PS 436
Tuesday, August 18, 2020
9:29 AM
WEEK 1: Why Cooperate?
*The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics*
I. Introduction
a. The question is: if international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state o
Lockean civil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in other
i. First, what circumstances favor the emergence of cooperation under anarchy
of a central authority to guarantee adherence to agreements, what features
encourage or permit states to bind themselves to mutually beneficial courses
features of situations preclude cooperation? Second, what strategies can stat
foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances they conf
Governments need not necessarily accept circumstances as given. To what ex
situational impediments to cooperation subject to willful modification? Throu
order strategies can states create the preconditions for cooperation?
II. Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences
a. Mutual cooperation (CC), mutual defection (DD), unilateral defection (DC), unrequi
(CD); the argument proceeds in three stages: (1) how does payoff structure affect t
of cooperation, (2) how does payoff structure affect the likelihood and robustness
& (3) through what strategies can states increase the long-term prospects for coop
altering payoff structures.
i. For a mutual benefit to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to m
(DD). For coordination to be necessary to the realization of the mutual benef
prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). These prefer
are consistent with the familiar games of Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and
these cases, the capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy, to bind them
mutually beneficial courses of action without resort to any ultimate central a
to the realization of a common good; Cooperation will be less likely in Prisone
than in Stag Hunt or Chicken;
1) Prisoner's Dilemma: If neither prisoner squeals, both will draw a light s
minor charge (CC). If one prisoner squeals and the other stonewalls, th
(DC) and the sucker will draw a very heavy sentence (CD). If both squea
a moderate sentence (DD) [DC > CC > DD > CD]. The temptation of rat p
towards mutual defection and, with both acting on this, will lead to bot
moderate sentence on the major charge and, with cooperation, leading
sentence on the minor charge. In single play prisoner's dilemma, individ
actions produce a collectively suboptimal outcome.
of nature and a
rs?
y? Given the lack
of situations
s of action? What
tes adopt to
front?
xtent are
ugh what higher
ited cooperation
the significance
of cooperation,
peration by
mutual defection
fit, actors must
rence ordering
d Chicken. In
mselves to
authority, is vital
er's Dilemma
sentence on the
he rat will go free
al, both will draw
payoff will drive
th getting a
g to a light
dually rational
a moderate sentence (DD) [DC > CC > DD > CD]. The temptation of rat p
towards mutual defection and, with both acting on this, will lead to bot
moderate sentence on the major charge and, with cooperation, leading
sentence on the minor charge. In single play prisoner's dilemma, individ
actions produce a collectively suboptimal outcome.
2) Stag Hunt: A group of hunters surround a stag. If all cooperate to trap t
eat (CC). If one person defects to chase a passing rabbit, the stag will es
defector will eat lightly (DC) and none of the others will eat at all (CD).
rabbits, all will have some chance of catching a rabbit and eating lightly
DD > CD]. The mutual interest in plentiful venison (CC) relative to all ot
militates strongly against defection. However, because a rabbit in the h
better than a stag on a bush (CD), cooperation will be assured only if ea
believes that all hunters will cooperate. In single play Stag Hunt, the tem
defect to protect against the defection of others is balanced by the stro
preference for stag over rabbit.
Lecture - 8/18/20
I. International Cooperation in International Relations
a. Cooperation in International Relations
i. What is cooperation?
1) Occurs when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one
relative to the status quo, without making others worse off
ii. Cooperation among states is difficult - Why?
1) States are sovereign
2) States exist in perpetual anarchy
a) The absence of a centralized supranational authority may impede
attain common goals
b. Understanding Cooperation - The "isms" Approach
i. Large debate in international relations from 1970s - early 1990s involved the
ii. Each approach sought to explain the international system
iii. Each approach is defined by assumptions regarding the interests and interact
and the importance of international institutions
c. International Cooperation: Realism
i. Two key assumptions:
1) States are dominant actors
2) International system is characterized by anarchy (absence of a central a
the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors)
ii. Given all these assumptions:
1) States are first and foremost concerned about their own survival and se
2) States are interested in acquiring power, primarily military capabilities
3) States are concerned with the relative power gains of other states
a) Power exists in a zero-sum game
payoff will drive
th getting a
g to a light
dually rational
the stag, all will
scape and the
If all chase
y (DD) [CC > DC >
ther outcomes
hand (DC) is
ach hunter
mptation to
ong universal
actor better off
e the ability to
"isms"
tion of actors,
authority with
ecurity
d.
e.
f.
g.
the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors)
ii. Given all these assumptions:
1) States are first and foremost concerned about their own survival and se
2) States are interested in acquiring power, primarily military capabilities
3) States are concerned with the relative power gains of other states
a) Power exists in a zero-sum game
4) Cooperation is rare
5) International institutions are weak
International Cooperation: Liberalism
i. Key assumptions:
1) There are many different types of actors in the world (individuals, firms
states)
2) Actors have numerous preferences, interests, and goals
ii. Given these assumptions:
1) Cooperation is likely
2) States care about absolute gains
3) International institutions facilitate cooperation
International Cooperation: Constructivism
i. Key Assumptions
1) Interests are not innate but are constructed through social interaction
2) The way states define interests is shaped by their social environment
ii. Given these assumptions:
1) Social actors pursue what they believe is right and proper
2) Neither interactions nor institutions are fixed
3) Example: "anarchy is what states make of it"
Problems with using "isms" to Analyze International Cooperation
i. Each emphasizes particular actors and interests at the expense of others
ii. More fruitful to combine approaches
iii. "isms" are often viewed more as approaches or schools of thought in interna
debates over superiority of a single "ism" are largely over
Mitigating Anarchy: The Conditions for Cooperation in International Relations
i. What circumstances favor the emergence of cooperation under anarchy?
ii. What strategies can states adopt to foster the emergence of cooperation?
Lecture - 8/25/20
I. Design of International Organizations
a. Difficult Cooperation…
i. Broad IR paradigms explore whether states will cooperate with one another;
that cooperation is unlikely b/c states are too concerned about relative gains
gains of cooperation will be distributed amongst states; liberalism argues tha
common b/c states seek to have maximum gains and states can benefit from
ecurity
s, NGOs, and
ational politics,
realism argues
s and how the
at cooperation is
m cooperation;
I. Design of International Organizations
a. Difficult Cooperation…
i. Broad IR paradigms explore whether states will cooperate with one another;
that cooperation is unlikely b/c states are too concerned about relative gains
gains of cooperation will be distributed amongst states; liberalism argues tha
common b/c states seek to have maximum gains and states can benefit from
constructivists say cooperation is likely because once states begin to crave co
interaction with one another their environment changes and so do their idea
cooperation
ii. But, if cooperation is possible, why is it not always obtained?; there are facto
cooperation difficult (distribution: distribution of benefits will not be evenly d
enforcement; large numbers of states can have issues with cooperation beca
collective gains; uncertainty: not being able to observe the actions of other st
significant obstacle to cooperation)
iii. Institutions often solve problems of cooperation
1) States design institutions to promote cooperation and make it more re
b. Rational Design
i. States and other institutional actors design international institutions purpose
their joint interests
ii. States and other actors debate institutional design b/c they recognize that it
outcomes
c. Institutional Differences: Membership
i. Who belongs to the organization?
1) Inclusive (UN) or restrictive (NATO)
2) Regional (EU, ASEAN) or universal (UN)
3) States, NGOS, institutes, companies, etc.
d. Institutional Differences: Scope
i. What issues are covered?
1) Wide or narrow set of issues?
2) Issue linkage?
ii. Sometimes scope is not open to design choice
e. Institutional Differences: Centralization
i. Are some important institutional tasks performed by a single focal entity or n
ii. Organizations may choose to centralize (or not), in order to:
1) Disseminate information
2) Enhance enforcement
f. Institutional Differences: Control
i. How will collective decisions be made?
ii. Voting arrangements: equal votes for all members, minority veto power
iii. Organizational financing: how is the organization funded? Does this influence
iv. Difference from centralization - changes in voting rules do not effect level of
g. Institutional Differences: Flexibility
i. How will institutional rules and procedures accommodate new circumstances
ii. Institutions confront unanticipated shocks or face new demands from domes
does the organization allow for flexibility to meet these demands?
realism argues
s and how the
at cooperation is
m cooperation;
ooperative
as about
ors that make
distributed;
ause of the
tates can be a
esilient
efully to advance
influences
not?
e voting power?
centralization
s?
stic coalitions -
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
iii. Organizational financing: how is the organization funded? Does this influence
iv. Difference from centralization - changes in voting rules do not effect level of
Institutional Differences: Flexibility
i. How will institutional rules and procedures accommodate new circumstances
ii. Institutions confront unanticipated shocks or face new demands from domes
does the organization allow for flexibility to meet these demands?
1) Adaptive flexibility - allows members to respond to unanticipated shoc
domestic circumstances while preserving institutional arrangement (es
2) Transformative flexibility - built-in institutional arrangements permittin
or sunset provisions
Explaining Design: Distribution Problems
i. When more than one cooperative agreement is possible, actors may face a d
problem
ii. Magnitude of distribution problem depends on the intensity of preferred alte
iii. Example: tragedy of the commons
Explaining Design: Enforcement Problems
i. Strength of individual actors' incentives to cheat on a given agreement or set
Prisoners' Dilemma Problem
ii. Problem arises when actors find unilateral noncooperation so tempting that
long-term cooperation for short-term defection
iii. Variation across issues
1) Enforcement problems exist when incentives to defect are high, often w
interactions less frequent (human rights, environment)
Explaining Design: Number of Actors
i. Refers to the actors that are potentially relevant to the issue at hand b/c thei
others to others' actions affect them
ii. Different from membership: the actors involved in an issue are not always th
who become members of the final institution
Explaining Design: Uncertainty
i. The extent to which actors are not fully informed about others' behavior, the
world, and/or others' preferences
ii. Uncertainty about behavior
1) States are unsure about the actions taken by other states
iii. Uncertainty about the state of the world
1) States are unsure about the consequences of their own actions, the act
states, or the actions of Ios
iv. Uncertainty about preferences
1) States are unsure what other states want/prefer
Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal (2001)
i. Ask: How can we explain the IO design choices made by states?
1) Different problems (distribution, enforcement, number of actors, unce
different outcomes (membership, scope, centralization, control, flexibi
2) How do political scientists answer these types of questions?
e voting power?
centralization
s?
stic coalitions -
cks or special
scape clauses)
ng renegotiation
distribution
ernatives
t of rules they sacrifice
when
ir actions affect
he same as those
e state of the
tions of other
ertainty) lead to
ility)
l. Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal (2001)
i. Ask: How can we explain the IO design choices made by states?
1) Different problems (distribution, enforcement, number of actors, unce
different outcomes (membership, scope, centralization, control, flexibi
2) How do political scientists answer these types of questions?
ertainty) lead to
ility)