
Ruling:
The Court agreed with the CA that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did
not have the purest intentions in marrying Guevarra. It noted that Banach lied about his marital status, and
even hid his true name from Guevarra. “These acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation. Finding
out hat one’s betrothed is still married to another person, and that they are not who they say they are, are
reasons enough to conclude bad faith…Since respondent himself did not act in good faith, he cannot
claim damages under the New Civil Code. The unjust enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies
if the property is acquired without legal grounds,” said the Court.
The Court explained that Banach gave the money as a gift to help Guevarra and her parents with their
possible eviction from their home. It added that the money being a gift, petitioner Guevarra is correct to
say that she cannot be compelled to return the same.
Decision:
Petition is granted, award of actual damages worth P500,00 is deleted.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Facts:
Roberto Reyes (AKA Amay Bisaya), filed an action for damages under Arts. 19 and 21 against
petitioners. He alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee
at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join
her in a birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will vouch for him.
He then carried Filart’s present (basket of fruits) to the party. However, while lining up at the buffet table,
Reyes was stopped by Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) and in a loud voice, was told to
leave the party. Filart was within hearing distance but completely ignored him when he said that he was
invited by Filart. Thereafter, he was escorted out by a Makati policeman.
Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain waiter, Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto), and Capt. Batung
regarding his presence, and requested Fruto & Batung to tell Reyes to leave. Because he still lingered, she
then approached Reyes when he went to a corner to eat and requested him to leave, but when she turned
around, Reyes began making a big scene. Filart, on the other hand, stated that she never invited Mr. Reyes
to the party and that it was Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket as he was also going to take the
elevator, but he was going to a different floor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed the same. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave for being a gate-crasher.
Issue:
WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party.
Ruling:
NO. We find more credible the lower courts findings of fact. We are dealing with a formal party in a posh,
five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager. To unnecessarily call attention
to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions
of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. In the absence of any
proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party
was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. Moreover, another problem
with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages.
Decision:
Petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is granted. Decision of the CA is reversed
and set aside. Decision of the RTC QC is hereby affirmed, no costs.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
Facts:
Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan, courted and proposed marriage to Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year old
single Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community.
Marilou accepted the marriage proposal.
Subsequently, Gashem forced her to live with him. Marilou, who was a virgin before she began living
with Gashe, became pregnant. She was later provided some medicine for abortion by Gashem.
Marilou was subjected to threats and maltreatment by Gashem, who later on repudiated their marriage
agreement, saying that he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Marilou sought damages against Gashem for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The
trial Court ruled in her favor and awarded her moral damages in the sum of P20,0000, attorney's fees in
the sum of P3,000, and litigation expenses in the sum of P2,000.
In his appeal, Gashem argued that Article 21 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because of the
following: (1) he claims to have not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; (2) he has not professed love or proposed marriage to Marilou; (3) he never maltreated her;
(4) the trial court liberally invoked Filipino customs, traditions and culture, to his prejudice; (5) his
actions were tolerable under his Muslim upbringing; and (6) the mere breach of promise to marry is not
actionable.
Issue:
Whether Marilou may recover damages from Gashem on the basis of Article 21.
Ruling:
YES. Consent to sexual intercourse obtained through a promise to marry (by a subtle scheme or deceptive
device, when he actually had no intention to marry) may justify an award of damages pursuant to Article
21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
Decision:
Finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
Facts:
Alfonso Pe, a married man, is an adopted son off Pe Becco. He was an agent of a Cigarette Factory in
Marinduque. Since Alfonso is considered collateral relative, parents of Lolita Pe, welcome the former in
their house as a constant visitor. Alfonso frequents Lolita because he wanted to teach her pray the rosary.
Lolita is 24-years old and a teacher. Due to the frequent visits of Alfredo, Lolita fell for him and agreed to
be committed in a secret relationship. The family of Lolita then filed cases against Alfredo, including
deportation proceedings but the relationship continued nonetheless. In April 1957, Lolita disappeared
from their residence in Quezon City and believed to have eloped with Alfonso. The family of Lolita then
filed charges against Alfredo based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the claims of the family of Lolita are valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in favor of Lolita Pe’s family. The defendant was sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The SC held that Alfonso’s
action to woo Lolita and later asked her to elope with him have caused injury to the latter’s family. There
was a damage done to the family as the illicit affair has tainted the reputation of the family. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Decision:
The decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778, August 1989
Facts:
Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager,
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T.
Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie
detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation.
Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie
detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office
of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry
wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.
Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and
for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful
remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and
“swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due
to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these
reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Decision:
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
Facts:
Respondent Romeo Jader sued petitioner UE for damages for the moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when he was not able
to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence.
Jader alleged that he got an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took the removals exam for said
subject but he was belatedly inform that it was a 5. The graduation ceremony invitation included his name
as one of the candidates but the invitation had a footnote that the list is tentative and still subject to the
completion of requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he marched with his parents, was given a
symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow-out attended by neighbors, friends, and relatives, took a
leave of absence without pay from work, and enrolled at a pre-bar review class.
In its answer, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led Jader to believe that he completed
the requirements for an LLB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students.
Issue:
May a university be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation?
Ruling:
Yes, it may be held liable. Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code states that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith and every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation
of an LL.B. graduate.
Hence petitioner is liable for its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. However, the
Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Jader suffered shock, trauma,
and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate. It was his duty to verify for himself whether
he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.
Decision:
CA decision is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirtyfive Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney’s fees. and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355, November 29, 1965
Facts:
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain. Upon discovery of their
daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested that the
marriage be recelebrated. However, the recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually
became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she filed a
complaint for divorce and later sought for the annulment of her marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu.
Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada and acquired American citizenship.
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and her parents whom
he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged their daughter from joining him and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church for having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents filed a counterclaim for
moral damages, denying that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts.
The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the Philippines;
Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. Divorce decree is invalid. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between
Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the civil code (Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon the citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.)
Yes. That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law. That the desertion
and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages; That an
action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part. 1M lawsuit against the Escanos is unfounded, them being found
not guilty of any improper conduct, but has wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, seriously
injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them.
Decision:
Pastor Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation. Defendant Appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; Appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of
damages and attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover costs.
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
St Louis Realty vs. CA, 133 SCRA 179 November 14, 1984
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Decision:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Decision:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Decision:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Decision:
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)
lOMoARcPSD|17068060
Downloaded by Jerimae Respicio (jerimae.respicio@gmail.com)