-1DOCTRINE:
Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the
title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known
as the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which
a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost.
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI
G.R. No. 205487. November 12, 2014
FACTS:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Suzuki, a Japanese
national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and
a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by
Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa
(SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, the parties agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00
from ₱3,000,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a BPI Check
No. 83349 for ₱100,000.00 as reservation fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki
issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for
₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price.
Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26,
2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
1
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the
renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver
the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. Suzuki
learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland
Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice
President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase
price of both the unit and parking lot. The annotation of mortgage in favor of
Orion, was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T.
No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
properties remained in possession of Perez.
Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated September
8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then
demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, (through Perez), however, refused
to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as
its reason.
RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s.
CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
2
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit. Hence, Orion then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
In his Comment, Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was
belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption of
conjugal ownership. Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a purchaser in
good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Korean Law prevail on the conveyance of the
condominium unit and parking slot.
HELD:
The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Philippine Law governs
the transfer of real property
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables
are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there. Thus, all matters concerning the
title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be
gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent,
3
alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances. This principle even governs the
capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no
matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the Lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as
the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the
conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law,
provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was
properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24
4
of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun
Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words,
the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married
to Hyun Sook Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those
cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the
name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community
properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
-2-
DOCTRINE:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (Art 2, NCC)
5
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.
G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos
P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation known
as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of
Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of
herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads: "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E.
Marcos". The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476
was published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the abovequoted addendum.
6
On 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476,
as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for
disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.Memorandum Order
No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some
areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No.
99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the
areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan,
from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
(3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of
the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting
the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was
an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling.
The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or
7
inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was
done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could
not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment.
Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced
Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when
President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar
General stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no
authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version
of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching
on the field of the legislature. Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated
24 January 2007.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January
2007.
CA
granted
MSS-PVAO’s
Petition.
Both
NMSMI and
WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for
Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
8
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots
were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the
ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included
in the publication of the said law
HELD:
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western
Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that
the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when
he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and
disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article
2 of the Civil Code. Under said provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the
law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada
v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
9
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette
but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because
it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that
a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it
but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that
such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
10
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy
or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of
the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn.
11
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely
on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative
Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in
the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not
only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently,
there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The
courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where
gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would
amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby
12
LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
-3DOCTRINE:
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (Art. 14,
NCC)
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM vs.ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July
19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
13
Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount of 250 Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent.
Respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof, respondent
14
was arraigned. Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu
issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 of
the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash
of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that
since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and
obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot
be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A.
9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support to his child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which
15
mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law.
HELD:
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. It cannot be
gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.
16
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.
The Court likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support
their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would
still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA
v. American Realty Corporation. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single
cause of action.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
17
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February
19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.
-4-
DOCTRINE:
All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in
the Constitution.
18
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA vs. MA.
JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG,
ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ,
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign corporation established
and existing under the Royal Decree in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil
J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). Respondents were
recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the
accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. After undergoing trainings, respondents became Permanent
Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts and
continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from
service on various dates in 2006 allegedly because the termination was
made solely because they were pregnant.
Respondents allege that they had gone through the necessary
procedures to process their maternity leaves its management in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required
respondents to file their resignation letters. Saudia anchored its disapproval
and its demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for
19
Female Cabin Attendants" where the employment of a Flight Attendant who
becomes pregnant is rendered void.
Respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal
dismissal. The case was initially assigned to the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all the
determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the
Complaint
ought
conveniens. The
to
be
Executive
dismissed
Labor
on the
Arbiter
ground
of forum
dismissed
non
respondents'
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction/merit. On respondents' appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division reversed the ruling of Executive
Labor Arbiter.
NLRC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. CA denied
petitioners'
Rule
65
Petition.
CA
denied
petitioners'
Motion
for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Appeal was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission may exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply
Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute.
HELD:
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic
validity of contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts . . . shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed"(i.e., lex loci
celebrationis). In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling
20
conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive content of
contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged: (1) lex loci
contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the
law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law
intended by the parties.
Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the
present dispute is lex loci intentionis. In this jurisdiction, this court manifested
preference for allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract that Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic
rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the
law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear
a substantive relationship to the transaction. On the matter of pleading forum
non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not
only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such
at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
The Court deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence
that a defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating
in the Philippine jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such danger
is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in
another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda
J. Betia is not solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and
second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and
21
exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi
Arabian
Airlines
is
ordered
to
pay
respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective
dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the
finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at
the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction
of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total
judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed
computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi
Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
22
-5-
DOCTRINE:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.cha
nrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen
and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
23
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace
Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the
marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner.
HELD:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce
decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign
24
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian
divorce
decree contains
a
restriction that
reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no
basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties’ marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
25
-6-
DOCTRINE:
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be
applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to validate as
constitutional an unconstitutional act.
MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights and interests
under him vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a
Caloocan
property
known
as
the Pangarap
Village
located
at
Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The lot that petitioner presently occupies
is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned. On
14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 293
which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open
for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association,
Inc. (MHAI).
On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio
M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built
houses there. On the other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the
members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village. The Supreme
26
Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact,
Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of
Justice and the National Treasurer which declared P.D. 293 as
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts om January 29, 1988. As a
consequence, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional
and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to
cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in
intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and
declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition
and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc.
to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and
efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing
any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. Sometime in 1995,
petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio
M. Juan in his favor. As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several
oral demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written
demand letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded
until
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mirallosa can avail the Operative Fact Doctrine.
HELD:
Mirallosa merly anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit
issued by Juan in 1995 after the Tuason was promulgated. At the time he
built the structures on the premises, he ought to have been aware of the
binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of
27
PD 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the
operation fact doctrine. The Operative Fact Doctrine is a rule in equity. As
such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional law produces no effect. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
relied on the invalid law, but it can never invoke to validate as
constitutional an unconstitutional act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190 are AFFIRMED.
-7-
DOCTRINE:
Presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or
legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence.
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M.
ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN vs. MELQUIADES
D. AZCUNA, JR.,
G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013
FACTS:
PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is
engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. PETAL built some cottages on
Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of
28
livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and
Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued
Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a
building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of the
Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas
Island. On July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a
Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of any
entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and
(b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the
premises, except if authorized by the local government. On July 12, 2002,
Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at
the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it
to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Petitioners filed an action
praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and damages against
respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize
Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject
ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted without public
consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province as required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it
29
was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be
enjoined.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against
them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island,
which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public
domain.
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void. On appeal, the CA
held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP
to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance
with Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its
powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.
HELD:
Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been taken by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law
and therefore valid.
It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a
public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject
30
ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject
ordinance was made.
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence
thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September
30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
-8-
DOCTRINE:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise
of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself
and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason
and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
31
To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or equitable to the
present or future enjoyment of property.
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.
QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO
G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They had
no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said
marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against
Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal
separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already
of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is
the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however,
Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be
forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the
FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
32
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that
the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous
decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to
its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE:
1. W hether or not Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
communit y or Art 129on dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains is applicable in this case.
2. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e o f f e n d i n g s p o u s e a c q u i r e d ve s t e d
r i g h t s o ve r ½ o f t h e properties in the conjugal partnership.
3. Whether or not the computation of “net profits” earned in the
conjugal partnership ofgains the same with the computation of
“net profits” earned in the absolute community
HELD:
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case
since the parties’ property relation is governed by the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation
of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence
33
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same
applies in the instant ase and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
63(2) of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
-9DOCTRINE:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
34
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Luna married Eugenia but they eventually agreed to live apart
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. Atty.
Luna later obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia fr om
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic and on the
same date, contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad.
Thereafter, Atty. Luna and Soledad returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named:
LUPSICON where he was the managing partner. LUPSICON through
Atty. Luna purchased a condominium unit bearing the following names :
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime
in
1992,
LUPSICON
was
dissolved
and
the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still
registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that
the interest of Atty. Luna over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share. Atty. Luna thereafter established and headed another law firm
with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz and used a portion of the office
35
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death
of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty. Luna’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz.
Soledad filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna with the
RTC alleging that the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment were acquired during the existence of her marriage with Atty.
Luna through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of
Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled that the condominium was acquired by Juan Lucas
Luna through his sole industry and plaintiff has no right as owner or
under any other concept over the condominium unit. Plaintiff was
declared to be the owner of the law books.
The CA denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband
acquired during the second marriage. It held that EUGENIA, the first
wife, was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna until the latter’s death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
36
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in
our jurisdiction. MR was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage.
2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and
the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
HELD:
1. The SC held that the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case
by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the
death
of
Atty.
Luna
on
July
12,
1997
terminated
their
marriage. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce,
even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage
37
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997.
2. Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property
regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any
marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of
the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia
did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gain s.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
38
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning
the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void;
properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
The petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
discharge her burden of proof.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
-10DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by
the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given
only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by
the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
39
When a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a
court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter
in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the
case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over
the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD,
vs. MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Nippon entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
(ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing
in
the
Philippines,
wherein
respondent
was
to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year and he was assigned as
project manager of the STAR Project of the PH Government. Nearly a year
later,
Hasegawa,
the
general
manager
of
Nippon, informed respondent that his ICA will no longer be renewed. After
failed negotiations, he filed this complaint. The petitioners moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the ICA had been
perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals. The
RTC denied the MTD, and affirmed by the CA.
40
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Lipa City has jurisdiction for contracts
executed by and between two foreign nationals in foreign country wholly
written in a foreign language.
HELD:
In the judicial resolution of conflict problems, 3 consecutive phases are
involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two different concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
a constitutional authority to apply forum law.
The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice of law rules as raised
by the petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for. The petitioner
prematurely invoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between
the laws of Japan and the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises
on certiorari is DENIED.
considered,
41
the
petition
for
review