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“Robust knowledge requires both consensus and disagreement.” Discuss this claim with
reference to two areas of knowledge.
Peter Drucker proclaimed that “knowledge has to be improved, challenged, and increased
constantly, or it vanishes” (Kotlarsky et. al xi). Drucker’s claim suggests that knowledge must
always be evolving or refined, and in relation to the title, eliminates the possibility of knowledge
forming a consensus, thus rejecting the idea of robust knowledge. I disagree with his statement. In
this essay, I will explore Drucker’s claim, arguing that consensus and disagreement are prerequisites
for robust knowledge. When examining the title, an assumption will be made that for knowledge to
be robust, consensus and disagreement do not need to coexist.
The first knowledge question (KQ) that will be discussed is: how do consensus and disagreement
differ in the natural sciences and human sciences?
The paragon of robust knowledge requiring both consensus and disagreement can be exemplified by
the scientific method in the natural sciences. Understanding the scientific method provides insight
as to why consensus and disagreement are needed. The five steps of the scientific method include
initial observation; hypothesis formulation; experiment; law discovery; and theory. The preliminary
stage is formulating a hypothesis which can be done by observing and classifying data, or as Karl
Popper advocated, by “imaginative conjecture” (Calver). Given that one can formulate a hypothesis
based on their own imagination, this necessitates and justifies the need for a rigorous methodology
to be employed in the natural sciences. A hypothesis is then followed by experiments, which has the
distinct features of manipulation and control. Scientific laws are then discovered if the hypothesis
holds true, and if it can be supported by further research becomes a theory. Consensus would refer
to other scientists replicating the same results of an experiment, funnelling further research, while
disagreement would refer to its falsification.
The example of the ether illustrates the importance and need of the scientific method. The concept
first surfaced in Isaac Newton’s 1704 Opticks, which soon became commonly accepted, primarily
due to no rivalling theories. However, in 1887 the Michelson-Morley experiment was able to
produce a “null result”, in what may be considered “one of the grandest generalizations in modern
science” (Moyer 136). This example illustrates the importance of methodology, without which, the
concept in which Newton had erred may still be relevant today. Without the demanding procedures
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of the scientific method, the robust knowledge of Albert Einstein’s theory of special relativity may
not have been engendered.
Similarly, the pseudoscience belief of homeopathy that claims to be an effective medical practice
whereby drugs diluted in water cure diseases, is completely unsubstantiated. Incidentally, Samuel
Hahnemann’s homeopathy has recently been denounced by the UK National Health Service as “a
placebo and a misuse of scarce NHS funds which could be better devoted to treatments that
work” (Donnelly). The lack of scientific proof combined with the lack of replicable demonstrations
of experiments fuel scientists to denounce homeopathy as quackery. Incredibly, the Australian
National Health and Medical Research Council were only able to find “225 from 1800 studies
rigorous enough to analyze”, concluding that “no good quality evidence [existed] to support that
homeopathy was effective” (Blakemore). Should it not have been banned in the UK, the glaring
implication is that it would deny patients from receiving proper medical treatment, thus being
administered unethically.
The two examples outline that in the natural sciences, consensus and disagreement are required, so
as to ensure knowledge produced is valid and credible (robust).
Contrastingly the human sciences is a lucid example in which “robust knowledge requires
consensus, but not necessarily disagreement”. Here, a focus will be drawn on economics. Unlike
scientists, economists may not have the luxury of manipulating variables. Often theories or models
are developed based on real-life events, for example, John Maynard Keynes’ theory that
government spending would increase aggregate demand. Economists cannot simply manipulate
government spending, as restitutio in integrum would be impossible - money spent would be
irrevocable and so would the resulting social changes. Another difficulty is when a phenomenon is
occurring in real time. In the case of Keynes, Keynesian economics was being developed during the
Great Depression. Therefore, economists are not discovering a law or proving a theory but instead
identifying the phenomenon’s conditionality. Due to conditionality, consensus and disagreement are
transient and temporal, e.g. Keynesian economics first became a household concept after WW2,
even receiving President Nixon’s support. However, monetarism emerged as a dominant theory
during the 1970s, with Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (appointed by President Carter)
used to end stagflation. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher used monetarism to reduce inflation “to 4.6%
by 1983 from 10.7% in 1979” (Crump). But soon thereafter, Keynesian economics was revitalised
by President Reagan, and subsequently by George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump. Keynes’ example
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illustrates how “that which is accepted as knowledge today can be discarded tomorrow” (“May
2014”). As such, the human sciences are prone to more vacillation and construal, while, the
structured methodical approach of the scientific method - based on deductive reasoning - is more
rigid. The temporal quality of knowledge in the human sciences shows how consensuses and
disagreements are reached differently between the two areas of knowledge (AOKs). Despite this,
the integrity of robust knowledge is still upheld.
A glaring problem that arises, however, is that if evidence is not needed for a theory, even priori
assertions, or premonitions could form the basis of a theory. As a result, this would lead to a
saturation of unqualified and invalid theories. For example, Eugene Farma’s efficient-market
hypothesis. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, assured the public that “he sees
no national bubble in home prices, but rather ‘froth' in some local markets” (Henderson). Farma’s
example demonstrates the dangers of promoting unproven theories. Given Farma’s authoritative
position as Chairman, the public would no doubt be confident about the housing market. Naturally,
there would be unwavering sentiment between creditor and debtors over subprime mortgages. But,
the hypothesis was falsified by the 2008 financial crisis and by Hyman Minsky’s financial
instability hypothesis.
Subsequently, having established that robust knowledge differs between AOKs, we can derive a
second KQ: whether all robust knowledge provides value?
Within the natural sciences, the theory of plate tectonics is a prime example of robust knowledge
that is valuable. The theory of “continental displacement, later called continental drift” was first
proposed by Alfred Wegener in 1912 (Yount). The theory was criticised by Harold Jeffreys who
claimed that “no force was adequate to move continental slabs over the surface of the globe” and by
Charles Schuchert who asserted it was “incompatible with uniformitarianism” (Lewis 159; Oreskes
178). Following Tuzo Wilson’s 1965 publication, plate tectonics is now widely understood to be the
movement of plates in the Earth’s lithosphere and has since contributed monumentally in
biogeography. Wegener’s plate tectonics evinces how a theory, subject to prolonged and deliberate
critique by Jeffreys and Schuchert, can produce accurate knowledge.
Using the same parameters for “robust knowledge” and applying them to an ongoing phenomenon
such as the sixth extinction, it would prima facie disqualify the Sixth extinction as a form of robust
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knowledge. As it is an ongoing phenomenon, it would be difficult to produce disagreements. As
mentioned previously, the human sciences are concerned with identifying the phenomenon’s
conditionality. However, we can distinguish the current case. Given that we have chronicled five
previous mass extinctions, we can extrapolate results to make informed predictions and algorithms
about the Sixth extinction. Therefore, I urge that the Sixth extinction shall be considered a form of
robust knowledge. As an ongoing phenomenon, its value is that it forces us to recognise “we are all
responsible, and that we have to become stewards of nature”, so to adapt our behaviour to the
changing environment (Hance). Therefore, it is eminently clear due to the rigorous methodologies
and selectiveness needed for one to qualify as robust knowledge, all robust knowledge provides
value.
Within the examples given, there is a recurring issue of robust knowledge requiring consensus and
agreement, to ensure that it is robust - and equally important is for it to be coherent. The example of
homeopathic treatment evidences unorthodox knowledge being produced to no avail. There is a
clear and urgent need for knowledge to be robust, and one possible way to achieve this may be to
rely on a set of precedent. In developing new laws or theories, the producer shall rely on existing
laws and theories by either distinguishing it or otherwise be bound by it. For example, in the human
sciences, it may be more likely for laws and theories to be distinguished due to conditionality.
Contrastingly, in the human sciences, laws, and theories will be binding. As such, the scientific
method would be used more so as an instrument for refinement, establishing consistency. This
proposed method would still adhere to disagreement (to distinguish) and consensus (to be bound)
while promoting coherence.
Responding to Drucker’s statement, I posit that there is not an active need to - forcefully and
intentionally - seek improvements or challenges to knowledge. However, for knowledge to qualify
as robust, there must have been attempts to falsify or disprove it, during the course of its production.
Improvements or challenges should be subject to sociocultural changes, which would create a
healthy balance between the influx of new knowledge and refinement of existing knowledge. In
doing so, the legitimacy of knowledge is ensured and any inaccuracies would be eliminated. A
shortcoming of Drucker’s statement is that disagreement may arise for the sake of disagreement.
For example, the US supplement industry, which in 2012 had an “estimated 50,000 supplement
products” (Christensen). There is no conceivable way where one can navigate through all the
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choices. The saturation of supplements in the market makes it difficult to determine which products
are safe, from those created just for pharmaceutical profitability.
Word count: 1597
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Works Cited:
Blakemore, Erin. “1,800 Studies Later, Scientists Conclude Homeopathy Doesn’t Work.”
Smithsonian, 11 Mar. 2015. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/1800-studieslater-scientists-conclude-homeopathy-doesnt-work-180954534/. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
Calver, Neil. “Sir Peter Medawar: science, creativity and the popularization of Karl Popper.” Notes
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rsnr.2013.0022. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
Christensen, Jen. “Americans take fewer multivitamins but more vitamin D, omega-3s.” CNN, 11
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Crump, Richard. “Britain’s economy transformed under Thatcher.” Financial Director, 11 Apr.
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Donnelly, Laura . “NHS to ban homeopathy and herbal medicine, as 'misuse of resources'.” The
Telegraph, 21 July 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/21/nhs-banhomeopathy-herbal-medicine-misuse-resources/
Hance, Jeremy. “How humans are driving the sixth mass extinction.” The Guardian, 20 Oct. 2015.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2015/oct/20/the-fourhorsemen-of-the-sixth-mass-extinction. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
Henderson, Nell . “Bernanke: There's No Housing Bubble to Go Bust.” Washington Post, 27 Oct.
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Kotlarsky, Julia, et al. Knowledge processes in globally distributed contexts. Palgrave Macmillan,
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Lewis, Cherry. The Dating Game: One Man's Search for the Age of the Earth. Cambridge
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“May 2014 Theory of knowledge prescribed titles.” International Baccalaureate.
Moyer, Albert E. American physics in transition: A history of conceptual change in the late
nineteenth century. Tomash Publishers, 1986.
Oreskes, Naomi. The rejection of continental drift: theory and method in American earth science.
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Yount, Lisa. Alfred Wegener: creator of the continental drift theory. Chelsea House, 2009.