350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank PRELIMINARY PAGES Intentionally left blank PRELIMINARY PAGES TABLE OF CONTENTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GI General Information AOP Airbus Operational Philosophy AS Aircraft Systems PR Procedures PIR Preventing Identified Risks 350-941 FLEET FCTM PLP-TOC P 1/2 06 FEB 20 PRELIMINARY PAGES TABLE OF CONTENTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PLP-TOC P 2/2 06 FEB 20 PRELIMINARY PAGES AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION TABLE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL This table gives, for each delivered aircraft, the cross reference between: - The Manufacturing Serial Number (MSN). The Fleet Serial Number (FSN) of the aircraft as known by AIRBUS S.A.S. The registration number of the aircraft as known by AIRBUS S.A.S. The aircraft model. (1) M MSN 350-941 FLEET FCTM FSN Registration Number Model PLP-AAT P 1/2 06 FEB 20 PRELIMINARY PAGES AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION TABLE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PLP-AAT P 2/2 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION Intentionally left blank GENERAL INFORMATION PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Main FCTM Changes.............................................................................................................................................. A FCTM Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................B FCTM Content......................................................................................................................................................... C Introduction to the Preventing Identified Risks....................................................................................................... D Questions and Suggestions.....................................................................................................................................E Abbreviations............................................................................................................................................................F 350-941 FLEET FCTM GI-PLP-TOC P 1/2 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM GI-PLP-TOC P 2/2 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL MAIN FCTM CHANGES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00021086.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 INTRODUCTION PURPOSE The purpose of the MAIN FCTM CHANGES section is to provide general information about the latest FCTM revisions, and to highlight the main changes. Note: In addition, each Documentary Unit (DU) highlights the reason(s) for change, and contains revision bars to indicate the revised sections. TIMEFRAME The MAIN FCTM CHANGES section is updated on a monthly basis, regardless of the revision cycle that is applicable to each Operator. The subjects in the MAIN FCTM CHANGES are categorized by month, but include revision information only from the previous 12 months. Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025394.0001001 / 09 JAN 20 JANUARY 2020 AIRCRAFT SYSTEM - HUD The HUD chapter is totally revised for harmonization between all Airbus programs. This chapter has a new layout in order to provide additional guidelines and recommendations for the use of the HUD by flight phases. This change is synchronized with a similar update of the FCTM documentation of the other Airbus aircraft types. NORMAL PROCEDURES - SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER The information about ice shedding procedure is removed since thrust increase is no longer required on A350-900 in icing conditions with freezing fog (FZFG) as per engine manufacturer's instructions. Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025362.0001001 / 09 JAN 20 DECEMBER 2019 No major change in this revision. Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025361.0001001 / 09 JAN 20 NOVEMBER 2019 No major change in this revision. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ GI P 1/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025360.0001001 / 09 JAN 20 OCTOBER 2019 No major change in this revision. Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025285.0001001 / 09 JAN 20 SEPTEMBER 2019 No major change in this revision. Ident.: GI-GMAIN-00025230.0001001 / 07 AUG 19 AUGUST 2019 NORMAL PROCEDURES - SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - TOUCH AND GO The Touch and Go chapter contains a table that provides details on tasksharing for the trainee and their instructor. In this table, the word “adjust” is deleted from the following sentence: “Monitor/adjust the pitch trim movement towards the green band”. After landing, the instructor disarms the ground spoilers and calls “STAND UP”. After this callout, the trainee moves the thrust levers forward approximately 5 cm. The instructor sets the flaps for takeoff, and monitors the pitch trim movement towards the green band. Previously, the instructor could manually adjust the pitch trim wheel. This action is not necessary because aircraft design ensures an automatic reset of the pitch trim wheel. As in any situation, the Airbus golden rules apply: If the instructor is not satisfied with the automatic reset of the pitch trim wheel, they can take over and manually adjust the pitch trim wheel. FCTM PURPOSE Ident.: GI-00009324.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Flight Crew Techniques Manual (FCTM) provides complementary information to the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM). The FCTM provides the flight crew with: ‐ The general Airbus operational philosophy (e.g. design and utilization principles, golden rules for pilots) ‐ Additional information to the FCOM procedures (the “why” to do and the “how” to do) ‐ Best practices, operating techniques on maneuvers, and handling ‐ Information on situation awareness. If the FCTM data differs from the FCOM data, the FCOM remains the reference. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B GI P 2/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FCTM CONTENT Ident.: GI-00020966.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The FCTM has 5 sections, amongst two are similar to the FCOM structure: GENERAL INFORMATION This section provides information on: ‐ The main FCTM changes ‐ The FCTM purpose ‐ The FCTM content ‐ The introduction to the Preventing Identified Risks ‐ The abbreviations. AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY This section is divided into four sub-sections: 1. Design Philosophy: This sub-section describes the Airbus design and utilization principles of: ‐ The cockpit ‐ The fly-by-wire ‐ The procedures. 2. Tasksharing rules and communication: This sub-section describes the general tasksharing and communication rules in normal and abnormal operations. 3. Management of Abnormal Operations: This sub-section describes how the flight crew should manage abnormal operations (e.g. Handling of ECAM alerts, QRH, ADVISORY) 4. Golden Rules for Pilots: This sub-section describes the Airbus “GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS”. AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS This section provides supplementary information and operating techniques on the use of specific systems (e.g. BIRD, TCAS) PROCEDURES This section provides in normal and abnormal operations: ‐ Best practices (why to, how to, what if not done) ‐ Maneuvers and handling techniques ‐ Human factor issues identified through risk symbols, when necessary. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C→ GI P 3/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL This section is divided into two sub-sections: 1. Normal Procedures (including Supplementary Procedures) 2. Abnormal and Emergency Procedures. PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS This section provides the glossary of the identified risks and potential consequences that the flight crew may encounter. INTRODUCTION TO THE PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS Ident.: GI-00020972.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the risks and potential consequences that the flight crew may encounter, in order to improve: ‐ The awareness of the flight crew with regards to these risks ‐ The risk management. Refer to PIR Introduction. QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS Ident.: GI-00015702.0001001 / 11 JUL 16 Applicable to: ALL QUESTION AND SUGGESTIONS For any questions or comments related to this manual, the Operator’s Flight Operations Management can contact the Airbus Flight Operations Support and Training Standard department. ABBREVIATIONS Ident.: GI-00019686.0001001 / 08 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL A Abbreviation A/BRK A/THR AAL ABB ABN ABN PROC AC ACCEL Term Autobrake Autothrust Above Aerodrome Level Abbreviation Abnormal Abnormal Procedure Alternating Current Acceleration, Accelerate 350-941 FLEET FCTM Continued on the following page ← C to F → GI P 4/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Abbreviation ACCUR ADF ADGB ADIRS ADR ADS-B AES AFM AFS AGL AH AIR COND ALD ALT ALT* ALTN ANF AOA AOC AP APP APPR APU ARS ATC ATIS ATT AUTO AUTO BRK AVNCS AZIM Term Accuracy Automatic Direction Finder Active Differential GearBox Air Data/Inertial Reference System Air Data Reference Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Automatic Extension System Airplane Flight Manual Automatic Flight System Above Ground Level Alert Height Air Conditioning Actual Landing Distance Altitude Altitude capture mode Alternate, Alternative Airport Navigation Function Angle-Of-Attack Airline Operational Control Autopilot Approach Approach Auxiliary Power Unit Auto Retraction System Air Traffic Control Automatic Terminal Information Services Attitude Automatic Autobrake Avionics Azimuth Continued from the previous page B Abbreviation B/C BKUP BRK BSF BTV Term Back Course Backup Brake Backup Steering Function Brake To Vacate 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ GI P 5/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL C Abbreviation C/L CAPT CAT CB CCOM CDA CDL CDS CFIT CFP CG CI CL CLB CLR CM1 CM2 CMS COND CONF CP CRM CRS CRZ CTL Term Check List Captain Category, Clear Air Turbulence Cumulonimbus Cabin Crew Operating Manual Continuous Descent Approach Configuration Deviation List Control and Display System Controlled Flight Into Terrain Computerized Flight Plan Center of Gravity Cost Index Coefficient of Lift, Climb Detent on Thrust Levers Climb Clear Crewmember (Left Seat) Crewmember (Right Seat) Constant Mach Segment, Cabin Management System, Central Maintenance System Condition, Conditioned, Conditioning Configuration Control Panel Crew Resource Management Course Cruise Control D Abbreviation DA DC DES DEST DEV DH DIR DIR TO DIST DME DU Term Decision Altitude Direct Current Descend, Descent Destination Deviation Decision Height Direction, Direct, Director Direction To Distance Distance Measuring Equipment Display Unit 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ GI P 6/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL E Abbreviation EBHA ECAM ECON ECP EFB EFIS EFOB EGT EHA ELEVN EMER ENG EO EOSID EP ESF ETACS ETOPS ETP EVAC Term Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring Economy, Economic ECAM Control Panel Electronic Flight Bag Electronic Flight Instrument System Estimated Fuel on Board Exhaust Gas Temperature Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator Elevation Emergency Engine Engine Out Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure End Point Estimated Surface Friction External and Taxiing Aid Camera System Extended Twin Engine Operations Equal Time Point Evacuate, Evacuation F Abbreviation F F/CTL F/O FAA FADEC FAF FAP FCOM FCTM FCU FD FE FF FG F-G/S F-G/S* Term Minimum Flap Retract Speed Flight Control First Officer Federal Aviation Administration Full Authority Digital Engine Control Final Approach Fix Final Approach Point Flight Crew Operating Manual Flight Crew Techniques Manual Flight Control Unit, Fuel Control Unit Flight Director Flight Envelope Fuel Flow Flight Guidance FLS Guide Slope, FLS Guide Slope Track Mode FLS Guide Slope Capture Mode 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ Continued on the following page GI P 7/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Abbreviation FL FLEX F-LOC F-LOC* FLS FLX FM FMA FMC FMS FOB FOD FPA FPD FPF F-PLN FPV FU FWC FWD FWS Term Flight Level Flexible FLS Localizer, FLS Localizer Track Mode FLS Localizer Capture Mode FMS Landing System Flexible Flight Management, Frequency Modulation Flight Mode Annunciator Flight Management Computer Flight Management System Fuel On Board Foreign Object Damage Flight Path Angle Flight Path Director Fuel Penalty Factor Flight Plan Flight Path Vector Fuel Used Flight Warning Computer Forward Flight Warning System Continued from the previous page G Abbreviation G/S G/S* GA GA TRK GD GDOT GEN GLS GNSS GPIRS GPS GPWS GS Term Glide Slope Glide Slope Capture Mode Go-Around Go-Around Track Mode Green Dot Green Dot Generator GNSS Landing System Global Navigation Satellite System GPS IRS Global Positioning System Ground Proximity Warning System Ground Speed 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ GI P 8/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL H Abbreviation HDG HMI HUD Term Heading Human Machine Interface Head-Up Display I Abbreviation I/D IAS ICAO IDENT IGN ILS IMC INIT IR IRS ISA ISIS Term Instinctive Disconnect Indicated Airspeed International Civil Aviation Organization Identification, Identifier, Identify Ignition Instrument landing System (LOC and G/S) Instrument Meteorological Conditions Initial(ization) Inertial Reference Inertial Reference System International Standard Atmosphere Integrated Standby Instrument System J Abbreviation JAA Term Joint Aviation Authorities K Abbreviation KCCU Term Keyboard and Cursor Control Unit L Abbreviation L/G LAND LAT LD LDA LDG LL LNAV LOC LOC* Term Landing Gear Landing Latitude, Lateral Landing Distance Landing Distance Available, LOC type Directional Aid Landing Latitude/Longitude Lateral Navigation Localizer, Localizer Track Mode Localizer Capture Mode 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ Continued on the following page GI P 9/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Abbreviation LOC B/C LOC B/C* LRC LS LVP LVR Term Localizer Back Course Track Mode Localizer Back Course Capture Mode Long Range Cruise Landing System, Low Speed, Loudspeaker Low Visibility Procedure Lever Continued from the previous page M Abbreviation MAP MAX MCT MD MDA MDH MEA MEL MEM METAR MFD MFP MHA MIN MLW MMEL MMO MMR MORA MSA MTOW Term Missed Approach Point Maximum Maximum Continuous Thrust Maximum Dive Speed Minimum Descent Altitude Minimum Descent Height Minimum En-route Altitude Minimum Equipment List Memory Meteorological Airport Report MultiFunction Display MultiFunction Probe Minimum Holding Altitude Minimum Maximum Landing Weight Master Minimum Equipment List Maximum Operating Mach Multi-Mode Receiver Minimum Off Route Altitude Minimum Safe Altitude Maximum Takeoff Weight N Abbreviation N1 N2 N3 NADP NAV NAVAID NAVAIDS Term Engine Fan Speed, Low Pressure Rotor Speed Engine Intermediate Pressure Rotor Speed Engine High Pressure Rotor Speed Noise Abatement Departure Procedure Navigation Navigation Aid Navigation Aids 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ Continued on the following page GI P 10/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Abbreviation ND NDB NORM NOTAM NPA NWS Continued from the previous page Term Navigation Display Non-Directional Beacon Normal Notice To Airmen Non-Precision Approach Nose Wheel Steering O Abbreviation OAT OEB OIS OP OP CLB OPT Term Outside Air Temperature Operations Engineering Bulletins Onboard Information System Open Open Climb Optimum, Optional P Abbreviation PA PAX PBE PERF PF PFD PM POS PPOS PRESS PRIM PROC PWS Term Passenger Address Passenger Protective Breathing Equipment Performance Pilot Flying Primary Flight Display Pilot Monitoring Position Present Position Pressure, Pressurization, Pressurize Primary Flight Control and Guidance Computer Procedure Predictive Windshear Q Abbreviation QFE QFU QNH QRH Term Field Elevation Atmospheric Pressure Runway Heading Sea Level Atmospheric Pressure Quick Reference Handbook 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ GI P 11/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL R Abbreviation RA RAT RCAM REC RED REV RF RLD RMP RNAV RNP RNP AR ROP ROW RTO RVR RVSM RWY Term Radio Altimeter, Radio Altitude, Resolution Advisory Ram Air Turbine Runway Condition Assessment Matrix Recommended Reduction Revise, Revision, Reverse Radius to Fix Required Landing Distance Radio Management Panel Area Navigation Required Navigation Performance Required Navigation Performance with Authorization Required Runway Overrun Protection Runway Overrun Warning Rejected Takeoff Runway Visual Range Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum Runway, Runway Mode S Abbreviation S SAT SD SEC SID SLS SND SOP SPD SRS STAR STD SURV SYS Term Minimum Slat Retract Speed, South Static Air Temperature System Display Secondary Flight Control Computer, Secondary Flight Plan Standard Instrument Departure Satellite Landing System Standby Navigation Display Standard Operating Procedure Speed Speed Reference System Standard Terminal Arrival Route Standard Surveillance, Surveillance System System 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ GI P 12/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL T Abbreviation T.O T/D TA TAF TAT TAWS TCAS TEMP TERR THR THS TLP TO TOD TOGA TOW TR TRAJ TRANS TRK TROPO TURB Term Takeoff Top of Descent, Touchdown Traffic Advisory Terminal Aerodrome Forecast Total Air Temperature Terrain Awareness and Warning System Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Temperature Terrain Thrust Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Thrust Lever Position Takeoff Takeoff Distance Takeoff/Go-Around Takeoff Weight Transformer Rectifier Trajectory Transition Track (angle) Tropopause Turbulence, Turbulent V Abbreviation V/S V1 V2 VAPP VD VDEV VERT VFE VHF VLS VMAX VMC VMCA VMCG Term Vertical Speed Decision Speed, Critical Engine Failure Speed Takeoff Safety Speed Approach Speed Vertical Display, Maximum Dive Speed Vertical Deviation Vertical Maximum Flap Extended Speed Very High Frequency Lowest Selectable Speed Maximum Allowable Speed Visual Meteorological Conditions Minimum Control Airspeed in Flight Minimum Control Airspeed on Ground 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ Continued on the following page GI P 13/14 06 FEB 20 GENERAL INFORMATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Abbreviation VMO VNAV VOR VR VS1g VSI VV Continued from the previous page Term Maximum Operating Speed Vertical Navigation VHF Omnidirectional Range Rotation Speed Stall Speed with a Load Factor of 1g Vertical Speed Indicator Velocity Vector W Abbreviation WD WPT WTB WXR Term Warning Display Waypoint Wing Tip Brake Weather Radar X Abbreviation XCHECK xLS XTK Term Cross Check x Landing System (e.g. ILS, GLS,...) Cross Track Z Abbreviation ZFW Term Zero Fuel Weight 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F GI P 14/14 06 FEB 20 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY Intentionally left blank AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS AOP-10 Design Philosophy AOP-10-10 Introduction Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A AOP-10-20 Cockpit Philosophy AOP-10-20-10 Objective Objective.................................................................................................................................................................. A AOP-10-20-20 Design Principles Arrangement of Panels............................................................................................................................................A Automation............................................................................................................................................................... B Alerts........................................................................................................................................................................ C AOP-10-20-30 Utilization Principles Dark Cockpit Concept for Overhead Panel.............................................................................................................A Color Coding............................................................................................................................................................ B Need to See Concept..............................................................................................................................................C Less Paper Cockpit................................................................................................................................................. D AOP-10-30 Fly-By-Wire AOP-10-30-10 Design Principles Fly-By-Wire...............................................................................................................................................................A Fly-By-Wire Benefits................................................................................................................................................ B Flight Control Protections........................................................................................................................................ C Sidestick...................................................................................................................................................................D Thrust/Autothrust......................................................................................................................................................E AOP-10-30-20 Utilization Principles Use of Sidestick.......................................................................................................................................................A AOP-10-40 Procedures Design What For?................................................................................................................................................................ A General Design and Utilization Principles............................................................................................................... B Normal Procedures - Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)................................................................................ C Normal Procedures - Supplementary Procedures.................................................................................................. D Abnormal and Emergency Procedures................................................................................................................... E AOP-20 Tasksharing Rules and Communication General.....................................................................................................................................................................A FCU/AFS and EFIS Control Panels........................................................................................................................ B FMS Entries via MFD/KCCU...................................................................................................................................C Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-PLP-TOC P 1/2 06 FEB 20 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS AOP-30 Management of Abnormal Operations AOP-30-10 General Continued from the previous page General.....................................................................................................................................................................A AOP-30-20 Handling of Cockpit Controls Handling of Cockpit Controls...................................................................................................................................A AOP-30-30 Handling of ECAM/QRH/OEB Procedures General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Tasksharing Rules................................................................................................................................................... B Handling of ECAM Procedure................................................................................................................................. C Handling of QRH Procedure................................................................................................................................... D ECAM/QRH/OEB Actions Completed......................................................................................................................E AOP-30-40 Handling of Advisory Handling of Advisory................................................................................................................................................A AOP-30-45 Handling of Dispatch Messages Handling of Dispatch Messages..............................................................................................................................A AOP-30-50 Fluctuating Caution Fluctuating Caution.................................................................................................................................................. A AOP-40 Golden Rules for Pilots Golden Rules for Pilots........................................................................................................................................... A 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-PLP-TOC P 2/2 06 FEB 20 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 INTRODUCTION FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: AOP-10-10-00009332.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL A safe and efficient flight results from an effective interaction between: ‐ The Airbus cockpit philosophy ‐ The procedures ‐ The pilots (human mechanisms and behaviors). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A AOP-10-10 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-10-10 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE Ident.: AOP-10-20-10-00020653.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Airbus cockpit is designed to achieve the operational needs of the flight crew throughout the aircraft operating environment, while ensuring the maximum of commonality within the Fly-By-Wire family. The design of the cockpit is built according to 10 high level design requirements: 1. The flight crew is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft 2. If required, the flight crew can exercise their full authority by performing intuitive actions, while aiming at eliminating the risks of overstress or overcontrol 3. Accommodate for a wide range of pilot skill levels and experience acquired on previous aircraft 4. Ensure safety, passenger comfort, and efficiency, in that order of priority 5. Simplify the tasks of the flight crew, by enhancing situation and aircraft status awareness 6. The automation is considered as an additional feature available to the flight crew, who can decide when to delegate and what level of assistance they need in accordance with the situation 7. The design of the Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) takes into account system features together with the strengths and weaknesses of the flight crew 8. The state of the art of the human factors considerations are applied in the system design process, in order to manage the potential errors of the flight crew 9. The overall cockpit design contributes to facilitate and to enhance the flight crew communication (e.g. tasksharing, teamworking) 10. The use of new technologies and implementation of new functionalities are imposed by: ‐ Significant safety benefits ‐ Obvious operational advantages ‐ A clear response to the needs of the flight crew. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A AOP-10-20-10 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - OBJECTIVE Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-10-20-10 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - DESIGN PRINCIPLES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ARRANGEMENT OF PANELS Ident.: AOP-10-20-20-00020558.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The purpose of the layout of the forward facing cockpit is to take into account the operational requirements for a two pilot-cockpit. This layout enables: ‐ To significantly reduce the flight crew workload ‐ To optimize the tasksharing ‐ To minimize “Head down” time. The location of the main controls takes into account: ‐ The relative importance of each system ‐ The frequency of operation by the pilots ‐ The ease with which controls can be reached ‐ The shape of the control (designed to prevent confusion) ‐ The duplication of control, if required. OVERHEAD PANEL The system control panels linked to an engine are vertically organized, in order to permit the accomplishment of Normal/Abnormal procedures in a straight forward and intuitive manner. In addition, this arrangement aims at minimizing the errors of the flight crew. GLARESHIELD The glareshield supports the short term tactical controls for the Auto Flight System (AFS). The operation of the controls can be achieved “Head Up” and within easy access for both pilots. MAIN INSTRUMENT PANEL The main instrument panel mainly supports the display units which are necessary to: ‐ FLY (PFD/HUD) ‐ NAVIGATE (ND) ‐ COMMUNICATE (ATC Mailbox) ‐ MONITOR the various aircraft systems (ECAM). The display units are located in the full and non-obstructed view of both pilots. PEDESTAL The pedestal mainly supports the controls for: ‐ Engine and thrust (engine master levers, thrust levers) ‐ Aircraft configuration (speed brake lever, flaps lever, rudder trim) 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-10-20-20 P 1/4 08 NOV 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - DESIGN PRINCIPLES ‐ Navigation (KCCU, FMS) ‐ Communication (RMP). AUTOMATION Ident.: AOP-10-20-20-00020559.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The automation reduces the workload of the flight crew and consequently improves the situation awareness. The automation assists the flight crew in their task: ‐ For a safe and accurate aircraft operation ‐ For fast and complex computations ‐ For the enhancement of pilots awareness through data management. However, the flight crew can always take actions if things do not go as expected. LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE The automation provides three levels of assistance: ‐ First level: The flight control loop provides immediate assistance (via the sidestick) ‐ Second level: The autopilot loop provides short term assistance (via the AFS CP) ‐ Third level: The flight management provides long term assistance (via the FMS). AUTOMATION REDUNDANCY The automation redundancy is designed to ensure robustness: ‐ The Flight Control (F/CTL), the Flight Envelope (FE) and the Flight Guidance (FG) functions are integrated in each of the three PRIMs ‐ The Flight Management (FM) function is integrated in each of the Flight Management System (FMS). ALERTS Ident.: AOP-10-20-20-00020560.0001001 / 04 SEP 18 Applicable to: ALL ALERT TRIGGERING As a general rule, an alert is required when: ‐ A system failure occurs ‐ The aircraft violates the normal flight envelope ‐ An unexpected event related to safety occurs (e.g. TCAS, TAWS) 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to C → AOP-10-20-20 P 2/4 08 NOV 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - DESIGN PRINCIPLES ‐ An outside message is coming up (e.g. cabin, ATC) ‐ A system automatically changes its mode of operation (e.g. AP auto-disconnection, mode reversion). The alerts: ‐ Trigger visual and/or aural indications ‐ Are ranked by severity and priority ‐ Are inhibited when not relevant in some specific flight phases. ALERT INDICATION The alerts indications are presented to the flight crew as follows: ‐ Initial indication (visual or aural) via the MASTER CAUTION or MASTER WARNING ‐ The Warning Display (WD) displays the title of the alert related to the failure ‐ The System Display (SD) automatically displays the affected system ‐ On the overhead panel, the pushbutton/pushbutton-switch light of the affected system comes on in amber or red. The flight crew is responsible to take any appropriate or required action to ensure a safe operation of the aircraft, even in the absence of alert(s) and shall take into account the entire operational environment. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C AOP-10-20-20 P 3/4 08 NOV 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - DESIGN PRINCIPLES Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-10-20-20 P 4/4 08 NOV 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES DARK COCKPIT CONCEPT FOR OVERHEAD PANEL Ident.: AOP-10-20-30-00020561.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL Most of the systems are controlled from the overhead panel via: ‐ Pushbutton ‐ Pushbutton switch ‐ Switch ‐ Knob, knob-selector. Each pushbutton/pushbutton switch has one or two lights: ‐ The upper one is dedicated to alert or system status (e.g. FAULT light, OPEN light). If no alert or system status is required, two grey dots replace the light ‐ The lower one corresponds: • On pushbutton switch, to the control selection of the system (e.g. ON, OFF, OVRD), or • On pushbutton, to the system status (e.g. ENG ANTI ICE). If no control system selection is required, two grey dots replace the light. The general operational rule is: Light out philosophy: The systems are ready and fit to fly. COLOR CODING Ident.: AOP-10-20-30-00020562.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL DISPLAY UNITS The information provided on the display units is color coded to indicate: ‐ The status of the system (ECAM or FMA) ‐ The status of the mode (FMA) ‐ The nature of the information (e.g. title of an alert, action to be performed, information). PUSHBUTTON/PUSHBUTTON SWITCH LIGHT The information provided on the pushbutton/pushbutton switch is also color coded to indicate the status of the system: ‐ Amber: Indicates that a system is failed ‐ Red: Indicates a failure that may require an immediate corrective action ‐ Green: Indicates that a system operates normally ‐ Blue: Indicates the normal operation of a temporarily selected system ‐ White: Indicates the abnormal position of a pushbutton switch or maintenance/test result indication ‐ Blank: The system is fit to fly. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B AOP-10-20-30 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY - UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL NEED TO SEE CONCEPT Ident.: AOP-10-20-30-00020563.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The DUs may display information that can potentially overload the flight crew. In order to prevent this situation, some principles have been established to provide the flight crew with the right information, at the right time: ‐ The right information in a given flight phase ‐ Uncluttered, and non-overloaded “need to show” data ‐ Redundant, or consolidated data for safety related parameters ‐ Predictive information on essential parameters. LESS PAPER COCKPIT Ident.: AOP-10-20-30-00020564.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The less paper cockpit concept: ‐ Improves the access to pilots' operational information and simplifies some of their tasks ‐ Reduces the number of paper documents in the cockpit and replaces them by electronic ones: • Improving information access and search • Enabling quicker and easier updates. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to D AOP-10-20-30 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLY-BY-WIRE - DESIGN PRINCIPLES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLY-BY-WIRE Ident.: AOP-10-30-10-00020565.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The relationship between the pilot input on the sidestick, and the aircraft response, is called the control law. The control law determines the handling characteristics of the aircraft. FLY-BY-WIRE BENEFITS Ident.: AOP-10-30-10-00020566.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL WITHIN THE NORMAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE: ‐ The aircraft is stable and maneuverable ‐ Efforts are balanced in pitch and roll ‐ Aircraft responses are consistent on all axes regardless of the aircraft speed, configuration, and CG. OUTSIDE OF THE NORMAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE: ‐ Pilots are immediately warned by a strong positive stability ‐ Simple, instinctive, and immediate procedure to get out of an emergency situation, allowing maximum aircraft performance with minimum risk to overstress, or overcontrol the aircraft. FLIGHT CONTROL PROTECTIONS Ident.: AOP-10-30-10-00021365.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The purpose of the flight control protections is to: ‐ Give full authority to the flight crew, in order to enable them to obtain the best aircraft performance with an instinctive, immediate action on the related control ‐ Minimize the risks of over-controlling, overstressing, or damaging the aircraft. The implementation of such protections is a benefit for flight safety: ‐ It reduces the flight crew’s stress in emergency situations ‐ It enables the flight crew to react unambiguously to emergency situations ‐ It does not require exceptional skills ‐ It enables the flight crew to achieve a higher aircraft performance than on non-protected aircraft ‐ The performance achieved is not affected by the flight crew’s stress, or fatigue, or skill 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C → AOP-10-30-10 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLY-BY-WIRE - DESIGN PRINCIPLES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ The performance is not restricted by a restrictive procedure ‐ The training can concentrate on the flight crew’s awareness level, rather than on the maneuver itself. SIDESTICK Ident.: AOP-10-30-10-00020568.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL OPERATIONAL BENEFITS The main operational benefits of the side-mounted stick: ‐ It enables a non-obstructed view of the main instrument panel ‐ It is adapted for emergency situations (e.g. incapacitation, stick jamming, control failures) ‐ It fits comfortably into the hand with a correct adjustment of the armrest ‐ It makes the sliding table installation possible (e.g. for maps, documents, meals). When the autopilot is engaged: ‐ The sidesticks are locked in neutral position (immediate tactile feedback) ‐ There is no possibility of simultaneous input from the flight crew and the autopilot ‐ The autopilot can be disconnected instinctively, at any time, by a firm pressure on the sidestick. THRUST/AUTOTHRUST Ident.: AOP-10-30-10-00020569.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The autothrust is hosted in a computer. The link between the thrust levers and the engines is electrical. This gives the same advantages as the flight controls management: ‐ Less weight ‐ Greater reliability. NON BACK-DRIVEN THRUST LEVER CONCEPT Airbus has selected the non-back-driven thrust lever concept: ‐ The flight crew can easily and intuitively monitor the energy of the aircraft via current energy cues (speed, speed trend, HUD chevrons, engine parameters), and not via ambiguous thrust levers movement ‐ The autothrust can directly interface with the engine computers to control the thrust, without the need of intermediate devices 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to E → AOP-10-30-10 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLY-BY-WIRE - DESIGN PRINCIPLES ‐ When the autothrust is engaged, the Thrust Lever Position (TLP) determines the maximum authorized thrust that may be commanded by the autothrust ‐ When the flight crew uses manual thrust, the TLP determines the current thrust (as on any aircraft not equipped with autothrust). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E AOP-10-30-10 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLY-BY-WIRE - DESIGN PRINCIPLES Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-10-30-10 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLY-BY-WIRE - UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES USE OF SIDESTICK Ident.: AOP-10-30-20-00020572.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL Only one pilot flies at a time. In order to use the sidestick, the flight crewmember must: ‐ Clearly announce “I have control” ‐ Press and maintain the sidestick pushbutton, in order to get full control of the Fly-By-Wire system. The flight crew should keep in mind that sidestick inputs are algebraically added. Therefore dual inputs must be avoided, and will trigger aural and visual alerts. Either pilot can make an input on their sidestick at any time. Either pilot can deactivate the other pilot’s sidestick by pressing on their sidestick pb. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A AOP-10-30-20 P 1/2 09 MAY 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLY-BY-WIRE - UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-10-30-20 P 2/2 09 MAY 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 PROCEDURES DESIGN FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL WHAT FOR? Ident.: AOP-10-40-00020573.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The objectives of the procedures are to: ‐ Share a common practice, in order to ensure a safe and efficient flight ‐ Organize tasksharing and teamworking ‐ Guide pilots actions (interface between the flight crew and the aircraft). GENERAL DESIGN AND UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES Ident.: AOP-10-40-00020574.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The procedures are consistent with the Airbus aircraft design philosophy. The procedures are divided into routine, and not-routine procedures. They are easy to identify and to understand. The pilots are trained to use and strictly apply the procedures. The tasksharing and a standard communication process are clearly defined, in order to ensure a safe and efficient use of the procedures. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B AOP-10-40 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 PROCEDURES DESIGN FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL NORMAL PROCEDURES - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) Ident.: AOP-10-40-00020575.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL During the daily normal operations of the aircraft, the flight crew performs actions frequently. These actions are identified as routine tasks. The routine tasks are supported by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOP DESIGN PRINCIPLES SOP are designed according to the following principles: ‐ One SOP per flight phase ‐ Actions are described in a chronological order ‐ Actions are easy to memorize and to apply (cockpit scan, actions flow). SOP design is effective provided that: ‐ All systems operate normally ‐ All automatic functions are used normally. Some SOP actions are checked against checklists. SOP UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES The flight crew should perform SOP actions by memory. The flight crew can also decide to refer to the FCOM, in order to perform both the Preliminary Cockpit Preparation and Securing the Aircraft procedures. NORMAL PROCEDURES - SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES Ident.: AOP-10-40-00020576.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL During the daily normal operations of the aircraft, the flight crew may have to perform actions which are not part of the SOP memory actions, i.e. not frequently done. These actions are identified as not-routine tasks dedicated to not-routine situation (e.g. airframe deicing/anti-icing procedures on ground, manual engine start). The not-routine tasks are supported by the Supplementary Procedures. The flight crew must perform not-routine actions, using the READ & DO principle. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to D → AOP-10-40 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 PROCEDURES DESIGN FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES DESIGN PRINCIPLES The Supplementary Procedures are designed according to the following principles: ‐ Easy to identify and to understand ‐ One Supplementary Procedure for a given situation ‐ Actions are described in a chronological order. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES Supplementary Procedures utilization is effective provided that the flight crew performs the Supplementary Procedures using the READ & DO principle (generally done by the PM). ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Ident.: AOP-10-40-00020577.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES DESIGN PRINCIPLES These procedures are not-routine, classified in abnormal or emergency, and prioritized in accordance with the criticality of the situation. An abnormal or emergency procedure is initiated following: ‐ A system failure, or ‐ An operational context. ENG HYD ELEC ... Abnormal System failure FIRE SMOKE ... Emergency Operational context Abnormal Emergency Volcanic Ash Forced Landing ... ... The design of an abnormal or emergency procedure is defined as: ‐ A MEMORY ITEM, when the flight crew has no time to refer to the ECAM/QRH/FCOM to ensure a safe flight path, or ‐ A READ & DO procedure that is handled via the ECAM, QRH, FCOM, or OEB. The type of procedure is easy to identify: [MEM] MEMORY ITEMS ECAM Sensed Procedures MEMORY [ABN] ECAM Not-Sensed Procedures [QRH] procedures READ & DO ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES UTILIZATION PRINCIPLES The utilization of abnormal and emergency procedures follows the here below principle: 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to E → AOP-10-40 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 350-941 PROCEDURES DESIGN FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Memory Items Abnormal/Emergency Procedures ECAM/QRH/FCOM 350-941 FLEET FCTM WHEN? Immediately When appropriate ←E HOW? Memory READ & DO AOP-10-40 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY TASKSHARING RULES AND COMMUNICATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AOP-20-00020555.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL A correct application of tasksharing and communication rules ensures a safe and effective operation of the aircraft. NORMAL OPERATIONS GENERAL It is the responsibility of the PF to: ‐ FLY ‐ NAVIGATE. It is the responsibility of the PM to: ‐ MONITOR the flight path, the navigation and the aircraft systems ‐ COMMUNICATE. However, when necessary, the flight crew may re-allocate the tasks, as required. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES For Supplementary Procedures, the flight crew should use the following tasksharing: If the procedure is related to engine start, it is recommended to read the entire procedure first, and then: ‐ The PM reads the actions, and ‐ The PF acts on the controls. For all other supplementary procedures: The procedures should be applied in accordance with the READ & DO principle, i.e. the PM reads the procedure and the PF or the PM acts on the controls, depending on the context. ABNORMAL OPERATIONS It is the responsibility of the PF to: ‐ FLY, ‐ NAVIGATE ‐ COMMUNICATE after the initiation of: • The ECAM actions, or • A QRH procedure. It is the responsibility of the PM to: ‐ MONITOR the flight path and the navigation ‐ Perform ECAM actions or apply QRH/OEB procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-20 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY TASKSHARING RULES AND COMMUNICATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: During the ECAM management process or the application of a QRH/OEB procedure, the “COM” task is transferred to the PF, as the cognitive skills of the PM are mostly dedicated to the understanding and the application of the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions. Therefore, their situation awareness of the environment and the navigation is less effective than the PF’s one. FCU/AFS AND EFIS CONTROL PANELS Ident.: AOP-20-00020557.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The FCU (AFS CP and EFIS CP) and MFD/KCCU must be used in accordance with specific rules, in order to ensure: ‐ Safe operation (correct entries made) ‐ Effective inter-pilot communication (knowing each other’s intentions). AFS CP SELECTIONS AFS CP entries (selection or target adjustment) are performed by: ‐ The PF, with AP ON, or by the PM (upon PF request) ‐ The PM (upon PF request), with AP OFF (except AP / A/THR that may be selected on by the PF). Selection of AP / A/THR FD AFS CP knobs (AP OFF) AFS CP knobs (AP ON) PF DISCONNECTION: YES (via instinctive disconnect pb) ENGAGEMENT: YES NO Engagement by PM DISCONNECTION: NO ENGAGEMENT: upon PF request Upon PF request NO Upon PF request YES Upon PF request EFIS CP SELECTIONS Whatever the status of the AP, the PF and the PM must perform their onside EFIS CP selections. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B AOP-20 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY TASKSHARING RULES AND COMMUNICATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FMS ENTRIES VIA MFD/KCCU Ident.: AOP-20-00020556.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL Below 10 000 ft, entries should be restricted to those that have an operational effect: ‐ PERF APPR ‐ DIR TO ‐ NAVAIDS ‐ Late change of runway ‐ Swap SEC F-PLN ‐ ENABLE ALTN. Time consuming entries must be performed at all times: ‐ By the PM upon PF request, or ‐ By the PF after a temporary transfer of controls to the PM. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C AOP-20 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY TASKSHARING RULES AND COMMUNICATION 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-20 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 GENERAL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AOP-30-10-00021262.0001001 / 15 APR 19 Applicable to: ALL In the case of any abnormal or emergency situation, different types of procedures are available: ‐ ECAM Sensed procedures are triggered automatically in response to an abnormal behavior of the systems monitored by the Flight Warning System (FWS) ‐ ECAM Not-Sensed procedures can be manually activated by the flight crew in response to an abnormal event detected by any flight crewmember ‐ QRH Not-Sensed procedures are applied by the flight crew in response to an abnormal event detected by any flight crewmember ‐ Some situations may trigger the application of an OEB procedure. All the above-listed procedures are of “READ & DO” type, i.e. the PM will “READ & DO” all the actions displayed on the ECAM/QRH/OEB procedure. However, in some time critical situations, the flight crew has no time to refer to the ECAM/QRH/FCOM to ensure a safe flight path. Therefore, the flight crew must know, and strictly apply by memory, items, referred to as MEMORY ITEMS. SEQUENCE OF PROCEDURES In most situations, the following sequence is the basic one that should be applied by the flight crew. However, this sequence may not cover all operational situations. Therefore, in all cases, the flight crew should exercise their judgment and adapt the sequence of actions to the real conditions. In the case of abnormal or emergency situations, the flight crew should apply the procedures in the following sequence, as appropriate: ‐ MEMORY ITEMS ‐ OEB ‐ Sensed ECAM ‐ Not-Sensed ECAM ‐ QRH. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-30-10 P 1/2 21 MAY 19 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 GENERAL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: 1. In the case a procedure is available in both the ABNORMAL PROC menu of the ECP and the QRH (e.g. SMOKE / FUMES), the flight crew should preferably select and apply the Abnormal Not-Sensed procedure in order to update the WD/PFD limitations and STATUS page, in accordance with the current technical status of the aircraft (e.g. LAND ASAP memo will appear on WD/PFD in the case of SMOKE / FUMES Abnormal Not-Sensed procedure). 2. The flight crew should apply the QRH procedure if: ‐ The conditions in the cockpit are not adequate to perform the ECAM actions (e.g. heavy smoke) ‐ The flight crew considers it is more convenient in time critical situation (e.g. emergency evacuation procedure). ONE PROCEDURE AT A TIME When the flight crew applies a procedure, they must complete the procedure, unless: ‐ An action requests to apply/consider another procedure ‐ The flight crew needs to update their situation assessment due to an unexpected abnormal or emergency situation (e.g. Smoke detected by the cabin crew or volcanic ash encounter). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AOP-30-10 P 2/2 21 MAY 19 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF COCKPIT CONTROLS FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF COCKPIT CONTROLS Ident.: AOP-30-20-00021263.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL In flight, the PF and PM must crosscheck before any action on the following controls: ‐ ENG MASTER lever ‐ IR selector ‐ All guarded controls ‐ RESET/POWER SUPPLY buttons. The flight crew must crosscheck the above-listed controls, in order to prevent any inadvertent action by the flight crew with irreversible effects (i.e. when the flight crew operates red guarded controls). If the flight crew inadvertently operates a black guarded control, the subsequent effect is reversible. The flight crew must restrict the reset of systems to those listed in the FCOM. TASKSHARING RULES FOR COCKPIT CONTROLS AND RESET BUTTONS OPERATION To confirm the operation of the above-listed controls, the flight crew should use the following tasksharing method: ‐ The PM indicates the related control and requests confirmation from the PF ‐ The PF verifies the control designated by the PM and gives confirmation to the PM ‐ The PM operates the related control, as required. TASKSHARING RULES FOR THRUST LEVERS OPERATION The thrust levers are part of the controls that the PF operates, in order to ensure their “FLY” task. Therefore, the PM should not operate the thrust levers. If requested by any ECAM/OEB/QRH procedure, the PM should ask to the PF to operate the corresponding lever. The flight crew should use the following tasksharing method: ‐ The PF indicates the related thrust lever and requests confirmation from the PM ‐ The PM verifies the thrust lever indicated by the PF and gives confirmation to the PF ‐ The PF operates the related thrust lever, as required. HANDLING OF OVERHEAD PANEL CONTROLS The cockpit overhead panels are clearly labeled, in order to help the flight crew to correctly identify all applicable systems and controls. When the ECAM/QRH/OEB procedure requires the flight crew to perform an action on the overhead panel or when the flight crew performs a system reset, the flight crew is able to rapidly identify and find the correct system panel via the white label (uppercase) that is on the side or on top of each panel. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-30-20 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF COCKPIT CONTROLS To perform any action requested by a procedure, the PM should indicate the related panel and control and announce in sequence: ‐ The name of the system ‐ The name of the control, or RESET/POWER SUPPLY button ‐ The action. E.g. “AIR, XBLEED, CLOSE”. The use of this type of approach enables the PM to keep the PF informed of the progress of the procedure and reduces the risk of the PM operating the wrong control. It is important for the flight crew to remember that, most of the time, in the case of a system failure, the FAULT light of the applicable control comes on in amber. This enables the flight crew to correctly identify the applicable system control on the overhead panel. After the selection of a control, the PM should check the SD page, in order to verify that the selected action was performed (e.g. The closure of the crossbleed valve should change the indications that appear on the SD page). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AOP-30-20 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES GENERAL Ident.: AOP-30-30-00024284.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL When an abnormal situation is detected by the flight crew, the first priority of the flight crew is to maintain a safe flight path before the flight crew performs any READ & DO actions. For takeoff or go around, the flight crew should delay READ & DO actions until the aircraft reaches a minimum of 400 ft AGL. This is an appropriate compromise between stabilization of the aircraft and a delay in the actions. However, the flight crew may initiate READ & DO actions below 400 ft AGL, provided that the flight path is safe. When the flight crew performs a “READ & DO" ECAM/QRH/OEB procedure, they must: ‐ Correctly read and apply the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions ‐ Appropriately share tasks ‐ Carefully monitor and crosscheck. TASKSHARING RULES Ident.: AOP-30-30-00024285.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL The PF usually remains the PF for the entire flight, unless the Captain decides to re-allocate tasks differently, or in the case of failure that impacts the “FLY” task of the PF. In addition to the routine tasks “FLY” and “NAVIGATE” performed by the PF, it is the responsibility of the PF to perform all the following actions: ‐ Initiate ECAM/QRH/OEB actions that the PM must perform ‐ Communicate after ECAM/QRH/OEB actions are initiated and until the PM announces: • “ECAM actions completed” or • “XXX procedure completed”, in the case of QRH or OEB procedure. In addition to the routine task “MONITOR” performed by the PM, it is the responsibility of the PM to manage the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions after the PF announces “ECAM ACTIONS”, or “Check ECAM Not-Sensed”, as follows: ‐ Read & Do the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions and checklist in a spoken voice ‐ Obtain PF confirmation before clearing any ECAM action. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B AOP-30-30 P 1/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF ECAM PROCEDURE Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00021395.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 GENERAL The ECAM actions are actions that the PM must perform on ground or in flight following an ECAM alert, once the aircraft trajectory is stabilized and the PF announced “ECAM actions”. The ECAM actions are divided into several steps, which are clearly identified on the WD and SD pages. The PM must: ‐ “READ & DO” the ECAM procedures, identified as procedure action lines on the WD ‐ Analyze the operational impact on the affected system via the SD page ‐ Read the STATUS page, including associated deferred procedures. If an ECAM procedure requests the flight crew to apply a QRH procedure, the flight crew should: ‐ Keep the procedure displayed on the ECAM ‐ Apply the requested procedure ‐ When the requested procedure is completed, tick the action line (e.g. FIRE/SMOKE PROC...APPLY). The objective is to avoid the flight crew to be disturbed with subsequent ECAM alerts that may trigger with less priority. TASKSHARING FOR ECAM SENSED PROCEDURE The flight crew should apply any OEB that affects an ECAM alert. To apply the ECAM procedure, the flight crew should use the following tasksharing method: Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024280.0001001 / 08 FEB 18 L12 PF PM First pilot who notices MASTER WARNING/CAUTION.................................RESET For each ECAM procedure: "Title of failure"................................................... ANNOUNCE ECAM......................................................................CONFIRM The PM should check/inspect the overhead panel and/or associated SD, in order to analyze and confirm the failure, before they take any action. The flight crew should keep in mind that the sensors on the overhead panel and/or SD may be different from the sensors that trigger the failure. OEB..................................................................... CONSIDER Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM C→ AOP-30-30 P 2/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Continued from the previous page PF PM "ECAM ACTIONS"....................................................ORDER When the ECAM displays several failures, the PF calls out "ECAM ACTIONS" for the first ECAM only. Apply the Tasksharing Rules and Communication for Abnormal Operations Refer to Tasksharing Rules and Communication ECAM/OEB ACTIONS...........................................PERFORM ECAM ACTIONS PERFORMED...............................CHECK "CLEAR (name of the system)?"........................... REQUEST "CLEAR (name of the system)"............................ CONFIRM CLR pb........................................................................ PRESS Before the PM presses the CLR pb (or ticks the CLEAR action line of the ECAM procedure), the flight crew should carefully check that all actions have been performed and look at the CLEAR bar. This bar indicates the lines that will be cleared. Even if the procedure is in overflow, the CLEAR bar clears only what appears on the screen. For each System Display (SD) page: SD page................................................................. ANALYZE "CLEAR (name of the system)"............................ CONFIRM "CLEAR (name of the system)?"........................... REQUEST CLR pb........................................................................ PRESS When STATUS page appears: "STOP ECAM"..........................................................ORDER Consider any normal C/L, system reset, or any additional procedure, as applicable "CONTINUE ECAM".................................................ORDER "REMOVE STATUS"............................................ CONFIRM 350-941 FLEET FCTM "STATUS"........................................................... ANNOUNCE ECAM ACTIONS........................................................... STOP STATUS.........................................................................READ •When the STATUS page indicates DEFERRED PROCs DEFERRED PROC (ALL).......................................PREVIEW The flight crew must not activate the deferred procedures. At this stage, referring to the DEFERRED PROCEDURES is only a quick review to evaluate the workload for each flight phase. "REMOVE STATUS?"............................................REQUEST ←C→ Continued on the following page AOP-30-30 P 3/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL PF Continued from the previous page PM STS pb........................................................................ PRESS "ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED".......................ANNOUNCE Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024286.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 TASKSHARING FOR ECAM NOT-SENSED PROCEDURE If the flight crew needs to review, or discuss a Not-Sensed procedure, they must use the FCOM. The flight crew must not activate a Not-Sensed procedure to review or discuss a procedure for the following reasons: ‐ If limitations or memos are associated with this procedure, they will appear on the WD or on the PFD ‐ If the ECAM Not-Sensed procedure is unduly activated without intention to apply it, avionics systems (including FWS alerting system) will reconfigure their system behavior in accordance with the activated Not-Sensed procedure. When the flight crew needs to activate a not-sensed procedure that is not requested by an ECAM procedure, they should use the following tasksharing method: Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024287.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 PF "Check ECAM Not-Sensed".......................ORDER PM ABN pb...................................................................................... PRESS Applicable ABN PROC..................................... SEARCH and SELECT "ACTIVATE"....................................... ANNOUNCE "Activate (name of procedure)?"...........................................REQUEST ABN PROC...........................................................................ACTIVATE Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024288.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 The flight crew can stop any abnormal not-sensed procedure if the conditions for its application disappear. Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024289.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 TASKSHARING FOR DEFERRED PROCEDURE To activate a deferred procedure, the flight crew should use the following tasksharing method: 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AOP-30-30 P 4/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00024290.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 PF "Check Deferred".......................................................ORDER PM DEFRD pb..................................................................PRESS Pending deferred procedure(s) title(s)..........................READ "ACTIVATE"....................................................... ANNOUNCE "Activate (name of procedure)?"........................... REQUEST XXX Deferred procedure...................................... ACTIVATE Ident.: AOP-30-30-A-00021306.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 STOP ECAM When necessary, the flight crew should stop the ECAM actions when they need to perform actions which require acknowledgement, check or crosscheck from both flight crewmembers (e.g. communication to ATC, request of configuration change, baro setting). Then, they should continue with ECAM actions. In all cases, the flight crew must stop the ECAM actions before reading the STATUS page, in order to: ‐ Perform the After Takeoff/Climb C/L or any normal C/L, if applicable. The flight crew must perform the pending normal C/L at this stage as it is a good compromise between the necessary application of ECAM procedures and system analysis and the delay in the check of systems status (e.g. in the case of failure after takeoff, flaps and landing gear retracted) ‐ Consider any system reset. The ECAM procedure may consider reset of computer/system by switching OFF then ON the associated computer/system via the usual cockpit control (e.g. PRIM). However some systems can be reset only via the RESET/POWER SUPPLY buttons. This action may not be requested by the ECAM procedure. Therefore it is the flight crew responsibility to consider any computer/system reset via a RESET/POWER SUPPLY button at this stage (provided the system reset is permitted, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ABN-RESET [RESET] System Reset Table), in order to recover the operation of the affected system. If the reset is successful, the STATUS page will disappear. The flight crew must not apply the system reset procedure from memory. They must refer to the FCOM. In flight, the flight crew should restrict the system resets to the ones listed in the operational documentation ‐ Consider activation of the ENG RELIGHT ABN PROC after an engine failure with no damage. The flight crew should consider performing the ENG RELIGHT procedure at this stage as if the relight is successful the STATUS page will disappear. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AOP-30-30 P 5/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES STATUS PAGE The purpose of the STATUS page is to provide an overview of the technical status of the aircraft in all flight phases. Therefore, it is important that the flight crew checks the whole STATUS page information, in order to correctly assess the situation and subsequently make appropriate decision. The STATUS page may contain some actions, also referred to as deferred procedures that should be performed by the flight crew at a more appropriate time. The flight crew should read the deferred procedures during the STATUS page review. At this stage, the purpose of reading the content of the deferred procedures is to evaluate and anticipate the workload for each flight phase. IF THE ECAM WARNING (OR CAUTION) DISAPPEARS WHILE APPLYING THE PROCEDURE If an ECAM warning disappears, while a procedure is being applied, the warning can be considered no longer applicable. Application of the procedure can be stopped. For example, during the application of an engine fire procedure, if the fire is successfully extinguished with the first fire extinguisher bottle, the ENG 1(2) FIRE warning disappears and the procedure no longer applies. Any remaining ECAM procedures should be performed as usual. DISPATCH PAGE L2 The purpose of the DISPATCH page is to provide the list of the dispatch messages that are currently sensed by the Flight Warning System (FWS). For more information on the DISPATCH page, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-60-10-50 DISPATCH Page. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AOP-30-30 P 6/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL On-ground, the appearance of a new dispatch message on the DISPATCH page is indicated to the crew via one of the two following cockpit effect: ‐ An ECAM alert that indicates a system failure (e.g. AIR PACK 1 FAULT) with or without ECAM action(s). This occurs when the system failure has an impact both on the on-going flight and on the next dispatch. A system failure has an impact on the on-going flight when a flight crew action or awareness is needed (e.g. F/CTL SPEED BRAKES FAULT). L1 L12 Note: Some ECAM alerts do not have any associated dispatch message on the DISPATCH page. This occurs when the ECAM alert does not indicate a system failure (e.g. BRAKES PARK BRK ON) or when the ECAM alert is the consequence of a primary alert (e.g. AIR ABNORM BLEED CONFIG). For more information, Refer to MEL/ 00012135 **Not found**. ‐ A generic DISPATCH PAGE UPDATE alert when the failure has only an impact on the next dispatch. This occurs when the system failure does not require immediate crew action or awareness. Note: In flight, the DISPATCH PAGE UPDATE alert is inhibited. This alert is used only on-ground to inform the flight crew of the detection of a failure that has an impact only on aircraft dispatch. Therefore, the consultation of the DISPATCH page during the flight is left at flight crew's discretion or Operator's policy. When the MEL must be consulted and applied, as defined by the operational rule and the Operator's policy (e.g. until start of the taxi), it is important that the flight crew checks the whole DISPATCH page content when a new dispatch message appears. This consultation eases the dispatch assessment since the dispatch message is the entry point into the MEL for the failures sensed by the FWS. HANDLING OF QRH PROCEDURE Ident.: AOP-30-30-00024281.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL When the flight crew needs to apply a QRH procedure, the PM should use the QRH/Abnormal and Emergency table of contents in order to search and select the applicable procedure. The flight crew can stop any abnormal QRH procedure if the conditions for its application disappear. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D AOP-30-30 P 7/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ECAM/QRH/OEB PROCEDURES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ECAM/QRH/OEB ACTIONS COMPLETED Ident.: AOP-30-30-00024282.0001001 / 31 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL When the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions are completed, the flight crew should: ‐ Resume the Normal Operations Tasksharing rules ‐ If time permits, review the FCOM for additional information on the applicable procedure(s). However, the flight crew should not prolong the flight to refer to the FCOM ‐ When convenient, recall the STATUS page and assess the situation, taking into account the following aspects: ‐ Operational aspects: • LAND ASAP or LAND ANSA • Aircraft limitations • Weather conditions • Check any fuel penalty factor and remaining fuel at destination or diversion airport L2 For more information, Refer to PR-AEP-FUEL Fuel Penalty. L1 • Check any landing performance penalty, and compute the landing performance at destination or diversion airport L2 For more information, Refer to PR-AEP-LDC Landing Computation. L1 • Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum capability (RVSM) • Required Navigation Performance (RNP) capability • Approach and landing capability ‐ Dispatch aspects ‐ Commercial aspects This list is not exhaustive. The operator or the flight crew should consider any other relevant aspects. ‐ Make the decision ‐ Inform the ATC, the cabin crew, the passengers, and airline operations as required. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E AOP-30-30 P 8/8 08 FEB 18 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF ADVISORY FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF ADVISORY Ident.: AOP-30-40-00009404.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The flight crew should keep in mind that the ECAM advisory is a monitoring function provided by the CDS. Therefore for a given system, the sensors used to trigger an advisory may be different from those used by the FWS to trigger an ECAM alert. Under normal FWS operation, the ADVISORY (i.e. Green pulsing parameter) indicates that a monitored parameter of an aircraft system starts to deviate from its usual operating range, but does not reach its abnormal range and associated ECAM alert level. The ADVISORY enables the flight crew to monitor the drifting parameter. However, as long as the parameter does not reach the abnormal indication associated to the triggering of the ECAM alert, no specific crew action is required. TASKSHARING RULES The flight crew should use the following tasksharing method: ‐ The flight crewmember that first notices an advisory announces “ADVISORY on XYZ system”. ‐ Then, the PF requests the PM to monitor the drifting parameter. If time permits, the PM may refer to the FCOM, in order to: • Check the advisory triggering conditions in various advisory situations • Be informed of the associated ECAM alert that may subsequently trigger, should the parameter keep on excessively drifting and reach the ECAM alert level. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A AOP-30-40 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF ADVISORY Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-30-40 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 HANDLING OF DISPATCH MESSAGES FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF DISPATCH MESSAGES Ident.: AOP-30-45-00025261.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL L2 L1 The purpose of the DISPATCH page is to provide the list of dispatch messages that are active in the Flight Warning System (FWS). For more information on the DISPATCH page, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-60-10-50 DISPATCH Page. For more information on dispatch messages inhibition, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-60-10-10 ECAM Flight Phases. One of the two following cockpit effects indicates the display of a new dispatch message on the DISPATCH page: ‐ The ECAM displays an alert related to a system failure (e.g. AIR PACK 1 FAULT) with or without ECAM action(s). This occurs when the system has an effect both on the on-going flight and on the following dispatch. The flight crew should complete the ECAM actions before any check of the associated dispatch message. Note: Some ECAM alerts do not have any associated dispatch message on the DISPATCH page. This occurs when the ECAM alert does not indicate a system failure (e.g. BRAKES PARK BRK ON) or when the ECAM alert is the consequence of a primary alert (e.g. AIR ABNORM BLEED CONFIG). For more information, Refer to MEL/ 00012135 **Not found**. ‐ The ECAM displays the generic DISPATCH PAGE UPDATE alert on ground, when the failure has only an effect on the following dispatch. This occurs when the system failure does not require immediate crew action or awareness. Note: In flight, the DISPATCH PAGE UPDATE alert is inhibited. This generic alert is used only on ground to inform the flight crew of the detection of a failure that has an effect only on aircraft dispatch. USE OF THE DISPATCH PAGE ON GROUND AND IN FLIGHT On ground, when the MEL must be consulted and applied, as defined by the operational rule and the Operator's policy (e.g. until the start of the taxi), it is important that the flight crew checks the DISPATCH page when a new dispatch message appears. This consultation eases the dispatch assessment since the dispatch message is the main entry point to the MEL for the failures that the FWS monitors. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-30-45 P 1/2 07 JAN 20 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HANDLING OF DISPATCH MESSAGES In flight, the flight crew may decide to consult the DISPATCH page for anticipation of the effect of the dispatch messages on the following dispatch. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AOP-30-45 P 2/2 07 JAN 20 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLUCTUATING CAUTION FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLUCTUATING CAUTION Ident.: AOP-30-50-00021396.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL Any fluctuating caution can be deleted via the EMER CANC pb. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A AOP-30-50 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FLUCTUATING CAUTION Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AOP-30-50 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS Ident.: AOP-40-00009333.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION The Airbus “Golden Rules for Pilots” are operational guidelines, based on all of the following: ‐ Basic flying principles ‐ The adaptation of these basic flying principles to modern-technology aircraft ‐ The provision of information about required crew coordination for the operation of Airbus aircraft. The objective of these Golden Rules is to also take into account the principles of flight crew interaction with automated systems, and the principles of Crew Resource Management (CRM), in order to help prevent the causes of many accidents or incidents and to ensure flight efficiency. GENERAL GOLDEN RULES The following four Golden Rules for Pilots are applicable to all normal operations, and to all unexpected or abnormal/emergency situations: 1. Fly. Navigate. Communicate: In this order and with appropriate tasksharing Fly! Navigate! Communicate! The flight crew must perform these three actions in sequence and must use appropriate tasksharing in normal and abnormal operations, in manual flight or in flight with the AP engaged. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AOP-40 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The following explains each of the three actions, and the steps associated with the performance of these actions: ‐ Fly “Fly” indicates that: • The Pilot Flying (PF) must concentrate on “flying the aircraft” to monitor and control the pitch attitude, bank angle, airspeed, thrust, sideslip, heading, etc., in order to achieve and maintain the desired targets, vertical flight path, and lateral flight path • The Pilot Monitoring (PM) must assist the PF and must actively monitor flight parameters, and call out any excessive deviation. The PM’s role of “actively monitoring” is very important. Therefore, both flight crewmembers must: • Focus and concentrate on their tasks to ensure appropriate tasksharing • Maintain situational awareness and immediately resolve any uncertainty as a crew. ‐ Navigate “Navigate” refers to and includes the following four “Know where ... ” statements, in order to ensure situational awareness: • Know where you are… • Know where you should be… • Know where you should go… • Know where the weather, terrain, and obstacles are. ‐ Communicate “Communicate” involves effective and appropriate crew communication between the: • PF and the PM • Flight crew and Air Traffic Control (ATC) • Flight crew and the cabin crew • Flight crew and the ground crew. Communication enables the flight crew to safely and appropriately perform the flight, and enhance situational awareness. To ensure good communication, the flight crew should use standard phraseology and the applicable callouts. In abnormal and emergency situations, the PF must recover a steady flight path, and the flight crew must identify the flight situation. The PF must then inform ATC and the cabin crew of: • The flight situation • The flight crew’s intentions. The flight crew must therefore always keep in mind the key message: Fly the Aircraft, Fly the Aircraft, Fly the Aircraft... 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ AOP-40 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL To safely and appropriately perform a flight, both flight crewmembers must have basic flying skills, and must be able to fly with appropriate tasksharing in all situations. 2. Use the appropriate level of automation at all times Aircraft are equipped with several levels of automation, used to perform specific tasks. The appropriate use of automated systems significantly helps the flight crew with, for example: ‐ Workload management ‐ Situation awareness (traffic, ATC communication, etc.). The flight crew must, at all times, perform both of the following: ‐ Determine and select the appropriate level of automation that can include manual flight Note: The decision to use manual flight must be agreed between both pilots and must be based on an individual assessment of the pilot. This assessment should include aircraft status (malfunctions), pilot fatigue, weather conditions, traffic situation, and if the PF is familiar with the area. ‐ Understand the operational effect of the selected level of automation. 3. Understand the FMA at all times The flight crew must confirm the operational effect of all actions on the AFS CP of the FCU, or on the KCCU, via a crosscheck of the corresponding annunciation or data on the PFD and on the ND. At all times, the flight crew should be aware of the following: ‐ Guidance modes (armed or engaged) ‐ Guidance targets ‐ Aircraft response in terms of attitude, speed, and trajectory ‐ Transition or reversion modes. Therefore, to ensure correct situational awareness, at all times, the flight crew must: ‐ Monitor the FMA ‐ Announce the FMA ‐ Confirm the FMA ‐ Understand the FMA. 4. Take action if things do not go as expected 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ AOP-40 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the aircraft does not follow the desired vertical or lateral flight path, or the selected targets, and if the flight crew does not have sufficient time to analyze and solve the situation, the flight crew must immediately take appropriate or required actions, as follows: ‐ The PF should change the level of automation: • From managed guidance to selected guidance, or • From selected guidance to manual flying. ‐ The PM should perform the following actions in sequence: • Communicate with the PF • Challenge the actions of the PF, when necessary • Take over, when necessary. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AOP-40 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS Intentionally left blank AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS AS-BIRD Bird Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A Practical Use of the Bird......................................................................................................................................... B AS-BTV BTV BTV Principle........................................................................................................................................................... A BTV Operation......................................................................................................................................................... B AS-FG Flight Guidance AS-FG-10-1 Auto Flight Objective.................................................................................................................................................................. A Managed and Selected Modes................................................................................................................................B Main Interfaces with the AP/FD.............................................................................................................................. C AP/FD Monitoring.................................................................................................................................................... D Recommended Practice for Autopilot (AP) Engagement........................................................................................ E Use of the FD without the AP ................................................................................................................................F AS-FG-10-2 Autothrust To Set Autothrust to OFF........................................................................................................................................A AS-FG-10-3 AP, FD, A/THR Mode Changes and Reversions Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A AP, FD, A/THR system integration......................................................................................................................... B Mode Reversions.....................................................................................................................................................C Triple Click............................................................................................................................................................... D AS-HUD HUD General.....................................................................................................................................................................A HUD Integration in Crew Tasks.............................................................................................................................. B HUD Configuration...................................................................................................................................................C Basic HUD Symbols................................................................................................................................................ D Operational Use of HUD......................................................................................................................................... E Use of HUD for Takeoff...........................................................................................................................................F Use of HUD for Approach.......................................................................................................................................G Declutter Modes.......................................................................................................................................................H Crosswind Mode........................................................................................................................................................I Use of HUD for Landing.......................................................................................................................................... J AS-ROWROP ROW/ROP ROW/ROP................................................................................................................................................................A Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-PLP-TOC P 1/2 06 FEB 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AS-RUD Rudder TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued from the previous page General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Operational Recommendations............................................................................................................................... B AS-TCAS TCAS Intruder Classification.............................................................................................................................................. A Operating Techniques..............................................................................................................................................B AS-VD Vertical Display General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Vertical Cut.............................................................................................................................................................. B Vertical Cut and Trajectory According to AP/FD Modes.........................................................................................C Safety Altitude and Terrain..................................................................................................................................... D AS-WXR Weather Radar General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Display Modes and Functions................................................................................................................................. B Use of the Weather Radar......................................................................................................................................C Operations in Convective Weather......................................................................................................................... D Ice Crystals.............................................................................................................................................................. E 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-PLP-TOC P 2/2 06 FEB 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BIRD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: AS-BIRD-00009647.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 Applicable to: ALL On the PFD, the flight crew may use one of the two following references: ‐ The pitch attitude ‐ The Velocity Vector (Flight Path Vector) called the "bird". The bird indicates the current inertial track and vertical path of the aircraft. It is the PF responsibility to fly the aircraft on the requested geometric trajectory. For dynamic maneuvers (such as takeoff or go-around), the PF should use the pitch attitude flight reference. Note: ‐ In TRK-FPA mode, the bird is green and is the flight reference ‐ In HDG-V/S mode (and VV pb pressed), the bird is black and must be considered as information only, not as the flight reference. RELIABILITY The bird is computed from IRS data and is affected by inertial errors. During the approach, the flight crew may detect a small track error, usually up to +/- 2 °. The bird is also computed from static pressure information. Therefore, if the altitude information is not reliable, the flight crew must consider the bird as not reliable. PRACTICAL USE OF THE BIRD Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-BIRD-20-5-00009651.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 GENERAL RULE As a general rule, when using the bird as a reference without flight guidance (FD OFF), the pilot should first change pitch attitude, and then check the result with reference to the bird. Ident.: AS-BIRD-20-5-00009653.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 VISUAL CIRCUITS (FD OFF) When flying visual circuits, the flight crew should use the bird as a cross reference, external visual cues remaining the main references. On the downwind leg, the pilot should: ‐ Position the wings of the bird on the horizon to maintain level flight ‐ Ask the PM to set the downwind track on the AFS CP ‐ Position the tail of the bird on the blue track bar to maintain the selected downwind track. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → AS-BIRD P 1/2 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BIRD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL On final approach, the track index should be set to the final approach course of the runway. A standard -3 ° approach path is indicated, when the top of the bird’s tail is immediately below the horizon, and the bottom of the bird is immediately above the 5 ° nose down marker. Ident.: AS-BIRD-20-5-00009654.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 INSTRUMENT APPROACHES (FD ON) The bird may be useful for monitoring the approach flight path in some instrument approaches. The bird does not provide guidance to a ground-based radio facility. Therefore, even if the bird indicates that the aircraft is flying with the correct flight path angle and track, this does not necessarily mean that the aircraft is on the correct final approach path. Ident.: AS-BIRD-20-5-00009655.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 FINAL APPROACH Associated with the GS mini function, the bird is an excellent indicator of shears, downburst or wind variation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B AS-BIRD P 2/2 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL BTV PRINCIPLE Ident.: AS-BTV-00020654.0002001 / 01 MAR 17 Applicable to: ALL OBJECTIVES BTV and BTV CONTAM are two different autobrake modes that use specific deceleration profiles. Depending on the selected autobrake mode, the flight crew feels a different deceleration at landing: ‐ In basic autobrake mode (BRK MED), when the nose landing gear touches down, the autobrake system targets a constant deceleration rate. The flight crew feels a constant deceleration. The flight crew disconnects the autobrake, and taxies the aircraft to an appropriate exit to vacate the runway. If the flight crew does not disconnect the autobrake, the aircraft will decelerate until full stop ‐ In BTV CONTAM mode, the behavior is the same than BRK MED, except that the BTV CONTAM disengages when the aircraft speed is below approx. 10 kt ‐ In BTV mode, the deceleration profile is an initial linear increase in deceleration (ramp) up to a target value. BTV maintains this target value (plateau) until the flight crew disengages BTV at a convenient speed, or the aircraft speed reaches approx.10 kt. Then, BTV releases the braking near the selected exit. HOW DOES BTV MANAGE THE BRAKING APPLICATION? BTV ON DRY AND WET RUNWAYS Because BTV specific deceleration profile is in accordance with the friction coefficient of DRY and WET runways, BTV may delay the braking application after touchdown. BTV only delays the braking application if: ‐ At any time, sufficient performance margins exist between the position of the BTV stop bar and the runway end, and ‐ The aircraft deceleration is more than the BTV deceleration profile (the BTV stop bar is before the exit). As a result, the runway occupancy time is minimized. In addition, full benefit of the aerodynamic braking and use of reverser thrust (most efficient at high speed) permits to minimize the brake energy for a selected exit. The delay in braking application and the unique brake application also have a beneficial effect on brake wear. At high speed, the deceleration provided by the aerodynamic drag and reversers is more than the BTV nominal deceleration order. As a result, as long as the real deceleration of the aircraft is stronger than the BTV nominal deceleration order, BTV delays the braking. Therefore, on ground, after reversers selection and ground spoilers extension, the flight crew feels a high deceleration due to high efficiency of the reversers and the aircraft drag. The speed decreases, the flight crew feels lower deceleration until BTV orders braking. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AS-BTV P 1/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL BTV Ramp Profile Note: For a given aircraft energy at landing, a given runway length and a given exit position, the farther the aircraft touchdown point is, the sooner BTV will command the deceleration. BTV CONTAM ON CONTAMINATED RUNWAYS BTV CONTAM targets a constant deceleration, from touchdown until the aircraft ground speed is approx. 10 kt, regardless of the position of the aircraft compared to the selected exit. Even if BTV CONTAM does not target the selected exit, the flight crew uses this autobrake mode in order to keep continuity between operations on dry, wet and contaminated runways. The actions flow to arm the autobrake will be the same regardless of the runway condition. In addition, in the case of a runway condition change, the flight crew can easily update the selected runway condition while BTV or BTV CONTAM remains armed. BTV OPERATION Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-BTV-31-00022172.0002001 / 01 MAR 17 LDA CROSSCHECK BTV has the capability to delay the brake application. In order to prevent a runway excursion, the flight crew must ensure that BTV uses a correct LDA. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → AS-BTV P 2/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The PRIMs memorize the LDA when the flight crew arms BTV. Therefore, in accordance with Airbus SOPs : ‐ Before arming BTV, the flight crew must insert the applicable runway shifts (end and threshold shift) in the ANF ‐ After arming BTV, the flight crew must crosscheck the LDA that appears on the ND (left upper corner of the ANF) with the LDA of the associated airport chart. Note: On contaminated runways, even if BTV CONTAM does not delay the braking, the flight crew must crosscheck the LDA in order to keep a single flow pattern to arm BTV, and also to anticipate the case of a mode change from BTV CONTAM to BTV. Ident.: AS-BTV-31-00023490.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 DECLUTTER RWY Some airport maps display multiple exit labels (e.g. when two opposite high speed exit cross). For an exit, several exit labels are displayed, but only one is interactive, and can be used to arm BTV. The flight crew can use the DECLUTTER RWY function, in order to display only the interactive exit labels that are associated with the selected landing runway. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 3/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-BTV-31-00021318.0002001 / 08 JUL 19 BTV RUNWAY CHANGE After BTV arming, the flight crew can modify the BTV preparation. In order to modify the selected runway, the flight crew must apply the following procedure: 1. Display the ANF in PLAN mode, with appropriate range 2. Click on a new runway QFU, and click on SET LDG RWY. BTV automatically disarms 3. Select a new BTV exit 4. Press the A/BRK pb. BTV or BTV CONTAM appears on the FMA. 5. Check the LDA between the ANF and the charts. BTV EXIT CHANGE When BTV is armed, the flight crew can modify the BTV exit without disarming BTV. In order to modify the selected exit, the flight crew must click on a new exit that is available on the selected runway, and click on SET BTV EXIT. Note: When BTV is armed, the END label is no more displayed. The flight crew must disarm BTV in order to set the runway end as the BTV exit. LATE LANDING RUNWAY CHANGE When the ATC requests a change of landing runway, the flight crew should usually have sufficient time to modify the FMS landing runway, or the selected runway in the ANF, and to set the new BTV exit. However in some cases, the landing runway can disagree with the selected BTV landing runway. For example, in the case of parallel runways, the ATC can request the flight crew to change the landing runway during the final approach phase on short notice. In this case, the flight crew may not have sufficient time to prepare BTV for the new landing runway. As a result, when BTV detects and confirms (at 300 ft) that the landing runway is not the selected runway, BTV function reverts to basic autobrake (BRK MED appears on the FMA and BTV/LDG RWY DISAGREE appears on the ANF). If the landing runway is valid in the TAWS database, ROW/ROP functions remain active. The flight crew may also manually arm BRK MED before the automatic reversion. LATE RUNWAY CONDITION CHANGE RUNWAY CONDITION CHANGE FROM DRY TO WET OR DAMP In the case of a runway condition change from DRY to WET, the flight crew should select the appropriate runway condition via the RWY COND / BRK ACTION knob-selector (WET-5, or GOOD-5). BTV remains armed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 4/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the BTV exit was selected between the DRY and WET lines: ‐ TOO SHORT will be displayed on the ND ‐ Depending on the touchdown position, aircraft speed and the use of reversers, the exit may be missed. The flight crew can keep this setting, or change the BTV exit if time permits. RUNWAY CONDITION CHANGE FROM DRY OR WET TO CONTAMINATED In the case of a runway condition change from DRY or WET to CONTAMINATED (e.g. snow, standing water, slush...), the flight crew must consider the following: ‐ If the flight crew performed an in-flight landing performance assessment for the current runway condition, and checked that the landing performance is in accordance with the available landing distance, the flight crew must: • Select the appropriate runway condition (LDG PERF CODE at or below 4) • Check that BTV CONTAM is displayed on the FMA • Check if the exit will be missed, and set a new exit if time permits • On ground, select max reverse without delay. Note: If the flight crew has not sufficient time to select BTV CONTAM in flight, they must select max reverse without delay after main landing gear touchdown, and apply full pressure on braking pedals to override BTV. ‐ If the flight crew did not perform an in-flight landing performance assessment for the current runway condition, or if the landing performance is not in accordance with the available landing distance, the flight crew must perform a go-around. OVERWEIGHT LANDING BTV remains operative in the case of overweight landing. The flight crew can use BTV in order to optimize the braking and to minimize the braking energy. The flight crew can select an exit far down the runway or the runway end as the BTV exit. In this case, the braking will begin with a reduced ground speed and the risk to deflate the tires is reduced. Ident.: AS-BTV-31-00021320.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 EXIT MANAGEMENT BTV uses the ANF database. This database is not specifically designed for BTV use. As a result, BTV cannot know the type of exit that the flight crew selects (i.e. standard exit or high speed turn off). BTV uses a reference point to compute the remaining distance between the aircraft position and the selected exit. The reference point is the intersection of the yellow centerline of the taxiway and the runway edge. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 5/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The BTV objective is to manage the aircraft deceleration, in order to reach 10 kt at approx. 60 m before the reference point, for all types of exit. HOW TO MANAGE A 90 DEGREES RUNWAY EXIT? 90 Degrees Runway Exit In normal operation, the flight crew waits until the aircraft ground speed is convenient for the intended exit, then deactivates BTV (via the A/THR instinctive disconnect pb or the brake pedals) and stow the reversers. The flight crew controls the speed to vacate the runway. If the flight crew does not disconnect BTV, BTV will release the braking and automatically disconnect when the aircraft ground speed is 10 kt. Note: On ground, if the flight crew presses one time the A/THR instinctive disconnect pb, the autobrake disconnects. Immediately after, if the flight crew presses a second time the A/THR instinctive disconnect pb, the AUTO BRK OFF memo disappears and the corresponding audio indicator is not emitted. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 6/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The deactivation of BTV before the aircraft reaches 10 kt may be appropriate: ‐ If the exit geometry and surface condition is appropriate for a safe turn at more than 10 kt, or ‐ If the flight crew selected a runway exit in the last 300 m of the runway, BTV applies braking to reach the 10 kt target at 300 m from the runway end. The flight crew may deactivate BTV at a speed above 10 kt, and taxi until the selected exit or a turn pad at runway end, or ‐ If the flight crew misses the selected runway exit, they may deactivate BTV, in order to avoid BTV strong braking application down to 10 kt. BTV deactivation to taxi the aircraft until the next appropriate runway exit may improve passengers comfort, use of brakes energy, and runway occupancy time. HOW TO MANAGE A HIGH SPEED EXIT? High Speed Exit In order to take advantage of a high-speed exit, the flight crew should deactivate BTV before the aircraft reaches 10 kt, but only when the speed is appropriate to vacate at the intended taxiway. If the flight crew does not deactivate BTV, BTV continues to apply braking, in order to reach 10 kt at approx. 60 m before the reference point. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 7/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the flight crew considers that the speed is too high, they may decide not to enter the high speed exit in accordance with the following considerations: ‐ The condition of the high speed exit ‐ The occupation of the high speed exit ‐ The missed exit situation. Possible technique Possible Technique In order to enter a high speed exit with BTV active, the flight crew should: ‐ Make sure that there is no EXIT MISSED situation ‐ Make sure that the intended exit is the exit selected for BTV ‐ Keep BTV active, and follow the yellow centreline of the high speed exit ‐ When the aircraft speed is appropriate to enter the taxiway (i.e. approximately at 30 kt), press the A/THR instinctive disconnect pb on the thrust levers, in order to deactivate BTV) ‐ Stow the reversers before vacating the runway. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 8/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Alternative technique Alternative Technique If the flight crew does not feel comfortable with the BTV managed speed, they should apply the following technique: ‐ On the runway, keep BTV active and follow the runway axis ‐ When the aircraft speed is appropriate to enter the taxiway, deactivate BTV ‐ Follow or return to the yellow centreline of the high-speed exit ‐ Stow the reversers before vacating the runway Note: In low visibility conditions, the flight crew might lose sight of the high speed exit reference (i.e. the yellow centreline). MISSED EXIT SITUATION The main causes of missed exit are the following: ‐ Long flare or excessive speed at touchdown ‐ Change in wind direction during landing (headwind to tailwind) ‐ Runway more slippery than a normal WET runway ‐ Use of REV IDLE on a WET runway. Before BTV indicates the missed exit situation, BTV increases the braking application up to 0.35 g. After 5 s, if the missed exit situation is confirmed, BTV displays the message EXIT MISSED on the FMA, and the stop bar in amber on the ND. When the missed exit situation is confirmed, BTV cannot revert to normal behavior. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-BTV P 9/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BTV 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Operational Recommendations In the case of missed exit and when the speed is appropriate, the flight crew should: ‐ Deactivate BTV ‐ Taxi the aircraft until the next appropriate runway exit ‐ Manage braking manually. The deactivation of BTV avoids a strong braking until BTV disconnection at 10 kt. EXIT MANAGEMENT AND USE OF REVERSERS On a dry runway, if the selected runway exit is near the DRY line, BTV is able to reach the selected exit even if the flight crew uses idle reverser thrust. However on a wet runway, if the selected exit is near the WET line and if the flight crew uses idle reverser thrust, BTV may miss the selected exit. This is because BTV takes into account the use of maximum reverser thrust for WET line computation Ident.: AS-BTV-31-00023439.0001001 / 08 NOV 18 CONTAMINATED RUNWAY If the selected LDG PERF CODE is at or above 5, BTV has the capability to delay the braking. In order to ensure an immediate braking after landing the flight crew must ensure that, for a landing on a contaminated runway, the engaged autobrake mode is BTV CONTAM or BRK MED. If the engaged autobrake mode is BTV, the flight crew must immediately apply pedal braking. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B AS-BTV P 10/10 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AUTO FLIGHT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL OBJECTIVE Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00009362.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Flight Director (FD) and the Auto Pilot (AP) assist the flight crew to fly the aircraft within the normal flight. To achieve these objectives: ‐ The FD provides adequate attitude or flight path orders and enables the PF to accurately fly the aircraft manually ‐ The AP takes over routine tasks. This gives the Pilot Flying (PF) the necessary time and resources to assess the overall operational situation. MANAGED AND SELECTED MODES Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00009365.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The choice of mode is a strategic decision that is taken by the PF. Managed modes require: ‐ Good FMS navigation accuracy (or NAV PRIMARY) ‐ An appropriate ACTIVE F-PLN (i.e. the intended lateral and vertical trajectory is entered, and the sequencing of the F-PLN is monitored). If these two conditions are not fulfilled, revert to selected mode. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B AS-FG-10-1 P 1/4 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AUTO FLIGHT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL MAIN INTERFACES WITH THE AP/FD Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00021478.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL *The DIR TO function is an exception to this rule. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES With the FMS, anticipate flight plan updates by preparing EN ROUTE DIVERSIONS, DIVERSION TO ALTN, CIRCLING, LATE CHANGE OF RWY in the SEC. This enables the MFD/KCCU to be used for short-term actions. AP/FD MONITORING Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00009366.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL The FMA indicates the status of the AP, FD and A/THR and their corresponding operating modes. The PF must monitor the FMA and announce any FMA changes. The flight crew uses the AFS CP or MFD/ KCCU to give orders to the AP/FD. The aircraft is expected to fly in accordance with these orders. The main concern for the flight crew should be: ‐ WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NOW? ‐ WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NEXT? If the aircraft does not fly as expected: ‐ And, if in managed mode: Select the desired target ‐ Or, disengage the autopilot, and fly the aircraft manually. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to D AS-FG-10-1 P 2/4 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AUTO FLIGHT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR AUTOPILOT (AP) ENGAGEMENT Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00021480.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 Applicable to: ALL Before engaging the AP, the flight crew should: ‐ Fly the aircraft on the intended path ‐ Check on the FMA that the Flight Director (FD) is engaged with the appropriate guidance modes for the intended flight path. If not, set the FD on, and the appropriate guidance mode(s) as required ‐ Center the FD symbol with the aircraft symbol on the PFD. Note: Engaging the AP while large orders are required to achieve the intended flight path may result in an AP overshoot of the intended vertical or lateral target. This situation can surprise the flight crew, due to the resulting large pitch/roll changes and thrust variations. USE OF THE FD WITHOUT THE AP Ident.: AS-FG-10-1-00021481.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 Applicable to: ALL When manually flying the aircraft with the FDs ON, the FD symbol provides lateral and vertical orders in accordance with the active modes that the flight crew selects. Therefore: ‐ Fly with a centered FD ‐ If not using FD orders, turn off the FD. It is strongly recommended to turn off the FDs to ensure that the A/THR is in SPEED mode if the A/THR is active. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E to F AS-FG-10-1 P 3/4 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AUTO FLIGHT Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-FG-10-1 P 4/4 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AUTOTHRUST FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TO SET AUTOTHRUST TO OFF Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-FG-10-2-10-2-1-00021482.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Ident.: AS-FG-10-2-10-2-1-00021483.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 USE OF INSTINCTIVE DISCONNECT (I/D) PUSHBUTTON If the I/D pb is pressed when the thrust levers are in CLB detent, thrust will increase to MAX CLB. This may cause an unwanted thrust change and may upset the approach. Therefore the recommended technique for setting A/THR to off is: ‐ Return the thrust levers to approximately the current thrust setting by observing the TLP symbol on the thrust gauge ‐ Press the I/D pb. This technique minimizes thrust discontinuity when setting A/THR to off. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AS-FG-10-2 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AUTOTHRUST FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-FG-10-2-10-2-1-00021484.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 USE OF THE A/THR PUSHBUTTON Use of the A/THR pb is considered to be an involuntary A/THR off command (e.g. in the case of a failure). When pressed, thrust is frozen and remains locked at the value it had when the flight crew pressed the A/THR pb, as long as the thrust levers remain in the CLB or MCT detent. If thrust levers are out of detent, thrust is manually controlled and, therefore, unlocked. An ECAM caution and an FMA message trigger during thrust lock: ‐ THR LK appears on the FMA ‐ The AUTO FLT A/THR OFF ECAM alert is triggered. In this case, when the flight crew moves the thrust levers out of detent, full manual control is recovered and the THR LK message disappears from the FMA. This feature should not be used, unless the I/D pb are inoperative. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AS-FG-10-2 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-00021485.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew manually engages the modes. However, they may change automatically, depending on the: ‐ AP, FD, and A/THR system integration ‐ Logical sequence of modes ‐ So-called "mode reversions". AP, FD, A/THR SYSTEM INTEGRATION Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-00021486.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL There is a direct relationship between aircraft pitch control, and engine thrust control. This relationship is designed to manage the aircraft’s energy: ‐ If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a vertical trajectory (e.g. ALT, V/S, FPA, G/S): → A/THR controls speed ‐ If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a speed (e.g. OP CLB, OP DES): → A/THR controls thrust (THR CLB, THR IDLE) ‐ If no AP/FD pitch mode is engaged (i.e. AP is off and FD is off): → A/THR controls speed. Therefore, any change in the AP/FD pitch mode is associated with a change in the A/THR mode. Note: For this reason, the FMA displays the A/THR mode and the AP/FD vertical mode columns next to each other. MODE REVERSIONS Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-10-3-1-00021487.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 GENERAL Mode reversions are automatic mode changes that unexpectedly occur, but are designed to ensure coherent AP, FD, and A/THR operations, in conjunction with flight crew input (or when entering a F-PLN discontinuity). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C → AS-FG-10-3 P 1/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS For example, a reversion will occur, when the flight crew: ‐ Changes the AFS CP ALT target in specific conditions ‐ Engages a mode on one axis, that will automatically disengage the associated mode on the other axis ‐ Manually flies the aircraft with the FD on, but does not follow the FD orders, which leads to the aircraft to the limits of the flight envelope. Due to the unexpected nature of their occurrence, the FMA should be closely-monitored for mode reversions. Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-10-3-1-00021489.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 FLIGHT CREW CHANGE OF FCU ALT TARGET → ACTIVE VERTICAL MODE NOT POSSIBLE This reversion to the V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify the pitch behavior of the aircraft. It is the flight crew’s responsibility to change it as required. Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-10-3-1-00021490.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 FLIGHT CREW HDG OR TRK MODE ENGAGEMENT → DISENGAGEMENT OF ASSOCIATED MODE ON THE VERTICAL AXIS This reversion is due to the integration of the AP, FD, and A/THR with the FMS. When the flight crew defines a F-PLN, the FMS considers this F-PLN as a whole (lateral + vertical). Therefore, the AP will guide the aircraft along the entire F-PLN: ‐ Along the LAT F-PLN (NAV - LOC - F-LOC modes) ‐ Along the VERT F-PLN (CLB - DES - APP-DES - G/S - F-G/S modes). Vertical managed modes can only be used, if the lateral managed NAV mode is used. If the flight crew decides to divert from the lateral F-PLN, the autopilot will no longer guide the aircraft along the vertical F-PLN. Therefore, in climb: 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-FG-10-3 P 2/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS In descent: This reversion to V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify the pitch behavior of the aircraft. It is the flight crew’s responsibility to adapt pitch, if necessary. Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-10-3-1-00021491.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 THE AIRCRAFT ENTERS A F-PLN DISCONTINUITY NAV mode is lost, when entering a F-PLN discontinuity: ‐ On the lateral axis, the aircraft reverts to HDG (or TRK) mode ‐ On the vertical axis, the same reversion (as the one indicated above) occurs. Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-10-3-1-00021492.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 THE PF MANUALLY FLIES THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE FD ON, AND DOES NOT FOLLOW THE FD VERTICAL ORDERS If the flight crew does not follow the FD vertical orders, an A/THR mode reversion occurs. This reversion is effective, when the A/THR is in THRUST MODE (THR IDLE, THR CLB), and the aircraft reaches the limits of the speed envelope (VLS, VMAX): 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-FG-10-3 P 3/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS A/THR in SPEED mode automatically readjusts thrust to regain the target speed. The FD symbol will disappear, because they are not being followed by the PF. TRIPLE CLICK Ident.: AS-FG-10-3-00021488.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 Applicable to: ALL The "triple click" is an aural alert. It is an attention-getter, designed to draw the flight crew’s attention to the FMA. The PFD FMA highlights a mode change or reversion with a white or amber box around the new mode, and the pulsing of its associated FD symbol. The reversions, described in the previous paragraph, are also emphasized via the triple click aural alert. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → AS-FG-10-3 P 4/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS The triple click also appears in the following, less usual, cases: ‐ SRS → CLB (OP CLB) reversion: If the flight crew selects a speed on the AFS CP ‐ The V/S selection is «refused» during ALT: The flight crew pulls the V/S knob, while in ALT ‐ The V/S target is not followed, because the selected target is too high, and leads to VMIN/VMAX. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D AS-FG-10-3 P 5/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT GUIDANCE 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-FG-10-3 P 6/6 09 MAY 18 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AS-HUD-00009692.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL The Head-Up-Display (HUD) is an instrument in the cockpit that provides the flight crew with trajectory-related symbols. The HUD superimposes flight-related symbols on the forward field of vision. This enables the flight crew to fly the aircraft, in relation to external parameters (e.g. terrain, runway surface, clouds, etc.). The flight crew can use the HUD during all the flight phases. The flight crew may take advantage of the HUD during all the following flight phases: ‐ Taxi (ground speed reading, energy state through energy chevrons) ‐ Takeoff (trajectory control and parameter monitoring, reduced takeoff minima) ‐ Climb, cruise and descent for overall situation awareness ‐ Intermediate and final approach for smooth IMC/VMC transition, trajectory control and parameter monitoring, energy state, accuracy in manual flight, and reduction of landing minima ‐ Visual or circling approach ‐ Landing and deceleration (touchdown zone accuracy on manual landing, deceleration state). The HUD and the PFD support the overall flying task as per Airbus Golden Rules. The HUD does not ensure situation awareness concerning the navigation task. The Navigation Display (ND) remains the primary instrument used to monitor the aircraft position in terms of the overflown area and other traffic. HUD INTEGRATION IN CREW TASKS Ident.: AS-HUD-00025319.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL The tasksharing between the PF and the PM is the same with the HUD. It is necessary to adapt how both the PF and PM scan cockpit information with the HUD. The PF and PM scan the ND and the ECAM. When HUDs are installed, it is recommended that both pilots use the respective HUD. However in some specific conditions that result in large dynamic control inputs (e.g. unusual attitude recovery, windshear recovery, Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance...), the PF should not focus exclusively on HUD symbols, and give priority to head-down displays. In addition, "REVERT TO PFD" message is displayed on the HCU with the following messages: ‐ TCAS RA ‐ EXCESSIVE ATT. At any time, the pilot may refer to head-down displays. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B AS-HUD P 1/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HUD CONFIGURATION Ident.: AS-HUD-00009693.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL It is recommended that the PF and the PM both use their HUD. In the case of a HUD failure, the PF must refer to the PFD and the ND. The PM uses the PFD and the ND as the main references to monitor the flight parameters. However, the PM periodically refers to the HUD, in order to: ‐ Take advantage of situational awareness enhancement of the HUD ‐ See the PF's tasks with the same level and format of information. During the final approach, the PM monitors the pitch, the bank, and the speed of the aircraft on the PFD, for deviation callouts. However, during the intermediate and final approaches, the PM may periodically refer to the HUD, especially during the IMC/VMC transition, and the visual approach segment. BASIC HUD SYMBOLS Ident.: AS-HUD-00009694.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL The basic HUD symbols include: ‐ The aircraft reference symbol indicates the pitch attitude of the aircraft. ‐ The horizon line. At high altitudes, the horizon line is above the earth's curve. The heading/track scale is included on the horizon line. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to D → AS-HUD P 2/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ The Flight Path Vector (FPV), also referred to as "the bird", indicates the current trajectory of the aircraft. Without AP, the flight crew uses the sidestick to control the FPV. The FPV must be positioned: ‐ Laterally to illustrate the track (TRK) ‐ Vertically to illustrate the Flight Path Angle (FPA). ‐ The energy chevrons indicate the total energy of the aircraft. Without A/THR, the flight crew uses the thrust levers to control the energy chevrons. Some aerodynamic features (speedbrakes, landing gear, etc) also modify energy chevrons. The relative positions of the FPV in terms of the horizon, and the energy chevrons relative to the FPV are important. This information enables to understand and control trajectory and energy. ‐ The delta speed indicates the difference between the current airspeed and the selected or managed airspeed target. The aircraft is at a constant airspeed, either at the selected or managed airspeed. The aircraft will decelerate, and the current airspeed is 5 kt above the selected or managed airspeed. The aircraft will accelerate, and the current airspeed is 15 kt below the selected or managed airspeed. The aircraft will decelerate, and the current airspeed is 20 kt above the selected or managed airspeed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ AS-HUD P 3/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ The Flight Path Director (FPD) on the HUD is a circle shape symbol that moves laterally and vertically relative to the FPV. The pilot flies the FPV on the HUD toward the FPD, in order to capture the FPD. OPERATIONAL USE OF HUD Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025320.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 GENERAL SEATING POSITION Correct seating position is important to obtain full HUD symbols in the pilot’s field of vision, and visual indications in low visibility conditions (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-70 Seating Position and adjustment of Rudder Pedals). BRIGHTNESS SETTING Pilot beginning with HUD may focus on one layer of information (e.g. the HUD symbols) and disregard other information (e.g. the outside environment). As means of mitigation, the pilot should adjust the brightness of the HUD so that outside visual information has priority over HUD symbols. Pilots must continuously adjust the brightness of the HUD in accordance with external visual conditions and the phase of flight, particularly at night. LOOK THROUGH HUD Mental process is required for pilots to be able to look through the HUD. So that earthly references should remain primary source of information in VMC. SCALING On the HUD, heading, pitch, flight path angle and drift are conformal to the external references while they are compressed on a conventional PFD. A variation of one degree in the outside world is equal to one degree through the HUD field of vision. As a result, for pilots used to fly with PFD, any change in aircraft attitude may appear expanded/more dynamic on the HUD. Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025321.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 BEFORE PUSHBACK OR START HUD DEPLOYMENT Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-50-70 How to Deploy the HCU. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to E → AS-HUD P 4/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL XWIND SW The XWIND position should be used in flight only when the FPV is not within the display area of the HUD. DECLUTTER SW On ground, two displays are available when cycling the DECLUTTER sw: ‐ Full display, indicated by N ‐ Declutter 2 mode limited to basic information. Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025323.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 TAXI During the taxi, the flight crew can monitor/control the GS and the energy of the aircraft with energy chevrons. The flight crew must carefully adjust the brightness to ensure optimum visual acquisition of external environment, particularly at night. Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025324.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 TAKEOFF The takeoff phase is divided into two subphases: ‐ The takeoff roll ‐ The rotation. The HUD assists the flight crew during both of these subphases. The flight crew must not use the crosswind mode during takeoff in order to display the full speed scale and altitude scale. These scales help the flight crew to better anticipate configuration changes and to better manage altitude constraints. TAKEOFF ROLL When the flight crew sets the thrust levers to FLX or TOGA, the aircraft reference symbol and the yaw bar (if the LOC signal is available) appear on the HUD. The yaw bar indicates the correction (guidance) that the flight crew must apply to the rudder pedal, in order to move the aircraft to the runway centerline. The LOC deviation symbol indicates the position of the aircraft in relation to the runway centerline. The combination of both helps the flight crew to perform an accurate takeoff roll. In the illustration below, the aircraft is on the left side of the runway centerline, and the yaw bar provides an order to go the right side. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-HUD P 5/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The flight crew must use both the LOC deviation symbol and the yaw bar to smoothly direct the aircraft to the centerline in addition to the external parameters. ROTATION On the HUD, when the aircraft is on the ground, the visible field of vision above the horizon line is approximately 5 °. As a result, the HUD does not display the pitch target during the takeoff roll. A normal rotation should be conducted as per FCTM (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-120 Rotation Technique). To monitor the rotation, the PF uses the outside visual references and the HUD symbols. The PF must control the pitch attitude target on the HUD considering the tail strike pitch limit symbol . The PF must control the bank angle. To do this, the PF maintains the roll at zero and flies the wing of the aircraft reference symbol parallel to the reference lines of the pitch scale. Note: The bank angle scale is displayed after liftoff. Then, the PF looks for the FPV and its associated FPD, in order to adjust the flight path, as per SRS TO mode. The PF then stabilizes the aircraft on the initial climb segment. Note: The tail strike pitch limit symbol no longer appears after takeoff. Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025327.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 APPROACH The flight crew can use the HUD for all types of approaches associated to any guidance functions. When the flight crew selects an approach in the FMS and approach phase is activated, the HUD displays additional approach-related features to enhance pilot situation awareness. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-HUD P 6/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SYNTHETIC RUNWAY The synthetic runway overlays the real runway. It helps the pilots to locate and identify the landing runway. The flight crew can take advantage of the synthetic runway in crosswind conditions or low visibility conditions. The synthetic runway is displayed for all approach guidance modes with a solid or dotted line, depending on the mode used. In the case of crosswind, the drift effect automatically appears on the HUD: the synthetic (real) runway appears on the HUD in relation to the drift angle. For example, if there is a crosswind that comes from the right side, the synthetic runway appears on the left side of the HUD, when the aircraft is on the centerline. TOUCHDOWN POINT The touchdown point is displayed on the synthetic runway. LOC AXIS / F-LOC AXIS The LOC/F-LOC axis symbol: ‐ Indicates a perspective view of the LOC axis on the ground ‐ Provides an indication of the aircraft position in relation to the LOC axis. The LOC/F-LOC axis is displayed for approaches with LOC modes and F-LOC modes as a solid or dotted line depending on the mode used. When the aircraft is established on the LOC, the LOC axis is perpendicular to the horizon. FINAL APPROACH FPA The Final Approach FPA indicates the reference slope of the approach starting from the current aircraft altitude. For approaches with FINAL APP, the Final Approach FPA is fixed at -3 °, or is as defined in the FMS database. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-HUD P 7/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Final Approach FPA When the aircraft is established on the glide path, the FPV, the Final Approach FPA and the touchdown point are aligned. If the aircraft is below the glide path, the Final Approach FPA is displayed before the touchdown point. If the aircraft is above the glide path, the Final Approach FPA is displayed beyond the touchdown point. In cold weather operations, the HUD displays a temperature compensated FPV in order to reach more accuracy during the approach. As the visual indications become sufficient, the pilot may reduce the quantity of symbols displayed in the HUD. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-HUD P 8/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL For this purpose, the HUD provides a declutter mode with two levels: ‐ Declutter mode level 1 enables the flight crew to remove the synthetic runway, the approach axis and the touchdown point or the FLS anchor point from the HUD. ‐ Declutter mode level 2 displays basic trajectory, speed and altitude information on the HUD and enables the flight crew to focus on external parameters. The V/S is no longer displayed when declutter mode level 2 is selected. CROSSWIND MODE In the case of high crosswind, the FPV may interfere with the speed and altitude scales. To compensate, the flight crew may use the crosswind mode via the XWIND sw on the glareshield. The crosswind mode aims to clear the lateral borders of the field of vision during approach. To do this, it is necessary to reduce the size of speed and altitude scales on the HUD. In the case of go-around, the flight crew can recover the full speed and altitude scales. To do this, it is necessary to remove the crosswind mode after the trajectory is stabilized. Crosswind Mode 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-HUD P 9/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-HUD-GOPERUSE-00025328.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 LANDING The HUD helps the PF to perform accurate landing, due to the fact that the stabilization of the final descent path is more accurate, as the aircraft approaches the touchdown point. The flight crew performs a conventional flare when the HUD is used for landing. The flight crew uses external parameters, and looks through the HUD. The HUD does not provide flare guidance. However, the HUD displays arrows that temporarily pulse on the FPV, as flare reminder. Flare Reminder Landing Roll USE OF HUD FOR TAKEOFF Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-HUD-GTAKE-00009695.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 The takeoff phase can be divided into two subphases: ‐ The takeoff roll ‐ The rotation. The HUD assists the flight crew during both of these subphases. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← E to F → AS-HUD P 10/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-HUD-GTAKE-00009700.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 TAKEOFF ROLL When the flight crew sets the thrust levers to FLX or TOGA, the aircraft reference symbol and the yaw bar (if the ILS is available) appear on the HUD. The yaw bar indicates the correction that the flight crew must apply to the rudder pedal, in order to move the aircraft to the runway centerline. The LOC deviation symbol indicates the position of the aircraft in relation to the runway centerline. The combination of both helps the flight crew perform an accurate takeoff roll. In the illustration below, the aircraft is on the left side of the runway centerline, and the yaw bar provides an order to go to the right side. The flight crew must use both the LOC deviation and the yaw bar to smoothly direct the aircraft to the runway centerline, in addition to the external parameters. Ident.: AS-HUD-GTAKE-00009701.0002001 / 08 JUL 19 ROTATION At takeoff, the flight crew must control the pitch and the pitch rate. On the HUD, when the aircraft is on ground, the visible field of view above the horizon line is approximately 5 °. Therefore, it is difficult for the flight crew to use the aircraft pitch symbol at rotation, because this pitch target (e.g. 12.5 °) is out of the flight crew’s field of view during the rotation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ AS-HUD P 11/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Initial Rotation As a result, at VR: ‐ The PF pulls the sidestick in order to rotate the aircraft, and controls the pitch and the pitch rate ‐ During the initial rotation, the PF adjusts the rotation rate ‐ Next, the PF looks for the FPV and its associated FPD, in order to adjust the flight path, as per SRS TO mode. The PF then stabilizes the aircraft on the initial climb segment. USE OF HUD FOR APPROACH Ident.: AS-HUD-00009696.0001001 / 01 MAR 17 Applicable to: ALL The HUD provides similar symbols for instrument and visual approaches. This is because for approaches, the same type of information helps the flight crew to stabilize the aircraft on: ‐ The final approach path (i.e. the published final approach path for XLS approaches, or the selected final approach path for VMC approaches) ‐ The lateral trajectory of the final approach, indicated either by a synthetic runway symbol, or the real runway when in view. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to G → AS-HUD P 12/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The flying technique for a visual approach is similar to the flying technique for an instrument approach. This explains why the IMC/VMC transition is smooth, when the flight crew uses the HUD. When transitioning from IMC to VMC, the real runway gradually appears through the HUD. The real runway should be superimposed by the synthetic runway symbol. In the case of crosswind, the drift effect naturally appears on the HUD: The synthetic (real) runway appears on the HUD in relation to the drift angle. For example, if there is crosswind that comes from the right side, the synthetic runway appears on the left of the HUD, when the aircraft is aligned on the centerline. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ AS-HUD P 13/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL DECLUTTER MODES Ident.: AS-HUD-00009697.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL The symbols provided on the HUD enable the PF to fly intermediate and final approaches using only the HUD. As a result, the HUD provides a full set of symbols (e.g. speed, altitude scales, FMA, etc) so that the flight crew can control the aircraft during these phases. However, when the aircraft approaches the terrain or the runway, it is important to improve the PF’s view of the external parameters through the HUD. For this purpose, the HUD provides a declutter mode, with two levels: ‐ Declutter mode level 1 enables the flight crew to remove the synthetic runway, the LOC axis, and the touchdown point or the FLS anchor point from the HUD. The declutter mode level 1 is recommended: • If the HUD LOC axis is not perpendicular to the horizon, when the aircraft is centered on the lateral deviation scale • For the visual acquisition of the real runway, after IMC/VMC transition. ‐ For stabilized approaches in VMC, declutter mode level 2 enables the flight crew to focus on external parameters, whilst using only basic trajectory, speed and altitude information on the HUD. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← G to H → AS-HUD P 14/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Without Declutter Mode Declutter Mode Level 1 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←H→ AS-HUD P 15/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Declutter Mode Level 2 CROSSWIND MODE Ident.: AS-HUD-00009698.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The aim of the crosswind mode is to clear the lateral borders of the field of view, so that the flight crew can fly the FPV without interfering with the speed and altitude scales. As a result, these scales are reduced in size on the HUD. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← H to I AS-HUD P 16/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL USE OF HUD FOR LANDING Ident.: AS-HUD-00009699.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL The HUD helps the PF to perform accurate landings, due to the fact that the stabilization of the final descent path is more accurate, as the aircraft approaches the touchdown point. The flight crew performs a conventional flare when using the HUD for landing: The flight crew uses external parameters, and looks through the HUD. The HUD does not provide flare guidance. However, the HUD displays arrows that temporarily pulse on the FPV, as “flare reminders”. Flare Reminder Landing Roll 350-941 FLEET FCTM J AS-HUD P 17/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS HUD 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-HUD P 18/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROW/ROP 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ROW/ROP Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-ROWROP-10-00021746.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 GENERAL Whatever the type of braking (autobrake or pedal braking), the flight crew must correctly configure ROW/ROP. The flight crew must set the appropriate runway condition, in order to get correct alerts. Even if the ROW will automatically detect the landing runway, the flight crew should correctly set the landing runway (runway selection, and runway shift if applicable) into the ANF in order to benefit from early awareness and the appropriate ROW line. Ident.: AS-ROWROP-10-00023990.0002001 / 01 MAR 17 OPERATING TECHNIQUES FROM DESCENT PREPARATION If the amber RWY TOO SHORT message is displayed on the ND, the flight crew selects an appropriate landing runway. FINAL APPROACH If the amber RWY TOO SHORT message is displayed on the PFD, the flight crew considers to perform a go-around. If the RWY TOO SHORT message is triggered on the PFD with the "RUNWAY TOO SHORT" aural alert, the flight crew must immediately perform a go-around. ON GROUND If the "BRAKE, MAX BRAKING, MAX BRAKING" aural alert is triggered, the flight crew must immediately: ‐ Apply and keep maximum pedal braking ‐ Apply and keep maximum reverse thrust. If the "SET MAX REVERSE" aural alert is triggered, the flight crew must immediately apply and keep maximum reverse thrust. If the "KEEP MAX REVERSE" aural alert is triggered, the flight crew must keep maximum reverse thrust as long as necessary. Below 70 kt, when the flight crew considers that the aircraft can stop on the runway and the message MAX REVERSE is no longer displayed on the PFD, the flight crew sets idle reverse thrust. Unless required due to an emergency, it is recommended to avoid the use of high level of reverse thrust at low speed in order to avoid engine stall and excessive EGT. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AS-ROWROP P 1/4 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROW/ROP 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-ROWROP-10-00021749.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 ABSENCE OF ROW LINE The absence of ROW line on the runway that is selected on the ANF indicates that the ROW/ROP does not prevent a runway overrun. In some cases, the ROW/ROP remains operative. Therefore, if a ROW/ROP alert is triggered, the flight crew must apply the associated procedure. Ident.: AS-ROWROP-10-00023363.0001001 / 01 MAR 17 RUNWAY CONDITION DEGRADED L2 The ROW/ROP system has the capability to automatically downgrade the selected runway condition. For more information about the system description, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-32-20-10 Runway Condition Degradation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ AS-ROWROP P 2/4 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROW/ROP 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL L1 In the case of a downgrade of the selected runway condition, the computed landing distance will increase and may trigger ROP alerts: ‐ If ROP alerts are triggered, the automatic downgrade of the selected runway condition may provide some additional safety net, as per the following examples: ‐ Early use of max reverse: On a runway with standing water, the runway friction at high speed is very low. If the selected runway condition is WET-5 and the real runway condition is WATER/SLUSH-2, the runway condition may automatically downgrade shortly after landing. This could occur before the flight crew sets max reverse, and may lead to early ROP alerts. These ROP alerts will require the flight crew to immediately set max reverse, and also to keep max reverse below 80 kt if necessary. ‐ Non-homogeneous runway friction: After an automatic runway condition degradation (e.g. ice patches over the runway) the selected runway condition cannot upgrade. Even if the runway friction improves along the runway the maximum braking is maintained during all the rollout. As a consequence, the aircraft performance will take advantage of every runway area where the friction is better. ‐ Icy runway: On a runway that is reported MEDIUM-3, and is currently POOR-1, due to aerodynamic braking, and the efficiency of the reverse thrust, the flight crew may feel a good deceleration just after landing. Without the automatic runway condition degradation, the flight crew cannot understand that the runway condition is worse than expected, and continue to believe that the braking action is medium. If the exit is at the runway end, the flight crew may disengage BRK MED or BTV CONTAM quite early. On icy runways, at low speed, the deceleration capability is very low, and the flight crew may understand too late that MAX BRAKING was required during all the landing roll. With the automatic runway condition degradation, the runway condition may automatically downgrade shortly after landing, and may trigger ROP alerts that will require maximum braking and maximum reverse during all the landing roll. ‐ If ROP alerts are not triggered, the system improves the flight crew awareness that the runway is more slippery than expected. the flight crew should vacate the runway and taxi with care. In the case of the use of BTV or BTV CONTAM, the exit may be missed, and the flight crew will be informed in due time. The flight crew shall not use the system to confirm and report the runway condition / braking action. The system is not a measurement system, and activates only when the antiskid is active. Therefore the absence of automatic degradation of the selected runway condition does not indicate that the initial selected runway condition was correct. Even if the actual runway condition is less than selected, there will be no cockpit effect if the antiskid does not activate. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ AS-ROWROP P 3/4 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROW/ROP 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-ROWROP-10-00022213.0001001 / 03 NOV 16 APPROACHING RUNWAY END The ROP function takes into account the LDA of the detected runway (shortened by the flight crew in the case of a NOTAM that affects the LDA) and its associated end of runway, in order to compute the ROP alerts with adequate margins. The ROP does not take into account the airport layout, and expects that the aircraft will decelerate with a minimum rate before it vacates at the runway end. In pedal braking, the flight crew should ensure a minimum deceleration rate and reach a ground speed below 30 kt when the aircraft approaches the end of the runway. ROP Prediction 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A AS-ROWROP P 4/4 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS RUDDER 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AS-RUD-00021694.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL In flight, the rudder controls the yaw, and the vertical stabilizer ensures directional stability. The rudder and the vertical stabilizer are designed to: ‐ Provide sufficient lateral/directional control of the aircraft during crosswind takeoffs and landings, within the certified crosswind limits ‐ Provide aircraft control in the case of an engine failure, and maximum asymmetric thrust, at any speed above the minimum control speed on ground (VMCG). The flight control computers give orders to actuate the rudder. Primary (PRIM) and Secondary (SEC) computers provide: ‐ Yaw control ‐ Yaw damping ‐ Rudder travel limitation. For more information about yaw control, Refer to FCOM/DSC-27-10-10 Flight Control System OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS Ident.: AS-RUD-00021695.0001001 / 31 MAR 17 Applicable to: ALL In order to avoid excessive structural loads on the rudder and on the vertical stabilizer, the flight crew must apply the following operational recommendations. THE RUDDER IS DESIGNED TO CONTROL THE AIRCRAFT, IN THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS A. IN NORMAL OPERATIONS, FOR LATERAL CONTROL ‐ During the takeoff roll, when on the ground, particularly in crosswind conditions ‐ During landing flare with crosswind, for decrab purposes ‐ During the landing roll, when on the ground. In the above situations, large and even rapid rudder inputs may be necessary in order to maintain control of the aircraft. The flight crew should always apply the rudder corrections as necessary, in order to obtain the appropriate aircraft response. On Airbus aircraft, when in flight, the rudder control system includes a turn coordination function, in order to achieve acceptable turn coordination. B. TO COUNTERACT THRUST ASYMMETRY Up to full rudder deflection can be used to compensate for the yawing moments that are due to asymmetric thrust. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → AS-RUD P 1/2 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS RUDDER 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: At high speeds, thrust asymmetry (e.g. due to an engine failure) does not have a significant effect on the yaw control of the aircraft. The rudder deflection required to counter an engine failure and center the sideslip is small. C. IN SOME OTHER ABNORMAL SITUATIONS The flight crew may also use the rudder pedals in some abnormal situations. For example: ‐ Rudder trim runaway: the flight crew uses the rudder pedals in order to return them to neutral ‐ Landing with an abnormal landing gear position, or asymmetric braking: the flight crew uses the rudder pedals for directional control on the ground. In all of the normal or abnormal situations that are described above, correct rudder pedal use does not affect the structural integrity of the aircraft. THE RUDDER SHOULD NOT BE USED ‐ To introduce roll ‐ To counter roll, induced by any type of turbulence. CAUTION Regardless of the airborne flight condition, and whatever the speed, the flight crew must not apply sudden, full or almost full, opposite rudder pedal inputs. These inputs can induce loads that are above the defined limit loads, and can result in structural damage or failure. The rudder travel limitation is not designed to prevent structural damage or failure in the event of such rudder system inputs. For dutch roll, the flight control laws combined with the natural aircraft damping are sufficient to correctly damp the dutch roll oscillations. Therefore, the flight crew should not use the rudder pedals in order to complement the flight control laws. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B AS-RUD P 2/2 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TCAS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRUDER CLASSIFICATION Ident.: AS-TCAS-00009676.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL Intruder Display on ND No threat traffic, or other Proximate Traffic Advisory (TA) (1) Type of Collision Threat No threat Consider as no threat Audio Indicator - - Possible threat "TRAFFIC" Flight Crew Response AP/FD TCAS AP/FD TCAS AP/FD TCAS not available without AP with AP - - No evasive maneuver. - - Monitor AP/FD TCAS mode arming. No evasive maneuver. Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AS-TCAS P 1/4 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TCAS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intruder Resolution Advisory (RA) Continued from the previous page Flight Crew Response Type of Display on ND Audio Collision AP/FD TCAS AP/FD TCAS AP/FD TCAS (1) Indicator Threat not available without AP with AP Collision threat Preventive (e.g. Do not alter Follow the FDs. Monitor V/S MONITOR V/S) the flight path. Monitor V/S remains out of Maintain V/S out remains out of red area. (2) red area. of red area. (2) Corrective (e.g. Smoothly and CLIMB) firmly (0.25 g) follow the green area of the V/S scale within 5 s. Smoothly and firmly follow the FDs. Monitor V/S gets out of red area, and remains in green area. Monitor V/S gets out of red area, and remains in green area. Smoothly and firmly follow the FDs. Monitor V/S gets out of red area, and remains in green area. Monitor V/S gets out of red area, and remains in green area. (2) (2) Corrective (e.g. CLIMB NOW or INCREASE CLIMB) Smoothly and firmly (0.35 g) follow the green area of the V/S scale within 2.5 s. (2) (2) (1) For aircraft equipped with the ADS-B TRAFFIC, the TCAS symbol is superimposed on the aircraft symbol when the TRAFF pb is pressed on the EFIS CP. (2) In AP/FD TCAS mode, the load factor authority of the guidance law is increased. OPERATING TECHNIQUES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-TCAS-80-1-00009672.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 GENERAL In all cases, the flight crew must always follow the TCAS RA orders, even if: ‐ The TCAS RA orders disagree with the ATC instructions ‐ It results in flying above the maximum ceiling altitude with “CLIMB, CLIMB” or “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” TCAS RA orders ‐ It results in crossing the altitude of the intruder. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → AS-TCAS P 2/4 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TCAS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-TCAS-80-1-00009674.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 The AP/FD TCAS mode optimizes the vertical speed for a rapid and appropriate response to an RA, and minimizes the deviation from the latest ATC clearance. If the TCAS generates a TA, or an RA, the flight crew should use the AP/FD TCAS mode, and apply the associated memory procedure. TCAS SELECTION L2 L1 NORM is the default selection. The flight crew may select another mode depending on the situation. For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-SURV-40-10 TCAS Display Selection. TRAFFIC ADVISORY If a TA is triggered, the flight crew should check the immediate arming of the AP/FD TCAS mode, and the engagement status of the AP and A/THR. For more information on the TA procedure, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-SURV [MEM] TCAS CAUTION - TRAFFIC ADVISORY. If the AP/FD TCAS mode does not immediately arm, the flight crew must be prepared to disconnect the AP in the case of an RA, and manually follow the TCAS guidances. RESOLUTION ADVISORY AP/FD TCAS MODE AVAILABLE When an RA is triggered and the AP/FD TCAS mode is available: ‐ If the PF uses the HUD , the PF must refer to the PFD ‐ If the AP is engaged, the flight crew should keep it ON ‐ If the AP is not engaged, the flight crew can engage the AP ‐ If any “CLIMB” audio indicator sounds during the final approach, the flight crew should first apply the AP/FD TCAS procedure. When clear of conflict, depending on the situation, they can consider a go-around. For more information on the RA procedure, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-SURV [MEM] TCAS WARNING - RESOLUTION ADVISORY. AP/FD TCAS MODE NOT AVAILABLE For more information, Refer to PIR Risks related to System Operations/Failures. When an RA is triggered and the AP/FD TCAS mode is not available, the flight crew must manually fly the TCAS RA. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-TCAS P 3/4 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TCAS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The flight crew must disconnect the FD as soon as the AP is disconnected, in order to: ‐ Ensure that the A/THR is in SPEED/MACH mode ‐ Avoid possible confusion between FD orders, and TCAS audio indicators and vertical speed orders. The PM monitors the evasive maneuver and does not attempt to see the intruder(s) because: • The relevant intruder(s) may be difficult to identify, and • The relative position of the intruder(s) may be difficult to assess. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B AS-TCAS P 4/4 08 AUG 19 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AS-VD-00009679.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The main objectives of Vertical Display (VD) is to enhance flight crew awareness of the vertical situation by: ‐ Collecting existing information in the same place, to provide a synthetic view of various parameters with their relative position ‐ Providing a situational assessment about the current and future aircraft position in relation to: • Safe altitudes (check that the flight path is compliant) • Terrain (check the altitude constraints versus the terrain) • Weather information (anticipate changes caused by weather). VERTICAL CUT Ident.: AS-VD-00009680.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL In normal operations (aircraft in NAV mode and on its F-PLN, or in HDG/TRACK mode), in ARC and ROSE-NAV modes, and provided that the flight crew did not pull the VD AZIM knob, the vertical cut is along the ND green solid line. There are few exceptions to this rule. These cases are indicated by the VIEW ALONG ACFT TRK message that appears on the lower part of the VD. Safety altitudes, terrain, and weather data are displayed along this vertical cut. VERTICAL CUT AND TRAJECTORY ACCORDING TO AP/FD MODES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-VD-2-00009682.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 MANAGED MODE Vertical cut: Solid line: Dotted line: Grey area: 350-941 FLEET FCTM Along the green solid line of the ND, i.e. the FMS flight plan. Vertical F-PLN until AFS CP altitude. Vertical F-PLN above AFS CP altitude. Identifies the next turning point in the vertical plan. A to C → AS-VD P 1/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-VD-2-00009685.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 SELECTED MODE Vertical cut: Solid line: 350-941 FLEET FCTM Along the green solid line of the ND, i.e. the current track. Selected trajectory. ←C→ AS-VD P 2/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: AS-VD-2-00009686.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 LATERAL MANAGED, VERTICAL SELECTED MODES Vertical cut: Solid line: Dotted line: 350-941 FLEET FCTM Along the green solid line of the ND, i.e. the FMS flight plan. Laterally managed/vertically selected trajectory. Vertical FMS F-PLN. ←C→ AS-VD P 3/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SAFETY ALTITUDE AND TERRAIN Applicable to: ALL Ident.: AS-VD-1-00009683.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 GENERAL The VD improves the vertical situational awareness of the flight crew in relation to the safety altitudes (i.e. MORA and MSA) and the terrain. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → AS-VD P 4/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL On the VD, the terrain information is considered to be secondary to the safe altitudes. However, this information is necessary and complementary to the safe altitudes, particularly when the flight crew flies the aircraft below the safe altitudes, because it makes any potential hazard visible. The display of safety altitudes enables the flight crew to anticipate hazardous situations for midand long-term flight planning. The VD is not designed for short-term use (e.g. for flying/guidance). The flight crew should be aware that the use of approved charts (i.e. electronic or paper charts) remains the primary source of information for safe altitudes, because VD data is not certified data. Ident.: AS-VD-1-00009687.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 SAFETY ALTITUDE DEFINITION Both the ND and the VD provide safety altitude information. The MSA information is based on the FMS database, and provides at least 1 000 ft of obstacle clearance within a 25 nm radius. The MORA information is the grid MORA based on the FMS database. However, the MORA value displayed on the ND and the VD may be different, because the calculation assumptions are different: ‐ The ND displays the max MORA around the aircraft within a 40 nm fixed radius ‐ The VD displays the MORA and the MSA along the flight path (i.e. along the F-PLN when in NAV mode, or along the track when in HDG/TRACK mode), in a corridor linked to the RNP value, within the VD range. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ AS-VD P 5/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Recommendations: ‐ Along a new path, check the MORA/MSA on the VD ‐ Before deviating, check the MORA on the ND and crosscheck with charts, to detect if the hazard is currently on the intended path. Ident.: AS-VD-1-00009688.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 TERRAIN The height of the aircraft above the terrain displayed on the VD is geometrically correct and does not vary with the altimeter setting. The flight crew must be aware that the vertical range of the VD depends on the lateral selected range (the ratio is fixed). As a result, at high altitude, if the flight crew selects a shorter range, the terrain below the aircraft may disappear. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ AS-VD P 6/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D AS-VD P 7/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS VERTICAL DISPLAY 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-VD P 8/8 22 MAY 17 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: AS-WXR-00009689.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION This section provides information on the use of the weather radar system. To obtain more information on the characteristics, limitations, and operational recommendations about the weather radar, refer to the user guide of the radar manufacturer. Safe operation in convective weather requires good knowledge of meteorology, particularly on the formation, development, and characteristics of convective clouds in different regions of the world. This manual includes some general recommendations on the aircraft operation in areas of convective weather (Refer to AS-WXR Operations in Convective Weather). WEATHER RADAR PRINCIPLE Weather detection is based on the reflectivity of water droplets. The weather echo is displayed on the ND and the VD with a color scale that goes from green (low reflectivity) to red (high reflectivity). The intensity of the weather echo is associated with the size, composition, and quantity of water droplets (e.g. the reflectivity of a water droplet is five times more than that of an ice particle of the same size). The weather radar does not detect weather that has small particles (e.g. clouds or fog), or that does not have particles at all (e.g. clear air turbulence). Global Principle of the Weather Radar The purpose of the weather radar is to help the flight crew to identify, and if necessary to avoid areas of convective clouds (e.g. cumulonimbus) and/or “wet” turbulence. Due to the fact that convective clouds can have a large vertical expansion, their reflectivity depends on the altitude. The quantity of liquid water in the atmosphere decreases with the altitude. Therefore, the reflectivity of a convective cloud decreases with altitude. The upper detection limit of the weather radar is referred to as the radar top. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ AS-WXR P 1/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The flight crew must be aware of both the following: • The radar top may not be the visible top of the convective cloud • The convective cloud and associated areas of threat (e.g. turbulence) may significantly extend above the radar top. Turbulence area DISPLAY MODES AND FUNCTIONS Ident.: AS-WXR-00009690.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Criteria: XW Applicable to: B-0001 The flight crew can select the following modes, in order to display the data on the ND, and the VD. AUTO When the flight crew selects the AUTO mode (default mode), the weather is displayed along the flight path of the aircraft. On the ND, the weather is displayed along the vertical FMS flight plan, or, if not available, along a flight path based on the current FPA. The WXR considers a vertical envelope, in order to differentiate: ‐ The on-path weather that will be encountered by the aircraft ‐ The off-path weather that will not be encountered by the aircraft, and that is displayed with reduced intensity and black parallel lines. This vertical envelope is defined as indicated on the following schematic. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → AS-WXR P 2/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: ‐ Resulting from this vertical envelope, it must be highlighted that, when the aircraft flies at high altitude (i.e. above 30 000 ft), some weather can be displayed on-path, even if it is located well below the flight path. The flight crew can use the VD to assess the altitude of the weather, compared to the flight path. ‐ The WXR may not be able to discriminate the on-path and the off-path weather at ranges above 160 nm, because of the angle of the antenna beam width. Therefore, the flight crew should not decide a diversion based on on-path weather located more than 160 nm ahead the aircraft. On the VD, the weather is displayed along the zero width vertical cut. For more information on the vertical cut, Refer to AS-VD Vertical Cut. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-WXR P 3/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ELEVN/TILT The flight crew can select these modes by using the SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page of the MFD. For weather analysis, ELEVN or TILT mode enables the ND to display the weather: ‐ At an altitude selected by the flight crew ‐ At a tilt angle selected by the flight crew. Note: The flight crew must return to the AUTO mode, when they have completed the analysis. AZIM The flight crew can select this mode by using the SURV panel. The AZIM mode enables to display the weather on the VD, along a selected azimuth. It should be used to prepare a diversion. The WXR automatically returns to AUTO after 30 s, if the flight crew does not select any azimuth value. GAIN The gain control is mostly used in AUTO. The flight crew can select the manual mode by using the SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page of the MFD. The detection or evaluation of cells will always start in the AUTO mode. However, the gain may be manually tuned to detect the strongest part of a cell displayed in red on the ND. If the flight crew slowly reduces the gain value, the red areas (level 3 return) will slowly become yellow areas (level 2 return), and the yellow areas will become green areas (level 1). The last part of the cell that becomes yellow is the strongest area. The gain must then be reset to AUTO when the flight crew has completed the analysis. TURB FUNCTION Turbulence detection (TURB) function mode is selected by default (AUTO on the MFD SURV page). The TURB function displays wet turbulence up to 40 nm in front of the aircraft. It is not affected by the gain. The TURB function should be used in order to isolate turbulence from precipitation. PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR (PWS) FUNCTION Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 General. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-WXR P 4/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL DISPLAY MODES AND FUNCTIONS Ident.: AS-WXR-00009690.0002001 / 03 SEP 19 Criteria: L43587, XW Applicable to: B-0002 The flight crew can select the following modes, in order to display the data on the ND, and the VD. AUTO When the flight crew selects the AUTO mode (default mode), the weather is displayed along the flight path of the aircraft. On the ND, the weather is displayed along the vertical FMS flight plan, or, if not available, along a flight path based on the current FPA. The WXR considers a vertical envelope, in order to differentiate: ‐ The on-path weather that will be encountered by the aircraft ‐ The off-path weather that will not be encountered by the aircraft, and that is displayed with reduced intensity and black parallel lines. For more information about the on-path envelope boundaries, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-SURV-30-10 On Path Envelope Boundaries Definition. Note: The WXR may not be able to discriminate the on-path and the off-path weather at ranges above 160 nm, because of the angle of the antenna beam width. Therefore, the flight crew should not decide a diversion based on on-path weather located more than 160 nm ahead the aircraft. On the VD, the weather is displayed along the zero width vertical cut. For more information on the vertical cut, Refer to AS-VD Vertical Cut. ELEVN/TILT The flight crew can select these modes by using the SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page of the MFD. For weather analysis, ELEVN or TILT mode enables the ND to display the weather: ‐ At an altitude selected by the flight crew ‐ At a tilt angle selected by the flight crew. Note: The flight crew must return to the AUTO mode, when they have completed the analysis. AZIM The flight crew can select this mode by using the SURV panel. The AZIM mode enables to display the weather on the VD, along a selected azimuth. It should be used to prepare a diversion. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ AS-WXR P 5/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The WXR automatically returns to AUTO after 30 s, if the flight crew does not select any azimuth value. GAIN The gain control is mostly used in AUTO. The flight crew can select the manual mode by using the SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page of the MFD. The detection or evaluation of cells will always start in the AUTO mode. However, the gain may be manually tuned to detect the strongest part of a cell displayed in red on the ND. If the flight crew slowly reduces the gain value, the red areas (level 3 return) will slowly become yellow areas (level 2 return), and the yellow areas will become green areas (level 1). The last part of the cell that becomes yellow is the strongest area. The gain must then be reset to AUTO when the flight crew has completed the analysis. TURB FUNCTION Turbulence detection (TURB) function mode is selected by default (AUTO on the MFD SURV page). The TURB function displays wet turbulence up to 40 nm in front of the aircraft. It is not affected by the gain. The TURB function should be used in order to isolate turbulence from precipitation. PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR (PWS) FUNCTION Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 General. USE OF THE WEATHER RADAR Ident.: AS-WXR-00024236.0001001 / 06 NOV 19 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL INFORMATION ON MODES The PF and the PM can independently manage their own weather radar display. For a description of the radar modes, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-SURV-30-10 Overview. The AUTO mode is the default mode of the weather radar. The AUTO mode is adapted and optimized for all flight phases. The flight crew can temporarily use the manual modes if needed, depending on the operational context. When the weather radar is in manual mode, the flight crew can always revert to the AUTO mode. To do this, they should push all the knob-selectors that are on the SURV. Instead, they can press the DEFAULT SETTINGS pb that is on the MFD SURV/CONTROLS page. By default, the TURB mode should be AUTO. The flight crew can temporarily turn off the TURB function to better differentiate precipitations from wet turbulence when the ND displays a lot of visual information. After analysis of the weather echo, the flight crew should set the TURB function back to AUTO. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → AS-WXR P 6/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL RANGE MANAGEMENT The “Blind Alley” effect occurs when the use of a low ND range hides weather on the flight path. As a result, the flight path may appear to be safe, while it may not be (refer to the following illustration). Blind Alley Effect In addition, at a long distance ahead of the aircraft, the accuracy of the weather echo is low, due to both of the following: ‐ The increase in the width of the weather radar beam ‐ Signal attenuation. Therefore, the accuracy of the weather echo is higher for short-distance weather. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 7/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Accuracy of the Weather Radar Display To avoid the “Blind Alley” effect and to correctly detect the weather, the flight crew should use a combination of both low and high ND ranges: ‐ A high ND range provides the flight crew with a long-term vision, for strategic anticipation ‐ A low ND range provides the flight crew with a short-term vision that is more precise, and can help with a detailed analysis. As a result, the use of two different ND ranges on PF and PM sides provides enhanced awareness on the situation. INTERPRETATION OF THE WEATHER DISPLAYED ON THE ND AND THE VD The reflectivity of a convective cloud does not always correspond to its danger. The following two cases are examples: ‐ When there is a high percentage of humidity in the atmosphere, thermal convection may generate clouds that are full of water. These clouds have a high reflectivity, but are not often dangerous ‐ Specific converging winds may produce large-scale uplifts of dry air (e.g. in equatorial overland areas). These convective clouds may be very dangerous, but due to low reflectivity, they can be more difficult to detect. The analysis of shapes combined to colours (instead of colours only) provides a more reliable indication on the severity of a convective cloud. Different colours next to one another usually indicate zones of severe turbulence. Some specific shapes (such as the ones displayed below) are also good indicators of severe hail and are usually associated with strong vertical drafts. Shapes that quickly change also indicate significant weather activity. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 8/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Typical Weather Shapes In order to analyze the weather echo with increased precision, the flight crew can use manual gain. Manual gain mode adjusts the sensitivity of the weather display on the ND. Therefore, the weather echo will appear either stronger (increased gain) or weaker (decreased gain). During operation in heavy rain, the weather radar display may be saturated. If the display becomes saturated, the flight crew should consider the manual reduction of the gain to identify the areas of heaviest precipitation in the convective cloud. The flight crew can also increase the gain in order to: ‐ Improve the accuracy of the weather echo at a long distance: the use of manual gain may compensate for the increase of the width of the radar beam and for the signal attenuation, which both depend on the distance ‐ Obtain a clearer display of the top of a convective cloud (that contains less reflective ice particles). Note: After analysis of the weather echo, the flight crew must set the gain mode back to AUTO. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 9/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Use of the Manual Gain Mode ATTENUATION EFFECT For areas of heavy precipitation, the zone behind the precipitation causes a lower weather echo and may appear as a green or black area, referred to as a “storm shadow”. Long-distance weather or ground echoes can help the flight crew to identify areas of heavy precipitation. The weather hazard prediction function (if installed) is able to detect areas of severe signal attenuation with the use of the Rain Echo Attenuation Compensation Technique (REACT). For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-SURV-30-10 Weather Hazard Prediction Function (If Installed). The flight crew should always consider a black hole behind a red area as an indication that this area may be very active. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 10/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Attenuation Effect RADAR INTERFERENCE External sources of high-power emissions that operate at a frequency next to the frequency of the weather radar may cause interference. This interference may generate a weather echo in the form of a thin triangle that extends toward the source of the interference. The width and color of the interference may be different between the ND and the VD, depending on the distance to the source and its strength. This interference does not damage the weather radar, and will disappear from the ND as soon as the source of interference is outside the limit of the radar scan zone. Radar Interference 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 11/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL USE OF THE MANUAL ELEVN MODE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL EXPANSION In order to analyze a detected convective cloud, the flight crew should assess its vertical expansion. The flight crew should use the VD to assess this expansion and to interpret the corresponding altitude (or flight level) of the convective cloud displayed on the left side of the VD. In addition, the flight crew can use the manual ELEVN mode to assess with increased precision the expansion of the convective cloud on the ND. Note: In AUTO mode, off-path weather is displayed on ND with black parallel lines (Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-SURV-30-20 ND). If the ND displays an off-path weather with yellow, red or magenta colour, the flight crew should perform a detailed analysis of the corresponding convective cell. Assessment of the Vertical Expansion of a Convective Cloud USE OF THE MANUAL AZIM MODE FOR AVOIDANCE PLANNING To assess the general weather conditions in the case of a course change, the flight crew can use the manual AZIM mode. In manual AZIM mode, the VD displays a vertical view along the selected course. Note: The weather radar automatically reverts to the AUTO mode after 30 s, if the flight crew does not select any AZIM value. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ AS-WXR P 12/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Manual AZIM Mode 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C AS-WXR P 13/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL OPERATIONS IN CONVECTIVE WEATHER Ident.: AS-WXR-00024237.0001001 / 06 NOV 19 Applicable to: ALL OPERATIONS IN CONVECTIVE WEATHER The flight crew should apply the following operational recommendations in convective weather conditions. These recommendations are applicable in addition to basic knowledge of meteorology and of operation in adverse weather conditions. ‐ Weather detection: • Always consider that a convective cloud may be dangerous, even if the weather echo is weak. Remember that the weather radar detects only water droplets • Frequent lightning may indicate an area with high probability of severe turbulence • Remember that the TURB function detects areas of wet turbulence only. ‐ Avoidance detection: • Establish an “area of greatest threat” based on the location and shape of the strongest weather radar echoes, and on the meteorological knowledge of the flight crew. This “area of greatest threat” corresponds to the zone where the flight crew estimates that the weather conditions are too dangerous to fly in • The weather hazard prediction function (if installed) indicates zones with a high probability of weather hazards (hail or lightning). Avoidance of the detected weather always has priority over avoidance of the weather hazards. As a priority, apply the recommendations to avoid storms, and avoid hazard areas as much as possible • Initiate your avoidance maneuver as early as possible. As the aircraft gets nearer to the convective weather zone, the information from the weather radar often becomes partial. Consider a minimum distance of 40 NM from the convective cloud to make the decision for avoidance maneuver. ‐ Avoidance technique: • If possible, perform lateral avoidance instead of vertical avoidance. Vertical avoidance is in general not recommended, particularly at high altitude, due to the reduction of buffet and performance margins. In addition, some convective clouds may have a significant and unpredictable build-up speed. • Lateral avoidance: ▪ If possible, deviate upwind instead of downwind. Usually, there is less turbulence and hail upwind of a convective cloud ▪ If possible, avoid the identified “area of greatest threat” by at least 20 NM ▪ Apply an additional margin if the convective clouds are very dynamic • Vertical avoidance: 350-941 FLEET FCTM D→ AS-WXR P 14/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ▪ Avoid flying below a convective cloud, even in visual conditions, due to possible severe turbulence, windshear, microbursts, lightning strikes and hail. If an aircraft must fly below a convective cloud, the flight crew should take into account all indications (visual judgement, weather radar, weather report, pilot’s report, etc.) before they take the final decision ▪ For flight above a convective cloud, apply a vertical margin of 5 000 ft from the identified “area of greatest threat”. Summary of the margins and distances ICE CRYSTALS Ident.: AS-WXR-00024233.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL Clouds are made of particles of water that can be either liquid or solid. Ice crystals are very small solid water particles. In some areas, there may be a very high concentration of ice crystals that may have adverse effect on the aircraft. Areas of ice crystals are usually next to, or above the core of convective clouds that have high-intensity precipitation. However, areas of ice crystals may sometimes even be several nautical miles away from the core of the associated convective cloud. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to E → AS-WXR P 15/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL When ice crystals get in contact with a hot surface, they melt. Depending on the type of surface, a water film may appear. On the windshield, this water film creates not-expected appearance of “rain” at temperatures too low for liquid water to exist. If there is a specific airflow towards a zone of the aircraft where water can build up, accretion may occur and create a block of ice. This is why flight in areas of ice crystals may result in various effects, for example engine vibrations, engine power loss, engine damage, or icing of air data probes. DETECTION OF ICE CRYSTALS Ice crystals are difficult to detect with the weather radar, because their reflectivity is very low due to both their small size and solid state. In addition, in areas of ice crystals, the flight crew should not expect significant icing of the airframe. This is because ice crystals bounce off cold aircraft surfaces. This is why even the ice detection system does not detect ice crystals, because ice crystals do not build up on ice detectors and visual ice indicators. However, areas of ice crystals are usually associated with visible moisture. Ice crystals can be indicated by one or more of the following: ‐ Appearance of rain on the windshield at temperatures too low for rain to exist. This “rain” is usually associated with a “Shhhh” noise ‐ Small accumulation of ice particles on wipers ‐ Smell of ozone or Saint Elmo’s fire ‐ Aircraft TAT indication that remains near 0 °C (due to freezing of the TAT probe) ‐ Light to moderate turbulence in IMC at high altitude ‐ No significant radar echo at high aircraft altitude, combined with: • High-intensity precipitation that appears below the aircraft, or • Aircraft position downwind of a very active convective cloud. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ AS-WXR P 16/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Isolated continental thunderstorm Mesoscale convective cloud OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICE CRYSTALS If possible, the flight crew should avoid flight into areas that have a high concentration of ice crystals. The following recommendations apply: ‐ Use the weather radar: • Identify areas that have a strong echo, and perform a detailed analysis of the structure of the convective clouds. • If necessary, use the weather radar manual modes for a more precise analysis. • Pay particular attention to strong echoes below the aircraft and to downwind areas. ‐ To avoid convective clouds, comply with operational recommendations (Refer to AS-WXR Operations in Convective Weather), particularly: • Prefer lateral to vertical avoidance • Comply with the avoidance margins • Deviate upwind instead of downwind. If the aircraft encounters ice crystals precipitation despite avoidance action, and if this results in engines or probes misbehaviors, the published procedures and recommendations apply, and in particular: ‐ ECAM alerts related to engine failure or engine stall ‐ ECAM alerts related to probe failure ‐ Not-sensed procedures such as the ones linked to unreliable airspeed indication, engine vibrations, engine relight in flight etc. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E AS-WXR P 17/18 07 JAN 20 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WEATHER RADAR 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM AS-WXR P 18/18 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES Intentionally left blank PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PR-NP Normal Procedures PR-NP-10 General General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Communication........................................................................................................................................................ B Clean Cockpit.......................................................................................................................................................... C PR-NP-SOP Standard Operating Procedures PR-NP-SOP-40 Preliminary Cockpit Preparation Fire Test/APU Start................................................................................................................................................. A OIS Preparation....................................................................................................................................................... B PR-NP-SOP-50 Exterior Walkaround Exterior Walkaround................................................................................................................................................ A PR-NP-SOP-60 Cockpit Preparation FMS Preparation......................................................................................................................................................A Takeoff Briefing........................................................................................................................................................B PR-NP-SOP-70 Before Pushback or Start Takeoff Data............................................................................................................................................................ A Seating Position and Adjustment of Rudder Pedals............................................................................................... B PR-NP-SOP-90 After Start ENG START Selector..............................................................................................................................................A PR-NP-SOP-100 Taxi External Taxi Aid Camera System .................................................................................................................A Airport Navigation.................................................................................................................................................... B Brakes...................................................................................................................................................................... C Flight Controls..........................................................................................................................................................D Taxi Roll and Steering.............................................................................................................................................E 180 degrees Turn on Runway.................................................................................................................................F Last Data Changes Before Takeoff........................................................................................................................ G Takeoff Briefing Confirmation..................................................................................................................................H ADIRS Alignment...................................................................................................................................................... I PR-NP-SOP-110 Before Takeoff Packs........................................................................................................................................................................A Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 1/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL PR-NP-SOP-120 Takeoff TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued from the previous page Thrust Setting...........................................................................................................................................................A Takeoff Roll..............................................................................................................................................................B Rotation Technique..................................................................................................................................................C Tail strike Avoidance............................................................................................................................................... D Slats/Flaps Retraction at Heavy Weight..................................................................................................................E Low Altitude Level Off............................................................................................................................................. F Noise Abatement Takeoff........................................................................................................................................G PR-NP-SOP-140 Climb Initial Climb.............................................................................................................................................................. A Climb Thrust.............................................................................................................................................................B Small Altitude Changes........................................................................................................................................... C Speed Considerations............................................................................................................................................. D Vertical Performance Predictions............................................................................................................................ E Vertical Display........................................................................................................................................................ F Lateral Navigation....................................................................................................................................................G PR-NP-SOP-150 Cruise FMS Use.................................................................................................................................................................. A Cost Index................................................................................................................................................................B Speed Considerations............................................................................................................................................. C Speed Decay during Cruise.................................................................................................................................... D Altitude Considerations............................................................................................................................................ E Step Climb................................................................................................................................................................F Fuel Temperature.................................................................................................................................................... G PR-NP-SOP-160 Descent Preparation Landing Performance...............................................................................................................................................A Content of a Landing Performance Data Crosscheck.............................................................................................B Brake oxidation........................................................................................................................................................ C Approach Preparation..............................................................................................................................................D Approach Briefing.................................................................................................................................................... E PR-NP-SOP-170 Descent Computation Principle..............................................................................................................................................A Guidance and Monitoring........................................................................................................................................ B PR-NP-SOP-180 Holding Holding Speed and Configuration........................................................................................................................... A In the Holding Pattern............................................................................................................................................. B Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 2/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PR-NP-SOP-190 Approach PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN General Continued from the previous page Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A Cold Weather Operations........................................................................................................................................ B Approach Speed Technique....................................................................................................................................C Discontinued Approach............................................................................................................................................D PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Configuration Management Initial Approach........................................................................................................................................................ A Intermediate Approach.............................................................................................................................................B Final Approach.........................................................................................................................................................C PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI Guidance Management Initial Approach........................................................................................................................................................ A Intermediate Approach.............................................................................................................................................B Final Approach.........................................................................................................................................................C PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA Specificities - Approach with Vertical Selected Guidance Particular Cases.......................................................................................................................................................A Initial Approach........................................................................................................................................................ B Intermediate Approach............................................................................................................................................ C Final Approach.........................................................................................................................................................D PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS Specificities - FLS General.....................................................................................................................................................................A FLS Principle............................................................................................................................................................B FLS Function Use....................................................................................................................................................C LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C Approach................................................................................................... D PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS Specificities - ILS ILS Raw Data.......................................................................................................................................................... A G/S Interception from Above...................................................................................................................................B PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO Specificities - Low Visibility Operations General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Flight Preparation.....................................................................................................................................................B Approach Preparation..............................................................................................................................................C Approach Procedure................................................................................................................................................D Failure and Associated Actions............................................................................................................................... E ILS Autoland in CAT I or Better Weather Conditions..............................................................................................F Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 3/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG Specificities - Radius-to-Fix (RF) Legs Continued from the previous page Radius-to-Fix (RF) Legs.......................................................................................................................................... A PR-NP-SOP-200 Circling Approach Circling..................................................................................................................................................................... A PR-NP-SOP-205 Visual Approach Visual Approach.......................................................................................................................................................A Intermediate/Final Approach....................................................................................................................................B PR-NP-SOP-210 Go-Around General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Consideration About Go-Around..............................................................................................................................B AP/FD Go-Around Phase Activation....................................................................................................................... C Go-Around Phase.................................................................................................................................................... D Leaving the Go-Around Phase................................................................................................................................E PR-NP-SOP-220 Landing Transition to Visual References.............................................................................................................................. A Flare and Touchdown..............................................................................................................................................B Rollout...................................................................................................................................................................... C Deceleration............................................................................................................................................................. D Tail Strike Avoidance...............................................................................................................................................E PR-NP-SOP-230 After Landing Brake Temperature.................................................................................................................................................. A PR-NP-SP Supplementary Procedures PR-NP-SP-10 Adverse Weather PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 Cold Weather Operations and Icing Conditions General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Preliminary Cockpit Preparation.............................................................................................................................. B Exterior Inspection................................................................................................................................................... C Aircraft Deicing/Anti-Icing on Ground......................................................................................................................D After Start.................................................................................................................................................................E Taxi-Out....................................................................................................................................................................F Takeoff..................................................................................................................................................................... G In Flight....................................................................................................................................................................H Landing...................................................................................................................................................................... I Taxi-in....................................................................................................................................................................... J Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 4/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 Windshear TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued from the previous page General.....................................................................................................................................................................A Operational Recommendations............................................................................................................................... B PR-NP-SP-10-10-3 Weather Turbulence Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A Use of the Radar..................................................................................................................................................... B Procedure.................................................................................................................................................................C Considerations On Clear Air Turbulence (CAT)..................................................................................................... D Miscellaneous...........................................................................................................................................................E PR-NP-SP-10-10-4 Wake Turbulence Wake Turbulence.....................................................................................................................................................A PR-NP-SP-10-10-5 Volcanic Ash, Sand, or Dust Volcanic Ash, Sand or Dust.................................................................................................................................... A PR-NP-SP-20 Engine Start Manual Engine Start................................................................................................................................................ A PR-NP-SP-30 Green Operating Procedures Green Operating Procedures.................................................................................................................................. A PR-NP-SP-40 Touch and Go Touch and Go..........................................................................................................................................................A PR-NP-SP-50 Stop and Go Stop and Go............................................................................................................................................................ A PR-AEP Abnormal and Emergency Procedures PR-AEP-GEN General Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A PR-AEP-AUTOFLT AUTO FLT Auto FLT FMS 1+2 Fault........................................................................................................................................ A Auto FLT EFIS/AFS CTL PNL Fault....................................................................................................................... B PR-AEP-ENG ENG Abnormal Engine Response....................................................................................................................................A All Engines Failure - Management of the Situation................................................................................................ B All Engines Failure - ECAM Procedure.................................................................................................................. C Engine Fail...............................................................................................................................................................D Engine Failure - General......................................................................................................................................... E Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 5/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued from the previous page Engine Failure at Low Speed (On Ground)............................................................................................................ F Engine Failure after V1........................................................................................................................................... G Engine Failure During Initial Climb......................................................................................................................... H Engine Failure During Cruise....................................................................................................................................I Engine Stall.............................................................................................................................................................. J Engine Tail Pipe Fire...............................................................................................................................................K Engine Vibrations..................................................................................................................................................... L One Engine Inoperative - Circling.......................................................................................................................... M One Engine Inoperative - Go-Around..................................................................................................................... N One Engine Inoperative - Landing..........................................................................................................................O Thrust Levers Management in the Case of Inoperative Reverser(s)...................................................................... P PR-AEP-FIRE FIRE Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A FIRE SMOKE/FUMES............................................................................................................................................. B FIRE SMOKE/FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY.................................................................................................... C PR-AEP-F_CTL F/CTL Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration........................................................................................................................ A PR-AEP-FUEL FUEL Fuel Penalty ............................................................................................................................................................A Fuel Imbalance Management.................................................................................................................................. B Fuel Leak................................................................................................................................................................. C PR-AEP-HYD HYD G+Y Hydraulic Failures............................................................................................................................................A PR-AEP-LDG L/G Nose Wheel Steering Failure - Use of Backup Steering Function..........................................................................A Landing with Abnormal L/G.....................................................................................................................................B Loss of Braking........................................................................................................................................................C Taxi with Deflated or Damaged Tires..................................................................................................................... D PR-AEP-LDC Landing Computation Landing Computation...............................................................................................................................................A PR-AEP-MISC MISC EFB Fault................................................................................................................................................................. A EMER DESCENT.................................................................................................................................................... B EMER EVAC............................................................................................................................................................C Emergency Landing Procedure...............................................................................................................................D Flight Crew Incapacitation....................................................................................................................................... E Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 6/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued from the previous page Handling the Aircraft in the Case of Severe Damage.............................................................................................F Low Energy..............................................................................................................................................................G Overspeed................................................................................................................................................................H Overweight Landing.................................................................................................................................................. I Rejected Takeoff...................................................................................................................................................... J Stall Recovery..........................................................................................................................................................K Upset Prevention and Recovery.............................................................................................................................. L PR-AEP-NAV NAV ADR/IR Failure.........................................................................................................................................................A Unreliable Air Speed Indication............................................................................................................................... B PR-AEP-WHEEL WHEEL Wheel Tire Damage Suspected.............................................................................................................................. A 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 7/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-PLP-TOC P 8/8 06 FEB 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 GENERAL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-10-00009417.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Normal Procedures chapter outlines the techniques that the flight crew should apply during each flight phase, in order to optimize the use of the aircraft. The flight crew should read the Normal Procedures chapter in conjunction with the FCOM, which provides the normal procedures and their associated tasksharing, callouts, and checklists. All of the flying techniques are applicable to normal conditions. COMMUNICATION Ident.: PR-NP-10-00019677.0001001 / 01 JUN 17 Applicable to: ALL CROSS-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION The term “cross-cockpit communication“ refers to communication between the PF and the PM. This communication is important for any flight crew. Each time one flight crewmember adjusts or changes information on the flight deck, the other flight crewmember must be informed, and an acknowledgement must be obtained. Such adjustments and changes include: ‐ FMS alterations ‐ Changes in speed or Mach ‐ Tuning of navigation aids ‐ Flight path modifications ‐ System selections (e.g. anti-ice system) ‐ Any changes which affect the display units, such as CAPT(F/O)OIS ON CENTER, SEND TO OFFSIDE, VIEW OFFSIDE. When using cross-cockpit communication, standard phraseology is essential to ensure effective flight crew communication. This phraseology should be concise and exact, and is defined in the callouts chapters. For more information on the callouts: ‐ Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SCO Communications and Standard Terms ‐ Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ABN-00 Standards Callouts for Abnormal Operations. In addition to the standard callout, the flight crew should communicate to enhance situational awareness. As per PM role and in accordance with the Airbus golden rules, the PM should monitor and announce any situation that requires PF reaction or should takeover, when necessary. This is the case for any deviation from the intended flight path, or any case that requires a new assessment of the flight situation and of the flight crew's intention. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-10 P 1/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 GENERAL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL “STERILE“ COCKPIT RULE When the aircraft is below 10 000 ft, the flight crew should avoid any conversation that is not essential. This includes conversations in the cockpit, or between the flight crew and the cabin crew. CLEAN COCKPIT Ident.: PR-NP-10-00015565.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL Objects not stored in their dedicated area in the cockpit may fall and cause hazards such as damage the equipment or accidentally operate controls, or pushbuttons. Airbus highly recommends that the flight crews put and store all objects in their dedicated area in the cockpit: ‐ Cups in the cup holders ‐ Books and paper, if any, in the lateral stowage ‐ Trash in the waste bin on the lateral console ‐ Meal trays on the floor behind the flight crew. The flight attendants should collect the meal trays as soon as possible ‐ Personal equipment properly secured in the various stowage area. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C PR-NP-10 P 2/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FIRE TEST/APU START Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-40-00009425.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew performs the engine, APU and main landing gear bay fire tests by using one common TEST pb. Therefore, even if the APU is already running, the flight crew should press the TEST pb . Purpose of this test is to clear any latent failures related to the engine, APU and main landing gear bay fire detection systems. The flight crew should select the appropriate frequency for an emergency call, if necessary (e.g. APU fire). OIS PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-40-00009426.0001001 / 30 JUN 17 Applicable to: ALL ROLE OF THE PRELIMINARY TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE COMPUTATION Usually, during the preliminary cockpit preparation phase, the workload of the flight crew is less heavy than during future flight phases. The preliminary takeoff performance computation enables both flight crewmembers to share a common view of the plan of actions for the takeoff. It also enables them to make the same assumptions for performance computations. Both flight crewmembers enter the necessary data in their OIS T.O PERF application. They must take into account any applicable MEL/CDL items and NOTAMs, and independently compute the preliminary takeoff performance data. Then, both flight crewmembers crosscheck the results: they compare the OIS of the Captain with the OIS of the First Officer for the parameters listed below. This crosscheck ensures the validity of the computations. CONTENT OF A PERFORMANCE DATA CROSSCHECK When SOPs request a crosscheck of performance data, the flight crew must verify all of the following parameters: ‐ Runway ident This ensures that the runway used for the computation in the OIS and/or inserted in the FMS is the same ‐ Takeoff shift ‐ V speeds (V1, VR, V2) ‐ Takeoff thrust (TOGA, FLEX, DERATED) ‐ FLAPS ‐ PACKS ‐ ANTI-ICE ‐ EO ACCEL ALT. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B PR-NP-SOP-40 P 1/2 02 AUG 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-40 P 2/2 02 AUG 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - EXTERIOR WALKAROUND EXTERIOR WALKAROUND Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-50-00009428.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) outline the various elements that the flight crew must review in detail. The objectives of the exterior inspection are: ‐ To obtain a global assessment of the aircraft status The flight crew checks any missing parts or panels. They should consult the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) for dispatch, and evaluate any operational consequences ‐ To ensure that main control surfaces are in the appropriate position compared to the surface control levers ‐ To check that there are no leaks: E.g. engine drain mast, hydraulic lines ‐ To check the condition of the essential visible sensors, i.e. MFP and static probes ‐ To observe any abnormal condition of the landing gear: • Cuts, wear, or cracks on wheels and tires • Safety pins should be removed • Brakes conditions. Check the length of the brake wear pin on the main landing gears, with parking brake set to ON • Length of shocks absorbers. ‐ To observe any abnormal condition of the engines: • Fan blades, turbine exhaust, engine cowl and pylon condition • Access door should be closed • Thrust reverser door condition. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-50 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - EXTERIOR WALKAROUND Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-50 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - COCKPIT PREPARATION FMS PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-60-00009431.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL FMS initialization means inserting navigation data and performance data. The flight crew starts the FMS initialization via the FMS ACTIVE/INIT page. The automatic cursor jump eases the review of each entry field. General FMS display rules: ‐ Amber boxed entry fields must be filled ‐ Blue entry fields inform the flight crew that entry is possible but not compulsory ‐ Green data are generated by the FMS, and cannot be changed ‐ Magenta indicates constraints (i.e. altitude, speed or time) ‐ Yellow indicates a temporary flight plan ‐ Amber indicates that the item is important and requires immediate action ‐ Small font indicates that the data is computed by the FMS ‐ Big font indicates that the data is entered by the flight crew ‐ Dashes indicate that the data are computing or that the data cannot be computed at that time. STATUS At power-up, the FMS DATA/STATUS page automatically appears. The flight crew can check the database validity, the pilot stored elements, and the perf factor at this stage. If the aircraft is already electrically supplied, the flight crew should check the DATA/STATUS page through the automatic cursor jump of the FMS ACTIVE/INIT page. FMS DATABASE VALIDITY On Honeywell FMS, the double AIRAC cycle of the NDB has one day in common (AIRAC cycle #1 Day 29 / AIRAC Cycle #2 Day 1). From Day 2 of AIRAC Cycle #2, the active database is no longer valid and the message "CHECK DATA BASE CYCLE" will be triggered. On the common day, select AIRAC Cycle #2 prior to the first flight of the day. INIT The flight crew can start the FMS initialization by pressing the INIT key on the keyboard of the KCCU. Then, they should follow the automatic cursor jumps. The FMS provides a default value for the CRZ TEMP field and for the TROPO field that are not covered by the automatic cursor jump. In order to have accurate FMS predictions, the flight crew 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-60 P 1/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - COCKPIT PREPARATION should update the CRZ TEMP value in accordance with the predicted value at the top of climb, if the default value is different. WIND The trip wind is available if the flight crew does not enter any wind profile. In that case, the FMS uses the trip wind for the entire flight from origin to destination. The flight crew can extract the trip wind from the Computerized Flight Plan (CFP): It is the average wind component. On the FMS ACTIVE/WIND page: The history winds panel is the vertical wind profile that was recorded during the previous descent. The flight crew can insert the history winds of the previous flight as the climb winds for the next flight if they are compatible with the vertical wind profile. PERFORMANCE On the FMS ACTIVE/PERF pages: The flight crew uses the CLB panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page to preselect a speed: e.g. preselect green dot for a sharp turn after takeoff. SECONDARY F-PLN SEC3 should be dedicated to ATC uplinks loads. In the case of AOC uplinks, use SEC1 or SEC2. SEC pages are similar to ACTIVE pages (e.g. ACTIVE/PERF page and SEC/PERF page). Therefore, it is a good practice, to read the page title before any FMS entry. FMS DATA CROSSCHECK When the PF finishes the FMS preparation, the PM must check the PF’s entries. The PM performs this check via a check of the different FMS pages, in the same order as the FMS preparation. When the PM reviews the T.O panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page, the PM compares it with their OIS TAKEOFF PERF application to crosscheck the performance data. For more information on the content of a performance crosscheck, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-40 OIS Preparation. TAKEOFF BRIEFING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-60-00009432.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The purpose of the takeoff briefing is for the PF to inform the PM of the planned course of action for both normal, and abnormal situations during takeoff and identify other operational risks. The PF should perform the takeoff briefing at the gate, when the flight crew workload permits, cockpit preparation is completed, and before engine start. The takeoff briefing should be appropriate, concise, and chronological. When a main parameter is referred to by the PF, both flight crewmembers must crosscheck that the parameters are set or programmed correctly. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PR-NP-SOP-60 P 2/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - COCKPIT PREPARATION The PF uses the KCCU keys (e.g. the INIT key for FUEL & LOAD, PERF, and F-PLN) to select the appropriate MFD pages. The takeoff briefing covers the following: 1. Miscellaneous Aircraft technical status (i.e. MEL and CDL items, OEB as applicable) NOTAMs Weather Runway conditions Use of engine and wings anti-ice Expected taxi clearance (if required, e.g. in complex airports) Use of weather radar Use of packs for takeoff Other Operational risks: ‐ Consider specific local characteristics: e.g. metric altitudes, QFE, high airfield elevation, terrain ‐ Flight crew performance/limitations. Block Fuel √ Estimated TOW Extra Fuel/time at destination T.O runway T.O slats/flaps configuration FLEX/TOGA V1, VR, V2 √ TRANS altitude THR RED/ACCEL Altitude 2. FMS ACTIVE/FUEL & LOAD Page (FOB on SD) 3. T.O panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF Page Runway heading after takeoff? Turn after takeoff? SID or radar vectors Initial ALT/FL √ Minimum Safe Altitude Only if NAV PRIMARY not avail: NAVAIDS √ In the case of failure before V1: CAPT announces “STOP” or “GO”. (V1, V2 on PFD) 4. FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN Page (Blue altitude target on PFD) (Consider using terrain on VD, confirm MSA on charts versus VD) Abnormal Operations (Navaids on ND) In the case of failure after V1: Continue takeoff. Follow SID unless an engine out trajectory is specified, EO ACCEL, MSA, radar vector, immediate return, overweight landing consideration. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-60 P 3/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - COCKPIT PREPARATION √ Items that should be crosschecked on the associated display. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SOP-60 P 4/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - BEFORE PUSHBACK OR START TAKEOFF DATA Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-70-00009434.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL The takeoff conditions may change before engine start due to one of the following reasons: ‐ The final loadsheet is different from the preliminary loadsheet, or ‐ A change affects the performance computation (e.g. runway condition degradation, intersection or runway change, etc). In the above-mentioned cases, the flight crew must update the takeoff data, and they independently compute again the performance data. After this new double computation, the PF enters the revised takeoff data in the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page. Before pushback or start is also the right time to perform a final check of takeoff performance data, even if the takeoff conditions are unchanged. To do so: ‐ The PM launches the XCHECK WITH AVNCS function to crosscheck the performance data ‐ The PM compares their OIS TAKEOFF PERF application with the T.O panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page. This is in order to crosscheck the runway, T.O shift and the engine-out acceleration altitude that are not part of the XCHECK WITH AVNCS function. SEATING POSITION AND ADJUSTMENT OF RUDDER PEDALS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-70-00009435.0001001 / 13 JAN 15 Applicable to: ALL To achieve a correct seating position, the aircraft is fitted with eye reference lights on the post between the two windshields. When the red and white lights are aligned, i.e. the flight crew does not see anymore the white light, the pilot’s eyes are in the correct position. The flight crew should not sit too low, to avoid reducing the visual segment. During Low Visibility Procedures (LVP), it is important that the pilot's eyes are positioned correctly, in order to maximize the visual segment, and consequently improve the acquisition of visual references for landing, as early as possible. After the seat is adjusted, each flight crewmember should adjust the armrest, so that the forearm rests comfortably when holding the sidestick. There should be no gap between the flight crew’s forearm and the armrest. The flight crew’s wrist should not be bent when holding the sidestick. This ensures that the flight crew can accomplish flight maneuvers by moving the wrist instead of lifting the forearm from the armrest. An incorrect armrest adjustment prevents from small and precise sidestick inputs, and therefore can lead to over reaction of the aircraft. Then, the flight crew should adjust the rudder pedals: They must have their feet in a position so that full rudder deflection combined with full braking, even differential, can be applied instinctively and without delay. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-70 P 1/2 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - BEFORE PUSHBACK OR START The armrest and the rudder pedals have position indicators. The flight crew should note those positions and set them at each flight. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SOP-70 P 2/2 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - AFTER START ENG START SELECTOR Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-90-00009443.0001001 / 31 JUL 18 Applicable to: ALL After the engines start, the flight crew should set to NORM the ENG START selector. If the ENG START selector is left inadvertently in the IGN START position, this will have the following impacts: ‐ On ground and in flight, the EEC will still provide continuous ignition during automatic recovery (i.e. auto-relight and surge recovery) ‐ In flight, this will prevent the EIF from commanding a quick relight (available in flight only). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-90 P 1/2 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - AFTER START Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-90 P 2/2 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL EXTERNAL TAXI AID CAMERA SYSTEM Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00009445.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The External Taxi Aid Camera System (ETACS) is designed to ease the taxi. The ETACS displays the external view of the aircraft and the nose and main landing gear position. Looking out of the cockpit window remains the primary means to determine when to initiate turns and to verify the aircraft position in relation to the ground track. The ETACS can assist the flight crew during the pushback. The flight crew can check that: ‐ The tow truck is connected ‐ The aircraft environment is free of obstacles ‐ The location of the ground crew personnel is appropriate. The magenta squares on the upper ETACS display help the flight crew to initiate turns: i.e. the flight crew should initiate the turn when the magenta square reaches the yellow line. When the turn is established, the aircraft is correctly turning if the wing root continues over the yellow line. During the taxi, the flight crew can monitor on the bottom ETACS display how close the wheels are to the edges of the runway. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-100 P 1/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AIRPORT NAVIGATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00009446.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Airport Navigation Function (ANF) is designed to improve the flight crew awareness at complex, and busy airports. The ANF enhances the safety, because it helps to prevent errors such as runway incursions, or takeoff from the wrong runway. It is important to emphasize that the ANF is not a guidance system. Therefore, the flight crew should not use the ANF as a substitute for taxi procedures. Taxi procedures include to look outside the aircraft, and to use the airport signs and ground markings. The flight crew must confirm the validity of all information displayed on the ANF by visually comparing this information to outside references. The ANF does not provide information about temporary taxi restrictions. It may not include the most recent buildings and construction sites. Therefore, the flight crew must consult the NOTAMs before beginning the taxi phase. They can update the moving airport map on the ND, by using flags and crosses, as necessary. During the taxi, the PF's primary reference should always be the outside of the aircraft. The PM assists the PF during the taxi, as necessary, by referring to the ND, in order to locate the taxiways and the runways. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PR-NP-SOP-100 P 2/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI When the visibility is reduced, the PM should announce when the aircraft approaches the active runways. Both flight crewmembers should deselect the ANF on both NDs before the line up, at the latest. BRAKES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-100-1-00024017.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 BRAKE CHECK When the aircraft begins to move, the PF smoothly presses the brake pedals to check the efficiency of the normal braking system. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-100-1-00009452.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 CARBON BRAKE WEAR Carbon brake wear depends on the number of brake applications and on brake temperature. It does not depend on the applied pressure, or the duration of the braking. The temperature at which maximum brake wear occurs depends on the brake manufacturer. Therefore, the only way to minimize brake wear is to reduce the number of brake applications. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-100-1-00009453.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 TAXI SPEED AND BRAKING The flight crew should use the GS indication on the PFD, HUD or ND to assess the taxi speed. On long straight taxiways and without any constraint from the ATC or other ground traffic, the aircraft can accelerate up to 30 kt. The PF should then use one smooth brake application to decelerate to 10 kt. The PF should avoid continuous brake application. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-100-1-00009454.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 BRAKE TEMPERATURE The maximum brake temperature for takeoff is 300 °C. This limitation ensures that in the case of a hydraulic leak, any hydraulic fluid that touches the brake units does not ignite in the wheel well after the landing gear retraction. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-100-1-00024846.0001001 / 29 NOV 18 BRAKE FANS Brake fans cool the brakes and the associated temperature sensors. Therefore, when the brake fans run, the indicated brake temperature will be significantly lower than the indicated brake temperature when the brake fans are off. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-100 P 3/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL As soon as the brake fans are switched on, the indicated brake temperature decreases almost instantaneously. On the other hand, when the brake fans are switched off, it will take several minutes for the indicated brake temperature to increase and match the real brake temperature. When the brake fans run, the difference between the indicated and the actual brake temperature can be between 50 °C (when the actual brake temperature is 100 °C) and 150 °C (when the actual brake temperature is 300 °C). As a consequence, before takeoff, if the brake fans run, the flight crew should refer to the indicated brake temperature. When the indicated brake temperature is above 150 °C, takeoff must be delayed. Brake fans should not be used during takeoff, in order to prevent damages from foreign object to fans and brakes. The brake fans are automatically set to off at takeoff when the engine thrust increases. FLIGHT CONTROLS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00019683.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL At a convenient stage, before or during taxi, and before arming the autobrake, the flight crew performs the flight controls check. If this check is carried out during taxi, it is essential that the PF remains head-up throughout the procedure. 1. The PF remains silent, and applies full longitudinal and lateral sidestick deflection. On the F/CTL SD page , the PM checks full travel of all elevators and all ailerons, and the correct deflection and retraction of all spoilers. The PM announces “full up”, “full down”, “neutral”, “full left”, “full right”, “neutral”, when each applicable full travel/neutral position is reached. The PF remains silent, and checks that the PM calls are in accordance with the sidestick order. Note: To reach full travel, maintain full sidestick for a sufficient period of time. 2. The PF remains silent, presses the PEDAL DISC pb to disconnect the NWS and applies full left rudder, full right rudder, and neutral. The PM follows on the rudder pedals and announces “full left”, “full right”, “neutral” as each full travel/neutral position is reached. Note: To reach full travel, apply full rudder for a sufficient period of time. 3. The PM applies full longitudinal and lateral sidestick deflection, remains silent, and checks full travel and the correct sense of all elevators and all ailerons, and the correct deflection and retraction of all spoilers, on the F/CTL SD page. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D PR-NP-SOP-100 P 4/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TAXI ROLL AND STEERING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00009458.0001001 / 27 JAN 17 Applicable to: ALL THRUST USE The flight crew will need a little power above idle thrust to move the aircraft. Excessive thrust application can result in exhaust-blast damage or Foreign Object Damage (FOD). Thrust should normally be used symmetrically. STEERING HANDWHEEL AND RUDDER PEDALS Rudder pedals control the nosewheel steering at low speed with a limited authority. Therefore, on straight taxiways and on wide turn, the flight crew can use the pedals to steer the aircraft, while they keep a hand on the steering handwheel. In small radius turns, the flight crew must use the steering handwheel. TAXI TECHNIQUE The relationship between the steering handwheel order and the nosewheel angle is not linear. Therefore, the PF should move the steering handwheel smoothly and maintain the steering handwheel position. The PF should apply small and smooth corrections, and maintain the correction long enough to evaluate the aircraft reaction. Too many steering handwheel inputs cause uncomfortable oscillations. On straight taxiways, the aircraft is correctly aligned on the centerline, when the centerline is lined-up between the PFD and the ND. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E→ PR-NP-SOP-100 P 5/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL For information on taxi with deflated or damaged tires, Refer to PR-AEP-LDG Taxi with Deflated Tires. For information on taxi in adverse weather condition, Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 Taxi-Out. 180 DEGREES TURN ON RUNWAY Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00023474.0001001 / 30 JUN 17 Applicable to: ALL For more information on the minimum runway width that is necessary to perform a 180° turn with the following technique, Refer to FCOM/DSC-20-30 180 degrees Turn on Runway. The flight crew can use the ETACS to enhance their situational awareness. However, external visual references are the primary reference. For more information on the use of ETACS, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-100 External Taxi Aid Camera System. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← E to F → PR-NP-SOP-100 P 6/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI ‐ On dry runway, in order to avoid stress and fatigue in the main landing gear, the flight crew should avoid using differential braking to fully stop one main landing gear (braked pivot turn technique) ‐ If the runway is wet or contaminated, the aircraft may skid, particularly on painted parts of the runway. The flight crew should consider additional margin when the runway is wet or contaminated. IF THE PF IS THE CREWMEMBER IN THE LEFT HAND SEAT (CM1) Taxi on the right hand side of the runway. Maintain a ground speed of 5 kt during the entire maneuver. Turn left, maintaining a 20 ° divergence from the runway axis. Monitor the approaching runway edge. When the CM1 is physically over the runway edge: ‐ Turn right, up to full tiller deflection ‐ If necessary, use asymmetric thrust (IDLE on ENG 2) and/or differential braking (more brake pressure on the right side) to maintain a constant speed. When the 180 ° turn is complete, align with runway centerline and release the tiller to neutral position before stopping. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ PR-NP-SOP-100 P 7/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI IF THE PF IS THE CREWMEMBER IN THE RIGHT HAND SEAT (CM2) Note: The technique is symmetrical. Taxi on the left hand side of the runway. Maintain a ground speed of 5 kt during the entire maneuver. Turn right, maintaining a 20 ° divergence from the runway axis. Monitor the approaching runway edge. When the CM2 is physically over the runway edge: ‐ Turn left, up to full tiller deflection ‐ If necessary, use asymmetric thrust (IDLE on ENG 1) and/or differential braking (more brake pressure on the left side) to maintain a constant speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ PR-NP-SOP-100 P 8/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL When the 180 ° turn is complete, align with runway centerline and release the tiller to neutral position before stopping. LAST DATA CHANGES BEFORE TAKEOFF Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00024306.0001001 / 30 JUN 17 Applicable to: ALL If the takeoff conditions change during the taxi phase, and if the previous performance computation is no longer appropriate, the flight crew must update the takeoff data. This is the case for example in the following conditions: ‐ The runway in use changes, or ‐ The runway condition deteriorates, or ‐ The use of a new intersection shortens the runway length, or ‐ The wind or the temperature changes. In order to ensure that the performance data used for the takeoff is accurate, the technique to perform this update is the same as for the Before Pushback or Start phase (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-70 Takeoff Data). However, the tasksharing is different. Both of the following apply: ‐ The PF delegates the FMS updates to the PM, in order to limit disruption during taxi ‐ As a result, the PF must crosscheck the data that the PM modified in the FMS. In order to compute and crosscheck the performance data, the PF should perform one of the following: ‐ Stop the aircraft, or ‐ Transfer the control to the PM. TAKEOFF BRIEFING CONFIRMATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00009450.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The TAKEOFF BRIEFING CONFIRMATION should only review any changes that may have occurred since the full TAKEOFF BRIEFING done at the parking bay (e.g. change of SID, change in runway conditions). ADIRS ALIGNMENT Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-100-00021370.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL During taxi, a good way to check the global consistency of FMS entries (position, and flight plan) is to check the runway, and the SID, on the ND, in comparison to the aircraft symbol that indicates the current aircraft position. To do so, set the ND in ARC, or NAV mode with a range of 10 NM. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to I PR-NP-SOP-100 P 9/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAXI Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-100 P 10/10 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - BEFORE TAKEOFF PACKS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-110-00009460.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL If the flight crew decides to perform a takeoff without bleeding air from the engines (i.e. for performance reasons), but they need air conditioning, then, they should use APU bleed with the packs switched on. This maintains the engine performance and the passengers comfort. During takeoff, the engine thrust is frozen until the flight crew manually reduces the thrust. In the case of an APU automatic shutdown, the packs revert to engine bleed. Therefore, this increases the EGT in order to maintain the THR. If one pack is failed before takeoff, the flight crew should set to OFF the failed pack. The takeoff can be performed with the other pack set to ON (if performance permit), because the operative pack is supplied by the onside bleeds. In this asymmetric bleed configuration, the N1 takeoff value is limited to the value corresponding to normal bleed configuration (i.e. two operative packs). The flight crew should compute the takeoff performance with AIR COND set to ON in the T.O PERF application. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-110 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - BEFORE TAKEOFF Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-110 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF THRUST SETTING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009462.0001001 / 09 JAN 18 Applicable to: ALL The PF announces "TAKEOFF". Then, the PF applies the takeoff power, as recommended in the SOPs. The thrust setting procedure ensures that all engines will accelerate similarly. If the flight crew does not correctly apply the thrust setting procedure, thrust increase can be asymmetrical, and can result in directional control problems. If the flight crew does not set the thrust levers to the appropriate takeoff detent, e.g. FLEX instead of TOGA, the ECAM triggers the ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET alert. At any time during FLEX takeoff, the flight crew may set the thrust levers to TOGA. TAKEOFF ROLL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009463.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL The Captain must keep their hand on the thrust levers when the thrust levers are set to TOGA/FLX and up to V1. The PF should use the pedals to keep the aircraft straight. The nosewheel steering is efficient up to 150 kt. Above 100 kt, the authority decreases at a pre-determined rate at the same time as the ground speed increases and the rudder becomes more efficient. The use of the tiller is not recommended during the takeoff roll because of its high efficiency which can result in aircraft overreaction. For crosswind takeoffs, routine use of into wind ailerons is not necessary. In strong crosswind conditions, the flight crew can use small lateral stick inputs if deemed necessary, due to the reaction of the into wind wing. Nevertheless, the flight crew should avoid large lateral stick inputs that result in excessive spoilers extension, and therefore increase the aircraft tendency to turn into the wind. At low speed (below 70 kt indicated airspeed) and in strong crosswind conditions, the flight crew may experience a downwind yawing motion. This downwind turning effect is opposite to the usual weathercock effect. The downwind turning effect is partially due to the fact that at low speed in high thrust conditions, the engine on the downwind side provides less thrust than the engine on the upwind side. This engine thrust difference creates a moment on the yaw axis. This moment may be more significant than the weathercock yawing moment. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-120 P 1/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF In the event of unexpected lateral disturbance during takeoff roll, the flight crew should use the rudder as for counteracting any lateral disturbance. The flight crew should avoid excessive rudder input that may increase the magnitude of the lateral disturbance. The flight crew may be surprised during takeoff roll by unexpected lateral disturbance in conditions such as: ‐ The presence of thermals or thermal vortices that might develop in hot and dry weather conditions. Sometimes, these thermal streams get stronger, and create small whirlwinds referred to as "dust devils", or ‐ The jet blast of another aircraft close to the active runway, or ‐ The wind that accelerates between two buildings by "venturi" effect. In the case of low visibility takeoff, outside view remains the primary means to track the runway centerline. ROTATION TECHNIQUE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009464.0001001 / 04 APR 18 Applicable to: ALL The rotation technique is similar on all fly-by-wire aircraft. To initiate the rotation, the flight crew performs a positive backward stick input. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-120 P 2/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF When the rotation is initiated, the flight crew achieves a rotation rate of approximately 3 °/s resulting in a continuous pitch increase. During the rotation, the aircraft liftoff occurs at approximately 10 ° of pitch, typically around 4 s to 5 s after the initiation of the rotation. After the liftoff, the PF targets the required pitch attitude. To monitor the rotation, the PF uses the outside visual references. Once airborne, the PF controls the pitch attitude target on the PFD. A slow rotation rate or an under rotation (below takeoff pitch target) has an impact on takeoff performance (refer to the below graphic): ‐ The takeoff run and the takeoff distance increase ‐ The obstacle clearance after takeoff decreases. TAIL STRIKE AVOIDANCE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009465.0001001 / 04 APR 18 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION Tail strikes can cause extensive structural damage, which can jeopardize the flight and result in heavy maintenance actions. They most often occur in adverse weather conditions, e.g. crosswind, turbulence, windshear. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → PR-NP-SOP-120 P 3/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF MAIN FACTORS EARLY ROTATION Early rotation occurs when the flight crew initiates the rotation below the appropriate VR. The possible reasons for this are: ‐ The computed VR is not appropriate to the aircraft weight or flap configuration ‐ The PF commands the rotation below VR because of gusts, windshear, or an obstacle on the runway. Whatever the cause of the early rotation, the result is an increased pitch attitude at liftoff, and therefore, a reduced tail clearance. ROTATION TECHNIQUE The rotation technique with the associated rotation rate is described in the FCTM PR-NP-SOP-TAKEOFF (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-120 Rotation Technique). An abrupt increase of rotation rate close to liftoff might lead to a tail strike. If the established pitch rate is not satisfactory, the PF must correct it as soon as detected. CONFIGURATION The flight crew should keep in mind that the tail clearance at liftoff depends on the slat/flap configuration. The highest slat/flap configuration provides the highest tail strike margin. TAKEOFF PITCH TRIM SETTING The main purpose of the pitch trim setting for takeoff is to provide consistent rotation characteristics. The pitch trim setting for takeoff is automatic on ground. The aircraft performs a safe takeoff, provided that the pitch trim setting is within the green band on the pitch trim display, on the PFD. CROSSWIND TAKEOFF The flight crew should avoid using large lateral sidestick inputs that result in excessive spoilers extension. The spoilers extension on one wing reduces the lift, and therefore reduces the tail clearance and increases the risk of tail strike. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D PR-NP-SOP-120 P 4/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF SLATS/FLAPS RETRACTION AT HEAVY WEIGHT Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-120-2-00009469.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 GENERAL If takeoff is performed at heavy weight, F speed may be close to VFE Conf 2 and S speed is above VFE Conf 1+F. In this case, two protections may apply: ‐ The Automatic Retraction System (ARS) ‐ The alpha/speed lock function. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-120-2-00009476.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 THE ALPHA/SPEED LOCK FUNCTION The triggering of the alpha/speed lock function is a normal situation at high gross weight. If the slats alpha/speed lock function is triggered, the flight crew continues the scheduled acceleration, to enable later slats retraction. LOW ALTITUDE LEVEL OFF Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009471.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL If the aircraft has to level off below the acceleration altitude, ALT* engages and SRS disengages. In this case, the flight crew should expect a faster than normal acceleration. They should be prepared to retract the flaps and slats rapidly. NOISE ABATEMENT TAKEOFF Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-120-00009472.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should not conduct the Noise Abatement Departure Procedures (NADP) in significant turbulence, or windshear conditions. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E to G → PR-NP-SOP-120 P 5/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF There are two types of NADP: ‐ An NADP of type I is a departure procedure that intends to reduce noise levels close to the airport. This procedure is also called a close-in noise abatement procedure NADP 1 ‐ An NADP procedure of type II aims at reducing noise levels further away from the airport. This procedure is also called a distant noise abatement procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ PR-NP-SOP-120 P 6/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF NADP 2 For more information on the NADP function in the FMS, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FMS-10-50-60 Introduction. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G PR-NP-SOP-120 P 7/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - TAKEOFF Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-120 P 8/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CLIMB INITIAL CLIMB Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00019760.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL As per basic SOPs recommendations, during the flight: ‐ The PF displays the FMS ACTIVE PERF page. In this phase of flight, the FMS ACTIVE PERF page automatically displays the CLB panel. This enables the PF to monitor when the aircraft reaches the AFS CP selected altitude. The PF may set other pages, such as the ACTIVE/F-PLN page, if necessary. The CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays the OPT FL and the REC MAX FL: • The OPT FL is a function of the cost index (CI) • The REC MAX FL provides the aircraft with a buffet margin of at least 0.3 g. The flight crew can enter a cruise flight level above this level in the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page, and the FMS will accept it, provided that it does not exceed the level at which the margin is reduced to 0.2 g. For more information on vertical performance predictions, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-140 Vertical Performance Predictions ‐ The PM displays the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN page. This page enables the flight crew to enter any long-term ATC revisions to the lateral or vertical flight plan. CLIMB THRUST Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00009477.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL During the climb, the thrust levers are set to the CL detent. The A/THR is active in THRUST mode. Engine life may be extended by operating the engines at less than the maximum climb thrust. Derated climb thrust is automatically set on the CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page. Climb performance is reduced when using the derated climb thrust but the ceiling is not affected. The flight crew can always cancel derated climb thrust via the CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page. If an engine failure occurs during a derated climb, derated climb thrust is deselected when the flight crew selects MCT. The derated climb slightly increases fuel consumption. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B PR-NP-SOP-140 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CLIMB FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SMALL ALTITUDE CHANGES Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00009479.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL CLB or OP CLB mode will be preferred to V/S mode for climb even for small altitude changes. Indeed, in the small altitude change case, the THR CLB mode is limited in order to give 1 000 ft/min, making this altitude change smoother and more comfortable for the passengers. SPEED CONSIDERATIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00009480.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The climb speed can be either: ‐ Managed, or ‐ Selected. MANAGED The managed climb speed computed by the FMS, provides the most economical climb profile as it takes into account the aircraft gross weight, the cruise flight level, the actual and predicted winds, the ISA deviation and the Cost Index (CI). The managed climb speed also takes into account any speed constraint, e.g. the default speed limit which is 250 kt up to 10 000 ft. SELECTED The flight crew can either preselect the climb speed on ground before takeoff on the CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page, or select the climb speed on the AFS CP. On ground before takeoff, the flight crew can preselect the speed/Mach target at the acceleration altitude, on the CLB panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page. This is useful when the F-PLN has a sharp turn after takeoff, when high angle of climb is required, or for ATC clearance compliance. When the aircraft is airborne, the flight crew can select the speed/Mach target on the AFS CP in order to achieve: ‐ The maximum rate of climb, i.e. to reach a given altitude in the shortest time, or ‐ Green Dot (GD). i.e. to reach a given altitude in a shortest distance. The flight crew can compute the maximum rate of climb speed as well as the corresponding time and distance required to achieve the selected altitude via the CLB module of the IN-FLT PERF application. The GD speed appears on the PFD. When the flight crew uses the selected speed/Mach, the FMS predictions on the ACTIVE/F-PLN page assume a return to the managed speed/Mach at the next climb speed limit or speed constraint where the managed speed becomes greater than the selected speed (e.g. 250 kt /10 000 ft). 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to D PR-NP-SOP-140 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CLIMB FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL VERTICAL PERFORMANCE PREDICTIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00009481.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays the REC MAX FL and the OPT FL information. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 Altitude Considerations. The flight crew uses this information to rapidly answer the ATC request: “CAN YOU CLIMB TO FL XXX?”. The CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays time, and distance predictions for a given FL with the selected and managed speed modes. The default value of this FL is the AFS CP target altitude. The flight crew can change the default value. The flight crew uses this information to rapidly answer the ATC request: “CAN YOU MAKE FL XXX by ZZZ waypoint?”. VERTICAL DISPLAY Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00009482.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL When the flight crew changes the barometric setting from QNH(QFE ) to STD, the safety altitude that was graphically displayed (if the safe altitude was within the VD area), switches to a numerical value. Because this numerical value is equal to the highest safe altitude along the F-PLN within the VD range, this can result in the aircraft flying below the displayed safe altitude. This behavior increases the flight crew's awareness in relation to the safe altitude. The vertical flight plan profile induces a change of practice in the way to avoid cells. Because the VD provides the predicted vertical clearance with cells, it can prompt the flight crew to overfly the cells with low vertical margins. If the flight crew is not able to establish whether or not the vertical clearance above the cell is sufficient enough to overfly safely, they should avoid the cell laterally. The cells displayed on VD are vertical cut along the green solid line. The flight crew can refine the lateral spacing of the aircraft vs. the cell by using the AZIM function. LATERAL NAVIGATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-140-00021371.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL If the aircraft is following the programmed SID, the AP/FD should be in NAV mode. If ATC vectors the aircraft, HDG mode will be used until time when clearance is given to either resume the SID, or track direct to a specific waypoint. In either case, the flight crew must ensure that the waypoints are correctly sequenced. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E to G → PR-NP-SOP-140 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CLIMB The flight crew should keep in mind that the use of HDG mode (e.g. following ATC radar vectors), will revert VERTICAL navigation from CLB to OP CLB and any altitude constraints in the FMS F-PLN page will not be observed unless they are selected on the AFS CP. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G PR-NP-SOP-140 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE FMS USE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009486.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL CRUISE FL If the ATC clears the aircraft at a lower cruise flight level than the preselected cruise FL displayed on FMS ACTIVE/PERF page, ALT CRZ does not appear on the FMA, and the cruise speed/Mach is not targeted. The flight crew should update the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page accordingly. When in cruise, i.e. ALT CRZ appears on the FMA, the A/THR is in the SPEED/MACH mode, and the soft mode is available. The A/THR soft mode allows slight speed/Mach variation around the cruise speed/Mach (i.e. +/- 4 kt to 6 kt) while reducing the thrust variations. This optimizes the fuel consumption. WIND AND TEMPERATURE When the aircraft reaches the cruise FL, the flight crew ensures that the wind and temperatures are correctly entered and that the lateral and vertical F-PLNs reflect the Computerized Flight Plan (CFP). The flight crew should update the wind and temperatures at waypoints when there is a difference of: ‐ Either 30 ° in direction, or 30 kt in velocity for the wind ‐ 5 °C for temperature deviation. They should make those entries for four different FLs in order to reflect the actual wind and temperature profile. This ensures that the FMS fuel and time predictions are as accurate as possible, and that the FMS provides an accurate OPT FL computation. STEP CLIMB If there is a step in the F-PLN, the flight crew should ensure that the wind is correctly set at the first waypoint beyond the step (D on the following example), i.e. at both initial FL and step FL. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-150 P 1/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE If at D waypoint, the CFP provides the wind at FL 350 but not at FL 310, it is recommended to insert the same wind at FL 310 as the one at FL 350. This is because of wind propagation rules that affect the optimum FL computation. F-PLN INFO On the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN page, the F-PLN INFO menu provides a quick access to several useful functions that are not associated with a waypoint, i.e.: ‐ ALTERNATE The ALTERNATE page enables to: • Obtain valuable distance, bearing time, and fuel information to several alternate airports • Select the alternate airport, if required. ‐ CLOSEST AIRPORTS The CLOSEST AIRPORTS page provides valuable distance, bearing time and fuel information to the four closest airports from the aircraft present position (PPOS), as well as to an airport defined by the flight crew. The fuel and time predictions are a function of the average wind between the aircraft and the airport ‐ FIX INFO ‐ LL CROSSING ‐ TIME MARKER ‐ CPNY F-PLN REPORT ‐ EQUI-TIME POINT. The EQUI-TIME POINT (ETP) function assists the flight crew in the decision to perform an en-route diversion. They should enter an appropriate airport pair, i.e. REF1 and REF2 and the wind at the cruise FL in the FMS EQUI-TIME POINT page. The ETP calculation is based on the entered wind at the diversion FL and on the current speed/Mach. The flight crew can reduce their workload in the case of a diversion, if they prepare the potential en-route diversion in the secondary F-PLN. This is particularly true when terrain considerations apply to the intended diversion route. The flight crew should insert the ETP as a waypoint in the SEC, and they should finalize the route to the diversion airfield. When the FMS sequences an ETP, the flight crew: ‐ Accesses the FMS EQUI-TIME POINT page via the F-PLN INFO menu ‐ Inserts the next applicable diversion airfield and the associated wind ‐ Reads the new ETP and inserts this ETP as waypoint in the active F-PLN ‐ Copies the active F-PLN in one SEC ‐ Inserts the new diversion airport as a new destination in the SEC from the new ETP. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-150 P 2/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE COST INDEX Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009487.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The Cost Index (CI) is used to take into account the relation between fuel and time related costs, in order to minimize the trip cost. Operators compute the CI for each sector. From an operational point of view, the CI affects the speed (i.e. the ECON speed/Mach) and the cruise altitude (i.e. the OPT ALT). CI=0 corresponds to the maximum range. CI=999 corresponds to the minimum time. The CI is a strategic parameter that applies to the entire flight. However, the flight crew can modify the CI in flight for valid strategic operational reasons. For example, if the flight crew needs to reduce the speed for the entire flight in order to comply with curfew requirements, or fuel management requirements (e.g. EXTRA approaches 0), then it can be appropriate to reduce the CI. The flight crew can use the SEC F-PLN to check the predictions associated with the new CI. If they are satisfactory, the flight crew modifies the CI in the primary F-PLN. However, the flight crew should be aware that any modification of the CI can affect the trip cost. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B PR-NP-SOP-150 P 3/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SPEED CONSIDERATIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009488.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The cruise speed can be either: ‐ Managed, or ‐ Selected. MANAGED When the aircraft reaches the cruise altitude, i.e. ALT CRZ appears on the FMA, the A/THR operates in SPEED/MACH mode. The optimum cruise speed/Mach (ECON speed/Mach) is automatically targeted. Its value depends on: ‐ CI ‐ Cruise flight level ‐ Temperature deviation ‐ Weight ‐ Headwind or tailwind component. The flight crew should be aware that the optimum speed/Mach changes in accordance with the above mentioned parameters, e.g. it increases with an increasing headwind. If the ATC requires a specific time over a waypoint, the flight crew can perform a vertical revision on that waypoint, and enter a time constraint. The FMS modifies the managed speed/Mach target accordingly, in order to remain between green dot and MMO and to achieve this constraint. If the FMS predicts that the constraint will be respected, a magenta asterisk appears near the waypoint on the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN page. If the time constraint is missed, an amber asterisk appears near the waypoint. When the FMS sequences the waypoint associated with a time constraint, the FMS resumes the ECON speed/Mach. The Constant Mach Segment (CMS) revision enables to fly a cruise segment at a constant Mach number. The cruise speed remains managed, and the FMS takes into account the CMS for cruise predictions. The flight crew uses the CMS revision via the waypoint revision menu of the ACTIVE/F-PLN page, or via the CRZ panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page. This function is also available in the SEC to evaluate any speed strategy change. SELECTED If the ATC requires a speed constraint for a limited period of time, the flight crew selects the cruise speed on the AFS CP. The FMS updates the predictions accordingly until the aircraft reaches either the next step climb or the top of descent, where the managed speed/Mach applies again. Therefore, the FMS predictions remain realistic. The CRZ panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays the Long Range Cruise (LRC) speed and the MAX TURB speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C→ PR-NP-SOP-150 P 4/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL At high altitude, the flight crew should not reduce the speed below green dot. This can lead to a situation where it is not possible to maintain the speed and/or the altitude because the increased drag can exceed the available thrust. SPEED DECAY DURING CRUISE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00019977.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL FACTORS THAT CAUSE A SPEED DECAY DURING CRUISE On aircraft with no failure, and the A/THR engaged or the MAX CLB thrust applied in manual mode, a continuous speed decay during cruise phase may be due to: ‐ A large and continuous increase in tailwind or decrease in headwind, in addition to an increase in the Outside Air Temperature (OAT), that results in a decrease of the REC MAX FL (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 Altitude Considerations), or ‐ A large downdraft, when the flight crew flies (parallel and) downwind in a mountainous area, due to orographic waves. The downdraft may have a negative vertical speed of more than 500 ft/min. Therefore, if the aircraft is in a downdraft, the aircraft must climb in order to maintain altitude, and the pitch angle and the thrust value increase. Without sufficient thrust margin, the flight crew may notice that aircraft speed decays, but the REC MAX FL is not modified. THRUST MARGIN AND EXTERNAL PARAMETERS The flight crew must be aware that at high altitude, the thrust margin (difference between the thrust in use and the maximum available thrust) is limited. The maximum available thrust decreases when there is an increase in altitude and/or in OAT. In some conditions, the Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT) may be the maximum available thrust. In such a situation, it is useless to put the thrust levers in the TOGA detent to try to increase the thrust. The REC MAX FL indicated in the PERF page of the FMS decreases when the OAT increases. The nearer the aircraft is to REC MAX FL, the smaller the thrust margin. GREEN DOT (GDOT) SPEED AS A REFERENCE The optimum lift/drag speed is the GDOT speed. The GDOT speed uses the lowest quantity of thrust necessary to maintain the required/desired altitude. When the aircraft speed is below GDOT speed, any decrease in speed requires an increase in thrust in order to maintain the required/desired altitude. Therefore, if the aircraft speed is below GDOT speed and continues to decrease, even with the maximum available thrust in use, if the flight crew maintains the current altitude, the angle of attack will further increase. OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION The nearer the aircraft is to the REC MAX FL, the smaller the thrust margin the flight crew has to manage a speed decay during cruise. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → PR-NP-SOP-150 P 5/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the aircraft speed goes below GDOT speed, with the maximum available thrust in use, the only way for the flight crew to avoid a dangerous increase of the angle of attack is to descend. As a result, the flight crew can recover normal aircraft speed and the normal thrust margin. ALTITUDE CONSIDERATIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009489.0001001 / 03 SEP 14 Applicable to: ALL The FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays: ‐ REC MAX FL ‐ OPT FL. REC MAX FL The REC MAX FL indicates the current engine and wing performance. It does not take into account the cost aspect. It provides a 0.3 g buffet margin. If the flight crew inserts a FL higher than the REC MAX FL, the FMS accepts the CRZ FL only if it provides a buffet margin of more than 0.2 g. The flight crew should consider REC MAX as the upper cruise limit, unless there are specific operational considerations, e.g. to accept a cruise FL higher than the REC MAX or to be held significantly lower for a long period. OPT FL The OPT FL displayed on the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page is the cruise altitude for minimum cost when the aircraft flies at the ECON speed/Mach. The flight crew should follow the OPT FL whenever possible. It is important to note that the OPT FL is meaningful only if the flight crew entered an accurate wind and temperature profile. The flight crew should be aware that flying at a FL different from the OPT FL can have an adverse effect on the trip cost. If a FMS failure occurs, the flight crew should refer to the CRZ module of the IN-FLT PERF application in order to determine the OPT FL. STEP CLIMB Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009490.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL From a cost point of view, it is better to climb to a higher cruise altitude when aircraft weight permits, because the optimum altitude increases when fuel is consumed during the flight. This technique is referred to as a Step Climb. The flight crew can plan the step climbs at waypoints, or the FMS can compute the optimum step points. In order to determine the optimum location of the next FL change, the flight crew uses the OPTIMUM STEP POINT function on the STEP ALTs panel of the ACTIVE/F-PLN/VERT REV page. If predictions are satisfactory in terms of time and fuel saving, the flight crew inserts the optimum step point in the temporary flight plan provided it is compatible with the ATC. The inserted step climb is set 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to F → PR-NP-SOP-150 P 6/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL as a geographic waypoint. The flight crew can update the step point by pressing the UPDATE* button on the STEP ALTs panel of the ACTIVE/F-PLN/VERT REV page. The OPT STEP computation is accurate if the flight crew accurately entered the vertical wind profile. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 FMS Use. It can be advantageous to request an initial cruise altitude above the OPT FL, if altitude changes are difficult to obtain on specific routes. This minimizes the possibility of being held at a low altitude and in high fuel consumption condition for long periods of time. The flight crew should compare the requested/cleared cruise altitude to the REC MAX FL. Before the flight crew accepts an altitude above the OPT FL, they should determine if this FL will remain acceptable considering the projected flight conditions such as turbulence, standing waves or temperature changes. The following graph indicates the two step climb strategies with respect to the OPT FL and the REC MAX FL. FUEL TEMPERATURE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-150-00009492.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL Fuel freeze is the formation of wax crystals suspended in the fuel, that can accumulate when fuel temperature is below the freezing point (e.g. -47 °C for JET A1) and can prevent correct fuel feed to the engines. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to G → PR-NP-SOP-150 P 7/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CRUISE During normal operations, fuel temperature rarely decreases to the point where it becomes limiting. However, extended cruise operations increase the possibility to reach the freezing point. During the flight, the fuel temperature slowly decreases toward the TAT. If the fuel temperature approaches the freezing point, the flight crew should consider to achieve a higher TAT, by: ‐ Descending or diverting to a warmer air mass. Below the tropopause, a 4 000 ft descent increases the TAT by 7 °C. In severe cases, the flight crew may need to descent to FL 250 ‐ Increasing the Mach number. An increase of M 0.01 increases the TAT by approximately 0.7 °C. In either case, the flight crew can need up to one hour in order to stabilize the fuel temperature. They should consider the fuel penalty associated with either of these actions. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G PR-NP-SOP-150 P 8/8 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION LANDING PERFORMANCE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-160-00019978.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 Applicable to: ALL LANDING PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS The flight crew should always consider an in-flight performance assessment as part of their approach preparation, particularly for cases whenever: ‐ No preliminary landing performance was established before departure, for example: • Runway change versus assumptions made at dispatch If it is not known which runway was planned to be used at time of dispatch, assume that it was based on the longest runway and no wind. If the runway to be actually used has more unfavorable characteristics, a specific computation should be made. • Diversion. ‐ Landing conditions have changed, as an example due to: • The intended use of autobrake or autoland The Required Landing Distance (RLD) only considers Manual Braking. • Degradation of the runway conditions since dispatch • In-flight failure affecting the landing performance. ‐ Unusual contaminated runway conditions, for example: • Wet runway in hot temperature and high altitude airport conditions • Contaminated runway with descending slope. The flight crew should use all available information that is reported to them, to make a realistic assessment of the Runway Surface Conditions. This includes assessing how these conditions may degrade before it becomes impossible to stop the aircraft within the declared distances. When any doubt exists, the flight crew should request to change the runway for a more favorable one, or should even decide that a diversion may be a better solution. In order to assess the landing performance, the flight crew should follow the two main steps described below: 1. Identify the Braking Performance Level with the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) for RWY COND selection in the LDG PERF application 2. Calculate the Landing Performance using the LDG PERF application. USE OF THE RUNWAY CONDITION ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RCAM) RCAM LOCATION Refer to FCOM/PER-LDG-30 Runway Condition Assessment Matrix for Landing. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RCAM The purpose of the RCAM is to provide the flight crew with an identification method of a realistic Braking Performance Level. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-160 P 1/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION The RCAM provides 6 Braking Performance Levels: ‐ 6 - Dry ‐ 5 - Good ‐ 4 - Good to medium ‐ 3 - Medium ‐ 2 - Medium to poor ‐ 1 - Poor USE OF THE RCAM The flight crew gathers all available information (e.g. ATIS, METAR, SNOWTAM, TAF, ATC report such as PiRep, NOTAM, Airport Documentation) related to Runway Surface Conditions. The flight crew makes a primary assessment based on Runway Condition information (i.e. runway state, contaminant type, depth, temperature). This results in a primary Braking Performance Level. Then, the flight crew downgrades this primary Braking Performance Level, if: ‐ A Pilot Report of Braking Action (PiRep) is available and this PiRep corresponds to a lower Braking Performance Level ‐ A SNOWTAM is published, and the Estimated Surface Friction (ESF) corresponds to a lower Braking Performance Level For loose contaminants (Dry Snow, Wet Snow or Slush), the flight crew should not consider an ESF based on friction measurements. ‐ Complementary information is available and is related to a possible degradation of the Runway Condition or braking action. In any case, the flight crew must not use a PiRep, ESF or any other complementary information in order to upgrade a primary Braking Performance Level that was based on Runway Condition information. In the following example, the reported Runway Condition is wet, and the PiRep is "Good to Medium": 1. The primary assessment based on Runway Condition information results in "5 - Good" 2. The downgrade based on Reported Braking Action results in "4 - Good to medium". 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-160 P 2/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION The following example illustrates the downgrade based on complementary information related to a possible degradation of the Runway Condition or braking action: ‐ Runway state reported as wet ‐ NOTAM “SLIPPERY WHEN WET". In this example, the flight crew should perform the landing performance assessment with the Braking Performance Level “3 - Medium”. Generally speaking, the flight crew should perform the landing performance assessment with the Braking Performance Level “3 - Medium” if there is rain on the runway, and if a NOTAM "SLIPPERY WHEN WET" or the equivalent information (e.g. airport documentation) warns that the runway adherence is not usual when the runway is wet. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-160 P 3/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION CROSSWIND CONSIDERATIONS The maximum crosswind value that the flight crew should retain is the one corresponding to the worse Braking Performance Level. This means that if the flight crew downgrades the braking performance assessment after considering additional information, they should also downgrade maximum crosswind value. For Maximum Crosswinds, Refer to FCOM/LIM-AG-OPS Maximum Crosswind for Takeoff and Landing. The LDG PERF application automatically takes into account the crosswind limitations according to the Operator policy. RISK OF DEGRADED RUNWAY CONDITIONS If there is a risk of degraded runway conditions, in addition to the usual assessment with the Braking Performance Level "5 - Good", it is a safe practice to perform a second assessment with "2 - Medium to poor". If the result of the second assessment shows that the runway is too short, it enables the flight crew to anticipate, in the event of degraded runway conditions (e.g. strong rain), an appropriate decision to continue or to discontinue the approach if they become aware of such conditions late in approach. e.g. following a PiRep transmission that contains "Medium to Poor", or following the visual assessment of the runway. Generally speaking, if there is a possibility that meteorological conditions will change, or under active precipitation, the flight crew should consider performing a backup in-flight landing performance assessment associated with the worst likely Braking Performance Level. LANDING PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT The flight crew confirms that: 1. A preliminary landing performance computation was performed before departure on the runway in use at destination 2. The initial landing conditions are applicable to the estimated arrival conditions 3. The runway condition is not degraded compared to the usual runway condition at the airport. As an example, the flight crew may omit the in-flight landing performance assessment if the expected landing conditions are not worse than the standard ones considered for dispatch (e.g. no expected tailwind, no in-flight failure affecting the landing performance), and if: ‐ For a runway that is reported Dry at time of descent preparation: The dispatch calculation was performed for Dry (or worse) on the runway in use at destination, or ‐ For a runway that is reported Wet (good) at time of descent preparation with no risk of degrading conditions: The dispatch calculation was performed for Wet (or worse) on the runway in use at destination, and the flight crew is aware that the runway is maintained to the FAA standards defining grooved or porous runways. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-160 P 4/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION If lthe flight crew does not confirm at least one of the three above mentioned conditions, the flight crew performs an in-flight landing performance assessment: 1. The flight crew identifies the Braking Performance Level with the RCAM using all available information related to the Runway Surface Conditions: a. The flight crew makes a primary assessment based on Runway Condition information (i.e. runway state, contaminant type, depth, temperature) b. The flight crew downgrades this primary Braking Performance Level in the case of PiRep, ESF, or any complementary information related to a possible degradation of the Runway Condition or braking action. 2. The flight crew calculates the Landing Performance using LDG PERF based on the identified Braking Performance Level. In addition, if there is a risk of degraded runway conditions, the flight crew considers performing a backup in-flight landing performance assessment associated with the worst likely Braking Performance Level. Regarding the landing distance assessment, the flight crew must check that, for the estimated landing weight, the Factored In-Flight Landing Distance (FACTORED LD) is shorter than the Landing Distance Available (LDA). Under exceptional circumstances, the flight crew may decide to disregard the Factored In-Flight Landing Distance (FACTORED LD). In this case the flight crew must check that the In-Flight Landing Distance (LD) is shorter than the LDA. CONTENT OF A LANDING PERFORMANCE DATA CROSSCHECK Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-160-00024915.0001001 / 29 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL When SOPs request a crosscheck of landing performance data, the flight crew must verify all of the following values: ‐ Runway ident This ensures that the runway used for the computation in the OIS and/or inserted in the FMS is the same ‐ Runway length ‐ FACTORED LD ‐ FLAPS ‐ VAPP. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B PR-NP-SOP-160 P 5/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION BRAKE OXIDATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-160-00023960.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 Applicable to: ALL Two different factors affect the life of carbon brakes: ‐ The wear of the discs ‐ The oxidation of the discs. The oxidation may degrade rapidly the carbon brakes and may cause the rupture of a brake disc. The main cause of oxidation is the repetitive high temperature of the brakes (particularly above 400 °C). Therefore, the flight crew should not use high braking rate when not necessary. APPROACH PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-160-00009493.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should obtain the latest weather at destination approximately 15 min before the descent. Then, they should prepare the FMS for the descent and the arrival. The PF transfers the control to the PM. Therefore during the FMS preparation, ROW/ROP and autobrake setting, the PF is head down, so it is important that the PM is not involved in any other task than flying the aircraft. APPROACH BRIEFING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-160-00009494.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL The main objective of the approach briefing is for the PF to inform the PM of the intended course of action for the approach. The briefing should be practical and appropriate to the expected weather conditions. The briefing should be concise and conducted in a logical manner. The flight crew should perform the approach briefing when the workload is low, if possible, to enable the best concentration on the content. It is very important to resolve any misunderstandings at this time. It is recommended to perform the approach using the maximum level of automation. Therefore, the flight crew should announce during the briefing if they intend to deviate from this recommendation (e.g. AP or A/THR disconnection, approach in a selected mode). Before starting an approach, the flight crew must brief again any change to the procedure initially planned during descent preparation (in particular changes to lateral, vertical and go around trajectory). 1. Miscellaneous Aircraft technical status (i.e. MEL and CDL items, OEB as applicable) NOTAMs 350-941 FLEET FCTM C to E → Continued on the following page PR-NP-SOP-160 P 6/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION Continued from the previous page 1. Miscellaneous Weather: ‐ Accessibility of the destination and alternate airports (e.g. weather above landing minima) ‐ Destination runway in use. Other Operational risks: ‐ Consider specific local characteristics: e.g. metric altitudes, QFE, high airfield elevation, terrain ‐ Flight crew performance/limitations. Fuel at DEST, ALTN, HOLDING √ Extra Fuel √ T/D (time, position) √ MORA, STAR, TRANS, MSA √ Altitude and speed constraints √ Entry in holding pattern MHA and MAX speed Approach type √ Altitude and FAF identification √ Descent gradient √ MDA/DH √ Missed approach procedure √ Alternate considerations √ 2. FMS ACTIVE/FUEL & LOAD Page 3. Descent 4. Holding (If expected) 5. Approach ACTIVE/FUEL & LOAD page ACTIVE/FUEL & LOAD page ACTIVE/F-PLN page Charts, ND and VD ACTIVE/F-PLN page ACTIVE/F-PLN page and ND ACTIVE/F-PLN page ACTIVE/F-PLN page APPR panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page and FMA ACTIVE/F-PLN page ACTIVE/F-PLN page 6. Landing Runway characteristics: Length, slope, surface (smooth, grooved or porous) Runway Surface Conditions & associated Braking Performance Level Expected wind Landing performance considerations vs. Braking Performance Level and expected wind Use of Autoland (if applicable) Use of Autobrake Use of Reversers, i.e. Idle or Max Expected taxi clearance 7. NAVAIDS NAVAIDS √ POSITION/NAVAIDS page √ Items that should be crosschecked on the associated display. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E PR-NP-SOP-160 P 7/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT PREPARATION Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-160 P 8/8 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COMPUTATION PRINCIPLE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-170-00009496.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL T/D AND PROFILE COMPUTATION The FMS calculates the Top Of Descent point (T/D) backwards from a point that is 1 000 ft high on the final approach with a speed at VAPP. It takes into account any descent speed and altitude constraints and assumes the use of managed speed. The first segment of the descent is always an idle segment until the aircraft reaches the first altitude constraint. Subsequent segments are geometric, i.e. the descent will be flown at a specific angle, taking into account any subsequent constraint. If the STAR includes a holding pattern, the FMS does not take it into account for T/D or fuel computation. The T/D appears on the ND as a symbol. The idle segment assumes a defined managed speed flown with idle thrust plus a small amount of thrust. This provides some flexibility to keep the aircraft on the descent path if engine anti-ice is used or if winds vary. This explains the THR DES display on the FMA. The T/D computed by the FMS is reliable provided the flight plan is correctly documented down to the approach. GUIDANCE AND MONITORING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-170-00009497.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION In order to perform the descent, the flight crew can use either the managed vertical mode (i.e. DES mode) or a selected vertical mode (i.e. the OP DES mode or the V/S mode). They can fly both vertical modes either in selected speed or managed speed. The modes and monitoring means are linked. The DES mode guides the aircraft along the descent profile computed by the FMS, as long as it follows the lateral F-PLN: i.e. DES mode is available if the NAV mode is engaged. As a general rule, when the flight crew engaged the DES mode, they monitor the descent by using: ‐ The vertical deviation (VERT DEV) called "yoyo" on the PFD, or the VERT DEV value on the ACTIVE/PERF page ‐ or . The level-off symbol on the ND: i.e. The flight crew engages the OP DES or the V/S modes when they fly in HDG or TRACK modes, or when they intend to miss an altitude constraint, or for other tactical purposes. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-170 P 1/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT As a general rule when OP DES or the V/S modes are engaged, the flight crew monitors the descent by using: ‐ The energy circle symbol on the ND The energy circle appears in HDG or TRACK modes and indicates the required distance to descend, decelerate and land from the present position. ‐ The level-off symbol on the ND: i.e. . When the aircraft is near the lateral F-PLN (i.e. the crosstrack error is small and less than 5 NM), the "yoyo" on the PFD is also a good indicator. MANAGED VERTICAL MODE The slope of the managed descent profile from high altitude is approximately 2.5 °. The flight crew should estimate the distance to touchdown in order to monitor the descent profile. Therefore, they must ensure that the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN page reflects the expected approach routing. Any gross error noticed in the descent profile is usually the result of a false routing entered in the FMS, or of waypoints not sequenced by the FMS, that lead to an erroneous distance to touchdown. DESCENT INITIATION To initiate a descent in a managed vertical mode, the flight crew sets the ATC cleared altitude on the AFS CP and pushes the ALT knob. The DES mode engages and is annunciated on the FMA. If the ATC requires an early descent, the rate of descent in the DES mode achieves 1 000 ft/min, until the aircraft regains the computed profile. To avoid overshooting the computed descent path, it is preferable to push the ALT knob a few miles prior to the calculated TOD. This method ensures a controlled entry into the descent and is particularly useful in situations of high cruise Mach number or strong tailwinds. If the descent is delayed, the flight crew should reduce the speed toward green dot. When cleared for descent, the flight crew pushes the ALT knob to engage the DES mode, and pushes the SPD/MACH knob to activate the managed speed. The speed reduction prior to descent enables the aircraft to recover the computed profile more quickly while it accelerates to the managed descent speed. DESCENT PROFILE In the DES mode with managed speed, the AP/FD guides the aircraft along the computed descent path that depends on a number of factors such as altitude constraints, wind and descent speed. However, because the actual conditions may differ from those planned, the DES mode operates within a 20 kt speed range around the managed target speed to maintain the descent path. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-170 P 2/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT If the aircraft is higher than the computed descent path: ‐ The speed increases toward the upper limit of the speed range, to keep the aircraft on the path with IDLE thrust. ‐ If the speed reaches the upper limit, THR IDLE is maintained, but the autopilot does not allow the speed to increase above the upper limit, therefore, the VERT DEV slowly increases ‐ A path intercept point, which assumes half speedbrake extension, appears on the ND descent track ‐ If the flight crew does not extend the speed brakes, the intercept point moves forward. If it approaches a waypoint associated with an altitude constraint, then EXTEND SPD BRK appears on the PFD and on the MFD. This technique enables the FMS to respect an altitude constraint with a minimum use of the speed brakes. When regaining the descent profile, the flight crew should retract the speed brakes to prevent the A/THR from applying thrust against the speed brakes. If the flight crew does not retract the speed brakes, the speed brake symbol becomes amber and RETRACT SPD BRK appears on the PFD and on the MFD. If the aircraft is lower than the computed descent path: The speed decreases toward the lower limit of the speed range with idle thrust. When the lower speed limit is reached, the A/THR reverts to SPEED/MACH mode and applies thrust to maintain the descent path at this lower speed. The path intercept point appears on the ND to indicate where the descent profile will be regained. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-170 P 3/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - DESCENT If the flight crew uses the selected speed: The computed descent profile remains unchanged. The selected speed may differ from the speed taken into account in the computed descent profile and the 20 kt speed deviation range does not apply. Therefore, the aircraft may deviate from the descent profile e.g. if the flight crew selects 275 kt with a computed descent profile assuming a managed speed of 300 kt, the VERT DEV will increase. SELECTED VERTICAL MODE There are two modes for flying a descent in a selected vertical mode: The OP DES and the V/S modes. The flight crew uses those modes for tactical purposes. The V/S mode automatically engages when the flight crew engages the HDG or TRACK mode, while in DES mode. In HDG or TRACK mode, only the OP DES and the V/S modes are available for the descent. To initiate a descent in a selected vertical mode, the flight crew sets the ATC cleared altitude on the AFS CP and pulls the ALT knob. The OP DES mode engages and is annunciated on the FMA. In the OP DES mode, the A/THR commands THR IDLE and the THS controls the speed. Speed can be either managed or selected. In managed speed, the descent speed appears as a magenta target but there is no longer a speed target range since the computed flight profile does not apply. The AP/FD does not consider any FMS descent altitude constraint and flies a descent without any restriction down to the AFS CP selected altitude. If the flight crew wants to increase the rate of descent, they should use the OP DES mode and select a higher speed. Speed brakes are very effective in increasing the descent rate but the flight crew should use them with caution at high altitude due to the associated increase in VLS. If the flight crew wants to reduce the descent path, they can use the V/S mode. The A/THR reverts to the SPEED mode. In this configuration, the use of speed brakes is not recommended to reduce the speed, because this can lead to increase the thrust and therefore to maintain the speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SOP-170 P 4/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - HOLDING HOLDING SPEED AND CONFIGURATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-180-00009502.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL If the flight crew flies a holding pattern, an automatic speed reduction occurs to reach the maximum endurance speed when entering the holding pattern, provided NAV mode is engaged and the speed/Mach is managed. The maximum endurance speed is approximately GD +20 kt and provides the lowest fuel consumption. If the maximum endurance speed is greater than the ICAO or state maximum holding speed, the flight crew should select flap 1 below 20 000 ft and fly S speed. Fuel consumption increases when holding in other configuration than clean configuration and maximum endurance speed. IN THE HOLDING PATTERN Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-180-00009503.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL The holding pattern is not included in the descent path computation because the FMS does not know how many patterns will be flown. When the holding fix is sequenced, the FMS assumes that only one holding pattern will be flown and updates predictions accordingly. When in the holding pattern, the VDEV indicates the vertical deviation between current aircraft altitude and the altitude at which the aircraft should cross the exit fix in order to be on the descent profile. The DES mode commands 1 000 ft/min rate of descent which is maintained during the hold, until reaching the cleared altitude set on the AFS CP or the altitude constraint. When in the holding pattern, last exit time and fuel information is displayed on the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN/HOLD page. This is the latest time to depart the hold with the required minimum reserves. These predictions are upon the fuel policy requirements specified on the FMS FUEL & LOAD page with no extra fuel, assuming the aircraft will divert. The flight crew should be aware that this information is computed with defined assumptions, e.g.: ‐ Aircraft weight being equal to landing weight at primary destination ‐ A cost index equal to zero (minimum fuel consumption) ‐ A flight level, depending on the alternate flight plan distance: • FL 100 if the alternate flight plan distance is less than 100 NM • FL 220 if the alternate flight plan distance is equal to or higher than 100 NM and less than 200 NM • FL 310 if the alternate flight plan distance is 200 NM or more. ‐ Constant wind as entered in the alternate field in the DES panel of the WIND page ‐ Constant delta ISA equal to delta ISA at primary destination ‐ Airway distance for a company route, otherwise direct distance. The flight crew can modify the alternate airport via the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN/ALTERNATE page. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-180 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - HOLDING To exit the holding pattern, the flight crew should select either: ‐ IMMEDIATE EXIT on the ACTIVE/F-PLN page The aircraft returns immediately to the hold fix, exits the holding pattern and resumes its navigation, or ‐ HDG if radar vectors, or ‐ DIR TO if cleared to a waypoint. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SOP-180 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH General INTRODUCTION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN-00009504.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL All approaches are divided into three parts (i.e. initial, intermediate and final) where the flight crew should perform associated configuration management and guidance management. Techniques, which apply to specific approach types are covered in the appropriate chapters. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN P 1/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN-00009533.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS When established on the final descent profile, the barometric altitudes read on PFD will be consequently higher and should be validated after the altitude correction has been made. For the same reason, the MDA must be updated. For altitude correction in cold weather operations, Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 In Flight. FLS BEAM The virtual FLS beam is corrected for temperature below ISA thanks to the ground temperature entered in the MFD PERF APP page. The FMS trajectory is not corrected for temperature below ISA. This may lead for low ISA to the non-superposition of the FMS trajectory to the FLS beam. FLS beam corrected for cold temperature When the F-G/S mode engages, the FMS trajectory (green) moves toward the FLS beam trajectory (magenta). 350-941 FLEET FCTM B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN P 2/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ILS/SLS /GLS BEAM The ILS/SLS /GLS beam is not affected by the temperature. RNP AR VERTICAL PATH The RNP AR vertical path is not corrected with temperature. As a consequence approaches that uses this type of vertical path are limited by the temperature. APPROACH SPEED TECHNIQUE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN-00022440.0001001 / 10 JUN 16 Applicable to: ALL DECELERATED APPROACH This technique refers to an approach where the aircraft reaches 1 000 ft in the landing configuration at VAPP. EARLY STABILIZED APPROACH This technique refers to an approach where the aircraft reaches the FAF in the landing configuration at VAPP. To get a valuable deceleration pseudo waypoint and to ensure a timely deceleration, the pilot should enter VAPP as a speed constraint at the FAF. DISCONTINUED APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN-00022442.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL The discontinued approach is an alternative technique to the GO AROUND procedure to interrupt an approach when the aircraft is at or above the selected altitude on the AFS CP. Contrary to the GO AROUND procedure, the discontinued approach technique does not require the flight crew to set the thrust levers to the TOGA detent. The flight crew should initiate the discontinued approach technique with the callout: “CANCEL APPROACH”. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to D → PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN P 3/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The first action of the flight crew is to press the APPR pb or LOC pb in order to disengage and disarm any AP/FD approach mode. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN P 4/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Configuration Management INITIAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF-00009505.0001001 / 16 APR 19 Applicable to: ALL APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION Activation of the approach phase initiates a deceleration toward VAPP or toward the speed constraint inserted at the FAF, whichever applies. When in NAV mode with managed speed/Mach, the approach phase automatically activates when sequencing the deceleration pseudo waypoint D. If an early deceleration is required, the flight crew can activate the approach phase on the APPR panel of the FMS PERF page. When in HDG mode, e.g. for radar vectoring, the flight crew manually activates the approach phase. When the approach phase is activated, the magenta triangle (i.e. the target speed) drops to VAPP, whereas the short term managed speed appears as a magenta dot. The short term managed speed is green dot in clean configuration, S in FLAP 1, etc... As defined in standard operating procedures, there are two approach techniques: ‐ The decelerated approach ‐ The early stabilized approach. TAILWIND CONDITIONS In the case of an expected tailwind that is more than 10 kt during the approach and/or landing, use one of the following techniques: ‐ Fly an early stabilized approach ‐ Use the CDA deceleration profile (if installed). The flight crew may also decide to perform a decelerated approach in these conditions. They should however adapt the configuration change to decrease the aircraft speed earlier. They should particularly anticipate Flaps 2 extension (e.g. with the use of speed brakes and/or landing gear extension to increase drag). This applies particularly when the aircraft encounters one of the following conditions that is not good: ‐ A tailwind that is more than 15 kt during approach ‐ A glide path that is more than 3 ° ‐ An aircraft weight that is near the MLW. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 1/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH INTERMEDIATE APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF-00009506.0002001 / 09 MAR 18 Applicable to: ALL The purpose of the intermediate approach is to bring the aircraft to the final descent point at the correct speed, altitude and configuration. DECELERATION AND CONFIGURATION CHANGE The CDA function can recompute the descent profile and the position of the pseudo-waypoints. However, the CDA function is more efficient if the flight crew flies a fully managed approach. Managed speed is recommended for the approach. When the approach phase is activated, the A/THR guides the aircraft speed toward the short-term managed speed displayed as a magenta dot. The short-term managed speed is the target speed of the current configuration, whenever higher than VAPP, e.g. green dot for CONF 0, S speed for CONF 1 etc. The managed speed target displayed either with the numeric value when out of the speed scale or with a magenta triangle when within the speed scale, drops to VAPP. When the flight crew select FLAPS 1, the Automatic Extension System (AES) automatically limits the slats/flaps extension to CONF 1 as long as the speed exceeds 203 kt. When the speed drops below 203 kt, the slats/flaps extends to CONF 1+F. The CDA function considers the expected configuration to calculate the deceleration in the segments (e.g. between the pseudo waypoints FLAP1 and FLAP2, the CDA function assumes a flaps 1 configuration). Therefore, the flight crew should select the corresponding configuration at the latest at the pseudo-waypoint. (e.g. select flaps 1 at the latest at the FLAP1 pseudo-waypoint). After the pseudo-waypoint FLAP2, the flight crew should not delay configuring the aircraft for landing, in order to have a stabilized configuration at 1 000 ft. To achieve a constant deceleration and to minimize thrust variations, the flight crew should extend the next configuration when reaching the short term managed speed +10 kt (IAS must be lower than VFE next). E.g., when the speed reaches green dot +10 kt, the flight crew should select FLAPS 1. If the flight crew uses selected speed to comply with ATC, they should set the requested speed on the AFS CP. The flight crew can select a speed below the manoeuvring speed of the current configuration provided that selected speed is above VLS. When the ATC speed constraint no longer applies, the flight crew should push the SPD/MACH knob on the AFS CP to resume managed speed. When flying the intermediate approach in selected speed, the flight crew should activate the approach phase. This ensures further correct speed deceleration when resuming managed speed. If they do not activate the approach phase, the aircraft will accelerate to the previous speed applicable to the descent phase. If the flight crew uses the selected speed mode, the position of the magenta dot is a valuable cue to identify the short term managed speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 2/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The flight crew can use the speed brakes to increase the deceleration rate, but they should be aware of: ‐ The increase of VLS with the use of speed brakes ‐ The limited effect at low speeds. When the FMS displays the EXTEND SPD BRK message, the flight crew should extend half speedbrakes at first. Then, if half speedbrakes is not enough, the flight crew should extend more speedbrakes. This is to avoid the successive display of the EXTEND SPD BRK and RETRACT SPD BRK messages. INTERCEPTION OF FINAL APPROACH COURSE To ensure a smooth interception of the final approach course, the aircraft ground speed should be appropriate, depending on the interception angle and distance to the runway threshold. The flight crew refers to the applicable raw data (i.e. LOC, needles), XTK information on ND and wind component for the selection of an appropriate IAS. Deceleration will not occur automatically as long as the lateral mode is HDG or TRK. If ATC provides a new wind for landing, the flight crew updates it on the APPR panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page. FINAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF-00009507.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL SPEED CONSIDERATION VAPP The flight crew defines the approach speed (VAPP) to perform the safest approach. It is a function of gross weight, configuration, headwind, A/THR ON(OFF) and downburst. In most cases, the FMS provides reliable VAPP on the APPR panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page, when the flight crew inserted the tower wind and FLAPS 3 or FLAPS FULL landing configuration. The calculated VAPP is based on the VLS and takes into account a part of the headwind component of the reported wind on ground. The VAPP has a minimum of VLS +5 kt and a maximum of VLS +15 kt (For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-27-10-20 VAPP). The flight crew can insert: ‐ A lower VAPP on the APPR panel, down to VLS, if landing is performed with A/THR OFF, with no wind and no downburst, or ‐ A higher VAPP in the case of suspected strong downburst 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 3/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH ‐ The VAPP calculated by the OIS LDG PERF application if a failure affects the landing performance. ‐ The VAPP increment if required by an ECAM abnormal procedure. In the case of strong or gusty crosswind greater than 20 kt, VAPP should be at least equal to VLS +5 kt. The 5 kt increment above VLS may be increased up to 15 kt at the flight crew's discretion. The flight crew should bear in mind that the wind entered in the APPR panel of the ACTIVE/PERF page considers that the wind direction is in the same reference as the runway direction (e. g. if airport is magnetic referenced, the flight crew inserts a magnetic wind). The wind direction provided by ATIS and tower is given in the same reference as the runway direction whereas the wind provided by VOLMET, METAR or TAF is always true referenced. VAPP is computed at predicted landing weight while the aircraft is in CRZ or DES phase. When the APPR phase is activated, VAPP is computed using the current gross weight. The flight crew should use managed speed for final approach as it provides the Ground Speed Mini protection, even if VAPP was manually inserted. GROUND SPEED MINI Purpose The purpose of the Ground Speed Mini function is to keep the aircraft energy level above a minimum value, whatever the wind variations or gusts. This enables an efficient management of the thrust in gusts or in longitudinal windshears. The thrust varies in the right direction, but in a smaller range in gusty situations, which explains why the Ground Speed Mini function is recommended in such situations. Moreover, the Ground Speed Mini function provides additional safety margins in windshears. Finally, it improves flight crew's awareness of the situation in the case of approaches affected by wind or gusts by monitoring the magenta target speed: e.g. a target increase indicates a headwind gust. Computation This minimum energy level is the energy the aircraft will have at landing with the expected tower wind. It is materialized by the ground speed of the aircraft at that time which is called Ground Speed Mini. Ground Speed Mini = VAPP – Tower Headwind Component To do so, the aircraft IAS varies during the approach, in order to cope with the gusts or wind changes. The FMS continuously computes an IAS target speed which ensures that the aircraft ground speed is at least equal to the Ground Speed Mini at landing. The FMS uses the instantaneous wind component experienced by the aircraft. Managed speed target = VAPP + computed gust 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 4/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The computed gust takes into account a part of the current headwind component and the tower headwind component. The computed gust has a limit of 0 kt, as a minimum value. The computed IAS target speed is limited by: ‐ VAPP as the minimum value, in the case of tailwind or if the Current Headwind Component is lower than the Tower Headwind Component The Tower Headwind Component has a limit of 10 kt, as a minimum value. ‐ VFE NEXT, in configuration clean, 1, 2, 3, as the maximum value, in the case of very strong gusts ‐ VFE -5 kt, in configuration FULL, as the maximum value, in the case of very strong gusts. USE OF A/THR The flight crew should use the A/THR for approaches as it provides accurate speed control. During final approach, the managed target speed moves along the speed scale as a function of wind variation. The flight crew should ideally check that the target speed is adequate referring to GS on the top left on ND. If the A/THR performance is unsatisfactory, the flight crew should disconnect it and control the thrust manually. If the flight crew is going to perform the landing using manual thrust, they should disconnect the A/THR before passing 1 000 ft AGL on the final approach. TRAJECTORY STABILIZATION The first prerequisite for safe final approach and landing is to stabilize the aircraft as per criteria given in the FCOM (Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-180-A Stabilization Criteria). If, for any reason, one flight parameter deviates from stabilized conditions, the PM announces a callout as stated below: IAS V/S Pitch attitude Bank angle Approaches using XLS guidance Approaches with a selected course Flight Parameter Deviation and Associated PM Callout Flight Parameter Deviation VAPP +10 kt / -5 kt if the descent rate goes above 1 200 ft/min +10 °/ 0 ° 6° LOC(F-LOC)(LOC B/C) 1/2 dot PFD Excess deviation G/S(F-G/S) 1/2 dot PFD Parameter Course Altitude at check points 350-941 FLEET FCTM Callout "SPEED" "SINK RATE" "PITCH" "BANK" "LOC" "GLIDE" Excess deviation: 1/2 dot on PFD (or 2.5 ° (VOR) / 5 ° (ADF )) "COURSE" Deviation "x FT HIGH (LOW)" ←C→ PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 5/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Following a PM callout associated with a flight parameter deviation, the appropriate PF response is: ‐ Acknowledge the PM callout, for correct crew coordination purposes ‐ Take immediate corrective action to control the exceeded parameter back into the defined stabilized conditions ‐ Assess whether stabilized conditions will be recovered early enough prior to landing, otherwise initiate a go-around. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF P 6/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Guidance Management INITIAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI-00009509.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL USE OF THE VD Within 25 NM around the navaid in relation to the selected arrival or the approach procedure, the displayed minimum altitude switches from MORA to MSA. MSA displayed on VD is associated with the navaids of the selected procedure. The flight crew should keep in mind that crossing the safe altitudes during an approach is not always a constraint violation, as long as the flight monitoring is supported by another means, e.g. the radar control. This is why the safe altitude does not appear as a red line (but as a magenta line). However, crossing the safety altitude should alert the flight crew regarding the aircraft position and the ATC clearance, i.e. "I will go below if I am sure of my position and if I am allowed to do it (radar or procedure)". F-PLN SEQUENCING In NAV mode, the F-PLN automatically sequences. In HDG (TRACK) mode, the F-PLN waypoints automatically sequence only if the aircraft flies near the programmed route. A correct F-PLN sequencing is important to ensure that: ‐ The Vertical Display is meaningful ‐ The programmed missed approach route is available in the case of go-around ‐ The predictions are correct. A good cue to monitor the correct F-PLN sequencing is the TO waypoint on the upper right side of the ND which should be the next waypoint ahead of the aircraft. If under radar vectors and if automatic waypoint sequencing does not occur, it is recommended to sequence the F-PLN by using the DIR TO COURSE IN function. For more information about the waypoint sequencing, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FMS-10-40-10 Flight Plan Waypoints. DIR TO COURSE IN must not be used beyond the Final Descent Point, in order to ensure that the vertical profile in final approach is unchanged. Using DIR TO or DIR TO COURSE IN function arms the NAV mode. If the NAV mode is not appropriate, pull the HDG/TRK knob to disarm it. NAVIGATION ACCURACY When NAV PRIMARY is available, no NAV ACCURACY monitoring is required. When NAV PRIMARY is lost the crew will check on MFD POS MONITOR page that the required navigation accuracy is appropriate. If the NAV ACCUR DOWNGRADED message is displayed 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI P 1/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH on the FMS, the crew will use raw data for navigation accuracy check. The navigation accuracy determines which AP modes the flight crew should use and the type of ND display. NAVIGATION ACCURACY NAV PRIMARY NAV ACCUR HIGH NAV PRIMARY LOST and NAV ACCUR LOW NAV PRIMARY LOST and aircraft flying within unreliable radio navaid area PF ND PM ARC or ROSE NAV with navaid raw data ROSE LS ARC or ROSE NAV or ROSE LS with navaid raw data AP/FD mode NAV HDG or TRK APPROACH DEVIATION INDICATIONS The flight crew checks the LS pb is pressed in the first stage of the approach. The flight crew checks that: ‐ Deviation scales are displayed on the PFD ‐ The IDENT is properly displayed on the PFD. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI-00009510.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL INTERCEPTION OF FINAL APPROACH COURSE When cleared for approach, and when on the intercept of the approach lateral trajectory, the flight crew should press the APPR pb. This arms the approach mode and lateral and vertical approach modes are displayed in blue on the FMA. At this stage the second AP, if available, should be selected if the approach is an ILS. The VV pb may be pressed, to display the small black bird, as a TRK/FPA information. It is particularly useful for crosswind or gusty conditions, to improve the situation awareness and smoothen the transition from instrument references to visual references. If the ATC clears for a lateral capture only, the flight crew will press LOC pb on the AFS CP. If the ATC clears for approach at a significant distance, e.g. 30 NM, the flight crew should be aware that the G/S may be disrupted and APPR1 will be displayed on FMA untill a valid Radio Altimeter signal is received. The AP uses the computed aircraft position versus the runway axis to smoothly capture the LOC, or F-LOC. If ATC provides radar vectors, the flight crew uses the DIR TO COURSE IN function. This ensures: ‐ A correct F-PLN sequencing ‐ An appropriate ND display ‐ An assistance for lateral interception ‐ The VDEV to be computed on reasonable distance assumptions. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI P 2/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The final approach course interception in NAV mode is possible if NAV is PRIMARY or NAV is ACCUR HIGH. When established on the lateral approach trajectory, the flight crew should not perform a DIR TO to sequence the F-PLN because this results in the FMS reverting to NAV mode, if the guidance mode is LOC or F-LOC. In this case, the LOC or F-LOC must be armed and captured again, unduly increasing the workload. When the aircraft is cleared for the approach, the flight crew presses the APPR pb to arm the approach modes when applicable. FINAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI-00009511.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL GO-AROUND ALTITUDE SETTING When established on final approach, the flight crew should set the go-around altitude on the AFS CP. This can be done at any time when G/S or F-G/S or APP-DES mode engages. However, for an approach with a selected guidance (either FPA or V/S), the flight crew must set the missed approach altitude only when the current aircraft altitude is below the missed approach altitude, in order to avoid inappropriate ALT* engagement. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI P 3/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH REACHING THE MINIMA The flight crew must decide to land or go-around at the minimum altitude at the latest. When the aircraft reaches the minimum altitude, at the MINIMUM callout: ‐ Continue and land if the appropriate visual references can be maintained and the aircraft is correctly established, or ‐ Go-around in all other cases. The flight crew should not set the minimum altitude as the target altitude on the AFS CP, because it causes a spurious ALT* when approaching the minimum altitude, resulting in a destabilization of the approach at a critical stage. AP DISCONNECTION During the final approach with the AP engaged, the aircraft is stabilized. Therefore, when the flight crew disconnects the AP for a manual landing, they should avoid to make large inputs on the sidestick. The flight crew should disconnect the autopilot early enough to resume manual control of the aircraft and to evaluate the drift before the flare. During crosswind conditions, the flight crew should avoid any tendency to drift downwind. Some common errors include: ‐ Descending below the final path ‐ Reducing the drift too early. MISCELLANEOUS Near the ground, avoid nose down corrections, the priority is attitude and sink rate. For more information on the effect of failure during approach, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FG-100-20 Autoland Warning. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI P 4/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Specificities - Approach with Vertical Selected Guidance PARTICULAR CASES Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA-00009529.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL This section deals with the guidance management of RNAV(GNSS) with LNAV minima or navaid approaches when the FLS function is not available. This can be due to: ‐ The approach construction (e.g. where the offset between final approach course and runway exceeds 50 °) ‐ A multiple failure condition (e.g. MMR 1+2 failure) ‐ RAW ONLY degradation (e.g. in the case of NAV ACCUR DOWNGRADED). In these cases, the FLS function must not be used. The lateral guidance may be either NAV or TRK and it depends on the flown approach type. The vertical guidance will be FPA. INITIAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA-00009530.0001001 / 27 SEP 18 Applicable to: ALL The early stabilized approach technique is recommended. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA-00009531.0001001 / 04 OCT 17 Applicable to: ALL When cleared for final approach course interception: If the navigation status is NAV PRIMARY or NAV PRIMARY LOST with ACCURACY HIGH The flight crew should use the NAV mode and validate the final interception course with raw data. Under radar vectoring, the flight crew should use the DIRECT TO CRS IN function. In all other cases: The flight crew selects the appropriate track on the AFS-CP, in order to establish final course tracking with reference to navaid raw data. When established on the final course, the selected track compensates the drift. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA P 1/2 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FINAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA-00009532.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should preset the FPA reference on the AFS CP 1 NM prior to the FAF, at the latest. The flight crew should perform a smooth interception of the final approach path by pulling the V/S / FPA knob 0.3 NM prior to the FAF. The flight crew should monitor the vertical navigation with altitude and distance raw data. When reaching the minima: ‐ If the required visual conditions are met at or above the MDA, the PF must disengage the AP (if not previously done) and orders the PM to: • Set the FDs off • Set the runway track. ‐ If the required visual conditions are not met before the MDA, a missed approach must be initiated. 350-941 FLEET FCTM D PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA P 2/2 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Specificities - FLS GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-00009513.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL This chapter explains some specificities to fly an approach with the FLS function. However, general recommendations mentioned in aircraft configuration management and aircraft guidance management of this FCTM APPROACH section apply. The approaches based on radio navaids and the RNAV (GNSS) with LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima, can be flown with the FMS Landing System (FLS) function. For LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C approaches, the lateral guidance remains based on the radio beam, and the FLS function can guide the aircraft on the vertical path, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C Approach. The flight crew can use the FLS function, if: ‐ The FLS function is available ‐ The required FLS capability for the approach is available. FLS PRINCIPLE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-00009514.0001001 / 17 AUG 17 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The FLS function allows to fly a navaids approach, or a RNAV(GNSS) with LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima approaches "ILS alike". The FMS uses information from the Navigation Database to compute a virtual FLS beam. The FMS sends the virtual beam to the Multi Mode Receiver (MMR). The MMR computes and displays the lateral and vertical angular deviations based on this FLS virtual beam and the aircraft position, like an ILS approach. These deviations are presented as double diamonds both on PFD & ND. The FLS virtual beam may be followed with F-LOC and F-G/S AP/FD modes. The FLS beam appears as a magenta doted line on the ND and VD. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 1/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLS virtual beam FLS on PFD 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 2/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The virtual FLS beam is characterized by: ‐ An anchor point The ident of the anchor point: • The ICAO code of the airport if it is located on the runway threshold, followed by the threshold runway identifier (i.e. LFBO32L) • The End Point (EP) in the others cases, followed by the threshold runway identifier (i.e. EP33L) ‐ A slope ‐ An approach course. The approach course is displayed as a double course pointer on the PFD heading scale. APPROACH CAPABILITY The approach capability is displayed on FMA, when the flight crew presses the LS pb. This approach capability helps the flight crew to determine the approach strategy : ‐ F-APP: Rely on FLS deviations and F-G/S, F-LOC guidance ‐ F-APP+RAW: Refer to FLS deviations and cross-check with navaid raw data (i.e. VOR, NDB and/or DME) ‐ RAW ONLY : Disregard FLS information and refer exclusively to NAVAID raw data i.e. VOR, NDB and/or DME to perform the approach. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-FPA Particular Cases. Note: ‐ Any approach capability degradation is associated with a triple click (as for ILS) and indicates the new strategy for the flight crew. ‐ In F-APP+RAW, the distance to be considered for the altitude/distance check is the radio-computed distance on the ND and not the FMS computed distance (to anchor point) on the PFD. ‐ The flight crew must not fly RNAV approaches when the FLS capability is F-APP +RAW, or RAW ONLY as no navaids raw data is available for this approach. F-G/S DEVIATION REFERENCE Unlike the ILS G/S, the F-G/S deviations are barometric referenced (i.e. a 1 hPa altimeter setting error will move the F-G/S vertical profile 30 ft up or down). The flight crew should therefore pay particular attention to the altimeter setting. Any altimeter setting change during the approach must be reflected both on EFIS-CP and on the MFD ACTIVE/PERF page. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 3/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Whatever the altimeter setting used prior or during the approach (i.e. STD, QNH, or QFE ), the virtual FLS GS beam is always based on QNH. The QNH value used for FLS beam is either: ‐ The QNH value entered on the APPR page of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page (as long as STD is used for barometric reference), or ‐ The QNH value entered on EFIS-CP (when QNH is used for barometric reference), or ‐ Computed from the QFE (if installed) set on EFIS-CP and the runway elevation from the FM data base (when QFE is used for barometric reference) When the temperature is below ISA, the F-G/S deviations are corrected in temperature, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-GEN Cold Weather Operations. EARTH CURVATURE EFFECT When the FLS function is used, the final path crossing altitudes are geometric altitudes referring to the anchor point. When intercepting the final approach path, and due to the earth curvature effect, a slight altitude deviation between the altimeter and the published approach chart may be noticed. Typically, at FAF, the F-G/S virtual beam is about 50 ft higher. Earth Curvature effect OFFSET APPROACH Depending on the approach procedure construction, the anchor point may be different from the runway threshold and may be located abeam this threshold. The anchor point ident is EPXX (e.g. EP33L). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 4/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Anchor point different from the runway threshold Down to MDA, the distance and slope information on the PFD are representative of distance and slope to the runway threshold. When flying the visual part of the approach (i.e. below the MDA): ‐ The distance displayed on PFD is no longer representative of distance to the threshold The distance may increase as the aircraft is converging towards the runway threshold. ‐ When the aircraft leaves the F-LOC beam toward the runway threshold, the F-G/S deviation becomes meaningless and must be disregarded. FLS FUNCTION USE Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009515.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 FLS FUNCTION USE All published NPA coded in the FM database may be flown using the FLS function provided that: ‐ The offset between final approach course and runway course does not exceed 50 ° ‐ At least one FM and one MMR are available ‐ The approach capability is at least F-APP or F-APP+RAW. If the FLS function is not available due to the approach construction, the NO FLS FOR THIS APPR message appears on the MFD when the flight crew selects the approach on the ACTIVE/F-PLN/ARRIVAL page of the FMS. If the FLS function is not available or limited (e.g. F-APP+RAW or RAW ONLY) due to system failures, this is displayed on the ECAM STATUS page. When available and usable, the FLS function should be preferred. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009519.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 FLYING TECHNIQUE The double diamond symbol indicates the FLS deviations. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 5/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The FLS deviation indications enables: ‐ The flight crew to fly the approach with similar pilot skill compared to standard ILS (beam concept) ‐ Crew awareness (double diamond are FMS computed data). The FLS deviations can be flown with or without guidance (AP /FD). Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009520.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 APPROACH PREPARATION It is essential to understand that the FLS virtual beam is generated from the FMS approach coding. Therefore, the following checks are required: ‐ The FMS approach coding is crosschecked against the published approach procedure ‐ The final approach leg is not modified by the flight crew. The flight crew reviews the aircraft STATUS to check the FLS function capability. Except for RNAV approach, NAVAID must be available for display. The flight crew pre-selects the appropriate NAVAID on the NAVAID page to anticipate any approach capability degradation. The briefing outlines the key elements such as: ‐ Check of the approach coding in the FMS database ‐ Preparation of the NAVAID page ‐ Strategy in case of approach capability degradation: ‐ The flying technique below minima. (The RWY or EP anchor coding may be consulted when switching LS pb temporarily). Note: ‐ If the approach capability downgrades to F-APP+RAW, and the NAVAID raw data is not available, e.g. for RNAV approach, a go-around must be initiated unless the required conditions to continue are applicable. ‐ The distance available on the lower left part of the PFD is the FMS computed and not the radio computed and must be considered as such. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 6/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009521.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 DESCENT (CROSSING FL100) When the flight crew presses the LS pb during the descent, they should check: ‐ The FLS virtual beam course, the flight path angle and the anchor point on the lower left part of the PFD ‐ The approach capability displayed on FMA to confirm the strategy for approach. Note: ‐ The flight path angle on the PFD is expressed in term of degree whereas it is expressed in % for some approach charts (e.g. 3 ° equates to 5.2 %). ‐ If the final approach slope information is not provided on the approach chart (e.g. for some NDB approaches, the FMS gives a 3 ° default final approach slope. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009522.0001001 / 09 MAR 18 INITIAL APPROACH APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION The flight crew can perform a decelerated approach technique, as it is the case for ILS approaches. However, depending on anticipated workload (e.g wind, failure), the flight crew can also choose to perform an early stabilized approach. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009523.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 INTERMEDIATE APPROACH The FLS virtual beam is displayed in magenta and is 80 NM long. It could be intercepted at any point along the magenta line. When cleared for final approach course interception, the pilot will press APPR pb on AFS-CP. Verify F-G/S and F-LOC become armed on the FMA. Note: Obstacle clearance is not guaranteed if FLS guidance is used outside the published approach Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-1-00009524.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 FINAL APPROACH When the aircraft reaches the FAF, the flight crew must check that F-G/S is engaged. As for ILS, when the aircraft crosses the FAF, the flight crew must check the altitude and the position of the FAF with the altitude/distance check. When the FLS capability is F-APP+RAW, the flight crew must monitor the final approach using the FLS deviations and crosscheck with navaids raw data (i.e. VOR or DME). This is not applicable for RNAV approaches. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 7/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL REACHING THE MINIMA The applicable minima are those associated with the approach chart. When the aircraft reaches the MDA, the PM either monitors or announces “MINIMUM”. The current altitude value becomes amber. If the appropriate visual conditions are met at minima: The flight crew can visually continue the approach. Below minima: When the FLS is used for approach, the FDs provide lateral and vertical managed guidance down to the anchor point. The flight crew can keep the AP/FD engaged below minima. Keeping the AP/FD below minima when visual references are acquired is highly valuable in the following conditions: ‐ High minima above ground level ‐ Marginal weather conditions. However, the guidance may not be relevant especially in the following cases: ‐ MAP not at the RWY threshold and final segment not aligned with the runway track (final segment does not cross the RWY threshold) ‐ Strong offset between final segment and runway track. In such cases the AP/FD should be switched off and TRK FPA (bird) flying reference may be used. At the Minimum Use Height of the AP: The flight crew must disconnect the AP no later than the Minimum Use Height of AP, Refer to FCOM/LIM-AFS-10 Autopilot. Switching OFF FDs and use of TRK FPA (bird) is at pilot discretion. CAUTION ‐ Below minima, the visual references must be the primary references until landing. ‐ From minima, the FD provides an additional guidance. The FDs must be switched off if the guidance is not relevant or not followed. If the appropriate visual conditions are not met at minima: The flight crew must initiate a missed approach. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 8/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C APPROACH Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-2-00009516.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C APPROACH GENERAL The LOC G/S OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC B/C approaches can be flown with or without AP/FD guidance: ‐ The lateral deviation and guidance refer to a radio beam ‐ The vertical deviation and guidance refer to the FMS computed glide. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-2-00009526.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 APPROACH PREPARATION (LOC G/S OUT CASE) LOC ONLY APPROACH The flight crew selects the LOC or LOC B/C approach as required in the FMS during the approach preparation. LOC B/C APPROACHES The LOC B/C approach consist in using the LOC signal of the opposite runway for lateral approach management. The flight crew inserts the LOC B/C approach in the F-PLN if the approach is stored in the FMS database. The ILS frequency and associated back course are automatically tuned and displayed on the POSITION/NAVAID page. A "B" character appears before the CRS digit. B/C appears both on PFD and ND. The PFD and the ND provide a correct lateral deviation. ILS WITH G/S OUT APPROACH The flight crew selects the ILS approach in the FMS during the approach preparation. As the G/S deviation and guidance modes are not available, the flight crew should use the vertical FLS deviation (double diamond) and F-G/S mode. The flight crew selects the “DESELECT GLIDE” prompt in the TUNED FOR DISPLAY page of the MFD POSITION/NAVAIDS. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-2-00009527.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 DESCENT (CROSSING FL100) When the flight crew presses the LS pb during the descent, they check: ‐ FLS approach capability (only related to the vertical mode) ‐ The LOC(LOC B/C) deviation Displayed as single diamond (radio data) 350-941 FLEET FCTM D→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 9/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH ‐ The F-G/S deviation Displayed as a double diamond (FMS computed data) ‐ The LOC ident, the frequency and the DME distance. LOC - F-G/S on PFD Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-2-00022453.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 INTERMEDIATE APPROACH The flight crew presses the APPR pb on the AFS CP when cleared for approach, and on the intercept trajectory for the final approach course. The flight crew monitors that LOC (or LOC BC) and F-G/S modes arm. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS-NPA-2-00009528.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 FINAL APPROACH If the approach capability reverts to F-APP+RAW: The lateral navigation (LOC or LOC B/C deviations) remains reliable. The vertical navigation (F-G/S deviations) must be crosschecked with navaids raw data (distance/altitude). If the approach capability reverts to RAW ONLY: The F-G/S vertical deviation remains displayed but must be disregarded. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 10/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The flight crew selects a Flight Path Angle. This disengages the F-G/S mode. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 11/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-190-FLS P 12/12 09 MAY 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Specificities - ILS ILS RAW DATA Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS-00009512.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION ILS raw data technique refers to an ILS flying technique without AP/FD, with the use of the ILS raw data indications (on the PFD and ND in ROSE-LS). INITIAL APPROACH It is recommended to select TRK FPA on the AFS-CP, as the flying reference. The flight crew will fly the green bird. INTERMEDIATE APPROACH The selected track is set to the ILS course. When established on the LOC, the tail of the bird should be aligned with the blue selected track symbol. This method allows accurate LOC tracking taking into account the drift. If the LOC deviate, the flight crew flies the bird in the direction of the LOC deviation. When the aircraft is established again on the LOC, set the tail of the bird on the selected track symbol again. If there is further LOC deviation, the flight crew should suspect a slight IRS drift. The bird is computed based on IRS data. Therefore, it may be affected by IRS data drift. A typical track error at the end of the flight is 1 °to 2 °. FINAL APPROACH When 1/2 dot below the G/S, the flight crew should initiate the interception of the G/S by smoothly flying the bird down to the glide path angle. The bird almost sitting on the -5 ° pitch scale on PFD, provides a -3 ° flight path angle. If the G/S deviate, the flight crew should perform small corrections in the direction of the deviation. When the aircraft is established again on the G/S, set again the bird to the G/S angle. G/S INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS-00022471.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Criteria: XW Applicable to: B-0001 GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE The following technique enables the flight crew to intercept the glide slope of an ILS from above, provided that the aircraft is already established on the localizer of the ILS. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS P 1/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH There are a number of factors that can result in a glide slope interception from above. In such a case, the flight crew must react without delay to reach the stabilization criteria. In order to achieve the best rate of descent when cleared by ATC and below the limiting speeds, the flight crew should extend the landing gear and select flaps as required, until final configuration in the case of very late descent. The flight crew can use the speedbrakes, taking into account information detailed in the following chapter, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Intermediate Approach. When cleared to intercept the glide slope, the flight crew should: ‐ Press the APPR pb on AFS CP and confirm G/S is armed. Monitor the vertical interception. ‐ Set the AFS CP altitude above aircraft altitude to avoid ALT* engagement. ‐ Select V/S -1 500 ft/min initially. V/S in excess of -2 000 ft/min will result in the speed increasing towards VFE It is important to use the V/S mode rather than the OP DES mode to ensure that the A/THR is in speed mode rather than THR IDLE mode. The flight crew should carefully monitor the rate of descent to avoid exceeding the VFE . When approaching the vertical approach trajectory, the vertical mode will engage. The flight crew will monitor the capture with raw data (pitch and vertical deviation). The flight crew sets the missed approach altitude on the AFS CP, and reduces the speed in order to be configured for landing by 1 000 ft AAL. In this situation, taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to carry out a 360 ° turn before resuming the approach. G/S INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS-00022471.0002001 / 09 MAR 18 Criteria: L48015, XW Applicable to: B-0002 GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPTION FROM ABOVE The following technique enables the flight crew to intercept the glide slope of an ILS from above, provided that the aircraft is already established on the localizer of the ILS. There are a number of factors that can result in a glide slope interception from above. In such a case, the flight crew must react without delay to reach the stabilization criteria. In order to achieve the best rate of descent when cleared by ATC and below the limiting speeds, the flight crew should extend the landing gear and select flaps as required, until final configuration in the case of very late descent. The flight crew can use the speedbrakes, taking into account information detailed in the following chapter, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Intermediate Approach. When cleared to intercept the glide slope, the flight crew should: ‐ Press the APPR pb on AFS CP and confirm G/S is armed. Monitor the vertical interception. ‐ Set the AFS CP altitude above aircraft altitude to avoid ALT* engagement. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS P 2/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH ‐ If the HDG-V/S reference is used, select a V/S of -1 500 ft/min and adjust as necessary. V/S in excess of -2 000 ft/min will result in an increase in speed, toward VFE. ‐ If the TRK-FPA reference is used, select an FPA and adjust as necessary. V/S in excess of -2 000 ft/min will result in an increase in speed, toward VFE. It is important to use the V/S or FPA mode rather than the OP DES mode to ensure that the A/THR is in speed mode rather than THR IDLE mode. The flight crew should carefully monitor the rate of descent to avoid exceeding the VFE . When approaching the vertical approach trajectory, the vertical mode will engage. The flight crew will monitor the capture with raw data (pitch and vertical deviation). The flight crew sets the missed approach altitude on the AFS CP, and reduces the speed in order to be configured for landing by 1 000 ft AAL. In this situation, taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to carry out a 360 ° turn before resuming the approach. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS P 3/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-190-ILS P 4/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Specificities - Low Visibility Operations GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009534.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL CAT II and CAT III approaches are flown to low DH (or without DH) with potentially low RVR. Flight path guidance on the ILS beam and speed control must be of sufficient precision so that an automatic landing and roll out can be performed with the required level of safety and reliability. Flight path and speed must be stabilized throughout the final approach. For operations with DH, the flight crew must obtain appropriate visual references at or before reaching DH. In all other cases, they must perform a go-around. Therefore: ‐ Automatic landing is required for CAT III operations, and must include automatic roll out in CAT IIIB ‐ Automatic landing is the preferred landing technique in CAT II conditions ‐ Any failure of the automated systems should not significantly affect automatic landing system performance. The flight crew procedures and tasksharing should enable rapid detection of any anomaly and therefore, correct decision-making. FLIGHT PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009536.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL In addition to the normal flight preparation, the flight crew must perform the following preparation when they plan a CAT II or CAT III approach: ‐ Ensure that the destination airport meets CAT II or CAT III requirements ‐ Check aircraft required equipment for CAT II or CAT III, Refer to FCOM/LIM-AFS-20 Required Equipment for ILS CAT II/III Approach with Autoland. ‐ Check that the flight crew qualification is current ‐ Consider extra fuel for possible approach delay ‐ Consider weather at alternate. APPROACH PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009537.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL LIMITATIONS The flight crew checks that the tower wind remains within the limit for CAT II or CAT III approaches (For more information, Refer to FCOM/Maximum wind conditions). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C → PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 1/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The flight crew must observe the autoland maximum altitude. AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY The failures that may affect the LAND2 and LAND3 approach and landing capability of the aircraft are listed in the FCOM. The FG monitors most of these failures. The approach and landing capability (i.e. LAND2, LAND3 SINGLE, LAND3 DUAL) appears on the FMA once the flight crew presses then APPR pb. However, there are a number of failures that affect the approach and landing capability which are not monitored by the FG and consequently, not reflected by the capability indicated on the FMA. Therefore, it is important that the flight crew refers to the FCOM to establish the actual approach and landing capability if any of the required equipment or system is inoperative. AIRPORT FACILITIES The airport authorities are responsible for establishing and maintaining the ground-based equipment required for CAT II(III) approach and landing. The airport authorities activate the Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) as the need arises based on RVR. Before performing a CAT II(III) approach, the flight crew must receive ATC confirmation that LVPs are in force. FLIGHT CREW QUALIFICATION The captain must ensure that both flight crew members are qualified and that their qualification is current for the planned approach. SEATING POSITION The flight crew must realize the importance of eye position during low visibility approaches and landing. A too low seat position may greatly reduce the visual segment. When the eye reference position is lower than intended, the visual segment is further reduced by the cut-off angle of the glareshield or nose. USE OF LANDING LIGHTS The use of landing lights at night in low visibility can be detrimental to the acquisition of visual references. Reflected lights from water droplets or snow may reduce visibility. Therefore, the flight crew should not use the landing lights in CAT II(III) weather conditions. APPROACH STRATEGY Regardless of the actual weather conditions, the flight crew should plan the approach using the best approach capability. This would normally be LAND 3 DUAL with autoland, depending upon aircraft status. The flight crew should then assess the weather with respect to possible downgraded capability. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 2/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Conditions CAT I CAT II Flying technique Manual or AP/FD+ A/THR DA (DH), meteorological visibility/RVR Possible with precautions AP/FD + A/THR down to DH Minima & weather Autoland Recommended CAT III WITH DH NO DH AP/FD + A/THR and Autoland DH with RA RVR Mandatory GO-AROUND STRATEGY The flight crew must be mentally ready for go-around at any stage of the approach, whether due to insufficient visual references or incorrect position at DH, or to a failure. The flight crew should perform all ECAM actions (and DH amendment, if required) before reaching 1 000 ft RA. If this is not the case, the flight crew should perform a go-around. APPROACH BRIEFING Before commencing a CAT II(III) approach, the flight crew must consider a number of factors specific to LVP. In addition to the standard approach briefing, the flight crew should emphasize the following points during an approach briefing for a low visibility approach: ‐ Aircraft capability ‐ Airport facilities ‐ Flight crew qualification ‐ Weather minima ‐ Tasksharing ‐ Callouts ‐ Go-around strategy. APPROACH PROCEDURE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009538.0001001 / 05 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL TASKSHARING The workload is distributed in such a way that the PF primary tasks are supervising and decision making and the PM primary task is monitoring the operation of the automatic system. PF TASKS The PF supervises the approach (i.e. trajectory, attitude, speed), manages the AFS modes selection and the AFS CP settings, and makes the decision: ‐ In the case of failure ‐ At DH, whether to continue to landing or to go around. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 3/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Because the approach is flown with AP/FD and A/THR, the PF must be continuously ready to take over manually: ‐ If a major failure occurs ‐ If AP or A/THR performance are no more satisfactory ‐ If any doubt arises. The PF announces "LAND", when displayed on the FMA. PM TASKS For aircraft without HUD, the PM is head down throughout the automatic approach and automatic landing. For aircraft with HUD, the PM may be head up or head down. The PM monitors: ‐ The FMA and announces all mode changes below 300 ft as required (i.e. after the PF announces "LAND") ‐ The automatic callouts ‐ The aircraft trajectory and announces any deviation or attitude exceedance ‐ Any failure. The PM should be go-around minded. VISUAL REFERENCES Approaching the DH, the PF starts to look for visual references, progressively increasing external scanning. It should be stressed that the DH is the lower limit of the decision zone. The captain should come to this zone prepared for a go-around but with no pre-established judgement. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 4/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Required conditions to continue at DH: ‐ With DH: In CAT II operations, the visual references should be sufficient to monitor the continued approach and landing and to confirm that the flight path is acceptable. If either of these conditions is not satisfied, it is mandatory to initiate a go-around. The minimum visual cue is a three axial lights segment and one lateral light element. In CAT III operations, the visual references should be sufficient to confirm that the aircraft is over the touchdown zone. Go-around is mandatory if the visual references do not confirm this. A three lights segment is required for fail-passive system and one center line light segment for fail-operational system. ‐ Without DH: The decision to continue does not depend on visual references, even though a minimum RVR is specified to enable monitoring the rollout. The decision depends only on the operational status of the aircraft and ground equipment. If a failure occurs before reaching the AH, a go-around will be initiated. A go-around must be performed if the AUTOLAND warning is triggered below AH. However, it is good airmanship for the PF to acquire visual cues during flare and to monitor the rollout. Loss of visual references: ‐ With DH before touchdown: If the decision to continue has been made at or before DH and the visual references subsequently become insufficient a go-around must be initiated. A late go-around may result in ground contact. If touchdown occurs after TOGA is engaged, the AP remains engaged in Go-around mode and A/THR remains in TOGA. The ground spoilers and autobrake are inhibited. ‐ With DH or without DH after touchdown: The flight crew should not attempt a go-around if they lose visual references after touchdown. They should continue the rollout with AP in ROLL OUT mode down to taxi speed. FLARE/LANDING/ROLL OUT During the flare, decrab and rollout, the PF looks outside to assess that the autoland is correctly carried out, using the appropriate visual references. For CAT II approaches, autoland is recommended. If manual landing is performed, the PF should disconnect the AP at 80 ft RA at the latest. This ensures a smooth transition for the manual landing. Pull to REV MAX (or REV IDLE if conditions permit) at main landing gear touchdown (not before). The use of autobrake is recommended as it ensures a symmetrical brake pressure application. However, the flight crew should be aware of possible asymmetry in the case of crosswind and wet runways. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 5/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH The PM should make the standard callouts. FAILURE AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009539.0001001 / 05 DEC 18 Applicable to: ALL As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1 000 ft AGL, the approach may be continued provided that ECAM actions are completed, approach briefing update is performed and a higher DH is set (if required) before reaching 1 000 ft AGL. Below 1 000 ft AGL (and down to AH in LAND3 DUAL), unless there are sufficient visual references, the occurrence of a caution or landing capability degradation implies a go-around and a reassessment of the system capability. Another approach may be undertaken according to the new system capability. It is considered that below 1 000 ft AGL, not enough time is available for the flight crew to perform the necessary switching, to check system configuration and limitations and brief for revised minima. In LAND3 DUAL and below AH, as a general rule, a single failure does not necessitate a go-around, except if the AUTOLAND warning is triggered. ILS AUTOLAND IN CAT I OR BETTER WEATHER CONDITIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO-00009540.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew may wish to perform automatic landings in CAT I or better weather conditions for training purposes. This type of approach should be carried out only with the airline authorization. The flight crew should be aware that fluctuations of the LOC and/or GS can occur because the protection of ILS sensitive areas, which applies during LVP, are not necessarily in force. Therefore, it is essential that the PF is prepared to take over manually at any time during such an autoland,, should the performance of the AP become unsatisfactory. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to F PR-NP-SOP-190-LVO P 6/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Specificities - Radius-to-Fix (RF) Legs RADIUS-TO-FIX (RF) LEGS Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG-01-00023448.0001001 / 14 NOV 16 GENERAL A Radius-to-Fix (RF) leg is an arc of circle with a fixed radius coded in the FMS navigation database. The rounded value of the arc distance is displayed on the FMS ACTIVE/F-PLN page in the "NN ARC" format, where NN corresponds to the arc distance. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG-01-00023449.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 USE OF AP/FD Depending on the RNP operations, use of the FDs or of the AP/FD may be mandatory. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG-01-00023450.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 SPEED MANAGEMENT ALONG RF LEGS When flying a RF leg, the FMS adapts the bank angle to fly the arc. The bank angle is a function of the ground speed. If the ground speed is excessive, the requested bank angle to follow the trajectory can be higher than the maximum bank angle permitted by the Flight Guidance (FG) system (30 ° in normal conditions). In this case the aircraft will overshoot the trajectory. Therefore, to fly RF legs, the flight crew should be aware of the following operational recommendations: ‐ Respect speed constraints on RF legs. Use of managed speed is recommended. ‐ Pay attention to strong winds, particularly to high tailwinds that increase the ground speed ‐ Monitor the bank angle, particularly when near 30 ° (i.e. the maximum bank angle with the AP/FD engaged). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG P 1/4 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Variation of the bank angle due to the wind in RF legs Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG-01-00023451.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 GO-AROUND DURING RF LEG When the flight crew selects TOGA thrust, particularly in a turn, they must check that NAV mode immediately engages in order to stay on the desired track. If NAV mode does not automatically engage, the flight crew must manually engage it. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG-01-00023452.0001001 / 26 JUN 18 USE OF THE DIR TO FUNCTION The use of the DIR TO function below MSA is not recommended. This is because the flight plan leg that results is not part of the approach procedure. The flight crew must use the CRS IN function when performing a DIR TO towards a waypoint followed by a RF leg. This enables the alignment of the aircraft with the RF leg track, and avoids the overshoot of the RNP F-PLN after the waypoint. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG P 2/4 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL 350-941 FLEET FCTM STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH ←A PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG P 3/4 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - APPROACH Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-190-RF-LEG P 4/4 08 AUG 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CIRCLING APPROACH CIRCLING Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-200-00021429.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL The circling approach is the visual phase of an instrument approach to bring an aircraft into position for landing on a runway which is not suitably located for a straight-in approach (e.g. due to wind conditions). APPROACH PREPARATION The flight crew performs the approach preparation before starting the descent, including tuning of the reference navaids. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-160 Approach Preparation. They should include the following additional items in the FMS programming: F-PLN Lateral: If applicable, enter the STAR, and the instrument approach procedure, including the missed approach procedure for the approach. SEC F-PLN When the flight crew plans for a circling approach, they should prepare the SEC F-PLN. They update the SEC F-PLN as follows: ‐ Access the MFD SEC INDEX page then IMPORT ACTIVE* to import the active flight plan ‐ Revise the destination and insert the landing runway in the ARRIVAL page ‐ Keep the F-PLN discontinuity. APPROACH BRIEFING The flight crew should perform the Approach Briefing as described in the Descent Preparation chapter (for more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-160 Approach Briefing), with additional items specific to the circling procedure: ‐ Circling minima as published on the Approach chart or as per Company Operations Manual ‐ Direction of circling, if restricted according to the Approach chart, e.g. due to terrain. It is preferable that PF should be on the same side as the direction of circling, e.g. for circling to the left, PF should be CM1 ‐ Significant obstacles in airport vicinity ‐ Technique to be used (e.g. AP and A/THR, FPV) and configuration ‐ Action in the case of loss of visual references. FINAL INSTRUMENT APPROACH The flight crew flies a stabilized approach at F speed, configuration 3 and landing gear down. The flight crew can perform the LANDING C/L except the FLAPS for landing. They will check the configuration for landing during the final turn. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SOP-200 P 1/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CIRCLING APPROACH CIRCLING APPROACH CAUTION The flight crew must conduct the flight within the circling area, while maintaining required visual references at all times. The following can be used to assist the flight crew in the circling approach pattern: ‐ Selected modes with AP are recommended. Waypoints can be entered before the approach to assist the flight crew in the circling approach pattern. However, they must not fly this pattern with AP engaged in NAV mode ‐ The ND in NAV mode with a low range can be used for situational awareness ‐ In support to the timing technique, the flight crew should initiate the base turn when the aircraft is approximately on the 45 ° angle of the runway threshold. Note: The circling area which ensures obstacle clearance is based on a maximum speed of 180 kt for Category C aircraft (ICAO PANS-OPS and JAR OPS). Maintaining F speed during the circling procedure ensures that the aircraft remains within the safe circling area. In regions where FAA TERPS criteria apply, the circling areas and limit speeds are more restrictive. Therefore, in these regions, refer to the Company SOPs. When the flight crew obtains required visual references for circling: ‐ Perform a level off not lower than the MDA(H) for circling by pressing the ALT pb on the AFS CP ‐ Select TRK-FPA ‐ Preselect a track of 45 ° away from the final approach course (or as required by the published procedure) ‐ When wings level, start the CHRONO ‐ After approximately 30 s select the downwind track parallel to the landing runway ‐ At any time in the downwind leg, activate the SEC F-PLN to display the landing runway and to take credit of the ground speed mini function in final approach when managed speed is used. ‐ When the aircraft is abeam the runway threshold, start the CHRONO. The time from abeam threshold to the beginning of the base turn depends on the height above touchdown: Approximately 3 s /100 ft. ‐ Disconnect the AP and remove the FDs at the latest before starting the descent toward the runway. Keep the A/THR. ‐ To perform the final turn, initially maintain 25 ° bank angle and maintain the altitude until the visual references for the intended runway are distinctly visible and identifiable ‐ Set the landing configuration when appropriate, but ensure early stabilization in final ‐ When the aircraft is fully configured for landing, complete LANDING checklist. If, at any time during the circling procedure, the required visual references are lost, the main objective is to climb and to leave the circling area into the missed approach of the initial instrument approach, while remaining within the obstacle-free area, unless otherwise specified. When the SEC F-PLN is activated, the go-around procedure in the FMS is associated with the landing runway, and not with the instrument approach. Therefore, if visual references are lost 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SOP-200 P 2/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CIRCLING APPROACH during the circling approach, the flight crew should fly the go-around using selected guidance, following the pre-briefed missed approach procedure, unless otherwise specified. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-NP-SOP-200 P 3/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - CIRCLING APPROACH Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-200 P 4/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - VISUAL APPROACH VISUAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-205-00021430.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew must keep in mind that the pattern is flown visually. However, the cross track error on the ND is a good indication of the aircraft lateral position versus the runway centreline. The flight crew obtains this indication by performing a DIR TO - CRS IN on the last available waypoint, located on the extended runway centerline. At the beginning of the downwind leg: ‐ Disconnect AP and remove FDs ‐ Select TRK-FPA to display the FPV ‐ Use the A/THR in managed speed, i.e. SPEED appears on the FMA Managed speed enables to take benefit of the Ground Speed Mini function. ‐ Set the downwind track on the AFS CP to assist in downwind tracking ‐ Set the altitude of the downwind track on the AFS CP. INTERMEDIATE/FINAL APPROACH Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-205-00021431.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL Assuming a 1 500 ft AAL circuit, the base turn should start 45 s after passing abeam the downwind threshold (+/- 1 second/kt of head/tailwind). Initially the rate of descent should be 400 ft/min, increasing to 700 ft/min when established on the correct descent path. The aircraft should be configured for landing at VAPP by 500 ft AAL, at the latest. If the aircraft is not stabilized, the flight crew should perform a go-around. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B PR-NP-SOP-205 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - VISUAL APPROACH Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-205 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - GO-AROUND GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-00021437.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 Applicable to: ALL Failure to recognize the need for and to execute a go-around, when required, is a major cause of approach and landing accidents. Because go-around does not frequently occur, it is important to be “go-around minded”, and mentally prepared for a possible go-around on every approach. The decision to go-around should not be delayed, as an early go-around is safer than a last minute go-around at low altitude. CONSIDERATION ABOUT GO-AROUND Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-210-1-00021433.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 DECISION MAKING The flight crew must consider to perform a go-around if: ‐ There is a loss or a doubt about situational awareness, or ‐ There is a malfunction which jeopardizes the safe completion of the approach or landing, e.g. major navigation problem, or ‐ ATC changes the final approach clearance resulting in rushed action from the crew or potentially unstable approach, or ‐ The approach is unstable in speed, altitude, or flight path in such a way that stability is not obtained by 1 000 ft AAL in IMC (500 ft AAL in VMC), or is not maintained until landing, or ‐ Any of the following alerts occur: • TAWS, or • TCAS, or • Windshear, or • ROW (For more information, Refer to AS-ROWROP Operating Techniques). ‐ Adequate visual references are not obtained at minima or lost below minima. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-210-1-00021434.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 GO-AROUND NEAR THE GROUND The PF must not initiate a go-around after the selection of the thrust reversers. If the PF initiates a go-around, the flight crew must complete the go-around maneuver. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-210 P 1/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - GO-AROUND If the flight crew performs a go-around near the ground, they should take into account the following: ‐ The PF should avoid excessive rotation rate, in order to prevent a tail strike. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-220 Tail Strike Avoidance. ‐ A temporary landing gear contact with the runway is acceptable. ‐ Only when the aircraft is safely established in the go-around, the flight crew retracts flaps one step and the landing gear. Note: If the aircraft is on the runway when the PF applies TOGA thrust, CONFIG ECAM red warning(s) may transiently trigger. The flight crew should disregard these alerts. AP/FD GO-AROUND PHASE ACTIVATION Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-00021435.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 Applicable to: ALL When the thrust levers are set to the TOGA detent, and provided the slats/flaps configuration is different from clean configuration, or the flap lever is not set to the 0 position, all of the following occur: ‐ The SRS GA and the GA TRK (NAV) modes engage ‐ The GA phase activates on the FMS: • The missed approach becomes the active F-PLN • At the end of the missed approach procedure, the FMS strings the previous flown approach in the active F-PLN. ‐ If not previously engaged, the FD automatically engages with the HDG V/S references automatically set on the AFS CP. For the go-around, the appropriate flight reference is the pitch attitude, because go-around is a dynamic maneuver. ‐ If extended, the speed brakes automatically retract. To perform a soft go-around, the PF must set thrust levers to the TOGA detent to ensure engagement of SRS GA mode. Then, the PF must set the thrust levers to the FLX/MCT detent to engage the GA SOFT mode. In this case, the FMA displays MAN GA SOFT on FMA, and the AP/FD vertical and lateral modes remain engaged. In GA SOFT mode, the SRS GA mode remains engaged with a vertical target speed of approximately 2 000 ft/min. If TOGA thrust is not desired during go-around for any reason (e.g. an early go-around ordered by ATC), it is essential that the thrust levers are set momentarily but without delay, to the TOGA detent (i.e. the full forward thrust levers position), in order to ensure proper activation of the SRS GA and the Go-Around phase (i.e. guidance modes and FMS flight phase). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-210 P 2/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - GO-AROUND If the thrust levers are not correctly set to the TOGA detent (i.e. the full forward thrust levers position), the following occurs: ‐ The AP/FD remains engaged in approach or landing mode (e.g. G/S, LOC, LAND, FLARE on FMA) ‐ The FMS does not engage the GA phase, and remains in APPR phase. GO-AROUND PHASE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-00021436.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL The SRS mode guides the aircraft with a maximum speed of VAPP, or IAS at time of TOGA selection (limited to maximum of VLS + 25 with all engines operative or VLS + 15 with one engine inoperative) until the acceleration altitude where the target speed increases to the CLB speed. The GA TRK mode guides the aircraft on the track memorised at the time of TOGA selection. The missed approach trajectory becomes the ACTIVE F-PLN provided the waypoints have been correctly sequenced on the approach. Thanks to the automatic arming of the NAV mode, the missed approach F-PLN is followed as soon as the NAV mode engages. When the flight crew sets the thrust levers to TOGA or TOGA then FLX-MCT for go-around, it takes some time for the engines to spool up due to the acceleration capability of the high-bypass ratio engines. Therefore, the flight crew must be aware that the aircraft will initially lose some altitude. This altitude loss will be greater if initial thrust is close to idle and/or the aircraft speed is lower than VAPP. Above the go-around acceleration altitude, the target speed is CLB speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D PR-NP-SOP-210 P 3/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - GO-AROUND LEAVING THE GO-AROUND PHASE Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-210-2-00021432.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 GENERAL The purpose of leaving the go-around phase is to obtain the proper target speed and proper predictions depending upon the strategy chosen by the crew. During the missed approach, the flight crew will elect either of the following strategies: ‐ Fly a second approach ‐ Perform a diversion. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-210-2-00021438.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 SECOND APPROACH If a second approach is to be flown, the flight crew will activate the approach phase on the MFD ACTIVE/PERF page. The flight crew will ensure proper waypoint sequencing during the second approach in order to have the missed approach route available, should a further go-around be required. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-210-210-2-00021439.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 DIVERSION Once the aircraft path is established and clearance has been obtained, the flight crew will enter the ALTN F-PLN as ACTIVE F-PLN: ‐ If the flight crew has prepared the ALTN F-PLN in the active F-PLN, on selecting the ENABLE ALTN prompt on the TO WPT revision menu, the lateral mode reverts to HDG if previously in NAV. The aircraft will be flown towards the next waypoint using HDG or NAV via a DIR TO entry. ‐ If the flight crew has prepared the ALTN F-PLN in one SEC F-PLN, the MFD SEC INDEX page will be accessed and SEC F-PLN for diversion will be swapped to active. The flight crew will use the DIR TO function as required to sequence the F-PLN. ‐ If the flight crew has not prepared the ALTN F-PLN, climb will be initially flown in OP CLB mode. Once established in climb and clear of terrain, the flight crew will use the “DIR TO” function to the next cleared waypoint, make a lateral revision at this waypoint to insert a NEW DEST and finalize the ALTN F-PLN. The route and a CRZ FL (on PERF page) can be updated as required. 350-941 FLEET FCTM E PR-NP-SOP-210 P 4/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING TRANSITION TO VISUAL REFERENCES Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-00009551.0001001 / 17 AUG 17 Applicable to: ALL When the aircraft transitions from IMC to VMC, the flight crew should: ‐ Continue to include the PFD in the scan ‐ Initially maintain pitch and heading ‐ Not eliminate the drift in the case of crosswind ‐ Not duck under ‐ Maintain a stabilized flight path down to the flare. At 50 ft, one dot below the glide slope is 7 ft below the glide slope. If the flight crew uses the FPV, they can monitor the FPV versus the aircraft attitude symbol in the center of the PFD. This provides a good assessment of the drift, and therefore, indicates in which direction to look for the runway. FLARE AND TOUCHDOWN Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-00009552.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL PITCH CONTROL When the aircraft reaches 100 ft, the pitch trim is no more automatic and the pitch law becomes a flare law. The flare technique is therefore conventional. Before the flare, avoid destabilization of the approach and steepening the slope at low heights in order to plan a shorter touchdown. If a normal touchdown point cannot be achieved or if destabilization occurs just before the flare, the flight crew should perform a go-around. The PM monitors the rate of descent and should call "SINK RATE" if the vertical speed is excessive before the flare. In stabilized conditions, the flare height is around 40 ft. This height varies due to the operational conditions that directly affect the rate of descent. Compared to typical flare heights at sea level associated with flat and appropriate runway lengths, the flight crew should be aware of factors that require an earlier flare, particularly: ‐ High airport elevation Increased airport altitude results in higher ground speed during the approach and therefore, increased descent rates to maintain the approach slope. ‐ Steeper approach slope (compared to the nominal 3 °) 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-NP-SOP-220 P 1/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING ‐ Tailwind Increased tailwind results in higher ground speed during approach and therefore, increased descent rates to maintain the approach slope. ‐ Increased runway slope. Increased runway slope and/or rising terrain in front of the runway affects the radio altitude callouts down to over flying the runway threshold. The flight crew uses those callouts to assess the flare height. Therefore, increased runway slope and/or rising terrain in front of the runway can cause late flare. The erroneous visual perception of being high is also possible. The cumulative effect of more than one of these factors should be anticipated to perform an earlier flare. If the flight crew initiates a too late flare (i.e. below 25 ft), time is not sufficient for the pitch changes to result in aircraft trajectory modifications. Late, weak, or released flare inputs increase the risk of a hard landing. Avoid under flaring: ‐ Before the initiation of the flare, the flight crew must control the rate of descent, i.e. nominal 3 ° slope and rate of descent not increasing ‐ Start the flare with positive (or "prompt") back pressure on the sidestick and hold as necessary ‐ Avoid significant forward stick input when the flare is initiated. It is acceptable to release the back pressure. At 20 ft, the “RETARD” auto callout reminds the flight crew to retard the thrust levers. It is a reminder instead of an order. When best adapted, the flight crew rapidly retards all thrust levers: Depending on the conditions (e.g. speed, glide), the flight crew retards earlier or later. However, the flight crew must ensure that all thrust levers are set to IDLE at the latest at touchdown, in order to ensure the ground spoilers extension at touchdown. In order to assess the rate of descent during the flare and the aircraft position vs. the ground, look well ahead of the aircraft. Do not allow the aircraft to float or do not attempt to extend the flare by increasing pitch attitude in order to achieve a perfect smooth touchdown. A prolonged float increases both the landing distance and the risk of tail strike. After touchdown, the flight crew must "fly" the nosewheel smoothly, but without delay, on to the runway, and must be ready to counteract any pitch up effect of the ground spoilers. However, the flight control law compensates the main part of pitch up effect due to the ground spoilers. It is not recommended to keep the nose high in order to increase the aircraft drag during the initial part of the rollout. This technique reduces the brake efficiency because the wings still provide significant lift and there is less weight on the wheels. It also increases the risk of tail strike. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SOP-220 P 2/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING LATERAL AND DIRECTIONAL CONTROL FINAL APPROACH In crosswind conditions, the flight crew should fly a "crabbed" final approach wings level, with the aircraft (cockpit) positioned on the extended runway centerline until the flare. For more information about the adjustment of rudder pedals, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-70 Seating Position and adjustment of Rudder Pedals. FLARE The objectives of the lateral and directional control of the aircraft during the flare are: ‐ To land on the centerline ‐ To minimize the loads on the main landing gear. The recommended decrab technique is to use the following: ‐ The rudder to align the aircraft with the runway heading during the flare ‐ The roll control, if needed, to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. The flight crew should counteract any tendency to drift downwind by an appropriate lateral(roll) input on the sidestick. In the case of strong crosswind during the decrab phase, the PF should be prepared to add small bank angle into the wind to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. The flight crew can land the aircraft with a partial decrab (i.e. a residual crab angle up to about 5 °) to prevent an excessive bank. This technique prevents wing tip or engine nacelle strike caused by an excessive bank angle. As a consequence, this can result in touching down with some bank angle into the wind, therefore, with the upwind landing gear first. ROLLOUT Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-00009555.0001001 / 04 APR 18 Applicable to: ALL NORMAL CONDITIONS During the rollout, the flight crew uses the rudder pedals to steer the aircraft on the runway centreline. At high speed, the rudder performs the directional control. When the speed reduces, the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) becomes active. However, the flight crew should not use the steering handwheel until the aircraft reaches the taxi speed. CROSSWIND CONDITIONS The above-mentioned technique applies. In addition, the flight crew should avoid applying the sidestick into the wind because it increases the weathercock effect. It creates a differential down force on the wheels that are into the wind side. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-NP-SOP-220 P 3/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING The reversers destabilize the airflow around the rudder and therefore, decrease the rudder efficiency. In addition, they create a side force in the case of a remaining crab angle, which increases the lateral skidding tendency of the aircraft. This adverse effect is noticeable on contaminated runways with crosswind. If a lateral control problem occurs during high crosswind landing, the flight crew should consider to set the reverser levers back to REV IDLE. At lower speeds, the directional control of the aircraft is more problematic, more specifically on wet and contaminated runways. The flight crew should use the differential braking, if necessary. On wet and contaminated runways, the same braking effect can be reached with full or half pedal deflection. In addition, the antiskid releases the brake pressure on both sides very early when the flight crew presses the brake pedals. Therefore, if the flight crew uses the differential braking, they should fully release the pedal on the opposite side to the expected turn direction. DECELERATION Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-220-1-00009556.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 When the aircraft is on the ground, the timely use of all means of stopping the aircraft is very important. Three systems are involved in braking when the aircraft is on the ground: ‐ The ground spoilers ‐ The wheel brakes ‐ The thrust reversers. In the case of a ROP alert, the flight crew must immediately apply the associated operating techniques. For more information, Refer to AS-ROWROP Operating Techniques. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-220-1-00009558.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 GROUND SPOILERS When the aircraft touches down with at least one main landing gear and both thrust levers at IDLE or when at least one thrust lever is in reverse, the ground spoilers automatically partially extend to ensure that all main landing gears are rapidly on the ground. This is the partial lift dumping function. Then, the ground spoilers automatically fully extend. The ground spoilers contribute to aircraft deceleration by increasing aerodynamic drag at high speed. Wheel braking efficiency is improved due to the increased load on the wheels. Additionally, the ground spoiler extension signal is used for autobrake activation. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-220-1-00009560.0002001 / 01 MAR 17 WHEEL BRAKES Wheel brakes contribute the most to aircraft deceleration on the ground. Many factors may affect efficient braking such as load on the wheels, tire pressure, runway pavement characteristics, 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → PR-NP-SOP-220 P 4/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING runway contamination and braking technique. The only factor over which the flight crew has any control is the braking technique, as discussed below. ANTISKID The antiskid function adapts the brake pressure to the runway conditions by sensing an impending skid condition and adjusting the brake pressure to each wheel group, as required. The antiskid function maintains the skidding factor (slip ratio) close to the maximum friction force point. This provides the optimum deceleration with respect to the flight crew input. BRAKES The use of AUTO BRK is usually better because it minimizes the number of brake applications and therefore, reduces brake wear. In addition, the AUTO BRK modes apply a symmetrical brake pressure which ensures an equal braking on the landing gear wheels. Recommendations for use of AUTO BRK vs. pedal braking are the following: ‐ The use of the Brake to Vacate (BTV) function is recommended regardless of the wind or visibility conditions, the landing configuration, with and without autopilot, and whatever the runway condition. ‐ In the case of pedal braking, do not ride the brakes but apply pedal braking as required and modulate the pressure without releasing. This minimizes the brake wear. BRK MED , BTV or BTV CONTAM displayed on the FMA indicates that AUTO BRK is active. DECEL that appears on the lower part of the airspeed scale of the PFD indicates that 80 % of the selected deceleration rate is achieved, when the basic AUTO BRK is active. For example, DECEL may not appear when the basic AUTO BRK is active on a contaminated runway, because the deceleration rate is not reached whereas the basic AUTO BRK is operating. In other words, DECEL is not an indicator of the basic AUTO BRK operation as such, but it indicates that the selected deceleration rate is reached. The basic AUTO BRK function senses the deceleration and modulates the brake pressure accordingly. Therefore, the timely application of MAX reverse thrust reduces the operation of the brakes and therefore, the brake wear and temperature. AUTO BRK does not relieve the flight crew responsibility of achieving a safe stop within the available runway length. Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-220-1-00009559.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 THRUST REVERSERS REVERSE THRUST EFFICIENCY Thrust reversers are more efficient at high speeds: the flight crew must select reverse thrust immediately after landing gear touchdown. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ PR-NP-SOP-220 P 5/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING Below 70 kt, thrust reversers efficiency rapidly decreases. Below 60 kt with REV MAX selected, engine stall may occur. Therefore, it is recommended to reduce the reverse thrust to REV IDLE at 70 kt, and keep REV IDLE until taxi speed. At taxi speed, and not above, stow the thrust reversers before leaving the runway, in order to avoid foreign object ingestion. DEPLOYMENT OF THE THRUST REVERSERS The selection of REV MAX is the standard practice for landing. Landing on dry runways On dry runways, the flight crew may select REV IDLE. Landing on wet runways On wet runways, the flight crew may select REV IDLE, if all the conditions described in the SOP DESCENT PREPARATION are satisfied. For more information about the conditions for REV IDLE selection, Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-160 Descent Preparation - Landing Performance. Landing on contaminated runways On contaminated runways, the flight crew must select REV MAX. STOWAGE OF THE THRUST REVERSERS To stow the thrust reversers, the PF must not leave the thrust reverser levers in an intermediate position between REV IDLE and FWD IDLE for more than approximately 10 s in order to prevent partial stowage of the thrust reverser. In the case of partial stowage of the thrust reversers, the PF must recycle the thrust reverser levers to REV IDLE again and then to FWD IDLE (still in less than approximately 10 s). REMINDER ON LANDING DISTANCE COMPUTATION AT DISPATCH FOR DRY AND WET RUNWAYS Definitions ALD: The Actual Landing Distance is the distance used on a dry runway from the crossing of the runway threshold at 50 ft until full-stop of the aircraft, using maximum manual braking. No reverse thrust is considered for the calculation of the ALD. The ALD is demonstrated during flight test campaign for certification purpose. RLD dry: The Required Landing Distance on a dry runway is a factored ALD. The factor is 1.67. (RLD dry = ALD x 1.67) RLD wet: The Required Landing Distance on a wet runway is a factored ALD. The factor is 1.92 (RLD wet = RLD dry x 1.15) 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←D→ PR-NP-SOP-220 P 6/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING Dispatch conditions For landing distance computation at dispatch, the airline uses the RLD. Landing distances computed at dispatch for wet runways provide only reduced margins in comparison with landing distances achievable in operations with the use of REV IDLE. Sufficient margins are restored when the flight crew uses REV MAX. The runway slope is not considered for the landing distance computation at dispatch. On a destination airport with multiple runways, the landing distance computation at dispatch may be performed on the longest landing runway with no wind. The expected landing runway may be used for the landing distance computation at dispatch with forecast wind at landing. If the wind condition changes at landing, the flight crew must perform a new landing distance computation. Landing with REV IDLE on wet runways The landing distance computation at dispatch (RLD) does not consider REV IDLE operation. Therefore, it is necessary to perform a computation to consider REV IDLE operation, as described in the SOP DESCENT PREPARATION (Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-160 Descent Preparation - Landing Performance). This may be done before the flight. At descent preparation, if the flight crew considers the use of REV IDLE on a wet runway, they should be able to confirm a MEDIUM TO POOR landing distance computation with no reverse credit on the predicted landing runway. A MEDIUM TO POOR computation enables the flight crew to consider extreme situations where a runway reported wet is worse than wet. If a runway reported wet is water contaminated, the braking action is a function of the water depth. During active precipitation or shortly afterwards, the water depth is variable, and therefore difficult to evaluate and to report accurately. Therefore on runways reported wet, the real friction coefficient may be significantly less than expected and/or aquaplaning may occur. When REV IDLE is used, the maximum possible deceleration of the aircraft mainly depends on the runway friction coefficient. TAIL STRIKE AVOIDANCE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-220-00009557.0001001 / 04 DEC 14 Applicable to: ALL Although most of tail strikes are due to deviations from normal landing techniques, some are associated with external conditions such as turbulence and wind gradient. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to E → PR-NP-SOP-220 P 7/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING DEVIATION FROM NORMAL TECHNIQUES Deviations from normal landing techniques are the most common causes of tail strikes. The main reasons are the following: ‐ Allowing the speed to decrease well below VAPP before flare Flying at too low speed means high angle of attack and high pitch attitude, therefore it reduces the ground clearance. In this case, when the aircraft reaches the flare height, the flight crew should significantly increase the pitch attitude to reduce the sink rate. This may cause the pitch to increase beyond the critical angle. ‐ Prolonged hold off for a smooth touchdown When the pitch increases, the flight crew should focus further ahead to assess the aircraft position in relation to the ground. The link between the attitude and the distance can cause the pitch attitude to increase beyond the critical angle. ‐ Too high flare A high flare can result in a airspeed decrease combined with a long float. Because both cause an increase of pitch attitude, the result is a reduced tail clearance. ‐ Too high sink rate, just before reaching the flare height In the case of too high sink rate close to the ground, the flight crew can attempt to avoid a firm touchdown by commanding a high pitch rate. This action significantly increases the pitch attitude and, because the resulting lift increase may not be sufficient to significantly reduce the sink rate, the high pitch rate can be difficult to control after touchdown, particularly if a bounce occurs. ‐ Bounce at touchdown In the case of bounce at touchdown, the flight crew can be tempted to increase the pitch attitude to ensure a smooth second touchdown. If the bounce results from a firm touchdown associated with high pitch rate, it is important to control the pitch attitude so that it does not further increase beyond the critical angle. APPROACH AND LANDING TECHNIQUES A stabilized approach is essential to achieve successful landings. It is imperative that the flare height is reached at the appropriate airspeed and flight path angle. The A/THR and bird (Velocity Vector) are efficient aids to the flight crew. The flight crew should determine VAPP with the wind corrections by using the FMS functions. As a reminder, when the aircraft is near the ground, the wind intensity decreases and the wind direction turns (direction in degrees decreases in the northern latitudes). Both effects reduce the head wind component near the ground and the wind correction to VAPP compensates for this effect. When the aircraft is near the ground, the flight crew should avoid a high sink rate, even in an attempt to maintain a close tracking of the glideslope. They should give the priority to attitude and sink rate. If a normal touchdown distance is not possible, they should perform a go-around. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E→ PR-NP-SOP-220 P 8/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING If the aircraft reaches the flare height at VAPP, with a stabilized flight path angle, the normal SOP landing technique results in repetitive touchdown attitude and airspeed. During the flare, the flight crew should concentrate primarily on the attitude in conjunction with external cues. The PM must make appropriate callouts in the case of excessive pitch attitude at landing. Note: A "PITCH-PITCH" aural alert is triggered if the pitch attitude, monitored by the flight controls, reaches a given limit. This aural alert is only available in manual landings when the aircraft height is lower than 400 ft RA. In addition, a tail strike pitch limit also appears on the PFD at landing below 400 ft RA. BOUNCING AT TOUCHDOWN In the case of light bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and complete the landing. Keep the thrust at idle. Do not let the pitch attitude to increase, particularly following a firm touchdown with a high pitch rate. In the case of high bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and initiate a go-around. Do not try to avoid a second touchdown during the go-around. If it happens, it would be soft enough to prevent damage to the aircraft, if pitch attitude is maintained. Only when safely established in the go-around, retract flaps one step and the landing gear. The flight crew should not attempt a landing immediately after the high bounce, because thrust may be required to soften the second touchdown and the remaining runway length may not be sufficient to stop the aircraft. In any case, if reverse thrust has been applied, a full stop landing must be completed. CUMULATIVE EFFECTS Although any one of these factors that occurs in isolation may not be so severe as to result in a tail strike, a combination of factors occurring together would significantly increase the risk. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←E PR-NP-SOP-220 P 9/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - LANDING Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-220 P 10/10 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - AFTER LANDING BRAKE TEMPERATURE Ident.: PR-NP-SOP-230-00009561.0001001 / 13 DEC 16 Applicable to: ALL The use of the brake fans before the aircraft reaches the gate prevents to blow carbon brake dust on the ground personnel. The brake fans blow dust during the first seconds of operation only. If the brake temperature is above 500 °C, the flight crew should avoid the use of the parking brake, unless operationally necessary, in order to prevent damages to the affected brake. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SOP-230 P 1/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - AFTER LANDING Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SOP-230 P 2/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Cold Weather Operations and Icing Conditions GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009630.0001001 / 06 JUN 18 Applicable to: ALL For more information on the cold weather procedures, Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ADVWXR Cold Weather Procedures - Safety Exterior Inspection. Aircraft performance is certified on the basis of a clean wing. Ice accretion affects wing performance. When the wing is clean, the airflow smoothly follows the shape of the wing. When the wing is covered with ice, the airflow separates from the wing when the Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) increases. Therefore, the maximum lift-coefficient is reduced. As a result, the aircraft may stall at a lower AOA, and the drag may increase. The flight crew must keep in mind that the wing temperature of the aircraft may be significantly lower than 0 °C, after a flight at high altitude and low temperature, even if the Outside Air Temperature (OAT) is higher than 0 °C. In such cases, humidity or rain cause ice accretion on the upper wing, and light frost under the wing. Only 3 mm of frost on the under-surface of the wing is acceptable. Ice accretion on the lower part of the nose fuselage may also affect the Static, Pitot and MFP probes. If ice ridges build up on the skin of the aircraft, it may impact the aerodynamic flow in front of the Static, Pitot and MFP probes. As a result, the flight crew may observe unreliable air data during takeoff and climb phases. PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009631.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL The probe and window heating may be used on ground. EXTERIOR INSPECTION Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009632.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL When ground-icing conditions are encountered, or when ice accretion is suspected, the Captain should determine, on the basis of the exterior inspection, whether the aircraft requires ground deicing/anti-icing treatment. This visual inspection must take into account all vital parts of the aircraft, and must be performed from locations that offer a clear view of these parts. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 1/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AIRCRAFT DEICING/ANTI-ICING ON GROUND Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009633.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL Deicing/anti-icing fluids enable to remove ice and to prevent ice accumulation on aircraft surfaces until the beginning of the takeoff. In addition, the fluids flow off the surfaces of the aircraft during takeoff, in order not to degrade the takeoff performance. Several types of fluids can be used. These fluids have different characteristics: Type 1 Low viscosity Limited holdover time Used mainly for deicing Type 2, 3, 4 High viscosity Long holdover time Used for deicing and anti-icing The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of the fluid. It depends on the type of fluid and on the nature and the severity of the precipitation. The flight crew should refer to applicable tables as guidelines. They should use these tables in conjunction with the pre-takeoff check. Depending on the severity of the weather, the flight crew must apply the deicing/anti-icing procedure: ‐ In one step, via the single application of heated and diluted deicing/anti-icing fluid, or ‐ In two steps, by first applying the heated deicing fluid, then by applying a protective anti-icing fluid. The "one step" procedure provides a short holdover time, and should only be used in low moisture conditions. The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of the fluid. During the "two step" procedure, the ground crew must apply consecutively the two fluids. The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of the second fluid. AFTER START Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009634.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should apply the following procedure: ‐ Keep the engine bleeds off ‐ Keep the APU running with the bleed off for a few minutes after spraying ‐ The slats/flaps and flight controls can be moved, because they no longer have ice. TAXI-OUT Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009635.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL On contaminated runways, the taxiing speed should be as low as possible, and any action that could distract the flight crew during the taxi should be delayed until the aircraft is stopped. 350-941 FLEET FCTM D to F → PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 2/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER The flight crew should consider the following factors: ‐ The antiskid is inhibited at very low speed ‐ The engine anti-ice increases the ground idle thrust ‐ Avoid large tiller inputs to minimize the risk of skidding during turns ‐ On slippery taxiways, it may be more effective to use differential braking and/or thrust, instead of the nosewheel steering ‐ If there is slush or snow on the taxiways, the flight crew should delay the flap selection until reaching the holding point, in order to avoid contaminating the flap/slat mechanism ‐ When reaching the holding point the flight crew should perform the "Before Takeoff Down to the Line" checklist ‐ The flight crew must maintain the aircraft far behind the aircraft in front ‐ In icing conditions, the flight crew should Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-90 After Start - Anti-Ice. TAKEOFF Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009636.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE When taking off on contaminated runways, it is not permitted to use FLEX thrust. However, derated thrust may be used, as required, in order to optimize aircraft performance. When available, a derated takeoff thrust results in lower minimum control speeds and therefore, in a lower V1. A reduction in the minimum control speeds can sometimes enhance takeoff performance. If anti-ice is used, the flight crew must apply the applicable performance penalty. Slush, standing water, and/or deep snow reduce the effectiveness of aircraft takeoff performance, because of increased rolling resistance and reduction in tire-to-ground friction. A higher flap setting increases the runway-limited takeoff weight, but reduces the second segment limited takeoff weight. TAKEOFF ROLL When on ground, in icing conditions, and if temperature is less than +1 °C: ‐ Before the aircraft lines up on the runway for takeoff, the flight crew must ensure that the airframe has no ice or snow ‐ In icing conditions, the flight crew should Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-90 After Start Anti-Ice. Then, before applying thrust, the Captain should ensure that the nosewheel is straight. If there is a tendency to deviate from the runway centerline, the flight crew must immediately correct this tendency by using the rudder pedal steering, not the tiller. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to G → PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 3/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER On contaminated runways, the flight crew should ensure that engine thrust is set symmetrically to avoid difficult directional control. The flight crew should consider the maximum crosswind in relation to the friction coefficient of the runway. IN FLIGHT Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009637.0001001 / 08 AUG 18 Applicable to: ALL CLIMB/DESCENT Whenever icing conditions are encountered or expected, the flight crew should turn on the engine anti-ice. Although the TAT before entering clouds may not require engine anti-ice, the flight crew should be aware that the TAT often decreases significantly, when entering clouds. In the climb or the cruise phase, when the SAT goes below -40 °C, the flight crew should turn off the engine anti-ice. If the flight crew does not apply the recommended anti-ice procedures, engine stall, over-temperature, or engine damage may occur. The flight crew should turn on the wing anti-ice, if severe ice accretion is expected, or if there is any indication of icing on the airframe. HOLDING If holding is performed in icing conditions, the flight crew should maintain the clean configuration because they should avoid flying in icing conditions with the slats extended during a long period of time. APPROACH If significant ice accretion develops on parts of the wing that have not been deiced, the aircraft speed must be increased (Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ADVWXR Flight in Icing Conditions). When the temperature goes below -10°C, the flight crew must correct the target altitudes (provided by the ATC), by adding the values that are indicated in the table below: Height (ft) 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 Corrections to be Added (ft) - 10 °C - 20 °C 50 70 100 140 200 280 290 420 390 570 490 710 - 30 °C 100 190 380 570 760 950 These corrections correspond to approximately 4 × delta ISA × Height (ft)/1000. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← G to H → PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 4/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER WHEN DOES THE FLIGHT CREW HAVE TO CORRECT THE ALTITUDE? Even if the aircraft is radar vectored, the flight crew must apply altitude correction for the following published altitude: ‐ Minimum En route Altitude (MEA) and Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) ‐ Altitude constraints during the Approach or Missed Approach ‐ Procedure turn altitude (as applicable) ‐ Final Approach Fix (FAF) and Final Approach Point (FAP) altitude ‐ Step-down altitude(s) during approach without vertical guidance ‐ Altitudes checks during final approach (check altitude versus distance or outer marker check altitude, as applicable) ‐ Barometric minima, i.e. MDA(MDH) or DA(DH) for CAT I ILS approach. WHEN DOES THE FLIGHT CREW HAVE NOT TO CORRECT THE ALTITUDE? Usually, when the aircraft is radar vectored, the flight crew must not correct the altitude provided by the ATC. The air traffic controller has the responsibility to provide altitudes or flight levels corrected to take into account the minimum clearance with the terrain. However, the flight crew must confirm this responsibility with the air traffic services in charge. Note: When an aircraft is radar vectored, the interception altitude of an ILS should only be corrected by the flight crew if it is the minimum interception altitude published. LANDING Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009638.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should avoid landing on very slippery runways. However, if it is not possible to avoid such landings, the flight crew should consider the following factors that are linked to operations on contaminated runways: ‐ Braking action ‐ Directional control. BRAKING ACTION Fluid contaminants on the runway has an adverse effect on braking performance, because it reduces the friction between the tires and the surface of the runway. It also creates a layer of fluid between the tires and the runway surface, and reduces the contact area. The flight crew should perform a firm touchdown. They should apply MAX reverse as soon as the main landing gear is on ground. Using reversers on a runway that is contaminated with dry snow may reduce the visibility, particularly at low speeds. In such cases the flight crew should reduce the reverse thrust to idle, if necessary. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← H to I → PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 5/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER The flight crew should set the autobrake when landing on an evenly contaminated runway. It is possible that the DECEL indication on the PFD does not appear, as the predetermined deceleration may not be achieved. This does not mean that the autobrake is not working. DIRECTIONAL CONTROL During rollout, the flight crew must center the sidestick. This prevents asymmetric wheel loading, that results in asymmetric braking and increases the weathercock tendency of the aircraft. The flight crew should use the rudder for directional control after touchdown, in the same way as for a normal landing. They must avoid using the tiller above taxi speed, because it may result in nosewheel skidding, and lead to a loss of directional control. If necessary, the flight crew must apply differential braking by completely releasing the pedal on the side that is opposite to the expected direction of the turn, because on a slippery runway, full or half deflection of the pedal may lead to the same braking effect. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←I→ PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 6/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Landing on a contaminated runway in crosswind conditions requires careful consideration. In such case, two factors can cause directional control difficulties: ‐ If the aircraft touches down with crab angle, and if the flight crew applies the reverse thrust, the side-force component of reverse thrust adds to the crosswind component, and causes the aircraft to drift to the downwind side of the runway ‐ As the braking efficiency increases, the cornering force of the main wheels decreases. If there is a problem with the directional control, the flight crew should: ‐ Set to idle the reverse thrust, in order to reduce the reverse thrust side-force component ‐ Release the brakes in order to increase the cornering force ‐ Return to the runway centerline, select again the reverse thrust, and resume braking (Refer to PR-NP-SOP-220 Transition to Visual References). The concept of equivalent runway condition is used to determine the maximum crosswind limitation. TAXI-IN Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-1-00009639.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL During taxi-in, after landing, the flight crew should not retract the flaps/slats, because retraction could cause damage, by crushing any ice that is in the slots of the surfaces. When the aircraft arrives at the gate, and the engines are stopped, the flight crew should perform a visual inspection to check that the slats/flaps areas are free of contamination. Then, the flight crew can retract the slats/flaps by using the electric hydraulic pumps. At the end of the flight, in extreme cold conditions, cold soak protection is requested when a longer stopover is expected. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← I to J PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 7/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-10-10-1 P 8/8 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Windshear GENERAL Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-2-00009640.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL WINDSHEAR PHENOMENON Windshear is a sudden change in either wind speed or direction, or both, over a relatively short distance. Windshear occurs either horizontally or vertically at all altitudes. Windshear can result from a microburst. Microbursts occur close to the ground and are a possible hazard to the safe flight of the aircraft for the following two reasons: ‐ The downburst of a microburst can result in strong downward winds (40 kt can be reached) ‐ The outburst of a microburst can result in both a large horizontal windshear and a wind component shift from headwind to tailwind (horizontal winds can reach up to 40 kt). An aircraft that approaches a microburst will first encounter a strong headwind. This can result in an increase in the indicated airspeed. This may cause the aircraft to fly above the intended flight path and/or accelerate. With a fixed speed on approach, the flight crew’s reaction may be to reduce power. This will cause the aircraft to fly with reduced energy through the downburst. The wind will then become a tailwind. The indicated airspeed and lift will drop and the downburst may be sufficiently strong to force the aircraft to lose a significant amount of altitude. The degraded performance, combined with a tailwind encounter, may cause the aircraft to stall. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 1/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER AWARENESS AND AVOIDANCE Awareness of the weather conditions that cause windshear reduces the risk of a windshear encounter. The flight crew should study meteorological reports and listen to tower reports in order to help them assess the weather conditions expected during takeoff or landing. If a windshear encounter is expected, the flight crew should delay takeoff or landing until the conditions improve (e.g. until the thunderstorm leaves the airport). RECOGNITION Timely recognition of a windshear condition is vital for the successful implementation of the windshear recovery/escape procedure. The flight crew should pay attention to the following deviations that may indicate a possible windshear condition: ‐ Indicated airspeed variations in excess of 15 kt ‐ Ground speed variations ‐ Wind indication variations on the ND: Directions and velocity ‐ Vertical speed excursions of 500 ft/min ‐ Pitch attitude excursions of 5 ° ‐ Glide slope deviation of 1 dot ‐ Heading variations of 10 ° ‐ Unusual A/THR activity. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 2/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER STRATEGY FOR COPING WITH WINDSHEAR Windshear and microburst are hazardous phenomena for aircraft at takeoff or landing. The strategy to cope with windshear is: ‐ Increase flight crew awareness by using the Predictive Windshear Function (PWS) ‐ Inform the flight crew of air mass variations that are not expected by using Velocity Vector (VV) and approach speed variations ‐ Warn the flight crew of significant loss of energy by using "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" and "WINDSHEAR" aural alerts ‐ Provide effective tools to escape the windshear by using ALPHA FLOOR protection, SRS pitch order, high AOA protection and Ground Speed mini protection. INCREASE FLIGHT CREW AWARENESS When the microburst reaches the ground, it expands outward, carrying a large number of falling rain droplets. The weather radar measures the speed variations of the droplets, and as a result, assesses wind variations. The Predictive Windshear Function (PWS) predicts wind variations. The PWS automatically operates below 1 500 ft AGL. The PWS triggers aural and visual alerts in the case of a windshear detection. INFORM THE FLIGHT CREW The bird (Velocity Vector) associated with the approach speed variations (GS mini protection) is an effective way of informing the flight crew of air mass variations that are not expected. Approach speed variations and lateral bird movement reflect the horizontal wind gradient. Vertical bird movement reflects the vertical movement of the air mass. WARN THE FLIGHT CREW The "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" low energy warning is based on the speed, the acceleration and the flight path angle of the aircraft. This warning attracts the PF's eyes to the speed scale, and requests rapid thrust adjustment. In windshear conditions, "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" is the first warning to appear, before the activation of the alpha floor protection. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 3/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL In addition, the aircraft has a reactive windshear warning function. This function triggers, if the aircraft encounters a windshear. In this case, "WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR" aural alert is triggered. PROVIDE EFFECTIVE TOOLS There are three effective tools that assist the flight crew to escape a windshear: ‐ The alpha floor protection ‐ The SRS AP/FD pitch law ‐ The high AOA protection. When the alpha floor protection is triggered, the A/THR applies TOGA on all engines disregarding the thrust levers position. The FMA displays A.FLOOR, that revert to the preceding A/THR mode (or A/THR OFF if no A/THR mode was selected before A.FLOOR activation) when out of the alpha floor protection. The SRS pitch mode ensures the best aircraft climb performance. Therefore, the procedure requests that the flight crew follows the SRS pitch bar and possibly apply full backstick, in order to follow the SRS orders and minimize the loss of height. The high AOA protection enables the PF to safely pull full backstick, if needed, in order to follow the SRS pitch order, or to rapidly counteract a down movement. This provides maximum lift and minimum drag, by automatically retracting the speed brakes, if they are extended. OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-2-00009641.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL TAKEOFF PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR The Predictive Windshear Function detected a windshear. A predictive windshear warning during takeoff is a "WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD" aural alert, associated with W/S AHEAD that appears on the PFDs. A predictive windshear caution is a "MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY" aural alert, associated with W/S AHEAD that appears on the PFDs. These alerts are inhibited above 100 kt. If a predictive windshear alert is triggered on the runway before takeoff, the flight crew must delay takeoff until conditions are better. In order to evaluate takeoff conditions, the flight crew should apply both of the following: ‐ Use their observations and experience ‐ Check the weather conditions. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 4/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER In order to select the preferred runway, the flight crew should take into consideration the location of expected windshear. If a predictive windshear warning is triggered during the takeoff roll, the Captain must reject takeoff. If a predictive windshear caution is triggered during the takeoff roll, it is the decision of the Captain according to the Captain's situation assessment to either: ‐ Continue with takeoff considering TOGA, or ‐ Reject takeoff. If a predictive windshear alert is triggered during initial climb, the flight crew must: ‐ Set TOGA ‐ Closely monitor the speed and the speed trend ‐ Ensure that the flight path does not include areas with suspected windshears ‐ Change the aircraft configuration, provided that the aircraft does not enter windshear. Note: In some specifics conditions, if the flight crew verifies and confirms that there is no risk of windshear for the takeoff, they may disregard the alert. For more information Refer to FCOM/FCOM/Abnormal procedures/SURV/Predictive Windshear. However, the flight crew must always rely on all reactive windshear (i.e WINDSHEAR) alerts. REACTIVE WINDSHEAR ("WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" AURAL ALERT) OR WINDSHEAR DETECTED BY FLIGHT CREW OBSERVATION The PRIMs detected a windshear. A reactive windshear warning is a "WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural alert, associated with WINDSHEAR that appears on PFDs. During the takeoff roll, "WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" alert is inhibited. Windshear recognition is based on the flight crew observation. If the windshear occurs before V1, with significant speed and speed trend variations, the Captain must initiate a rejected takeoff. If the windshear occurs after V1, the flight crew must select TOGA. The flight crew must pay attention to the following: ‐ The flight crew should not change the configuration, until the aircraft is out of the windshear, because operating the landing gear doors causes additional drag ‐ The PF must fly SRS pitch orders rapidly and smoothly, but not aggressively, and must consider pulling full backstick, if necessary, to minimize height loss ‐ The PM should call out the wind variations from the ND and V/S and, when clear of the windshear, report the encounter to the ATC. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 5/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER APPROACH PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR The Predictive Windshear Function detected a windshear. A predictive windshear warning during approach is a "GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD" aural alert, associated with W/S AHEAD that appears on the PFDs. A predictive windshear caution is a "MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY" aural alert, associated with W/S AHEAD that appears on the PFDs. If "MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY" or the visual alert appears, the flight crew should either delay the approach or divert to another airport. However, if the flight crew decides to continue the approach, they should: ‐ Assess the weather severity with the radar display ‐ Consider the most appropriate runway ‐ Select FLAPS 3 for landing, in order to optimize the climb gradient capability in the case of a go-around ‐ Use managed speed, because it provides the GS mini function ‐ Increase the VAPP displayed on the FMS PERF APP page up to a maximum of VLS +15 kt ‐ Consider using the VV pb, for an earlier detection of vertical path deviation. In the case of "GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD" triggering, the PF must set TOGA for a go-around. The flight crew can change the aircraft configuration, provided that the windshear is not entered. Full backstick should be applied, if required, to follow the SRS, or to minimize the loss of height. Note: In some specifics conditions, if the flight crew verifies and confirms that there is no risk of windshear during the approach, they may disregard the alert. For more information Refer to FCOM/FCOM/Abnormal procedures/SURV/Predictive Windshear. However, the flight crew must always rely on all reactive windshear (i.e WINDSHEAR) alerts. REACTIVE WINDSHEAR The PRIMs detected a windshear. A reactive windshear warning is a "WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural alert, associated with WINDSHEAR that appears on PFDs. In the case of a "WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural alert, the PF must set TOGA for a go-around. However, the flight crew must not change the configuration (slats/flaps and gear) until out of the windshear, and must closely monitor the flight path and speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 P 6/6 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Weather Turbulence INTRODUCTION Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-3-00009642.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew must use weather reports and charts to determine the location and altitude of possible CBs, storms, and Clear Air Turbulence (CAT). If turbulence is expected, the flight crew must turn on the seatbelt signs, in order to prepare passengers and prevent injury. USE OF THE RADAR Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-3-00009643.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL Areas of known turbulence, associated with CBs, must be avoided. Usually, the gain should be left in AUTO. However, selective use of manual gain may help to assess the general weather conditions. Manual gain is particularly useful, when operating in heavy rain, if the radar picture is saturated. In this case, reduced gain will help the flight crew to identify the areas of heaviest rainfall, that are usually associated with active CB cells. After using manual gain, it should be reset to AUTO, in order to recover optimum radar sensitivity. A weak echo should not be a reason for the flight crew to underestimate a CB, because only the wet parts of the CB are detected. The decision to avoid a CB must be taken as early as possible, and lateral avoidance should, ideally, be at 20 NM upwind. PROCEDURE Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-3-00009644.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL If moderate turbulence is encountered, the flight crew should set the AP and A/THR to ON with managed speed. If severe turbulence is encountered, the flight crew should display the MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE procedure, by pressing the ECP ABN pushbutton, then selecting the MISCELLANEOUS Menu. For more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-MISC [ABN] MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE. The ECAM procedure indicates 300 kt/M 0.85 as MAX TURB SPEED, and green dot as MIN TURB SPEED. This range protects the aircraft structure from wind gusts, and maintains the buffet margin, especially during vertical wind gusts. The ECAM procedure also recommends to set the AP to ON, and to disconnect the A/THR in case of excessive thrust variations. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to C → PR-NP-SP-10-10-3 P 1/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER With the A/THR OFF, it is better that the flight crew does not try to maintain the airspeed. Therefore, the speed may exceed VMO/MMO. In this case, the flight crew applies the overspeed recovery operating techniques. For more information, Refer to PR-AEP-MISC Overspeed Recovery. When the speed comes back below VMO/MMO, the flight crew resumes the MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE procedure. Use of the A/THR is, however, recommended during approach, in order to benefit from the GS mini. If the aircraft is flown manually, the flight crew should be aware of the fact that flight control laws are designed to cope with turbulence. Therefore, they should avoid the temptation to fight turbulence, and should not over-control the sidestick. The flight crew must set the harness to on, check that the seat belts signs are on and use all white lights in thunderstorms. In normal law, the flight crew should consider a descent to or below the Optimum Flight Level (OPT FL) in order to increase the buffet margin. In alternate or direct law, the flight crew may descend to approximately 4 000 ft below the Recommended Maximum (REC MAX) flight level. This increases the buffet margin and reduces the possibility of a stall warning in the case of turbulence. CONSIDERATIONS ON CLEAR AIR TURBULENCE (CAT) Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-3-00009645.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) can be expected by referring to weather charts and pilot reports. However, the radar cannot detect CAT, because it is "dry turbulence". If CAT is encountered, the flight crew may consider avoiding it vertically, keeping in mind that the buffet margin reduces as the altitude increases. MISCELLANEOUS Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-3-00009646.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL It is not necessary to set the ENG START selector to IGN. In the case of an engine flameout, the igniters will trigger automatically. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to E PR-NP-SP-10-10-3 P 2/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Wake Turbulence WAKE TURBULENCE Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-4-00024554.0001001 / 09 JAN 18 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL Every aircraft that flies generates wake vortices, also known as wake turbulence. Wake turbulence rolls-up into a pair of coherent, counter-rotating vortices that can persist for some minutes behind the aircraft's flight path. This wake turbulence usually moves downward and laterally with the wind. The intensity of the trailing vortex and the dissipation time depends upon factors such as the weight, size, speed of the aircraft, and the prevailing atmospheric conditions (calm weather creates the most critical situation). Wake turbulence may cause possible danger to the safe flight of another aircraft that crosses or operates below the trajectory of the aircraft that generates these vortices. An aircraft can encounter wake turbulence during any flight phase. WAKE TURBULENCE PREVENTION To reduce the encounter of a wake turbulence, the flight crew must comply with the aircraft separation minima. If the flight crew suspects that the aircraft may encounter wake turbulence, an upwind lateral offset can be used to avoid the wake turbulence. However, the application of a lateral offset does not guarantee that the vortex will be avoided (except if the vortices are clearly visible by condensation trails). During final approach, the flight crew should remain on the standard approach slope because a deviation does not guarantee avoidance of wake turbulence. WAKE TURBULENCE RECOVERY If the aircraft encounters wake turbulence, pilot input can amplify the effect of the vortices. All of the following is therefore recommended: ‐ Do not use the rudder: Use of the rudder does not reduce the severity of the encounter, nor does it enhance the ease of recovery. ‐ Keep the AP ON: The AP is able to correctly manage roll and pitch movements that are generated by wake turbulence. ‐ If the AP was set to OFF by the flight crew, release the controls and wait for a reasonable stabilization of the aircraft. When the aircraft is stabilized perform both the following: • Roll wings level • Establish again the trajectory. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SP-10-10-4 P 1/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-10-10-4 P 2/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Volcanic Ash, Sand, or Dust VOLCANIC ASH, SAND OR DUST Ident.: PR-NP-SP-10-10-5-00023247.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL VOLCANIC ASH Volcanic ash contains very abrasive particles that can significantly damage aircraft parts and degrade the operation of aircraft systems. ‐ On ground: Operators should avoid airports that are covered with volcanic ash. If not possible to avoid these airports, operators should Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ADVWXR Operations in Ash, Sand or Dust. ‐ In flight: Operators must avoid flight into areas of known volcanic activity. If the aircraft encounters volcanic ash during the flight, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-MISC [ABN] MISC VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER. SAND AND DUST Sand and dust can degrade the engines, and damage the aircraft surfaces. Operators should avoid airport covered with sand and dust, and flight operations in sand or dust clouds. If not possible to avoid these airports, or the sand or dust clouds, operators should Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ADVWXR Operations in Ash, Sand or Dust in order to avoid contamination. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SP-10-10-5 P 1/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ADVERSE WEATHER Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-10-10-5 P 2/2 08 FEB 18 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ENGINE START FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL MANUAL ENGINE START Ident.: PR-NP-SP-20-00009440.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL The automatic engine start is designed to cover all the operational cases. It was tested extensively in high altitude, hot and cold conditions, and with different bleed air pressures. Nevertheless, the manual engine start is maintained to cover some very remote cases, and is considered as a backup of the automatic engine start. The flight crew can decide to perform a manual engine start in the following cases: ‐ When the bleed performance are degraded due to very hot conditions, or at high-altitude airfield in extreme weather conditions, or ‐ When the performance of the external pneumatic power units is very low, or ‐ When an engine has a reduced EGT margin in hot conditions, or at high altitude airfields. The automatic start sequence has fixed parameters for the injection of the fuel (i.e. 25 % N3). The 25 % N3 target for fuel injection may not be the most appropriate motoring speed for fuel ignition in the above conditions. In manual engine start, the flight crew can wait for the maximum motoring speed (i.e. N3 acceleration is less than 0.2 % in approximately 3 s) that may provide a better air/fuel mixture. The manual engine start procedure is a "read and do" procedure. For more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ENG Manual Engine Start. The FADEC has limited control over the manual start process. In manual starting, the FADEC controls the engine start valve closure N3 is at or above 48 %, monitors engine parameters and generates the associated ECAM alerts, when necessary. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-NP-SP-20 P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - ENGINE START Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-20 P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022488.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 This section describes the available cost-reduction guidelines for the different flight phases. Operators can use these procedures in order to define their own cost-reduction policy. Each Operator is responsible for the decision of what costs/parameters to reduce, for example (non-exhaustive list): ‐ Maintenance costs ‐ Fuel consumption ‐ Operating costs ‐ Passenger comfort. For example, the purpose of both Cost Index (CI) and Flexible Takeoff is to reduce general costs, not the fuel consumption. The information in this chapter is not applicable to all Operators to the same extent, and depends on their specific operations (e.g. geographical location, airport conditions, local regulations, etc.). The flight crew should decide which procedures to apply, in accordance with the Operator guidelines and the flight conditions of the day. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022489.0001001 / 13 JAN 15 DISPATCH - FUEL QUANTITY The flight crew must determine the necessary fuel quantity at departure, from accurate and consistent data (i.e. weather, performance factor, optimum flight level, average wind speed, etc.) The weight of any extra fuel increases fuel consumption. DISPATCH - TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION Fuel reduction is not a factor for the selection of a takeoff configuration. The takeoff performance and best takeoff configuration depend on several operational and environmental factors. Select the takeoff configuration that: ‐ Optimizes takeoff performance (takeoff weight, etc.) ‐ If possible, increases flexible temperature ‐ Reduces takeoff speed (higher configuration for a given flexible temperature). A more extended slats and flaps configuration slightly increases fuel consumption, but with a higher flexible temperature increases cost reduction. DISPATCH - TAKEOFF THRUST When performance permits, use the highest flexible temperature for takeoff. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 1/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES Takeoff with flexible thrust increases fuel consumption compared to takeoff with TOGA thrust, due to the longer takeoff phase. But the use of flexible thrust reduces engine wear and reduces general costs. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024833.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION APU The flight crew may delay, for as long as possible, the APU start, and use the ground electrical unit and ground pneumatic unit when available. The flight crew should consider the possibility of using the APU ECON mode. The APU bleed air is limited to provide minimum cabin air ventilation. There is no control of the temperature in the cockpit and in the cabin, which may affect passenger comfort. Therefore, the flight crew should not use APU ECON mode for too long. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022490.0001001 / 13 JAN 15 EXTERIOR WALKAROUND During the exterior walkaround, the flight crew should pay attention to defects that may increase aerodynamic drag, e.g. : ‐ Mismatch of aircraft fuselage panels ‐ Flight control surfaces not correctly aligned ‐ Worn seals on the airframe ‐ Peeling paint ‐ Dirt on the aircraft. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022491.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 COCKPIT PREPARATION MFD FMS PREPARATION INIT PAGE The flight crew should respectively check that: ‐ The Cost Index (CI) is consistent with the Computerized Flight Plan (CFP). The CI is the ratio of time costs versus fuel costs. The purpose of the CI is to reduce fuel consumption. ‐ The tropopause value is correct, in order to ensure the accuracy of FMS predictions. TAKEOFF PERF PAGE If conditions and regulations permit, the flight crew should reduce the altitude for both the thrust reduction altitude (THR RED ALT) and the acceleration altitude (ACCEL ALT). Depending on the regulations, the lowest authorized altitude may be 400 ft. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 2/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES TAKEOFF RUNWAY OPTIMIZATION The takeoff performance is the first factor to consider in the selection of the takeoff runway. When possible, the flight crew should request takeoff on the runway that minimizes the taxi time and optimizes the departure trajectory, in order to minimize the flight time. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022492.0001001 / 13 JAN 15 PUSHBACK/START CLEARANCE When conditions and ATC permit, the flight crew should delay the engine start as long as possible. This is to reduce time spent with the engines running before takeoff. Before any takeoff, the flight crew must ensure engine warm-up, in order to prevent engine wear and to maintain engine performance. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022493.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 AFTER START APU ‐ If the APU is not necessary during or after taxi, the flight crew should set the APU bleed to off and shut down the APU. Fuel consumption is reduced when the APU is not running, even if bleed air is supplied by the engines. ‐ If the APU is necessary during or after taxi (e.g. when takeoff performance requires APU bleed), the flight crew may set the APU bleed to ON, in order to reduce fuel consumption. This opens the crossbleed valve and automatically closes the engine bleed. As the bleed air is not supplied by the engines, the fuel consumption is reduced. However, the use of APU bleed can lead to exhaust gases ingestion into the air conditioning system. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022494.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 TAXI THRUST MANAGEMENT Idle thrust is sufficient to move a light aircraft during taxi. If necessary, the flight crew should apply a small thrust increase. Excessive thrust burns more fuel, requires more brake application, and results in an increase in brake wear. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 3/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES ONE ENGINE TAXI Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ENG One Engine Taxi - At Departure. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022495.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 BEFORE TAKEOFF Before takeoff, the flight crew can set both packs to OFF. Refer to PR-NP-SOP-110 Packs. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024834.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 CLIMB ECON SPEED Unless restricted by the ATC, the flight crew should use managed speed during climb, in order to fly at the optimum ECON speed. ACCELERATION BELOW 10 000 FT By default, the FMS flight plan takes into account the 250 kt speed limitation below 10 000 ft. If the ATC permits, the flight crew can remove this limitation, in order to accelerate and save fuel. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024835.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 CRUISE OPTIMUM FLIGHT LEVEL (OPT FL) During cruise, the OPT FL increases while the aircraft weight decreases. The flight crew should monitor the OPT FL, and fly at the most appropriate flight level for optimum aircraft performance and fuel consumption. For additional information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 Step Climb. WIND UPDATE The flight crew should insert accurate and up-to-date wind information in the FMS, in order to optimize respectively: ‐ Fuel predictions ‐ Determination of OPT FL. The flight crew should update wind information when the change is more than: ‐ 30 ° in direction, or ‐ 30 kt in speed. For additional information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 FMS Use. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 4/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES MANAGED SPEED The flight crew should use managed speed mode, in order to: ‐ Fly at ECON speed ‐ Optimize speed in accordance with the CI and flight conditions of the day. The flight crew should not modify the CI in flight. For additional information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 Cost Index. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022496.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 DESCENT PREPARATION LANDING RUNWAY OPTIMIZATION When landing performance permits, the flight crew should ask the ATC to land on the runway that minimizes approach and/or taxi time. LANDING PREPARATION When landing performance permits, the best combination to reduce fuel costs and brakes oxidation is: CONF 3 + REV IDLE + BTV. In accordance with the recommendations of the SOP, preferably select an exit beyond the wet line to limit the increase of the brakes temperature. This also reduces the brakes oxidation phenomenon. For more information about brakes oxidation, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-160 Brake oxidation. If the flight crew needs to reduce the landing distance, they should consider to use the deceleration devices in the following order: 1. FLAPS FULL 2. REV MAX 3. Nearer BTV runway exit: Select an exit nearer to the wet line, but not before the wet line. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024836.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 DESCENT MANAGED SPEED The flight crew should use managed speed mode, in order to: ‐ Fly at ECON speed ‐ Optimize speed in accordance with the CI and flight conditions of the day. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024837.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 HOLDING FLAPS CONFIGURATION Clean configuration is the optimum configuration for a holding circuit. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 5/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES When required (holding pattern or speed limitation), the flight crew may consider the selection of CONF 1. OPTIMUM SPEED In clean configuration, the flight crew should fly at Green Dot speed + 20 kt, as it is a good approximation of the maximum endurance speed. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024838.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 APPROACH DECELERATION When conditions and ATC permit, a decelerated approach reduces fuel consumption. When the approach type does not enable to fly a decelerated approach, the flight crew should fly an early-stabilized approach. FLAPS CONFIGURATION When landing performance permits, the selection of CONF 3 reduces both the approach time and fuel consumption. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00022497.0001001 / 26 SEP 18 AFTER LANDING APU At the gate: ‐ If electrical supply and/or air supply are available, the flight crew may keep the APU off after landing and during transit ‐ If only air supply is available, the flight crew may keep the APU bleed off during transit ‐ If neither electrical supply nor air supply are available, the flight crew may delay the APU start as long as possible. ONE ENGINE TAXI Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SUP-SUP-ENG One Engine Taxi - At Arrival. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-30 P 6/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES Ident.: PR-NP-SP-30-30-1-00024839.0001001 / 05 DEC 18 PARKING APU ‐ If the APU is not used: Before the flight crew sets the EXT 1(2) pb to ON, they must check that the associated AVAIL light is on. ‐ If the APU is used: • Before the flight crew shuts down the engines, they must check that the AVAIL light of the APU START pb is on. This avoids an APU automatic shutdown. • The flight crew should consider the possibility of using the APU ECON mode. The APU bleed air is limited to provide minimum cabin air ventilation. There is no control of the temperature in the cockpit and in the cabin, which may affect passenger comfort. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-NP-SP-30 P 7/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GREEN OPERATING PROCEDURES Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-30 P 8/8 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - TOUCH AND GO TOUCH AND GO Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SP-40-220-2-00022479.0001001 / 03 JAN 19 GENERAL The primary objective of a touch and go is to practice approach and landing. Touch and go are not intended for neither landing roll nor takeoff procedure training. Except for the items detailed hereafter, the flight crew must apply the SOPs and standard tasksharing when they perform a touch and go. On repetitive patterns without significant change, the instructor can decide to adapt the After Takeoff and Approach checklists. The flight crew should pay attention to the following remarks when they perform a touch and go: ‐ The decision speed (V1) does not apply to touch and go. The PFD does not display V1 during the roll phase of a touch and go. Therefore, the flight crew should be go-minded. ‐ If the instructor wants to abandon the touch and go, the instructor calls “STOP – I HAVE CONTROL”. Simultaneously the instructor takes control and stops the aircraft, with the use of maximum braking and reverse. When the aircraft stops, the instructor calls for any applicable ECAM actions. The decision to discontinue a touch and go after the application of TOGA must only be taken if the instructor is sure that the aircraft cannot safely fly. ‐ If the trainee selects reverse thrust, the flight crew must perform a full-stop landing. If any failure occurs during the touch and go training, the flight crew must first perform the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions. Then, during the decision process, the instructor should consider the consultation of the DISPATCH page for MEL assessment and training continuation. For the determination of the MEL repair interval, consider each “touch and go” or “stop and go” as one flight. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-40-220-2-00022517.0001001 / 29 NOV 18 DURING FINAL APPROACH The instructor ensures that the trainee selects the L/G lever down as soon as possible when FLAPS are at 2. This ensures that the braking Pre-Land Test (PLT) is complete before touchdown and prevents the risk of tires degradation (flat spots). Before each touch and go, the instructor confirms with the trainee that both of the following apply: ‐ Reverse thrust will not be selected ‐ Brakes (auto or manual) will not be used. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SP-40 P 1/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - TOUCH AND GO Ident.: PR-NP-SP-40-220-2-00022518.0001001 / 07 AUG 19 DURING TOUCH AND GO Trainee Instructor ‐ Perform usual flare and landing technique ‐ Maintain the runway centerline. ‐ Disarm the ground spoilers (1) ‐ Order “STAND UP”. Move forward the thrust levers approximately 5 cm (2 in), in order to prevent the reduction of engines to ground idle. ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Set flaps configuration for takeoff (2) If necessary, reset the rudder trim Monitor the pitch trim movement towards the green band Place one hand behind the thrust levers to ensure that they are advanced to approximately 5 cm (2 in) ‐ Order “GO” when the aircraft is in the correct configuration (pitch trim, rudder trim and flaps). Set TOGA thrust. Remove the hand from the thrust levers. ‐ Check engine parameters and announce “THRUST SET” ‐ Order “ROTATE” at VAPP ‐ Maintain the hand behind the thrust levers to ensure that the trainee does not perform an inadvertent reduction of thrust or unwanted stop. Rotate the aircraft and target takeoff pitch attitude, then follow SRS. (1) At nosewheel touchdown, the instructor pushes on the SPEED BRAKE lever to disarm the ground spoilers. The objective is to initiate the immediate retraction of the ground spoilers, and not to wait for their automatic retraction while the thrust levers are advanced. Carefully disarm the ground spoilers, so that the SPEED BRAKE lever is not moved. If the SPEED BRAKE lever is not in the fully-retracted position, the CONFIG SPEED BRAKES NOT RETRACTED alert will appear and the SPEED BRAKE lever will possibly command speed brakes extension. As per aircraft design, ground spoilers automatically retract when thrust levers are set above CLB detent. (2) Flap settings are as follows: ‐ Landing configuration: CONF FULL ‐ Takeoff configuration: CONF 3. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-NP-SP-40 P 2/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - TOUCH AND GO Ident.: PR-NP-SP-40-220-2-00023351.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 VISUAL PATTERN 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-NP-SP-40 P 3/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - TOUCH AND GO Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-NP-SP-40 P 4/4 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - STOP AND GO FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STOP AND GO Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-NP-SP-50-220-3-00022480.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 GENERAL The primary objective of a stop and go is to practice: ‐ Approach and landing ‐ Roll out and runway vacation ‐ Taxi and takeoff. Except for the items detailed hereafter, the flight crew must apply the SOPs and standard tasksharing when they perform a stop and go. The flight crew should taxi the aircraft to the runway threshold for the next takeoff. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-50-220-3-00022521.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 WHEN THE RUNWAY IS VACATED Disarm ground spoilers. PF Set the FLAPS lever to 0. PM Ident.: PR-NP-SP-50-220-3-00022522.0001001 / 03 JAN 19 BEFORE NEXT TAKEOFF Before the next takeoff, the flight crew should perform all of the following actions: ‐ Consider MEL (if applicable). For the determination of the MEL repair interval, consider each “touch and go” or “stop and go” as one flight. ‐ Set FMS: • • • • Set INIT data Set ZFW & ZFW CG data Set F-PLN data Set TAKEOFF data. ‐ Set FCU and reset FDs ‐ Set Takeoff configuration: • • • • Arm Ground Spoilers Set Flaps Set / check Rudder and Pitch Trims Arm RTO Autobrake mode. ‐ Perform T.O CONFIG test ‐ Perform After Start checklist ‐ Request ATC clearance 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-NP-SP-50 P 1/2 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES NORMAL PROCEDURES 350-941 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - STOP AND GO FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ Perform Takeoff briefing ‐ Perform Before Takeoff checklist. Ident.: PR-NP-SP-50-220-3-00022523.0001001 / 04 MAY 16 BEFORE LINE UP Check brake temperature. (1) PF Check brake temperature (1). PM In order to limit the brake temperature, the flight crew should select the appropriate exit after landing. If performance permits, the instructor can decide to keep the landing gear down after takeoff for brake cooling. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-NP-SP-50 P 2/2 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 GENERAL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: PR-AEP-GEN-00009573.0001001 / 15 JAN 15 Applicable to: ALL The Abnormal and Emergency Procedures chapter highlights techniques that will be used in some abnormal and emergency operations. Some of the procedures discussed in this chapter are the result of double or triple failures. Whilst it is very unlikely that any of these failures will be encountered, it is useful to have a background understanding of the effect that they have on the handling and management of the aircraft. In all cases, the ECAM should be handled as described in FCTM - AIRBUS OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY - MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL OPERATIONS (Refer to AOP-30-30 General). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-AEP-GEN P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL GENERAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-GEN P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 AUTO FLT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AUTO FLT FMS 1+2 FAULT Ident.: PR-AEP-AUTOFLT-00009599.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL If all FMCs fail: ‐ All FMS data and functions are lost on both sides (FMS1 + FMS2) • However, the ND still displays a trajectory. This trajectory is the BACKUP TRAJ (Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-40-40-90 BACKUP TRAJ) • The VD displays the altitude and distance scales in red. ‐ The AP/FD and A/THR remain available as these functions are managed through the PRIMs but the AP reverts to SPEED / V/S / HDG mode. A FMC system reset should be performed as described in the FCOM. If unsuccessful, ‐ The flight crew should tune the NAVAIDS via the RMP ‐ The navigation function is recovered through the Standby Navigation Display (SND) . The aircraft position computation is not impacted, as it is hosted in ADIRS. The navigation source and the position are displayed on the lower part of the ISIS. Waypoints and FIX are entered in the ISIS (Long/Lat only) thanks to SND menu. The flight plan is composed of 10 waypoints maximum. Once the waypoint list has been entered, the pilot has to activate the navigation via the button LS/DIR TO. Navigation is followed in HDG/TRK mode. Lateral aircraft deviation may be assessed with the lines displayed on each part of the aircraft symbol. One big line represents 5 NM lateral deviation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-AEP-AUTOFLT P 1/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 AUTO FLT FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL AUTO FLT EFIS/AFS CTL PNL FAULT Ident.: PR-AEP-AUTOFLT-00009600.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL The Flight Control Unit (FCU) is composed of the AFS CTL panel and of two EFIS CTL panels which may fail independently. In the case of one panel failure, most of the functions may be restored with the appropriate backup function on the FCU BKUP page of the MFD. The MFD FCU BKUP page will be activated either: ‐ Automatically in the case of detected FCU failure. In that case, the AUTO FLT AFS CTL PNL FAULT or CDS CAPT(F/O)(CAPT + F/O) EFIS CTL PNL FAULT alert advises the flight crew ‐ Manually in the case of a FCU malfunction detected by the flight crew. In that case, the flight crew selects the appropriate FCU BKUP page of the MFD. The FCU and the FCU backup function are exclusive (i.e. when one is active, the other is in standby). The use of the MFD FCU BKUP page is based on the following principles: ‐ Permanent display of the AFS CTL panel page of the MFD FCU BKUP, except during cruise. The use of other MFD displays must be minimized. ‐ Check on the associated PFD or ND each data inserted in the MFD FCU BKUP page. The MFD FCU BKUP page has the following specificities: ‐ Entries are only made through the scroll wheel of the KCCU ‐ The ND mode and ND range entries are scrollable ‐ The ZOOM function is not available ‐ The taxi pb is not available. 350-941 FLEET FCTM B PR-AEP-AUTOFLT P 2/2 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ABNORMAL ENGINE RESPONSE Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00023235.0001001 / 31 JUL 18 Applicable to: ALL Most of the engine malfunctions are taken into account by one or several ECAM alerts that warn the flight crew and provide the flight crew with the actions to perform. However, some engine malfunctions may not trigger an ECAM alert. These engine malfunctions may require some knowledge and the analysis of the flight crew, so that the flight crew can recognize, understand and manage them. When the flight crew identifies an abnormal parameter, the flight crew should use all the information available to analyze the engine malfunction. The flight crew should not consider only this abnormal parameter to perform their analysis. If possible, the flight crew should keep the engine running in-flight. Except if a procedure requires an engine shutdown, it is usually preferable to keep the engine running. Even at idle, the engine powers the hydraulic, electric and bleed systems. In addition, if the flight crew is not sure which engine has a malfunction, the flight crew should keep the engines running. If really damaged, the affected engine will eventually fail. Before approach, if the engine response remains abnormal, the flight crew decides to keep the engine running or to shut it down taking into account the aircraft controllability and the flight conditions. ALL ENGINES FAILURE - MANAGEMENT OF THE SITUATION Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00023902.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 INTRODUCTION All engines failure is a situation where the aircraft entirely or partially loses engine thrust, and is no longer able to maintain level flight. In most cases, the Flight Warning Computers (FWCs) detect an all engines failure condition and display the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM alert. However, in some cases, the FWCs do not detect the all engines failure condition. When there is partial loss of thrust (no engine flame out) to one or more engines, the N3 parameter may remain slightly above the ECAM alert threshold. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-AEP-ENG P 1/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024489.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 SITUATION ASSESSMENT AND IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Subsequent to an all engines failure, the flight crew must fly the aircraft and establish a safe flight path: ‐ The flight crew must follow the GOLDEN RULES: • Fly: The PF should ensure aircraft control to maintain a safe speed • Navigate: The PF should adapt the aircraft trajectory to avoid any terrain or obstacle • Communicate: Use VHF1 as needed (VHF2 remains available). • Use the appropriate level of automation: The use of Autopilot significantly decreases the flight crew workload. ‐ As soon as a safe flight path is established the flight crew must rapidly assess the situation, decide on immediate conservatory diversion options and communicate with cabin crew accordingly. The flight crew should take all the following parameters into account: • The remaining time before touchdown • The suitable landing surface options • The technical condition of the aircraft. After the situation assessment: ‐ If the flight crew considers that there is sufficient time for engine relight, all the following applies: • A windmilling relight should be considered first. Compared with the starter assisted relight the windmilling relight enables simultaneous relight attempts on all engines. In addition, the relight attempts are not dependent on the technical condition of the aircraft systems. If windmilling relight is considered, the PF should adjust the pitch to maintain sufficient speed in order to keep the engine turning. • On the ND, when in ROSE-NAV mode with airport option (ARPT pb) selected on the EFIS/CP, the flight crew can assess which airport can be reached, based on the aircraft position. • On MFD, the F-PLN INFO menu provides access to the list of closest airports. ‐ If remaining time is not sufficient for relight attempt, or if relight cannot be attempted (no more fuel remaining, engines damaged) the flight crew can reduce speed to green dot speed. This is in order to maximize the remaining time for cabin preparation and the distance flown. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 2/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024490.0001001 / 15 APR 19 MANAGEMENT OF ALL ENGINES FAILURE SITUATION In most cases, the FWCs detect an all engines failure situation. In this case, the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM alert appears on the WD. This procedure provides all the necessary information for the flight crew to attempt engine relight and if necessary, to prepare the aircraft for a ditching or a forced landing (For more information, Refer to PR-AEP-ENG Introduction). At any time, if remaining time is not sufficient for engine relight or for aircraft preparation for an anticipated ditching or forced landing, the flight crew can refer to the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure. The following cases summarize which procedures can be used by the fly crew to deal with an all engines failure situation (ECAM, [ABN] ECAM NOT-SENSED or [QRH] procedure). Note: The decision to use a specific procedure depends on the situation assessment and remains the responsibility of the flight crew. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 3/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024491.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 CASE 1 - BOTH ENGINES DETECTED FAILED BY FWCS After both engines have been detected failed by the FWCs, in case the flight crew can reply "YES" to the question "TIME PERMITS FOR FULL PROCEDURE?", the flight crew should apply the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "FULL PROCEDURE" (For more information, Refer to PR-AEP-ENG Introduction). 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 4/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024492.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 CASE 2 - ONLY ONE ENGINE DETECTED FAILED BY THE FWCS If the thrust is lost on both engines but only one engine is detected failed by the FWCs, because its parameters remain above the ECAM alert threshold, the ENG 1(2) FAIL ECAM procedure appears on the WD. In this case, the flight crew should apply the ENG 1(2) FAIL ECAM procedure and may consider engine relight with the not-sensed [ABN] ENG RELIGHT IN FLT procedure. If the engine does not relight, in order to prepare the aircraft, the flight crew should use one of the following not-sensed procedures: ‐ [ABN] MISC DITCHING (For more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-MISC [ABN] MISC DITCHING), or ‐ [ABN] MISC FORCED LANDING. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 5/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024493.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 CASE 3 - ENGINES FAILURE NOT DETECTED BY THE FWCS If the engine failure is not detected by the FWCs, in order to prepare the aircraft, the flight crew should use one of the following not-sensed procedures: ‐ [ABN] MISC DITCHING (For more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-MISC [ABN] MISC DITCHING), or ‐ [ABN] MISC FORCED LANDING. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 6/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: At any time, if remaining time is neither sufficient for engine relight nor for aircraft preparation for an anticipated ditching or forced landing, the flight crew should refer to the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure. Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024494.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 CASE 4 - EMERGENCY LANDING If the all engines failure occurs close to the ground the flight crew should use one of the following procedures to prepare the aircraft: ‐ The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "SHORT PROCEDURE" (for more information, Refer to PR-AEP-ENG Introduction), or ‐ the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 7/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Note: The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "SHORT PROCEDURE" is equivalent to the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure. However the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure provides the crew with the optimum configuration for ditching or forced landing in accordance with the current technical condition of the aircraft. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-ENG P 8/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-1-00024495.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 SUMMARY Note: At any time, if remaining time is neither sufficient for engine relight nor for aircraft preparation for an anticipated ditching or forced landing, the flight crew should refer to the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure. ALL ENGINES FAILURE - ECAM PROCEDURE Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-2-00024521.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 INTRODUCTION When the FWCs detect the all engines failures situation, the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM alert appears on the WD. The gliding distance that appears on the ECAM enables the flight crew to approximately estimate the aircraft range as a function of the aircraft altitude, at the optimum speed for engine relight without wind. However, this gliding distance is an envelope value. As a 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-AEP-ENG P 9/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL result, depending on current parameters, the current gliding distance may differ from the one that appears on the ECAM. After the range assessment, the PF should then initiate the diversion to an accessible runway, or determine the most appropriate area for a forced landing or ditching. Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-2-00024496.0001001 / 02 NOV 17 PROCEDURE The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure informs the flight crew that the APU automatically starts and that an auto-relight is launched on both engines. The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure requests that the flight crew checks the onboard fuel quantity. This is in order to ensure that the aircraft is not experiencing a fuel starvation issue that will prevent engine relight. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-AEP-ENG P 10/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Then, the ECAM requests that the flight crew decides if the available time permits to apply the FULL PROCEDURE: ‐ If the flight crew replies "YES" to the question "TIME PERMITS FOR FULL PROCEDURE?" that appears on the WD, the flight crew applies the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "FULL PROCEDURE", that includes all the following: • The PF targets the optimum windmilling speed for engine relight, that appears on the ECAM • The PF sets both engine thrust levers to idle to avoid any thrust power surge when the engine starts • If the flight crew replies "YES" to the question "ENGINE RELIGHT CAN BE ATTEMPTED?" both of the following apply: ▪ Compared with the starter-assisted relight (that uses the APU bleed), the windmilling relight has two advantages: ‐ Simultaneous relight attempts are possible for all engines ‐ Relight attempts are not dependent on the technical condition of the aircraft systems. For these reasons, the ECAM procedure promotes the windmilling relight ▪ If windmilling relight is not successful, the ECAM procedure indicates that the flight crew should reduce the aircraft speed to green dot speed. This is to enable the FADEC to perform a starter-assisted engine relight. Green dot speed enables the aircraft to reduce the descent rate. • If the flight crew replies "NO" to the question "ENGINE RELIGHT CAN BE ATTEMPTED?" or if engine relights are not successful, both of the following apply: ▪ The ECAM requires that the aircraft flies at green dot speed. This is because this is the best lift-to-drag ratio speed that maximizes the remaining time for cabin preparation and distance flown ▪ The flight crew should then prepare the aircraft either for a ditching or for a forced landing, even if the aircraft can reach a runway. Therefore, the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "FULL PROCEDURE" includes all the steps for the aircraft preparation for an anticipated ditching or forced landing. ‐ If the crew replies "NO" to the question "TIME PERMITS FOR FULL PROCEDURE?", both of the following apply: • The flight crew continues the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "SHORT PROCEDURE" that is equivalent to the [QRH] EMER LANDING procedure • The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE "SHORT PROCEDURE" contains the minimum steps (aircraft configuration, approach speed) for a ditching or forced landing. The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure provides the flight crew with the optimum configuration for ditching or forced landing, in accordance with the technical condition of the aircraft. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-AEP-ENG P 11/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-2-00024503.0001001 / 01 OCT 19 PREPARATION FOR DITCHING OR FORCED LANDING The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure request that the flight crew sets the TERR SYS and the GPWS to OFF. This is in order to avoid noise pollution in the cockpit when the aircraft approaches touchdown. The speed brakes are available to increase descent rate if needed. The ditching procedure includes all of the following steps: ‐ The PF takes VLS +15 kt approach speed ‐ The PM sets the DITCHING pb to ON to close all valves under the water line of the aircraft. In addition, during the approach with the DITCHING pb ON, the VLS will decrease, in order to reduce the kinetic energy at touchdown. ‐ The PF should increase flare height and maintain the optimum pitch provided by the ECAM procedure until the aircraft touches the water. The forced landing procedure includes all of the following steps: ‐ Since the vertical trajectory is significantly modified when the aircraft is configured for landing (due to slat/flap and landing gear extension), the aircraft descent slope in landing configuration is provided at the beginning of the "Forced Landing" section of the procedure. This is to help the flight crew to anticipate this modification. ‐ The flight crew must extend the landing gear to absorb some energy, even if the landing is expected out of a runway. The landing gear is extended by gravity (L/G extension requires 1 min). ‐ During the initial and final approach, the PF follows VLS. The main concern for the PF is to maintain the aircraft energy. The ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure recommends to set FLAPS 1 configuration for forced landing. If more drag is required, it is possible to use the FLAPS 2 configuration (FLAPS 1 extension requires 3 min and 1 min more for FLAPS 2). If the flaps lever is already at FLAPS 2 or above when the all engines failure is detected, the ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure requests that the flight crew does not change the slats and flaps position. This is to avoid a configuration change near the ground (for example, in case of engines failure after takeoff). In the case of a forced landing and if there is not enough time to perform the full ENG ALL ENGINES FAILURE ECAM procedure, it is recommended to set FLAPS 2 configuration. ‐ The PF increases flare height, in order to adopt the right attitude for forced landing ‐ On ground, the PF may use differential braking to maintain the selected axis. In addition, the PF should avoid to release the brake, in order to maximize the endurance of the accumulator. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-AEP-ENG P 12/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ENGINE FAIL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009615.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL The ECAM requires to assess if the engine is damaged or not. Engine damages are generally accompanied with a loud noise, significant increase in aircraft vibrations, repeated or uncontrolled engine stalls, associated abnormal indications such as loss of N1, N2 or N3 indications. The THR parameter set to 0 will not be considered as an indicator of engine damage. Indeed, the THR is a thrust indicator but not an engine rotation indicator. ENGINE FAILURE - GENERAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009581.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL An engine flameout can be due to many reasons, for example: ‐ Fuel starvation ‐ Encounter with volcanic ash, sand or dust clouds ‐ Heavy rain, or hail, or icing ‐ Bird strike ‐ Engine stall ‐ Malfunction of the engine control system. An engine flameout may trigger an ECAM alert. The flight crew can detect an engine flameout without damage by a rapid decrease of N1 , N2, N3, EGT and FF. The flight crew can suspect engine damage, if the flight crew observes two or more of the following symptoms: ‐ Rapid increase of the EGT above the red line ‐ Significant mismatch of the rotor speeds, or absence of rotation ‐ Significant increase in aircraft vibrations, or buffeting, or both vibrations and buffeting ‐ Abnormal engine oil pressure, or temperature ‐ Hydraulic system loss ‐ Repeated, or not controllable engine stalls. ENGINE FAILURE AT LOW SPEED (ON GROUND) Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009578.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL On ground, if an engine failure occurs at low speed, the resultant yaw may be significant, leading to rapid displacement from the runway centreline. For this reason, it is essential that the Captain keep their hand on the thrust levers once take-off thrust has been set. Directional control is achieved 350-941 FLEET FCTM D to F → PR-AEP-ENG P 13/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL by immediately closing the thrust levers and using maximum rudder and braking. If necessary, the steering handwheel should be used to avoid runway departure. ENGINE FAILURE AFTER V1 Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-3-00009582.0001001 / 04 APR 18 AIRCRAFT HANDLING If an engine fails after V1, the flight crew must continue the takeoff. The essential and primary tasks are associated with the aircraft handling. The flight crew must stabilize the aircraft at the correct pitch and airspeed, and establish the aircraft on the correct flight path before the beginning of the ECAM procedure. ON THE GROUND Use the rudder as usual, in order to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. When the rudder input is more than 2/3 of the full rudder deflection, the ground law order ailerons and spoiler 3 deflection in order to ease the lateral control of the aircraft. At VR, rotate the aircraft using a continuous pitch rate towards an initial pitch attitude of 10 °. The combination of high FLEX temperatures and low VR speeds requires precise handling during the rotation and liftoff. The 10 ° pitch target will ensure the aircraft becomes airborne. WHEN SAFELY AIRBORNE The flight crew should then follow the SRS orders. If an engine failure occurs on ground, the SRS takes the engine failure into account, and targets V2 speed (instead of V2 +10 kt with all engines operating). If an engine failure occurs after liftoff, the SRS takes the engine failure into account, and targets the speed at which the failure occurred (limited between V2 and V2 +15 kt). Shortly after liftoff, the lateral normal law orders rudder surface deflection in order to minimize the sideslip (there is no feedback of this command to the pedals). Therefore, the lateral behavior of the aircraft is safe and the flight crew should take their time to react on the rudder pedals and to center the beta target. In the case of an engine failure at takeoff, the blue beta target appears instead of the usual sideslip indication on the PFD. The lateral normal law does not order the entire rudder surface deflection that is necessary to center the beta target. Therefore, the flight crew must adjust the rudder pedals as usual to center the beta target in order to optimize the climb performance. Beta target indication when the aircraft is not in clean configuration. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to G → PR-AEP-ENG P 14/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Sideslip indication when the aircraft is in clean configuration. When the beta target is centered, it minimizes the drag even if the aircraft flies with a small sideslip. The calculation of the beta target is a compromise between the drag induced by the deflection of the control surfaces and the airframe drag produced by a small sideslip. When the beta target is centered, it causes less drag than centering a conventional ball, because rudder, aileron, and spoiler deflection, and aircraft attitudes are all taken into account. The flight crew should keep in mind that the flight controls react to a detected sideslip. This means that with hands off the sidestick and no rudder input, the aircraft bank angle is approximately 5 ° maximum and then remains stabilized. Therefore, the aircraft is laterally stable and it is not urgent to laterally trim the aircraft. The flight crew should control the heading as usual with the bank angle, and center the beta target with the rudder. The flight crew should accelerate if it is not possible to center the beta target by applying full rudder. Trim the rudder as usual. The use of the autopilot is STRONGLY recommended. After an engine failure, the flight crew should laterally trim the aircraft with the rudder before they engage the autopilot. When the AP is engaged, the rudder trim is managed via the AP and therefore, manual rudder trim command that includes reset, is inhibited. Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-3-00009596.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 THRUST CONSIDERATIONS Consider the use of TOGA thrust in the case of one engine failure (above the THR RED ALT but below the EO ACCEL ALT), keeping in mind the following: ‐ For a FLEX takeoff, setting the operating engine to TOGA provides an additional performance margin but is not a requirement for the reduced thrust takeoff certification. The application of TOGA supplies a large thrust increase very rapidly but this comes with a significant increase in yawing moment, and an increased pitch rate. The selection of TOGA restores thrust margins, but it may increase the workload in aircraft handling. ‐ For a derated takeoff, the flight crew cannot apply asymmetric TOGA thrust if the speed is below F, due to VMCA considerations. WARNING If the takeoff is performed at derated takeoff thrust, selecting TOGA at a speed below F can lead to loss of control of the aircraft. ‐ Takeoff thrust is limited to 10 min. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ PR-AEP-ENG P 15/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-3-00022424.0001001 / 02 APR 15 DURING AIRCRAFT TURN Bank Angle Limitations Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-10-3-00009597.0001001 / 02 APR 15 PROCEDURE INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE The PM carefully monitors the aircraft flight path. The PM cancels any Master Warning/Caution and reads the ECAM title that appears on the top line of the WD. Procedures are initiated on PF's command. No action is performed (except cancel audio alerts via the MASTER WARNING/CAUTION light) until: ‐ The appropriate flight path is established ‐ The aircraft is at least 400 ft above the runway. A height of 400 ft is recommended, because it is a good compromise between the necessary time for stabilization and the excessive delay beginning the procedure. In some emergency cases and provided that the flight path is established, the PF may initiate the ECAM actions before 400 ft. The flight crew should control and monitor the aircraft trajectory as a priority. They should delay the acceleration phase only for the purpose to secure the engine. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ PR-AEP-ENG P 16/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL "Secure the engine" means that the flight crew should continue the ECAM procedure until: ‐ "ENG MASTER OFF" in the case of an engine failure without damage, or ‐ "AGENT 1 DISCH" in the case of engine failure with damage, or ‐ Fire extinguished or "AGENT 2 DISCH" in the case of an engine fire drill. ACCELERATION SEGMENT At the Engine-Out (EO) acceleration altitude, press ALT pb to level off and enable the speed to increase. If the flight crew manually flies the aircraft, the PF should remember that as airspeed increases, the rudder input necessary to center the beta target decreases. Retract the flaps as usual. When the flight crew sets the flaps lever to zero, the beta target reverts to the usual sideslip indication. Note: If the decision has been taken to delay the acceleration, the flight crew must not exceed the engine-out maximum acceleration altitude (The engine out maximum acceleration altitude corresponds to the maximum altitude that can be achieved with one engine out and the other engine operating at takeoff thrust for a maximum of 10 min). FINAL TAKEOFF SEGMENT When the speed trend reaches the green dot speed, pull the ALT knob to engage OP CLB. Set the thrust lever to MCT when the LVR MCT message flashes on the FMA (This message appears, when the speed index reaches green dot). Resume the climb phase with THR MCT. If the thrust lever is already in the FLX/MCT detent, move the thrust lever to CL and then back to MCT. FMA MAN TOGA FMA MAN FLEX FMA THR MCT 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ PR-AEP-ENG P 17/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the engine failure occurs after takeoff, the noise abatement procedures are no longer a requirement. In addition, the acceleration altitude provides a compromise between the obstacle clearance and the engine thrust limiting time. It enables the aircraft to fly with Flap 0 and at green dot speed, that provides the best climb gradient. When the aircraft is established on the final takeoff flight path, the flight crew should continue the ECAM procedure until the STATUS page appears. At this point, the flight crew should complete the AFTER TO checklist. They should consider the system resets, and consider engine relight in flight procedure. Then, they should review the STATUS page. ONE ENGINE-OUT FLIGHT PATH The flight crew flies the one engine-out flight path in accordance with the takeoff briefing performed at the gate: ‐ The EOSID if applicable (with attention to the decision point location) ‐ The SID ‐ Radar vectors, etc. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←G→ PR-AEP-ENG P 18/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Takeoff pattern ENGINE FAILURE DURING INITIAL CLIMB Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009583.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL This procedure is similar to the "Engine Failure after V1" procedure. However, if the failure occurs above V2, maintain the SRS commanded attitude. In any case, the minimum speed must be V2. When an engine failure is detected, the FMS produces predictions based on the engine-out configuration and any pre-selected speeds entered in the MFD are deleted. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← G to H PR-AEP-ENG P 19/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ENGINE FAILURE DURING CRUISE Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009584.0001001 / 05 DEC 17 Applicable to: ALL When an engine failure occurs during cruise, three possible strategies apply: ‐ The standard strategy ‐ The obstacle strategy ‐ The fixed speed strategy. Unless a specific procedure has been established before dispatch (considering ETOPS, or mountainous areas), the standard strategy is used. Note: Pressing the CLR EO key on the MFD restores the all engine operative predictions and performance. Reverting to one engine-out performance again is not possible. PROCEDURE As soon as the engine failure is recognized, the PF simultaneously: ‐ Sets all thrust levers to MCT ‐ Disconnects A/THR. In cruise, the PF: ‐ Sets a HDG as appropriate and pulls ‐ Determines the engine out recovery altitude. When ready for descent, the PF: ‐ Sets the speed and pulls (standard strategy) or keeps managed speed (obstacle strategy) ‐ Sets the engine out recovery altitude and pulls to engage OP DES. When appropriate, the PF requires the ECAM/OEB actions. At high flight levels close to limiting weights, crew actions should not be delayed, as speed will decay quickly requiring prompt crew response. The crew must not decelerate below green dot. The A/THR is disconnected to avoid any engine thrust reduction when selecting speed according to strategy or when pulling for OP DES to initiate the descent. With the A/THR disconnected, the target speed is controlled by the elevator when in OP DES. Carrying out the ECAM actions should not be hurried, as it is important to complete the drill correctly. STANDARD STRATEGY Set speed target M 0.85/300 kt. The speed of M 0.85/300 kt is chosen to ensure the aircraft is within the stabilized windmill engine relight in-flight envelope. The EO MAX FL, which equates to the LRC Engine-Out maximum FL with anti-icing off, is displayed on the MFD PERF page. When the V/S becomes less than 500 ft/min, select V/S -500 ft/min and A/THR on. 350-941 FLEET FCTM I→ PR-AEP-ENG P 20/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL OBSTACLE STRATEGY To maintain the highest possible level due to terrain, the drift down procedure must be adopted. The speed target in this case is green dot. The procedure is similar to the standard strategy, but as the speed target is now green dot, the rate and angle of descent are reduced. The CRZ panel of the MFD PERF page displays the drift down ceiling. When clear of obstacles, revert to Standard Strategy. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←I→ PR-AEP-ENG P 21/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FIXED SPEED STRATEGY 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←I PR-AEP-ENG P 22/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ENGINE STALL Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00023236.0001001 / 01 OCT 19 Applicable to: ALL An engine stall is the disruption of the airflow in a turbine engine. When the blades of the engine compressors stall, they are no longer able to compress the air from the front to the rear of the engine. In some cases, there may be a breakdown of the airflow, with the high pressure air at the end of the compressor reversing flow, and exiting from the front of the engine. If this occurs, it may result in an immediate and significant loss of thrust. From the flight crew perspective, the engine stall is one of the most startling events at takeoff or during flight. The engine stall should not take the flight crew away from their primary task that is to fly the aircraft. An engine stall can be due to many reasons such as: ‐ An engine degradation (e.g. compressor blade rupture, or high wear) ‐ Ingestions of foreign objects (e.g. birds), or ice ‐ A malfunction of the bleed system ‐ A malfunction of the engine controls (e.g. fuel scheduling, or stall protection devices) ‐ An aerothermal disturbance. During takeoff, and at high power settings, the symptoms of an engine stall are the following: ‐ One or more very loud bangs, usually compared to a shotgun fired a few meters away ‐ An instant loss of thrust, or even a reverse thrust, that causes a yaw movement ‐ Fluctuations of the engine parameters (N1, N2 or N3). The engine may give the impression to pump ‐ An increase of the EGT ‐ Engine vibrations ‐ Flames may be visible from both ends of the engine (inlet/tail pipe) ‐ Acrid smell in the cockpit. In cruise, and at low power settings (e.g. at thrust reduction at the T/D), the symptoms of an engine stall are the following: ‐ One or more muffled bangs ‐ Slow or no thrust lever response ‐ Fluctuations of the engine parameters (N1, N2 or N3). The engine may give the impression to pump ‐ An increase of the EGT ‐ Engine vibrations ‐ Acrid smell in the cockpit. 350-941 FLEET FCTM J→ PR-AEP-ENG P 23/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The FADEC has functions that: ‐ Regulate the airflow through the compressor, to prevent engine stalls ‐ Are able to detect engine stalls ‐ Try to recover from an engine stall, without flight crew action by modifying the airflow. When the FADEC detects an engine stall, the FADEC requests that the ENG 1(2) STALL alert is triggered. The ENG STALL procedure is as follows: ‐ When the flight crew has stabilized the aircraft trajectory, the flight crew first reduces thrust to idle on the affected engine. This action reduces the pressure differential across the compressor. This helps the engine-airflow to become more stable. ‐ When at idle thrust, the flight crew checks the stability of the engine parameters on the WD, in particular the N1, EGT, N2 and N3. The flight crew should also check the engine vibrations on the ENG SD page. ‐ The flight crew shuts down the engine if: • The fluctuations of the engine parameters, or the high EGT, or the engine vibrations persist, or • The symptoms of the engine stall persist at idle thrust. ‐ If the engine parameters are normal: • The flight crew selects the anti-ice on, in order to increase the bleed demand. This reduces the pressure at the exit of the compressor, and helps the airflow to circulate in the engine turbine from front to rear • Then, the flight crew slowly advances the thrust levers, as long as the engine stall does not occur again. The engine response may be slow at high altitude. ▪ If the engine stall occurs again, the flight crew keeps the engine thrust below the stall threshold. The flight crew should not shut down the engine if the engine stall can be avoided. The flight crew should manually control the thrust on the affected engine between idle and the identified stall threshold for the remainder of the flight ▪ If the engine stall does not occur again, the flight crew can resume normal operation of the engine. The flight crew must report any engine stall for maintenance action. ENGINE TAIL PIPE FIRE Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009441.0001001 / 03 DEC 15 Applicable to: ALL An engine tail pipe fire can only occur at engine start or at engine shutdown. It is the result of an excess of fuel in the combustion chamber, the turbine or the exhaust nozzle, that ignites. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← J to K → PR-AEP-ENG P 24/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL A tail pipe fire is an internal fire within the engine, compare with an engine fire that occurs outside the engine core and gas path. No critical areas are affected in the engine in the case of tail pipe fire. However, it can have an effect on the aircraft (e.g. damage the flaps). The correct method to manage an engine tail pipe fire is to stop the fuel flow and to ventilate the engine. In the case of a tail pipe fire, there is no cockpit alert. The only indication can be an increasing EGT due to the fire in the turbine. Therefore, most of the time, the ground crew, cabin crew, or ATC visually detect the tail pipe fire. In the case of a tail pipe fire, the flight crew must apply the ENG TAIL PIPE FIRE procedure by pressing the ABN PROC pb on the ECP. Then, they must apply the ECAM action, i.e.: ‐ Shut down the engine in order to stop the fuel flow ‐ Dry crank the engine to remove the remaining fuel. The flight crew should not use the ENG FIRE pb: This cuts off the electrical supply of the FADEC, and stops the dry crank sequence performed by the FADEC. The flight crew should not use the fire extinguisher, as it does not extinguish an internal engine fire. As a first priority, the fuel flow must be stopped, and the engine must be ventilated. If the tail pipe fire procedure does not stop the fire, or if bleed air is not easily available, the ground crew can use a ground fire extinguisher as a last option: Ground fire extinguishing agent can cause serious corrosive damage to the engine and requires a maintenance action on the engine. ENGINE VIBRATIONS Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00023243.0001001 / 03 DEC 15 Applicable to: ALL Engine vibrations are usually caused by an imbalance of the engine that can be due to many reasons such as: ‐ A deformation of one or several blades due to Foreign Object Damage (FOD) or a bird strike ‐ A rupture or a loss of one or several blades ‐ An internal engine rupture (e.g. engine stall) ‐ A fan icing High engine vibrations alone do not require an engine in-flight shutdown. If the engine needs to be shutdown, others symptoms and certainly an ECAM alert will warn the flight crew, and ask them to shut down the engine. A high N1 vibrations level may be accompanied by perceivable airframe vibrations. When the vibrations level exceeds a certain threshold, the vibrations indications are displayed in amber on the ENG SD page, and ENG 1(2) N1(N2)(N3) HIGH VIBRATIONS alert is triggered. In the case of high engine vibrations, the flight crew applies the procedure associated with ENG 1(2) N1(N2)(N3) HIGH VIBRATIONS alert, and checks the engine parameters, and crosschecks them with the other engine. If there is another problem on the engine for which the flight crew may expect an ECAM alert. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← K to L → PR-AEP-ENG P 25/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The flight crew determines if icing is suspected or not if N1 vibrations occurs without other engine parameters variation. If the flight crew notices unexpected behavior on other engine parameters associated with ENG 1(2) N2(N3) HIGH VIBRATIONS alert, the flight crew should consider that no icing is suspected. Outside icing conditions, in the case of fan blade deformation or rupture, ENG 1(2) N1 HIGH VIBRATIONS alert may be triggered. If the flight crew suspects icing and if flight conditions permit, the flight crew should shed ice as follows: ‐ The flight crew disconnects the A/THR ‐ The flight crew performs several large thrust variations from idle to a thrust compatible with the flight phase. It may be necessary to perform several engine run-ups (decrease and then increase of thrust) to fully shed the ice. If the flight crew does not suspect icing and if flight conditions permit, the flight crew reduces thrust to make the vibrations decrease, and stay below the advisory threshold. If the vibrations do not decrease, there may be another problem on the engine, and the flight crew should expect an ECAM alert that will provide guidance and actions to carry. ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE - CIRCLING Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00021350.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL In normal conditions, circling with one engine inoperative requires the down wind leg to be flown in CONF 3, with landing gear extended. In hot and high altitude conditions, and at high landing weight, the aircraft may not be able to maintain level flight in CONF 3 with landing gear down. The flight crew should check the maximum weight showed in the QRH CIRCLING APPROACH WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE procedure table. If the landing weight is above this maximum value, the landing gear extension should be delayed until established on final approach. If the approach is flown at less than 750 ft RA, the warning "L/G NOT DOWN" will be triggered. "TOO LOW GEAR" warning is to be expected, if the landing gear is not downlocked at 500 ft RA. ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE - GO-AROUND Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009587.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL A one engine inoperative go-around is similar to that flown with all engines. On the application of TOGA, rudder must be applied promptly to compensate for the increase in thrust and consequently to keep the beta target centered. Provided the flap lever is selected to Flap 1 or greater, SRS will engage and will be followed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← L to N → PR-AEP-ENG P 26/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If SRS is not available, the initial target pitch attitude is 10 °. The lateral FD mode will be GA TRK (NAV) and this must be considered with respect to terrain clearance. The flight crew should press the ALT pb at the engine inoperative acceleration altitude, with the flap retraction and further climb performed using the same technique as described earlier in "ENGINE FAILURE AFTER V1" section. ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE - LANDING Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009585.0001001 / 31 MAR 17 Applicable to: ALL Autoland is available with one engine inoperative. Thus, the flight crew should use the AP in order to minimise their workload. In anticipation of the autopilot disconnection, the autopilot trims the rudder pedals to obtain zero-sideslip after autopilot disconnection. Therefore shortly after the autopilot disconnection and without any flight crew input, the aircraft sideslip will be zero. The consequence is a lateral movement of the aircraft. In this case, the flight crew may apply roll input to control the aircraft trajectory and maintain steady heading. The flight crew can reset the rudder trim in the later phase of approach, before engine thrust reduction. The flight crew should anticipate the force on the rudder pedals necessary to maintain the pedals deflection after the rudder trim reset. THRUST LEVERS MANAGEMENT IN THE CASE OF INOPERATIVE REVERSER(S) Ident.: PR-AEP-ENG-00009588.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL This section provides recommendations on thrust levers management in the case of inoperative reverser(s). These recommendations are applicable in the case of in-flight failure (including engine failure) and/or in the case of MEL dispatch with deactivated reverser(s). ONE REVERSER OPERATIVE If one reverser is operative, the general recommendation is to select the reverse thrust on both engines during rejected takeoff (RTO) and at landing, as per normal procedures. Note: If one reverser is inoperative, the following alerts may be triggered: ‐ ENG 1(2) REVERSER FAULT ‐ ENG 1(2) REVERSER CTL FAULT ‐ ENG 1(2) REVERSER LOCKED ‐ ENG 1(2) REVERSER UNLOCKED NO REVERSER OPERATIVE If no reverser is operative, the flight crew should not select the reverser thrust during RTO and at landing. However, as per normal procedures, the PF still selects both thrust levers to IDLE detent. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← N to P → PR-AEP-ENG P 27/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 ENG FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL BRIEFING IMPORTANCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW BRIEFING. Among other things, the flight crew must review the aircraft status during the flight crew briefing. The flight crew must review any particularities at that time (i.e. operational consequences, procedures, associated tasksharing and callouts). The flight crew must particularly review: ‐ The status of the thrust reversers, and if reverse thrust can be used ‐ Aircraft handling during rollout. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←P PR-AEP-ENG P 28/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-00009608.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL Fire and/or smoke in the fuselage may lead to potential hazardous situations. The flight crew will have to deal not only with the emergency itself, but also with the passengers who may possibly panic should they become aware of the situation. It is essential therefore, that action to control the source of combustion is not delayed. An immediate diversion should be considered as soon as the smoke is detected. If the source is not immediately obvious, accessible and extinguishable, it should be initiated without delay. FIRE SMOKE/FUMES Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00009609.0001001 / 15 APR 19 GENERAL The FIRE SMOKE / FUMES procedure is designed to help the flight crew to isolate a smoke source. This procedure includes: ‐ Immediate actions to protect the flight crew and the passengers, to avoid further contamination of the cockpit or cabin, and to isolate potential smoke sources ‐ Actions to anticipate diversion or to isolate the smoke source, if the source is immediately obvious, accessible and extinguishable ‐ Actions to identify and isolate the smoke source, if the source is not immediately accessible and extinguishable (identification and isolation part of the procedure). In addition, at any time during the application of the procedure, if the smoke/fumes become the greatest threat, or if the situation becomes unmanageable, the procedure recommends to consider an immediate landing. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021407.0001001 / 15 APR 19 WHEN TO APPLY THE QRH PROCEDURE Smoke can be identified either by an ECAM alert, or by a crewmember (flight crew or cabin crew) without any ECAM alert. The flight crew must apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure: ‐ If requested by an ECAM procedure ‐ If a crewmember detects smoke or fumes. If the ECAM triggers another SMOKE alert (e.g. SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE), the flight crew must apply the corresponding ECAM procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-AEP-FIRE P 1/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If any doubt exists about the origin of the smoke, the flight crew must refer to the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. If the smoke source is immediately identified as a device equipped with a lithium battery, the flight crew should apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY procedure. For more information about the SMOKE / FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY procedure, Refer to PR-AEP-FIRE FIRE SMOKE/FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY. HOW TO APPLY THE QRH PROCEDURE If the visibility in the cockpit is sufficient to read the ECAM, the flight crew activates and applies the FIRE SMOKE / FUMES ABN not-sensed procedure. The activation of the ABN not-sensed procedure enables to display LAND ASAP limitation. After the immediate actions, the ECAM requests to apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. If the visibility in the cockpit is not sufficient to read the ECAM, the flight crew directly refers to the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. In the case of SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE, the flight crew must apply the ECAM actions, then apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. The ECAM procedure must not be cleared at this time. When the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure is completed, the flight crew continues ECAM actions. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021409.0001001 / 15 APR 19 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS The immediate actions of the procedure are included in: ‐ The [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-FIRE [QRH] FIRE SMOKE / FUMES) ‐ The FIRE SMOKE / FUMES ABN not-sensed ECAM procedure (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-FIRE [ABN] FIRE SMOKE / FUMES) ‐ The SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE ECAM procedures (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-SMOKE SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE). The FIRE SMOKE / FUMES ABN not-sensed procedure and the SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE ECAM procedure request to apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure after the immediate actions. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021411.0001001 / 15 APR 19 CONSIDERATION ABOUT DIVERSION AND IMMEDIATE LANDING Time is critical. Therefore, the flight crew must immediately anticipate a diversion, as indicated by the LAND ASAP in the procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-FIRE P 2/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Then, after the immediate actions, if the smoke source is not immediately identified and isolated, the flight crew must initiate the diversion before entering the identification and isolation part of the procedure. At any time during the application of the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure, if the situation becomes unmanageable, the flight crew can consider an immediate landing. However, the flight crew should consider a diversion, an immediate landing or ditching, only after the application of the immediate actions. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021413.0001001 / 15 APR 19 IDENTIFYING AND ISOLATING THE SMOKE SOURCE The rest of the procedure is only available in the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-FIRE P 3/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the smoke source is not immediately isolated, the flight crew enters the identification and isolation part of the procedure. The procedure is designed to assess probable smoke sources from the most probable to the least probable. Some guidelines may help to identify the origin of the smoke / fumes: ‐ If smoke initially comes out of the cockpit ventilation outlets, or if smoke is detected in the cabin, the flight crew may suspect an air conditioning smoke ‐ Following an identified ENG or APU failure, smoke may come from the faulty equipment through the bleed system and be perceptible in the cockpit or the cabin. In that case, smoke is re-circulated throughout the aircraft, until it completely disappears from the air conditioning system. ‐ If smoke is detected, while an equipment is failed, the flight crew may suspect that smoke is coming from this equipment ‐ If the ECAM triggers a SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE ECAM alert, the flight crew may suspect an avionics smoke. ‐ The crew can notice some cabin odors. The table below references the cabin odors list with suspected origins to help the flight crew to improve the communication coordination with the cabin crew. DESCRIPTION OF ODORS Acrid Burning Chemical Chlorine Electrical Dirty Socks Foul Fuel Oil Skydrol Sulphur 350-941 FLEET FCTM SUSPECTED CAUSE (MOST REPORTED LISTED FIRST) Electrical Equipment / IFE Engine Oil Leak Electrical Equipment Galley Equipment Bird Ingestion Contaminated Bleed Cuts APU Ingestion PBE Blocked Door Area Drain Electrical Equipment APU or Engine Oil Leaks Lavatories APU FCU / Fuel Line Engine or APU Oil Leaks Engine Hydraulic Wiring Avionics Filter Water Contamination Light Bulb ←B→ PR-AEP-FIRE P 4/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL According to the suspected / detected smoke source, the flight crew enters one of the following sub-sections: ‐ 03 - AIR COND / CABIN EQPT ISOL (smoke suspected from AIR COND or CABIN) ‐ 04 - ELEC ISOL SIDE 1 THEN SIDE 2 (smoke detected with SMOKE L AVNCS SMOKE ECAM alert or if smoke source cannot be determined) ‐ 05 - ELEC ISOL SIDE 2 THEN SIDE 1 (smoke detected with SMOKE R AVNCS SMOKE ECAM alert). If the flight crew applies the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure without SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE ECAM being triggered, the procedure requests in the following order: ‐ First, to consider smoke from the air conditioning system (first part of 03 - AIR COND / CABIN EQPT ISOL sub-section) ‐ Then, if smoke continues, to consider smoke from cabin equipment (second part of 03 - AIR COND / CABIN EQPT ISOL sub-section) ‐ Then, if smoke continues, to isolate the side 1 of the electrical network (first part of 04 - ELEC ISOL SIDE 1 THEN SIDE 2 sub-section) ‐ Finally, if smoke persists, to isolate the side 2 of the electrical network (second part of 04 ELEC ISOL SIDE 1 THEN SIDE 2 sub-section) If the SMOKE L(R) AVNCS SMOKE ECAM is triggered: ‐ The flight crew directly applies the isolation of the affected side of the electrical network. This isolation sheds non-essential systems to isolate a potential electrical source of smoke ‐ Then, if smoke continues, the flight crew sheds the other side of the electrical network ‐ Finally, if smoke persists, the flight crew considers a smoke source from the air conditioning system or cabin equipment and tries to isolate the potential sources. During the application of the FIRE SMOKE / FUMES procedure, some action steps may trigger ECAM alerts. In this case, the flight crew must acknowledge these ECAM alerts, and delay the ECAM actions until the end of the [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES procedure. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021984.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 DEFERRED PROCEDURE In certain cases (e.g. MEL cases), the isolation of one side of the electrical network can lead to the total loss of systems, such as the slat actuation or the Landing System (LS 1 and LS 2). Recovering the slat actuation enables the flight crew to extend the slats and reduce the approach speed. Recovering a landing system may be useful if the weather is difficult at the diversion airport (e.g. low visibility). Setting the GENs of the isolated side to ON, before landing, enables the systems recovery. However, it may also reignite the smoke source. This is why the flight crew has to carefully consider the possibility to set the GENs to ON before landing. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-FIRE P 5/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-1-00021414.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 COORDINATION WITH CABIN CREW A good coordination between the flight crew and the cabin crew is a key element. In the case of a smoke in the cabin, it is essential that the cabin crew evaluates the situation and informs de flight crew about the density of smoke and the severity of the situation. FIRE SMOKE/FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-2-00022553.0001001 / 15 APR 19 GENERAL The [QRH] SMOKE / FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY procedure is dedicated to the suppression of a fire from a lithium battery. Lithium batteries can be found in several electronic devices, such as: ‐ Laptop computers (including EFBs) ‐ Flashlights ‐ Tablets ‐ Mobile phones, etc. Fire and smoke from lithium battery is due to a thermal runaway in the battery cells. It is important to know that fire extinguishers are successful on flames but cannot stop the thermal runaway. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-2-00022554.0001001 / 15 APR 19 WHEN TO APPLY THE QRH PROCEDURE If the flight crew detects smoke and immediately determines that the smoke is coming from a device equipped with a lithium battery, then the flight crew should apply the [QRH] SMOKE / FIRE FIRE LITHIUM BATTERY procedure. If the smoke source cannot be immediately identified, the flight crew should apply the FIRE SMOKE / FUMES procedure. For more information about the FIRE SMOKE / FUMES procedure, Refer to PR-AEP-FIRE FIRE SMOKE/FUMES. QRH PROCEDURE The treatment for thermal runaway of lithium battery is to cool the battery by pouring water or non-alcoholic liquid on the device. The first step of the procedure establishes appropriate tasksharing and communication. The Pilot Flying (PF) contacts the cabin crew to request initiation of the [CCOM] STORAGE PROCEDURE AFTER A LITHIUM BATTERY FIRE. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-AEP-FIRE P 6/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL This [CCOM] procedure specifies that the cabin crew must fill a container with water or non-alcoholic liquid and must immerse the device in it. If there is no cabin crew on board (e.g. ferry flight, etc.) the Pilot Monitoring (PM) must apply the steps of the [CCOM] procedure. If there are flames, the PM must use the fire extinguisher. Before discharging the fire extinguisher, it is important to protect the flight crew respiratory system: the PF must wear the oxygen mask and the PM must wear the PBE. If there are no flames, or when the flames are extinguished, the PM must assess if the device can be removed or not from the cockpit. If the device is attached to a cable that cannot be easily disconnected, then the device must be considered not removable from the cockpit, and water or non-alcoholic liquid must be poured on it. The device must then be regularly monitored to ensure that the thermal runaway is successfully stopped. If the device is removable, then it must be put in the container prepared in advance by the cabin crew member who takes over the procedure. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-2-00022555.0001001 / 15 APR 19 CONSIDERATION ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF SMOKE If, at any time of the procedure, the smoke becomes the greatest threat, the flight crew must consider applying the actions dedicated to the removal of smoke. These actions are embedded in the [QRH] SMOKE / FIRE FROM LITHIUM BATTERY procedure. Ident.: PR-AEP-FIRE-10-2-00022556.0001001 / 06 MAR 15 CONSIDERATION ABOUT IMMEDIATE LANDING If at any time of the procedure, the situation becomes unmanageable, an immediate landing must be considered. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-AEP-FIRE P 7/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FIRE FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-FIRE P 8/8 21 MAY 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 F/CTL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ABNORMAL SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION Ident.: PR-AEP-F_CTL-00009610.0001001 / 08 JUL 19 Applicable to: ALL CAUSES The abnormal slats/flaps configuration may be due to: ‐ Multiple slats control unit, or flaps control unit failures: • SLAT SYS 1, and SLAT SYS 2 monitor and control the slats • FLAP SYS 1, and FLAP SYS 2 monitor and control the flaps. ‐ Multiple slats/flaps motor power supply failures: • The yellow hydraulic system, and the AC EMER 1 busbar power the slats motors • The green and yellow hydraulic systems power the flaps motors. In addition, outer flaps can be actuated by the electrical motors of the Active Differential GearBoxes (ADGBs). ‐ Slats/flaps jam (i.e. when the Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) have locked the slats/flaps). CONSEQUENCES An abnormal slats/flaps configuration has the following consequences: ‐ When both SLAT SYS and both FLAP SYS are lost and the position of the slats/flaps is lost (i.e. indicated amber XX on the F/CTL SD Page), the flight control laws revert to direct law when the aircraft is below 22 000 ft. ‐ The flight control laws revert to alternate law, as long as the position of the slats/flaps remains available ‐ The pitch attitude during the approach and flare differ from the usual pitch attitude without failure ‐ The flight crew must use the selected speed ‐ The flight crew must prefer a stabilized approach ‐ The approach speed and landing distance increase ‐ The aircraft approach capability downgrades to APPR 1 ‐ The flight crew may need to change the go-around procedure. In the case of a go-around with the flaps failed, the flight crew must maintain the slats/flaps configuration. Therefore, the go-around performance may not be achieved ‐ When the slats/flaps are extended, the fuel consumption increases. The FMS predictions do not take into account the slats/flaps abnormal configurations. Therefore, the flight crew must insert the FUEL penalty factor in the FMS to update the FMS fuel predictions ‐ When the slats/flaps are extended, the maximum cruise altitude is 20 000 ft. Note: On the PFD, the speed scale displays the VLS and the VFE in accordance with the actual position of the slats/flaps. The overspeed warning and stall warning trigger in accordance with the actual position of the slats/flaps. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-AEP-F_CTL P 1/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 F/CTL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL PROCEDURE GUIDELINES FAILURE AT TAKEOFF If a slats/flaps retraction failure occurs at retraction during takeoff, the flight crew may pull the SPD/MACH knob to select the speed and stop the acceleration. However, if the speed remains managed, the aircraft design prevents VFE exceedance since: ‐ The VFE on the PFD (and associated overspeed warning) is computed in accordance with the actual position of the slats/flaps, and ‐ The short term managed speed is set to VFE -5 kt. The landing distance available at the departure airport, and the aircraft gross weight will determine decision to come back to the departure airport or to divert to another airport. FAILURE DURING THE APPROACH When the slats/flaps fail during the configuration of the aircraft for landing, the flight crew should: ‐ Pull the SPD/MACH knob on the AFS CP to stop the deceleration Note: If the autothrust and the FMS approach phase are engaged, the managed target speed becomes the next maneuvering characteristic speed (e.g. S speed when the FLAPS lever is set to 1). If the flight crew does not stop the deceleration, the aircraft may decelerate to a speed close to VLS. Depending on the position of the slats/flaps, the margin between the characteristic speeds and the VLS may be significantly reduced. ‐ Delay the approach to complete the ECAM procedure ‐ Update the approach briefing or decide to divert, if required. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-AEP-F_CTL P 2/2 08 AUG 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FUEL PENALTY Ident.: PR-AEP-FUEL-00019048.0001001 / 01 MAR 17 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION The fuel penalty is a conservative value, provided as a guideline, in order to increase flight crew awareness, and to help them to decide (fly to destination or divert). When a failure affects the fuel consumption by 3 % or more, the ECAM displays the FUEL CONSUMPT INCRSD limitation. The flight crew should enter the associated fuel penalty in the FMS DATA/STATUS page. INPUTS DISPATCH: MEL OR CDL ITEMS The applicable MEL and CDL items may have an effect on fuel consumption. The associated fuel penalty is given in the MEL operational procedure and CDL dispatch conditions . IN FLIGHT The flight crew uses the fuel penalty table in the FCOM for all of the following: ‐ In order to check the fuel penalty value ‐ For variable fuel penalties, in order to obtain the maximum value. The flight crew checks the fuel penalties that are associated with all of the following: ‐ The INOP SYS list on the ECAM STATUS page ‐ An abnormal slats/flaps configuration ‐ A severe fuel imbalance ‐ The RAT OUT memo. The values that are provided in the FCOM fuel penalty table are computed for specific conditions (altitude, speed, etc.) These values may be different from the current value for fuel penalty that the flight crew computes. CALCULATION OF FUEL PENALTY The flight crew must check if the fuel penalty is variable via the FCOM fuel penalty table. VARIABLE FUEL PENALTY Both of the following cases are associated with a variable fuel penalty: ‐ In the case of spoiler(s) failure, the affected spoiler(s) may gradually extend. The fuel penalty may therefore increase during flight ‐ In the case of a fuel imbalance, the associated fuel penalty may change with time (e.g. in the case of a fuel leak, or if the flight crew balances the fuel). 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-AEP-FUEL P 1/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If a variable fuel penalty is applicable, the flight crew should enter the maximum value of the range, as per the FCOM fuel penalty table, in order to assess a conservative case for decision making. The flight crew must then decide to keep this maximum value or to enter an estimated value that may be lower. NOT VARIABLE FUEL PENALTY In some cases (i.e: rudder, stabilizer, differential flap setting), the fuel penalty is not variable. Even if the fuel penalty is not variable, the table indicates a range because the fuel penalty depends on the position of the flight control surface at the time of the failure. TOTAL FUEL PENALTY TO ENTER IN THE FMS Dispatch: MEL or CDL Items that Affect Fuel Consumption The flight crew must enter the sum of the applicable fuel penalties in the FMS. In Flight: Fuel Penalty Table in the FCOM If several rows of the table are applicable, the total fuel penalty is the sum of all applicable fuel penalties. If the flight crew entered a fuel penalty in the FMS at dispatch, the total fuel penalty for additional failures in flight is the sum of the fuel penalty at dispatch and the fuel penalty computed from the FCOM fuel penalty table. PERIODIC FUEL CONSUMPTION ASSESSMENT The flight crew must periodically assess the fuel consumption in order to adjust the fuel penalty factor. Provided that there is no change to the flight plan, and the current parameters are in accordance with the parameters entered in the FMS, the flight crew may use one of the following techniques to check the accuracy of the current FMS fuel penalty: ‐ If the DEST EFOB increases, the fuel penalty that is entered in the FMS is more than the current fuel penalty ‐ If the DEST EFOB decreases, the fuel penalty that is entered in the FMS is less than the current fuel penalty. SPECIFIC CASES DISPATCH WITH MMEL ITEMS 27-64-01 TO 27-64-06 (SPOILERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, AND 7) The operational procedure that is associated with the MMEL items 27-64-01 to 27-64-06 includes a fuel penalty. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PR-AEP-FUEL P 2/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The MMEL fuel penalties consider the most severe penalty that the failed spoiler can create. Therefore, during the flight, an inoperative spoiler will not create additional fuel penalties compared to the initial penalty given in the MMEL operational procedure. If the F/CTL SPLRS PARTLY EXTENDED alert is triggered in flight due to the same inoperative spoiler as per MMEL, no additional fuel penalty needs to be considered. In the case of an in-flight failure of another spoiler, the flight crew must take into account this failure as any other in-flight failure that increases the fuel consumption. ABNORMAL SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION The fuel penalty table in the FCOM contains fuel penalties associated with each specific slats/flaps configuration. The flight crew should use these fuel penalties for abnormal slats/flaps configuration (e.g. slats locked, flaps locked, flaps retraction inhibition, etc.). RAM AIR TURBINE (RAT) Some failure cases require the RAT extension. The RAT is not part of the INOP SYS list on the ECAM. Therefore, when the RAT OUT memo is displayed the flight crew should use the fuel penalty associated with the RAT extension, as indicated in the Abnormal Configuration of the fuel penalty table. FUEL IMBALANCE MANAGEMENT Ident.: PR-AEP-FUEL-00021339.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL FUEL IMBALANCE Fuel imbalance is a difference of fuel quantity between the left wing tank and the right wing tank. Fuel imbalance may develop up to a maximum value due to the following factors: ‐ Fuel leak ‐ Difference in the engines fuel consumption ‐ Accuracy of the fuel quantity measurement. CONSEQUENCES OF IMBALANCE The consequences of fuel imbalance are: ‐ Fuel consumption increase: Flight control surfaces may extend to compensate for the lateral moment of an imbalance . The additional extension of flight control surfaces may increase the fuel consumption ‐ Impact on handling quantities. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PR-AEP-FUEL P 3/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL MONITORING AND PROCEDURES TO BALANCE TANKS Before managing a fuel imbalance, the flight crew must check that a fuel leak is not the cause of the fuel imbalance. The FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED alert appears to correct an imbalance beyond the maximum threshold in normal operations (3 000 kg between each wing tank). In addition, the fuel quantities in imbalanced tanks are underlined in amber on the FUEL SD page. When the imbalance is corrected, the FUEL IMBALANCE CORRECTED alert appears. For manual correction of imbalance below the maximum threshold in normal operations, the flight crew can activate the not-sensed FUEL WINGS MAN BALANCING procedure. In this case, the FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED alert and the FUEL IMBALANCE CORRECTED alert are inhibited. After the detection of an imbalance, the flight crew can insert a FPF into the FMS. When the imbalance is corrected, the flight crew should update the FPF. FUEL LEAK Ident.: PR-AEP-FUEL-00021696.0001001 / 29 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL Fuel checks should be carried out when overflying a waypoint or at least every 30 min. Any discrepancy should alert the flight crew and investigation should be performed without delay. In addition, the flight crew can also suspect a fuel leak if: ‐ The sum of FOB and FU is significantly less than FOB at engine start, or is decreasing, L2 If the sum of FOB and FU is significantly more than FOB at engine start, an erroneous or over read fuel quantity indication can be suspected. L1 ‐ There is a discrepancy between the fuel on board and the expected flight plan fuel, ‐ A passenger or cabin crew observes a fuel spray from an engine/pylon or a wing, ‐ The total fuel quantity abnormally decreases, ‐ A fuel imbalance develops, ‐ The fuel quantity of one wing tank decreases abnormally fast (leak from engine/pylon, or hole in a tank), ‐ A tank overflows (due to pipe rupture in a tank), ‐ The fuel flow is excessive, or the N1 indication decreases (leak from engine), ‐ Fuel is smelt in the cabin, ‐ The destination EFOB is decreasing or is displayed amber on the FMS F-PLN page, ‐ DEST EFOB BELOW MIN appears on the FMS messages area, the memo DEST EFOB appears on the ECAM WD and the FMS predictions are reliable (wind, temperature, fuel penalty factor, etc.) For any message or alert related to the fuel quantity or imbalance, the flight crew should consider a fuel leak as a possible cause. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-AEP-FUEL P 4/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If the flight crew detects a fuel leak before the ECAM alert is triggered, the flight crew can activate the FUEL LEAKabnormal not sensed procedure. The FUEL LEAKor the FUEL LEAK SUSPECTED procedures will help the flight crew to identify the source of the leak. The main steps of the FUEL LEAKor the FUEL LEAK SUSPECTED procedures are : ‐ Isolate each tank : Each wing tank feeds the associated engine and the center tank pumps are off. ‐ If the fuel quantity decreases faster in one wing tank than in the other wing tank, the fuel leak is identified as coming from one wing tank. In this case, the associated engine is shut down, in order to confirm if the leak comes from the wing tank, or from the engine. When a wing leak is confirmed, a fuel imbalance can appear, and the flight crew must not balance the wings. ‐ If the fuel quantity symmetrically decreases in both wing tanks and the fuel quantity in the center tank decreases, the fuel leak comes from the center tank. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C PR-AEP-FUEL P 5/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FUEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-FUEL P 6/6 14 JAN 19 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 HYD FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL G+Y HYDRAULIC FAILURES Ident.: PR-AEP-HYD-00009611.0001001 / 27 SEP 18 Applicable to: ALL Dual hydraulic failure triggers a MASTER WARNING, but has little effect on the handling of the aircraft since AP/FD and A/THR remain available. The flight controls revert to ALTN LAW. When the landing performance penalty has been computed, it is time for decision-making: ‐ Weather (CAT I or better weather conditions only) ‐ Operational (landing performances) ‐ Maintenance ‐ Commercial. The approach briefing will concentrate on safety issues: ‐ Use of the selected speed on the AFS CP ‐ Approach configuration ‐ Landing gear gravity extension ‐ VAPP ‐ Early stabilized approach technique ‐ Tail strike awareness ‐ Braking and steering considerations ‐ Go-around callout, aircraft configuration and speed. The fuel consumption increases due to the loss of both outer ailerons. If the position of the failed spoilers leads also to an increase of the fuel consumption, the F/CTL SPLRs PARTLY EXTENDED alert is displayed on the WD. Consider an immediate fuel consumption increase for these spoilers. DEFERRED PROC will be applied early in approach phase: ‐ In some abnormal slats/flaps configurations, the FMS does not receive the FLAPS lever position. Thus, the managed speed is not in accordance with the FLAPS lever position. Therefore, as a general rule, when the slats/flaps are in abnormal configuration (e.g. following a dual hydraulic failure, or when slats/flaps are locked), the flight crew must use the selected speed to configure the aircraft for approach and landing The speed reduction and configuration changes should preferably be done with wings level ‐ The VFE NEXT displayed on the PFD takes into account the abnormal slat/flap configuration vs. placard speeds. Therefore, to configure the aircraft, the flight crew must consider the VFE displayed on the PFD ‐ The VLS displayed on the PFD takes into account the abnormal slat/flap configuration 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-AEP-HYD P 1/2 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 HYD FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ As the landing gear is extended by gravity, the landing gear doors are mechanically locked open. The Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) is lost, and backup steering function is not available ‐ The early stabilized approach technique will be preferred, and the aircraft should be configured for landing at the FAF. The approach capability downgrades to APPR1 and AP may be used down to CAT I minimum. The alternate braking with anti-skid is available. Brake To Vacate (BTV) is lost, but Auto brake mode remains available. If the manual braking is used, brake as required without releasing to ensure brake accumulators endurance. The nose wheel steering is lost. The flight crew considers towing to vacate the runway up to the gate. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-AEP-HYD P 2/2 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 L/G FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL NOSE WHEEL STEERING FAILURE - USE OF BACKUP STEERING FUNCTION Ident.: PR-AEP-LDG-00022549.0001001 / 08 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION In the case of non-availability of the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) indicated via the HYD Y SYS PRESS LO alert or via the STEER N/W STEER FAULT alert, the Backup Steering Function (BSF), if available, permits to vacate the runway. For more information on BSF architecture and operation, Refer to FCOM/description. For more information on BSF limitations, Refer to FCOM/limitations. FOR LANDING The use of A/BRK MED for landing is recommended in order to prevent accumulator depletion. Since the BSF will automatically activate when the aircraft speed is below 30 kt, it is recommended to disconnect the A/BRK before 30 kt in order to recover lateral control at low speed using pedal braking. FOR RUNWAY VACATION When the flight crew uses the BSF, the following turn technique apply: ‐ Disconnect the autopilot (AP) and the autobrake (A/BRK) before using the BSF. ‐ Do not use manual differential braking or differential thrust to steer the aircraft. ‐ Start the turn with a target of 10 kt. This speed ensures aircraft movement even when the BSF will command the brakes. ‐ During the turn, keep some thrust on the engines and adjust the level of thrust to maintain 10 kt. Note: The PM may assist the PF and monitor the ground speed. ‐ If the landing was performed above the Maximum Landing Weight (MLW), use the BSF with care. Note: Due to the higher engine thrust needed during a turn with BSF, it is recommended to tow the aircraft for the last turn before alignment to the gate. LANDING WITH ABNORMAL L/G Ident.: PR-AEP-LDG-00021347.0001001 / 27 OCT 17 Applicable to: ALL In all cases, weight should be reduced as much as possible to provide the slowest possible touchdown speed. Although foaming of the runway is not a requirement, full advantage should be taken of any ATC offering to do so. The passengers and cabin crew should be informed of the situation in due time. This will allow the cabin crew to prepare the cabin, and perform their emergency landing, and evacuation procedures. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-AEP-LDG P 1/4 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 L/G FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL If one or both main landing gears are in abnormal position, the flight crew should avoid crosswind (from the side of the affected landing gear if only one landing gear is in abnormal position) to ensure the controllability of the aircraft after touchdown. The flight crew will not arm the ground spoilers to keep as much roll authority as possible, for maintaining the wings level. Ground spoiler extension would prevent spoilers from acting as roll surfaces. In all cases, the crew will not arm the autobrake, as manual braking will enable better pitch and roll control. A normal approach should be flown, and control surfaces used as required, to maintain the aircraft in a normal attitude, for as long as possible after touchdown. If one or both main landing gears are in abnormal position, the engine on the side of the affected landing gear should be shut down before nacelle impact. This will ensure that fuel is cut off prior to nacelle touchdown, while keeping sufficient authority on control surfaces in order to: ‐ Maintain runway axis ‐ Prevent nacelle contact on first touchdown ‐ Maintain wings level, and pitch attitude as long as possible. If the nose landing gear is in abnormal position, the crew will apply a maximum braking pressure of 1 000 PSI in order to avoid a strong pitch-down movement (1 000 PSI approximately corresponds to half-pedal deflection). The engines should be shut down before nose impact. If one main landing gear is in abnormal position, the reversers will not be used to prevent the ground spoilers extension. If the nose landing gear is in abnormal position, the reversers will not be used to prevent the nose down effect induced by the reverse thrust. The engines and APU fire pushbuttons are pushed, when the use of flight controls is no longer required, i.e. when aircraft has stopped. LOSS OF BRAKING Ident.: PR-AEP-LDG-00021348.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL If the flight crew does not perceive deceleration when required, the flight crew will apply the LOSS OF BRAKING procedure from memory, because of the urgency of the situation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← B to C → PR-AEP-LDG P 2/4 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 L/G FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL PROCEDURE USE OF REVERSE THRUST ‐ If needed, full reverse thrust may be used until coming to a complete stop. Below 70 kt, when the flight crew considers that the aircraft can stop on the runway, the flight crew should set idle reverse thrust. ‐ Unless required due to an emergency, it is recommended to avoid the use of high level of reverse thrust at low speed in order to avoid engine stall and excessive EGT. ANTI SKID OFF In order to successfully revert to emergency braking, t is important to sequence the actions in three steps. The PF should: 1. Release the brake pedals, 2. Request the PM to set the ANTI SKID sw to OFF, 3. Press the brake pedals only after the PM has set the ANTI SKID sw to OFF. The pressure of the brakes is automatically limited. TAXI WITH DEFLATED OR DAMAGED TIRES Ident.: PR-AEP-LDG-00023093.0001001 / 07 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL In some abnormal situations, after a rejected takeoff or after landing, the flight crew may need to vacate the runway and taxi the aircraft with deflated or damaged tires. The flight crew must ensure that the number and position of deflated or damaged tires are in accordance with the limitations provided in the FCOM. For more information, Refer to FCOM/Taxi with Deflated Tires. In order to identify the number and position of the affected tires, the flight crew can use the tire pressure indication available on the WHEEL SD page. If the number or position of the affected tires is not in accordance with the limitations provided in the FCOM, the ground crew must change a sufficient number of wheels before taxi, in order to ensure compliance with the FCOM limitations. As indicated in the FCOM limitations, the nosewheel steering angle must be limited to a maximum of 30 °. In order to ensure that this limitation is not exceeded, the flight crew should use the graduations available on the steering handwheel. The 30 ° limitation for the nosewheel steering angle corresponds to either of the following: ‐ A steering handwheel position in the middle between the 3rd and 4th graduation, or ‐ A steering handwheel position on the 3rd graduation with the rudder pedals fully deflected in the same direction. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D PR-AEP-LDG P 3/4 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 L/G FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-LDG P 4/4 08 NOV 18 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 LANDING COMPUTATION FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL LANDING COMPUTATION Ident.: PR-AEP-LDC-00021341.0001001 / 02 APR 15 Applicable to: ALL The use of the OIS LDG PERF application for the computation of landing performance following in-flight failure is driven by the ECAM. Several cases are considered depending on the messages that appear on the ECAM. The following table summarizes how to use the OIS LDG PERF according to the ECAM displays. Before launching landing performance computation the flight crew: ‐ Checks that the correct failure message appears in the "ECAM ALERTS" panel of the OIS LDG PERF application. If not, the ECAM failure message must be manually selected in the AIRCRAFT STATUS panel of the OIS LDG PERF application. ‐ Identifies the Braking Performance Level with the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) ‐ Updates the landing weight and CG, if necessary. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-AEP-LDC P 1/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ECAM Displays LANDING COMPUTATION Conditions Procedure & Limitations: ‐ Single failure LDG DIST ‐ No VAPP increase AFFECTED ‐ Landing distance STATUS page: penalty below 1.15. ON DRY RWY ONLY : LDG DIST AFFECTED < 15% Flight Crew Actions If LDG at destination airport: ‐ Dry runway : Computation of the LD and FACTORED LD is not necessary because landing distance penalty is below the recommended margin (15 %) between LD (In-Flight Landing Distance) and FACTORED LD (Factored In-Flight Landing Distance). The landing distance penalty applies to the In-Flight Landing Distance. The In-Flight Landing Distance with failure is shorter than the Factored In-Flight Landing Distance without failure. However, the flight crew can compute the LD and FACTORED LD with the OIS LDG PERF application in order to assess the stop margin. Note: ‐ In all other cases Procedure & Limitations: LDG DIST AFFECTED Procedure & Limitations: LDG PERF AFFECTED ‐ No VAPP increase but landing distance penalty at 1.15 or above, or ‐ No VAPP increase but multiple failures affecting the landing distance. VAPP increase and landing distance penalty 350-941 FLEET FCTM : When an aircraft is dispatched under MEL, with an inoperative system that impacts landing performance, the flight crew must always use the OIS LDG PERF application, even if the ECAM displays ON DRY RWY ONLY : LDG DIST AFFECTED < 15%. The ECAM cannot combine MEL items with in-flight failures. Computation of the LD and FACTORED LD with the OIS LDG PERF application is required If diversion: Computation of the LD and FACTORED LD with the OIS LDG PERF application is required. Computation of the LD and FACTORED LD with the OIS LDG PERF is required. Computation of the LD, FACTORED LD and the VAPP with the OIS LDG PERF application is required. ←A→ PR-AEP-LDC P 2/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 LANDING COMPUTATION FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL For more information on the landing performance assessment, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-160 Landing Performance. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-AEP-LDC P 3/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL LANDING COMPUTATION Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-LDC P 4/4 22 MAY 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL EFB FAULT Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00022478.0002001 / 04 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The ECAM detects most of the OIS failures. The OIS remains usable even with only one EFB operative. If one EFB fails in flight, the flight crew can use the OIS ON CENTER, or the VIEW OFFSIDE functions, in order to share the available EFB functions. The purpose of the EFB FAULT procedure is to provide the flight crew with troubleshooting actions when both of the following apply: ‐ One EFB is already inoperative ‐ The ECAM does not detect a failure of the remaining EFB. The EFB FAULT procedure includes several troubleshooting actions, that may require the PM to leave their seat (e.g. the removal of the laptop from the docking station, the check of the connection cables, etc.). In addition, application of the EFB FAULT procedure may take some time, and does not always ensure the recovery of the failed EFB. Therefore, the flight crew should apply the EFB FAULT procedure, only if they have sufficient time. SENSED OIS FAILURES The following ECAM alerts indicate failures that are related to the OIS, and for which the flight crew does not need to apply the EFB FAULT procedure. ECAM Alert CDS CAPT(F/O) OUTR DU FAULT Failure Failure of one outer DU. Procedure Summary Use the OIS ON CENTER function. Refer to FCOM/procedure. OIS CAPT(F/O) OIS DISPLAY FAULT On one side, the OIS cannot provide Depending on the failure, either use the the video signal to the CDS. OIS ON CENTER function, or use the EFB as a standalone device. Refer to FCOM/procedure. OIS CAPT + F/O OIS DISPLAY FAULT On both sides, the OIS cannot provide Use the EFB as a standalone device. the video signal to the CDS. Refer to FCOM/procedure. CUSTOMIZATION Each airline is responsible for the management of their selected EFB solution (software, hardware, backup). Therefore, each airline should customize the content of the EFB FAULT procedure. The objective of this customization is to adapt the EFB FAULT procedure to the airline policy, the backup means available, and the in-service hardware and software. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A PR-AEP-MISC P 1/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL EMER DESCENT Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00023803.0002001 / 05 NOV 18 Applicable to: ALL The flight crew should initiate an emergency descent if they confirm that cabin altitude and rate of climb are excessive and not controllable. By flight crew decision, an emergency descent may be initiated for any other reason of urgency. The flight crew should perform the actions of the EMER DESCENT in two steps: ‐ First step: Apply the memory items. The PM should focus on monitoring the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) to ensure that the PF has correctly established the aircraft in descent. ‐ Second step: Perform the read and-do procedure (ECAM or EMER DESCENT Abnormal not-sensed procedure). The PF should refine the settings. To initiate the emergency descent, two techniques are available. The technique to apply depends on systems availability and PF’s discretion: ‐ The use of AUTO EMER DESCENT function, or ‐ The use of selected guidance on the AFS CP. For both emergency descent techniques, the use of Autopilot (AP) and Autothrust (A/THR) is highly recommended. Note: When in IDLE thrust at high speed with speed brakes extended, the rate of descent is approximately 6 000 ft/min. To descend from cruise altitude to FL 100, it takes approximately 5 min and 40 NM. The flight crew should be aware that the safety altitude displayed on the ND is the highest grid MORA value within a circle of 40 NM radius around the aircraft while the safety altitude displayed on the VD is the MORA or MSA, along the aircraft trajectory within the VD range. The flight crew should suspect structural damage in case of a loud bang, or high cabin vertical speed. If the flight crew suspects structural damage, apply both of the following: ‐ Carefully use the speed brakes, to avoid additional stress on the aircraft structure ‐ During the second step, set the SPEED/MACH pb to SPEED, to prevent an increase in the IAS, or to even reduce the speed. This action minimizes the stress on the aircraft structure. If the cabin altitude goes above 14 000 ft, the flight crew must press the MASK MAN ON pb. When it is obvious that the cabin altitude will exceed 14 000 ft, the flight crew can press the MASK MAN ON pb, even before the cabin altitude reaches 14 000 ft. The TCAS mode selector must remain on the TA/RA position. Avoidance of collision has the priority, even if it requires one temporary interruption of the descent maneuver. The TA/RA TCAS mode enables a maximum protection against collision. 350-941 FLEET FCTM B→ PR-AEP-MISC P 2/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Finally, subsequent to an emergency descent, once the crew oxygen masks have been removed, the flight crew should perform all of the following: ‐ Close the crew oxygen stowage box ‐ Press the PRESS TO TEST AND RESET pb, to deactivate the mask microphone and to cut off the oxygen. Below FL 100, the flight crew should limit the rate of descent to 1 000 ft/min or less. Specificities of the AUTO EMER DESCENT Function To initiate the emergency descent with use of the AUTO EMER DESCENT function, the flight crew must press the EMER DESCENT pb on the SPEED BRAKE panel and then extend the speed brakes. When engaged, the AUTO EMER DESCENT function targets a MORA with an envelope margin (MORAdISA/dP , displayed in the AFS CP), which is higher than the grid MORA value displayed on the ND. For more information about the AUTO EMER DESCENT function, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FG-70-60-40 General. The flight crew can adjust the altitude target during the descent at any time. The flight crew should be aware that a PULL or PUSH action on the ALT knob will disengage the EMER DES mode and will remove the AUTO FLT EMER DESCENT procedure, if displayed on the WD. First Step for both Techniques 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-MISC P 3/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Excessive Cabin Altitude without Flight Crew Reaction In case an excessive cabin altitude is predicted, a 15 s countdown is initiated. If the flight crew is not able to initiate an emergency descent, the AUTO EMER DESCENT function will automatically engage at the end of the countdown. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-AEP-MISC P 4/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL EMER EVAC Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-2-00009580.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 INTRODUCTION The typical case, which may require an emergency evacuation, is an uncontrollable engine fire on ground. This situation, which may occur following a rejected take-off, or after landing, requires good crew coordination to cope with a high workload situation: ‐ In the rejected take-off case, the captain calls "STOP". This confirms that the captain has controls ‐ In all other cases, the captain calls "I HAVE CONTROL", if required to state the control takeover. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-2-00009593.0001001 / 04 MAY 18 DECISION MAKING As soon as the aircraft is stopped, the parking brake is set, the captain notifies the cabin crew and the F/O notifies ATC. The Captain calls for ECAM ACTIONS. At this stage, the tasksharing is defined as follows: ‐ The first officer performs the ECAM actions, until evacuation decision point ‐ The captain may decide to evacuate depending on the circumstances. Considerations should be given to: • Fire remaining out of control after having discharged the fire agents • Possible passenger evacuation of the aircraft on the runway • Positioning the aircraft to keep the fire away from the fuselage, taking into account the wind direction • Communicating intentions, or requests to ATC. If fire remains out of control after having discharged the fire agents, the captain calls for the EVACUATION. The applicable actions are displayed on the ECAM (included in the ENG FIRE (On Ground) ECAM procedure, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ENGF ENG 1(2) FIRE). Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-2-00009594.0001001 / 06 SEP 18 EVACUATION PROCEDURE If an evacuation is required for another reason than ENGINE FIRE (On Ground), the flight crew will find the EMER EVAC procedure in the ECAM ABN PROC menu. This procedure is also available in the QRH. 350-941 FLEET FCTM C→ PR-AEP-MISC P 5/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Some items need to be highlighted: ‐ "CABIN CREW...ALERT" reminds the captain for the “ATTENTION CREW AT STATION” call (In case of RTO, this is done during the RTO flow pattern). Cabin crew must be aware that the flight crew is still in control of the situation. In certain circumstances, this will avoid any unwanted or unnecessary evacuation initiated by the cabin crew ‐ "EVAC (PA)...ANNOUNCE" requires the captain confirmation that the emergency evacuation is still required. If still required, the captain: • Notifies the cabin crew to launch the evacuation • Activates the EVAC COMMAND pb • Advises ATC, if required. This will be done preferably in this order for a clear understanding by cabin crew. The captain can sweep their hand in order to locate the EVAC COMMAND pb from the bottom of the left side of the overhead panel until reaching the CAPT & PURS / CAPT sw , and then moving to the guarded pushbutton on the left. The flight crew will keep in mind that as long as the evacuation order is not triggered, the flight crew may differ or cancel the passengers’ evacuation. As soon as the evacuation order is triggered, this decision is irreversible. If lives are in danger at any time during an ECAM procedure, the captain should call for the evacuation of all passengers. When the aircraft is on batteries power, the cockpit seats must be operated mechanically. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-2-00009595.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 TASKSHARING When applying the EMERGENCY EVACUATION procedure, the F/O can set the engine master lever to OFF, and push the FIRE pb, without any confirmation from the Captain. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ PR-AEP-MISC P 6/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL EMERGENCY LANDING PROCEDURE Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00021988.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL In some rare cases, the loss of all engines occurs at a very low height above ground level, and there is not sufficient time to attempt an engine relight. Therefore, the flight crew may not be able to apply the ALL ENGs FLAME OUT procedure. The flight crew must use the remaining time to fly the aircraft to an appropriate landing spot, and to prepare the aircraft for touchdown (ditching or forced landing). The EMERGENCY LANDING procedure provides the flight crew with the following items and actions to perform, for the best possible touchdown: ‐ The landing gear position ‐ The slats/flaps configuration 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← C to D → PR-AEP-MISC P 7/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ‐ The speed ‐ The pitch attitude, in the case of a ditching. Depending on the situation, the flight crew may adapt the sequence of actions in order to manage the energy of the aircraft. When the DITCHING pb-sw is pressed, the VLS will decrease as soon as the aircraft height is below 1 000 ft. Flight crew actions that are considered as basic airmanship (notify the ATC, notify the cabin crew, etc.) are not included in the EMERGENCY LANDING procedure. The flight crew can perform these actions (ATC, cabin crew,...), if there is sufficient time. The EMERGENCY LANDING procedure is provided in the QRH (back cover page), immediately above the EMERGENCY EVACUATION procedure. WHEN TO APPLY THE EMERGENCY LANDING PROCEDURE The flight crew must rapidly decide to apply either the ALL ENGs FLAME OUT procedure, or the EMERGENCY LANDING procedure, depending on their assessment of the situation. To make their decision, the flight crew should take all the following parameters into account: ‐ The aircraft altitude ‐ The remaining time before touchdown ‐ The rate of descent ‐ The flight crew workload ‐ The weather conditions ‐ The suitable landing surface options ‐ The technical state of the aircraft, etc. FLIGHT CREW INCAPACITATION Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00009617.0001001 / 07 MAY 18 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL Flight crew incapacitation is a real safety hazard that occurs more frequently than many of the other emergencies. Incapacitation can occur in many forms that range from sudden death to partial loss of function. Sometimes the flight crew does not have any symptom before incapacitation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← D to E → PR-AEP-MISC P 8/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL DETECTION In order to help with the early detection of flight crew incapacitation, the Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles should be applied: ‐ Correct crew coordination that involves routine monitoring and aural crosschecks. The absence of standard callouts at the appropriate time may indicate incapacitation of one flight crewmember. ‐ One flight crewmember who does not feel well must inform the other flight crewmember. Other symptoms for example incoherent speech, a pale and (or) fixed facial expression, or irregular breathing may indicate the beginning of incapacitation. ACTION L2 L1 In the case of flight crew incapacitation, the fit flight crewmember should apply the following actions: ‐ Take over and ensure a safe flight path: • Announce “I have control” • If the incapacitated flight crewmember causes interference with the handling of the aircraft, press the sidestick pb for 40 s The time required of 40 s includes the time necessary for AP deactivation (if AP engaged) and the time for offside sidestick deactivation. • Keep or engage the onside AP, as required • Perform callouts (challenge and response included) and checklists aloud. ‐ Inform the ATC of the emergency ‐ Take any steps possible to contain the incapacitated flight crewmembers. These steps may involve cabin/supernumerary/courier crew ‐ In order to reduce workload, consider: • Early approach preparation and checklists reading • Automatic Landing • Use of radar vectoring and long approach. ‐ Land at the nearest suitable airport after consideration of all pertinent factors ‐ Arrange medical assistance onboard and after landing, providing as many details as possible about the condition of the affected flight crewmember ‐ Request assistance from any medically qualified passenger, except for flight with only two flight crewmembers onboard (i.e. freighter or ferry flight). HANDLING THE AIRCRAFT IN THE CASE OF SEVERE DAMAGE Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00020765.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL In the event of severe damage to the aircraft, the flight crew’s immediate action should be to “fly the aircraft”. In severe damage cases, it might be necessary for the flight crew to revert to the use 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← E to F → PR-AEP-MISC P 9/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL of a “back to basics” flying techniques, where bank, pitch, and thrust are the primary parameters to manually control the aircraft. In addition, as for any flight phase, the flight crew must continue to perform all navigation and communication tasks. If the damage significantly affects aircraft aerodynamics, flight controls, or engines, then aircraft handling qualities may be affected. Therefore, the flight crew should perform an assessment of aircraft handling qualities as soon as possible, in order to identify how pitch, roll, and yaw are controllable. During assessment of the flight controls, the flight crew should apply smooth sidestick input and should limit the bank angle to 15 °, in order to prevent possible destabilization of the aircraft. In addition, the flight crew should avoid the use of the speedbrakes before the end of the flight, unless necessary. To assess aircraft handling qualities, the flight crew must keep the following basic principles in mind: ‐ Elevators, ailerons, and rudder are the primary flight controls ‐ In addition to the use of the elevators, the use of the THS (via longitudinal trim control) may also be necessary in order to control pitch ‐ On all Airbus aircraft, engines are mounted under the wing. As a consequence, a thrust increase results in a pitch-up effect, and a thrust decrease results in a pitch-down effect ‐ If damage to the aircraft is severe, it may be necessary to use not-usual flying techniques to maintain control of the aircraft. Each flight control can be used to compensate for an inoperative or damaged surface. For example, the flight crew can compensate for a lack of roll efficiency via the use of rudder input. As another example, the application of asymmetrical thrust enables the flight crew to indirectly control roll, with a slightly delayed response. CAUTION Regardless of the airborne flight condition, and whatever the speed, the flight crew must not apply sudden, full or almost full, opposite rudder pedal inputs. These inputs can induce loads that are above the defined limit loads, and can result in structural damage or failure. The rudder travel limitation is not designed to prevent structural damage or failure in the event of such rudder system inputs. As soon as control of the aircraft is ensured: ‐ Depending on the severity of the damage to the aircraft, the flight crew may attempt to use automation. However, if the autopilot and the flight director remain available, their operation may be erratic. Therefore, the flight crew should monitor carefully the AP behaviour, and must be prepared to immediately revert to manual flying techniques ‐ The flight crew can start ECAM actions, if applicable. An assessment of the indications in the cockpit may provide the flight crew with useful information about affected systems. When possible and depending on the situation, a visual check can also provide important information. Prior to landing and at an appropriate altitude, the flight crew must perform an assessment of aircraft handling qualities in landing configuration in order to help determine an appropriate strategy for 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←F→ PR-AEP-MISC P 10/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL approach and landing. The flight crew must perform this analysis at different speeds down to VAPP. If it becomes difficult to control the aircraft when the aircraft goes below a specific speed, the flight crew must perform the approach landing at a speed above this specific speed. The result of the above-mentioned assessments helps to build the correct follow up strategy. The quantity of flight crew workload required to maintain control of the aircraft is one of the decision factors to take into account for this strategy. Good flight crew coordination is essential throughout the assessment process. The flight crew should share their own understanding and view of the situation with the other flight crewmembers. LOW ENERGY Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00023000.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL L2 L1 The "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" low energy audio indicator announces a low energy situation. This situation requires a flight crew action to increase energy. For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-27-20 Low Energy Protection. Note: The "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" audio indicator can also be associated with: 1. A windshear detection during takeoff, or approach. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-2 General. 2. A speed decay in cruise at high altitude with AP ON. For more information, Refer to PR-NP-SOP-150 Speed decay during Cruise. LOW ENERGY RECOVERY Increase the thrust and/or adjust the pitch depending on the circumstances, until the audio indicator stops. Note: At high altitude, thrust increase may not be sufficient to increase energy. A pitch down action (descent) may be necessary to reduce angle of attack and recover energy. OVERSPEED Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-4-00021351.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 INTRODUCTION The flight crew must not intentionally exceed VMO/MMO (340 kt/M 0.89) during the flight. However, during normal operations, the aircraft may temporarily exceed VMO/MMO due to wind gradients. The aircraft is designed to fly up to the maximum structural speed (VD/MD = 375 kt/M 0.96) without structural failure. However, in the case of an overspeed event, the aircraft may experience 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← F to H → PR-AEP-MISC P 11/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL vertical load factors that may exceed the aircraft limits, and thus requiring a maintenance inspection. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-4-00020762.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 OVERSPEED PREVENTION If the aircraft encounters significant speed variations close to VMO/MMO during the flight, the following operating techniques apply. It is recommended to keep the AP and A/THR engaged. This enables to keep the intended flight path while thrust reduces to idle, if necessary. The flight crew selects a lower target speed in order to increase the margin to VMO/MMO. However, the flight crew should not reduce the target speed below Green Dot, which is the minimum recommended speed during the flight. After the selection of the lower target speed, the flight crew monitors the speed trend arrow on the PFD. If the aircraft continues to accelerate, and if the speed trend arrow approaches or exceeds VMO/MMO, the flight crew uses the appropriate position of speed brakes depending on the rate of acceleration. The length of the speed trend arrow is a good indication of the rate of acceleration. For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-CDS-40-20-40 General Airspeed Indications. Note: ‐ The use of speed brakes is an efficient deceleration mean, that is certified for the whole flight envelope. However, the use of speed brakes results in a reduction of the speed envelope. The use of speed brakes increases VLS and reduces the buffet margin at high altitude. ‐ The use of speed brakes results in a pitch up effect, but the AP and the normal law compensate for it. ‐ Regardless of the position of the SPEED BRAKES lever, the speed brakes automatically fully extend at VMO +5 kt. For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-27-20 High Speed Protection. For the descent in DES mode and managed speed, the flight crew should enter descent wind data that is as accurate as possible. This results in an optimized managed speed and vertical profile. This action results in a speed during descent which would be approximately the managed speed target . For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FG-60-20 FMS Speed/Mach Target. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-4-00020763.0001001 / 03 MAY 17 OVERSPEED RECOVERY If the OVERSPEED warning is triggered, the following operating techniques apply. The OVERSPEED warning is triggered if the speed exceeds VMO +4 kt/MMO +0.006, and lasts until the speed is below VMO/MMO. For more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-OVERSPEED OVERSPEED. The flight crew should keep the AP engaged. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←H→ PR-AEP-MISC P 12/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL In order to minimize overspeed, the flight crew should extend the speed brakes to the most appropriate lever position depending on the overspeed situation. If the A/THR is ON, keep it engaged and check that the thrust is reducing to idle. There is no operational advantage to disconnect the A/THR and manually set idle for overspeed recovery. In fact, both techniques result in the same engine response in terms of thrust reduction. If the A/THR is OFF, set both thrust levers to idle. In the case of severe overspeed, the high speed protection activates (except in direct law). The protection activation results in an automatic pitch up order to reduce the speed. Speed brakes may automatically extend. For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-27-20 High Speed Protection. Note: If the aircraft enters the protected flight envelope or if the flight crew engages the AP in the protected flight envelope, the AP/FD remains engaged; the flight control law of the flight envelope protection takes over the autopilot. In this case the AP IN PROT message appears on the FMA. The objective of the high speed protection is only to recover from the overspeed, regardless of the vertical load factors. However, the high speed protection is designed to request the appropriate vertical load factor demand. Therefore, if the autopilot is not engaged, the flight crew should smoothly adjust the pitch attitude in association with the high speed protection. Note: The flight crew should disregard the FD orders while the high speed protection is active. In fact, the FD orders do not take into account the high speed protection. If the flight crew follows the nose down orders of the FD, the target speed of the high speed protection increases (up to VD -10 kt / MD M -0.02 if the sidestick is full forward). The flight crew should keep speed brakes, as their use is compatible with the high speed protection. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-4-00021352.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 REPORTING The flight crew must report any type of overspeed event (i.e. if the OVERSPEED warning is triggered). This report triggers the appropriate maintenance actions. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-4-00021353.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 LINK WITH TURBULENCE The significant speed variations near VMO/MMO and above VMO/MMO may be one of the first indication of a possible severe turbulence area. In the case of severe turbulence, the flight crew should activate and apply the ECAM procedure MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE. Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-MISC [ABN] MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE. For more information on the turbulence procedure, Refer to PR-NP-SP-10-10-3 Procedure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←H→ PR-AEP-MISC P 13/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL In severe turbulence, the flight crew prevents overspeed by applying the ECAM procedure MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE. However, if the speed exceeds VMO/MMO, the flight crew should apply the overspeed recovery operating technique that has priority over turbulence procedure. When the speed returns below VMO/MMO, and if the severe turbulence persists, the flight crew resumes the MISC SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CRUISE procedure. OVERWEIGHT LANDING Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-00009618.0001001 / 27 SEP 18 Applicable to: ALL Overweight landing can be performed "in exceptional conditions" (in flight turn back or diversion), provided that the flight crew follows the OVERWEIGHT LANDING procedure. The decision to jettison remains at captain discretion after the analysis of various parameters such as runway length, aircraft conditions, emergency situation. Automatic landing is certified up to Maximum Landing Weight (MLW), but flight tests were successfully performed up to the Max Takeoff Weight (MTOW). In the case of an emergency, and under the flight crew responsibility, an automatic landing may be performed up to MTOW provided that the runway is approved for automatic landing. The flight crew must press the ABN PROC pb on the ECP, then select the OVERWEIGHT LANDING procedure in the MISCELLANEOUS section to activate the ECAM procedure. As required by the procedure, the flight crew must compute the landing performance. Unless the ECAM requires a specific landing flap setting, the CONF FULL is preferred for optimized landing performance and to minimize energy. CONF 3 is used only when necessary, for go-around performance. When an overweight landing is required, a long straight-in approach, or a wide visual pattern, should be flown in order to configure the aircraft for a stabilized approach. The early stabilized approach technique should be used, and VAPP established at the FAF. The speed is reduced to VLS in the final phase of the approach to minimize the aircraft energy. For go-around, if the landing configuration is different from FLAP FULL, FLAP 1 must be used. If a go-around FLAP 1 is performed, VLS CONF 1+F may be higher than VLS CONF 3 +5 kt . The recommendation in such a case is to follow SRS orders that accelerates the aircraft up to the displayed VLS. However, note that VLS CONF 1+F is equal to 1.23 VS1G, that is more than the 1.13 VS1G minimum go-around speed required by regulations. The flight crew should be aware that the transition from -3 ° flight path angle to the go-around climb gradient requires a lot of energy and therefore some altitude loss. It is recommended to use the BTV function, and to set the runway end as the BTV exit in order to optimize the braking, and to minimize the braking energy. In the case of manual braking, the flight crew should take into account the maximum runway landing distance available, and the use of brakes should be adapted to avoid very hot brakes and risk of tire deflation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← H to I PR-AEP-MISC P 14/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL REJECTED TAKEOFF Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00009579.0001001 / 02 OCT 14 Applicable to: ALL FACTORS AFFECTING THE REJECTED TAKEOFF (RTO) Experience indicates that a rejected takeoff can be hazardous, even if the flight crew applies the correct procedures. The following factors can impact on the rejected takeoff: ‐ Tire damage ‐ Brakes worn or brakes that do not operate correctly ‐ Error in gross weight determination ‐ Erroneous performance calculations ‐ Erroneous runway line-up technique ‐ Initial brake temperature ‐ Delay in the initialization of the stop procedure ‐ Runway friction coefficient less than expected. Thorough preflight preparation and a detailed exterior inspection can eliminate the effect of some of these factors. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00009589.0001001 / 18 JUN 15 Applicable to: ALL DECISION MAKING A rejected takeoff can possibly be a hazardous maneuver, and the time for decision making is limited. To minimize the possibility of decisions that are not appropriate to reject a takeoff, many alerts are inhibited between 80 kt and 400 ft. Therefore, the flight crew must consider as significant any alert triggered during this period. 350-941 FLEET FCTM J→ PR-AEP-MISC P 15/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL To assist the flight crew in the decision making, the takeoff is divided into low speed and high speed phases, separated by the 100 kt speed. The speed of 100 kt is not critical. It is selected in order to help the Captain make the decision, and to avoid inadvertent stops from high speed. ‐ Below 100 kt, the Captain considers stopping the takeoff, if any ECAM alert is triggered ‐ Above 100 kt, and when the aircraft approaches V1, the Captain should be "Go-minded". The Captain should only reject the takeoff in the case of: • A fire alert, or severe damage, or • A sudden loss of engine thrust, or • Any indication that the aircraft will not fly safely, or • If an ECAM alert is triggered. In the case of a tire damage between V1 minus 20 kt and V1, and unless debris from the tire causes noticeable engine parameter fluctuations, it would be preferable to take off, to reduce the fuel load, and to land with a full runway length available. The Captain must decide to reject the takeoff and to stop the aircraft before it reaches V1. ‐ If a failure occurs before V1, for which the Captain does not intend to reject the takeoff, the Captain announces the appropriate callout for GO decision (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ABN-00 Standards Callouts for Abnormal Operations) ‐ If the Captain decides to reject the takeoff, the Captain announces the appropriate callout for RTO decision (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ABN-00 Standards Callouts for Abnormal Operations). The RTO decision callout confirms the decision to reject the takeoff, and indicates that the Captain has control. It is the only situation where taking over control is not associated with the "I have control" announcement. If the failure occurs above V1, the flight crew must continue the takeoff because it may not be possible to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00009591.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 Applicable to: ALL OPERATING TECHNIQUES If the flight crew initiates a rejected takeoff, and when the autobrake decelerates the aircraft, the Captain should not press the pedals (which may be a reflex action). If the Captain does not feel the deceleration of the aircraft, the Captain can apply full braking pedals. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←J→ PR-AEP-MISC P 16/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00022336.0001001 / 03 DEC 15 Applicable to: ALL TASKSHARING CAPT F/O "STOP"............................................................. ANNOUNCE Simultaneously: THRUST LEVERS........................................................ IDLE REVERSE THRUST.......................................... MAX AVAIL REVERSES.....................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE (1) DECELERATION............................ CHECK/ANNOUNCE (2) ANY AUDIO............................................................CANCEL AIRCRAFT STOPPED: Consider positioning the aircraft to keep any possible fire away from the fuselage. REVERSERS........................................................ STOWED ATC.......................................................................... NOTIFY PARKING BRAKE........................................................... ON CABIN CREW............................................................ALERT ECAM ACTIONS......................................................ORDER ECAM ACTIONS.................................................PERFORM The aircraft should remain stationary while the flight crew evaluates the situation. (1) Full reverse may be used until the aircraft is fully stopped. But, if there is enough runway at the end of the deceleration, the flight crew should reduce the reverse thrust when passing 70 kt. (2) ‐ If the brake response does not seem appropriate for the runway condition, the flight crew ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ should apply and maintain full manual braking. If the flight crew has any doubt, they must take over manually. Before clearing the runway, the flight crew must ensure that an evacuation is not necessary and that it is safe If the A/BRK is inoperative, the Captain simultaneously reduces the thrust and applies maximum pressure on both pedals. The aircraft stops in the minimum distance, only if the flight crew maintains the brake pedals fully pressed until the aircraft stops If braking is inoperative, the flight crew should immediately apply the [MEM] LOSS OF BRAKING memory items (Refer to FCOM/procedure) After a rejected takeoff, if the aircraft stops using A/BRK RTO, before taxiing, the flight crew must disarm the ground spoilers in order to release the brakes If the takeoff is rejected before 72 kt, the ground spoilers do not extend, and the auto-brake is not active. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00009592.0001001 / 03 DEC 15 Applicable to: ALL RTO FLOW PATTERN The main actions flow pattern is the following: 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←J→ PR-AEP-MISC P 17/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-1-00023862.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL TAKEOFF FOLLOWING RTO Depending on the technical condition of the aircraft and the reason for the RTO (e.g. ATC instruction), the flight crew may consider a new takeoff attempt subsequent to the RTO. In this case, the flight crew should: ‐ Reset both FDs and set FCU ‐ Restart SOPs from the "AFTER START" checklist. For FMS preparation, Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-FMS-30 How To Change Departure T.O Data after Rejected Takeoff. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←J PR-AEP-MISC P 18/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL STALL RECOVERY Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-5-00021368.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 DEFINITION OF THE STALL The stall is a condition in aerodynamics where the Angle of Attack (AOA) increases beyond a point such that the lift begins to decrease. As per basic aerodynamic rules, the lift coefficient (CL) increases linearly with the AOA up to a point where the airflow starts to separate from the upper surface of the wing. At and beyond this point, the flight crew may observe: ‐ Buffeting, which depends on the slats/flaps configuration and increases at high altitude due to the high Mach number ‐ Pitch up effect, mainly for swept wings and aft CG. This effect further increases the AOA. If the AOA further increases up to a value called AOAstall, the lift coefficient will reach a maximum value called CL MAX. When AOA is higher than AOAstall, the airflow separates from the wing surface and the lift coefficient decreases. This is the stall. The stall will always occur at the same AOA for a given configuration, Mach number and altitude. 350-941 FLEET FCTM K→ PR-AEP-MISC P 19/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Lift Coefficient versus Angle of Attack Slats and flaps have a different impact on the lift coefficient obtained for a given AOA. Both slats and flaps create an increase in the maximum lift coefficient. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←K→ PR-AEP-MISC P 20/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Influence of Slats and Flaps on Lift Coefficient versus Angle of Attack On the contrary, speed brake extension and ice accretion reduce the maximum lift coefficient. Flight control laws and stall warning threshold take into account these possible degradations. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←K→ PR-AEP-MISC P 21/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Influence of Speed Brakes and Icing on Lift Coefficient versus Angle of Attack To summarize, loss of lift only depends on AOA. The AOAstall depends on: ‐ Aircraft configuration (slats, flaps, speed brakes) ‐ Mach and altitude ‐ Wing contamination. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←K→ PR-AEP-MISC P 22/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-5-00020764.0001001 / 06 NOV 14 STALL RECOGNITION The flight crew must apply the stall recovery procedure as soon as they recognize any of the following stall indications: ‐ The STALL aural alert: The STALL aural alert sounds when the AOA exceeds a given threshold, which depends on the aircraft configuration and Mach number. This alert provides sufficient margin to alert the flight crew in advance of the actual stall even with contaminated wings. ‐ Stall buffet: Buffet is recognized by airframe vibrations that are caused by the non-stationary airflow separation from the wing surface when approaching AOAstall. When the Mach number increases, both the AOAstall and CL MAX will decrease. The STALL aural alert is set near the AOA at which the buffet starts. For some Mach numbers, the buffet may appear next to the STALL aural alert. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-5-00021367.0001001 / 05 OCT 15 STALL RECOVERY ‐ The immediate key action is to reduce the AOA: The reduction of AOA will allow the wing to regain lift. The flight crew must achieve this by applying a nose down pitch order on the sidestick. This flight crew action ensures an immediate aircraft response and reduction of the AOA. In the case of lack of pitch down authority, the flight crew may have to reduce the thrust, possibly down to IDLE. If the A/THR is active, the flight crew should use the I/D pushbutton to disconnect the A/THR. Simultaneously, the flight crew must ensure that the wings are level in order to reduce the lift necessary for the flight, and as a consequence the required AOA. As a general rule, minimizing the loss of altitude is secondary to the reduction of the a AOA as the first priority is to regain lift. When the AOA reduces below the AOAstall, lift and drag will return to their normal values. ‐ The secondary action is to increase energy: When stall indications have stopped, the flight crew should increase thrust smoothly as needed and must ensure that the speed brakes are retracted. Immediate maximum thrust application upon stall recognition is not appropriate. Due to the engine spool up time, the aircraft speed increase that results from thrust increase, is slow and does not enable to reduce the AOA instantaneously. Furthermore, for under wing mounted engines, the thrust increase will generate a pitch up that may prevent the required reduction of angle of attack. When stall indications have stopped, and when the aircraft has recovered sufficient energy, the flight crew can smoothly recover the initial flight path. If in clean configuration and below FL 200, 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←K→ PR-AEP-MISC P 23/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL during flight path recovery, the flight crew must select FLAPS 1 in order to increase the margin to AOAstall. UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY Applicable to: ALL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-6-00023799.0001001 / 30 SEP 16 DEFINITION OF UPSET An aircraft upset is an undesired aircraft state characterized by unintentional divergences from parameters normally experienced during operations. An aircraft upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences and may lead to inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions. An upset condition exists any time an aircraft diverges from what the flight crew is intending to do. Deviations from the desired aircraft state will become larger until the flight crew takes action to stop the divergence. Return to the desired aircraft state can be achieved through natural aircraft reaction to accelerations, auto-flight system response or flight crew intervention. Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-6-00023800.0001001 / 30 SEP 16 UPSET PREVENTION The prevention of an upset situation is possible thanks to an effective monitoring of: ‐ The environment (turbulences, icing conditions, weather) ‐ The aircraft energy state ‐ The aircraft flight path ‐ The aircraft technical state (Flight controls laws, systems failure). All flight crew members are responsible of the monitoring to ensure that the aircraft state is understood and correct for the situation. Each flight crew member should: ‐ Know and understand the expected aircraft state for the situation ‐ Communicate expectations ‐ Keep track of current aircraft state ‐ Detect and communicate deviations from the intended situation ‐ Assess risk and decide on a response ‐ Update and communicate understanding. An efficient monitoring and effective coordination and communication are keys to prevent upset situations. As such, the flight crew is able to assess the energy, to stop any flight path divergence, and to recover a stabilized flight path before the upset situation. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← K to L → PR-AEP-MISC P 24/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Ident.: PR-AEP-MISC-10-6-00023802.0001001 / 14 NOV 16 RECOVERY TECHNIQUES The flight crew must be or become aware of the upset situation, i.e. recognize and confirm the situation before they take appropriate actions. COMMUNICATION Communication between crew members will assist in the recognition of upset situation and recovery actions. At the first indication of a flight path divergence, the first pilot who observes the divergence must announce it. The flight crew must use the flight instruments as primary means to analyze the upset situation. SITUATION ANALYSIS The situation analysis process is to: ‐ Assess the energy (airspeed, altitude, attitude, load factor, thrust setting, position of drag and high-lift devices and the rate of change of those conditions) ‐ Determine the aircraft attitude (pitch and bank angle) ‐ Communicate with other crew member(s) ‐ Confirm attitude by reference to other indicators: • For a nose low upset, normally the airspeed is increasing, altitude is decreasing and the Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI) indicates a descent • For a nose high upset, the airspeed normally is decreasing, altitude is increasing and the VSI indicates a climb. A stalled condition can exist at any attitude and could be recognized by stall buffet and/or stall aural alert. If the aircraft is stalled, apply the stall recovery procedure. Refer to PR-AEP-MISC Definition of the Stall. REFERENCES FOR RECOVERY The Primary Flight Display (PFD) is a primary reference for recovery. Pitch attitude is determined from the PFD pitch reference scale. Even in extreme attitudes, some portion of the sky or ground indications is present to assist the pilot in analyzing the situation. The bank indicator on the PFD should be used to determine the aircraft bank. Other attitude sources should be checked: Standby Attitude Indications, the pilot monitoring (PM) instruments or references outside the cockpit when possible. ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY An overview of actions to take to recover from an upset would gather three basic activities: ‐ Assess the energy (become situationally aware) ‐ Stop the flight path divergence ‐ Recover to a stabilized flight path. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←L→ PR-AEP-MISC P 25/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The Nose High/Nose Low techniques represent a logical progression for recovering the aircraft. They are not necessarily procedural. The sequence of actions is for guidance only and represents a series of options for the pilot to consider and to use depending on the situation. The flight crew may apply these actions or part of these actions, mainly if the recovery is effective. Depending on the situation, the PF should apply the required actions (see figures “Nose High” and “Nose Low”). During the maneuver, the PM must monitor the airspeed and the attitude throughout the recovery. The PM must also announce the flight path divergence if the recovery maneuver is not efficient. Notes: (1) If the AP and A/THR responses enable to stop the flight path divergence, the flight crew may keep the AP and A/THR engaged. (2) The flight crew must apply as much nose down pitch order as required to obtain a nose down pitch rate. In the case of lack of pitch down authority, the flight crew may use incremental inputs on the trim (nose down) to improve the effectiveness of the elevator control. (3) Select up to maximum thrust available while ensuring adequate pitch control. Increasing thrust may reduce the effectiveness of nose-down pitch control. It may be necessary to limit or reduce thrust to the point where control of the pitch is achieved. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←L→ PR-AEP-MISC P 26/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL (4) (5) The bank angle must not exceed 60 °. If all normal pitch control techniques are unsuccessful, the flight crew can keep the current bank or bank the aircraft to enable the nose to drop toward the horizon. The bank angle should be the least possible to start the nose down and never exceed approximately 60 °. If the bank angle is already greater than 60 °, the flight crew should reduce it to an amount less than 60 °. The flight crew must avoid entering a stall due to premature recovery at low speed or excessive g-loading at high speed. Recover to level flight at a sufficient airspeed while avoiding a stall due to premature recovery at low speed, or excessive g-loading at high speed. Notes: (1) If the AP and A/THR responses enable to stop the flight path divergence, the flight crew may keep the AP and A/THR engaged. (2) Even in a nose low situation, the aircraft may be stalled and it would be necessary to recover from a stall first. (3) In general, a nose low, high-angle-of-bank requires prompt action, because the decreasing altitude is rapidly being exchanged for an increasing airspeed. The flight crew must avoid entering a stall due to premature recovery at low speed or excessive g-loading at high speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←L→ PR-AEP-MISC P 27/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 MISC FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL (4) (5) The flight crew should reduce the thrust and/or use the speedbrakes to control the speed. Recover to level flight at a sufficient airspeed while avoiding a stall due to premature recovery at low speed, or excessive g-loading at high speed. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←L PR-AEP-MISC P 28/28 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 NAV FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL ADR/IR FAILURE Ident.: PR-AEP-NAV-00009612.0002001 / 06 SEP 18 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL INFORMATION Each ADIRS has two parts (ADR and IR), which may fail independently of each other. In addition, the IR part may totally fail or may be available in ATT mode. A failure of one ADR or IR affects only the approach capability . In case of failure of two ADRs or IRs, the flight controls remain in normal law. The approach and RVSM capabilities are affected. TRIPLE ADR FAILURE L2 A total loss of reliable ADR information is mainly due to obstructed pitot tubes or static sources, because the probability of a triple ADR failure is very low. In the case of a detected triple ADR failure, the flight crew should apply the ECAM procedure. Both PFDs display the ISIS speed and altitude. The flight controls revert to alternate law. If the automatic monitoring of the air data rejects the three ADRs and the ISIS, both PFDs display the backup speed and backup altitude. The flight controls revert to direct law. For more information on ADIRS monitoring, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-NAV-20-10-50 ADIRS Monitoring. For more information on the backup speed and backup altitude, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-NAV-20-30 Backup Speed and Backup Altitude Indications. UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION Ident.: PR-AEP-NAV-00021616.0001001 / 03 JAN 20 Applicable to: ALL INTRODUCTION L2 L1 In the very remote case where the flight crew detects unreliable air data indication (not detected by the aircraft systems), the flight crew must perform the memory items (if necessary) and apply the NAV UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION abnormal not-sensed procedure. For more information on the memory items, Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-NAV [MEM] UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION. The unreliable air speed indication procedure has two objectives: ‐ To confirm that the air data indication is not reliable, and isolate the ADRs (if necessary) ‐ Enable to fly the aircraft until landing. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A to B → PR-AEP-NAV P 1/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 NAV FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL The unreliable air speed indication procedure includes the following steps: 1. Memory items (if necessary) 2. Troubleshooting (with manual selection of the backup speed and backup altitude indications for display) and isolation of the ADRs (if necessary) 3. Use the backup speed and backup altitude indications to fly, if the troubleshooting confirms that the ADRs are not reliable. WHEN TO APPLY THE UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION PROCEDURE L2 L1 The flight crew should consider applying this procedure when they suspect an erroneous speed or altitude indication (not detected by the aircraft systems). For more information on the ADIRS monitoring, Refer to FCOM/DSC-34-NAV-20-10-50 ADIRS Monitoring. The flight crew can suspect an erroneous speed or altitude indication, in any of the following cases: 1. Fluctuating or unexpected variations in the indicated airspeed or altitude 2. Abnormal correlation between the basic flight parameters (i.e. pitch, thrust, airspeed, altitude and vertical speed indications). For example, an erroneous speed or altitude indication can be suspected when one of the following applies: ‐ The altitude does not increase, although there is a significant nose-up pitch and high thrust ‐ The IAS increases, although there is a significant nose-up pitch ‐ The IAS decreases, although there is a significant nose-down pitch ‐ The IAS decreases, although there is a nose-down pitch and the aircraft descends. 3. An abnormal behavior of the AP/FD and/or the A/THR 4. The STALL warning triggers and this is in contradiction with the indicated airspeeds. In this case, the flight crew should rely on the STALL warning. Erroneous airspeed data does not affect the STALL warning, because the STALL warning is based on the Angle Of Attack (AOA) 5. The OVERSPEED warning triggers and this is in contradiction with the indicated airspeeds. Depending on the situation, the OVERSPEED warning may be false or justified. When the OVERSPEED VFE warning triggers, the appearance of aircraft buffet is a symptom that the airspeed is indeed excessive 6. The barometric altitude is not consistent with the RA height (when the RA height is displayed) 7. The aerodynamic noise reduces whereas the indicated airspeed increases, or vice versa. Note: Due to the fact that the barometric altitude may be erroneous, the aircraft may not be able to accurately maintain level flight. In addition, the ATC transponder may transmit an incorrect altitude to ATC or to other aircraft, which can lead to confusion. Therefore, the flight crew should advise ATC of the situation without delay. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PR-AEP-NAV P 2/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 NAV FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL HOW TO APPLY THE UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION PROCEDURE This procedure is divided into three different phases, as follows: The flight crew must ensure a safe path. If safe conduct of the flight is affected, the flight crew must apply the memory items. Safe conduct of the flight is affected when the flight crew is not sure to be able to safely fly the aircraft in the short term, with the current parameters, i.e.: ‐ The flight crew has lost situation awareness, or ‐ The current pitch and thrust settings are not appropriate for the current flight conditions, or ‐ The aircraft has an unexpected flight path for the current flight conditions. The memory items enable the flight crew to rapidly establish safe flight conditions for a limited period of time, in all phases of flight, and aircraft configurations (i.e. weight, landing gear, and slat/flaps). If the flight crew flies the aircraft with the pitch/thrust values of the memory items for an extended period of time, they may exceed the speed limits of the aircraft. Therefore, the flight crew must apply the NAV UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION abnormal not-sensed procedure without delay. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B PR-AEP-NAV P 3/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 NAV FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PR-AEP-NAV P 4/4 07 JAN 20 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 WHEEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL WHEEL TIRE DAMAGE SUSPECTED Ident.: PR-AEP-WHEEL-00023225.0002001 / 03 OCT 17 Applicable to: ALL GENERAL The flight crew activates the WHEEL TIRE DAMAGE SUSPECTED ECAM not-sensed procedure (Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-WHEEL [ABN] WHEEL TIRE DAMAGE SUSPECTED) in the case of suspicion of a damage on one or several tires. The crew may suspect tire damages based on several indications. These include, but are not limited to: ‐ Information from the ATC on the presence of tire debris on the runway, ‐ A bang noise during the takeoff roll or just after takeoff, Note: A bang noise does not necessarily indicate tire damages. A bang noise may also have other origins (e.g. engine, nose landing gear retraction) ‐ A non-commanded sudden yaw noticed during the takeoff roll, Note: Directional deviation may also come from lateral gusts during the takeoff run. ‐ The WHEEL TIRE PRESS LO alert triggered once airborne, Note: The WHEEL TIRE PRESS LO alert may not trigger in all cases as the tire debris may have also damaged the tire pressure sensor. ‐ The WHEEL SD page showing amber XX for the tire pressure indication on one or several wheels, Note: The tire debris may have affected other tire pressure sensors (or associated wiring) so amber XX may be displayed for other wheels than the damaged ones. ‐ The aircraft has other damages (brakes, slats/flaps, etc.). Depending on the situation, one or several of the above factors may help the flight crew in the decision to activate the procedure in the ECAM. PROCEDURE FOR LANDING Damage on one or more tires has an impact on the landing distance. The performance impact of a burst tire is equivalent to a brake released. When the flight crew activates the WHEEL TIRE DAMAGE SUSPECTED alert, the Flight Warning System (FWS) automatically sends this alert to the EFB LDG PERF application. 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PR-AEP-WHEEL P 1/2 02 NOV 17 PROCEDURES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 350-941 WHEEL FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL FOR RUNWAY VACATION AND TAXI After landing, before the taxi in, it is necessary to assess the exact condition of the wheels and landing gear. To do so, the flight crew must ask for an inspection of the landing gear before the taxi is initiated and make sure the condition of the affected wheels is in accordance with FCOM limitations. For more information, Refer to FCOM/FCOM / Limitations / Taxi with Deflated Tires, and Refer to FCTM / Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency / L/G / Taxi with Deflated Tires. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A PR-AEP-WHEEL P 2/2 02 NOV 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS Intentionally left blank PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A Risks related to Flight Phases................................................................................................................................ B Risks related to System Operations/Failures..........................................................................................................C 350-941 FLEET FCTM PIR-PLP-TOC P 1/2 06 FEB 20 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS PRELIMINARY PAGES 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Intentionally left blank 350-941 FLEET FCTM PIR-PLP-TOC P 2/2 06 FEB 20 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL INTRODUCTION Ident.: PIR-00020971.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the risks and potential consequences that the flight crew may encounter, in order to improve: ‐ The awareness of the flight crew with regards to these risks ‐ The risk management. CATEGORY OF RISKS, AND ASSOCIATED SYMBOL 7 categories of risks may be encountered: Categories Potential Consequences AIRCRAFT Possibility of damage to the aircraft. FLIGHT It may not be possible to complete the initial flight. FLIGHT CREW Possibility of flight crew incapacitation, or injury. GROUND CREW Possibility of injury to the ground personnel. Symbol Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM A→ PIR P 1/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Categories Potential Consequences HANDLING The handling or the control of the aircraft may be affected. NAVIGATION The navigation may be affected. PAX Possibility of injury to passengers. Continued from the previous page Symbol RISKS RELATED TO FLIGHT PHASES In normal operations, some risks may be encountered during specific flight phases. For each risk, a dedicated table provides: ‐ The flight phase, where the risk may be encountered ‐ A description of the risk ‐ A description of the consequences, if the flight crew does not correctly manage the risk ‐ The type of the consequences of the risk (who, or what is affected) illustrated with the appropriate risk symbol ‐ When applicable, a reference to the FCTM part, where the related explanations and recommendations (for prevention and/or recovery) are developed. Refer to PIR Risks related to Flight Phases. RISKS RELATED TO SYSTEM OPERATIONS/FAILURES Some risks may be encountered during the interaction of the flight crew with systems, or in the case of system failure. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←A→ PIR P 2/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL For each risk, a dedicated table provides: ‐ The aircraft system related to the risk ‐ A description of the risk ‐ A description of the consequences, if the flight crew does not correctly manage the risk ‐ The type of the consequences of the risk (who, or what is affected) illustrated with the appropriate risk symbol ‐ When applicable, a reference to the FCTM part, where the related explanations and recommendations (for prevention and/or recovery) are developed. Refer to PIR Risks related to System Operations/Failures. RISKS RELATED TO FLIGHT PHASES Ident.: PIR-00020969.0001001 / 02 MAR 16 Applicable to: ALL Flight Phase Risk Consequences Exterior During the exterior ‐ In-flight loss of the fan Walkaround walkaround, the flight crew cowl doors does not check that the fan ‐ Structural damage to the cowl doors are correctly aircraft closed and latched. ‐ Danger to people on ground Refer to FCTM Refer to PR-NP-SOP-50 Exterior Walkaround Cockpit Preparation During the takeoff briefing, Erroneous trajectory. the flight crew does not check that the FMS SID (including the constraints) is correct. Refer to PR-NP-SOP-60 FMS Preparation Takeoff The flight crew announces “THRUST SET” before the thrust reaches the target thrust value. Refer to PR-NP-SOP-120 Takeoff Roll Engine check not valid. Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM ← A to B → PIR P 3/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Flight Phase Risk Consequences Climb/DescentThe flight crew uses the Climb or descent does not V/S knob without setting an stop. altitude target. Descent Preparation Descent Descent Approach If the QNH is not correct, the cabin pressure control system computes erroneous cabin pressurization segment, that may trigger pressurization related ECAM alert leading to undue emergency descent. In managed descent, If the aircraft is on the the flight crew uses the computed profile, the speedbrakes to attempt autothrust increases to descend below the thrust to remain on the computed profile. computed profile. The expected increased rate of descent will not be reached. In addition, the fuel consumption will increase. The flight crew does not Reduced situational select WXR or TERR on the awareness. ND. In addition, the flight crew does not correctly adjust the brightness. Continued from the previous page Refer to FCTM During descent preparation, the flight crew does not correctly insert/check the QNH and TEMP in the PERF APPR Page. One flight crewmember activates the approach phase without crosschecking with the other one. The other flight crewmember may perceive the speed change as abnormal and may react to it. Refer to PR-NP-SOP-170 Guidance and Monitoring Refer to PR-NP-10 Communication Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B→ PIR P 4/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Flight Phase Risk Approach The flight crew uses the DIR TO or DIR TO CRS IN function to sequence the F-PLN, and the aircraft is in radar vectoring. Consequences NAV mode arms or engages. If NAV mode is not appropriate, this may lead to an erroneous trajectory Approach Any erroneous computation leads to an erroneous trajectory. The flight crew does not monitor the raw data. ILS Approach The glide slope is The aircraft descends intercepted from above: G/S through the glide slope axis, not armed. without intercepting it. Non Precision Approach When the aircraft reaches the minimum height for use of AP, the flight crew does not set the AP to OFF. At the MAP, the flight crew does not set the FD to OFF. The AP will not disconnect until landing, and AUTOLAND is not provided on NPA approach. At the MAP, the flight guidance reverts to basic mode (HDG and V/S). Go-Around When the flight crew initiates the Go-Around, the PF does not set the thrust levers to the TOGA detent. The SRS GA mode and the FMS go-around phase do not engage. Therefore, the AP/FD remain engaged in approach, or landing mode and the FMS remains in APPR phase 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←B Continued from the previous page Refer to FCTM Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Initial Approach and Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Intermediate Approach Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-CONF Final Approach Refer to PR-NP-SOP-190-GUI Final Approach Refer to PR-NP-SOP-210 AP/FD Go-Around Phase Activation PIR P 5/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL RISKS RELATED TO SYSTEM OPERATIONS/FAILURES Ident.: PIR-00020970.0001001 / 06 OCT 16 Applicable to: ALL Aircraft System ADR Risk The flight crew sets the ADR pb-sw to OFF using the ADIRS selector, instead of using the ADR pb-sw. Consequences Refer to FCTM Irreversible loss of redundancy. The associated IR is lost, and cannot be recovered until the end of the flight. Auto Flight - Flight Guidance In order to disconnect the Immediate and undue thrust autothrust, the flight crew increase. presses the instinctive disconnect pb on the thrust levers before they move the thrust levers to the current thrust setting. Auto Flight - Flight Guidance The flight crew does not use Trajectory not correct. the correct knob to change heading or speed. Auto Flight - Flight Guidance The flight crew does not sequence the F-PLN. Erroneous computation (e.g. time, fuel) and trajectory. Engine In the case of an engine failure after takeoff, the flight crew does not stabilize the aircraft on the flight path before they perform ECAM actions. Performing the ECAM actions before the aircraft is stabilized on the flight path, reduces efficiency due to the PF’s high workload, and may lead to a trajectory error. Refer to AS-FG-10-2 How to Set Autothrust to OFF Refer to PR-AEP-ENG Aircraft Handling Continued on the following page 350-941 FLEET FCTM C→ PIR P 6/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Aircraft System Fuel Continued from the previous page Risk The flight crew does not check the fuel quantity before they open the fuel crossfeed valve. Consequences Refer to FCTM Fuel loss. Refer to PR-AEP-FUEL Fuel Leak Miscellaneous For EMERGENCY DESCENT, the flight crew turns but does not pull the ALT knob, or does both, but not in the correct sequence, with no FMA crosscheck. The flight crew does not detect that the descent is not engaged. Delayed descent leads to limited oxygen for passengers. Refer to PR-AEP-MISC EMER DESCENTRefer to AS-FG-10-1 Recommended Practice for Autopilot (AP) Engagement RMP Error in the use of RMP. Loss of transmission to ATC due to an erroneous setting. Slats/Flaps The flight crew does not At takeoff: select the speed after slat or When slats/flaps are locked, flap failure. if the flight crew does not select the current speed, the aircraft continues to accelerate and possibly exceeds Max Speed. In approach: When slats/flaps are locked and if the flight crew does not select the current speed, the aircraft continues to decelerate down to a speed that is not consistent with the current aircraft configuration. 350-941 FLEET FCTM ←C→ Refer to PR-AEP-F_CTL Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration Continued on the following page PIR P 7/8 22 MAY 17 PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS 350-941 FLIGHT CREW TECHNIQUES MANUAL Aircraft Risk System Slats/Flaps In the case of flight with Landing Gear slats/flaps extended or landing gear extended, the flight crew takes into account the FMS predictions. TCAS Resolution Advisory In the case of the AP/FD TCAS is not available and the flight crew does not set the FD pb to OFF. 350-941 FLEET FCTM Continued from the previous page Consequences Refer to FCTM If the flight crew does not insert the fuel penalty factor in the FMS, the FMS predictions (i.e. time, fuel) are not correct. Refer to PR-AEP-F_CTL Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration The autothrust may remain in THRUST mode whereas it must be in SPEED mode. If the thrust remains in THRUST mode, this may lead to the activation of the high speed/AOA protection. Refer to General ←C AS-TCAS PIR P 8/8 22 MAY 17
