Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO,
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA,
Petitioners,
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
54811, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for
registration of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
- versus-
On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao,
and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY,
Respondents,
G.R. No. 170757
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to
Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared
alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3)
the application has no factual or legal basis.
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 28, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
DECISION
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others:
that
1. neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto;
2. that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of
applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of
their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
3. that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and
4. that the present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral case
prosecuted between the same parties and involving the same parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
PERALTA, J.:
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land
from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale[5] dated May 19, 1916 entirely
handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until
his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious,
uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs
possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed
them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified
Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners
submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names
of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property, the dispositive portion of which states:
parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic.
The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for
land registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the
public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE
the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for
registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot and academic any and all
claims of private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel of
land to be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.[8]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot
No. 2372 subject of the present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the
applicants, who are declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant
Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and Certificate of
Title be issued in the name of the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao,
Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea, subject to the rights of private
oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared
VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor
Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision
dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification of lands of the public domain is an
exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and in the absence
of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO.
2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED
LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES
RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION.[9]
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open,
continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land into a private land. The subject lot
had already become private in character in view of the length of time the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the confirmation
of their title. Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not
constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for registration of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present petition, i.e.,
whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and whether
petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in their name through
prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA and no
longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when supported by sufficient
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners
failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred by a prior
decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient
evidence to prove that their possession over the subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful,
exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law
may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings
on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court
are contrary to those of the trial court.[10] Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and
the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that:
(1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
(2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[11] These the petitioners
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[12]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title.
[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
a.
b.
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
1. presidential proclamation or an executive order;
2. an administrative action;
3. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
4. a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.[16]
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.[17]
Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land
subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July 11, 1966, the
petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen
the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its
Order[18] dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that
after the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be inside the communal forest. On
appeal, the CA, in its Decision[19] dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed
the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the case to this Court was
dismissed for lack of merit.[20] In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005,
ruled that such judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land
registration on the same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a judicial declaration that a
parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Section 48[22] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public lands remain alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that
they by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession.[23] Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.[24]
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's
possession and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio
was in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the subject
property, during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947,
was presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio
allegedly introduced improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in the records
which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion
that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and
self-serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could
only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can
only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed to explain why,
despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in
the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to
declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the
names of the applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessorsin-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811,
which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental,
Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of
title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao,
and Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R.
VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and
FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.,
Respondents,
ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ,
ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G. BUHAY-SENADOSA,
FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAYGRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS,
Respondents-Intervenors.
G. R. No. 177790
Present:
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 17, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
- versus DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner Republic), through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals,[1]
which affirmed a lower courts grant of an application for original registration of title covering a
parcel of land located in Los Baos, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the appellate court are
straightforward and without much contention from the parties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and
Heirs of Gloria R. Vega namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap
and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) filed an application for registration of title. The
application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos, Laguna,
with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land).
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria
Revilleza Vda. de Vega,
who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza.
Their mothers siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any
offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas application for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of
the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents Vegas presented
several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove
respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration.
Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna,
under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having
conducted an inspection of the subject land[2] and identified the corresponding Report dated 13
January 1997, which he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report
stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable
zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by
any other person.[3]
During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G.
Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa,
Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie
Buhay-Dallas (respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to
intervene in respondents Vegas application for registration.[4]
Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land consisting of eight
hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purportedly sold by respondents Vegas mother
(Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the formers predecessors-in-interest - the sisters Gabriela
Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio - by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan dated 14
January 1951.[5] They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D,
which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their
predecessors-in-interest.[6]
In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents Vegas
application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays
predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the subject land.
Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents Vegas
failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of
Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
Unpersuaded by petitioner Republics arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
earlier Decision of the trial court.
Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.
Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectively,
respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Petition, which the
Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in the instant Petition, procedural
deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a)
petitioner Republic failed to include the pertinent portions of the record that would support its
arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellees Brief of
respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised questions of fact, which are
beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.[7]
The Court is not persuaded by respondents arguments concerning the purported defects of the
Petition.
First, petitioner Republics failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas Appellees Brief to the
instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition.
The requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by such material
portions of the record as would support the petition is left to the discretion of the party filing the
petition.[8] Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be
appealed from,[9] there are no other records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached
before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.
Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or records in
the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding whether the Decision
appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding
which records would support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event,
respondents are not prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the
records that they deem necessary for the Courts evaluation of the case, as was done by
respondents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellees Brief to their Comment. In the
end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether
the material portions of the records attached are sufficient to support the Petition.
Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic
simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding
the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When
petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence
presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support
the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,[10] the Court
reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted.
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether
the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower courts conclusion that the subject land
is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by
respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified
under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject
land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the
correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.
Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the question of
whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that
the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have
affirmed the trial courts grant of registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject
land? We find no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for
the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of
land:
Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.
Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove the following:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
and
(2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[11] Section 14 (1)
of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable
at the time the application for registration is filed.[12]
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first
requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same
in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and result
in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands
remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights.[13]
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.[14] To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the
following:
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.[15] The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.[16]
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to
establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.[17]
However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[18] the Supreme Court overturned the grant by
the lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and
ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration
of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records in order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[19]
To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration of title under the
Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification
and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is
alienable and disposable, together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original
classification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.[20] If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial
of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the Courts pronouncement in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was issued after the decisions of the trial court[21] and
the appellate court[22] in this case.
Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,[23] the Court affirmed the findings of the trial and
the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable.
The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification, which is annotated
on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with
the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable
and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical
Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by
Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that
Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the
contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration
Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective
shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced,
the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a
certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
and a certified true copy of the DENRs original classification of the land. The Court, however, has
nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and
convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the
ground of substantial compliance.
Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the
CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has
been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed
alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.
First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the
subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection
of the subject land.
In the Report,[24] Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that
(1) the area is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No.
15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;[25]
(2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes;
(3) the land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;[26]
(4) there are no public land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;[27] and
(5) the land is residential/commercial.[28] T
That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added to the reliability of the
Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court
affirms the Court of Appeals conclusion that Mr. Gonzales testimony and written report
under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the
subject land.
Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondentsintervenors Buhays,[29] expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable.
Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision
plan, which was annotated with the following proviso:
[T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582,
certified on Dec. 31, 1925. Notably, Mr. De Leons annotation pertaining to the identification of
the land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.
Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original registration, the LRA
never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In
the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings,[30] the LRA did not
interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted
that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO
Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA
recommended that should the instant case be given due course, the application in Case No. 1469,
GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed. In addition, not only did
the government fail to cross-examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any
countervailing evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before
this Court,[31] no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from the pro
forma opposition filed by the OSG.
The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the applicant in
an original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the purported nature of the
land, need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise.[32] In this case though, there was no
effective opposition, except the pro forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicants
claim as to the character of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any
effective opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents other pieces of
evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to
when the land was declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in open court is
bereft of any detail as to when the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as
well as the date when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been
dealt with extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because of its
repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.[33] In any event, the Report, as well
as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified as alienable and
disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and commercial
in nature.
Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled with the
absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings
under the Property Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the
trial court or the appellate court in granting the registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays title to that portion of the subject land is likewise affirmed,
considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life
from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed
sale of that portion of the land to the formers predecessors-in-interest.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It
does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar
cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable,
especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were
rendered prior to these rulings.[34] To establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original
registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO
certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR
Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence
presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial
compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and
character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception
shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to
this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial courts Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
RAMON ARANDA,
Petitioner,
- versus G.R. No. 172331
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PEREZ,* JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
August 24, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated April 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 which reversed and set aside the Decision[3]
dated January 31, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
Reg. Case No. T-335 (LRA Record No. N-69447).
Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of land situated in San
Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of 9,103 square meters and designated as Lot 3730, Psc
47, Malvar Cadastre. The petition[4] was originally filed by ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI)
represented by its Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr. The Republic through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed its opposition[5] on grounds that the land applied for is part of the
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the following reasons: (1) the
petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping; (2) the statement of
technical description was based merely on the boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and
(3) due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant corporation cannot push
through and consequently the tax declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and
the land cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.[6]
The trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title,[7] this time filed in
the name of Ramon Aranda, herein petitioner. Petitioner prayed that should the Land
Registration Act be not applicable to this case, he invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous possession of the subject
land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years prior
to the filing of the application.[8]
In support of the application, petitioners sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her
father Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to his brother (petitioner), as evidenced by
documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa which she and her siblings executed on June
7, 2000.[9] She came to know the land for the first time in 1965 when she was eight years old
and his brother Ramon has been tilling the land since then, planting it with rice and corn. His
brother did not introduce any permanent improvement and also did not hire a tenant to work on
the land. As to the donation made by his father to his brother Ramon, she recalled there was such
a document but it was eaten by rats.[10]
Another witness, Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land and that
he had known about this property since he was six (6) years old as he used to accompany his
father in going to the land. His father farmed the land and planted it first, with rice, and later
corn. They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of
owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio Aranda. The children of Anatalio then
took over in tilling the land, planting it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He
does not have any copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.[11]
On January 31, 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision[12] granting the application and
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of petitioner.
The Republic appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court. The CA held that petitioners
evidence does not satisfactorily establish the character and duration of possession required by
law, as petitioner failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight to the documents
Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa and Pagpapatunay ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa,[13]
both prepared only in the year 2000 when the application for registration was filed, as factual
proof of ownership by the parties to the compromise agreement.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 alleging that the
decision of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts with regard to compliance with the
required 30 years of open, exclusive, public and adverse possession in the concept of owner.
Petitioner argues that the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio Aranda and
the 1965 donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of ownership notwithstanding
that these were executed only in the year 2000. He asserts that the testimonies of witnesses
Merlita Aranda-Enriquez and Luis Olan on the fact of loss and destruction of copies of the
aforesaid deeds constitute secondary evidence of the contents thereof based on recollection of
persons who are adversely affected. Such testimonial evidence coupled with the deeds of
confirmation warrants the application of the exception from the best evidence rule. Petitioner
thus contends that the CA had no legal basis to doubt the veracity of the donation and sale of the
subject property, and to conclude that the confirmation deeds can be treated as compromise
agreement considering that the transactions had been previously completed and perfected by
the parties.
We deny the petition.
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original registration of land in an
ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section 14(1)[14] thereof, a petition may be granted
upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.[15]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[16] The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.[17]
In this case, the Assistant Regional Executive Director For Operations-Mainland Provinces of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in compliance with the directive of
the trial court, issued a certification stating that the subject property falls within the Alienable
and Disposable Land, Project No. 22-A of Lipa, Batangas per LC Map 718 certified on March 26,
1928.[18] However, in the Certification[19] dated January 14, 2000 issued by the DENR CENR
Officer of Batangas City, Pancrasio M. Alcantara, which was submitted in evidence by the
petitioner, it states that:
This is to certify that based on projection from the technical reference map of this Office, Lot No.
3730, Ap-04-009883, situated at Barangay San Andres, Malvar, Batangas containing an area of
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THREE AND FORTY SEVEN (9,103.47) SQUARE METERS and
shown at the reverse side hereof has been verified to be within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 39, Land Classification Map No. 3601 certified on 22
December 1997 except for twenty meters strip of land along the creek bounding on the
northeastern portion which is to be maintained as streambank protection.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of classification[20] mentioned in the
foregoing government certifications. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable
and disposable was not clearly established.
We also agree with the CA that petitioners evidence failed to show that he possessed the
property in the manner and for the duration required by law.
Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale from the
original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation made by the latter in
favor of petitioner. But as found by the CA, the history of the land shows that it was declared for
taxation purposes for the first time only in 1981. On the other hand, the Certification issued by
the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar stated that petitioner, who supposedly received the property
from his father in 1965, had been paying the corresponding taxes for said land for more than five
consecutive years including the current year [1999], or beginning 1994 only or just three years
before the filing of the application for original registration. While, as a rule, tax declarations or
realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession they constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.[21]
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. His
witness Luis Olan testified that he had been visiting the land along with his father Lucio since he
was 6 years old (he was 70 years old at the time he testified), or as early as 1936. Yet, there was
no evidence that Lucio Olan declared the property for tax purposes at anytime before he sold it
to Anatalio Aranda. There is also no showing that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his
name from the time he bought it from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted
rice and corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the concept
of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership.[22] Specific acts of
dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness
of the evidence of the oppositors.[23] Furthermore, the court has the bounden duty, even in the
absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and
by positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands
which he is attempting to register.[24] Since petitioner failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by law, the CA was correct in reversing the trial court and dismissing his application for
judicial confirmation of title.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated July
26, 2005 and Resolution dated April 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 are
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172011
March 7, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving respondent’s
application for registration of an 8,957-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Taberna,
Bauang, La Union.
The facts are undisputed.
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La
Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration3 of a parcel of land
referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706,4 located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of
8,957 square meters.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he
obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and that
he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax
Declaration No. 222066 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment7 of real property
taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that
neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.
At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth. Consequently, the trial court
issued an Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines
and entered the same in the records of the case.
At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject property by purchase from his
mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as evidenced by a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962.8 He
also testified that he was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property; that no one was questioning his ownership over the land; and that he was the one
paying the real property tax thereon, as evidenced by the bundle of official receipts covering the
period of 1953 to 2000. He also stated that he was the one who had the property surveyed; that
no one opposed the survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete markers on the
boundaries of the property. Further, he stated that he was not aware of any person or entity
which questioned his mother’s ownership and possession of the subject property.
Respondent’s mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also presented during the trial. She stated that she
purchased the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated July
8, 1952. She confirmed that before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner
of the subject property and was in possession thereof, without anyone questioning her status as
owner. She further stated that she was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and
that she even installed improvements on the subject property.
After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land
Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report10 on July 17, 2001. Aside from the
technical description of the land, the report certified that indeed the subject parcel of land was
within the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was indeed in actual occupation
and possession of the land.
On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any evidence.
As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its
Decision11 on November 29, 2001, approving respondent’s application. The dispositive portion
of the trial court’s decision reads-WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special Default, hereby approves the
application and orders the adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey Plan No.
PSU-200706 (Exh. "A") and the Technical Description of the land (Exh. "B") situated at Brgy.
Taberna, Bauang, La Union containing an area of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Seven
(…8,957) square meters.
Once this decision becomes final and executory let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal.
In its Brief,13 the OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicant proved a
registrable title to the property. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated
the assailed Decision14 on March 14, 2006, affirming the trial court’s decision.
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to
seek relief.
In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all lands of
public domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its
alienable and disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is
strictly construed against the grantee/applicant.15
The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show indubitably that he has complied with
all the requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has
become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time
required by law. The OSG maintains that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest failed to
show convincingly that he or they were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of
the land of the public domain as required by law. The OSG points out that there is no evidence
showing that the property has been fenced, walled, cultivated or otherwise improved. The OSG
argues that without these indicators which demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation,
the application for registration cannot be allowed.16
On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented sufficient proof that the subject
property was indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. He also
asserts that his title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback to 1948 and
hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition of an imperfect title over alienable
public land has been satisfied.17
Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of ownership, tax declarations and official
receipts of payment of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real property. In
addition, he highlights the fact that since the occupancy and possession of his predecessors-ininterest, there has been no question about their status as owners and possessors of the property
from adjoining lot owners, neighbors, the community, or any other person. Because of this, he
claims that his possession of the land is open, continuous, adverse, and public -- sufficient for
allowing registration.
Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were in
open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the manner and
length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
We answer in the negative.
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152918 or the
Property Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
xxxx
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report19 dated July 17,
2001 submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone,
certified as such since January 21, 1987.
In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,20 we have ruled that a certification and
report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to
show the classification of the land described therein. We held:
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic,21 we ruled that said Certification is sufficient to
establish the true nature or character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We
similarly ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals22 and intoned therein that the certification enjoys
a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive government act, an
administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the petitioner,
the classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the
petitioner has overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the subject lot.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC
and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon
this Court absent any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual,23 we
reiterated,
Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court, having heard the
witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide
the question of their credibility. Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the
highest respect, even finality, by this Court. x x x.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the land since 1958
through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale24 dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina
Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration No. 1107825 for the year 1948 in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.26 In Llanes v.
Republic,27 the Court held that tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.28] However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof
of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning
June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.29
But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing
laws.1avvphil The laws on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well
settled that prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.30
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his
claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.
However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes
of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only
begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial.31 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled,
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2)32, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.33
In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO
dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and
disposable zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it
does not encroach any area devoted to general public use.34 Unfortunately, such certification
and report is not enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under
Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by the state
that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth. Thus, there appears no basis for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period in this case.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to
signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable
and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a
mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws
on prescription.
Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of
social justice35 we are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow
respondent’s application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2001 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent’s application for registration is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169599
March 16, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JUANITO MANIMTIM, JULIO UMALI, represented by AURORA U. JUMARANG, SPOUSES
EDILBERTO BAÑANOLA and SOFIA BAÑANOLA, ZENAIDA MALABANAN, MARCELINO
MENDOZA, DEMETRIO BARRIENTOS, FLORITA CUADRA, and FRANCISCA MANIMTIM,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the September 5, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 74720, which reversed and set aside the February 15, 2000 Amended Judgment2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City (RTC), and reinstated the March 31, 1997
Judgment3 granting the respondents’ application for registration of Lot 3857 but deferring the
approval of the application for Lot 3858.
The Facts
Records show that on December 3, 1991, Juanito Manimtim, Julio Umali, Spouses Edilberto
Bañanola and Sofia Bañanola, Zenaida Malabanan, Marcelino Mendoza, Demetrio Barrientos,
Florita Cuadra, and Francisca Manimtim (respondents) filed with the RTC two applications for
registration and confirmation of their title over two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot 3857
(Ap-04-006225) with an area of 38,213 square meters and Lot 3858 (Ap-04-006227) with an
area of 9,520 square meters, located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City.
4] The land is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which is not
subject to private appropriation.4
Julio Umali died while the case was pending and he was substituted by his heirs namely:
Guillermo, Jose, Gerardo, Meynardo, Jacinto, and Ernesto, all surnamed Umali, and Aurora UmaliJumarang.
On May 15, 1992, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) transmitted to the RTC a report dated
April 29, 1992 stating that there were discrepancies in Plans Ap-04-006225 (Lot 3857) and Ap04-006227 (Lot 3858) and referred the matter to the Land Management Sector (LMS), now
called the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), for verification and correction.
The respondents alleged that they are the owners pro indiviso and in fee simple of the subject
parcels of land; that they have acquired the subject parcels of land by purchase or assignment of
rights; and that they have been in actual, open, public, and continuous possession of the subject
land under claim of title exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.
In support of their applications, the respondents submitted blueprint plans of Lot 3857 and Lot
3858, technical descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost geodetic engineer’s certificates,
declarations of real property tax, official receipts of payment of taxes, real property tax
certifications, and deeds of absolute sale.
The RTC set the initial hearing of the case on May 20, 1992 after compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting.
On February 19, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the respondents’ twin application on the following grounds:
1] Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto;
2] The muniments of title, that is, tax declaration and tax receipts, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for registration;
3] This is a claim of ownership on the basis of a Spanish title or grant, which has been barred as a
mode of proving acquisition; and
On May 20, 1992, Moldex Realty, Inc. (MOLDEX) opposed the applications on the ground that it is
the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot 4, Psu-108624 and technically
described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-20118 and that the metes and bounds of Lot
3857 and Lot 3858 overlapped its lot by about 14,088 square meters. MOLDEX, therefore, prayed
that the overlapping portion be excluded from the applications.
On June 30, 1993, the respondents and MOLDEX filed a joint motion requesting the RTC to
appoint a team of commissioners composed of a government representative from the Survey
Division, LMS, DENR; Engr. Vivencio L. Valerio, representing the respondents; and Engr. Romeo
Durante, representing MOLDEX, to conduct an actual ground verification and relocation survey
to assist the RTC in resolving the controversy on the location and position of the subject lots. On
that same day, the RTC granted the joint motion and directed the team of commissioners to
submit its findings within 15 days after the termination of the ground verification and relocation
survey.
On January 19, 1995, Robert C. Pangyarihan, the Chief of Survey Division, LMS, DENR,
transmitted to the RTC the report of Engr. Alexander L. Jacob (Engr. Jacob), based on the
verification and relocation survey he conducted in the presence of the respondents and MOLDEX,
which found an encroachment or overlapping on Lot 4, Psu-108624. The report stated the
following findings and recommendations:
3.5. Lot 4, Psu-108624 is an older approved survey previously decreed and, therefore, it is the
survey which was encroached upon or overlapped by Lot 1, Psu-176181;Lot 1, Psu-176182; and
Lot 1 & 2 Psu-176184.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 In view of the foregoing findings of encroachment on decreed survey, the portions labeled as
"A" "B" "C" and "D" should be segregated from Lot 1, Psu-176181; Lot 1 & 2, 176184; and Lot 1 &
2 Psu-176182; respectively, which process involves the amendment of said plans to be submitted
for approval by the Regional Office.
4.2 It is further recommended that the point of reference or "tie point" of Lot 1, Psu-176181, Lot
1, Psu-176182, Lot 1, Psu-176182 and Lot 3, Psu-176181 be changed to BLLM No. 5, Tagaytay
Cadastre, the said amendment being warranted by the findings of this verification survey thru
direct traverse connection of the corner boundaries of said lots from BLLM No. 5 which is
relatively near to subject lots.5
On March 31, 1997, the RTC handed down its Judgment granting the respondents’ application for
registration of Lot 3857 of Plan Ap-04-006227 but deferred the approval of registration of Lot
3858 pending the segregation of 4,243 square meter portion thereof which was found to belong
to MOLDEX.
2. The judgment dated March 31, 1997 with respect to Lot 3858, Cad. 355 item #2 of the
dispositive portion be amended accordingly.6
On January 29, 1998, MOLDEX filed an opposition to the respondents’ motion for partial new
trial for lack of a supporting affidavit of the witness by whom such evidence would be given or a
duly authenticated document which was supposed to be introduced in evidence as required by
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On September 3, 1998, the RTC granted the respondents’ motion for partial new trial.
On February 15, 2000, the RTC, after due hearing and pleadings submitted by the parties,
rendered an Amended Judgment by also approving the application for the confirmation and
registration of Lot 3858 of Plan Ap-04-006227, Cad. 355, Tagaytay Cadastre, Barangay Sungay,
Tagaytay City.
The OSG and MOLDEX filed their respective appeals with the CA based on the following
On April 29, 1997, the respondents filed a motion for partial new trial on the following grounds:
1] Newly discovered evidence explaining that when they were in the process of amending plan
Ap-04-006227 of Lot 3858, they found out that the sketch plan that was furnished to them by the
LRA, upon their request, showed no overlapping between their property and that of MOLDEX;
and
2] Insufficiency of evidence because the plan prepared by Engr. Jacob, which was the basis of his
report, was not signed by the respondents or their representatives and the LRA was not
informed of these developments.
On October 27, 1997, Director Felino M. Cortez (Director Cortez) of the LRA Department of
Registration transmitted a supplementary report to the RTC dated October 1, 1997, which found
that Lot 3858 did not encroach on MOLDEX’s property. Likewise, the supplementary report
made the following recommendations:
1. To approve the correction made by the Lands Management Sector on the boundaries of Lot
3858, Cad. 355 along lines 2-3 and 9-1 which is Lot 4-B, Psu-105624 Amd. as mentioned in
paragraph 2 hereof; and
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
For MOLDEX:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPROVING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
LOT 3858 DESPITE FINDINGS OF ENCROACHMENT BASED ON ACTUAL GROUND VERIFICATION
SURVEY CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO ITS OWN ORDER.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
DATED 1 OCTOBER 1997 ISSUED BY THE LRA THRU DIRECTOR FELINO CORTEZ.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE REPORT ON THE ACTUAL GROUND
VERIFICATION SURVEY PREPARED BY ENGR. ALEXANDER JACOB DESPITE COMPLETE
ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT ITS VERACITY AND CORRECTNESS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT DENIAL OF THE REGISTRATION FOR LOT
3858 WILL VIOLATE SECTION 19, PARAGRAPH 2 OF P.D. 1529.
For the OSG:
ISSUE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF ORIGINAL
TITLE FOR FAILURE OF THE APPELLEES TO SUBMIT IN EVIDENCE THE ORIGINAL TRACING
CLOTH PLAN OR SEPIA OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REINSTATING THE MARCH 31, 1997
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH APPROVED THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF LOT 3857 BUT DEFERRED THE APPROVAL OF REGISTRATION OF LOT 3858.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES, BY THEMSELVES AND THROUGH
THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED LANDS IN
THE CONCEPT OF OWNER, OPENLY AND ADVERSELY FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW.
The OSG argues that the respondents have not shown a registrable right over Lot 3857.
According to the OSG, respondents’ evidence is insufficient to establish their alleged possession
over Lot 3857 to warrant its registration in their names. Despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of Lot 3857 for over 40 years at the time of
their application for registration in December 1991, it appears that their possession only started
in 1951 which falls short of the legal date requirement of possession, that is, since June 12, 1945
or earlier. The respondents simply made a general statement that their possession and that of
their predecessors-in-interest have been adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in the
concept of an owner for the required number of years. Their general statements simply lack
supporting evidence.
On September 5, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the February 15, 2000 Amended Judgment
of the RTC and reinstated its earlier March 31, 1997 Judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the February 15, 2000 Amended Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay
City, Branch 18 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in its stead, the earlier March 31, 1997
Judgment is hereby REINSTATED whereby registration as to LOT 3857 is hereby APPROVED
while registration as to LOT 3858 is hereby DENIED until such time that the encroachment on
the land of MOLDEX REALTY, INC. is separated and removed.
The CA held, among others, that the January 19, 1995 Report made by Engr. Jacob of the LMS,
DENR was more reliable than the supplementary report dated October 1, 1997 of Director Cortez
of the Department of Registration, LRA. The CA reasoned out that the January 19, 1995 Report
which found that Lot 3858 encroached on the property of MOLDEX was based on an actual field
verification and actual relocation survey ordered by the RTC upon joint motion of the parties. On
the other hand, the supplementary report dated October 1, 1997 which found no encroachment
was only based on an unreliable "table survey" of existing data and plans which were actually not
verified in the field.
The CA likewise ruled that although the respondents failed to submit in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan or sepia of the subject lots (Lots 3857 and 3858), these were sufficiently
identified with the presentation of the blueprint copy of Plans Ap-04-006225 and Ap-04-006227
and the technical descriptions duly certified by the Land Management Bureau.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
The OSG further contends that the respondents’ claim over the subject lots suffer from the
following infirmities, to wit:
1] The alleged deed of absolute sale upon which Juanito Manimtim (Juanito) anchors his claim
over the lot is a mere xerox copy and mentions only an area of 6,225 square meters and not 11,
577.44 square meters as claimed by him.
2] The signature appearing in the deed of sale as allegedly belonging to Julio Umali as vendor is
actually that of his daughter, Aurora, who, as far as Juanito knows, was not authorized to sign for
and in behalf of her father.
3] Likewise, in the case of Edilberto Bañanola, the alleged deed of absolute sale upon which he
banks his claim on the subject land is a mere xerox copy.
4] Jacinto and Isabelo Umali, claiming that they inherited the land they seek to be registered in
their names, have not adduced any evidence to substantiate this claim.
5) As to Eliseo Granuelas, representing Zenaida Malabanan, he failed to present any instrument
to substantiate her claim that her parents bought the claimed property from Julio Umali.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petition violates Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court because the CA decision dated September 5, 2005 is not yet final in view of the
unresolved issues raised in their motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 2005. The
respondents likewise claim that the RTC decision dated February 15, 2000 refers only to Lot
3858, Plan Ap-04006227 and that it was promulgated in accordance with the fundamental
requirements in the land registration of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529.
They further argue that the OSG, represented by the City Prosecutor of Tagaytay, did not raise
the issues, currently put forward by the OSG, in all the hearings before the RTC. Neither did the
OSG contest the respondents’ possession of Lot 3858 and 3857. In fact, Lot 3858, Plan Ap-04006227, together with the other adjoining lots, is originally listed in the original copy of the
tracing cloth of Tagaytay Cadastre Map as those belonging to the respondents’ grandmother,
Agapito Magsumbol, and/or Julio Umali.
Finally, the respondents aver that insofar as Lot No. 3857 is concerned, Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-741 was issued in their names pursuant to the decision dated March 31, 1997 and
that the derivative transfer certificates of title were already registered in their names in
compliance with the order for the issuance of the decree dated December 14, 1998 issued by the
Land Registration Court in LRC No. TG-399.
In reply, the OSG asserts that the issue raised by the respondents has been rendered moot with
the denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated March 13, 2006.
The OSG further claims that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of whatever classification
belong to the state. Hence, the respondents have the burden to show, even in the absence of an
opposition, that they are the absolute owners of the subject lots or that they have continuously
possessed the same under claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The Court’s Ruling
In its September 5, 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents by approving their
application for registration of Lot 3857 but denying their application for registration of Lot 3858
until such time that the encroachment on the land of MOLDEX would have been separated and
removed. The CA, however, did not rule on the second and more important issue of whether the
respondents were qualified for registration of title.
After going over the records, the Court agrees with the OSG that the respondents indeed failed to
sufficiently prove that they are entitled to the registration of the subject lands.
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 15297 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,8 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.1avvphi1
Xxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. [Emphasis supplied]
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.9 These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.10
Moreover, the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lands, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
In the case at bench, the respondents failed to establish that the subject lots were disposable and
alienable lands.
The respondents presented the testimonies of Juanito Manimtim (Juanito), Edilberto Bañanola,
Jacinto Umali, Eliseo Ganuelas, Isabelo Umali, and Engr. Vivencio Valerio and tax declarations to
prove possession and occupation over the subject lots. These declarations and documents,
however, do not suffice to prove their qualifications and compliance with the requirements.
Although respondents attached a photocopy of a certification11 dated August 16, 1988 from the
District Land Officer, LMS, DENR, attesting that the subject lots were not covered by any public
land applications or patents, and another certification12 dated August 23, 1988 from the Office
of the District Forester, Forest Management Bureau, DENR, attesting that the subject lots have
been verified, certified and declared to be within the alienable or disposable land of Tagaytay
City on April 5, 1978, they were not able to present the originals of the attached certifications as
evidence during the trial. Neither were they able to present the officers who issued the
certifications to authenticate them.
A careful scrutiny of the respondents’ Offer of Evidence13 would show that only the following
were offered as evidence:
1) blue print plans of AP-04-006225 and AP-04-006227
2) technical descriptions of Lot 3857 and 3858
3) surveyor’s certificates for Lot 3857 and 3858
4) photo-copy of the deed of sale dated September 17, 1971
5) jurisdictional requirements of posting and publication
6) tax declarations
7) tax receipts
Hence, there is no proof that the subject lots are disposable and alienable lands.
Juanito testified, among others, that he is a co-owner of the subject lots14 and that his ownership
covers about 11,577.14 square meters of the subject lots;15 that he acquired his possession
through a deed of absolute sale16 dated September 17, 1971 from Julio Umali (Julio);17 that the
11,577.14 square meter property has been covered by three (3) tax declarations;18 and that his
great grandparents were in possession of the subject lots for a period of 40 years.19
Juanito, however, could not show a duplicate original copy of the deed of sale dated September
17, 1991. Moreover, a closer look at the deed of absolute sale dated September 17, 1991 would
show that, for and in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00, the sale covered only an area of
6,225 square meters of Lot 1, Plan Psu-176181 (Lot 3858) and not 11,577.44 square meters as
claimed. Juanito explained that only the 6,225 square meter portion (Tax Declaration No. 0180928)20 was covered by the subject deed of absolute sale while the two (2) other portions (Tax
Declaration No. 018-0673 and Tax Declaration No. 018-0748 covering 2,676.40 square meters
each)21 were not covered by any deed of sale because Julio knew that these other portions were
already owned by him (Juanito).22 So, no deed of sale was executed between the two of them
after he paid Julio the price for the portions covered by Tax Declaration No. 018-0673 and Tax
Declaration No. 018-0748.23 He was not able to show, however, any other document that would
support his claim over the portions beyond 6,225 square meters.
In any event, Juanito failed to substantiate his general statement that his great grandparents
were in possession of the subject lots for a period of over 40 years. He failed to give specific
details on the actual occupancy by his predecessors-in-interest of the subject lots or mode of
acquisition of ownership for the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing
and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions
of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.24
Like Juanito, the testimonies of Edilberto Bañanola, Jacinto Umali, Eliseo Ganuelas, and Isabelo
Umali were all unsubstantiated general statements.
Edilberto Bañanola (Edilberto) claims that he owns a portion of Lot 3857 based on Tax
Declaration No. GR-018-1058-R25 covering 5,025 square meters and Tax Declaration No. GR018-1059-R26 covering 6,225 square meters.27 According to him, he bought the subject
property from Hilarion Maglabe and Juanito Remulla through a deed of absolute sale28 dated
February 6, 1978.29 To prove the same, he presented several tax declarations30 in the names of
Hilarion Maglabe and Juanito Remulla. He further asserts that he has been in actual, continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the subject property since he purchased it in 1978.31
Like Juanito, however, Edilberto failed to present a duplicate original copy of the deed of sale
dated February 6, 1978 and validate his claim that he himself and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
As for Jacinto Umali and Eliseo Ganuelas, they likewise failed to authenticate their claim of
acquisition through inheritance and acquisition through purchase, respectively.
Apparently, the respondents’ best evidence to prove possession and ownership over the subject
property were the tax declarations issued in their names. Unfortunately, these tax declarations
together with their unsubstantiated general statements and mere xerox copies of deeds of sale
are not enough to prove their rightful claim. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-ininterest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.32
Finally, the fact that the public prosecutor of Tagaytay City did not contest the respondents’
possession of the subject property is of no moment. The absence of opposition from government
agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the September 5, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74720 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
judgment entered denying the application for land registration of the subject properties.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA, G.R. No. 179673
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need for an applicant for registration of title to land to prove that the same
has been officially declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Facts and the Case
On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the
law[1] of a 1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondent
Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application in the usual form.
Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence to show that the subject lot, known as Lot
5176-D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping is a portion of a parcel of land with an
area of 17,507 sq m originally owned by Victorias father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously declared
in his name for tax purposes. Upon Genaros death, Victoria and her siblings inherited the land
and divided it among themselves via a deed of partition.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside
the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the
Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly,
openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than
30 years and have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The
Republic did not present any evidence in support of its opposition.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision,[2] granting the application for registration
and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the land registration
law to have the subject property registered in her name.
The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief
that Victoria failed to present evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of possession required for
registration.
In her brief, Victoria replied that the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted carried a
notation that the subject property is within alienable and disposable area. Further, she attached
to her brief a Certification[3] dated November 6, 2006 issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
On June 19, 2007 the CA rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the MeTC decision
because Victoria failed to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. She could not, said the CA, rely on the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she
submitted before the MeTC, although it carried a notation that the land is alienable and
disposable as certified by the Chief of Survey of the Land Management Services of the DENR on
January 3, 1968, because such notation was made only in connection with the approval of the
plan.
On the other hand, the CA could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification of November 6,
2006 that she submitted together with her appellees brief even if it were to the same effect since
she did not offer it in evidence during the hearing before the trial court. The CA found it
unnecessary to pass upon the evidence of Victorias possession and occupation of the subject
property. It denied Victorias motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2007.
Issues Presented
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.
Courts Ruling
Section 14(1)[4] of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[5]
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[6] There are no material
differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.[7] Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.[8]
Here, the only reason the CA gave in reversing the decision of the MeTC is that Victoria failed to
submit the November 6, 2006 Certification issued by the DENR, verifying the subject property as
within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, during the hearing before the
MeTC. She belatedly submitted it on appeal.
land.[14] The OSG also submitted a certified true copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141
dated January 3, 1968,[15] signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo
R. Tanco, Jr., which declared portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map
LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968, as alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute.[9] The applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO.[10] The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.[11]
Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems too hasty for
the CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not formally offered in evidence
before the court below. More so when even the OSG failed to present any evidence in support of
its opposition to the application for registration during trial at the MeTC. The attack on Victorias
proof to establish the nature of the subject property was made explicit only when the case was at
the appeal stage in the Republics appellants brief. Only then did Victoria find it necessary to
present the DENR Certification, since she had believed that the notation in the
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was sufficient.
The DENR Certification submitted by Victoria reads:
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of this
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of Lot 5176 MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Csd-00000648, containing an area of 17,507 square meters, situated at Bambang, Taguig City, Metro
Manila, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Justa M. de las Alas for Marissa S. Estopalla, et al., was
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 27-B, Taguig City, Metro
Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.[12]
On July 28, 2010 the Court issued a resolution requiring the OSG to verify from the DENR
whether the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital Region, Office of the
Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services, who issued the Certification in this
case, is authorized to issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and disposable,
and to submit a copy of the administrative order or proclamation that declares as alienable and
disposable the area where the property involved in this case is located, if any there be.[13]
In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR stating that Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Victorias DENR Certification, is
authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable
In Llanes v. Republic,[16] this Court allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification though it
was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The rules of procedure
being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to
suspend their application to a particular case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote the ends of justice.[17] Denying the application for registration now on the ground
of failure to present proof of the status of the land before the trial court and allowing Victoria to
re-file her application would merely unnecessarily duplicate the entire process, cause additional
expense and add to the number of cases that courts must resolve. It would be more prudent to
recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter now.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig
conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage
landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense
to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the
public domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.
The CA also erred in not affirming the decision of the MeTC especially since Victoria has, contrary
to the Solicitor Generals allegation, proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject lot continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the
concept of owners since the early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax declarations covering the
land way back in 1948 that appeared in her fathers name.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that Victoria amply established her
right to have the subject property registered in her name, given that she has met all the
requisites for registration of title under the Property Registration Decree.
Respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June 19, 2007
decision and the September 11, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals, and REINSTATES the
January 25, 2006 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74 of the City of Taguig.
August 31, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Promulgated:
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus G.R. No. 179978
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] dated June 25, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868. The CA reversed the Decision[3] dated August 22, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch 25 in LRC No. 147 (LRA Rec. No. N-73333).
On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D.
Dira, Jr., filed a verified application for registration[4] of a parcel of land situated in Taytay,
Danao City with an area of 4,493 square meters designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, CAD
681-D. It was alleged that applicant which acquired the property by purchase, together with its
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property for more than thirty (30)
years. Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially confirmed.
After compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, the trial court through its clerk of court
conducted hearings for the reception of petitioners evidence. Based on petitioners documentary
and testimonial evidence, it appears that although designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, the
approved technical description indicated the lot number as Lot 30186, CAD 681-D which is
allegedly identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621 consisting of 3,781 square meters. Lot 5331part (4,493 sq. ms.) was subdivided into two (Lots 21225-A and 21225-B) so that the 712 square
meters (Lot 21225-B) can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative Order
No. 97-05.[5]
Andrea Batucan Enriquez, one of the six (6) children of Vivencio and Paulina Batucan, testified
that her parents originally owned the subject land which was bought by her father after the
Second World War. Vivencio and Paulina died on April 2, 1967 and November 11, 1980,
respectively. Upon the death of their parents, she and her siblings inherited the land which they
possessed and declared for tax purposes. On December 22, 1993, they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement With Absolute Sale whereby they sold the property to Danilo C. Dira, Sr.,
petitioners father.[6]
Danilo D. Dira, Jr. testified that the subject land declared under Tax Declaration (TD) No.
0400583 in the name of Danilo C. Dira, Sr. was among those properties which they inherited
from his father, as shown in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate With Special Power of
Attorney dated May 28, 1996 and Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated
February 27, 1997. On June 26, 2000, his mother, brothers and sisters executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale whereby the subject land was sold to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner declared the
property for tax purposes and also paid realty taxes. His father had possessed the land beginning
1992 or 1994, and presently petitioner is in possession thereof. Petitioner also assumed the P3.8
million mortgage obligation with Land Bank of the Philippines as evidenced by the Deed of
Undertaking/Agreement dated March 30, 2000.[7]
On August 22, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all of the foregoing undisputed facts, this Court finds and so holds that the
applicant DCD CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to Lot No. 5331-A with an area of
3,781 square meters as part of Lot 5331, CAD-681-D, under Csd-072223-003891 which is
identical to Lot No. 21225-A as part of Lot No. 21225, CAD-681-D, under Csd-07-006621, and is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 0-0400469 situated in Taytay, Danao City, hereby confirming the
same and ordering its registration under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529,
strictly in line with the Technical Description of Lot 30186, Danao, CAD-681-D, identical to Lot
21225-A, Csd-07-006621, upon finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal by respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA
ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and disposable
considering that only a notation in the survey plan was presented to show the status of the
property. The CA also found that petitioners evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite
possession as the land was bought by Vivencio Batucan only after the Second World War or in
1946, further noting that the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued only in 1988. As to the
testimony of witness Andrea Batucan Enriquez, the CA held that it did not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court raising the
following arguments:
I
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE LAND APPLIED FOR IS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS, WHICH WARRANTS A REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING IN MEGAWORLD AND HOLDINGS, INC. VS. HON. JUDGE
BENEDICTO G. COBARDE, ET AL. AND SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. VS.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.
(A)
THE BUREAU OF LANDS VERIFIED AND CERTIFIED THE SUBJECT LOT AS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE.
(B)
THE DENR CERTIFIED THAT ITS OWN LAND CLASSIFICATION MAP SHOWS THAT
SUBJECT LOT IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SETTLED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THE PERIOD
REQUIRED BY LAW HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
(A)
WITNESS ANDREA ENRIQUEZS TESTIMONY SHOWS THAT PETITIONERS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ACQUIRED AND POSSESSED SUBJECT LOT IN 1942.
(B)
IN REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. SPOUSES ENRIQUEZ, THE SUPREME COURT
CATEGORICALLY RULED THAT POSSESSION FOR 34 YEARS IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR REGISTRATION.[9]
We deny the petition.
In Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v. Cobarde,[10] the Court held that as an exception to
the binding effect of the trial courts factual findings which were affirmed by the CA, a review of
such factual findings may be made when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant facts that would lead to a
completely different conclusion. In the same vein, we declared in Superlines Transportation
Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company,[11] that while it is settled that this
Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the
Court, such as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. Petitioner invokes the foregoing exceptions
urging this Court to pass upon anew the CAs findings regarding the status of the subject land and
compliance with the required character and duration of possession by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of title.
After a thorough review, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that
petitioner failed to establish a registrable title on the subject land.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms
part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[12]
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[13]
All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.[14]
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable and
disposable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.[15] Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[16]
In support of its contention that Lot 5331-A, CAD-681-D under Csd-072223-003891 is alienable
and disposable, petitioner presented the following notation appearing in the survey plan which
reads:
CONFORMED PER LC MAP NOTATION
LC Map No. 1321, Project No. 26-A certified on June 07, 1938, verified to be within Alienable &
Disposable Area
(SGD.) CYNTHIA L. IBAEZ
Chief, Map Projection Section[17]
Petitioner assailed the CA in refusing to give weight to the above certification, stressing that the
DENR-Lands Management Services (LMS) approved the survey plan in its entirety, without any
reservation as to the inaccuracy or incorrectness of Cynthia L. Ibaez[s] annotation found
therein.[18] Petitioner relies on the statement of Rafaela A. Belleza, Chief, Surveys Assistance
Section, DENR-LMS, who testified (direct examination) as follows:
Atty. Paylado continues:
Q Before this is given to the surveyor, did these two (2) documents pass your office?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you said it passed your office, it passed your office as you have to verify all the entries in
these documents whether they are correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to have a personal look and verification on these Exhibits P and Q and will you
confirm that all the entries here are true and correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Based on the records in your office?
A As a whole.
x x x x[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner contends that the foregoing declaration of Belleza conclusively proves that the LMS
itself had approved and adopted the notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan as its own. Such
approval amounts to a positive act of the government indicating that the land applied for is
indeed alienable and disposable.
We do not agree.
First, it must be clarified that the survey plan (Exhibit Q) was not offered by petitioner as
evidence of the lands classification as alienable and disposable. The formal offer of exhibits
stated that said document and entries therein were offered for the purpose of proving the
identity of the land, its metes and bounds, boundaries and adjacent lots; and that the survey has
passed and was approved by the DENR-LMS. And while it was also stated therein that the
evidence is also being offered as part of the testimony of Belleza, nowhere in her testimony do
we find a confirmation of the notation concerning the lands classification as correct. In fact, said
witness denied having any participation in the actual approval of the survey plan. This can be
gleaned from her testimony on cross-examination which immediately followed the afore-quoted
portion of her testimony that the survey plan passed their office, thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION: (FISCAL KYAMKO TO THE WITNESS)
Q Madam Witness, you said that Exhibits P and Q passed before your office, now, the question is,
could you possibly inform the Court whether you have some sort of an initial on the two (2)
documents or the two (2) exhibits?
A Actually, sir, I am not a part of this approval because this will undergo in the isolated survey
and my section is I am the Chief, Surveys Assistant Section, which concerns of the LRA, issuance
of Certified Sketch Plans, issuance of certified Technical Descriptions of Untitled Lots to correct
the titles for judicial purpose.
Q In other words, since Exhibits P and Q are originals, they did not actually pass your office, is it
not?
A Our office, yes, but not in my section, sir.
Q So it passed your office but it did not pass your section?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, you had [no] hand in re-naming or renumbering of the subject lots, is it not?
A It is in the Isolated Survey Section, sir.
Q In other words, you cannot possibly testify with authority as to the manner by which the
numbering of the subject lot was renumbered, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to the
veracity of the notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan regarding the status of the subject
land. Hence, no error was committed by the CA in finding that the certification made by DENRLMS pertained only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the survey plan and not
to the nature and character of the property surveyed.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; and administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.[22] A certification issued by a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that the lots involved
were found to be within the alienable and disposable area was deemed sufficient to show the
real character of the land.[23]
As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of the lot stating that it is within the alienable
and disposable area, the consistent holding is that these do not constitute proof required by the
law.[24] In Menguito v. Republic,[25] the Court declared:
x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation x x x indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act
validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable.[26]
The above ruling equally applies in this case where the notation on the survey plan is supposedly
made by the Chief of Map Projection Unit of the DENR-LMS. Such certification coming from an
officer of the DENR-LMS is still insufficient to establish the classification of the property
surveyed. It is not shown that the notation was the result of an investigation specifically
conducted by the DENR-LMS to verify the status of the subject land. The certifying officer,
Cynthia L. Ibaez, did not testify on her findings regarding the classification of the lot as reflected
in her notation on the survey plan. As to the testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, the
CA noted that Engr. Norvic Abella who prepared the survey plan had no authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain, while Rafaela A. Belleza who is the Chief of the Surveys Assistance
Section, admitted on cross-examination that she had no part in the approval of the subdivision
plan, and hence incompetent to testify as to the correctness of Ibaezs notation. More important,
petitioner failed to establish the authority of Cynthia L. Ibaez to issue certifications on land
classification status for purpose of land registration proceedings.
Our pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[27] is instructive:
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of
596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No.
30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925. The second certification in
the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical
Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec.
31, 1925 per LC No. 582.
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May
1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20,
series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate
of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the
CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the
authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over
50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by
Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the
entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. x x x
xxxx
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents
of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed
duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land
is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO
is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring
public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication
of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class
of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer, such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
captain in the ships logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications
cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
x x x x[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the notation inserted in the survey plan (Exhibit Q)
hardly satisfies the incontrovertible proof required by law on the classification of land applied
for registration.
The CA likewise correctly held that there was no compliance with the required possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on
the applicant to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession was
of the nature and duration required by law.[29] The bare statement of petitioners witness,
Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of the subject land from the
time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice.
Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of petitioners father, TD No. 0400583 was issued only
in 1994, while TD No. 0-0400469 in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners predecessorsin-interest were able to submit a tax declaration only for the year 1988, which was long after
both spouses Vivencio and Paulina Batucan have died. Although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner.[30] And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez claimed
knowledge of their familys possession since she was just ten (10) years old although she said she
was born in 1932 -- there was no clear and convincing evidence of such open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never mentioned
any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property throughout the
alleged length of possession.[31] There was no account of the circumstances regarding their
fathers acquisition of the land, whether their father introduced any improvements or farmed the
land, and if they established residence or built any house thereon.
We have held that the bare claim of the applicant that the land applied for had been in the
possession of her predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not constitute the well-nigh
inconvertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration.[32]
As the Court declared in Republic v. Alconaba:[33]
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.[34] (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2007
and Resolution dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868 are
AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154953
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Promulgated:
Respondent. June 26, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion
of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007
square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November
1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999
issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,[4] and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples
Journal Taliba,[5] a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial
Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.[6] All adjoining owners and
all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.[7]
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no
oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued
an Order[8] of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land
Registration Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as
oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his
written opposition.[9] Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the
succeeding hearings. In an Order[10] dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the
Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three
witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident
of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy)
had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner
since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga
(Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in
favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave
Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation
of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga
(Porting).[11] On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land
provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or
more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted
the land to private property.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby
adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on
plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province
of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with
principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in
granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as
required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in
nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have
been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the
land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he
and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of
his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista
should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of
Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to
Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further
ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public
knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional
witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the
corroboration of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only
testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that
respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the
following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant
corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and
2.
Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.[13]
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or
earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land
Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.[15]
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16] certified that lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of
596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No.
30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925. The second
certification[17] in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the
Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that
the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,[18] dated 30 May
1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20,
series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate
of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,[19] dated 19 April
1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of
the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as
the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering
over 50 hectares.[20] In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area
covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38,
series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for
public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents
of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed
duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO
is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring
public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication[21] of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class
of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer, such as entries made by the Civil Registrar[22] in the books of registries, or by a
ship captain in the ships logbook.[23] The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public documents.[24] The certifications are
conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.[25] Certainly, the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.[26]
Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a
witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.[27] Here, Torres, a private
individual and respondents representative, identified the certifications but the government
officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such,
the certifications cannot be given probative value.[28] The contents of the certifications are
hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.[29] Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or
FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and
disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue
print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under
the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
Respondent alleged that the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the
metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature
and classification of the land involved.[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic
engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is not sufficient proof of the lands classification.[31] However, respondent should
have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification.
Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of
the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan,
and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in
the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic
Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different
from the other certifications submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was
misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents
predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world
was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner
alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land
openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and
disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a
lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas
knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he
had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors.[32] The Court of Appeals
observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to
understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such
familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that
matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of
public knowledge to them.[33]
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted
that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is
rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship
between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding
of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who
was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single
witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated
testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony
of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents
acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his
information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.[34]
Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid
starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land
before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the
Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the
land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[35] the Court traced
the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution
limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino
citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present
1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.[36] The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply
limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than
24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more
than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the
name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would
inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would
prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation
to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals
from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation
on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an evergrowing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional
intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would
seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.[37]
In Director of Lands v. IAC,[38] the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters,
or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that
case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was
instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it
from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution,
private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while
individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares.[39]
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of
alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) x x x shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x. No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts,
the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition
against said corporations holding or owning private land. x x x.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the land x x x was
already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme. In this case, respondent
acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest,
has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the
land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting,
the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and
disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a
vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and
adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June
1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had
already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed
was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through
lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer
alienable lands of the public domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant
for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private
land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had
already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to
complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations
from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the
doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176[42] (RA 9176) further amended the Public
Land Act[43] and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31
December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12)
hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated
as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent
with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not
more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-ininterest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12
hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of
44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a
private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it
derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding
12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present
case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus CAYETANO L. SERRANO,[1] and HEIRS OF CATALINO M. ALAAN, represented by PAULITA P.
ALAAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 183063
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 24, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an application for registration,[2] docketed as LRC Case No. 270,
over a 533-square meter parcel of commercial land known as Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the
lot), located in Poblacion Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.
Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon
Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange[3] dated February 10, 1961;
and by a private deed of partition and extrajudicial settlement forged by him and his co-heirs.
Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree or,
in the alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[4]
Cayetano also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917 by himself and through his deceased
parentspredecessors-in-interest or for more than 70 years.
The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),[5] intervened and filed an
application for registration,[6] their predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having
purchased[7] a 217.45-square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27,
1989 during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration.
The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions of the Property Registration
Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that
their application for confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetanos, and that,
thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names.
Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of Catalinos application for
registration.[8]
Cayetanos brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him at the
hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away[9] and was
substituted by his heirs.
At the trial, the following pieces of documentary evidence, inter alia, were presented to support
Cayetanos claim of ownership over the lot: original survey plan dated January 3, 1957 and
certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands
Director Zoilo Castrillo,[10] technical description of the lot (Psu-157485),[11] Tax Declarations
for the years 1924 (in the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the name of either Simeon
[deceased] or Cayetano),[12] official receipts showing real estate tax payments (from 19481997),[13] and Surveyors Certificate No. 157485 dated January 1957.[14]
As Cayetanos sole witness Leonardo was already physically infirm (hard of hearing and due to
old age) at the time trial commenced, his testimony was taken by deposition on written
interrogatories.[15]
In answer to the interrogatories,[16] Leonardo declared that his family had lived on the lot since
pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it following his acquisition from Julian
Ydulzura in 1923[17] who had purchased it from Lazaro Raada in 1917;[18] that the
construction of a family home in 1923 was reflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of
Simeon for the year 1924[19]; that after his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother
Cayetano continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built his own
house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the
current year 1997;[20] that the lot was assigned to him and Cayetano as their share of the
inheritance by virtue of a private document, Kaligonan, dated June 16, 1951,[21] which was
executed by all of the heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated August 24, 1988;[22] and that on February 10, 1961,
Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardos) half-share in the lot, thereby
making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof.[23]
On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that
in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter
lot subject of the present case as embodied in a deed of absolute sale;[24] and that Catalino
religiously paid real estate taxes therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan of
Lot 249,[25] Cad-866 indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on
a survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on May 9, 1997.[26]
The above-said Subdivision Plan of the lot, duly approved by Celso V. Loriega, Jr., Regional
Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management Services, Region Office XIII for Butuan City,
carries the following annotation:
Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77 issued by CENRO.
This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per project no. 5 L.C Map No. 550
certified on July 18, 1925.
Lot 249-A, Lot 9090, Lot 249-B, Lot 9091, CAD 866 Cabadbaran Cadastre. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Butuan provincial prosecutor
Ambrosio Gallarde, did not present any evidence to oppose the applications.
By Decision of November 3, 2003,[27] the RTC granted respondents applications, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby rendered:
1. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-15(5)7485 (now known as Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D)
containing an area of 316 sq. meters to applicant Cayetano L. Serrano, Sr., represented by his
heirs;
2. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-157485 (now known as Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D)
containing an area of 217 sq. meters to applicant Catalina M. Alaan, represented by Paulita P.
Alaan;
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed the RTC decision
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds that respondents failed to present evidence that the
property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and duration required by
the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.[28]
By Decision of May 13, 2008,[29] the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in this
wise:
requirement of certification as the same is competent enough to show that the disputed land or
the parcels of land (now Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866, respectively) applied for
by the applicants (Cayetano and Alaan) were already reclassified as alienable and disposable as
early as 18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550.
xxxx
Records show that the subject land was first owned and possessed by Lazaro Raada and the
same was sold to Julian Ydulzura per untitled document executed on 15 May 1917. On 3
September 1923, Ydulzura sold the subject land for one hundred fifty pesos (Php150.00) to
Simeon M. Serrano per untitled document, father of Cayetano. Simeon M. Serrano then had the
subject land tax declared in his name in 1924 per Declaration of Real Property (Urban) No.
18,587. Upon the demise of Simeon Serrano on 9 January 1931, his heirs, including herein
applicant Cayetano, partitioned by way of an Agreement on 16 June 1951 the properties of their
deceased father. On 24 August 1988, the heirs of Simeon M. Serrano executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement confirming further the Agreement executed on 16 June 1954 (sic). It is
worth noting that from 1955 up to the filing of the Application for Registration in 21 June 1988
and until 1997, Cayetano religiously paid the real estate taxes of the said subject property. As
held in a long line of cases, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Undoubtedly, applicant Cayetano, through his predecessors-in-interest, having been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation over the subject property under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier had met the requirements set forth
in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L. Serrano and intervenor-appellee heirs
of Catalino M. Alaan, have registrable title to the aforesaid subject lands, Lot 249-B, Csd-13000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D, respectively, as they were able to prove that they are
qualified and had complied with the requirements set forth by the provisions of P.D. No. 1529
which amended Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which to Our mind merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said property
by the trial court.[30] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
. . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSGs assertion that there was no competent evidence
that would clearly show the subject land was released as alienable and disposable land is
unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said annotation would suffice to comply with the
Hence, the present petition which raises the same grounds as those raised by petitioner before
the appellate court.
The petition fails.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree are: that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[31]
The Court reiterates the doctrine which more accurately construes Section 14(1) in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,[32] viz:
. . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. Therein, the
Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a 5presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released
and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[33] (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable
and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical
Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by
Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that
Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.
It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or
the DENR to contest respondents applications on the ground that their respective shares of the
lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of
the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
Petitioners contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of possession and
occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree does not lie.
Undeniably, respondents and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be shown to have exercised
acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On what constitutes open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation as
required by statute, Republic v. Alconaba[34] teaches:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessorsin-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was first owned by Lazaro Raada who sold
the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn sold it to his and Cayetanos father Simeon in
1923; that Simeon built a house thereon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries
in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of
a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed materials, and of coconut trees
planted thereon; and that after Simeons demise in 1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the
old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax
Declarations made in 1948-1958.[35]
When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo had any other pre-war
tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explained that all available records
may have been destroyed or lost during the last war but that after the war, the lot was
reassessed in his fathers name.[36] The Court finds Leonardos explanation plausible and there is
nothing in the records that detracts from its probative value.
Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments[37] religiously made by Cayetano from 1948
to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after his fathers death in 1931, continued
to exercise acts of dominion over the lot.
The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to
demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion
of all others.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185683, March 16 : 2011]
UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
MR. HILARION P. UY, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For consideration of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Union
Leaf Tobacco Corporation (petitioner) of the Resolution dated March 1, 2010
which denied the present petition for review on the ground of petitioner's failure
to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decision and resolution.[1]
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union on December 1,
2004 four applications for land registration covering various parcels of land (LRCA-294, LRC-A-295, LRC-A-296 and LRC-A-298).[2]
Petitioner alleged that it is the absolute owner of those parcels of land, having
bought them from various individuals; and that its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the properties for more than thirty (30) years.[3]
The Republic opposed the applications, citing Article XII, Section 3 of the
Constitution which proscribes private corporations or associations from holding,
except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain for a period not exceeding
twenty five (25) years and not to exceed one thousand (1,000) hectares in area.
[4]
After the trial court dismissed without prejudice the applications for failure of
petitioner to prove its allegation that it had been in "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation" of the lots,[5] it, on petitioner's move,
reopened the applications and allowed the presentation of additional evidence ?
testimonial ? in support thereof.[6]
By Decision of July 30, 2005,[7] the trial court confirmed petitioners' titles over
the properties subject of its applications. In finding for petitioner, the trial court
ruled that petitioner had complied with the minimum 30-year uninterrupted
possession; that realty taxes have been paid on these properties; and that no
interested private individual opposed the applications.[8]
On appeal by the Republic, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 30, 2008,[9]
reversed the trial court's decision, it holding that:
have occupied the properties since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[13]
x x x x. Union Leaf presented no evidence to show that the subject parcels of
land have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private
person. Absent proof of such reclassification, the subject parcels of land remain
part of the public domain. x x x x.
x x x x.
The trial court ruled that the subject parcels of land were converted to private
lands by reason of the possession of Union Leaf's predecessors-in-interest for a
period longer than 30 years. In so ruling, the trial court relied on the testimonies
of Celso Domondon, Bartolome Carreon, Encarnacion Magno, Norma Gayo,
Ricardo Fronda, Anastacia Saltat, Em[manuel] Balderas and Jose
Padilla. Analyzing their testimonies, it is our considered view that they are
inconclusive to prove that Union Leaf's predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of
land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application. (underscoring partly in
the original and partly supplied)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied,[10] it filed a petition
for review which, as stated early on, the Court denied by Resolution of March 1,
2010 for failure to show that the appellate court committed any reversible error
in its challenged issuances.
In its present motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues in the main that its
documentary evidence shows that the government declared and confirmed that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable.[11] It particularly points to the
Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans which all noted that the subject lands are
"inside alienable and disposable area as per project No. 5-A, LC Map No.
2891."[12]
The Solicitor General counters that petitioner failed to present evidence that the
subject lands are alienable and disposable and that petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they
The Motion for Reconsideration fails.
The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of
evidence that the law requires. The notation by a geodetic engineer on the
survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to
prove these lands' classification.[14]
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[15] directs that
x x x x [T]he applicant for registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed
to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[16] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent failed to comply with this directive. This leaves it unnecessary to
delve into the testimonies of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest respecting their
alleged possession of the subject properties.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. No further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG,
Petitioners,
- versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 171726
Present:
BRION,* J.,
Acting Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,**
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 23, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
On March 22, 1949, petitioners father, L. Yu Chang[4] and the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur,
through its then Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property[5]
wherein the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter
residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece
of land located in San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the
property thus obtained and erected a residential house and a gasoline station thereon. He also
declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 01794[6] and 01795[7] and paid
the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official receipts from February
21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata
Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the property and succeeded in the possession of the
property.
On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation[8] of their rights over the property was
executed by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in
favor of herein petitioners. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and
subdivided into two lots, Lot 2199[9] and Lot 2200[10] of Plan SWO-05-000888, Pili Cadastre.
Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation purposes as shown in Tax
Declaration No. 02633[11] and paid the real property taxes thereon.
On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her
brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition[12] for registration of title over the
aforementioned lots under the Property Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that
they are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described
parcels of land for more than 100 years[13]; and that allegedly, they have continuously,
peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of owners. Hence, they are
entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance and registration of title in their names.
In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following documents, to wit:
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR. J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated February
13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the
April 28, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in LRC
No. P-115, LRA Rec. No. N-68012, which granted petitioners application for registration of title
over two parcels of land, denominated as Lots 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
1. Agreement to Exchange Real Property;
2. Deed of Transfer and Renunciation;
3. Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre;
4. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199;
5. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200;
6. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044 for Lot 2199 Cad. 291; and
7. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043 for Lot 2200 Cad. 291 Pili
Cadastre.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition[14] to the
application, alleging, inter alia, that: (1) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and (3) that
the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain and are not subject to private
appropriation.
No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an Order of General
Default[15] was issued by the trial court.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The fallo of
the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Confirming the imperfect title of the herein applicants Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang
over the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph two (2) page 2 of the Petition,
particularly Lot 2199, Plans S0-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre and Lot 2200, Plan SWO-05000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; both Filipino citizens, residents of #14 Joaquin St., Corinthian
Garden, Quezon City and San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur respectively;
2. Ordering the dismissal of the application in the Cadastral proceeding with respect to Lots 2199
and 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre under CAD Case No. N-9;
3. After finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority to the herein applicants above-mentioned.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The Republic appealed the decision to the CA on the ground that the court a quo erred in
granting petitioners application for registration of Lots 2199 and 2200 despite their failure to
show compliance with the requirements of the law. In addition, the Republic asserted that the
land was classified as public forest land; hence, it could not be subject to appropriation and
alienation.
As aforesaid, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on August 26, 2005, and dismissed
petitioners application for land registration. The CA considered the petition to be governed by
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held
that petitioners were not able to present incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land
sought to be registered are alienable and disposable.[17] The CA relied on the testimony of
Lamberto Orcena, Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to
October 30, 1986, the entire area encompassing the right side of the Naga-Legaspi Highway,
including the subject properties, was classified as forest land. According to the CA, even if the
area within which the subject properties are located is now being used for residential and
commercial purposes, such fact will not convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural
land.[18] The CA stressed that there must be a positive act from the government declassifying
the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.[19]
Additionally, the CA noted that the lands sought to be registered were declared disposable public
land only on October 30, 1986. Thus, it was only from that time that the period of open,
continuous and notorious possession commenced to toll against the State.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court via the present appeal, raising the sole issue of
whether the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for registration of title on the
ground that they failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended.
Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as
forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even government structures existing
and standing on the land.[20] In their Memorandum,[21] petitioners point out that the original
owner and possessor of the subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was
established in 1930. The land was originally part of the municipal ground adjacent to the
Municipal Building located at the right side of the Naga-Legaspi National Highway.[22] From
1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the property through barter and up to the filing of petitioners
application in 1997, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual physical
and material possession of the land in the concept of an owner, notorious and known to the
public and adverse to the whole world.
The Republic, through the OSG, for its part, maintains that petitioners failed to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots for the period of time required
by law. The OSG also submits that the subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable
only on October 30, 1986.
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, under which petitioners
application was filed, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
x x x x[23]
Under this provision, in order that petitioners application for registration of title may be granted,
they must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.[24] Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are
applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.[25]
In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of
their application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners
contend that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land
since there are building structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing
and standing on the area. This, however, is hardly the proof required under the law. As clarified
by this Court in Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,[26] a forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted with crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. The classification of
land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like.[27] Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[28] As aptly held by
the appellate court:
[T]he fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is being used for
residential and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into
agricultural land. It is fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there
must be a positive act from the government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the
simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of
imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can
be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.[29]
Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic presented a Report[30] of
Rene Gomez, Land Investigator/Inspector, CENRO No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots
applied for by the petitioners were classified as alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E,
L.C. Map No. 3393 and released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A Compliance[31]
dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OIC-CENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court
also stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291 were verified to be within Alienable and
Disposable area under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the
then Bureau of Forestry. Evidently, therefore, the subject lots were declared alienable and
disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that period, the same could not be the subject of
confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners possession of the subject forest land prior to the date
when it was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession.[32] To reiterate, it is well settled that
possession of forest land, prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective
since such possession may not be considered as possession in the concept of owner.[33] The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared and alienable.[34]
Much as this Court wants to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of
social justice, our hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect
titles.[35] Here, petitioners failed to present well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to
prove their compliance of the requirements under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in dismissing their application for confirmation and registration of title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 26, 2005 and the
Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CANDIDO, DEMETILA, JESUS, ANGELITO, and TERESITA, all surnamed VERGEL DE DIOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 170459
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August
17, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated November 16, 2005. The assailed Decision deleted the trial
courts order to reconstitute a certificate of title, but maintained the order directing the Register
of Deeds to issue a second owners copy of the said title.
Danilo, Candido, Marciana, Francisco, Leonardo, Milagros, Petra, Demetila, and Clarita, all
surnamed Vergel De Dios, are the registered owners of three parcels of land (Lots 1, 2 and 3)
located in Angat, Bulacan. The entire land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T141671. The owners sold Lot 1, with an area of 246,377 square meters (sq m), in 1989; and Lot
3, with an area of 135 sq m, became part of the provincial road. Thus, only Lot 2, with an area of
1,839 sq m, remained with the registered owners. Out of the total area of Lot 2, a 50.01 sq mportion was used for road widening, leaving only an area of 1,788.99 sq m, owned by the abovenamed individuals. This remaining portion was allotted to herein respondents, Candido,
Demetila, and the heirs of Danilo, namely: Jesus, Angelito, and Teresita, all surnamed Vergel De
Dios, by virtue of a Kasulatan ng Partihan sa Lupa na may Kalakip na Pagmamana at Pagtalikod
sa Karapatan (Kasulatan) signed by all co-owners.[3]
The owners duplicate of TCT No. T-141671, which was allegedly in the custody of a certain Elmer
Gonzales, was destroyed on October 17, 1978 when the Angat River overflowed and caused a big
flood which inundated their houses. On March 7, 1987, the original copy of TCT No. T-141671
was among the documents destroyed by the fire that razed the office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan.[4]
RESOLUTION
In view of all these circumstances, respondent Candido, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of the
other respondents, Demetila, Jesus, Angelito, and Teresita, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a Petition for Reconstitution of the Burned Original of TCT No. T141671 and Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy in Lieu of the Destroyed One.[5] The
petition alleged that the owners duplicate was not pledged to any person or entity to answer for
any obligation; that no co-owners copy, no mortgagees copy or any lessees copy of the said title
had been issued by the Register of Deeds; that the parcel of land is in the possession of
respondents; and that no other document is pending registration in favor of third persons, except
the Kasulatan. Attached to the petition were the following documents:
NACHURA, J.:
1.
Promulgated:
February 9, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Special Power of Attorney
2. Photocopy of the owners duplicate certificate of TCT No. 141671
3. Kasulatan ng Partihan sa Lupa na may Kalakip na Pagmamana at Pagtalikod sa Karapatan
4. Technical description of Lot 2
5. Print copy of plan
6. Tax declaration
7. Official receipt
8. Certification by the Register of Deeds that TCT No. 141671 was among the titles burned
during the fire
9. Affidavit of Loss
On January 21, 2003, the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, granted the petition for reconstitution, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. The Register
of Deed[s] of Bulacan is directed, upon payment of all legal fees, to reconstitute Transfer
Certificate of Title No. [T-]141671 on the basis of the Plan, Technical Description and Tax
Declaration and thereafter to issue a second owners copy thereof in lieu of the lost one which is
declared of no force and effect and ordered cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner appealed the case to the CA. Applying the Courts ruling in Heirs of Ragua v. Court of
Appeals,[7] the CA ruled that the photocopies of the subject TCT, survey plan, technical
description, tax declaration, and certification of the Register of Deeds were not sufficient to order
a reconstitution of the lost title. It noted in particular that, in Heirs of Ragua, a photocopy of the
TCT which was not certified by the Register of Deeds was held as not sufficient basis for
reconstitution of title. The CA also held as insufficient evidence the Kasulatan which was
executed only in 1996, long after the original TCT was burned and the owners duplicate title was
lost.
The CA, however, noted that the appeal merely questioned the order granting reconstitution; it
did not question the order for the issuance of a new owners duplicate title. Hence, it held as final
and executory the portion of the Decision ordering the issuance of a new owners duplicate title.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated August 17, 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 21 January 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Branch 15, is hereby MODIFIED in that the Order for reconstitution of TCT No.
141671 is deleted and is affirmed in all other respect.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration, averring that the subject of its appeal was
the entire decision of the RTC, and that the issuance of a new owners duplicate title was but a
consequence of the grant of the petition for reconstitution. Petitioner prayed that the CA
Decision granting the issuance of a new owners duplicate title of the TCT be reconsidered.
Unconvinced, the CA, in a Resolution[9] dated November 16, 2005, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA erred in
maintaining and declaring as final and executory the order for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate title despite its judgment deleting the trial courts order for reconstitution.[10]
Petitioner insists that the subject of its appeal before the CA was the entire Decision granting the
petition for reconstitution, and ordering the issuance of the owners duplicate copy of the
reconstituted title. It points out that, in its notice of appeal, it stated that it was filing with the CA
an appeal from the RTC decision dated January 21, 2003. Likewise, in its appellants brief, it
prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the January 21, 2003 decision.[11] At any rate,
petitioner avers that the CA was imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters not
otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a complete and just resolution of the case.[12]
Petitioner points out that the order for the issuance of a new owners duplicate title was but a
consequence of the order for the reconstitution of the title. Considering that the CA found that
there was no basis for the reconstitution, it should have deleted the order for the issuance of the
owners duplicate certificate of title.[13]
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioners appeal centered only on the trial courts
order granting the reconstitution of title. Hence, the trial court decision ordering the issuance of
a new owners duplicate title is already final and executory and can no longer be the subject of an
appeal.[14]
The petition is meritorious. The CA erred in not deleting the trial courts order for the issuance of
a new owners duplicate title to respondents after it deleted the order for reconstitution.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition
of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of
the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.[15]
The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in the custody of the Register of
Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is replaced with a new onethe
reconstituted titlethat basically reproduces the original. After the reconstitution, the owner is
issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted title. This is specifically provided under Section 16 of
Republic Act No. 26, An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed, which states:
Sec. 16. After the reconstitution of a certificate of title under the provisions of this Act, the
register of deeds shall issue the corresponding owner's duplicate and the additional copies of
said certificates of title, if any had been previously issued, where such owner's duplicate and/or
additional copies have been destroyed or lost. This fact shall be noted on the reconstituted
certificate of title.
Petitioner went to great lengths to convince the CA that the order for the issuance of a duplicate
title to respondents was included in its appeal. We find such exercise unnecessary. The CA should
not have been quick in declaring that such order had already become final and executory.
It really does not matter if petitioner did not specifically question the order for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate title. The fact that petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition for
reconstitution meant that it was questioning the order for reconstitution and all orders corollary
thereto. The trial courts order for the Register of Deeds to issue a new duplicate certificate of title
was only an offshoot of its having granted the petition for reconstitution of title. Without the
order for reconstitution, the order to issue a new owners duplicate title had no leg to stand on.
More importantly, it would have been impossible for the Register of Deeds to comply with such
order. The Register of Deeds cannot issue a duplicate of a document that it does not have. The
original copy of the certificate of title was burned, and the Register of Deeds does not have a
reconstituted title. Thus, it does not have a certificate of title that it can reproduce as the new
owners duplicate title.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 17, 2005 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the entire January 21, 2003 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118691 July 5, 1996
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique,
and ALBERTO MAGDATO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the Order of 18
October 1994 1 of the respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Antique, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 2708, a petition for relief from judgment. 2 The Order set
aside the final and partly executed judgment 3 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, in an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 262 4 and
remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposition.
The antecedent facts are not disputed:
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog (hereinafter, BAYOG) and private respondent
Alberto Magdato (hereinafter, MAGDATO) entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a
lot with an area of 0.8 hectares located in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique, 5 with BAYOG as the
LANDOWNER — LESSOR and MAGDATO as TENANT — LESSEE. The contract commenced with
crop year 1975-1976 and expressly provided that matters not therein stipulated would be
governed by the provisions of R.A. No. 3344, as amended.
On 19 April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. 3844, and
P.D. No 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold 6 to MAGDATO, declaring that the
latter had complied with all the requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land
cultivated by him and owned by BAYOG located in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique. The
certificate enumerated the following rights of MAGDATO, inter alia:
1.
He shall not be ejected, dispossessed, excluded, removed or ousted from his farmholding
by any landowner, agricultural lessor or anybody except when his disposition has been
authorized by the proper court;
2.
He shall have the right to peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of this
farmholding;
3.
He shall have the right against conversion of the farmholding into . . . any nonagricultural use or to the production of any other crop by the landowner . . . or anybody acting for
and in his behalf, without prior approval of the proper authorities and payment of disturbance
compensation. . . .
On 3 September 1990, BAYOG, in consideration of P250,000.00, executed a so-called Deed of
Equitable Mortgage, with right of redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. The
document covered four parcels of unregistered riceland in Bugasong, Antique, with a total area of
30,187 square meters. 7
In a letter dated 19 October 1992, BAYOG asked MAGDATO to remove his (MAGDATO's) house
from BAYOG's land. BAYOG explained that the house was an obstacle to the cultivation of the
land by Jorge Pesayco, Jr., the brother and civil law lessee of Santiago Pesayco. 8
As MAGDATO did not comply, BAYOG and Jorge Pesayco, Jr. filed with the Third MCTC of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, a complaint, dated 26 November 1992, for "Ejectment
and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition," which was docketed as Civil Case No.
262. 9
In its Order of 15 December 1992, the MCTC declared that the case fell under the Rule on
Summary Procedure and directed the issuance of summons which, together with complaint, was
served on MAGDATO on 11 January 1993. 10
MAGDATO had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22 January 1993) to file his
Answer, 11 but he filed it only on 25 January 1993. In his Answer, MAGDATO admitted BAYOG's
ownership of the lot, but asserted that he was in actual possession thereof as BAYOG's
agricultural lessee as evidenced by the Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed on 17 June
1975. As defenses, MAGDATO alleged that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, it being an
agrarian dispute; and that he had not been able to cultivate the land because plaintiff Jorge
Pesayco, Jr. threatened to shoot anyone who would work on it. 12
On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order 13 holding that since MAGDATO's Answer was
filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. It then considered "needless" for the court to
resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority under
Section 5 14 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs BAYOG and Pesayco, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, as
follows:
1.
Ejecting defendant from the parcel of land plaintiff Alejandro Bayog described in
paragraph 2 of this complaint and ordering defendant to remove his house therefrom before
judgment becomes final and executory;
2.
Ordering the Provincial Sheriff, or his defendant, to demolish and destroy defendant's
house on the above-mentioned land of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog, in case defendant should fail to
remove the same therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and executory; and
3.
Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P1,000.00,
Philippine Currency, as and by way of actual litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED. 15
MAGDATO's counsel, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, received a copy of the Order on 11 October 1993. 16
On 16 December 1993, the MCTC issued an Order of
Execution 17 commanding the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to eject MAGDATO, his "attorneyin-fact, agent, or any other person acting on his behalf" from the parcel of land in question and to
"demolish and destroy" MAGDATO's house standing thereon "should he fail to remove it before
the judgment against him becomes final."
The Sheriff's Return of Service 18 dated 26 January 1994 reported that the order was personally
served on MAGDATO on 24 January 1994, and upon MAGDATO's receipt thereof, "he and any
other person acting under his . . . authority were ejected from the parcel of land . . . and his house
was demolished and destroyed." However, "there was no monetary satisfaction of the judgment
since [MAGDATO] refused to give the amount and he has no real/personal properties [sic] that
can be levied on execution."
As to the first, BAYOG asserted that a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading
under Section 19 (d) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Moreover, the petition was not
accompanied by the affidavit of merit required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the second, BAYOG maintained that the petition did not contain a statement of facts
constituting fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. In any event, the cause of action
was mooted by the partial execution of the MCTC judgment, for it was settled that relief from
judgment was not available where the judgment had already been executed, without, however,
prejudice on the part of the aggrieved party to sue to recover the property. 22
On 9 February 1994, MAGDATO filed a petition for relief from judgment with injunction and
prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC of San Jose Antique, Branch 12 (Civil Case No. 2708).
MAGDATO alleged therein that the late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable
neglect, for at the time he received summons, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis
which restricted his nobility and sound judgment. Further, his illiteracy limited his
understanding of the English language, hence, he was unaware of the "unextendible" 10-day
period, and by the time he consulted a lawyer in San Jose, Antique, said period had already
lapsed. In fact, it was only when his house was demolished in the latter part of January 1994, that
he learned of the judgment rendered against him.
Finally, BAYOG contended that Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court required that petitions for
relief from judgment be "filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment . .
. to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment . . . was entered. . . ."
Considering that MAGDATO learned of the MCTC judgment through his lawyer on 11 October
1993 when the latter received a copy thereof, the 60-day period expired on 12 December 1993.
Since the petition for relief was filed only on 9 February 1994, it was then filed out of time.
MAGDATO further asserted that he had good, valid, and strong evidence to counteract BAYOG's
claim, and if given a chance to be heard, would prove that he was a duly instituted tenant of
BAYOG, as evidenced by copies of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold. More importantly, this tenancy relationship had never been terminated
for cause. Finally, he contended that as the MCTC judgment had already been partly executed, he
was bereft of other avenues to protect his rights. He thus prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent disturbance of his possession; that he be allowed to litigate in forma
pauperis, as he owned no real property as attested to by a certification from the Office of the
Municipal Assessor; 19 and that the MCTC judgment in Civil Case No. 262 be set aside and a new
trial
ordered. 20
On 16 September 1994, BAYOG filed another Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 on the
ground that the petition for relief from judgment was not accompanied by a sworn certification
against forum-shopping as required by Administrative Circular No. 9-94 of this Court. 25
MAGDATO filed his Comment 26 thereto on 3 October 1994, while BAYOG filed a Reply 27 to the
Comment on 10 October 1994.
On 19 May 1994, BAYOG filed a Motion to Dismiss 21 Civil Case No. 2708 on grounds of: (a) lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC; (b) failure of the petition to state a cause of action; and (c)
prescription and/or laches.
On 22 June 1994, MAGDATO filed an Opposition 23 to the Motion to Dismiss, to which BAYOG
filed a Reply 24 on 7 July 1994.
In its Order 28 of 18 October 1994, the RTC denied BAYOG's first and second motions to dismiss
and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Civil Case No. 262 rendered by Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong and Valderama is set aside and let this
case be remanded back to that court for proper disposal.
The grounds relied upon for the denial were: (1) that the petition for relief from judgment is not
a prohibited pleading under the Rule of Summary Procedure since the latter does not apply to
Regional Trial Courts, per the ruling in Jakihaca vs. Aquino; 29 (2) the petition states a cause of
action as MAGDATO, as shown in Annex "B" of the petition, is a tenant farmer who is entitled to
protection against ejectment; (3) the issue of prescription must yield to the fact that MAGDATO is
a tenant farmer, or his ejectment by the MCTC was a violation of the law; (4) BAYOG and Pesayco
did not come to court with clean hands as they did not reveal the fact that MAGDATO is a holder
of a certificate of agricultural leasehold; (5) the MCTC should not have disregarded MAGDATO's
answer filed therein which showed that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case; and (6)
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 took effect only on 1 April 1994, or before the filling of the
petition for relief from judgment, hence, it could not be given retroactive effect.
BAYOG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order 30 was denied on 12 December 1994. 31
Hence, BAYOG and Pesayco (hereinafter, Petitioners) filed this petition for certiorari and ask us
to set aside the above order. They reiterate their arguments regarding the prohibition against
petitions for relief from judgment; maintain that Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is inconsistent
with the letter and spirit of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; allege that since
MAGDATO's Answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time, it should be deemed not to have
been filed at all, in light of Lesaca vs. Court of Appeals; 32 assert that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the petition for relief from judgment since the decision challenged therein was already final
and executory; and characterize the Order in question as void as it directs the conduct of a new
trial, contrary to Section 19 (c) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
As to the petition for relief from judgment itself, the petitioners assert that it was fatally defective
for it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit; it was filed out time; its subject matter had
become moot and academic; and it is not the proper remedy pursuant to Banco Español-Filipino
vs. Palanca, 33 where this Court held that the proper remedy was an action to annul the
judgment and enjoin its enforcement, if not yet carried into effect; or an action to recover the
property if the judgment had already been executed and the property of the aggrieved party
disposed of.
We required the respondents to Comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining
order.
In his Comment, MAGDATO admits that his answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time;
however, he insists that the MCTC should not have disregarded it as it alleged the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties, thereby bringing the case beyond its jurisdiction, and
within that of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
As to the affidavit of merit, MAGDATO countered that "the affidavit of merit may be set forth in
the petition itself and need not be in a separate document (Consul vs. Consul, L-22713, July 26,
1966)," if the "facts constituting petitioner's substantial cause of action or defense . . . are alleged
in the verified petition for the oath elevated the petition to the same category as a separate
affidavit (Fabar, Inc. vs. Rodelas, L-46394, Oct. 24, 1977)."
In their Reply to the Comment, the petitioners contend that while MAGDATO used to be a tenantlessee on another parcel of land of petitioner BAYOG, this ceased when MAGDATO sold his
tenancy rights, without BAYOG's prior knowledge or consent, to Federico Valdevieso, Sr. under a
Deed of Mortgage of Tenancy Rights dated 31 August 1987. Valdevieso then tilled the land and
delivered to petitioner BAYOG the latter's share of the harvest, as evidenced by the receipts of 5
December 1987, 10 April 1988, and 15 August 1988. 34 Then, in September 1989, Valdevieso,
with petitioner BAYOG's consent, sold his tenancy rights to Jose Bayog, as evidenced by the 3
May 1994 affidavit of Arturo P. Valdevieso, Federico's son. 35 The petitioners then argue, citing
Yabut vs. Lillies, 36 that the above Deed of Mortgage "amounted to [MAGDATO's] declaration
against his interest and an express waiver of his tenancy rights" resulting in the extinguishment
of the tenant-lessor relationship between them.
We gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15
November 1991, the MCTC Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15
December 1992 order. While it may be true that this did not affect the outcome of the case,
judges are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars adopted by
this Court which affect the conduct of cases before them.
Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure
in Civil Case No. 262 since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an
agrarian relationship between him and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking
cognizance of MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the MCTC had
no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG and
MAGDATO, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the
Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While
this assertion, oer se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment
case, 37 nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received
the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over
the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 38 Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural
lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. 39
The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply
adopting a strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without
exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said
section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the
reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no
provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed
out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to
dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which reads:
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a)
Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section;
(b)
Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c)
Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d)
Petition for relief from judgment;
(e)
Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f)
Memoranda;
(g)
Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;
(h)
Motion to declare defendant in default;
(i)
Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j)
Reply;
(k)
Third Party complaints;
(l)
Interventions. (emphasis supplied)
Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO "to remove his house . . .
before judgment becomes final and executory, " and the Provincial Sheriff 'to demolish and
destroy [MAGDATO'S] house on the . . . land of [BAYOG] in case [MAGDATO] should fail to
remove the same . . . before judgment against him becomes final and executory." 40 This was
clearly in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Such orders of "removal" and "demolition" before the judgment
becomes final and executory were obviously intended to render futile any appeal which
MAGDATO could interpose therefrom pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC, in its Order of Execution
41 of 16 December 1993, directed the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's
[MAGDATO's] home standing in the above-described parcel of land in case defendant should fail
to remove the same therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and executory." And,
in strict obedience to this said order, Sheriff IV Amando S. Lapos, acting for the Ex-Officio
Provincial Sheriff, accompanied by Edgar Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro
Pojo, members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts,
and BAYOG himself, served on MAGDATO the order of execution on 24 January 1994 and
forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question and demolished and destroyed
MAGDATO's house. 42
This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the law. No demolition of
MAGDATO's house could have been validly effected on the day of service of the order of
execution. MAGDATO should have been afforded a reasonable period of the time to remove his
house, and only after he failed to comply within the given period could a demolition order have
been issued by the court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 43
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case may be.
We now turn to the acts of the RTC.
While the MCTC Order of 20 September 1993 was received by MAGDATO's lawyer, Atty. Marcelo
C. Josue, on 11 October 1993, the latter, however, did not inform nor notify MAGDATO about it;
worse, the said lawyer took no action whatever after he received a copy of BAYOG's motion for
execution on 22 November 1993. MAGDATO learned of the Order of 20 September 1993 only on
24 January 1994, when he was served with a copy of the Order of Execution. 47 MAGDATO filed
the petition for relief from judgment on 9 February 1994, or FIFTEEN days from the time he
learned of the judgment. BAYOG's insistence then that the period must be reckoned from Atty.
Josue's receipt of the Order on 11 October 1993 deserves scant consideration. Under what we
considered above as the unusual and peculiar circumstances in this case, we cannot consider as
notice to MAGDATO of the 20 September 1993 Order the notice to his lawyer, who to us appears
to have been unconscionably irresponsible. So we did in People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation vs. Tiongco, 48 where we declared:
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708)
is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca 44
ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief
from judgment 45 on a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court, 46 it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38
regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by
Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Munucipal
Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and
65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief
from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from
cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court.
This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of
relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him
through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief
from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to
the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the
MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances
alleged therein and the jurisdiction pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. And contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
petition for relief from judgment was filed within the period fixed in Section Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
Sec 3. Time for filing of petition contents and verification. — A petition for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its
application to a given case, however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the
surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court's desire to make short cut of the proceedings,
it might foster, wittingly or uwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would
then be easy for one lawyer to sell one's rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot
every process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance,
one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
In any event, the 60-day period in this case can, with equal force and effect, be reckoned from
MAGDATO's receipt of the Order of Execution of 24 January 1994 and the petition may then be
treated as a petition for relief from the said order. Tiongco is likewise authority therefore, to wit:
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment under consideration, may even be considered as
one for relief from the order of execution, which was filed within the reglementary period,
inasmuch as Section 2 of Rule 88, Revised Rules, does not only refer to judgments, but also to
orders, or any other proceedings. 49
Furthermore, as regards the mandatory second period of six months, the least that can be said is
that it had not even begun to run as the records do not disclose that the Order of 20 September
1993, which is the challenged "decision," had been entered. On this score, Section 3 of Rule 38
speaks of entry of the judgment or order, not its rendition nor finality, thus the 6-month period
must be reckoned from the entry. On this matter, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Remedial
Law Compendium, 50 states:
The 6-months period is computed from the date of actual entry of the order or judgment as this
is defined in Sec. 2, Rule 36, that is, from the recording of the judgment or order in the book of
entries of judgments and not from the date of the order of default or the rendition of the
judgment or the finality of the judgment. With respect to the "proceedings" in Courts of First
Instance which can be subject of petitions for relief, supra, the date when the proceedings were
taken controls (Dirige vs. Biranya, L-22033, July 30, 1966, reviewing all previous decisions and
expressly repealing all contrary doctrine). Also, in judgments upon compromise, being
immediately executory, prescription runs from the date of its rendition, hence the 6-months
period also runs therefrom (Bodongan vs. Ceniza, et al., O.G. 8058; Dirige vs. Biranya, supra).
We likewise agree with the RTC that the absence of an affidavit of merit was not fatal since the
petition itself, which is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute the
grounds for the petition. Such being the case, a separate affidavit reiterating the grounds already
laid bare in the petition would be superfluous. Elsewise stated, the absence of the affidavit is of
de minimis importance, as the oath elevates the petition to the same category as the affidavit. 51
In the alternative, the petition for relief from judgment may properly be considered as
MAGDATO's appeal from the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993, or an action to
annul the said order. It is a settled rule that a final and executory judgment may be set aside in
three way, viz., (1) by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) when the judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction, by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack; and (3)
when the judgment was obtained by fraud and Rule 38 cannot be applied, by civil action under
Article 1114 of the Civil Code. 52 The fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. In the instant case, the
unconscionable failure of MAGDATO's lawyer to inform MAGDATO of his receipt of the Order of
20 September 1993 and the motion for execution and to take the appropriate action against
either or both to protect MAGDATO's rights amounted to connivance with the prevailing party
for MAGDATO's defeat, which constituted extrinsic fraud. 53
The RTC cannot then be faulted for taking cognizance of the case. However, it acted with rather
undue haste when, in its Order of 18 October 1994 denying BAYOG's first and second motions to
dismiss, it forthwith "set aside" the 20 September 1993 Order to the MCTC and "remanded the
case to [the latter] for proper disposal." What it should have done was simply deny the motions
to dismiss, in light of Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which provides that if a motion to
dismiss is denied or if determination is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the
period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or
deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
The petitioners do not, however, question the RTC's error on this point. If we would then annul
that portion of the challenged order setting aside the MCTC's Order of 20 September 1993 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, then the petitioners herein would be allowed
to file their Answer in Civil Case No. 2708. Thereafter, the RTC would hold a pre-trial conference
and trial on the merits. These would merely unduly delay the resolution of an otherwise
uncomplicated issue. Then, if respondent Judge Natino reaches the same conclusion and renders
the same resolution as that of his challenged Order of 18 October 1994, the case would have to
be remanded to the MCTC for proper "disposal." However, the pleadings filed in this case and the
annexes thereto inexorably firm up the issue of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the ejectment case.
We have for MAGDATO, copies of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract between him and BAYOG
and Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued by then President Marcos; and for BAYOG, the
Deed of Mortgage of Tenancy Rights executed by MAGDATO and his wife in favor of Federico
Valdevieso, the affidavit of Arturo Valdevieso of 3 May 1994 to the effect that after the execution
of the mortgage, his father Federico and the immediate members of his family possessed its
subject property and paid the rentals to BAYOG, and the so-called receipts issued by the latter for
the said rentals.
In short, there is nothing more the parties can offer on the issue of the jurisdiction of the MCTC.
There is then absolutely no acceptable reason to await the end of the tedious procedural rituals
above indicated since that issue can now be resolved in view of the foregoing considerations. It
serves no useful purpose to withhold our verdict and remand this case to the MCTC, only for it to
order the dismissal of the ejectment case. The resultant further delay which may accompany a
likely appeal therefrom by BAYOG and Pesayco must be forestalled to serve the ends of justice.
54 Plainly, the greater interest of justice, especially to MAGDATO, whose rights as an agricultural
leaseholder were trampled upon, demands that we dispose of the issue of the MCTC's
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. 55
Accordingly, we adopt that portion of the challenged Order of 18 October 1994 of respondent
Judge Natino in Civil Case No. 2708 setting aside the order (judgment) of the MCTC of 20
September 1993 in Civil Case No. 262, consider Civil Case No. 2708 closed and terminated, and
declare the Third MCTC of Antique without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 262.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit. That
part of the dispositive portion of the Order of 18 October 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 12, in Civil Case No. 2708 setting aside the Order of 20 September 1993 of the
Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, in Civil Case No.
262 is AFFIRMED, and the Order of Execution of 16 December 1993 in Civil Case No. 262 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the said case is ordered DISMISSED.
Furthermore, Honorable Judge DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, and Atty. MARCELO C. JOSUE are directed TO
SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they should not
be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law and violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respectively.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario and Atty. Marcelo C.
Josue.
Costs against the petitioners.
- versus TRINIDAD SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 161034
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
SO ORDERED.
15. THIRD DIVISION
ZENAIDA ACOSTA, EDUARDO ACOSTA, ARNOLD ACOSTA, DELIA ACOSTA, SPS. TEODULO
MACHADO AND AURORA ORENZA, SPS. ROLDAN PALARCA AND PACITA PANGILINAN, SPS.
FROMENCIO JONATAS AND LUCENA M. MARIANO, SPS. MARCIAL IGLESIA AND VIRGINIA
LAPURGA, ATTY.-IN-FACT FELINO MACARAEG, SPS. MANUEL MANGROBANG AND VALERIANA
SOTIO, SPS. VIRGINIA DELA ROSA AND ROMEO DELA ROSA, SPS. PACIFICO SOTIO AND LOLITA
SORIANO, JUAN DALINOC (DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY DAUGHTER CONSUELO DALINOC,
SPS. MARIANO TORIO AND MAXIMA MACARAEG, REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS TORIBIA
TORIO AND MAYUMI MACARAEG, TEOFILO MOLINA AND AVELINO DIZON,
Petitioners,
Promulgated:
June 30, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On November 20, 1986, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the
affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show cause why their titles should not
be cancelled.[8]
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 25, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) as well as its November 25, 2003 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70161, which
reversed and set aside the December 20, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7256. Said RTC decision dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title filed by herein respondents Trinidad Salazar and Aniceta Salazar against
petitioners.
Below are the facts.
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (hereinafter, Salazars), filed a
petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who
died without issue.[4] The Salazars claim that two of the entries Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102
annotated at the back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the
Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries; and that Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a
certification issued by the RD.[5] On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant
the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102.[6] No respondent was impleaded
in the said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct
the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the
tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted in an Order issued on November
7, 1986.[7]
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to
comply with the courts order issued on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to
comply with the said court order would remove the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 9297 which
title had, in turn, been cancelled by many other transfer certificates of title and would
indubitably result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners
thereof.[9] On this basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the
matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority or
LRA). After the Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply
with the October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD
elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTCs
orders.[10] On March 7, 1989, OCT No. 40287 was reconstituted and TCT No. 219121 was issued
in the names of the Salazars, sans Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other subsequent
purchasers for value of the disputed property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all[11] filed their
formal written comment dated April 17, 1989.[12] In their comment, the oppositors contended,
among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower
court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership.[13]
On September 14, 1989, the said court, apparently realizing its mistake, issued an Order, stating
thus:
Upon motion of Atty. Alcantara and without objection on the part of Atty. Molina and Atty.
Lamorena, all the incidents in this case are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of
an appropriate action in a proper forum.
SO ORDERED.[14]
This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners
as well as other individuals who claim to have purchased the said property from the heirs of Juan
Soriano. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7256 before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac.[15]
The complaint alleged that TCT No. 219121 was issued in the names of the Salazars without
Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 at the back of said title, but the previous TCTs issued by the RD of
Tarlac as well as the tax declarations existing in the Assessors Office have not been cancelled and
revoked by the said government agencies to the detriment and prejudice of the complainants
(herein respondents). They also alleged that Pcs-395, from which Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V were
taken, is non-existent and, thus, the court should cause the cancellation and revocation of
spurious and null and void titles and tax declarations.[16]
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both
deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as
attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter, Macaraegs) maintained that
the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the
Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct, but a collateral, attack against
a property covered by a Torrens certificate.[17]
Defendants, now herein petitioners, for their part, maintained that the Plan of Consolidation
Subdivision Survey Pcs-396 had been an existing consolidation-subdivision survey plan
annotated on OCT No. 40287 under Entry No. 20102 dated February 17, 1950 from which TCT
No. 9297 was issued covering Lot Nos. 702-A to 702-V, inclusive, in the names of the heirs of Juan
Soriano. They argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is spurious and null
and void from the beginning since it was acquired pursuant to an illegal order issued by the
court.[18] By way of special and affirmative defenses, they also alleged, among others, (1) that
the Salazars were not among the heirs of the late Juan Soriano, not within the fifth civil degree of
consanguinity, and hence, they have no right to inherit; (2) that TCT No. 219121 constitutes a
cloud upon the Torrens title of herein petitioners, and should therefore be cancelled and
revoked; (3) that assuming, without admitting, that the Salazars have any right over the lots in
question their right to enforce such action had already prescribed by laches or had been barred
by prescription since more than forty (40) years had lapsed since the heirs of Juan Soriano had
registered the lots in question under TCT No. 9297 on February 17, 1950; and (4) that
petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest acquired the lots in question in good faith and
for value from the registered owners thereof.[19]
Defendant spouses Francisco Jonatas and Lucena M. Mariano and spouses Manuel Mangrobang
and Valeriana Sotio filed their answers practically raising the same defenses.[20]
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1991, petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et al., filed
before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment[21] rendered by RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac,
Tarlac. The case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25643, was, however, dismissed on the ground of
litis pendencia.[22]
On December 20, 2000, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac dismissed the complaint for quieting of
title. The trial court faulted the Salazars for failure to present proof that they are heirs of the late
Juan Soriano.[23] It also declared TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars as null and
void, and affirmed TCT No. 9297 as well as all certificates of title derived therefrom.[24]
Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the CA,[25] which ruled in their favor.
According to the CA, it was erroneous for Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac to reverse and declare
as null and void the decision of Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such issue should have
been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final judgment. Consequently, the orders
issued by RTC Branch 63, had become final and executory, hence, covered by res judicata.[26]
The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the appellees that the orders of RTC Branch 63
are null and void for lack of proper notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land
registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners
or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the res and over the parties.[27]
A motion for reconsideration[28] was filed, but the same was denied.[29] Hence, this petition.
Pivotal to the resolution of this case is the determination of the validity of the action taken by the
Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac.
We rule for petitioners.
It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in
personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those
outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to
the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.[30]
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars both in Branch 63 of the RTC
of Tarlac for the cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of the RTC of
Tarlac for quieting of title can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The petition for cancellation
of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been directed against specific
persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably,
against their successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the property over
the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should
have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as
those claiming ownership over the property under their names because they are indispensable
parties. This was not done in this case.[31] Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by
the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac,
herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court.[32] Consequently, the
judgment or order of the said court never even acquired finality.
the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 never acquired
finality.[37] Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.[38]
Apparently realizing their mistake, the Salazars later on filed an action for quieting of title, also
an action quasi in rem, albeit this time before Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac. Because the
Salazars miserably failed to prove the basis for their claim, the RTC dismissed the complaint.[33]
In fact, the RTC was bold enough to have pronounced thus:
More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under
the Torrens system. To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the
validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex parte petition for
cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was
adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on
the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate,
or which may arise subsequent thereto.[42] Once a title is registered under the Torrens system,
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting
in the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.[43] Rarely will the court allow
another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is
compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance
with law.[44]
Who are the heirs of Juan Soriano who caused the consolidation and in whose favor TCT No.
9297 was issued? Certainly, they are not the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs claim that they are the only
heirs, they should file a case against those who executed the consolidation in whose favor [E]ntry
[N]o. 20102 was made.
x x x In its order dated February 24, 2000, this Court ruled that it is necessary that plaintiffs
should prove that they are the heirs of Juan Soriano, the registered owners as indicated in OCT
No. 40287 of (sic) Vicenta Macaraeg, the late spouse. Despite the cue, the plaintiffs opted not to
present evidence on how they became the heirs of Juan Soriano or Vicenta Macaraeg. There being
[no] evidence presented to prove that plaintiffs are the heirs of the late Juan Soriano and Vicenta
Macaraeg, they had no right and cause of action to prosecute this case.[34]
Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the
petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to
dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case.[35] Yet, although the action proceeded,
any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on
the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.[36] Thus,
Paraphrasing by analogy this Courts ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v.
Sison,[39] a void order is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It
has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect,
impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those
who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all proceedings founded on the void court order are
themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no order
issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the
trial.[40] A void order, like any void judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight.[41]
Finally, this Court also takes note of the fact that for more than 30 years from the time Entry No.
20102 was annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 on February 17, 1950 until the time of the
filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said certificate of title on
November 19, 1985 the Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any move to
question the issue of ownership over the said land before the proper forum. They also failed to
ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by the heirs of Juan Soriano sometime
in 1939. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to
petitioners who, for themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would
lead to the inevitable conclusion that if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over the
said property although such issue is not the subject of the present case the same had already
prescribed[45] or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals including its November 25, 2003 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
December 20, 2000 Decision rendered by Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City,
Tarlac is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
The complaint filed on October 26, 1956 in the Court of First instance of Camarines Norte, sought
the cancellation of OCT No. P-506 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Norte, issued on May 10,
1956 pursuant to Free Patent No. V-36970 covering a parcel of land situated in Paracale,
Camarines Norte, in the name of respondent Cipriano Dar.
SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff's evidence shows that the land in question is a part of the public domain; that in
1914, when it was still within the forest zone, it was occupied, together with the land adjoining it
on the North (now in the possession of Pedro Lamadrid); that adjoining it on the East (now in
possession of Maximins Andaya); and that on the West, now in possession of the heirs of Adriano
Lopez, by Emilio, Gregorio and Isidoro,, all surnamed Andaya; that the Andaya brothers gradually
cleared the entire area by making caingin and planting bananas, abaca and coconuts; that in
1918, when Isidoro, who was the youngest among the Andaya brothers, was ready and able to
take care of and improve the land, it is ceded to him by his two elder brothers, Emilio and
Gregorio; that while in possession he improved the land and incurred indebtedness from his
aunt, Martina Herico, in the amount of P60.00, representing cash advices and cost of supplies
given to him that to guarantee payment of the said amount he executed on March 12, 1925, a
private document purpotedly mortgaging the land in question to Martina Herico (Exhibit A); that
in 1938, Martina Herico demanded payment from him of the amount of indebtedness which by
this time laid amounted to P130.00 but Isidoro Andaya, instead of paying, transferred and
assigned his right to the land to plaintiff Moises Herico, a brother of Martina, in consideration of
the sum of P130.00 which was paid by Moises Herico to Martina Herico; that Moises Herico took
possession of the land in 1939 and planted it with abaca and coconuts, although there were
coconut trees thereon previously planted by Isidro Andaya; that plaintiff declared the land for
taxation purposes in 1940 and 1945; that in 1943, he placed Maximino Andaya, a son of Emilio
Andaya, as tenant on the land who planted some coconut trees and remained as such tenant until
1953; that in 1949 plaintiff placed the defendant as his tenant on said land with the privilege of
gathering all the produce thereof provided he planted some coconut trees for the plaintiff; that
on December 12, 1955, while he was still plaintiff's tenant, defendant without the knowledge and
consent of the plaintiff filed a Free Patent application for said land; that on April 7, 1956, the said
application was approved and an order for the issuance of a parent was issued; that on May 10,
1956, the corresponding certificate of title was issued in favor f the defendant; that the adjoining
owners of the land, including the plaintiff himself, who is also the owner of the adjoining land on
the South, were not notified of the Free Patent application; and that the defendant is a relative of
the plaintiff's wife who went to reside in barrio Batobalane municipality of Paracale, only after
16. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23265 January 28, 1980
MOISES HERICO, petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO DAR and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro A. Venida for petitioner.
Ricardo S. Heraldo & F. H.Geris for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 reversing the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in favor of the plaintiff, Moises Herico 2 the petitioner
here and accordingly dismiss the latter's complaint. 3
As recited in the appealed judgment the plaintiff-petitioner's evidence shows the following.
the liberation, staying at first in a house near that of the plaintiff, but out of charity plaintiff
placed him as tenant on said land with the privilege of harvesting for his benefit the produce of
the land. (pp. 2-4, Petitioner's Brief)
On the basis of the evidence of defendant-respondent which the Court of Appeals recited as
follows:
On the other hand, the defendant sought to show that he took possession of the land in question
in 1922; that he cultivated the same and possession it continuously to the exclusion of all other
persons; that he declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon; that on
December 10, 1949, he entered into a contract with Mrs. Victorina Salen and Mrs. Eufemia Salen
to do prospecting work on the land in question and for them to sell the mining located thereon;
that he also entered into a contract with Vicente Inocalla giving the latter the right to prospect
locate and carry out mining operations over said land-, that he filed his Free Patent application
after occupying and cultivating the land continuously since 1922; that nobody objected or filed a
protest against his application in spite of the fact that notices of the application were posted in
the various places required by law; that not being the owner of more than twenty-four hectares
of land and having cultivated the land in question continuously since 1922, a report to that effect
was submitted by Junior Public Land Inspector Florencio Rosales who stated in his report that
the land is claimed by nobody and that the defendant had totally cultivated the total area of
8.6973 hectares and introduced improvements thereon consisting of 700 coconuts ranging from
twenty to thirty years old, and banana plants smittered all over the land; that pursuant to said
report, Free Patent No. V-36970 was issued by authority of the President of the Philippines and
on the basis thereof Original Certificate of Title No. P-506 was issued to him by the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Norte. (pp. V-VI, Petitioner's Brief)
The Court awarded judgment in favor of defendant, Cipriano Dar.
The decision of the respondent Court failed utterly to pass on the question of whether
respondent Dar was a tenant of petitioner Herico on the land in question. It proceeded on the
assumption that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between them, and came to the
conclusion that when respondent Dar applied for a free patent over the land in question, he did
so without committing any fraud against petitioner or his landlord, or to create a constructive
trust in favor of the latter. Sole basis of the conclusion was the approval of his application for free
patent by the land authorities and the granting of the Torrens title thereafter.
The allegation of respondent Dar that he has never been a tenant of the petitioner over the land
in question is belied by his own statement which he signed on November 8, 1956 in which he
admitted that he has been petitioner's tenant since 1945 (Exhibit D). On the witness stand he
also admitted that he has been making copra for the petitioner. 4 With these admissions, it is
easier to believe the allegation of petitioner that his possession dates back to 1914, through that
of his predecessors-in-interest, as recited earlier, and declared the land for taxation purposes
earlier in 1940 than respondent Dar who declared it only in 1952 (Exhibit 3), after he had been
allegedly placed as tenant in the land in question in 1949.
What led the Court of Appeals to find in favor of respondent Dar is the fact that his application
for a free patent was approved after the requisite official investigation which enjoys the
presumption of regularity. This presumption however, may be said to have been seriously
impaired by respondent Dar's admission of having been a tenant to petitioner Herico, for by such
relationship, respondent Dar should not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, claim to which by
the latter is strengthened by the prompt filing of the present action, just months after the
issuance of the certificate of title sought to be cancelled, precisely on the ground of fraud. As held
by this Court:
It is elementary that a tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, hence, the
proceedings whereby the defendants obtained free patents were fraudulent.
We cannot concur with the distinguished trial judge that it is necessary that the plaintiff
'presente pruebas concluyentes o titulos positives que justifiquen con la claridad de la Luz
meridiana el derecho de propiedad o dorainio del demandante sobre los terrenos cuestionados.'
By virtue of his possession since 1892, established by the preponderance of evidence, the
plaintiff is entitled to a certificate of title to the lands described in his petition, under the
provisions of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No 2874, the Public Land Law, and he is
conclusively essential to a government grant. That being so, the original certificates of title of free
patent issued to the various defendants, as recited in the agreed statement of facts, were
unauthorized and void as against this plaintfff. (Lizada vs. Oman Ari 59 Phil. 547, 555; See also
Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, G.R. No. 7745 November 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 5590; Bancadren vs. Diones,
et al., G.R. No. L-8013, December 20, 1955). (pp. 5-6, Petitioner's Brief).
Another obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance
of the Torrens title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, and has
become absolute and indefeasible. In the first place, the action to annul or cancel the certificate of
title was brought within one year as admitted by respondent in his brief. 5 Secondly, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent-court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under
the Public Land Act as by free patent This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took
effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides:
SO ORDERED.
... (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (p. 8, Petitioner's Brief).
SECOND DIVISION
As interpreted in several cases 6 when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
DECISION
On the ground, therefore, that there is evidence of fraud in the filing of application for free patent
over the land by respondent Dar, and that the land applied for had ceased to be part of the public
domain by reason of the operation of Republic Act -No. 1942 in favor of petitioner, the decision
appealed from has to be reversed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint is
hereby reversed, and another one entered cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-506 issued
in favor of the defendant-respondent, for being null and void, and declaring plaintiff-petitioner
entitled to either judicial confirmation or administrative legalization of his incomplete or
imperfect title under the provision of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. 7 Costs against private respondent.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Metencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
21. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 157536
May 16, 2005
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503, affirming the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 15529 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 from Ruperto Gepilano as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale2 dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan,
Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849
hectares. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro,
consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of
Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale3 dated January 31,
1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands, District
Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The
application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional
Director rendered a Decision4 canceling the said application, thusly:
This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of Calaya, Nueva Valencia,
Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of Melchor Caro.
In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he acquired it through
sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought the land from Ruperto Cepellano
(sic) in 1953. On the other hand, protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in controversy was
bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied, possessed and
improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven out by
Gregorio Caro from the land in question.
Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was actually sold to Gregorio Caro by
Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessor’s Lot No. 160. The description and physical identity of Lot No.
160 is basically different and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the land in question. This could be
clearly seen in the Certified True Copy of the Sketch Plan from the Assessor’s Office of Assessor’s
Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit 9 of the Respondent-Applicant. It has been
established that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 corresponds to Lot No. 4511 and not Lot No. 4512
claimed by the protestant. Moreover, Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified that what
he sold to Gregorio Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a
Free Patent7 covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor.
Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession8 before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was
granted in an Order9 dated May 7, 1984.
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint10 against Sucaldito for "Annulment of
Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages"
before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended complaint,11 alleging that he was the
owner of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior
thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further
alleged that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his
predecessors-in-interest, and that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He
claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511
and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was
located two kilometers away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his
ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of
Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence,
as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful
owner. The complaint contained the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A. No. (VI-1)8548 of applicantrespondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is, cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la Cruz if
qualified, is given one hundred twenty (120) days from the finality of this decision to file an
appropriate public land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.
1. Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the Bureau of Lands, the free patent and
the Original Certificate of Title No. F-27162 or in the alternative;
SO ORDERED.5
2. Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event she wrests possession from
plaintiff then, also the possession of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre,
back to plaintiff;
Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, docketed as MNR Case
No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an Order6 dated June 29, 1982, on the ground of
failure to file an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.
3. Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia,
Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the issuance of a free patent or a torrens title in favor of
plaintiff;
4. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P2,000.00 as expenses on litigation plus exemplary damages in an amount at the
discretion of this Court.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.12
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special affirmative defense, the fact
that she intervened in the proceedings on Caro’s application for a free patent over Lot No. 4512
before the Bureau of Lands having bought the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary
to the allegations of the petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the same lot, as
per the findings of the Bureau of Lands.
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective claims. In a Decision13 dated
December 7, 1993, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff is dismissed. The
counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the filing of the complaint, is likewise
dismissed.
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caro’s claims, the evidence clearly showed that Lot
No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters, was not included in Assessor’s Lot No. 160, thus:
Assessor’s Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area of around 17 hectares, more
or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we add Lot 4512 to Lot 4511 following the
contention of the plaintiff, then the area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the claim
of plaintiff that Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessor’s Lot 160.
The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot 989 which is owned by Felix
Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well taken, because the identification of the lot as
stated in the tax declaration is not binding and conclusive. What is binding and conclusive is
what is stated in the title of the land and its technical description. In the technical description as
found in the title of the defendant [Sucaldito], it is clearly stated therein that the lot is Lot 4512
and is located at Brgy. Calaya and not Brgy. Olacon, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.18
Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on the following grounds:
I
Costs against the plaintiff.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
ACTION;
SO ORDERED.14
II
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III,15 the trial court ruled that
Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor of
Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant for a
free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the
land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the
Public Land Act,"16 or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed
that the remedy of a rival-applicant for a free patent over the same land was through
administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title
of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the owner of the land in dispute.17
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE PLANTIFF HAS THE PERSONALITY
TO BRING THE ACTION STILL HE CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO.
4512;
III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY THE LAND IN
QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY DAMAGES.19
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision20 dated July 31, 2002. The appellate court agreed
with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no personality to file the action under Section
101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free
patent. Citing several cases,21 the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact made by
administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must be respected,
particularly where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring special knowledge and experience.22
Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied in a
Resolution23 dated February 7, 2003.
Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the following grounds:
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THIS ACTION;
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL INTERPOSED
BY PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CAN FILE AN ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PATENT.24
The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal personality to bring
and institute the present action against the respondent, considering that title issued on the basis
of a patent is annullable on the ground of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period within which
to file an action to cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does
not apply where the registered owner, or the successor-in-interest, knew that the property
described in the title actually belongs to another, as in this case. The petitioner cites Vital v.
Anore, et al.25 to bolster his claim. The petitioner also cites Director of Lands v. Abanilla26
where the Court stressed that any false statement in the application, which is an essential
condition of the patent or title under Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, "shall ipso facto
produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted."
In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the Bureau of Lands itself would
show that the petitioner is not the true and lawful owner of the subject lot; as such, the argument
that he has the legal personality to file the action for annulment of patent based on constructive
trust is untenable. The respondent further contends that the CA did not err in upholding the
ruling of the RTC.
The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply dated December 30, 2003.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner has no
personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.
The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of the
free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the
respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for
reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is
sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right."28
Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back
to the State.29
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land
back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.30
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,31 every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.32
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the
petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for
reconveyance. The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v.
Cezar33 as follows:
… Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and,
consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title.
The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the
property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff,
being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for
reconveyance. …
...
Verily, the Court stressed that " … [i]f the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real
party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action [Travel Wide v. CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991), per Cruz, J. See also Suguister v.
Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be invalidated if the real
parties-in-interest are not included. This was underscored by the Court in Arcelona v. CA [280
SCRA 20, October 2, 1997], in which a final judgment was nullified because indispensable parties
were not impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore,
not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have
no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such
suit.34
In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court, in dismissing the petitioner’s imputation of fraud
in securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name.36
The Court further expounded:
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by
the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936)]. In such cases, the real party-in-interest
is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established,
after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to
annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the
law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.37
In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 where the private respondents
therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court ruled that as mere lessees, they
had "no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues involving ownership of
the disputed property." The Court went on to declare:
… The only interest they have, in the event the petitioner’s title over the subject property is
cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that they become qualified buyers of the
subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private
respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the State, they only have
"pre-emptive rights" to buy the subject property; that their real interest over the said property is
contingent upon the government’s consideration of their application as buyers of the same. It is
settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed.39
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states –
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines.
This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, et al.,40 a case on all fours with the present one, as follows:
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any
action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of
title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form
part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality
from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a
free patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public
domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public
land. Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does
not automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who
may apply for the same.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would
result in the reversion of the land to the government.41 The petitioner has no personality to
"recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2003 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
25. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74454. September 3, 1998]
ALFRED PEARSON, for himself and as the attorney-in fact of his co-heirs/co-successors-ininterest, namely: ELSIE PEARSON-FUENTES, HENRY PEARSON, WILLIAM PEARSON, JR., ROBERT
PEARSON, EDUARD PEARSON, JR., CHARLES PEARSON, FREDRIECH PEARSON and HARRY F.
GASSER, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 155, Pasig, Metro Manila, Hon. Presidential Executive Assistant; Hon. Minister of Natural
Resources; Hon. Director of Mines; DIAMOND MINING CORPORATION, ROSARIO MINING
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and A. SORIANO CORPORATION, respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING J.:
This petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary Injuction and Prayer for Restraining
Order seeks to annul the following:
1. Decision dated September 30, 1983 of respondent Intermidiate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. 15439 which in effect upheld herein private respondent's mining claims
and directed respondent Regional Trial Court to resolve the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
45053.[1]
2. Order dated July 31, 1984 of the Court of First Instance, Branch X (now Regional Trial Court,
Branch 155), Pasig, Metro Manila, dismissing Civil Case No. 45053 on the basis of an earlier
decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the findings of fact of the Minister of Natural
Resources;[2]
3. Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President, upholding the finding of the
Minister that petitioners had abandoned their "BAROBO" mining claims and accordingly
dismissed their appeal;[3]
4. Decision dated October 29, 1979 of the Minister of Natural Resources, affirming the decision of
the Director of Mines;[4]
5. Consolidated Decision dated May 12, 1976 of the Director of Minis in Mines Administrative
Case Nos. V-817 and V-818, upholding the preferential rights of private respondents to lease,
possess, explore and develop their respective "DIAMOND" AND "MARTIN" mining claims in
question;[5]
The petitioners also pray that their mining claims be declared valid and that private respondents'
mining claims be declared null and void.
The petitioners Alfred Pearson, et al. (hereinafter "Pearsons") claims to have inherited the
benificial interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Tambis Gold") upon its
dissolution, owing to the fact that the biggest stockholder of said company and the sole owner of
the claims was their ancestor, William F. Pearson, Sr.[6]
Private respondents Diamond Mining Corporation, Rosario Mining Development Corporation
and their assignee A. Soriano Corporation (hereinafter "Mining Companies") are domestic
corporations organized and existing under Philippine laws.
The public respondent are the Director of Mines, the Minister of Natural Resources, the
Presidential Executive Assistant, the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC).[7] Each of them had ruled in favor of the Mining Companies.
The facts as found by the respondent Minister of Natural Resources and confirmed by the
respondents Presidential Executive Assistant and the IAC are as follows:
"From the records and the documentary evidence at hand, it appears that the Tambis Gold
Dredging Co., Inc. filed in 1919, under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declarations of location
covering the "BAROBO-1" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims located at the barrio of Bahi,
municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao del Sur. These declarations of locations were
destroyed or lost during the war.
In 1948, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Mines affidavits to
reconstitute the declarations of location for the "BOROBO" placer claims. The affidavits were
recorded with the mining recorder on January 19, 1949.
On February 29, 1960, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. was dissolved. Appellants (herein
petitioners) were at the time stockholdres of the corporation.
From May 10, to June 11, 1970, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining through its agent
Marcelino Manabat, discovered and located the "MARTIN-1", "MARTIN-2", "MARTIN-5",
"MARTIN-6" and "MARTIN-27" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Barobo,
province of Surigao del Sur. On June 25, 1970, the declarations of locations therefor, and the
Special Power and (sic) Attorney appointing Marcelino Manabat as attorney-in-fact, were
registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur.
On August 31, 1970, the application for the survey of the "MARTIN" claims were filed, and, on
March 13, 1973 and December 18, 1973, the corresponding orders for survey were issued.
On June 22, 1973, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining filed the lease application covering
the "MARTIN" placer claims. After the survey returns of said placer claims were approved on
January 3, 1975, the notice of lease was published in February 20 and 27, 1975 issues of the
"Mindanao Times" and in the February 25 and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times Journal".
Meanwhile, from February 24 to March 5, 1974, appellee (now also respondent) Diamond
Mining, through its agent Justiniano Deloso, discovered and located the "DIAMOND-1" to
"DIAMOND-7" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, minicipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del
Sur. On March 25, 1974, the declarations of location therefor, including the Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Justiniano Deloso, were registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del
Sur.
On April 17, 1973, the application for survey of the "DIAMOND" placer claims were filed, and, on
May 21, 1974, the order for survey was issued.
On April 22, 1974, appellee Diamond Mining filed the lease applications covering the "DIAMOND"
placer claims. Subsequently, after the survey returns of said claims were approved on December
24, 1974 and January 3, 1975, the notice of lease application was published in the February 25
and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times Jornal" and in the February 27 and March 6, 1975 issues
of the "Mindanao Times".
On 10 March 1975, appellants (petitioners herein) filed the adverse claims against appellees
(now private respondents).
After the case was heard by the Panel of Investigators of the Bureau of Mines, the Director of
Mines rendred (sic) the decision appealed from.
In his decision, the Director held that appellants (petitioners) failed to establish the existence of
the conflict among the placer claims involved; that the "BAROBO" placer claims are null and void
because their tie points, as described in the affidavits to reconstitute the declarations of location
therefor, are not the natural objects or permanent monuments prescribed under the law and
their geographical positions cannot be accurately determined; that, even if said "BAROBO" claims
were validly located, the same have been abandoned due to the failure of the original locators
threof to perform assessment works therein, to file the corresponding affidavits of annual work
obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes thereon; and that appellants (petitioners) are not the
successors-in-interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc., hence they have no legal personality
to institute the adverse claims."[8]
On appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources in a Decision dated October 29, 1979, affirmed the
judgment of the Director of Mines[9] He agreed with the Director's finding on the issue of
abandonment.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, the Pearsons appealed to the
Office of the President. They filed a Manifestation requesting the Office to require the Mining
Companies to file a bond in such amount as may be necessary to protect the interest of the
Pearsons during the pendency of the case before it. Also, they prayed for an order for immediate
ocular inspection of the area to determine the fundamental issue of the correct tie point of the
controverted mining claims.[10]
In an Order dated June 23, 1981, the Office of the President granted the motion concerning the
bond but denied the request for ocular inspection. In the order, it was stated that "the
investigation conducted by the Presidential Investigating Committee of Bureau of Mines has
already considered and determined the issue which require no more (sic) further verification
and clarification."[11] The Pearsons and the Mining Companies separately moved for
reconsideration.[12]
Subsequently, the Office of the President granted the motion for ocular inspection, and ordered
the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee on June 23, 1989.[13] The Mining
Companies moved for reconsideration of this order.[14]
In a Decision dated August 31, 1981, the Office of the President revoked the order allowing
ocular inspection, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and released all monies that might have
been deposited by the Mining Companies. The pertinent grounds of its dismissal are hereunder
quoted:[15]
"xxx We agree with the findings of the Ministry of Natural Resources that Appellant's mining
claims are abandoned, if not null and void. Evidence on record clearly establishes the fact that
appellants failed annual work obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes. These ommissions
(sic) by appellants constitute abandonment of their claims. Executive Order No. 141 dated
August 1, 1968, explicitly states that unpatented mining claims which were located more than
thirty years ago under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended, and which have
not complied with the annual assessment requirement are considered abandoned and their
declaration of location cancelled. On this score, this Office finds no legal justification to modify,
much less reverse, the appealed decision."
On January 18, 1982, the Office of the President issued a Resolution denying the Pearsons'
motion for reconsideration.[16]
After said denial, the Pearsons filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a
writ of preliminary injuction, before Branch X of the CFI of Pasig to annul the aforementioned
decisions of public respondents and to restrain private respondents from entering and
developing the mining claims involved.[17] This was docketed as Civil Case No. 45053. The
Mining Companies filed their joint motion to dismiss and opposition to the preliminary injuction
alleging, among other, that the Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President is
already final and executory pursuant to Presidential Decree no. 463, Section 50 which states that:
"Appeals- Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director, may, within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decision of the Secretary are likewise
appealable within five (5) days receipt thereof by the affected party to the President of the
Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx"
Instead of expressly resolving and said motion to dismiss, the CFI ordered on October 15, 1982
the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee "to determine the correct tie-point of
private respondents' mineral claim". Both the public and private respondents moved for
reconsideration of said order.[18] The CFI denied both motions and issued the Order dated
December 21, 1982 scheduling the ocular inspection for January 3, 1983.
In view of this last order, the Mining Companies filed with the IAC their Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, assailing the abovementioned orders dated October 15, 1982 and December 21,
1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule for ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc
Committee, and praying that the latter court be prohibited from further proceeding with Civil
Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies argued that when P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463 were
promulgated, it became unquestionable that the procedure of adjudicating mining claims was
made completely administrative with the President as the Final authority.[19] In their Answer,
the Pearsons assailed the propriety of the petition since its subjects are two interlocutory
orders.[20]
The IAC issued a Restrating Order dated January 31, 1983, restraining the CFI judge from
implementing his order directing the Ad Hoc Committee to conduct an ocular inspection.[21]
Later on, the IAC granted the writ of certiorari, set aside the orders of the CFI with regard to the
Ad Hoc Committee and ocular inspection, and directed the CFI "to resolve the joint motion to
dismiss filed by the private respondents in said case in light of what has been stated in this
decision." The decision of the IAC was promulgated on September 30, 1983, and the same
became final and executory with an entry of judgment issued by the said IAC on February 17,
1984.
As directed by the IAC, the CFI issued an Order on July 31, 1984 dismissing the petition of the
Pearsons before it.
Hence, the petitioners now come before this Court raising in their petition the following
issues:[22]
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IN
CA-G.R. NO. 15439 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE;
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO AND DECIDED SAID PETITION DESPITE THE
CLEAR SHOWING BY HEREIN PETITIONER THAT THE ORDERS IN QUESTION ARE MERELY
INTERLOCUTORY AND ARE, THEREFORE, NOT PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; AND
III. ASSUMING AGAIN ARGUENDO THAT THE QUESTIONED INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ARE
PROPER SUBJECT OF CERTIORARI, WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 30,
1983 OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS A PATENT NULLITY FOR BEING
DEVOID OF ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS.
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgement and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided in xxx xxx xxx
(2) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court in the issue.
Petitioners maintain that the Supreme Court that the Supreme Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases where the jurisdiction of a lower court is in issue, as well as all cases
decided by lower courts involving pure questions of law,[23] pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) Section
5, Art X of the present Constitution which states that:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
They further argue that the questioned orders of the CFI dated October 15, 1982 and December
21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule for ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc
Committee were merely interlocutory, and therefore, cannot be subject of a petition for certiorari
in the IAC.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in xxx xxx xxx
( c ) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior courts is in issue
xxx xxx xxx"
Like wise, they assert that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended, also clearly
provides that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Paragraph
(3), Sec 17 thereof, to wit:
"Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, they argue that the IAC Decision dated September 30, 1983 is a patent nullity for
utter want of jurisdiction.
Lastly, they claim that the IAC, in its September 30, 1984 decision sustaining the Decision dated
August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President dismissing the appeal of petitioners, had no factual
and legal bases. They stress that they have lived in their ancestral home in the mining area up to
the filing of this petition; they continued performing the assessment work on their mineral
claims up to 1975 when this case arose, and they were enjoined to stop their operations by
respondent Bureau of Mines; that they have performed assessment work constinously up to
1975; that they filed religiously their affidavits of assessment work; and that they paid their
realty taxes due, although they admitted that certain affidavits were filed and certain taxes were
also paid in later years.[25]
Private respondents, in their Comment dated June 26, 1986, allege that the IAC has jurisdiction to
entertain the original petition for ceriorari filed by them against respondent CFI and the
Pearsons under Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court. They argue that under P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309 and
463 governing the procedures of adjudicating conflicting mining claims which were made
completely administrative, the decision of the President on appeal to his Office is final and
executory, and therefore, not subject to judicial review.[26]
The different issues raised in the instant petition may be subsumed in two principal issues:
1. Whether or not respondent IAC committed reversible error in assuming jurisdiction over the
private respondents' petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's interlocutory orders?
2. Assuming the IAC had validly assumed jurisdiction, whether or not it committed reversible
errors of law in its decision now before us?
We find the petition entirely devoid of merit. Thus we see, in regard to the first principal issue,
no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed jurisdiction over private respondents'
petition for certiorari involving interlocutory order of the trial court.
The petitioners launch a two-pronged attack against the jurisdiction of the respondent
appeallate court, to wit: first, the IAC could not adjudicate cases where the jurisdiction of the trial
court is in issue; and second, the orders of the CFI, being merely interlocutory, could not be the
subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC.
The petitioners err on both counts.
Firstly, the IAC correctly invoked the ruling of this Court in Uytiepo vs. Aggabao[27], the wit:
"As regards the claim that the issues raised by Aggabao in her action filed with the respondent
Court of Appeals involve only questions of law and are therefore exclusively reviewable by this
Court, the petitioners apparently confuse the remedy of special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 30 of the Judiciary Act as amended and an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 42 also of the Rules of Court in relation to the court fourth
paragraph of section 17 of the same Act. The first is a remedy available in the Court of Appeals in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, essentially to correct errors of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The second lies within the competence of this Court for the
review of errors of inferior courts involving only questions of law. x x x ."
What private respondents availed of was the first remedy, placing in issue the jurisdiction of the
trial court to create an Ad Hoc Committee and Schedule an ocular inspection.
Considered in relation to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980),
now incorporated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which vested the
then IAC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition, among other
auxillary writs, "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction", we find that respondent
appellate court correctly assumed jurisdiction over CA-G.R. No. 15439.
It has also been emphasized in a number of cases[28] that while this Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts (for writs enforceable within
their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are
well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. Instead,they should initially seek the
proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is concurrently within the competence of the CA or RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of heirarchy of courts. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary, or where serious and important reasons therefor
exist.
Secondly, petitioner's contention that the lower court's orders of October 15, 1982 and
December 21, 1982, being merely interlocutory, are not correctible by certiorari, ignores this
Court's consistent ruling, to wit:
"On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be
questioned before the Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case would
not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate
remedy."[29]
In Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[30] we held that although, as a general rule, an interlocutory order is
not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits, an exception is made
where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief. In such exception,
certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a
party. We further held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for
certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of
appeal.[31] This we reiterated in Salcedo-Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals[32]
Does the controversy at hand fall under the exception where interlocutory orders may be the
subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC? In our view, it does. For the trial court clearly acted
outside of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders creating the Ad Hoc Committee and
scheduling the ocular inspection.
To begin with the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the mining dispute. With the
issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463,[33] the procedure of adjudicating
conflicting mining claims has been made completely administrative in character, with the
president as the final appeal authority.[34] Section 50 of P.D. 463, providing for a modernized
system of administration and disposition of mineral lands, to promote and encourage the
development and exploitation thereof, mandates on the matter of "Protests, Adverse Claims and
Appeals," the following procedure:
"Appeals - Any party not statisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are likewise
appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the President of the
Phillippines whose decision shall be final and executory."
It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) required that after
the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the adverse claimant had to go to a court of
competent jurisdiction for the settlement of the claim. With the amendment seeking to expedite
the resolution of mining conflicts, the Director of Mines became the mandatory adjudicator of
adverse claims, instead of the Court of first Instance.[35] Thus, it cannot escape notice that under
Section 61 of the Mining Law, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Minister of Natural
Resources) on conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be made to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. In contrast, under the decrees issued at the
onset of martial law, it has been expressly provided that the decision of the same Secretary in
mining cases are appealable to the President of the Philippines under Section 50 of the Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. No. 463) and Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 in relation
to P.D. No. 309.[36]
The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative
matter.[37] This does not mean that administrative bodies have complete rein over mining
disputes. The very terms of Section 73 of the Mining Law, as amended by R.A. No. 4388, in
requiring that the adverse claim must "state in full detail the nature, boundaries and extent of the
adverse claim" show that the conflicts to be decided by reason of such adverse claim refer
primarily to questions of fact. The controversies to be submitted and resolved by the Director of
Mines under the sections referred only to the overlapping of claims and administrative matters
incidental thereto[38] Question and controversies that are judicial, not administrative, in nature
can be resolved only by the regular counts in whom is vested the judicial power to resolve and
adjudicate such civil disputes and controversies between litigants in accordance with the
established norms of law and justice.[39] Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes
have recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions
of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of
an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of lisence, permits, lease and contracts,
or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting
applications," and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between
litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of
justice.[40]
This distinction is carried on even under the present law.[41] Findings of fact by the Mines
Adjudiction Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the panel of
arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and its decision or order shall be final
and executory.[42] But resort to the appropriate court, though a petition for review by certiorari,
involving question of law, may be made within thirty days from the receipt of the order or
decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.[43]
With regard to the second issue, the query boils down to whether the IAC committed reversible
error in concluding that petitioners had abandoned their mining claims.
As found by IAC:
"It will not be amiss to state here that the basis of abandonment of the Pearsons of their mining
claims is well established by the evidence already presented to the Bereau of Mines and to the
Ministry of Natural Resources. We need only to refer to the following reasons found in the
decision of the Ministry of Natural Resources, dated October 29, 1975, to wit:
'x x x assuming, in gratia argumentis, that the 'BAROBO' placer claims were validly located, said
claims have been abandoned for failure of the claim owners thereof to conduct works therein, to
file the affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes.
The evidence that affidavits of annual assessment works have been filed for the 'BAROBO-2' to
'BAROBO-5' placer claims from 1946 to 1951. However, the affidavits for the years 1957 to 1974,
respectively were all filed only on April 8, 1975. Thus, during the latter years, no proof was
submitted to show compliance with the annual assessment works. So, at the time the 'DIAMOND'
and 'MARTIN' placer claims were located and registered, the 'BAROBO' claims had already been
deemed abandoned and the areas covered thereby open to relocation.'
"Said decision also took into account Executive Order No. 141, dated August 1, 1968, which
provides:
'NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, president of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare unpatented mining claims which were located
more than thirty years ago under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended, and
which had not complied with the annual assessment requirement, as abandoned and their
declaration of cancelled."'[44]
Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) appealed from will not be
reviewed by this Court unless there has been a grave abuse of discretion in making said findings
by reason of the total absence of competent evidence in support thereof.[45] As shown above,
the public officials' judgments are well supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, by the
Pearsons' own admission, they failed to file the affidavit of annual assessment works and to pay
the real estate taxes from 1957-1974, which were filed and paid only later in 1974[46]
In Santa Rosa Mining Co. vs. Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido, Jr. And Directors of
Mines Juanito Fernandez[47], this Court held that while it is recognized that the right of a locator
of a mining claim is a property right, such right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right,
more so where petitioner's claims are still unpatented. Mere location does not mean absolute
ownership over the affected land or located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area
from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and
appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply the
location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This
cannot be approved or sanctioned because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the
locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirement for annual works and
improvements in the located mining claims.[48] Not only should there be a valid and subsisting
location of the mineral land but also there should be, thereafter, continuous compliance with all
the requirements of law such as the performance of annual assessment works and payment of
real estate taxes.[49]
While it is understandable that petitioners would want this Court to reassess the evidence
presented before the mining officials to support their plea of not having abandoned the mining
claim involved, this cannot be done now in this proceeding, for this Court is not atrier of facts.
Moreover, we find no cogent, much less compelling, reason to depart from established practice
and precedents. For where, as in the case at bar, there is no showing that there was fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President
or a department head in rendering a questioned decision; nor a total lack of substantial evidence
to support their administrative decisions, their factual findings and conclusion are entitled to
great weight and respect, and will not be interfered with.[50]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assiled Orders and Decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 15439, including the Order of dismissal of Civil Case
No 45053, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.