CAUSATION
Bataclan v. Medina, L-10126, 22 October 1957, 102 Phil. 181
FACTS: Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. At
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on
the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the
best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated
beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce
fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help
set it on fire. Hence, the petitioners sought for the recovery of compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees against the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable.
HELD: YES. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause in the case at bar was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available. The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor because none of them have cautioned or taken
steps, with the circumstances present, to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus.
PEOPLE V ILAGAN GR NO. 75369 NOVEMBER 26, 1190 PETITONERS/PROSECUTORS: People of the
Philippines RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS: Fernando Ilagan y Jamito, Edmundo Asis y Ilagan, and Juan
Macandog
TOPIC: Wrongful done be different from what was intended
TERMS: Proximate legal cause- “that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”
LAWS/PROVISIONS: Article 4, Par. 1 of the RPC: “Criminal liability shall be incurred: o By any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended”
FACTS:
 August 4, 1980 – After a barrio fiesta in Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Edmundo pushed aside the
group of Esmeraldo Quinones, Jr., Zaldi Asis, and Felix Lukban, and even prompted Zaldi to box.
Fernando brought out his bolo when he saw Edmundo on the ground, hacked Zaldi but missed. The
group of Quinones was then pursued by the three accused.
 Upon seeing they were no longer being chased, Quinones invited the other two to his house so
that he could change to his working clothes as a bus conductor.
 While the trio were walking along a national highway towards the victim’s house, the three
accused suddenly emerged on the road side. That was the time when Fernando hacked Quinones, Jr.
on his face, causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which resulted in his death.
 The accused denied having perpetrated the crime and stated that they were on their respective
houses when the crime occurred.
 The lower court found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of
the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo. Fernando and Edmundo were then
charged with the crime of murder with aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery.
ISSUES:  WON Fernando could be absolved of his criminal liability given that the victim was
subsequently run over by a vehicle
RULING:  1st issue: Denied.
 Based on the doctrine: “el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado” (he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. These requisites
are present in this case. The intentional felony was the hacking by Fernando.
 The second requisite was also met. Given that the incident happened on a national highway where
vehicles are expected to pass, Fernando’s hacking of Quinones’s head was the proximate, might not
be direct, cause of the latter’s death. The sequence of events from Fernando’s assault to the time
Quinones was run over by a vehicle is one unbroken chain of events. With that said, it did not really
matter if he directly caused Quinones’s death or if he actually meant it. Having triggered such
events, Iligan cannot escape liability even though the autopsy indicated that the death was caused
by a vehicular accident.
 Since treachery and evident premeditation were not established, the lower court’s charge for
Fernando was modified from murder to homicide.
 However, it was not clearly established that Edmundo took any direct part in the hacking incident
since mere knowledge/approval of the act without cooperation is not enough to charge him a coprincipal. Therefore, he deserved exoneration.
Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, 7 January 1988
Ponente: Justice Hugo Guitierrez, Jr.
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused the
flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for
the soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the
treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his tobacco
plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed
that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the
case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by
him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule
is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco
plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us
to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.
B. Impossible Crimes (Art. 4, Par. 2)
SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA (G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992)
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)
Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.
Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went
to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was
not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted. Petitioner raised the case to CA but the same affirmed the
decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2,
art. 4 of RPC.
ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.
RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire
and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar
belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although
in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted)
as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the
evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in
reason committed.
Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense
that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs.
Case: People v. Saladino, L-3634, 30 May 1951, 89 Phil. 807
Topic: Impossible Crimes (Art 4, Par 2, RPC) Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Bartolo
Saladino and Anastacia Alejo
Facts
In the night of June 23, 1948 Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private Anastacia Alejo of the Philippine
Constabulary were resting in the house of Celso Abucay in Paoay, Ilocos Norte,together with
policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman and George Plan of that municipality. They had gone
on patrol duty to the barrio for the purpose of apprehending those who on a previous night had
fired upon the dwelling. About midnight they were suddenly awakened by cries for help. They went
down and were approached by one Felix Pasion who reported he had been robbed, one of the
robbers being Luis Bernabe. The next morning, Saladino and Alejo, accompanied by the policemen
proceeded to the house of Luis Bernabe in Barrio Samac of San Nicolas same province. Having found
the suspect, they brought him, for questioning, to the residence of Felix Pasion in Barrio Singao same
municipality. It was about ten in the morning.
As Pasion reiterated his imputation, Saladino led Bernabe up the house for further investigation. He
was followed by Anastacio Alejo and the policemen. Bernabe denied the charge. To extract a
confession, Saladino repeatedly boxed and kicked him in different parts of the body. Bernabe
continued denying his guilt. Saladino got a piece of wood, two inched thick and one-yard-long, and
clubbed him several times on the chest, abdomen and the back. Then he called on Alejo to take his
turn. Alejo reluctantly whipped Bernabe four times with the branch of a tree, and then retired to the
kitchen.
Saladino again questioned his prisoner and as the latter would not admit his culpability, he repeated
the severe beating, and tying Bernabe’s wrists together with a rubber strap, made him stand on a
chair, tied the strap to a beam in the ceiling and then pushed the chair from under Bernabe with the
result that the latter was left hanging in the air. While in that position Bernabe was cudgeled by
Saladino, with the wooden club, on the sides, armpits, stomach, hips and back. It was at this juncture
that policeman Plan interceded for the victim saying, Stop now corporal. Better bring him to your
headquarters and there you will investigate him”. But Saladino ignored plea, and resumed the
maltreatment, loudly predicting that Bernabe would confess before noon. After Bernabe had
remained suspended for five minutes, Saladino untied him, made him sit on a chair and urged him to
acknowledge his offense. As Bernabe persisted in his refusal, Saladino kicked the chair and Bernabe
fell on the floor, even as Saladino pouncing on his captive booted him several times until the latter
lay motionless on the floor. “It seems he is dead,” Policeman Oaman exclaimed. Saladino replied
“No, he is only feigning death” and presently stepped on Bernabe’s throat and chest. Then Saladino
let him alone for fifteen minutes, during which time Bernabe did not stir nor breathe. An old man
approaching
Bernabe and taking his pulse said that the man was dead. Suddenly realizing his predicament,
Saladino ordered two civilians to carry Bernabe down and told Alejo: “shoot him now and we will say
that he ran away”. Complying with the corporal’s order Alejo shot Bernabe four times with his
carbine, after the latter had been laid down flat on his stomach about thirty meters away from the
house. Three days afterwards Bernabe was intered.
Issue Whether or not the accused shall incur criminal liability?
Held Yes. Bartolo Saladino and Anastacia Alejo shall incur criminal liability. From the foregoing it is
plain that Bernabe having died as a consequence of the violent mauling by Saladino, the latter must
be declared guilty of assassination. Anastacio Alejo does not appear to have conspired with him, and
is not liable either as principal or as accomplice of the murder. But he is guilty as accessory after the
fact for having performed acts tending to conceal Saladino’s crime by making it appear that Bernabe
had run away. U.S. v. Cuison 20 Phil. 433 is a relevant example.
Facundo Balangac was shot from behind by Private Valentin Fortuna in the cemetery of Barili, Cebu.
“Some hours afterwards, the defendant Cuison with several constabulary privates, among them
Valentin Fortuna, went by order of Lieutenant Poggi to the place where the body of the deceased
lay, and commanded the soldiers to spread out in skirmish like and discharge their firearms into the
air; then the defendant, with the private Fortunam, went to the house of Epimaco Sosa to ask him
for a dagger to place beside the body of a man whom they had shot, thereby to give the appearance
that the deceased had been carrying a dagger.”
This court declared the defendant Cuison guilty of accessory after the fact saying: “But we do find
criminal liability in the acts performed by Corporal Cuison, eventhough he obeyed orders from his
Lieutenant, Poggi; such liability consists in his having intervened subsequently to the commission of
the crime, by furnishing the means to make it appear that the deceased was armed and that it was
necessary to kill him on account of his resistance to the constabulary man, who, to lend color to such
pretended resistance, discharged their firearms into the air, under the direction of Cuison, at the
place there where the corpse was lying; and also consists in his having tried to find a dagger to place
beside the deceased. Such acts must be characterized as concealment, and since they are not only
wrong but also unlawful, the defendant is not exempt from liability, even though he acted in
obedience to a command from his superior, because such command was illegal and in conflict with
law and justice. Therefore it can not be alleged that obedience was due, or that it exempts the
defendant from criminal liability.”
Ruling Therefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant Saladino accords with the law, the
judgment against him is affirmed, with costs. As to appellant Alejo the appealed decision is revoked
and one will be entered sentencing him to imprisonment for not less than 3 years of prision
correctional nor more than six years and two months, of prision mayor; and in case of insolvency of
Saladino to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of his own inability to pay. No costs against this appellant. So ordered.
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a postdated checked
worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check
was deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca,
another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was
looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said
that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the
dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI
filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five
(5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;
That the act was alone with evil intent; and
That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed
all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.
III. Stages of execution
UNITED STATES VS. EDUAVE
Doctrine:
According to Article 3 of the Penal Code, a felony is frustrated if the offender performs all acts of
execution which should have ended with the felony, but the intended outcome did not happen. On
the other hand, there is an attempt if the offender did not finish the act because of external
interference, and not his personal desistance.
Facts:
Plaintiff Protasio Eduave committed a crime when he attacked a girl from behind with a sharp bolo.
The injury was sustained on a vital region on the lumbar area, slightly to the side, where a gash 8.5
inches long and 2 inches deep was found to have severed that part's muscle and tissue. While with
the authorities, he said that he had killed the girl. His motive, it turned out, was that he was
incensed with the girl because she charged him with rape, resulting to her pregnancy. At the time of
the alleged rape, Eduave was living with the girl as her mother's "querido". Despite his actions and
belief that he had killed the girl, she survived the attack.
Issues Ratio:
WoN the crime would have been murder or homicide had the victim died.
WoN the felony is frustrated or attempted.
The crime would have been murder. This is because the crime was accompanied by alevosia
(treachery). The manner of attack, from behind and dealing a blow to the side and the back with a
bolo, shows such. Thus, murder would have been the crime if it resulted in death. The crime was
frustrated murder.
According to Article 3 of the Penal Code, a felony is frustrated if the offender performs all acts of
execution which should have ended with the felony, but the intended outcome did not happen. On
the other hand, there is an attempt if the offender did not finish the act because of external
interference, and not his personal desistance. The Supreme Court added that to put it in another
way, frustrated felonies are those where the subjective phase is completely passed. This is the phase
between the beginning of the act and the last act that should consummate the crime. This is
followed by the objective phase or the period where the act begins until he voluntarily desists. If
between the start and end of the crime, he is stopped by an external force, there is an attempt.
However, if there was no such interruption until the final act, such as in the instant case, it is
frustrated.
Dispositive:
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs
Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326
Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:
As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and
dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of
words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and his three-year-old daughter went to the store
to buy food, Edgardo together with his brother Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their
house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to
the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera
brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and
superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.
Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted
murder.
(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim
with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds
sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill
is presumed.
(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when
the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity
for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack to the victim
caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was
treachery.
CASE DIGEST: RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: One evening, inside her room, Malou retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her
bedroom door, her maid slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the following day, petitioner, clad
in t-shirt and shorts, entered the room of Malou through its window. Once inside, he approached
Malou and tightly pressed on her face a piece of cloth soaked with chemical and. at the same time,
pinned her down on the bed. She was awakened thereby and she struggled but could not move.
She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals
were very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right
hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex
organ which she then squeezed. Petitioner let her go and escaped while Malou went straight to the
bedroom door and roused her maid.
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape?
HELD: No, he is not. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the
act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes
an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her
to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did
not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It
cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his
part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the
complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
D. Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies 1. Theft
Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the
accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them
where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket,
and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started
loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked
Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of
the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles
stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.
Held:
No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should
be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of
execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
Illegal Trespass
People VS. Lamahang; G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935
TOPIC: Indeterminate Offense – it is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is
not certain. Its nature in relation to is objective is ambiguous
FACTS:
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused Arelio Lamahang (an
habitual delinquent) in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods located in Fuentes street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside
with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him
under custody. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding the accused guilty of attempted robbery
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was erroneously charged guilty of attempted robbery?
HELD: Yes. The court ruled that the accused was guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling committed
by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to
three months and one day of arresto mayor
An offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular,
concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective
is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store
by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in
order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing
penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses
defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into
a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence
another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another.
In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the
day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may
only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said
store against the will of its owner.
Physical Injuries, Homicide, and Murder
People vs. Borinaga
Facts:
The victim Harry Mooney, an American who resided in Calubian Leyte, contracted with Juan Lawaan
for the construction of a fish corral. Lawaan attempted to collect the whole amount of the contract
even though the corral is not yet finished. Upon Mooney‘s refusal to pay, Lawaan warned and
threatened him that something would happen to him.
On that evening, Mooney was in the store of his neighbor, sitting with his back towards a window
when suddenly Basilio Borinaga struck him with a knife. The knife imbedded on the back of the seat
though. Mooney fell off from the impact but was not injured. Borinaga left the scene but after ten
minutes, he returned to have another attempt at Mooney but was warded off by Mooney and his
neighbor frightening him by turning a flashlight on him.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime is frustrated murder.
Held:
YES. As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all the acts of execution,
attending the attack. There was nothing left that he could do further to accomplish the work. The
cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of his will. Borinaga
also voluntarily desisted from further acts. The subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.
Dissenting opinion, J. Villa-Real:
“The acts of execution perfomed by [Borinaga] did not produce the death of Mooney as a
consequence not could they have produced it because the blow did not reach his body; therefore,
the culprit did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony. There was
lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of Mooney.”
What the back of the chair prevented was the wounding of Mooney, not his death. It is the
preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence had been performed, that constitutes
a frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the preventing of the performances of all the acts
of execution which constitute a felony, as in the present case.
People v. Kalalo GR Nos. L-39303-39305 March 17, 2009
FACTS: On November 10, 1932, the appellants, namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo
and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, together with Alejandro
Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the first two
for murder, and the last for frustrated murder.
Upon agreement of the parties said three cases were tried together and after the presentation of
their respective evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia
Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants. Prior to the commission of the three crimes, the
appellant Marcelo Kalalo and Isabel Holgado, the latter being the sister of one of the deceased, had a
litigation over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang in the municipality of San Luis,
Batangas. Kalalo filed two complaints against the said woman in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, alleging that he, Kalalo cultivated the land in question during 1931 and 1932 but that,
when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon. Both complaints
were dismissed. On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the
deceased, ordered the plowing of the disputed land and employed several laborers for that purpose.
Marcelo Kalalo, upon learning about it, went to the place accompanied by his brothers and Felipa and
Juan, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro Garcia. They were all armed with bolos and
upon arriving at the place, they ordered the workers to stop. Having been informed of the cause of
the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan, one of the deceased, ordered the laborers to
continue the work. At this point, Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio and the other appellants
approached Marcelino Panaligan and they all simultaneously struck with their bolos. Arcadio Holgado
and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received. After the two had fallen, Marcelo
Kalalo took the revolver that Marcelino Panaligan carried, and fired four shots at Hilario Holgado who
was then fleeing from the scene in order to save his own life.
ISSUE: WON the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple homicide in each of the cases.
HELD: It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the
circumstance of “abuse of superior strength”, if proven to have been presented, raises homicide to
the category of murder;but it is also to be borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of
them with a bolo, and the other with a revolver.
The risk was even for the contending parties and their strength was almost balanced because there is
no doubt but that, under circumstances similar to those of the present case, a revolver is as effective
as, if not more than three bolos. For this reason, this court is of the opinion that the acts established
in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859 (G.R. Nos. L-39303 and 39304, respectively), merely constitute two
homicides.
As to the third case, the evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion
Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the
appellants and their companions and save his own life. The fact that the said appellant, not having
contended himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the
circumstance that immediately before doing so he and his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio
Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law, respectively, of the former, shows that
he was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his pat to
commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his
will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots,
none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo
constitute attempted homicide.
People v. Trinidad GR No. 79123-25/ 9 January 1989/ Second Division/ Appeal People of the
Philippines - plaintiff-appellee Emeliano Trinidad - accused-appellant Decision by J. MelencioHerrera,
Short Version: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial
Laroa. While the three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano
Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte. Tan, the driver at that time, suddenly heard
two gunshots -- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the head.
Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off the car and
hail a jeepney passing by. However, he noticed that Trinidad was also seated at the back of
the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the
jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired two shots,
one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and fortunately a
Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for Butuan.
Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting of Tan.
Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While
the three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad
asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte. Trinidad, a member of the Integrated National Police,
was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver. Tan was driving
the car at that time, and he was instructed by Trinidad to slow down because they were
treading dangerous territory.
Tan suddenly heard two gunshots -- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on
the head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off
the car and hail a jeepney passing by. However, he noticed that Trinidad was also seated at
the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad.
When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired
two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and
fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board a
bus for Butuan. Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting
of Tan, and he was found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad claims that the RTC erred
in convicting him of the crime of frustrated murder.
Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted of attempted
murder? YES
Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder. Ratio: Trinidad
had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other
than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in
motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the
wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on
the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only ATTEMPTED murder, the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the
death (citing, People v. Pilones)
Voting: Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, concur.
BENJAMIN P. MARTINEZ v. CA, GR NO. 168827, 2007-04-13
Facts: Dean Dongui... was a teacher at the Tubao National High School, La Union. Petitioner
Benjamin Martinez was the husband of Dean's co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez. Petitioner eked out a
living as a tricycle driver.
On October 28, 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint for damages against the spouses
Martinez in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tubao, La Union. They alleged that in March
1998, petitioner, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had been peddling false reports that
Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations... he even told Freda that Elvisa was Dean's mistress. This led to a
quarrel between Dean and Freda, and the latter was hospitalized for her hear... t ailment.
Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband from spreading lies, and she replied that
Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. They prayed that they be awarded moral and exemplary
damages and litigation fees in the total amount of P100,000.00.[3] The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 226.
For her part, Elvisa also filed a complaint against the spouses Martinez in the MCTC of Tubao for
damages anchored on Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Dean went to the Tubao Credit Cooperative (TCC) office to pick up the dividend certificate of his wife
who was a member of the cooperative. He left the building and walked to his car which was parked
in front.
Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van which was parked in front of the building when
petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged from behind the vehicle and stabbed him on the
left breast. Dean instantly moved backward and saw his assailant.
Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry into the bank. Petitioner ran after him and
upon cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was able to parry the blow with his right hand,
and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to the floor and tried to... stand up, but petitioner
stabbed him anew on his left breast.
Meantime, SPO1 Henry Sulatre was at the Tubao Police Station, about 100 meters away.
He was informed that a fight was going on in the bank. He rushed to the place on board the police
car. He... brought petitioner to the police station. On the way, they passed by the loading area of
tricycles, about 40 meters away from the... police station.
Petitioner shouted: I stabbed him, he is just a visitor so he should not act like a king here in Tubao
SPO1 Sulatre placed Benjamin in jail. Benjamin kept on shouting: "Napatay kon, napatay kon
In the meantime, PO3 Valenzuela brought Dean to the Doña Gregoria Memorial Hospital in Agoo, La
Union. The victim was transferred to the Ilocos Regional Hospital (IRH) in San Fernando, La Union
where Dean was examined and operated. Dean sustained two stab wounds
On February 7, 1999, Dean gave a sworn statement to SPO1 Sulatre. On March 10, 1999, SPO1
Sulatre filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against petitioner in the MCTC. On
September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union indicted Benjamin for frustrated murder
before the Regional Trial Court
Petitioner declared that he merely defended himself against Dean's assault. Dean was so jealous of
him because his mistress, Elvisa, had also been his mistress. Petitioner declared that the criminal
charge against him was Dean's concoction, and intended solely to harass him.
He parked his tricycle in front of the building on the left side of the railing going to the entrance of
the cooperative. On his... way, he met his 82-year-old uncle, who was also on his way to the
cooperative to update his passbook because he was intending to apply for a loan.
Dean thought that he was blocking his way and shouted invectives at him and his uncle. Dean kept
attacking him, forcing him to move backward through the railing and towards his tricycle
He stabbed Dean on his right elbow. He entered the office and stood by the entrance door to see if
Dean would get a weapon. Dean continued hurling invectives at him but was later pacified by
Patricio Alterado, an... employee of the cooperative.
When Barangay Captain... he surrendered, along with his bolo He never boasted on the way to the
police station that he had killed Dean.
Issues:
Petitioner's argument that he should be acquitted because the criminal complaint against him was
not supported by the victim's sworn statement or by an affidavit
Petitioner next argues that should he be convicted of any crime, it should be of less serious physical
injuries only, absence the element of intent to kill.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The surrender must be...
spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledged his guilt or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses that would necessarily be incurred in the search and... capture.
In the case at bar, SPO1 Salutre testified that petitioner did not voluntarily surrender but was
forcibly apprehended by Barangay Captain. We agree with the trial court that the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation has not been adequately shown. To properly appreciate the
same. The trial court awarded Dean the amount of P92,000.00 representing his hospitalization and
medical expenses which was increased by the CA to P92,715.68.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6... prision mayor... to... eclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Principles:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce... it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
The offender performs all the acts of execution;
All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
But the felony is not produced;
By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result
in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission
of the crime.
ISIDORO MONDRAGON, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS: The petitioner, Isidoro Mondragon, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of
the crime of frustrated homicide. After trial the Court of First Instance of Iloilo found him guilty of
the crime of attempted homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of from 4
months and 21 days of arresto mayor to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, with
the accessory penalties of the law and the costs. Mondragon appealed to the Court of Appeals, and
the latter court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in all its parts, with costs.
This case is now before us on a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
No brief for the respondent. The People of the Philippines, was filed by the Solicitor General.
The pertinent portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which embody the findings of fact and
conclusion of said court, is as follows: At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while
complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao,
Iloilo, to drain the water therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout
from afar telling him not to open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same
voice shouted again, "Don't you dare open the dike." When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon
coming towards him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he would
plant the next morning. Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged
the blow.
Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body.
Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm
and between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and
the complainant did not pursue him but went home instead.
ISSUE: Did Court of Appeals err in finding Mondragon guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and
not of the crime of less serious physical injuries.
HELD: There is merit in the contention of the petitioner. We have carefully examined the record, and
We find that the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively
shown.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party is
simply the result of an inference from an answer made by the petitioner while testifying in his own
behalf. Thus in the decision appealed from, it stated: x x x Appellant's intention to kill may be
inferred from his admission made in Court that he would do everything he could to stop Nacionales
from digging the canal because he needed the water.
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the
same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. Supreme Court hold that
the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case do not justify a
finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party.
On the contrary, there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from which indicates that the
petitioner had no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on the offended party
by just giving him fist blows; the wounds inflicted on the offended party were of slight nature,
indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went away
when the offended party started hitting him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the petitioner had
intended to kill the offended party he would have held his ground and kept on hitting the offended
party with his bolo to kill him. The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and
considering that the injuries suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be
healed in less than 30 days, We hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only
that of less serious physical injuries.
The offense of less serious physical injuries, as defined in Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, is
punishable by arresto mayor or imprisonment of from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. The facts as
found by the Court of Appeals do not show any aggravating or mitigating circumstance that may be
considered in the imposition of the penalty on the petitioner. We, therefore, sentence the petitioner
to suffer the penalty of three (3) months and fifteen (15) days of arresto mayor.
People vs. Sy Pio
Facts: Sy Pio shot three people early in the morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian
and Jose Sy.Sy Pio entered the store at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz Manila and started firing with a .45
caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose Sy, Tan asked ―what is the
idea? thereupon, Sy Pio turnedaround and fired at him as well. Tan was shot at his right shoulder
and it passed through his back. He ran to a room behind the store to hide. He was still able to hear
gunshots from Sy Pio‘s pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital where his wound was treated. He
stayed there fromSeptenber 3-12, 1949. He was released upon his request and against physician ‘s
advice and was requested to return for further treatment which he did 5 times in a period of 10
days. His wound was completely healed; he spent P300 for hospital and doctor ‘s fees.
Sy Pio was found by the Constabulary in Tarlac. Lomotan, a police from Manila Police Department
went to Tarlac toget Sy Pio. He admitted to Lomotan that he shot the victims and handed him the
pistol used in the shooting. According to Sy Pio‘s declaration, some months prior to the incident, he
was employed in a restaurant owned by OngPian. Sy Pio‘s wife, Vicenta was also employed by Ong
Pian‘ s partner. When he tried to borrow money from Ong Pian fpr his wife ‘s sick father, Ong Pian
only lent him P1. his wife was able to borrow P20 from her employer.
Afterwards, defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work. Ong Pian presented a list of Sy Pio‘s
debts and thesewere deducted from his wife‘s monthly salary. Sy Pio could not remember incurring
such debts. As such, he wasresentful of Ong Pian‘s conduct.In Tan Siong Kiap‘s case, a few months
before Sept3, Sy Pio was able to realize the sum of P70 and he put hismoney in a place in his room.
The next day, Sy Pio found that his money was gone. Tan tolf Sy Pio that he hadprobably given the
money to his wife.
Thereafter, Sy Pio could hear that he had lost his money gambling. ASo early inthe morning of Sept
3, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman who has a pistol was away, he got his pistol and went to arestaurant
in Ongpin where Ong Pian worked and shot him. Afterwards he went to Sta Cruz and shot Jose Sy
and Tan.
Issues:
Trial court erred in not finding that Tan received the shot accidentally from the same bullet that had
beenfired at Jose Sy.


The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Lower court erred in sentencing him to pay an indemnity of P350.Defendant-appellant
should only be found guilty of less serious physical injuries instead of frustrated murder.
Held:1. Sy Pio had to turn around to shoot Tan Siong Kiap.
2. There is sufficient proof. (Uncontradicted testimony of the victim, admissions made to
Lomotan, testimony ofphysician, etc.)
3. Assignment of error must be dismissed. Offended party spent P300 for the hospital fees.4. The
fact that he was able to escape which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind
of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. The
defendant appellant knew that he had not actually performed all acts of execution necessary to kill
his victim. Under thesecircumstances, it cannot be said that the subjective phase of the acts of
execution had been completed
4. Robbery
PEOPLE VS. DIO G.R. No. L-36461. June 29, 1984|||
FACTS:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed on October 1, 1971, against Danilo
Tobias and a John Doe. The order to arrest Tobias was returned unserved and he is still on
the "Wanted Persons Files."On December 7, 1971, the information was amended to name
Hernando Dio as the John Doe, the appellant herein.
At about noontime, Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer by profession working at the Sugar
Construction Company, with a salary of more than P500.00 amonth, went to the
Southeastern College, Pasay Cityto fetch his girlfriend, Remedies Maniti, a third year high
school student
They proceeded to the Pasay City Public Market. Asthey were going up the stairs leading to
the Teresaand Sons Restaurant, Remedios suddenly heard the dropping of her folders and
other things, being carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she saw a man (Danilo
Tobias) twisting the neck of Crispulo, while the appellant (Hernando Dio) was holding his
(Crispulo's) two hands
The robbers tried to divest Crispulo of his 'Seiko ‘wrist watch, but Crispulo resisted their
attempt and fought the robbers which caused Danilo Tobias to stab him on the left side of
his chest. The victim ran down the stairs but when they reached Pasay Commercial Bank,
Crispulo Alega fell down and expired. At the time of his death, the ‘Seiko' watch was still
strapped to his wrist.
The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he should not have been convicted
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not
consummated. He states that there was only an attempted robbery.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime of robbery was not consummated
RULING:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the evidence adduced show that the
appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal venture of divesting the
victim of his wristwatch so as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery. The
evidence adduced show that the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their
criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the
consummated crime of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier, when the victim expired,
the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his wrist. The killing of Crispulo Alega
may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the
robbery, which however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the
deceased.
PEOPLE v. BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, GR No. 86163, 1990-04-26
Facts:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, conspiring and confederating among themselves, working
together and helping one another, armed with guns and... handgrenade and with the use of violence
or intimidation employed on the person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimia Choco and Rodita
Hablero, did then and there... wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with intent of
gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz
wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued at
P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robber
Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla
likewise suffered serious physical injuries... aggravating circumstances of band, and illegal possession
of firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two
(2) Men's... wrist watches, two (2) Lady's wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live
granade were recovered from the accused
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber
yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the
accused using a loud speaker... and appealed to them to surrender with the assurance that no harm
would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused
refused to surrender or to release the hostages.
Finally, the... police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the
place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo
and Reynaldo Canasares
Issues: The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and in not
holding that the same was merely attempted.
The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender."
Ruling: "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking. In other words, the crime of robbery/theft
has three consecutive... stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or
asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted" (Memorandum for
Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused cannot
be considered in their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the
following... requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender was
voluntary (People vs. Ganamo, G. R. No. L 62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were,
indeed, asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they refused until only much
later when they could no longer do... otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was
held not to be mitigating as when he gave up only after he was... surrounded by the constabulary
and police forces.
Case Digest: People vs. Campuhan G.R. No. 129433, March 20, 2000
FACTS:
On April 25,1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went
down from the second floor of their house to prepare chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At
the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, the accused who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of
Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of
her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants"
and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
As seen by Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised
by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury
was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was
only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of consummated statutory rape.
RULING:
No. Accused is guilty of attempted rape and be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years
4 months and 10 days of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape
— are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant; G.R.
No. L-14128 December 10, 1918
FACTS:
The house Mrs. Lewis was seen to have smoke issuing from its lower floor by their neighbor Mrs.
Auckback. Mrs. Lewin ordered her servant Paulino Banal to look for the source, a piece of a jute sack
and a rag were burning between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol. At that moment
the defendant Severino Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning while the other
defendant is cleaning the horses. On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the
defendants, having been called for the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest,
according to the statement, drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen that
it was he who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the date
mentioned. and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on
previous days. That he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo
Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters. That he acted as he did
under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he should start.
Defendant Hugo Labarro was dismissed due to lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has committed the crime of frustrated arson?
HELD: Yes. The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed
beside an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion
when some of its inmates were inside of it. The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch
as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless.,
owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The
offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited
house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the
piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the
partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with the
commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in degree
to that specified in article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium degree.