Summary Document
ISSSV1855 International Politics
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Abrahams, Max
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Aistrope
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Allison
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Aron
(no access to article)
Ayres
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Averre
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Avey
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Bandarage
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Bellamy
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Braumoeller
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Busby
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Dov
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Draege
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Dyke
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Floyd
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Fravel
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Gleditsch
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Hansen Lene
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Keywords
Höglund
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Howard
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Jaffe
Kagan
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Kaarbo
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Kirshner
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Khong
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Kohli
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Kuchins
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Laurens
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Mazarr
(in progress)
Mearsheimer
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Milliken
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Monaco
(in progress)
Pisarska
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Putnam
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Quek
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Robinson a
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Robinson b
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Sandler
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Schweller
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Sørli
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Tannenwald
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Valbjørn
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Walt, 1998
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Walt, 2015
(in progress)
Walter
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Wohlforth
(in progress)
46 articles in total → 4 summaries left
Abrahms, Max. "Why terrorism does not work."
Terrorist groups attack civilians to coerce their governments into making policy
concessions, but does this strategy work?
If target countries systematically resist rewarding terrorism, the international community is
armed with a powerful message to deter groups from terrorizing civilians.
The prevailing view within the field of political science, however, is that terrorism is an effective
coercive strategy.
The implications of this perspective are grim; as target countries are routinely coerced into
making important strategic and ideological concessions to terrorists, their victories will reinforce
the strategic logic for groups to attack civilians, spawning even more terrorist attacks.
This pessimistic outlook is unwarranted; there has been scant empirical research on
whether terrorism is a winning coercive strategy, that is, whether groups tend to exact policy
concessions from governments by attacking their civilian populations.
Thomas Schelling asserted more than a decade ago that terrorists frequently accomplish
“intermediate means toward political objectives . . . but with a few exceptions it is hard to see
that the attention and publicity have been of much value except as ends in themselves.”
This study corroborates that view; the twenty-eight groups of greatest significance to U.S.
counterterrorism policy have achieved their forty-two policy objectives less than 10 percent of
the time. As the political mediation literature would predict, target countries did not make
concessions when terrorist groups had maximalist objectives.
Yet even when groups expressed limited, ambiguous, or idiosyncratic policy objectives, they
failed to win concessions by primarily attacking civilian targets.
This suggests not only that terrorism is an ineffective instrument of coercion, but that its poor
success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.
Why are terrorist groups unable to coerce governments when they primarily attack
civilian targets? Terrorism miscommunicates groups’ objectives because of its
extremely high correspondence.
The responses of Russia to the September 1999 apartment bombings, the United States to the
attacks of September 11, and Israel to Palestinian terrorism in the arst intifada provide evidence
that target countries infer the objectives of terrorist groups not from their stated goals, but from
the short-term consequences of terrorist acts.
Target countries view the deaths of their citizens and the resulting turmoil as proof that the
perpetrators want to destroy their societies, their publics, or both. Countries are therefore
reluctant to make concessions when their civilians are targeted irrespective of the perpetrators’
policy demands.
Four policy implications follow for the war on terrorism.
1. First, terrorists will and it extremely difacult to transform or annihilate a country’s political
system.
2. Second, the jihadists stand to gain from restricting their violence to military targets.
Already, mounting U.S. casualties in Iraq and the absence of a post–September 11
attack on the homeland have eroded U.S. support for maintaining a military presence in
Iraq.124 Terrorist strikes on the U.S. homeland will only undermine the terrorists’
message that their purpose is to alter unpopular U.S. policies in the Muslim world. Even
sporadic attacks on American civilians—if seen as the dominant component of alQaida’s overall strategy—will undermine support for an exit strategy.
3. Third, the self-defeating policy consequences of terrorism will ultimately dissuade
potential jihadists from supporting it. Although guerrilla attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq
show no signs of abating, polling data from Muslim countries suggest that the terrorism
backlash is already under way. The Pew Research Center reported in its July 2005
Global Attitudes Project that compared with its polls conducted in 2002, “In most
majority-Muslim countries surveyed support for suicide bombings and other acts of
violence in defense of Islam has declined signiacantly,” as has “conadence in Osama bin
Laden to do the right thing in world affairs.” Similarly, major Islamist groups and leaders
are increasingly denouncing terrorist attacks as counterproductive, even as they
encourage guerrilla warfare against the Iraqi occupation.
4. Fourth, it is commonly said that terrorists cannot be deterred because they are willing to
die for their cause and that they lack a “return address” to threaten with a retaliatory
strike. But perhaps the greatest reason deterrence breaks down is because of the
widespread, albeit erroneous, belief that attacking civilians is an effective strategy for
terrorist groups to advance their policy goals. Disabusing terrorists of this notion would
go a long way toward defusing the cycles of violent reprisal.
Further research is needed in three areas.
First, why do terrorist groups target civilians if doing so is strategically ineffective?
Second, future research may demonstrate that in international relations the attribute-effect
linkage diminishes over time.
Third, correspondent inference theory may have prescriptive utility for conducting a more
strategic and humane war on terrorism.
If countries impute terrorists’ motives from the consequences of their actions, then the
communities in which terrorists thrive may impute states’ motives from the consequences of their
counterterrorism policies, reinforcing the strategic logic of minimizing collateral damage.
Correspondent inference theory can explain not only why terrorist campaigns rarely
work, but also perhaps why counterterrorism campaigns tend to breed even more
terrorism.
Aistrope, Tim, and Roland Bleiker. "Conspiracy and foreign
policy."
We argue that claims about conspiracies should be seen as narratives that are intrinsically
linked to power relations and the production of foreign policy knowledge. We illustrate the links
between conspiracies, legitimacy and power by examining multiple conspiracies associated with
9/11 and the War on Terror. Two trends are visible. On the one hand, US officials identified a
range of conspiracies and presented them as legitimate and rational, even though some, such
as the alleged covert development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, are now widely
considered false. On the other hand, conspiracies circulating in the Arab-Muslim world were
dismissed as irrational and pathological, even though some, like those concerned with the
covert operation of US power in the Middle East, were based on credible concerns.
“...we have stressed in this article that conspiracy narratives are legitimized or delegitimized
within the hierarchies of authority and modes of knowledge production present in particular
interpretive communities. We have shown that studying conspiracy narratives that emerge
around moments of crisis and controversy like 9/11 provides a unique insight into the social
production of foreign policy knowledge, which is the basis for consequential decision-making on
matters of war and peace.”
Allison
This article offers a multifaceted analysis of Russian intervention in Ukraine, but focuses on
the persuasiveness of Russian legal claims and on alternative, but overlapping, explanations of
Russian conduct.
The first part of this article assesses and deconstructs Moscow’s ‘legal rhetoric’.
For years there have been entrenched beliefs within the Russian security and foreign policy elite
that in a highly competitive and increasingly conflictual world, western political ideals and
regional structures mask strategic goals.

Russian intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine between February and September
2014, using coercion and force to take control of and destabilize the territories of a
neighbour state, is a frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order.

This is important since Russia is a major power, with a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, which aspires to shape and constrain interpretations of law and
international norms in the wider community of states as well as in its own
neighbourhood.
For more than six weeks after the Crimean occupation Putin explicitly denied that Russian
soldiers had been involved. However, in April 2014 he suddenly shifted to admit that ‘Russian
servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces’, that in Crimea ‘Russia created
conditions—with the help of special armed groups and the Armed Forces... for the expression of
the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol’.
Moscow continued to deny that regular forces were involved, but the scale of the Russian
military intervention in August and September was such that Russian denials convinced very
few states... Russia cloaked its actions in legal language, as other major states have done in the
past, with the aim of fostering a reputation as a lawful actor... It is thus very important to assess
how Russia ‘broke the rules’, for the language and claims involved go far beyond mere
diplomatic jousting.
1. Russian legal claims have been constructed to mobilize and consolidate Russian
domestic opinion around Putin’s leadership. They include justifications for the Russian
use of force and the annexation of Crimea, blanketed in partial truth and disinformation,
cast in terms which appeal to deeper sentiments and grievances in Russian society and
among Russian elites.
2. Making unfounded assertions of ‘facts’ (especially ostensible threats to Russians and
Russian-speakers).
3. Grey areas and flux in legal and normative development as well as playing back to
western states their own liberal discourse. These included:
a. the claim to be protecting Russian citizens from danger (a rationale following the
occasional practice by certain countries of carrying out rescue operations for their
own nationals without the consent of the country concerned, though this was not
at the fore of the Russian case over Crimea);
b. the claim to be intervening by invitation (relying on some earlier cases of
intervention, especially in western Africa, that depended on the consent of
deposed democratically elected governments);
c. and reference to the western focus on human protection and Kosovo’s secession
from Serbia (used by Moscow to argue the case for remedial secession).
Vote on 27 February by an unverifiable number of deputies in the seized Crimean parliament
building to hold a Crimean referendum on the issue of enlarging Crimea’s autonomy. Thereafter
a ‘declaration of independence’ was adopted by the Crimean parliament on 11 March,7 and a
referendum (offering the option of secession to Crimean residents) was conducted on 16 March.
Putin described this as an expression of the popular will of the Crimeans to secede from
Ukraine. He claimed he would ‘respect the choice of the Crimean people’.
However, article 2 (4) of the UN Charter prohibits states from engaging in not only the use of
force but any threats of such use against other states, and it was difficult to deny that Russian
conduct in Crimea fell into this category of coercive activity.
Allison proceeds to present Russia’s formal position as set out by UN Security Council meetings
and Putin:
Ayres, Alyssa. "Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power?"
The country with the world’s third-largest military by personnel strength, fifth-largest defense
budget, and seventh-largest economy isn’t a member of the UN Security Council. It isn’t
even a member of the G-7, the exclusive club of major industrialized economies. It is India, a
country long regarded as an emerging power rather than a major global player.
In fairness, for years, this assessment was not off the mark, and India’s reality did not match up
to its vaunted potential. And indeed, India still faces daunting developmental challenges. It is
home to around 270 million people living in extreme poverty. Its infrastructure is in need of
major investment—to the tune of $1.5 trillion over a decade, according to India’s finance
minister. Discrimination among India’s famously diverse population persists, whether on the
basis of gender, caste, religion, or region.
Because of these challenges, and because the country has been kept on the margins of the
global institutions central to U.S. diplomacy, India’s impressive economic power and defense
capabilities have often gone unnoticed. But that is changing. A more confident India has
already begun to shape the global agenda on climate change, clean energy, and worker
mobility. And spurred by China’s increasingly assertive regional posture, India has
ramped up its own military capacity.
Averre and Davies (2015) Russia, humanitarian intervention and
the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria
What follows are excerpts from the article made by Alex Moltzau
Most western analysis perceives Russian approaches to humanitarian intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as running counter to (largely) western-inspired international
norms.

Scholars of Russian foreign policy have offered a more thoughtful explanation of
Moscow’s approach that downplays material and ‘geopolitical’ factors and highlights
Russian concerns about domestic political legitimacy. (outlook rooted in the powerful
elite that surrounds Putin)
However this article argues that the Syria case reflects important developments in Russia’s
broader foreign policy thinking.
In this article we seek not to add to the substantial literature on the legal aspects
of intervention, but rather to investigate their place in Russian foreign policy
thinking; for evolving debates on international practice depend to a large extent
on understanding the respective positions of the major powers. (p. 814)
Russia’s normative position, aimed at strengthening its international and regional influence and
affirming its legitimacy in the changing global order, has been increasingly accompanied by
values-based narratives which fundamentally challenge western liberalism.
Ian Hurd has argued: international law should be seen as a resource that is used by states,
rather than as a fixed standard against which we can assess behaviour ... the practice of
humanitarian intervention exists in a space between legality and illegality, one where each
instance of the practice can be plausibly seen as either compliance or noncompliance with
international law.
Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) carried
out extensive consultations across the globe and drew up a report which asserted that states
have internal responsibility towards their own peoples and external responsibility
to react as members of the ‘international community’ in cases of (to use Kofi
Annan’s words) ‘gross and systematic violations of human rights.
Three key principles for military intervention for R2P purposes.
1. The ‘just cause’ threshold states that interven- tion may be warranted in the case of
large-scale loss of life arising from deliberate state action or from neglect or inability to
act (for example, in a ‘failed state’ situation), or from ethnic cleansing.
2. ‘precautionary principles’ come into play: these focus on right intention, which should be
to halt or avert human suffering; on last resort, with military force being justified only
when non-military options have been explored;
3. Finally, the principle of ‘right authority’ dealt with the process of obtaining legal authority
to act. It reaffirmed the primary authority of the UNSC and stipulated that states in favour
of intervention should formally request its authorization.
The World Summit Outcome (WSO) document, published in 2005, took up the ICISS framework
but omitted some of its key provisions. This document adopted a narrow reading, affirming the
responsibility to protect civilians from four ‘crimes’: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.11 This reading was subsequently reaffirmed in UNSC Resolutions
1674 (2006) and 63/308 (2009).
Avey, Paul C., and Michael C. Desch. "What do policymakers
want from us? Results of a survey of current and former
senior national security decision makers."
What do the most senior national security policymakers want from international relations
scholars? To answer that question, we administered a unique survey to current and former
policymakers to gauge when and how they use academic social science to inform
national security decision making.

We find that policymakers do regularly follow academic social science research and
scholarship on national security affairs, hoping to draw upon its substantive expertise.

But our results call into question the direct relevance to policymakers of the most
scientific approaches to international relations.

And they at best seriously qualify the “trickle down” theory that basic social science
research eventually influences policymakers.
To be clear, we are not arguing that policymakers never find scholarship based upon the
cutting-edge research techniques of social science useful. But policymakers often find
contemporary scholarship less-than-helpful when it employs such methods across the board, for
their own sake, and without a clear sense of how such scholarship will contribute to
policymaking.
1. In conclusion, we first highlight the main findings of the policymaker survey.
2. Next, we offer what we think are the most important policy recommendations that flow
from these findings.
3. Finally, we highlight some continuing puzzles and future research questions.
Our results clearly show that policymakers do want scholarly expertise, challenging the
scientific purists’ strict separation of science and policy.
On both sides of the theory/policy divide, the majority of voices clamor for a bridge. But they
also call into question when and how often the techniques of the modern science of international
relations are directly useful to policymakers.
Policymakers seem to prefer mid-range theories to help them make sense of the world
and their presentation in brief and jargon-free formats.
Finally, these results also speak to the question of the indirect influence of social science on
policymakers: While some basic research clearly trickles down (more accurately, percolates up)
to the policy world, it is generally not that which is based upon the most scientific approaches to
the academic study of international relations.
Indeed, our findings about the utility of social science for policymakers in many ways parallel
those of the 1960s era “Project Hindsight,” which found that little natural science basic research
actually translated into useful defense technology (see Sherwin and Isenson 1967:1571–1577).
While it will be no surprise to scholars and policymakers that the gap between the Beltway and
the Ivory Tower persists, and is probably even growing, we believe that this policymaker survey,
in conjunction with the 2011 TRIP scholar survey, has documented that this gap is both
substantive (what issues and areas matter) and also methodological (how we should study
international relations and national security issues).
The gap between the scientific aspirations of contemporary international relations
scholarship and the needs of policymakers is greatest the higher one reaches in the
policy world. More surprisingly, this gap tends to be greater the more educated the
policymaker. This is consistent with the argument that familiarity with advanced techniques
instills greater appreciation for both their promise and limits. (For a related argument, see
Eriksson 2012:746– 749.)
It is also worth reiterating that we are not advocating scholars abandon sophisticated
research methods or suggesting that these methods are never useful for policy-relevant
scholarship.
Rather, we believe that policymakers operate under some logic of appropriateness in
terms of their tolerance for sophisticated social science (especially statistics and formal
models) based upon the particular issue in question.
(added: The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules
of. appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because.
they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate.)
For example, respondents to our policymaker survey seemed amenable to the use of the latest
social science tools and techniques in certain realms (economics and public opinion surveys),
just not for their own sake.
Another conclusion we draw from this survey is that a scholar’s broader visibility—both in
government and among the public, whether through previous government service or publication
in broader venues—enhances influence among policymakers more than his or her academic
standing.
Of course, we have long known that the primary constraint policymakers face in
digesting scholarly, or any other writings, is lack of time. As one respondent put it, “any
research papers that exceed 10–15 pages” are not useful to policymakers.
Another noted that “I do not have the time to read much so cannot cite” many examples of
useful social science scholarship.
We were surprised by two other findings from our survey about how policymakers get their
information:
1. First, unclassified newspaper articles were as important to policymakers as the classified
information generated inside the government. This fact opens up an important avenue
for scholarly influence upon policy if scholars can condense and convey their findings via
this route.
2. Second, the Internet has not yet become an important source of information for
policymakers, despite its ease of accessibility and the generally succinct nature of the
presentation of its content. It could be a just a matter of time until a more web-oriented
generation reaches the pinnacle of national security decision-making authority, but we
also ought to consider whether the Internet suffers from weaknesses vis-a-vis traditional
print media that dilute its influence. The plethora of Internet news and opinion outlets,
many of questionable reliability, combined with the lack of an authoritative source among
them, may mean that the Internet will continue to lag behind the elite print media
because it exacerbates the signals to noise problem for policymakers.
3. But our most important findings concern what role policymakers think scholars
ought to play in the policy process. Most recommended that scholars serve as
“informal advisers” and as “creators of new knowledge.” There were two surprises for us
here: First, policymakers ranked the educational and training role of scholars for
future policymakers third behind these other two roles. They also confessed that
they derived relatively little of their professional skills from their formal educations. The
main contribution of scholars, in their view, was research. Second, and again somewhat
surprisingly, they expressed a preference for scholars to produce “arguments” (what
we would call theories) over the generation of specific “evidence” (what we think of
as facts). In other words, despite their jaundiced view of cutting-edge tools and rarefied
theory, the thing policymakers most want from scholars are frameworks for making
sense of the world they have to operate in.
Given these findings, we offer the following recommendations for scholars who aspire to
influence policymakers. While scholars may want to participate in policymaking, they
should do so not because of the superior contribution they can make to policymaking
directly but rather because doing so will enrich their scholarship.
Indeed, the most important roles for scholars to play are as both teachers and
researchers, but our results suggest that both areas need careful rethinking. On the
former, the findings of our survey should lead to some introspection about how we train students
for careers in government service.
We suspect that the focus on social science techniques and methods that dominates so much
graduate, and increasingly undergraduate, training in political science is not useful across the
board to policymakers.
On the other hand, a purely descriptive, fact-based approach is not what policymakers seem to
want from scholars either. Since policymakers think that the most important contributions
scholars can make is in the area of research, it is worth thinking further about exactly what that
should look like.
Three aspects of scholarship appear to be most important:
1. First, policymakers appear to want mid-range theory. Policymakers do not reject
methodologically sophisticated scholarship across the board but do seem to find
much of it not useful. They prefer that scholars generate simple and
straightforward frameworks that help them make sense of a complex world. (For
related arguments, see Silver 2012:96–97; Mearsheimer and Walt 2013.) They seem not
so much to be looking for direct policy advice as for background knowledge to help them
put particular events into a more general context. We interpret policymakers’ preference
for theories over facts to the fact that like most busy people, they are cognitive
economizers who need ways to make good decisions quickly and under great
uncertainty. Along these lines, Henry Kissinger reportedly demanded of his
subordinates: “Don’t tell me facts, tell me what they mean.”
2. Second, brevity is key for policymakers. We suspect that the reason that Op/Eds
are so influential among policymakers is only partly due to where they are
published; another important aspect of their influence is their short length. We are
by no means suggesting that scholars only write in that format, but we strongly believe
that research findings that cannot be presented in that format are unlikely to
shape policy. Therefore, our recommended model is one in which a scholar publishes
his or her findings in traditional scholar outlets such as books or journals but also writes
shorter and more accessible pieces reporting the same findings and telegraphing their
policy implications in policy journals, opinion pieces, or even on blogs.
3. Finally, a related issue is accessibility: Policymakers find much current scholarly
work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. Policymakers
don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English. The
results of this survey are by no means the last word on this large and very complex
question of what policymakers want from scholars. At least, five particular puzzles or
research challenges remain:
a. First, why is it that policymakers are relatively tolerant of complex modeling and
statistical work in economics and survey research but not in other areas of
political science and international relations? One possibility is the logic of
appropriateness argument we suggested above. But another possibility is that
policymakers in international and national security affairs operate under a
misconception about how influential some of those tools— particularly in
economics—really are in policymaking (Krugman 1994: chapter 1).
b. Second, why do scholars continue to do business in a way that they know is not
useful to policymakers despite their clear desire to influence policy? While the
“new scholasticism,” “the cult of the irrelevant,” and the “flight from reality” away
from policy relevance among many scholars are well documented, we lack a
comprehensive explanation for this phenomenon (Shapiro 2005; Mead
2010:453–464; Menand 2010; Van Evera 2010:4–9).
c. Third, more work clearly needs to be done exploring why undergraduate and
graduate training seem not to be contributing as much as they could to the
preparation of aspiring policymakers.
d. Fourth, since it is possible that lower-ranking analysts and policy-support officials
may be more amenable to work based upon the most sophisticated social
science approaches and tools, it would be worthwhile to survey them as well to
get a complete sense of the various indirect routes by which social science
can influence policymaking.
e. Finally, it could be that the relative unimportance of the Internet to current
policymakers is just an artifact of the high average age of our sample and
the relative newness of the technology. But there may be elements of the
Internet information architecture that make policymakers shy away from it that
need to be considered. In sum, we hope that these results will be of use to
scholars who are interested in contributing to security policymaking by helping
them better understand when and how academic social science is of use to
policymakers and suggesting pathways for them to make their work useful to
national security policymakers.
Bandarage, Asoka. “The‘Norwegian Model: Political Economy of
NGO Peacemaking.”
Abstract
Norway is a leading donor of international development assistance. Since the 1993 Oslo
Peace Accords, Norway has also emerged as the pre-eminent global peacemaker.1 The
breadth and depth of Norwegian development, humanitarian assis tance, and
peacemaking have significant global political economic as well as cultural implications.
Almost all the analyses and evaluations of Norwegian international involvement come from
internal Norwegian sources or those funded by them. On the other hand, there are critiques
which present Norway as an agent of the West "recolonizing" the global south to advance
economic liberalization and the dismemberment of states, but these lack sufficient empirical
investigation. Independent, field-based research on Norwegian economic assistance and global
peacemaking is clearly needed.
While this paper is unable to fill that large vacuum in the literature, it seeks to delineate the
structure and operation of the idealized "Norwegian Model" of peacemaking and its core feature,
the close partnership between the Norwegian state and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). The paper also presents critiques of Norwegian peacemaking from the global
South as well as a discussion of Norway s expanding economic and military interests. The
objective is to help broaden the discourse on the '"Norwegian Model" making it more
transparent and accountable.
Conclusion
In a world where poverty, conflict, and violence are rampant, the value of Nor wegian economic
and humanitarian assistance must be appreciated, not belittled. And Norwegian intervention in
peacemaking should not be dismissed simply as a new form of colonialism.
Nevertheless, the potential contradictions of Norwegian international involvement in conflict
resolution and neoliberal globalization must be addressed. While some of the charges coming
from the global South may be unjust and sensational, there is no doubt that international
political and economic inter vention including NGO involvement has the power to do good as
well as harm. Norwegian Foreign Minister Store's statement that, "Norway has certain interests,
for example in the energy sector, but these must not be mixed up with our political engagement
in conflict resolution," needs to be questioned in light of the increasing convergence of global
political and economic interests and the cooptation of local movements by externally funded
NGOs.
Empirical and objective studies on NGOs and Norwegian peacemaking are needed, but they
are difficult to undertake given the paucity of funding and other challenges facing scholars and
activists with alternative perspectives. Unlike the state and private sectors, there are no
international legal and ethical frameworks to hold the expanding "civil society sector"
accountable.
But, the so-called "non-state" actors and the "third sector" often have close ties to both
the state and business sectors. Broadening the discourse on NGOs, peacemaking, and
globalization to incorporate these concerns is a necessary step towards sustainable peace and
global justice.
Bellamy (2011)
This article is about Libya and the right to protect
Bellamy claims that Libya is the exception rather than the rule in three senses:
1. The threat of mass atrocities. Not since Rwanda has a regime so clearly signalled its
intent to commit crimes against humanity.
2. The time frame was extremely short. None of the world’s risk assessment frameworks
viewed the country as posing a threat to mass atrocities. Neither was a conflict
anticipated.
3. The role played by the regional organizations.
Braumoeller, Bear, Is War Disappearing?
Abstract
There is a large and growing belief, based on a handful of recent scholarly works, that the
propensity of states to use force against one another is on the decline. I take issue with two
lines of argument that support this conclusion. The first is the claim that, whereas the two World
Wars were statistical anomalies, the “Long Peace” that followed is a meaningful trend: I show
that both are very plausibly the result of the same stochastic process. The second is the claim
that there is less war now than there was in the recent past: I examine what is meant by war,
control for two confounding influences that resulted from the proliferation of states in the 20th
century, and show that, taking those considerations into account, no such trend is evident.
Keywords: war, international security, statistics, APSA Chicago 2013 Meeting
Conclusion
In this paper, I set out to explore the claim that there has been an overall decline in the
propensity of states to use violence against one another in international relations. I’ve argued
that per-capita deaths from war is a misleading and irrelevant statistic to use in answering this
question, because it has no foundation in a coherent account of how wars actually happen. I
argue instead that we should be examining uses of force that have the potential to become
wars, because such actions are indicative of a willingness to use considerable violence even if
that willingness is not realized. An initial glance at uses of force per year suggested that the
propensity to use force is going up rather than down. This trend is plausibly an artifact of the
division of the world into a larger number of political units with a larger number of conëict
opportunities. At the same time, those units are on average smaller, weaker, and more distant. I
therefore examine a new metric—uses of force per relevant dyad— that controls for both trends
simultaneously. The results bear little resemblance to a decline in violence over time. A more
reasonable characterization might be a semi-random oscillation, with more and less conëictual
periods alternating across irregular periods. A pattern of that nature offers little basis to
conclude that war is on the decline—or indeed, to conclude much of anything at all about its
likely future direction.
Busby, Josh (2015). 4 Things the US Can Do to Reinforce
China’s Actions on Climate Change.
China recently reaffirmed its pledge to peak emissions around 2030 and to increase non-fossil
energy to 20% by the same year. China also announced a new target to reduce CO2 emissions
per unit of GDP (its carbon intensity) by 60 to 65 percent below 2005 levels. How can the US
ensure that China sustains and even accelerates progress in this direction?
Our starting premise is that air pollution is a more salient issue in China than climate change
and that the country is likely to take more heroic and costly measures to reduce the threat of air
pollution for Chinese citizens than they are to contribute to the global public good of climate
change mitigation. From this perspective, much of the discussion of using climate change to
produce co-benefits for air pollution is misplaced. We need to ensure that air pollution policies
create co-benefits for the climate. As we note, some actions, reducing the use of coal, will be
beneficial for both air pollution and climate goals. Other policies, such as producing synthetic
gas from coal or relocating coal plants to the interior, might produce benefits for air pollution but
make the climate problem worse.
The US has limited leverage over this domestic dynamic in China, but we identify 4 strategies
the US can engage in to make it more likely that China will choose policies that produce cobenefits for climate change.
These include:
1. The US keeping its own climate commitments
2. Fostering transparency through research partnerships
3. Pursuing complementary processes to the UNFCCC
4. Considering border tax adjustments.
The first point is that (1) China wants to avoid being perceived as a climate scofflaw. China will
still have strong domestic incentives – energy security, air pollution, economic rebalancing – to
continue its current trajectory of policies that reduce its carbon footprint, but some of these
objectives could be achieved by policies that make the climate problem worse.
Second point (2) The climate regime has evolved to one what analysts used to call “pledge and
review” where countries make pledges of what they are prepared to do and other countries then
subject them to international scrutiny. China and the United States, have made their pledges,
so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).
The third point (3) While the US should get as much as it can through the UNFCCC process,
there may be other attractive opportunities to make progress on climate change with China. The
U.S. has already seized the initiative on this through the potentially historic bilateral agreement
that was reached last fall on the cusp of the APEC meeting. Here, we identified two other
possible processes that might be worth pursuing.
The fourth point (4) We close with a more controversial argument that the U.S. should consider
implementing border tax adjustments which would require some national effort to put a price on
carbon.
Dov H. Levin; When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of
Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results (2016)
What are the electoral consequences of attempts by great powers to intervene in a partisan
manner in another country’s elections? Great powers frequently deploy partisan electoral
interventions as a major foreign policy tool. For example, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have
intervened in one of every nine competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and
2000.
However, scant scholarly research has been conducted about their effects on the election
results in the target. I argue that such interventions usually significantly increase the electoral
chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert
interventions. I then test these hypotheses utilizing a new, original dataset of all U.S. and
USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000. I find strong support for
both arguments.
Conclusion and discussion
Vojislav Kostunica’s campaign team had good reason to see the foreign support as critical to
their victory. My findings demonstrate that, overall, partisan electoral interventions seem to
substantively benefit the aided candidate or party. Furthermore, overt interventions prove to be
significantly more effective than covert interventions in swaying elections. Of course, given the
average effect that I find (about a 3 percent change in vote share), electoral interventions will
not always assure victory for the great powers’ preferred candidates.
However, such interventions often do swing elections. The evidence presented in this article
suggests that in the foreseeable future, partisan electoral interventions will continue to be an
effective way for great powers to determine the leadership of other states, regardless of whether
their targets are governed by “competitive authoritarian,” partially democratic, or fully democratic
regimes.
These results also provide further—and cross-national— support for the finding of Corstange
and Marinov (2012, 664–669) that no popular backlash effect existed in their survey experiment
of overt intervention. Future research should focus on other effects of electoral interventions.
Partisan electoral interventions affect a key democratic institution—the national level elections
and the process by which the executive is peacefully replaced or retained. As a result, such
interventions may have major effects on the target. For example, one important direction for
future research in this regard would be to investigate whether electoral interventions have
ramifications for the level of democracy in the target over the medium and long term.
Another important direction for future research would be the possible effect of electoral
interventions on the target’s domestic stability. Research on this question could investigate, for
example, whether such interventions may inadvertently encourage various kinds of extraparliamentary opposition (such as mass protests, general strikes, riots, and terrorism) by the
frustrated losing side. This study shows that even when foreign powers do not use force
(whether overtly or covertly) toward a democracy, they can still exert a major influence over the
nature of its leadership, and they are frequently willing and able to use this option. Indeed, in a
world in which military interventions are increasingly costly and democracies are more common,
partisan electoral interventions are likely to become an ever more central tool of the great
powers’ foreign policy.
For example, had the Arab Spring led to a new, more enduring crop of democratic and
democratizing regimes (in addition to Tunisia) in the Middle East, it is quite likely that some of
these countries would have become targets of partisan electoral interventions in order to
prevent “undesirable” parties or leaders from winning power. Indeed, carrying out electoral
interventions for this purpose was an option openly advocated during the initial aftermath of the
Arab Spring by some segments of the US foreign policy community.53 Furthermore, given the
fact that many of China’s and India’s neighbors and potential peer competitors are full or partial
democracies, a future attempt by either power to rise to regional or global prominence may not
necessarily lead to warfare as some theorists predict (compare Mearsheimer 2001, 396–402).
Instead, either power may choose initially to invest its efforts in replacing foreign leaders
strongly hostile to their geopolitical ambitions with “friendlier” ones through a partisan electoral
intervention, thus preempting much of the resistance to their rise. Ballots thus may well supplant
bullets in the twenty-first century but in a way quite different than usually conceived.
Draege, Jonas Bergan. "The formation of Syrian opposition
coalitions as two-level games." (2016)
This article investigates coalition patterns between two main factions of the Syrian opposition
before and after the 2011 uprising. The two factions united over common platforms on several
occasions following the 2000 Damascus Spring, but failed to do so in 2011 despite repeated
domestic and international pressure. Drawing upon two-level game theory to explain this
change, this article argues that increased interest from both domestic and international
audiences after 2011 made the two factions less flexible in negotiating a unified platform. Thus,
paradoxically, it was increased pressure for unification that deterred the opposition factions from
unifying.
Dyke, James. Don’t wait for global politics to fix climate change –
we can do it ourselves. The Conversation. (2015)
Full article: https://theconversation.com/dont-wait-for-global-politics-to-fix-climate-change-wecan-do-it-ourselves-50687
Why has it proved so difficult to agree to limit carbon emissions?
One reason stems from the fact the Earth’s atmosphere is a public good, just like street lighting,
schools or public parks. A public good is non-rivalrous in that my use of it does not reduce your
or anyone else’s access to it. A stable climate is a global public good as it is something all of
humanity enjoys. We all, to a greater or lesser extent, affect it too. It makes no difference if
carbon dioxide is released in Beijing, Birmingham or Baltimore.
If the atmosphere is a global public good then, in the absence of enforcement via international
law to limit carbon emissions, you may conclude we are doomed. There is nothing to stop
someone from emitting more than their fair share – this is the free rider problem.
Can we avoid climate tragedy?
In 2009, US political scientist Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for
her work on the management of public goods and common-pool resources. What Ostrom
established is that, contrary to certain grim predictions, there are numerous examples of
effectively managed public goods: Nepalese forests, American lobster fisheries, community
irrigation schemes in Spain and many other systems are looked after sustainably through
following a combination of eight principles.
Climate change is as much a moral issue as a scientific one. Taking more than your fair share is
wrong. Changing the climate which leads to people being harmed is wrong.
Any effective agreement that emerges from Paris will not have come out of a vacuum, but as a
consequence of many individuals’ and communities’ agitation for change – some locally, some
through the internet.
If we are going to address climate change, then recognising our shared values and interests is
crucial. Humans are fundamentally a social species. We’ve only very recently appreciated that
we are also a planet-altering species. Our moral senses know intuitively what we need to do in
the light of such knowledge. Our economic and political institutions need to catch up rapidly.
Floyd, Rita. "Parallels with the hate speech debate: the pros and
cons of criminalising harmful securitising requests."
Abstract
This article argues that public expressions of Islamophobia are best understood as securitising
requests (that is, calls on powerful figures/bodies to treat an issue in security mode so that
extraordinary measures can be used to combat it), especially in those cases where Muslims are
feared and disliked because of the perception that Islamic people are prone to terrorism. This
article argues that harmful and derogatory securitising requests targeting racial, ethnic, or
religious minorities are on par with hate speech and it highlights the fact that many
contemporary societies are now seeking legal protections against such security speech
(expressed most notably in the desire to ban Islamophobia). It is from this perspective that this
article poses an important research question: With a view to protecting those adversely affected,
are legal protections against harmful and offensive securitising requests justified? The research
question can be answered by drawing parallels to the existing hate speech debate in legal and
political theory. The research reveals that, although the case against legal protections of harmful
and defamatory security speech is ultimately more convincing, security speech alone can be so
damaging that it should be informed by a number of ethical considerations. This article goes on
to suggest three criteria for governing the ethics of requesting securitisation. As such this article
fills a lacuna in the ‘positive/negative debate’ on the ethics of security that has engaged with
securitisation, but that has failed to consider the ethics of speaking security.
Conclusion
In contemporary Europe and elsewhere there is a discernible trend towards either tightening
existing hate speech legislation or introducing new legislation in order to curtail the
defamation of migrants and refugees as security threats and/or terrorists.
For the time being, this is most clearly expressed by an increased willingness to ban
Islamophobia. In the context of these developments, this article has critically engaged with the
justifiability of criminalising requests to securitise that are harmful or derogatory to racial, ethnic,
or religious minorities in order to protect those adversely affected. It has done so by drawing
parallels to the existing hate speech debate in legal and political theory.
As part of the analysis offered, this article developed the novel analytical concept securitising
requests, which captures security speech uttered not by securitising actors intent on
securitisation, but rather security speech expressed by (ordinary) people intent on
persuading powerful actors to securitise.
It was argued that even securitising requests that do not use overtly offensive language, but
simply single out racial, ethnic, or religious minorities as security threats are tantamount to
expressions of hate speech because the link to security due to who these groups are is in and
of itself degrading. It was further argued that the recognition of securitising requests as
expressions of hate speech reveals the important insight that harmful speech is based not only
on hate, but also on fear. Conceived as such – from the point of view of security – the case
against protections is more convincing. In part because one positive of liberal democracies is
that citizens are allowed to express their security fears, including of government policy.
The analysis further revealed that, although criminalising harmful and offensive securitising
speech can lead to an increase in security for affected groups and that it can pre-empt violent
counter-securitisation, punitive measures are a disproportionate response because even
offensive and derogatory security speech causes only indirect harm (that is, they leave
members of minorities feel insecure, or they offend members of religious, etc. groups). This is in
line with the rationale behind many state’s longstanding hate speech legislation which seeks to
prevent primarily the consequences of hate speech (that is, hate crime, terrorism), and which
recognises the adverse consequences for democratic process if offensive speech is
criminalised.
On the basis of these arguments this article concluded that laws banning public expressions
of Islamophobia – at least in those cases where Muslims are feared and disliked because
of the perception that Islamic people are prone to terrorism, as well as similar
securitising requests – are not justified.
Far from negating the significance of indirect harm, however, this article went on to suggest that
all persons ought to request security ethically. This article then outlined where the focus should
be: when to request security and how to do so. In so doing, this article filled a lacuna in the
research on ethics and securitisation, which has hitherto failed to engage with the ethics of
speaking security.
Fravel, M. Taylor. "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining
China's Changes in Military Strategy."
Abstract
Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies, known as “strategic guidelines.”
The strategies adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993 represent major changes in China's military
strategy, or efforts by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to wage war in a new way. Shifts in
the conduct of warfare in the international system offer one explanation for why China, a
developing country for most of this period, pursued major change in its military strategy. Such
shifts in the conduct of warfare should be especially powerful if a gap exists between a state's
current strategy and the requirements of future warfare. The PLA has only been able to change
strategy, however, when the Chinese Communist Party leadership is united and agrees on
basic policies and the structure of authority. When the party is united, it delegates substantial
responsibility for military affairs to the PLA leadership, which changes or adjusts military
strategy in response to changes in China's security environment.
Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies
Conclusion
Significant shifts in the conduct of warfare in the international system best explain when China
has pursued major changes in its military strategy. Yet China has been able to respond to these
shifts and change its strategy only when the party is united and delegates substantial
responsibility for military affairs to senior PLA officers. China pursued major changes in its
military strategy in 1956 in response to lessons it observed from World War II, along with its own
experience in Korea, during a period of unprecedented unity. China pursued major change in
1980, as lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War shaped how the PLA assessed the Soviet
threat, but it did so only after Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his authority as China's
paramount leader in a power struggle with Hua Guofeng after Mao's death. In 1993, China
pursued a major change in military strategy in response to the shift in the conduct in warfare
highlighted by the Gulf War, but only once divisions among the elite over reform after
Tiananmen were removed. In one case, 1964, the top party leader, Mao Zedong, intervened in
China's military affairs to push for a new strategy, but the purpose was to justify a dramatic
reversal in economic policy and attack political opponents he viewed as revisionist.
The conditions under which China has pursued major change in its military strategy may help
illuminate when and why future changes are likely to occur. Overall, China will continue to
monitor closely other wars that occur in the international system, especially those involving U.S.
forces. China will focus on the United States and its allies not just because of the potential for
greater competition with the former in the Western Pacific, but also because the United States
possesses the most advanced military power in the world, whose operations could signal a shift
in the conduct of warfare. At the time same, China's rising power suggests that China may
pursue minor changes in its strategy as its interests expand. But for the short to medium term,
the main issues over which China would use force remain unresolved sovereignty and territorial
disputes within East Asia, such as over Taiwan and the South China Sea. As a result, China's
military strategy is likely to emphasize how to prevail in such conflicts, especially over Taiwan.
Finally, China's ability to pursue either major or minor changes in strategy will depend on
continued unity within the leadership of the CCP over basic policies and the structure of
authority. Although periods of disunity within the party may be hard to predict, one important
consequence is that they can prevent the adoption of a new military strategy.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. "Transnational dimensions of civil
war." Journal of Peace Research (2007)
KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH Department of Government, University of Essex & Centre for
the Study of Civil War, PRIO
Abstract
Existing research has related civil war primarily to country-specific factors or processes that take
place within individual states experiencing conflict. Many contemporary civil wars, however,
display a transnational character, where actors, resources, and events span national
boundaries. This article challenges the ‘closed polity’ approach to the study of civil war, where
individual states are treated as independent entities, and posits that transnational factors and
linkages between states can exert strong influences on the risk of violent civil conflict. Previous
research has shown that conflicts in a state’s regional context can increase the risk of conflict,
but the research has not distinguished between different varieties of transnational linkages that
may underlie geographic contagion, and it has failed to consider the potential influences of
domestic attributes. The article develops and evaluates a series of hypotheses on how
transnational factors can influence the risk of conflict and the prospects for maintaining peace in
a conditional autologistic model, including country-specific factors often associated with civil
wars. The results suggest that transnational linkages between states and regional factors
strongly influence the risk of civil conflict. This, in turn, implies that the risk of civil war is not
determined just by a country’s internal or domestic characteristics, but differs fundamentally,
depending on a country’s linkages to other states.
Discussion and Conclusions
Most research on civil wars focuses exclusively on attributes of states and treats states as
independent of one another. I have shown that some hypothesized transnational linkages
appear to make civil wars more likely, and the risk of conflict varies, depending on the
interactions and processes that cross national boundaries in ways that cannot be fully
accounted for by attributes or processes within individual states. Understanding the dynamics of
civil wars and the prospects for their resolution requires that we consider potential contributing
factors both within states and in transnational relations and interactions across state
boundaries. Civil wars that display clear transnational dimensions, such as the Albanian revolt in
Macedonia, may have as much to do with events outside the boundaries of the country in
question as the behavior of national governments. If we accept Blainey’s (1988) argument that
the reasons why wars start must be related to why wars eventually end, then looking to the role
of transnational factors for onset can suggest how international strategies may help contain
internal conflicts. The international community can alter the prospects for conflict by regulating
access to transnational support, mobilization, and the availability of arms. Just as transnational
factors influenced the onset of a minor armed violent conflict in Macedonia, the actions of
international third parties also helped prevent the conflict from escalating to a major war. The
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE) and NATO helped Macedonia
close the border with Kosovo and supported the government’s relatively measured military
response against the Albanian insurgents occupying cities in the border area.
The behavior of the international community also helped the Macedonian government resist
demands from Slav militants for more forceful actions against Albanians. Another critical
international factor was the Albanian government’s refusal to endorse the NLA, despite
widespread support for the organization from many ethnic Albanians. As such, international
factors appear to have helped promote and sustain the Ohrid peace agreement between the
rebels and the government. Numerous extensions can help improve on the present analysis and
clarify further the transnational dimensions of civil war. One limitation of the present analysis is
the exclusive use of national-level data, and there are clear benefits from trying to disaggregate
the study of civil war. Just as wars may not be confined within the boundaries of a state, they
rarely engulf the entire territory of a state.
Whereas the conflict in Chechnya, for example, displays clear transnational linkages and entails
significant risks of contagion for other states in the Caucasus, neighbors of Russia far from the
Caucasus, such as Finland and Norway, have few links to actors in the conflict and little
exposure to spillovers. Future research can benefit from improved data incorporating
geographical information for the incidents in the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data (see Buhaug &
Gates, 2002). Just as the dependent variable (conflict) is not well represented by the entire
territory of states, there is an increasing recognition that existing research on civil war has
tended to use rather crude national-level proxies for features and processes that often vary
considerably within states and ignore the actors in civil war.
There is an emerging wave of research considering disaggregated conflict data on the
subnational level on explanatory factors such as terrain, resources, and population (e.g. Buhaug
& Rød, 2006), and future research on the transnational dimensions of conflict can be enhanced
by gathering additional data on the transnational linkages of actors that might increase or
decrease prospects for peace at the group level. For example, transnational linkages may be
particularly relevant in cases where disadvantaged ethnic groups are already mobilized in
another country and can count on the support of ruling ethnic kin in other states or mobilize
among refugees in neighboring states. However, new theoretical extensions and data-gathering
on the specific constellations of transnational ethnic groups and third-party support that can
increase the risks of conflict require an initial foundation to build on. This article clearly suggest
that transnational factors exert important influences on the risk of civil war onset and provides a
stepping stone for future research of this kind.
Hansen Lene (2011), The politics of securitization and the
Muhammad cartoon crisis: A post-structuralist perspective
This article draws attention to and strengthens the post-structuralist elements in the writings of
Buzan and Wæver, as this part of the theory has received less attention than those attributable
to Schmitt and Austin. Starting from securitization theory as developed by Buzan and Wæver
and engaging with later expansions of the theory, I suggest a post-structuralist framework built
around three questions:
1. Through which discursive structures are cases and phenomena represented and
incorporated into a larger discursive field?
2. What is the epistemic terrain through which phenomena are known?
3. And, what are the substantial modalities that define what kind of an issue a security
problem is?
Hansen opted for a more genealogical approach, starting with how recent securitization
theorists have analysed the impact of post-structuralist philosophy on Buzan and Wæver’s
canonical writings.
Her critique claimed that while Balzacq and Stritzel set out to rescue securitization theory from
its alleged internalist reliance on an idealized notion of language and its ‘vague and
undertheorized terminology’ (Stritzel, 2007:358), Buzan and Wæver are less in need of rescue
than Balzacq and Stritzel suggest.
Both theorists offer, in turn, revisions that break with Buzan and Wæver’s discursive, poststructuralist assumptions.10 Whether one wants to go down the route indicated by Balzacq and
Stritzel or to take the more post-structuralist approach that I then laid out in the second part of
the article is up to each securitization scholar to decide.
The three conceptual elaborations of securitization theory facilitated an analysis of the cartoon
crisis that emphasized points that previous studies have either downplayed or overlooked:
1. The implications of the structural incorporation of ‘the crisis’ within the
macrosecuritization of ‘the clash of civilizations’ for the subjects that were constituted;
2. The way in which debates over interpretation and epistemic certainty were part of ‘the
crisis’
3. The extent to which the crisis was one over political logics and referent objects.
The three conceptual elaborations constitute one possible expansion of more general poststructuralist ideas.
I think it thus quite likely that other post-structuralist attempts at deepening securitization might
follow, in a similar way to that in which the engagement with Searle and Austin has produced a
distinct body of second-generation securitization theories.
Höglund, Kristine, and Isak Svensson. "Mediating between tigers
and lions: Norwegian peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka's civil war."
Contemporary South Asia 17.2 (2009)
Abstract
Sri Lanka has suffered from one of Asia’s most intractable civil wars, and is remarkably resistant
to resolution. The peace process was initiated with a ceasefire between the separatist Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan Government in 2002. This article explores the
implications of the Norwegian mediation on this process. We argue that Norway’s aspiration to
promote an image of being a global peacemaker and the consent from regional and global
powers are important in explaining why Norway became involved. Moreover, the Norwegian
mediation approach – based on impartiality, owner- ship by the two main parties, and
internationalization – has had consequences for how the process has unfolded. For instance, it
influenced the potential leverage of Norway and conceptions about bias. This article contributes
to an understanding of how regional and global processes, as well as mediator characteristics
and approaches, influence the dynamics of civil war termination.
Keywords:
Sri Lanka; Norway; mediation; civil war; conflict resolution
Conclusion
The civil war in Sri Lanka has shown itself remarkably resistant to resolution. The return to the
battlefield after six years of, first, an actual and, then, a nominal ceasefire between the
government and the LTTE marked an endpoint to the peace process. To give a definitive
assessment of the success or failure of the Norwegian intervention is much too early at this
stage. The ceasefire agreement, by implementing a lull in the fighting, saved a substantial
number of lives. Also, during the period it was respected, it significantly and positively affected
the living conditions for all civilians on the island. Moreover, the efforts by the Norwegian
mediators could very well have laid the ground for future dialogue and solutions. Yet, the thirdparty intervention was also a failure. Our analysis identifies some points that need to be taken
into account in the debate on this issue. A number of factors have driven the Norwegian
engagement in Sri Lanka.
These can be found at three different levels: the readiness of the mediator; the acceptance of
the primary parties; and the consent of the regional and global powers. As argued above, the
ambition of Norway to function as a peacemaker in the international system was one of the
driving forces behind its willingness to act as a mediator in this conflict. The acceptance of the
parties has to do with access, international recognition, and impartiality. India’s and the United
States’ consent to accept. Norwegian peacemaking is found in an interest to keep other, more
influential actors with more direct interests outside Sri Lanka. The Norwegian mediation
revealed a weakness of the ownership approach to the process. Even if the approach is
appealing in theory, it carries difficulties in practice. It puts the responsibility of the process
entirely on the antagonists, who can face problems in seeing beyond escalatory dynamics. At
the same time, the primacy of ownership is a reflection of a situation on the ground, where the
two major armed parties, the government and the LTTE had the veto-power over the design of
the process, which a mediator without authority, such as Norway, has really little
influence over.
The Norwegian approach to mediation was also built on impartiality. However, it was difficult to
uphold the image of impartiality in the asymmetrical setting of the Sri Lankan conflict. The
complexity created by the fact that Norway played multiple roles – taking a lead role in the
monitoring mission, while at the same time facilitating the peace talks – also factored into the
perceptions of bias. We have suggested that the regional and global power-dynamics created
the particular context that made Norwegian mediation possible, but also undermined the
possibility of success. The international community, by failing to convince the parties with the
carrots of aid and financial support, or the sticks involving terrorist listing, was not effective in
pushing or pulling the parties towards peace.
Yet, it is important that actors like Norway exist in the international context and can function as
channels of communication with non-state actors, who continue to be part of the international
system. With the international war on terror, there are fewer mediators that are available to play
this peacemaking role. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the Sri Lankan
conflict has shown itself remarkably resistant to conflict resolution efforts, including international
mediation.
Ultimately, mediation and negotiation proved to be important, but insufficient, instruments for
dealing with the state-formation conflict in Sri Lanka. Although they were fruitful in getting the
process initiated, mediation and negotiation failed to address the basic underlying question of
different forms of nationalism competing for state power. Moreover, the peace mediation in Sri
Lanka did not succeed in addressing obstacles for a peaceful solution, and in some aspects
added to the intractability of the conflict. In this respect, mediation is a risky endeavor.
Howard, Lise Morjé, and Alexandra Stark. "How Civil Wars End:
The International System, Norms, and the Role of External
Actors." International Security 42.3 (2018)
Abstract
Historically, civil wars ended in one-sided victory. With the end of the Cold War, however, the
very nature of how civil wars end shifted: wars became two times more likely to terminate in
negotiated settlement than in victory. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
proportion of victories has increased, especially for civil wars that include a terrorist group; wars
are also ending less frequently. Why would civil war termination vary by time period? The
literature on civil wars looks to three basic types of causes: domesticstructural factors,
bargaining dynamics, and types of international intervention. Current explanations cannot
account for why civil wars would end differently in different time periods because, as Kenneth
Waltz might say, they are “reductionist” in nature. Material and ideational factors constitute the
international political environment, which varies in different time periods. This environment
drives outside actors' normative strategies of viewing victory, negotiation, or stabilization as the
appropriate solution to civil war. These norms, in turn, directly affect how civil wars end. A novel,
three-part methodological approach using quantitative analysis, case studies, and original
content analysis demonstrates that civil wars tend to end the way external actors think they
ought to end.
Conclusion
During the Cold War, civil wars most often ended in military victory for one side. After the Cold
War, they ended mainly in negotiated settlement. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, wars that do not involve terrorists still generally end in negotiation or low activity, whereas
those with terrorist groups tend to end in one-sided victory; civil wars are also ending less often
in general. Most civil war terminations involve external intervention, but the literature on civil
wars has not offered a theory of why international actors would intervene differently in different
time periods.
For decades after World War II, the United States and its allies sought military victory for one
preferred side in civil wars. After the Cold War, however, the material condition of unipolarity
enabled the United States to seek to end civil wars as it chose. The United States decided,
along with its allies, to end wars not in victory, but rather in negotiation, often using mediation as
a tool to achieve settlements. There is nothing from the fact of material unipolarity that would
necessitate such a choice, but the democratic character of the unipole compelled a shift toward
negotiation. After the Cold War, the overarching international political environment was
characterized by the United States' and its allies' quest for democratization. In this new
environment, a norm of negotiated settlement arose, which in turn produced the material and
social outcomes of negotiated settlements.
After the September 11 attacks, the international political environment changed again. The new
threat of terrorism, along with the failures of democratization in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere, spurred disillusionment with the quest for externally assisted democracy. As the
2000s progressed, many countries experienced democratic backsliding, and many
democratization movements faltered. In place of the quest for democracy after war, stabilization
has become the overarching normative impulse and policy goal.
The norm trajectories we trace are different from most theoretical accounts of normative
change. Usually, “norm entrepreneurs” set out to change “bads” such as apartheid, slavery, or
the use of weapons of mass destruction. Activists convince powerful people and states to
change policies. Thus notions of appropriateness create changes in outcomes. This standard
causal chain fits to a certain extent with the processes of norm change after the Cold War,
except rather than individual norm entrepreneurs, it was the great powers, led by the democratic
unipole, that decided to change their methods for ending civil wars. In contrast, the normative
shifts in the post–September 11 time period do not stem from the actions of one or a few
powerful states, individuals, or social movements. They are more reactive than proactive. From
the material facts of terrorist attacks, failures of democratization, and civil wars already ending in
low activity, we see normative trends in the United States and the UN Security Council of the
acceptance of the appropriateness of non-negotiation with terrorists, and the quest not for
democracy but stabilization.
Thus our argument is basically structural: actors are bound in large part by the international
political environment in which they operate. That does not mean, however, that innovation and
agency are impossible. Structures are hard to change, but norms are easier. When it comes to
policy recommendations, much of the scholarly literature on war termination advocates a certain
type of ending to achieve lasting peace: partition, negotiated settlement, or rebel victory. Our
article makes explicit the implicit assumption in these arguments that external actors have the
power to influence how civil wars end. External actors, however, are under the influence of the
prevailing international political environment. By highlighting the character and pressures of this
environment in different time periods, and the role of accompanying conflict resolution norms, it
may be easier for actors to come to novel policy decisions that buck the prevailing trend.
Sometimes, better outcomes may result when outsiders do not push for a negotiated settlement,
but rather allow one side to win. Other times, it may be necessary to negotiate with terrorists in
order to conclude a devastating civil war, despite the pressures of the international political
environment. Regardless, having a better understanding of how and why civil wars conclude
could give policymakers some tools to help end such wars and eliminate their attendant
economic and humanitarian costs.
Jaffe, Amy Myers. "Green Giant." Foreign Affairs. March/April
2018
(in progress)
Kagan, Robert (2012). “Not fade away”. New Republic, January
11
Editor’s Note: In his State of the Union address on January 24, President Barack Obama
argued, “Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned,
doesn’t know what they’re talking about.” According to a Foreign Policy report, the president
was influenced by the following article, which originally appeared in The New Republic. Robert
Kagan’s views on America’s role in the world are expanded upon in a new book, The World
America Made.
Is the United States in decline, as so many seem to believe these days? Or are Americans in
danger of committing pre-emptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own
declining power? A great deal depends on the answer to these questions. The present world
order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global
prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among
great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by
American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power
declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order,
reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse,
as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held
by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal
international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has
argued, is a pleasant illusion. American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for
everyone.
....
In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to
come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various
competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do
so again.
But there is a danger. It is that in the meantime, while the nation continues to struggle,
Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States
can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many
Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material
burdens that have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to
return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States was rich, powerful, and not
responsible for world order.
The underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less
persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the
slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special
exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its
general prosperity, and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique.
Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to
come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant
American commitment.
In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has
observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers
rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United
States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a
great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.
Kaarbo, Juliet. (2015) A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on
the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory
Over the last 25 years, there has been a noteworthy turn across major International Relations
(IR) theories to include domestic politics and decision-making factors. Neoclassical realism and
variants of liberalism and constructivism, for example, have incorporated state motives, perceptions, domestic political institutions, public opinion, and political culture. These theoretical
developments, however, have largely ignored decades of research in foreign policy analysis
(FPA) examining how domestic political and decision-making factors affect actors’ choices and
policies. This continues the historical disconnect between FPA and “mainstream” IR, resulting in
contemporary IR theories that are considerably underdeveloped. This article revisits the reasons
for this separation and demonstrates the gaps between IR theory and FPA research. I argue
that a distinct FPA perspective, one that is psychologically-oriented and agent-based, can serve
as a complement, a competitor, and an integrating crucible for the cross-theoretical turn toward
domestic politics and decision making in IR theory.
An FPA perspective is not superior to other perspectives, and it continues to suffer from
weaknesses outlined earlier. FPA, moreover, is also not a single theory of international
relations, but this does not make it unique or less developed than other IR “theories” that are
today better characterized as schools of thought or branches of theoretical traditions. An FPA
perspective is, however, parsimonious in that other factors and contexts can be funneled
through the subjective understanding of the decision maker (although most FPA researchers
would sacrifice parsimony in favor of accuracy and validity; Peterson 2006). In addition, FPA
has a history of investigating—with a track record of theoretical conceptualization,
methodological development, and empirical examination—all of these domestic and decisionmaking orientations that currently separate dominant IR theories.
Kirshner, Jonathan. "The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical
realism and the rise of China."
Abstract
What is the realist position on how to deal with the rise of China? One prominent realist
approach, associated with John Mearsheimer, calls for the US to do whatever it can to slow
China’s rise. However, while this is a realist perspective, it is not the realist perspective. In
particular, realist approaches that derive from a classical foundation suggest policies
fundamentally different from those favored by Mearsheimer. This article argues that realism
should return to some of its classical traditions. It reviews why, from a classical realist
perspective, the rise of China must be viewed with alarm, but argues that Mearsheimer’s
approach — offensive realism — is wrong, and dangerous. Many of these errors are rooted in
structuralism; a classical realist approach, which allows for the influence of history and politics,
provides greater analytical purchase and wiser policy prescriptions than offensive realism.
Keywords
classical realism, International Relations, national security, offensive realism, policy
relevance, rise of China.
Conclusion: The unwritten future
The trajectory of state choices — especially of great powers, which have room for maneuver —
is uncertain, and contingent. This is true in general, and this is true for contemporary China.
Structural realists, of course, cannot distinguish between the Japan of the 1920s and the Japan
of the 1930s; for them the former was necessarily pregnant with the latter. Nor can they
distinguish between Weimar Germany and Nazi Germany; or mourn the blunders of the
Western powers in the 1920s, rooted in a tragically short-sighted and narrow (and un-realistic)
conception of the national interest.
Classical realists, on the other hand, looking back tend to see the catastrophes of the 1930s not
as the inevitable consequences of physical laws, but rooted in the dismal political choices of the
1920s. A classical realist would have preferred to live in a world where Weimar thrived, and was
reintegrated into the international economy, and, however a bitter pill this might be to swallow,
to re-emerge with some respect of its power and interests. In Kennan’s view (1951: 69, 70), ‘the
great misfortune of the west was not Hitler but the weakness of German society which made
possible his triumph which takes us back to the question of the attitude of the Western
democracies toward the Weimar Republic,’ and the ‘lost opportunities’ of the 1920s. For
Morgenthau (1946: 150), ‘The German situation in 1932, for instance, contained essentially
three such germinal developments: parliamentary democracy, military dictatorship, and Nazism,’
any one of which could have ‘finally materialize[d].’
Which one? The classical realist cannot be sure. It depended on ‘the contingent elements of the
situation,’ and ‘could not be foreseen.’ This remains true today. ‘The first lesson the student of
international politics must learn and never forget,’ Morgenthau lectured, ‘is that the complexities
of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible.’ This
admonition weaves its way as a central theme throughout his writing (Morgenthau, 1960: 20, 21;
1946: 150, also pp. 129, 139, 146–8, 220, 221).
This is not to duck the question at hand. Emphasizing contingency does not provide a get-outof-jail-free card — quite the opposite. It requires a political evaluation of a political question,
more or less on a case-by-case basis, if informed by a consistent set of assumptions and
analytical tools. As Morgenthau (1960: 10, 11) wrote, ‘Realism, then, considers prudence — the
weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions — to be the supreme virtue in
politics.’ For Kennan (1951: 47, 50), the ‘recognition of power realities’ would encourage ‘the
gentle civilizer of national self-interest.’
What, then, are the consequences of alternative political actions for the US with regard to the
rise of China? Almost all China hands and Asian security specialists consider its future foreign
policy trajectory to be uncertain.14 It may emerge as a responsible great power, or it may
blunder into a disastrous bid for hegemony. American foreign policy will be one factor among
several that shapes this choice. An ‘offensive realist’ approach, designed to ‘make sure that
China does not become a peer competitor’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 400), is suspect (at best) in its
logic, handcuffed by the limits of its structuralism, and, ironically, rooted in utopianism — an
attempt to reshape the world as one would like to see it, rather than respecting the realities of
power.
It is also, from the perspective of the self-interest of the US, almost certainly a self-fulfilling, and
self-defeating, prophesy. If it turns out (as is likely) that the US simply does not have the
capability to inhibit China’s rise, certainly the prophesy of a powerful and hostile China will be
realized by the attempt. If by chance it is ‘successful,’ the effort by the US to slow China’s rise
would backfire, for three reasons:
1. it would be very costly
2. it would seriously harm America’s international political position
3. it would make China much more dangerous
China holds over two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves, most of which are in the form
of US dollar assets, in particular US government debt. This can sound ominous, but, in practice,
this position gives China much less practical coercive leverage over the US than it might seem.
China has found itself (if with mixed emotions after the financial crisis of 2007–8) with
considerable vested interests in both the future of the dollar and in the general health of the US
economy, its largest export market.
China would be a big loser in a confrontation that undermined either the greenback or American
consumer demand. But if push came to shove cooler heads would be unlikely to prevail, and a
Sino-American macroeconomic tussle that seriously implicated the dollar would leave both
countries much worse off.15 But it is not hard to imagine China going ‘financially nuclear’ in
response to US policies explicitly designed to take down the People’s Republic. In aggressively
confronting China, the US would be inviting the very high costs of an unwanted and major crisis
of the dollar, which would seriously harm not just its economy, but America’s global military
capacity as well (Kirshner, 2008: 431).
The US would not be the only victim of its ‘success’ in damaging China’s economy — the
collateral damage would be widespread and considerable, for China has become both a pillar
and an engine of global economic growth. It is commonly reported with fanfare that China is the
world’s second largest economy, and that it has surpassed Germany to become the world’s
largest exporter. Less discussed is China’s increasing importance as an importer of other
countries’ products.
In 2008 China was the world’s third largest importer, and it is poised to take the number two
slot, behind the United States.16 In 2008 China was the biggest export market for — among
others — Argentina, Chile, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Yemen, Burma, Taiwan, and South Korea
(which exported twice as much to China as it did to the United States). China was the second
most important importer of goods from a host of countries including Australia, Japan, and Peru,
and was a very important export market for scores of others, including the United States, which
exported more to China than it did to any other country except for Canada and Mexico
(International Monetary Fund, 2009; World Trade Organization, 2009).
China’s value as an export market for the world is only likely to increase in importance in the
coming years, both as it recovers earlier than others from the ‘great recession’ and as it
resumes high rates of annual economic growth. If, then, the US was somehow able, at great
cost and effort, to knock down China’s rate of economic growth, it would also take the wind
from the sails of China’s demand for imports, leaving behind an angry mob of exporting
countries in distress, who would (correctly) blame the US for their economic (and subsequent
political) woes.
Finally, successful US policies that wounded the Chinese economy would generate perverse
outcomes; the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, desperate for a new foundation of
legitimacy, could easily resort to virulent nationalism; and stripped of the expectation that many
of its foreign policy goals will be best achieved implicitly as a natural consequence of its
continued ascendance, China might adopt more aggressive, risk-acceptant international
strategies, especially it if perceived its relative power to be diminishing. More generally, a highly
antagonistic US posture toward China would almost certainly bring about that self-fulfilling
prophecy; assuring a wounded, hostile, dangerous adversary.
In sum, a full-blown confrontation with China along the lines suggested by offensive
realism would be a self-mutilating geopolitical gesture that would damage the US,
undermine its international political influence, and result in an angry and unstable China
— and that is if it worked. Classical realism, on the other hand, expects a rising China to be
more ambitious, assertive, and, often, difficult to deal with. There is cause for concern — even
grave concern. But however wary and pessimistic as they approach the table, classical realists
nevertheless place their (always) hedged bets on those policies that have the best chance of
shaping China’s domestic political debates and international opportunities so as to encourage
and accommodate its peaceful rise to great power status.
Khong, Yuen Foong. "Primacy or World Order? The United States
and China's Rise—A Review Essay."
Conclusion Aaron Friedberg and Hugh White write on the assumption that time is running out
for both the United States and China. I would argue that time has something to offer both sides.
China is currently in no position to replace the United States as the Asian hegemon, which
Chinese leaders recognize. Although it is hard to deny that in recent years China has acted
more assertively, especially with respect to the territorial disputes in the East and South China
Seas, these exertions are not about displacing the United States. If they are, the strategy is
remarkably incompetent, because it helped pave the way for the United States’ pivot to Asia.
China’s best shot at dislodging the United States is to continue growing at 6 to 8 percent
annually for another quarter century. When China’s leaders say that they must continue to focus
on internal economic development, and that in turn requires a peaceful and stable Asia, I read
that to mean that they are in no hurry to displace the United States. Yan Xuetong seems content
with his studied approach to drawing lessons of hegemonic statecraft from ancient Chinese
thinkers. Deng Xiaoping’s adage about “hiding your strength and biding your time” remains
relevant. Another twenty-ªve years of strong economic growth and China might be in a position
to play the role that the United States played after World War II, in Asia and beyond. Chinese
strategists adopting what Friedberg calls “the propensity of things” calculations (chap. 5) should
worry about others provoking it to act prematurely on issues that, over time, may resolve
themselves in China’s favor. Consider Taiwan. With Ma Jing Yeou (instead of Lee Teng Hui or
Chen Shui Bian) in charge, China-Taiwan relations are on an even keel. Reuniªcation can wait.
As China-Taiwan economic interdependence intensiªes, it is the Taiwanese captains of industry
who are likely to push for uniªcation. In March 2013, a Taiwanese tycoon and his associates
who favored “Taiwan’s absorption by China” tried but failed to acquire Taiwan’s largest
newspaper. Owning the largest newspaper would have given the “pro-China businessman,” who
already owns one Taiwanese media company, serious power to shape public opinion. Strong
opposition to his owning a second company, however, scuttled the deal.
A few decades from now, China’s political-military clout will also be such that Taiwan will have
great difªculty resisting reuniªcation, peaceful or otherwise. It is Taiwan that does not have the
luxury of biding its time: since the 1990s, Taiwanese leaders have been confronted with the “it’s
now or never [to declare formal independence]” syndrome. Presidents Lee and Chen tested the
waters of formal independence but were beaten back by Chinese as well as U.S. pressures.
Both China and the United States would prefer that Taiwanese leaders put off moves toward
formal independence indefinitely.
The political military frictions between China and Taiwan in the 1990s (which embroiled the
United States) have obfuscated Mao Zedong’s stance on Taiwan, conveyed to Henry Kissinger
in 1973: China was in no great hurry to bring Taiwan back to its fold, it could “come after one
hundred years.”32 For the United States, shelving the Taiwan issue is not only prudent; time will
also be the best test of its conªdence in its ability to outcompete China and to retain its
hegemonic position. Although China has the advantages of scale (four times the population)
and geography (permanent resident of Asia), the United States has many other advantages,
including its absolute wealth, democratic politics, military allies (with more than 700 bases
worldwide), soft power, and a culture of innovation.
Assumptions of continued Chinese growth are just that. Will China be able to maintain its high
growth rates over the next two decades? Although the Chinese economy has deªed predictions
about its implosion in the 1990s or being dragged down by the “hard landings” in the 2000s,
Chinese policymakers are only too aware of the challenges they face in the future. Time will tell
if China will muster the economic base and technological innovations to mount a credible
challenge to U.S. hegemony. Perhaps the greatest advantage for the United States is that the
current rules of the international economic and political systems are largely stacked in its
favor.34 China has done remarkably well under those rules, and although it is safe to assume
that China will want to change some of them, it comes to the table as a relatively satisfied
power, not a dissatisfied one.
Time will also allow the United States to help nudge along or witness China’s possible
transformation into a democracy. For Friedberg, promoting “regime change” or nudging China to
become a liberal democracy is an important element of U.S. policy (p. 2). Americans and others
who put their faith in the sequential development of capitalism and democracy and who were
disappointed by the Tiananmen crackdown may have a better chance of seeing their
expectations realized with the expansion of the Chinese middle class in the next few decades. A
democratic China, going by Friedberg’s analysis, would make it a much more acceptable Asian
hegemon to the United States. Finally, if the United States–China contest is a long-haul
endeavor (as Yan assumes), where one is thinking in terms of decades instead of years, both
sides will have opportunities to experiment with policies capable of blunting the sharp edges of
such a contest, even if they are unable to eliminate it.
The United States’ pivot to East Asia, for example, has encouraged some in China to call for its
own “pivot to the West” (i.e., Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East), not only to secure
its energy needs, but also to expand its strategic space, such that over time, its economic and
strategic well-being will not rely exclusively on developments in East Asia. The prospects for
U.S.-China cooperation in these areas are deemed to be better, given their “common interests
in economic investment, energy, anti-terrorism, non-proliferation and regional stability.”35 This
would ªt with Kissinger’s view that there is room for “coevolution,” whereby “both countries
pursue their domestic imperatives cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to
minimize conºict.”36 Competition will not be absent, but will manifest itself more on the
economic and political, rather than military, fronts.
Kissinger’s emphasis on “domestic imperatives” is pertinent and prescient. It can be read as a
lament and warning to his fellow Americans about the dangers to the United States’
international standing of the political inªghting and dysfunction—witness the budget
sequestration in the spring of 2013 and the government shutdown of October 2013—that have
come to characterize the United States government of late. The world’s greatest democracy is
having trouble agreeing on its domestic imperatives. The government shutdown forced
President Obama to cancel his trip to Bali, Indonesia, to attend the East Asia Summit at a
critical moment of the United States’ “pivot” to Asia. His absence was perceived as a setback for
the pivot. It also made it hard for the United States to twist some arms on the TPP or reassure
its Asian partners about the TPP’s clauses.
The international and regional media were also quick to portray the Chinese as stealing a march
on the United States. The implied comparator in Kissinger’s point about domestic imperatives is
of course China. The Chinese leadership seems united in pursuing sustained economic
development, in part because their political survival and legitimacy depend on it.
The global market worries about “hard landings,” but has so far been pleasantly
surprised by China’s economic resilience. Asian states interested in growing with China are
reassured. Thus the argument about time is not about how it will nudge Chinese and U.S.
interests toward convergence; that may or may not happen. It is about which side will be better
able to marshal its domestic political, economic, technological, and cultural resources to
implement a grand strategy that facilitates its becoming or staying the hegemon, in a manner
that makes its leadership congenial to Asia and the rest of the world.
Kohli, Atul. (2010). “Chapter 33: Politics and Redistribution in
India”
India has shifted from a reluctant pro-capitalist state with a socialist ideology to an enthusiastic
pro-capitalist state with a neo-liberal ideology. This shift has significant implications for the
politics of redistribution in India.

The embrace of capital has led to economic growth

This growth is leading to widening inequalities along a variety of dimensions: city, versus
the countryside; across regions; and along class lines
Conclusion
While the rhetoric of redistribution and social justice is deeply embedded in Indian politics,
concrete redistributive achievements have been limited.
Limitations are rooted in nature of the society, but also the pattern of politics.
The growing power of big capital define limits on the redistributive possibilities in India.
The concluding issue: can democratic forces in India moderate the emerging class and other
inequities?
Evidence is also mixed.
1. First notice that whereas India’1s main model of development is being driven by a close
alliance of state and capital, in order to win elections all national parties need to make
promises to the poor.
2. Second, below near geenopmy evident at the national Centre, politics in state after state
across India is moving in nearly opposite direction; even in Utta Pradesh, a party of the
lowers castes and classes was just installed in power
3. And finally, whereas in the past members of the upper cases and clases readily
controlled local governments, by now the process is a lot more compelx, forcing the
political and social elites to channel som resources to those below them to secure their
political support.
The narrow ruling alliance of a technocratic elite and business groups in India wil thus continue
to be under democratic and possibly not-so-democratic, pressure from the excluded masses.
Kuchins, Andrew C., and Igor A. Zevelev. (2012). "Russian
Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change."
The imminent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012
raises many questions about the future of Russian foreign and security policy as well as U.S.—
Russia relations. To what extent will Putin seek to continue and implement the goals of current
President Dmitri Medvedev’s modernization program? Will Putin reform the political system in
the direction of decentralization of power and pluralism? Will the ‘‘reset’’ in U.S.—Russia
relations endure? Even with these issues up in the air, the return of Putin as president will not
significantly alter the course of Moscow’s foreign policy. Some argue that Putin never
relinquished authority over foreign policy in the first place, and that may well be true. But even if
it is, there are deeper structural reasons involving debates among Russian elites about foreign
policy and Russia’s place in the world that are more important in explaining why Putin’s return
will not usher in a significant policy shift.
Liberals, Balancers, and Nationalists. The debating parameters over Russia’s national identity
and its core foreign policy goals are rooted in five elements of Russian history.
1. An enduring belief exists that Russia is a great power and must be treated as such.
2. That international politics is essentially a Darwinian or Hobbesian competition in which
‘‘realist’’ and ‘‘neo-realist’’ state-centric power politics is the dominant paradigm.
3. That Russia from Peter the Great 300 years ago to Putin and Medvedev today
continually faces challenges to ‘‘catch up’’ to the economic, technological, and military
achievements of its rivals.
4. That strategies concerning how to catch up are based in, and continue to define,
contested aspects of Russian national identity that link domestic economic and political
order with foreign policy priorities and orientation.
5. That the central debate today and for at least 200 years revolves around the extent to
which Western liberalism is an appropriate model for Russia, and subsequently how
closely Moscow should ally with the West, or certain partners in it, to achieve its
goals.
They go on to list different groups: liberals, balancers and nationalists.
The group broadly defined as ‘‘Russian nationalists’’ may be especially adverse to U.S. and
Western interests. It includes at least three subgroups, namely neo-imperialists, proponents of a
Russian sphere of influence (Russia’s regional domination of the post-Soviet space), and ethnic
nationalists.
For most of the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union were
locked in a competitive struggle for global power and hegemony, and each country viewed its
adversary as the principal ‘‘other’’ around which much of its identity and foreign policy revolved.
The most influential party that effectively backed neo-imperialism throughout the 1990s was the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The essence of those in favor of regional
domination, the second subgroup, is state-building within the borders of present-day Russia,
accompanied by subjugating other successor states and creating a buffer zone of protectorates
and dependent countries around Russia. Finally, the essence of an ethno-nationalist program is
to unite Russia with the Russian communities in the near abroad and build the Russian state
within the areas of settlement of ethnic Russians and other Eastern Slavs.
...the views of the United States held by pro-Western liberals influenced official Russian thinking
strongly in 1992—1993. However, the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections
favored those who backed more aggressive and anti-Western policies such as Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, whose misnamed Liberal Democratic Party won a plurality.
From 1993—2003, Russian foreign policy was dominated by great power balancers who were
joined by many liberals disappointed with reform and the West. Beginning in 1996, Evgeniy
Primakov started playing the key role in Russian foreign policy and the views of pro-Western
liberals, as noted earlier, were gradually marginalized. Great power balancers are well
represented politically and have significant government influence. The founding father of the
great power school of thought is Evgeniy Primakov, who was an academic, Russia’s prime
minister in 1998—1999, and its foreign minister before that starting in 1996. Primakov is
considered Russia’s Henry Kissinger, both for being a statesman and for his straightforward
realist conception of international affairs.
From 1996—2010, the most vocal advocate of the policy of domination was Yuri Luzhkov, the
mayor of Moscow. Mid-2000s Russian foreign policy reflected growing confidence about
Moscow’s own re-emergence. From 2000—2008, like many other nations in the world, Russia
sought means to balance, or more correctly contain, U.S. unipolar hegemony.
The global economic crisis has had a far deeper impact on Russian foreign policy than the
Georgia War. The most significant factor for Moscow will be the world economy and its effect on
oil prices.
Laursen, Finn. (2002). Theories of European Intergration.
Background Paper, Graduate Institute of European Studies,
Tamkang University
Introduction
Since the start of the integration process in Europe in the early 1950s a number of theories of
integration have been applied to study the process. Explanations - and predictions - require
concepts to organize our knowledge. Theories provide us with such concepts and notions of
their relations. Good theory not only helps us understand the world we live in, but also to have
certain ideas about likely futures. The future is obviously uncertain; yet we need to think about it.
Scientific inquiry is about developing better and better theories that will improve our
explanations and predictions. Thinking about the past and the future is a question of using
theories to see the fit between the predictions that follow from the theory and the reality we
observe. Beyond trying to explain and predict it can be argued that scientific inquiry cannot
escape the question of desirable futures. We can therefore add prescription to explanation and
prediction as a part of scientific inquiry. Yet, many political scientists prefer to limit their inquiry
to explanation or understanding. Prediction is difficult and prescription requires you to deal with
values. Many prefer to leave the latter to politicians. In reality the separation is not so easy.
Another way to look at theory is to see it as a kind of language. Political science and other social
sciences have developed a number of different languages for discourse on European
integration. Many, as the classical neo-functionalist integration theories developed in the 1950s
and 1960s, have focussed upon explanation, but the literature on international integration has
also dealt with questions about the likely and preferred futures of the process. Most integration
theorists have probably seen the process as a desirable thing, whether they explicitly have said
so or not. It has usually been seen as a process that would produce peace, security and
economic welfare gains. 2 The concept of subsidiarity used recently in connection with the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (EU) is an example of a prescriptive concept which has
entered not only the discourse of politicians, but which is clearly in need of clarification.
Basically the concept suggests that decisions should be made on the most appropriate level of
society. So European problems should be solved at the European level. But, in the end, it is
through a political process that European states decide which problems are common European
problems.
(not a real summary)
A number of younger European scholars now started wondering whether the dominant
approaches to the study of European integration were too rationalistic, too, and paid too little
attention to how interaction affects interests and identity. A special issue of the Journal of
European Public Policy explored the issue in 1999 (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, 1999).
Moravcsik was invited 15 to contribute. He asked whether something was rotten in the state of
Denmark, referring also to the ‘Copenhagen school’ in security studies: “…the force of
continental constructivist theories appears to radiate outward from the Danish capital, where it is
the hegemonic discourse” (Moravcsik, 1999: 669). His judgment was harsh: “Hardly a single
claim in this volume is formulated or tested in such a way that it could, even in principle, be
declared empirically invalid” (ibid.: 670). Most of the contributors to the volume were criticized
for not advancing testable theories. Based on his own research Moravcsik claimed that ideas
are transmission belts for interests and indeed rather epiphenomenal. The authors did not take
alternative theories seriously enough to test them. “Constructivism prevails by default rather
than by surmounting the challenge of honest empirical validation” (ibid.: 676). Among those
criticizing liberal intergovernmentalism we also find Marlene Wind, who said that … important
institutional elements such as the evolution and change of norms, ideas and historically
produced codes of conduct – discursive as well as behavioural, are completely expelled from
analysis (Wind, 1997: 28). She further criticizes Moravcsik for underestimating the role of the
Commission and personalities. “The member states are far from ‘in control’ of the process,” she
says (Ibid.: 30). We can only conclude that the theoretical debate about how to explain
European integration continues
Mazarr, Michael J. "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State
Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction." Foreign Affairs
93.1 (2014)
(in progress)
Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. "Leaving theory
behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International
Relations." European Journal of International Relations 19.3
(2013)
Abstract
Theory creating and hypothesis testing are both critical components of social science, but the
former is ultimately more important. Yet, in recent years, International Relations scholars have
devoted less effort to creating and refining theories or using theory to guide empirical research.
Instead, they increasingly focus on ‘simplistic hypothesis testing,’ which emphasizes discovering
well-verified empirical regularities. Privileging simplistic hypothesis testing is a mistake,
however, because insufficient attention to theory leads to misspecified empirical models or
misleading measures of key concepts. In addition, the poor quality of much of the data in
International Relations makes it less likely that these efforts will produce cumulative knowledge.
This shift away from theory and toward simplistic hypothesis testing reflects a long-standing
desire to professionalize and expand the International Relations field as well as the short-term
career incentives of individual scholars. This tendency is also widening the gap between the
ivory tower and the real world, making International Relations scholarship less useful to
policymakers and concerned citizens. Unfortunately, this trend is likely to continue unless there
is a collective decision to alter prevailing academic incentives.
Keywords: cumulative knowledge, hypothesis testing, methodology, policy-relevance,
professional norms, scientific realism, theory
Conclusion
The study of IR should be approached with humility. There is no single theory that makes
understanding world politics easy, no magic methodological bullet that yields robust results
without effort, and no search engine that provides mountains of useful and reliable data on
every question that interests us. We therefore favor a diverse intellectual community where
different theories and research traditions coexist. Given how little we know, and how little we
know about how to learn more, overinvesting in any particular approach seems unwise. As
Schrodt (2006: 336) wisely observes, ‘we need all the help we can get to figure out this whacko
world.’
What matters most, however, is whether we create more powerful theories to explain key
features of IR. Without good theories, we cannot trust our empirical findings, whether
quantitative or qualitative in nature. Unless we have theories to make sense of them, we cannot
even keep track of all the hypotheses that scholars keep piling up. There are many roads to
better theory, but that should be our ultimate destination.
Milliken, Jennifer and Keith Krause (2002), “State Failure, State
Collapse and State Reconstruction”, Development and Change
Practically and conceptually, the `state' is again under siege. Less than two decades after its
`rediscovery' by scholars (Evans et al., 1985; Hall, 1986), the central unit of analysis in
international relations and comparative politics seems once again in crisis. Some authors, such
as Robert Kaplan, present a vision of future chaos resulting from (in a dystopic twist on Marx)
the withering away of the central governments of modern states in favour of tribal domains,
`city-states, shanty-states, [and] nebulous and anarchic regionalisms' (Kaplan, 1994: 24).
Others welcome the weakening of the state in favour of either a more cosmopolitan (global) or
more representative (local) vision of politics (Held, 1995, 1997; Rosenau, 1990, 1997). Still
others, often accused of being anachronistic (or even reactionary), argue that in the absence of
global or regional hegemons, the sovereign state remains the most appropriate solution to the
problem of political order (Jackson, 2001; Krasner, 1999).
Perhaps it was always so. The modern state, since it emerged out of the ashes of the medieval
order, has always been a work in progress. The aspirations of its most ardent defenders for
legitimate, representative, redistributive or just governance have shimmered on the horizon
distant from the reality of contemporary states, whether in their eighteenth century absolutist, or
twentieth century authoritarian, versions. But it is against this backdrop that the current
discourse of `failed' or `collapsed' states must be understood. For every claim that a state has
collapsed, is failing, or is going to fail, contains two usually implicit definitions or benchmarks.
One concerns the `stateness' against which any given state should be measured as having
succeeded or failed (the institutional dimension of state collapse), and the other concerns the
normative and practical implications of such a failure (the functional dimension of state failure).
Concern over the possibility of state failure thus often has as much to do with dashed
expectations about the achievement of modern statehood, or the functions that modern states
should fulfil, as it does with the empirically-observed decomposition or collapse of the
institutions of governance in different parts of the world. The articles collected in this volume all
work with such benchmarks and assumptions, seeking to reflect critically and synthetically on
state failure and state collapse. The main aims of the volume are:

To develop more precise and nuanced concepts of state failure and collapse, as
situations distinctive in important ways from state decay, political crisis and civil war;

To examine the different and contrasting paths that have led to state collapse, and the
inter-relationships between the national and trans- national economic, political and social
forces that are making instances of state collapse relatively more frequent in the
contemporary era;

To analyse the intervention strategies that the international community has adopted to
respond to situations of state collapse, including con- sidering how the efforts of external
intervenors are constrained and thwarted, and how their activities may have unintended
(or dysfunctional) consequences.
CONCLUSION
The issues that frame this volume are really a large agenda for research, which a collection
such as this can only begin to address. Nonetheless, the collection already makes several
notable advances. Contributors carefully examine the phenomenon of state collapse, including
historicizing this `other face' of state formation and drawing out how and why today's
international context is less conducive to the maintenance of states than it was during the Cold
War. They also give empirically-grounded insights into recent cases of state collapse, potentially
emergent situations of this kind, and the conditions and dynamics that can lead to state collapse
as well as to (at least partial) reconstitution. Finally, they analyse contemporary responses to
state collapse, questioning the assumptions underlying relief, conflict resolution and
reconstruction efforts and, when appropriate, proposing alternative strategies. These efforts
serve collectively to extend the study of the issue of state collapse and to open avenues for
further debate and research.
We consider it important for such debate and research to recognize – as this volume has sought
to – that state failure and state collapse must be distinguished from each other, and must not be
subsumed under the vague, broad and ambiguous headings of political conflict or civil war.
State collapse is different. It poses challenges both to the Whig narrative of a progressive
worldwide march to modern (usually liberal) statehood, and to the `anti-statist' vision that
regards the erosion of state forms as an opportunity for new forms of political community to
emerge at the local or cosmopolitan (global) level. The modern state continues to be a work in
progress, and the potential for failure or reversal remains present. Similarly, post-modern
political forms of authority and legitimacy may emerge in different parts of the world, but these
are just as likely to be dystopic as celebratory, and they still need to answer the fundamental
questions of political order that animated the emergence of the modern state in Europe.
A close study of the processes that can lead to state collapse, to the dynamic interplay of global
and local forces in state collapse, and to the normative and practical underpinnings of the
international community's efforts to recreate states after collapse, can shed light on some of
these broader reshapings of the global political order in the twenty-first century.
Monaco, Lisa. "Preventing the Next Attack." Foreign Affairs. Vol.
96 November/December 2017
(in progress)
Pisarska, Katarzyna. "Peace Diplomacy and the Domestic
Dimension of Norwegian Foreign Policy: The Insider's Accounts."
Scandinavian Political Studies 38.2 (2015)
By focusing on the internal conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian
peace diplomacy (as seen by Norwegian diplomats and nongovernmental organisation
representatives), this study argues that the high level of the country’s engagement in
international peace efforts and its success in pursuing a ‘niche diplomacy’ can be attributed to
two factors.
1. First, it is the ability of the Norwegian government to capitalise on the society’s belief that
Norwegians are a ‘Peace Nation’ with a missionary obligation.
2. Second, it is the existence of the so-called ‘Norwegian Model’, which allows creating
efficient interactions between government, civil society and research institutions in
specific foreign policy efforts.
Both factors combined make Norwegian peace diplomacy a model example representing
New Public Diplomacy, where domestic civil society remains both an audience (‘Norway as a
Peace Nation’ notion) and a driver (Norwegian model of cooperation) of state public diplomacy
efforts.
Peace diplomacy (PD)
Study Conclusions
By focusing on the internal conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian PD
(as seen by Norwegian diplomats and NGO representatives), this article has challenged the
common assumption that this public diplomacy initiative is merely a pre-calculated foreign
policy effort aimed at reinforcing a positive image of Norway among foreign publics.
Instead, the study has shown that the peace engagement is strongly linked to the very identity
of the Norwegian nation. The author argues that the efficiency of Norwegian PD can be
attributed to: the ability of the government to capitalise on Norwegian society’s belief that the
country is a Peace Nation with a missionary obligation; and the existence of the so-called
‘Norwegian Model’, which allows for interaction between government, civil society and research
institutions in specific foreign policy efforts. The attractiveness of the Norwegian foreign
policy cause for its own society and Norwegian society’s direct engagement in the
implementation of the policy assures domestic constituencies support and identify with state
actions abroad, thus strengthening the country’s soft power outreach. From a more accidental
involvement in conflict mediations, Norway has slowly gained a solid reputation in PD. Such a
reputation, based on strong solidarity and egalitarian traditions, cooperative culture, small
country size and noble history, has created important political capital for the state’s foreign
policy. These findings add to the more general debate on the importance of including a
domestic dimension in state public diplomacy efforts (Riordan 2005; Cull 2009; Fitzpatrick
2012; Huijgh 2013). This Norwegian case study provides evidence that domestic publics
should be seen not just as an audience for foreign policy messaging and consultation,
but more importantly as equal partners in public diplomacy’s formulation and
implementation.
Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic
of Two-Level Games.” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3,
1988
Quek, Kai, and Alastair Iain Johnston. "Can China Back Down?
Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition."
International Security 42.3 (2018)
Abstract
Many pundits and analysts, both inside and outside China, claim that public sentiment is an
important driver in China’s coercive diplomacy in the East and South China Seas. They argue
that China’s leadership faces potential domestic instability arising from ethnic unrest,
socioeconomic inequality, environmental degradation, and a slowing economy. The regime
therefore has an interest in pursuing tough external policies, as variants of diversionary conoict
theory might suggest. Moreover, owing to socialization into the “Century of Humiliation”
narrative (namely, that China was bullied by stronger imperialist powers from 1840 to 1949), the
Chinese public reacts angrily to any hints of government concessions on territory and
sovereignty issues. Public opinion, therefore, can create the worst of all worlds for Chinese
leaders’ ability to control the escalation of conoicts. It explains coercive external behavior that
could give rise to militarized crises, but it also limits the regime’s options to de-escalate once
militarized crises have broken out.
Conclusion
Our study relates generally to agency and options for governments constrained by public
pressures in a crisis. Although the public costs of backing down enhance bargaining leverage,
they can also entrap leaders looking for ways to prevent further escalation in a crisis. Our
ªndings expand on previous work by specifying a wide range of realistic strategies available to
governments—democracies and non-democracies alike—to de-escalate in the face of public
pressure to remain tough. Some of these strategies appeal to nonrational thought processes in
the public—role identities, for example. Others appeal to apparently rational calculations—
economic costs, for instance. In
cases where audience costs may exist but appear to be relatively ineffective in constraining
leaders, scholars might look to see whether leaders have employed some of these strategies.
We also show that the costs imposed on leaders for backing down or blufªng in a crisis are
inºuenced by some of the population’s basic beliefs about nationalism and basic preferences
regarding military spending. This ªnding suggests that the success of backing down or
exercising restraint in a crisis can also rest on the distribution of nativist nationalists and hawks,
as well as on the ability of the regime to mobilize nonnativists and doves. Our study also relates
speciªcally to the Chinese government’s options and agency. Our research question assumes
that leaders, for whatever reason, decide that the military option is too dangerous, or not
desirable, or—at the very least—that they want the ºexibility to consider the option of deescalation. Once they make that decision, the issue then becomes how to reduce the domestic
costs to the lowest possible level. We have shown that there may be a range of realistic
strategies and reasons for backing down that may indeed reduce the costs imposed on Chinese
leaders by their public.64 The Chinese public may be susceptible to arguments about the
economic costs to using force. The Chinese public, on average, may also be more supportive of
restraint if this is seen as normatively consistent with their perceived role identities as a peaceful
people. They apparently also see beneªts from third-party mediation by the UN. They may, in
particular, also be willing to accept economic sanctions as a substitute for the use of force in a
territorial conºict. Different groups in society may be more or less susceptible to different
appeals. In principle, this means that the Chinese leadership could combine different, but
logically congruent, strategies to maximize its ºexibility. Thus, for example, invoking China’s
peaceful identity, the economic costs of military conºict, and a threat of economic sanctions
might lead to higher levels of support than invoking any single option. Our ªndings suggest that
Chinese leaders have certain diplomatic and practical options for giving themselves more
domestic space to pursue concessions in high-stake crises.
Our ªndings also suggest, however, that controlling emotional nativist tendencies, and
mobilizing more moderate “butter over guns” or dovish constituencies, may be critical if the
regime wants to minimize the public costs of making concessions in a crisis. Mobilizing opinions
in a wellcalibrated way is obviously not easy to do in an emerging crisis over territorial issues. In
the tensions created by nationalist rhetoric and military moves, mobilizing moderate public
opinion can be particularly difªcult. The regime would likely have to communicate quietly with
the United States that it would use rhetoric and actions that give it more room for self-restraint
and concessions—such as some combination of symbolic economic sanctions and requests for
UN mediation—in return for the United States minimizing its public threats of intervention. This
latter reassurance from the United States appears to be important for Chinese leaders’ agency.
As our ªndings suggest, the Chinese public— particularly those segments of the public with
nativist and hawkish beliefs —might increase rather than lower the costs for leaders should the
latter back down in the face of U.S. military threats, especially highly public ones. This likelihood
creates a tension in the arguments some pundits make in Washington for a tougher U.S.
deterrence strategy against China in maritime disputes in East Asia. Given our ªndings, one
cannot both argue—as some in Washington do—that popular nationalism constrains the
Chinese leadership and that certain cost-imposition strategies (e.g., military deterrent threats)
will constrain China’s coercive diplomacy. If general deterrence has failed and China and Japan
face a crisis over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, imposing costs for immediate deterrence
purposes runs into this contradiction. If public opinion does indeed constrain Chinese leaders,
then high-proªle immediate deterrent threats are likely to reduce the leadership’s ºexibility and,
in turn, reduce the effectiveness of these deterrent threats.
Robinson, David A. (2011a). “India’s Rise as a Great Power, Part
One: Regional and Global Implications”

India’s traditional strategy of non - alignment has shifted towards “poly - alignment”
(bridging power between competing poles of US, Russia, China and EU). As a new
regional power, India is increasing its naval, air force and missile capabilities.

During this period of rapid development, domestic stability is a key challenge for India.

The US supports Indian expansion, with the aim of balancing Chinese influence in Asia.
In the decades to come, India will continue its rise to great power status aided by the United
States, which sees it as helping to keep the global strategic balance in Washington’s favour.
Following a strategy of “poly - alignment”, India will subsequently look to project greater power
beyond its borders. This will particularly be the case in the Indian Ocean region, viewed by New
Delhi as being essential to India’s economic and social stability.
… its ascent depends on maintaining relative domestic stability, and carefully crafting its policies
toward s the United States and its neighbours , Pakistan and China. All four states are nuclear
powers, so the consequences of any conflict between them are potentially dire.
Growing wealth + population
From independence in 1947 → strategy of non-alignment
Prioritising multilateral institutions
Civilian nuclear development
India’s other major challenge comes from its unstable neighbour Pakistan, with which full-scale
war and nuclear exchange have been avoided, despite clashes in the Kargil region of Kashmir
in 1999, and attacks on India by Pakistani-backed terrorists in 2001 and 2008.
Despite India’s meteoric economic development, it can be said that India has both the best of
the First World and the worst of the Third World within its borders, and faces unpre cedented
human security challenges. India now has 410 million people living below the United Nations’
poverty line – 37.2 per cent of its population and actually 100 million more people than in 2004.
Millions of India’s rural poor are faced with food price inflation of up to 17 per cent. Sixty per
cent of Indian labour is still agricultural, and the integration of hundreds of millions of peasants
into a modern economy may be an extremely painful process.
Conclusion
Since independence India has pursued non - alignment or poly - alignment, and has spurned
the use of force as a tool of foreign policy. Despite India’s advocacy of a non - polar world,
Indian policymakers nonetheless recognise the benefits of American sponsorship. Both nations
agree tha t it serves neither US nor Indian interests for a powerful, authoritarian China to
dominate the Asian landmass or for radical Islamic forces to wage wars that threaten the
security of both states. Thus, as the United States perceives strategic advantage fr om assisting
India’s rise to great power status, and India is receiving tangible military and economic benefits
from this relationship, for the foreseeable future, India’s continued ascendance will be supported
by the global hegemon.
Robinson, David A. (2011b). “India’s Rise as a Great Power, Part
Two: The Pakistan-China-India Dynamic”

Pakistan is unstable and is accused by India of supporting regional terrorism.

Nuclear exchange and accidents remain a key threat, with global implications.

India perceives China to be strategically encircling it with South Asian allies, including
Pakistan.

India’s military expansion will not change the fundamental regional power balance.
Summary
In considering India’s rise as a great power, this paper focuses specifically on India’s relations
with its strategically significant neighbours, Pakistan and China. Though India’s increasing
projection of influence may change the regional dynamics, the fundamental balance of power
among India and its neighbours will not change dramatically in the near future. Pakistan is
already overwhelmed by the military strength of India, thus its strategic outlook will remain
unchanged, while China and India have increasingly intertwined relations and evenly - matched
conventional and nuclear forces, ensuring relative regional stability.
Conclusion
India’s rise to great power status is inevitable and will occur quickly over the coming decades,
especially while the United States believes this will assist it in maintaining a global strategic
balance. This will lead to a greater projection of India’s power outside of its borders and
especially into the Ind ian Ocean region, which it sees as being essential for its economic and
social stability. The two states that India’s ascent will have the greatest strategic impact on will
be its neighbours, Pakistan and China. For contrasting reasons, however, this impact may not
change the fundamental power balance that exists today. Pakistan is already overwhelmed by
the military strength of India, and thus its primary defences are the threat of nuclear exchange
or state disintegration – neither of which will definitely be undermined by rising Indian power. In
contrast, China and India will have increasingly complex and intertwined relations, but the
economic and strategic issues that bind them and the evenly - matched nature of their
conventional and nuclear forces are likely to maintain relative peace and strategic stability. India
sees itself as an emerging great power in an increasingly multi - power world, and is thus
maintaining a strategy of poly - alignment. With the balance of forces developing as they
are, that ambition is likely to become a reality.
Sandler, Todd. "The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock."
Journal of Peace Research 51.2 (2014)
Abstract
This article presents an eclectic review of the analytical study of terrorism that views all agents
as rational decision-makers. This analytical literature began in earnest with the seminal study of
US skyjackings by William Landes in 1978. After 11 September 2001, the analytical literature on
terrorism grew rapidly. Based on policy relevance, my survey article identifies five key areas of
intense research interests. These include analyses of terrorist attack trends, the economic
consequences of terrorism, the study of counterterrorism effectiveness, the causes of terrorism,
and the relationship of terrorism and liberal democracies. New developments in the field
focused on distinguishing key differences between domestic and transnational terrorism.
Additionally, recent game-theoretic advances permitted more active agents and stages to the
games. Other major developments involved the study of networked terrorists and the role of
counterterrorism foreign aid. Fruitful future directions include using advanced econometric
methods to discern the true impact of terrorism on growth, applying spatial econometrics to the
study of terrorism, ascertaining the determinants of terrorist groups’ longevity, and learning how
to foster international counterterrorism cooperation.
Keywords:
counterterrorism effectiveness, domestic and transnational terrorism, economic consequences
of terrorism, game theory
Directions for Future Research and concluding remarks
What is the true impact of terrorism on growth? For regional aggregates, the literature’s
consensus is that terrorism has a small, but significant, negative impact on per capita GDP
growth (see e.g. Blomberg, Hess & Orphanides, 2004). There are, however, grounds for
believing that terrorism typically has no effect on economic growth – e.g. most countries
experience few attacks with little loss of life or property; much of terrorism’s impact is localized;
and transference of economic activities can limit economic consequences.
To date, the studies of this growth impact ignores biases – e.g. Nickell bias stemming from
lagged per capita income on the right-hand side of the growth equation. Another crucial
bias comes from cross-country dependence which causes an endogeneity bias. When
accounting for these biases, Gaibulloev, Sandler & Sul (2013) found no influence of terrorism on
economic growth for a host of regional samples. More work is needed because losses in
economic growth are used to gauge offsetting fiscal and monetary policies.
There is also a need for more spatial analysis of terrorist incidents and civil wars. Recently, georeferenced GTD data were used by Findley & Young (2012) to investigate the spatial and
temporal relationship between terrorist incidents and civil wars. Spatial analysis can indicate the
spread of terrorist campaigns across countries and regions. The analysis can also identify
where vulnerabilities are the greatest within countries, and how terrorist attacks
respond spatially to counterterrorism measures. There are additional issues concerning
counterterrorism spending that require investigation. How much is enough in terms of defensive
spending? That is, have past counterterrorism measures been effective and worth the cost?
Since its inception, the budget of US DHS has risen by 9% annually (Enders & Sandler, 2012:
328).
To address such questions requires an unobservable counterfactual, in which benefits in terms
of inhibited attacks are ascertained. The cost side of counterterrorism is readily observable.
There is only a single study that attempts to compute a counterfactual for post-9/11
counterterrorism spending (Sandler, Arce & Enders, 2011). Though this study is imperfect,
these authors found only about a ten cents return on a dollar from post-9/11 defensive
spending.
Datasets, such as ITERATE, GTD, and RAND, attribute attacks to terrorist groups for the last 40
years. Even though less than half of the recorded attacks are tied to specific groups, there are
now sufficient data to investigate the determinants of terrorist group survival. The pioneering
article using survival (hazard) analysis is by Blomberg, Engel & Sawyer (2010), with its focus on
‘one hit wonders’ or groups that struck just once.
Their study investigated how economic, political, and geographical considerations in the venue
country influenced terrorist group longevity. A follow-up study by Blomberg, Gaibulloev &
Sandler (2011) included terrorist groups’ ideologies and tactics (e.g. attack diversity and share
of transnational attacks). This second study relied on economic, political, and geographical
variables but in the terrorist group’s base country. Future analyses need to go a step further to
condition the groups’ failure to a cause – i.e. loss of a leader, dissent within the group,
accomplishment of its political goal, or defeat by the authorities.
Data in a study by Jones & Libicki (2008) can be used to explain specific causes of group failure
(Carter, 2012). Suicide terrorism requires further analysis. Benmelech, Berrebi & Klor (2012)
established that poor economic conditions may result in terrorist groups recruiting more capable
and better educated suicide bombers to attack Israeli targets. As a result, the ‘quality’ of attacks
increased in terms of carnage because more qualified suicide bombers can wreak more
casualties. This important work should be extended to a global sample.
Yet another issue for future research is the study of the factors that promote international
cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. For example, INTERPOL can coordinate
arrest efforts among countries. The aftermath of 9/11 showed that, under dire threat, nations
can cooperate against a common terrorist enemy. For counterterrorism, the role of partial
cooperation needs to be investigated. A final direction for future research involves the development of efforts to counter the growing threat of cyber-terrorism in an increasingly electronicdependent world.
This article demonstrates that the analytical study of terrorism is a very active research area that
has much policy relevance. Event datasets facilitated empirical tests of theoretical propositions,
but underscored a real deficiency – i.e. the need for data on governments’ counterterrorism
actions. There are a few country-specific coun-terterrorism datasets (see e.g. Dugan &
Chenoweth, 2012), but no global counterterrorism dataset. This article also highlights select
areas of major new developments, as well as future directions for research.
Schweller, Randall L., and Xiaoyu Pu. "After unipolarity: China's
visions of international order in an era of US decline."
Article overview
1. Why emerging powers will initially attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the hegemon—
through cost-imposing measures short of hard balancing—to pave the way for global
contestation.
2. Various forms of resistance to hegemonic domination:
3. The discourse and practices of resistance and the strategies of everyday and rightful
resistance.
4. China as the most viable contender for a hegemonic challenge, exploring its ambitions
and blueprints for a new world order.
After the cold war realism was pronounced dead, and the future of international politics became
legalized, cosmopolitanized, and network globalized. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the world does not appear so easily transformed, or history so easily escaped. Even
unipolarity, which seemed strangely durable only a few years ago, appears today as a “passing
moment”—one that most realists predicted. US remains a superpower, but no longer
hyperpower. An emergence of multipolarity.
order). These issues largely depend on what roles the emerging powers, especially China,
decide to play. They may choose to be:
(1) supporters, who assume their fair share of the responsibilities associated with co-managing
an evolving but essentially unchanged global order,
(2) spoilers, who seek to destroy the existing order and replace it with something entirely different, or
(3) shirkers, who want the privileges of power but are unwilling to pay for them by contributing to
global governance.
Global governance or world governance is a movement towards political cooperation among
transnational actors, aimed at negotiating responses to problems that affect more than one state
or region. (sounds a lot like world domination or control, lol!)
Dramatic structural change rarely happens smoothly or peacefully.
The fundamental issue at stake in hegemonic wars is the maintenance or acquisition of prestige, deaned as the reputation for power that serves as the everyday currency of international politics.
Robert Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war and international change is the law of uneven
rates of growth among states, which redistributes power in the international system.
Economic and military growth (trigger) -> security dilemmas
This delegitimation phase, which appears years before the critical inflection point of a power
transition, creates the conditions for the emergence of a revisionist counterhegemonic coalition.
This phase occurs within the larger cyclical pattern of
(1) a stable order,
(2) the deconcentration and delegitimation of the hegemon’s power,
(3) arms buildups and the formation of alliances,
(4) a resolution of the international crisis, often through hegemonic war, and
(5) system renewal.
The nuclear age makes power transition by means of a deliberately waged hegemonic war
unthinkable. This has according to authors permanently broken the hegemonic war cycle.
-
They argue that the current international system is entering a deconcentration/delegitimation
phase. Delegitimation involves two components:
1. a delegitimating rhetoric (the discourse of resistance) and
2. cost-imposing strategies that fall short of full-fledged balancing behavior (the practice of
resistance).
Sørli, Mirjam E., Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand. "Why
is there so much conflict in the Middle East?." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 49.1 (2005)
Abstract
The Middle East is one of the most conflict-proneregions—but why? The Collier-Hoeffler model
of civil war provides the starting point for our analysis. In an application to Africa, Collier and
Hoeffler found poverty to be the most significant predictor of conflict. For conflict in the Middle
East, a more complex picture emerges. Consistent with Collier and Hoeffler, the authors find
that economic development and economic growth, in addition to longer periods of peace,
generally decrease the likelihood of conflict. They also find that ethnic dominance is significant,
while social fractionalization is not. Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler, they find that regime type
matters. Variables for the Middle East region, Islamic countries, and oil dependence are not
significant. Conflict in the Middle East is quite well explained by a general theory of civil war,
and there is no need to invoke a pattern of “Middle Eastern exceptionalism.”
Keywords: Middle East; conflict; Collier-Hoeffler model; civil war.
This study has found no support for Middle Eastern exceptionalism regarding the causes of
conflict. There is nothing mysterious or particular about conflict in the Middle East or in Muslim
countries. Conflict is quite well explained by a general model of civil war, although the model
underpredicts the probability of conflict in the Middle East. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) conclude
that Africa would have seen less conflict if the region had achieved economic development at
the world level. The Middle East has enjoyed much greater prosperity than Africa but would
undoubtedly benefit from improved economic development. Nevertheless, deciphering the
Middle East’s correlates of conflict is a more complex task.
In the Middle East and North Africa, abundant access to oil has created a peculiar regional
system as well as ties to the international markets and political actors. The failure to modernize
and democratize has not led to major internal rebellions in the Middle East. So far, oil money
has bought some of the countries enough carrots and sticks to keep their populations quiet. But
what will happen when the oil wells run dry? Deteriorating economic conditions and the lack of
democracy in the Middle East may well create a fertile base for grievance-based rebellions.
Loot-seeking behavior aimed at controlling oil revenue does not characterize civil war in the
Middle East, and Collier and Hoeffler’s looting argument appears to be less applicable than in
Africa. The concept of the rentier state provides a more fruitful explanation for the current and
upcoming economic and political challenges faced by oil producers in the Middle East. These
economic and political challenges fit better into the traditional grievance-based perspective on
civil war. Lack of economic and political opportunities provides a fruitful base for frustration and
opposition. Unless the regimes become increasingly repressive, the future is likely to hold
growing political unrest and even civil war in the Gulf area. Sick and Potter (1997, 12) suggest
that the Gulf countries are experiencing “a crisis in slow motion.” The economic and political
effects of oil—corruption, slow growth, and authoritarianism—create a basis for grievancebased conflict. The growth of political Islam is, to a large extent, a result of these forces.
The regime change strategy in Iraq is not likely to dramatically change the Middle East’s status
quo in which the region’s authoritarian regimes have remained in power to a large extent due to
external (particularly U.S.) support. These regimes have little legitimacy and put the West in an
awkward light in many Arab eyes. Although the authoritarian regimes so far have been
successful in quelling serious political and domestic armed conflict, they have not successfully
constructed solid economic and social platforms for the future. The incumbent regimes face
serious challenges to provide food and jobs to their populations (UNDP 2002). Ensuring
diversified economic development remains the key to preventing future conflicts. Improved
management of resources, natural as well as human, and the development of more transparent
and legitimate, if not democratic, regimes provide the most efficient means toward preventing
new conflicts—in the Middle East as in other developing regions.
Tannenwald, Nina. "The nuclear taboo: The United States and the
normative basis of nuclear non-use."
Deterrence theory and MAD cannot fully explain the non-use:
1. Cases with no fear of retaliation, and still nuclear weapons were not used • First ten
years of nuclear era, the US in Vietnam and 1991 Persian Gulf war, the UK in the
Falkland war, Soviet in Afghanistan.
2. Cases when non-nuclear states attacked nuclear states without fear of nuclear
retaliation China attacked the US in Korean War, North Vietnam attacked the US in
Vietnam War, Argentina attacked Britain in Falkland War, Iraq attacked U.S. forces and
Israel in 1991 Gulf War.
3. Non-nuclear states do not seem very scared of nuclear states
There is a norm in the global system against the use of nuclear weapons – the use of
nuclear weapons is stigmatized.
Non-nuclear powers feel safer because they know their enemies are hesitant
of using nuclear powers.
Valbjørn, Morten. “International Relations Theory and the New
Middle East: Three Levels of a Debate.”
The Arab uprisings have not only impacted the Arab world but also scholarship about Arab
politics. Valbjørn identifies three clusters of debate:
The first cluster, which operates at a more empirical level, concerns the question of how
Middle East international relations have been affected by the Arab uprisings and relates to the
debate about the “newness” of the “new Middle East.” Halliday once remarked—in the context
of September 11, 2001—that, “there are two predictable, and nearly always mistaken,
responses to any great international upheaval: one is to say that everything has changed; the
other is to say that nothing has changed,”
The second cluster, which operates at a first-order theoretical level, is about how insights on
and studies of the “new Middle East” can contribute to the academic field of IR and enrich our
general understanding of the international relations. This kind of engagement can take a
number of forms. One variant will be to use the Middle East as a “most/least likely” case to test
allegedly universal IR theories. As Halliday once noted, one should ask of any theory what it can
contribute to the study of Middle East international relations, and if it cannot help to explain this
region then it cannot fly as an IR theory of general scope.
Lastly, a third and final cluster concerns a range of questions of a more meta-theoretical
second-order nature. The first of these questions takes its point of departure in the classic
universalism/particularism debate. As Halliday explained, this relates to a “very fundamental
issue much debated in contemporary social thought on whether it is possible, or desirable, to
analyze and evaluate different parts of the world on the basis of similar criteria, or whether we
should accept that they are marked by different and distinct dynamics precluding any
universalist ‘narratives,’ maybe necessitating a spatial and temporal differentiation of a plurality
of concepts and logics.
Walt, Stephen M. (1998). “International Relations: One World,
Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (110)
Abstract
Is NATO expansion an effort to extend Western influence at Russia's expense or to support nascent
democracies? The answer depends on whether you are a "realist" or "liberal" thinker. Find out where
you fall on the theoretical spectrum and how ideas can become self-fulfilling realities.
Conclusion // Tomorrow’s conceptual toolbox
While these debates reflect the diversity of contemporary scholarship on international affairs,
there are also obvious signs of convergence. Most realists recognize that nationalism,
militarism, ethnicity, and other domestic factors are important; liberals acknowledge that power
is central to international behavior; and some constructivists admit that ideas will have
greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces.
The boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat perme- able, and there is ample opportunity
for intellectual arbitrage. Which of these broad perspectives sheds the most light on contemporary international affairs, and which should policymakers keep most firmly in mind when
charting our course into the next century? Although many academics (and more than a few
policymakers) are loathe to admit it, realism remains the most compelling general framework for
understanding international relations.
States continue to pay close attention to the balance of power and to worry about the possibility of major conflict. Among other things, this enduring preoccupation with power and security
explains why many Asians and Europeans are now eager to preserve-and possibly expand-the
U.S. military presence in their regions. As Czech president Vaiclav Havel has warned, if NATO
fails to expand, "we might be heading for a new glob- al catastrophe ... [which] could cost us all
much more than the two world wars." These are not the words of a man who believes that great
power rivalry has been banished forever.
As for the United States, the past decade has shown how much it likes being "number one" and
how determined it is to remain in a predominant position. The United States has taken
advantage of its current superiori- ty to impose its preferences wherever possible, even at the
risk of irritating many of its long-standing allies. It has forced a series of one-sided arms control
agreements on Russia, dominated the problematic peace effort in Bosnia, taken steps to
expand NATO into Russia's backyard, and become increasingly concerned about the rising
power of China.
It has called repeatedly for greater reliance on multilateralism and a larger role for international
institutions, but has treated agencies such as the United Nations and the World Trade
Organization with disdain whenever their actions did not conform to U.S. interests. It refused to
join the rest of the world in outlawing the production of landmines and was politely uncooperative at the Kyoto environmental summit. Although U.S. leaders are adept at cloaking their
actions in the lofty rhetoric of "world order," naked self-interest lies behind most of them.
Thus, the end of the Cold War did not bring the end of power politics, and realism is likely to
remain the sin- gle most useful instrument in our intellectual toolbox.
Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would also keep insights from the
rival paradigms in mind. Liberal theories identify the instruments that states can use to achieve
shared inter- ests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must
now contend, and help us understand why states may differ in their basic preferences.
Paradoxically, because U.S. protec- tion reduces the danger of regional rivalries and reinforces
the "liber- al peace" that emerged after 1945, these factors may become relatively more
important, as long as the United States continues to provide security and stability in many parts
of the world.
Meanwhile, constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests
can change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionally
triggering far- reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs. It matters if political identity
in Europe continues to shift from the nation-state to more local regions or to a broader sense of
European identity, just as it matters if nationalism is gradually supplanted by the sort of "civilizational" affinities emphasized by Huntington. Realism has little to say about these prospects, and
policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignore these possibilities entirely.
In short, each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world
politics. Our understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined to only
one of them. The "compleat diplomat" of the future should remain cognizant of realism's
emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic
forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change.
Walt, Stephen M. "ISIS as Revolutionary State." Foreign Affairs.
Vol 94 (2015): 42
(in progress)
Walter Barbara F. The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars.
International Security, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Fall 2017)
Abstract / Introduction
One of the puzzles of the current wave of civil wars is that rebel groups espousing extremist
ideologies—especially Salaª jihadism—have thrived in ways that moderate rebels have not.1
Groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (also known by the acronym ISIS) have
attracted more recruits, foreign soldiers, and ªnancing than corresponding moderate groups
such as the Free Syrian Army, Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa, or Jaysh Rijaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia
(JRTN).2 The proliferation and success of extremist groups is particularly surprising given that
their goals are far more radical than those of the populations they seek to represent.3 Salaª
jihadists aim to establish a transnational caliphate using military force, an objective the vast
majority of Muslims do not support.4 Why have so many extremist groups emerged in countries
experiencing civil wars since 2003, and why have they thrived in ways that moderate groups
have not?
Conclusion
This article helps to explain one of the major international phenomena of our time: the rise of
Sala jihadist groups in civil wars in the Muslim world. It began with the observation that the
number of Salaª jihadist groups ªghting in civil wars has grown and, in many cases, these
groups have outperformed and outlasted more moderate groups. By 2016, Sala jihadist groups
accounted for most of the militant groups in Syria, half of all such groups in Somalia, and a third
of all militant groups in Iraq. Currently, the scholarly literature has no theory for why rebel
groups would embrace an extreme ideology or why more extreme groups would perform better
than more moderate groups in war. The academic literature has tended to ignore the role of
ideology in civil war.99 Instead, scholars have assumed that the core features of rebel groups—
their identity, goals, and beliefs—were exogenous to the war in which they were ªghting and not
part of an ongoing strategy of the war itself. This article has attempted to ªll this gap. It has
argued that the choice of ideology, especially the level of extremism, is likely to be endogenous
to speciªc features of a civil war: the level of competition, a group’s local support network, and
the institutional constraints on state power. When competition is high, information poor, and
institutional constraints weak, an extremist ideology could help rebel groups mitigate difªcult
collective-action, principalagent, and commitment problems. An extremist ideology, therefore,
can give rebel entrepreneurs an organizational advantage under certain conditions. All three of
these conditions were present in the post-2003 civil wars in Muslim countries, and all help
explain the emergence and growth of Salaª jihadist groups. This theory challenges a number of
assumptions about extremist ideology and its adherents. The popular press is ªlled with stories
about the increasing radicalization of Muslims around the world. The assumption is that Salaª
jihadism has grown in popular support and strength because the number of true believers has
grown. This article offers a different interpretation of the rise of these groups. Muslims need not
believe in an extreme version of Islam to sympathize and support groups that embrace such a
vision. They need only operate in a world where political power is heavily contested and the
quality and commitment of competing rebel groups is uncertain. An extremist ideology will
always attract citizens who believe in the ideology, but during times of uncertainty and insecurity
it will attract more moderate citizens as well.
Finally, the popular press often portrays individuals who join or collaborate with extremist groups
as either true believers or hapless victims. The formation of so many Salaª jihadist groups and
the ability of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS, and al-Qaida to capture and administer
territory suggests a deeper level of local support than many Westerners have been willing to
acknowledge. This article reveals the very practical incentives that moderate citizens might have
to support such groups in environments of uncertainty, competition, and state abuse of power.
The seeming popularity of Salaª jihadist groups, therefore, may have less to do with the ideas
Salaª jihadism promotes than with the security and assurances it offers. The framework reveals
the role that an extreme ideology can play in organizing a rebel group and ªghting a war. It
suggests that many rebel leaders may have embraced Salaª jihadism because this particular
ideology allowed them to use cheap inducements and punishments to attract supporters. The
extreme nature of the ideology helped them recruit a core group of particularly tough ªghters—
zealots—who elevated the quality of the ªghting force and helped enlist additional soldiers
attracted to the success of the group. Salaª jihadism then allowed rebel elites to reassure
Muslims that they would remain true to the rule of Islam and avoid aligning with the West,
making them additionally attractive to a more mainstream audience. Al-Baghdadi and alZarqawi effectively used these advantages to outcompete other Sunni groups. This article is the
ªrst step in understanding the role that ideology, especially extremist ideology, plays in civil war.
It reveals the incentives that individuals may have to promote an extreme ideology even if they
do not believe in its ideals. Much more work needs to be done. On the theoretical side,
signiªcantly more analysis is needed on the societal bases of ideology and on the initial choice
of ideology by rebel entrepreneurs. Why do certain ideas resonate more with some societies
than others? Additional theorizing is also needed on the strategic choices made by individual
citizens and the conditions under which their support for one ideology over another may change
and evolve over time. On the empirical side, this framework lends itself to rigorous testing. The
theory proposes a number of conditions purported to encourage the emergence of extremist
rebel groups. These include periods of heavy political competition, low information, and weak
political institutions. It also identiªes additional factors that could cause elites and citizens to
embrace an extreme ideology, including rapid social change, lengthy civil wars, and powerful
Salaª jihadist networks. At the macro level, data could be collected on each of these variables to
determine whether extremist groups are more likely to emerge under any of these conditions. At
the meso level, data could be collected to determine whether the ideology of rebel groups
ªghting in a civil war changes as conditions on the ground change.
Do rebel groups shift to more extreme ideologies if the number of rebel groups increases over
time, or if ªnancing from radical organizations suddenly becomes available? Finally, at the micro
level, data could be collected to determine whether moderate citizens are strategic, shifting their
support to more radical groups based on certain predicted conditions on the ground. Do
moderate individuals behave as the theory predicts or are they more heavily inºuenced by other
factors? It is my hope that this article triggers a larger research program on ideology and civil
war that addresses many of these theoretical and empirical issues. The theory, if correct, could
have three potentially important implications for policymakers seeking to counter the rise of
radical Islamist groups around the world. The most important concerns the sources of support
for extremist groups, especially from local populations. The type of counterstrategy the United
States pursues will depend heavily on whether U.S. leaders assume that Muslim citizens
support Salaª jihadist groups because they truly believe in a seemingly “medieval” and fringe
interpretation of Islam, or because they believe these groups are more likely to deliver justice
and reform in countries where both characteristics are missing. This article reveals the
incentives that moderate citizens may have to support extreme groups and the conditions under
which these incentives are likely to be strong and weak. It also reveals the parts of an extremist
strategy that are designed to appeal to more moderate citizens. Dissuading true believers from
joining these movements will be a huge challenge, but convincing more moderates to defect
might not. This article suggests three ways in which moderate support for these movements
might be undercut. The ªrst involves the competitive nature of these wars and the collectiveaction problems this creates for rebels. Wars with multiple competing rebel factions create
incentives for rebel entrepreneurs to go to the ideological extreme, but this competition also
creates opportunities for outsiders to bolster less extreme groups. This can be done by helping
moderate groups build high-quality ªghting units that would then attract the support of a larger
percentage of moderate citizens. The second has to do with agency problems. Outsiders can
also help to reveal the fraudulent nature of extremist elites and their claims. Religious authorities
of a more moderate persuasion (often tribal leaders), for example, can use the politics of
religious legitimacy as a check against radical leaders who attempt to use their religiosity as a
costly signal of principle and devotion. Finally, outsiders can address the commitment problems
that encourage extremism by helping to reform state institutions and refusing to support and
sustain corrupt regimes.
Scholars can no longer close their eyes to the role of ideology in civil war. The rise of Salaª
jihadist groups, with their global aims and their condemnation of the United States and its allies,
has become one of the biggest security threats in the world today. To date, the United States
has not been particularly effective at reducing their number. Indeed, these groups are growing
over time. This growth suggests an underlying level of support from Muslim communities around
the world that we do not yet understand. Only by analyzing the ways in which an extreme
ideology may beneªt both elites and more moderate citizens in civil war can we begin to
understand how it might be strategically used, and the conditions under which it is likely to
attract support. This article is a first step in that direction.
Wohlforth, W., De Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Neumann, I. (2018).
Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states
and the social dimension of status seeking.
(in progress)