Essay Writing for Competitive Examinations
All types ,CSS, PCS, etc
By
Agha Humayun Amin
ISBN-13: 978-1497516892
ISBN-10: 1497516897
About the author
A.H Amin studied at Saint Marys Academy
Lalazar and Forman Christian College Lahore
and at Pakistan Military Academy Kakul.
He was commissioned in 11 Cavalry (FF)
earlier known as PAVO Cavalry on 17 March
1983.
Served in various command , staff and
instructional appointments in the army , finally
commanding an independent tank squadron
and retiring from the army on 05 March 1994.
His writings were published in Pakistan Armys
leading institutional journals , notably Pakistan
Army Journal and Command and Staff College
Quettas Citadel Journal.
He also authored three major tactical
publications “ Tactical Handling of Recce Troop
“ (1986) , “ Tactical Handling of Recce Support
Group” *(1989 and the “ The RFS Concept “
(1990).
His recommendations regarding creation of
army command groups as published as an
article in 1998 were accepted by the Pakistan
Army in 2007 when army commands were
created.
His books are essential reading in more than
200 leading libraries of the world including
Library of Congress USA , Combined Arms
Research Library of US Army Command and
General Staff College ,Fort Leavenworth which
is worlds largest military library ,US Army War
College Carlisle Library,Defence Intelligence
Agency Library of USA , Columbi University
Library , US Armor School Fort Knox
Library,LUMS Library etc.
He wrote extensively for various journals and
newspapers and also served as Assistant Editor
Defence Journal , Executive Editor Globe,
Founding Editor Journal of Afghanistan
Studies and presently as Editor in Chief for
“Intelligence Review”.
He also actively worked as an associate of two
leading think tanks www.orbat.com of Ravi
Rikhye and as Fellow of Alexandrian Defense
Group ,USA.
Major Agha H Amin has been invited to lecture
and present papers at various institutions
including US Army Centre of Military History
etc .
He headed Afghan Toll and Transoxiana two
consulting firms which played keyrole in
various Asian Bank and World Bank electric
transmission line studies, notably CASA
1000,Uzbekistan Afghanistan Pakistan line and
Turkmenistan-Shibirgan –Mazar Sharif line.
List of Publications and writings
Books
•
•
•
Development of Taliban Factions in
Afghanistan and Pakistan-Co authored
with Prof. Dr. Andre deGeorges and
Colonel David Osinski
Pakistan's Military Failures -1947 to 2014
Tank Battles around Chawinda-Comedy
of higher Command Errors
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How the English East India Company
Conquered India
Atlas of Battle of Chillianwallah-13
January 1849
Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
Reinterpreted
Pakistan Army through eyes of Pakistani
Generals
Handling of Tanks in Indo Pak Wars
Atlas and Military History of India
Pakistan Wars (Volume 1)
The Indian Army in the First World War
Intelligence Review-Volume 1
Stanley A. McChrystal , Michael Hastings
-Understanding USAs Afghan War
Energy Review (March 2014) (Volume 1)
No More Free Ice Cream Cups for
NATO ,EU and USA-Future Wars
Scenarios
Military Leadership and Decision Making
Atlas of Battle of Chawinda
The Indian Army in Second World War
Pakistan Army, 1971 India Pakistan War
and after
Atlas of Battle of Chamb 1971
Atlas of Battles of Assal Uttar and
Lahore-1965
USA, ISI, AL QAEDA and TALIBAN
Anatomy of Grand US Strategic Failure
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare
in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Counter Terrorism Strategy for Islamic
World
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Pakistans Grand Strategic Failures from
Jinnah to Zardari 1916-2013
A British Siege Bloodier than Sevastopol
Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of
India Pakistan History
Intelligence Review-Volume Two (Volume
Two-November-December 2013)
Bolan Pass-A Pictorial Journey
Khojak Pass
Distortions, Misconceptions, Twists,
Myths and Lies about history
Taliban War in Afghanistan
The Lucknow Campaign 1857-1858
History: December Issue ,Volume Two
(Volume 2)
The Kashmir and Northern Area War of
1947-48
Pakistan Army in East Pakistan
Understanding a bitter conflict
The Tank Attack that Failed
Eftikhar Khan Pakistan's half European
Commander and Battle of Chamb 1971
Operation Grand Slam and 1965 WarAkhtar Hussain Malik,Yahya Khan and
Ayub Khan
Atlas of 1857-59 WAR
Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army
Failed in 1965 War
Border Trade Zone Concept
Military and Security Review-Volume 1
History (Volume 1)
The Essential Clausewitz
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Mans Role in History
Books on Pakistan Reviewed
Central India Campaign,Hugh Rose
,Tantia Topi and Jhansi Rani
The FATA and Swat Wars
Taliban War in Afghanistan-A Writers
Transformed Perceptions from 2001 to
2011
Professional Papers
1.
Tactical Handling of Recce Troop-1986Military Paper.
2.
Tactical Handling of Recce Support
Group-1989- Military Paper.
•
Pakistan Army Journal
1.
Orders and Obedience -March 1991.
2.
The Siege of Delhi -December 1991.
3.
Resolution Cardinal Command Virtue
-June 1992.
4.
Intangible Forces behind a Military
Manoeuvre-June 1993.
•
Citadel Magazine-Command and
Staff College Quetta
1.
Plain as well as subtle aspects of
military decision making-1/94.
2.
Obedience and Disobedience-Another
View -2/97.
3.
The Armoured Thrust-An Operational
Analysis - 1/98.
4.
The Relationship of Organisation to
Doctrine and Conduct of War- 2/98.
•
Friday Times
•
When the Ranghars Rebelled-February
12-18-1999.
•
Defence Journal
1.
Book Review-History of the Pakistan
Army by BrianCloughley- July 1999.
2.
The Sepoy Rebellion- Serialized from
July 1999 till April 2002 in 22 issues.
3.
The Battle of Chhamb-1971
-September 1999.
4.
The Battle of Bara Pind-Jarpal -October
1999.
5.
The War of Lost Opportunities- -April
and May 2000 .
6.
Chillianwalla-The Forgotten British
Reverse in India-July 2000.
7.
Stray Reflections on Geopolitics and
History writing-July 2000.
8.
Handling of Armour in Indo Pak Wars-A
Case Study-August and October 2000.
9.
Behind the Scenes-Book ReviewAugust 2000.
10.
Grand Slam-Battle of Lost
Opportunities- September 2000.
11.
History of Baluch regiment-Volume –1Book Review-October 2000.
12.
1971 War-Tank Ambush at KushtiaNovember 2000.
13.
The Arms Bazaar-Reflections on
Pakistani Arms Market- November 2000.
14.
Pakistan Army-1965-71-November
2000.
15.
History of Baluch regiment-11-Book
Review-November 2000.
16.
Hunger Poverty and development-Book
Recview-November 2000.
17.
Stray Reflections on Commencement of
Writing Pakistan Army Till 1965- Dec 2000.
18.
Ethnicity, Religion, Military Performance
and Reliability-British Recruitment.
19.
Policy and the Indian Army-December
2000 and February 2001.
20.
Realism, Heroism, Bravery, Boldness or
Cowardice-January 2001.
21.
The 1971 War-An Examination of the
Strategic Concept-January 2001.
22.
Some Reflections on 1971 War-A
Different Perspective-February 2001.
23.
Some Reflections on 1971 War-A
Different Perspective-February 2001.
24.
The Battle of Chawinda-The Comedy of
Higher Command Errors-March 2001.
25.
Hitler's Greatest Defeat-Book ReviewMarch 2001.
26.
The Relationship of Organisation to
Doctrine and Conduct of War-April 2001.
27.
The Forgotten Regiments- May 2001.
28.
Indo Pak War s-A Strategic Summing
up- May 2001.
29.
Francois's Disobedience at TannenbergJune 2001.
30.
When the 62nd Punjabis saved the Suez
Canal- July 2001.
31.
The Anatomy of Indo Pak Wars-A
Strategic and Operational Analysis-August
2001.
32.
Gap between perception and reality in
higher leadership-August 2001.
33.
1965 Analysed- September 2001.
34.
Audit of Warfare- October 2001.
35.
Battle of Ravi Sutlej Corridor- December
2001.
36.
The Western Theatre in 1971 WarFebruary 2002.
37. Why Indo Pak Armies Failed in War-May
2004
38- Ongoing Taliban War in AfghanistanOctober 2007
•
Daily Nation
1.
Misperceptions, Contradictions and
Enigmas-The Pakistani Political Scene-23 June
2001.
2.
Expectations and Catch 22- 14 July
2001.
3.
Endless Sycophancy Goes on- 16 July
2001.
4.
The Chemistry of Agra Summit- 21 July
2001.
5.
Old Carrots in New Bottles- August 05
2001
6.
Superkamikaze in USA-26 September
2001- 26 September 2001.
7.
First Global Low Intensity War-03
October 2001 -03 October 2001.
8.
Short term gains.Long Term Faux Pas-–
08 Nov 2001.
9.
Games Superpowers Play- 25
December 2001.
10.
Fourth Round or Web of Conspiracies09 January 2002.
11.
Kargil to 2002-28 January 2002.
12.
On Different Breeds of Wolves-06
February 2002.
13.
A Conspiracy against Pakistan-19 March
2002.
14.
The Fourth Military Government-29 April
2002.
15.
A Distorted Geopolitical Scenario-17th
May 2002.
16.
Reducing Pakistan to Size-24th May
2002.
17.
Indo Pak Strategic Equation-31 May
2002
18.
What USA seeks to destroy -22 June
2002
19.
Essence of the Matter – 21 August 2002
20.
Dual Central Position-19 April 2003
21.
Tejh Singh of Meerut -25 May 2003
22.
The Kargil Conspiracy-09 June 2003
23.
Betrayal at Camp David-23 June 2003
24.
Wars of Opportunism-28 June 2003
25.
The so called new US way of war-19
July 2003
26.
The future of Indo Pak Conflict-23
August 2003
27.
USA's Strategic Failure-30 August 2003
28.
Russia's Strategic Opportunity-06
September 2003
29.
Strategic Brilliance-13 September 2003
30.
Terrorism or Just War-03 October 2003
31.
The Gathering Storm-21 October 2003
32.
The Age of Strategic Anarchy-18
November 2003
33.
Why Pakistan does not need generals31 December 2003
34.
The Last Remedy-18 January 2004
35.
Why Waziristan cannot be conquered-24
January 2004
36.
USA's culminating point-14 February
2004
37.
Strategy of Opportunism-24 February
2004
38.
2004-Pakistan's Turning Point-06 March
2004
39.
Collaboration par excellence-20 March
2004
40.
Pakistan's non NATO faux pas-03 April
2004
41.
Second Wana-12 May 2004
42.
Grand Intelligence Beheading-17 May
2004
43.
History Repeated-22 June 2004
44.
Afghanistan Kargil and Clifton Bridge-27
June 2004
45.
An indigenous Struggle-19 March 2005
46. USA in Afghanistan-A Long Term
Strategic View-12 May 2009
47. US Strategic Plan-28 May 2009
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Globe
1.
Interpol-Some Basic Facts -September
2000.
2.
At Cold War's End-Book Review
-September 2000.
3.
Cheka-Lenin's Secret Police -October
2000.
4.
Superpowers Defeated-Book Review
-February 2001.
5.
Indian Muslim Politics-Serialised from
February 2001 till September 2001.
6.
The Comfort Women-Book ReviewMarch 2001.
7.
Life of a Soviet Spy -March 2001.
8.
Word and Term Power - serialised from
March 2001till September 2001.
9.
Country Study-Afghanistan/Taliban
-March 2001.
10.
A Conspiracy against Pakistan -March
2001 .
11.
Man's Role in History - Serialised from
April 2001till September 2001.
12.
The Dynasty-Book Review -April 2001.
13.
The Fearful State-Book Review -April
2001.
14.
The Law of Desire-Book Review -April
2001.
15.
Wordpower and Term Power -May 2001.
16.
A Princess Remembers-Book ReviewMay 2001.
17.
Shiekh Mujeebs Six Point Formula-Book
Review- May 2001.
18.
A Woman Speaks-Book Review- May
2001.
19.
Conflict and Violence in Singapore and
Malaysia-Book Review-June 2001.
20.
The Jews-Story of a People-Book Review
-June 2001.
21.
Chekhov-Book Review- June 2001.
22.
The Destruction of Democracy in
Pakistan-A Historic Analysis-June 2001.
23.
Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan-Book
Review -July 2001.
24.
From Martial Law to Martial Law-Book
Review -July 2001.
25.
From Plassey to Pakistan-Book Review
-July 2001.
26.
Pakistan-Constitutional and Political
Dilemmas-Book review-August 2001.
27.
Narcotics and Global Economy-August
2001.
28.
The Southern Rules-August 2001.
29.
Khaki Shadows-Book ReviewSeptember 2002.
30.
The Mughal Nobility under AurangzebBook Review-September 2002.
31.
Imperial Rule in Punjab-Book ReviewSeptember 2002.
32.
Makran Coastal Highway-September
2001.
•
Frontier Post
1. The War of Defamation- 19 January
2001.
2.
2008
•
5 Minutes over Islamabad-October
Dawn
The Forgotten Regiments- February 4 ,
2001.
•
News
1.
Terrorism or Another Jewish
Conspiracy- 22 September 2001.
2.
Afghanistan-Myth and Reality- 12
November 2001.
3.
Afghan Jihad-Second Round- 16
November 2001.
JOURNAL OF AFGHANISTAN STUDIES
1.
Resolving the Durand Line
Question-January 2005
AFGHANISTAN TIMES
1.
2.
Afghanistan – A Strategic Analysis
Kargil- A military Analysis
Interviews /Transcript talks of
various personalities
1.
Major General Naseerullah Babar –
Military Career-Defence Journal-April 2001.
2.
Major General Naseerullah Babar –
Political Career-Globe-May 2001.
3.
French Ambassador meets Senior
columnists of Karachi-Globe-April 2001.
4.
His Excellency Mr Peter TejlerAmbassador of Sweden-Globe-May 2001.
5.
HisExcellency Mr Numata-Ambassador
of Japan-Globe-June 2001
6.
Admiral Tasnim-Defence Journal-May
2001.
7.
Group Captain Cecil Chaudhry-Defence
Journal-June 2001.
8.
Brigadier Taj-Defence Journal-July
2001
9.
Maj Gen Hidayat ullah Niazi- Defence
Journal-August 2001
10.
Maj Gen Tajammul Hussain MalikDefence Journal-September 2001
11.
Lieutenant General Imtiaz WarraichDefence Journal-October 2001.
12.
Lieutenant General Ali Kuli KhanDefence Journal¬-December 2001.
13.
Brig Shamim Yasin Manto-Defence
Journal- February 2002.
14.
Flight Lieutenant Raffat Jamil- Defence
Journal- March 2002.
15.
Brigadier Z.A Khan
• Research for following Interviews aired
on ARY Digital between January and April
2002:-1.
2.
3.
Imran Khan.
Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah,
Senator Iqbal Haider
4.
Mr Altaf Saleem,Minister for
Privatisation
5.
Lieut Gen Hamid Gul
6.
Finance Minsister Shaukat Aziz
7.
Ex Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz
8.
Senator Aitizaz Ahsan
9.
Mr Hafeez Shaikh
10. Mr Imtiaz Ahmad Shaikh
11.
Lieutenant General Moin Haider
12.
Senator Ijaz Shafi
13.
General Pervez Musharraf
Preamble
English essay remains a simple but
subtle test of a mans mental caliber.
Since essay was discovered by Sir
Francis Bacon and improved and refined
by countless writers , English essay has
remained a good judge of any aspiring
candidate for public or private sector
jobs and posts.
For many years the only standard of
judging military staff college candidates
was simply one essay from which their
analytical and communication skills were
judged.
In competitive examinations in third
world countries English Essay takes the
highest toll in failures , as a subject.
Thus English essay possesses the
notorious distinction of being the sword
of Damocles for a very large number of
competitive examination candidates.
The aim of this brief work is to serve as
a primer or as a study aid for
competitive examination candidates
worldwide but more specifically South
and West Asia.
When I joined the Pakistan Military
Academy in 1981 I discovered that
English took the maximum toll of
cadets who were relegated or failed in
the first two terms.
When I appeared and qualified in the
CSS competitive examination in 1987
and 1989 I again discovered that
English Essay remained CSS candidates
Bermuda Triangle of failure.
Mr Syed Zafar Bukhari who I met in
Multan in 1987 during his attachment as
a civil service academy student with
Pakistan Army was very fond of
discussing how CSS candidates mostly
failed in English essay.
My early interest in writing articles since
1977 motivated me to read great
masters of essay like Francis Bacon who
off course was the greatest master , as
well as Montaigne , Bertrand Russell etc.
Francis Bacon above all , I regard as the
most formative influence on what I
learnt in life about English essay writing.
In addition I immensely admired Indian
historian Syed Ameer Alis style of
writing when I read his magnum opus
A History of the Saracens in 1975-77.
B.H Liddell Hart and J,.F.C Fullers simple
but brilliant writings were of great help
in improving style of essay writing.
Bertrand Russell whose Sceptical Essays
I READ IN 1977-78 was a very
formative and inspiring experience.
My first attempt at serious writing
spanned many years .Orders and
Obedience an article about when not to
obey orders captured my imagination
for many years starting from initial
conception since 1977 till it was finally
published in Pakistan Army Journal in
April 1991.
My intellectual duel and wrestling with
Carl Von Clausewitz’s classic On War
started in 1975-76 and finally came to a
near honorable conclusion when I
managed to summarise it in some sixty
pages in 1993 in a book titled as The
Essential Clausewitz.
Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 obsessed
me for many years when I first read
Micael Edwardes Battles of Indian
Mutiny in 1975-76 in Quetta.The
Quetta where my friend Syed Mansoor
Bukhari was still young and Pakistan
was still a passably decent place to live
your life.
It took me 23 years or 24 years more to
arrive at some conclusions about what
really happened in 1857 when I wrote
my Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
Reinterpreted in 1998-99.
Having read countless rape books of
Pakistan Armys military history starting
from Shaukat Rizas trilogy in 1987-89
and Fazal Muqeems partial twists from
1972-75 I embarked to write my
Pakistan ARMY TILL 1965
in 1999.
A stint with Defence Journal Karachi
from July 1999 till May 2002 enabled
me to focus on Indo Pak military
history.
Finally an eventful period in Afghanistan
from 2004 t0 2012 interspersed with
travels in Balochistan from 1990 to
2014 enabled me to make sense of
Afghan War as well as Balochistan War.
All along I repeatedly realized that the
English Essay which my teachers had
taught me from 1970 to 1983 was of
immense assistance .
Assistance not only in format and style
but in substance and analysis.
An essay after all is a short logical
appreciation of a problem in hand in
writing and if a person can master an
essay , he or she can master many
serious situations in life.
Clear thinking and effective decision
making , this is life really about after all.
Two ways
of going
about it
Simply there are two ways of going
about it :Long Route
Life long study from earliest schooling
and constantly till lifes end.
Short Route
For aspirants who were not lucky
enough to study at leisure and who
want to master English Essay to clear an
examination.
Ideally English essay needs to be
mastered as a passion , a hobby , a past
time .
Most who attempt English essay
however are forced to learn it as a harsh
necessity.
Essentials
• Write as a habit:-- Writing
should be done as a habit . May
take various forms (1) a diary of
daily events and reflections (2) a
note book of your comments on
what you read in a book or a
newspaper or magazine or
journal or a book .
• Don’t be shy of expressing
yourself:--- One experiences
some inner fears and inner
blocks when one starts
expressing oneself in writing and
on paper. The first step is to
overcome the fear of thinking
that what you write will be seen
by others as funny or stupid or
simply outrageous.
• Essay writing is a life long
continuous process:-- It spans
a whole life time and involves
various activities from watching
TV , conversing with people ,
listening to people conversing ,
reading a paper .
• Take Notes and leave nothing
that comes into your mind
out of your notebook :-Maintain note books where (1)
you write interesting
quotations/thoughts/facts ,
preferably with references of
name of publication,page
number , date of publication
,title iof article,name of author
etc (2) Maintain note book
where you write daily stray
reflections , random thoughts
etc.
• Deliberate Creative writing
:--- Essay will not come to you ,
you will have to master it. In
order to master essay writing , it
is necessary that nothing is left
to chance or impulse. So give
yourself a target topic every day
and write something about it .
No short cut to practice.
• Dictionary Habit :--- Read at
least two pages of the dictionary
every day .It will improve your
vocabulary and will have an
impact in improving your writing
abilities.
• Encyclopaedia Habit:-- Read
at least one encyclopedia article
a day so that your knowledge
constantly expands .
• Select a current journal to
read daily :-- For third world
students whose first language is
not English it is good to combine
Time or Newsweek (either) with
Economist (compulsory ).
Economist is good to improve
your facts knowledge as well as
analysis of experts plus its
relatively superior English
language. At least its lead article
and weekly obituary needs to be
read like a compulsory text book
.The weekly obituary is useful
for style as well as language and
knowledge.Economist articles
invariably contain sentences and
phrases which can help you in
improving your expression for
the English essay.So if you see
anything interesting in your
economist just write it and one
day it would really help you.
• Select a teachor and mentor
in whose ability you have
faith:-- It is necessary to have a
man in whose analytical abilities
you have faith.This person may
be a friend , an associate or a
professional teacher.
• Understand Two Factor
Strategy of mastering essay
writing :-- An essay requires
mastery of two essential
factors.These are (1) Knowledge
of facts and (2) Ability to make
use of facts and analyse them
,in brief (1) KNOWLEDGE and
(2) ANALYSIS. Matering essay
strategy has to revolve around
these two key factors .So every
day you have to earmark time
for (1) acquiring knowledge (2)
mastering analysis. Both are
complementary to each other
and indispensable.
• Plans must most move
events in essay
preparation:-- A good
preparation plan for a beginner
should ideally be spread over six
to nine months. Ideally you
should be writing one
composition daily and one long
essay per week . Each
composition and essay should be
checked by your designated
mentor guide or teacher who
should critique it for (1)
Coherence of analysis (2) Unity
of thought (3) Standard of
knowledge of complete essential
facts (4) Brevity (5)
Grammatical mistakes (6)
Accuracy of facts . Each
critique/correction session by
your guide/mentor should be
followed up with writing a Final
Solution and this Final Solution
should be written in a master
note book which you should
ideally read every day for at
least 30 to 45 minutes .
• Choices that a person must
make:-- Competitive
examination essays are broadly
divided into abstract themes and
specific factual themes. Basically
each person is unique in insights
and a candidate appearing in a
competitive examination has to
decide (1) where his strength
and interest lies , i.e abstract or
factual themes. (2) Essay
preparation must be based on a
strategy as to which type of
essay is priority to be attempted
in the question paper . (3) While
factual topics require greater
preparation involving hard facts
and data , abstract themes also
require knowledge of facts but
contents of facts differ in
between abstract and factual
topics (4) Ideally a CSS
candidate should keep allowance
to prepare for both as selective
study can lead to disasters also
(5) Nevertheless important
decisions have to be made by a
candidate regarding his study
plan when he prepares for essay
paper
• Tangible Plan to visualize all
possible essay themes based
on last 20 years essay
papers:-- The student must
make a comprehensive plan (1)
Identifying all possible essay
themes based on a study of last
twenty years essay papers (2)
Themes should be separately
grouped into abstract and fact
related themes (3) Study plan
must be divided into data
collection and data employment
work routine.Ideally each topic
should be allotted a day on
which data dealing with that
topic or theme is collected as
well as data is analysed and
transformed into analytical
conclusions .
• Each topic preparation in a
single day must be based on the
following broad format:---
• For a single day the above data
alongwith analysis must be
carried out and a specific
document created which
provides a comprehensive
framework for one particular
essay.
• Ideally a candidate must prepare
at least ONE long essay per
week, with and one day to
debriefing and critique from a
guide/mentor as well as
rewriting final draft solution
• Thus a two day essay plan
should be as following :--
• Ideally a six months study plan
should focus on (1) One Long
Essay per week for first two
months , thus preparing eight
essays in first two months (2)
Two long essays per week for
•
•
•
•
next four months preparing 32
long essays (3) Thus a total of
forty essays in six months
Ideally a candidate should
decide his/her priorities and
maintain a ratio of 25 : 15
essays out of total 40 essays
which are prepared into abstract
or factual topics .The precise
decision that a candidate must
take is about whether he/she
wants to do 25 abstract and 15
factual essays or vice versa.This
decision depends on aptitude of
a candidate.
Only two days per week would
be allotted to essay preparation
wholly whereas four days per
week will be devoted to other
subjects during this six months
peak preparation period.
Ideally a candidate should
precede peak preparation of six
months with 50 % light
preparation for first three
months.
Operational details of study plan
would be a highly subjective
affair and may vary from person
to person.
STRATE GIC
PLAN TO
MASTER
ENGLISH
ESSAY
EXAMPLES
OF
WRITING
What are you going to do
I have never been a fan of complicated
technical jargon and verbosity.
Simply speaking a candidate as to
master three things :--
Grammar
• Practice essay writing and
corrections by mentor/guide
.Candidate must write in double
space and with one third page
space on left side blank for detailed
notes of guide/mentor.
• Manually writing with and corrected
essay will inculcate a grammatical
sense in candidate as a mechanical
habit.
Knowled ge
• Knowlede of facts is necessary for
any essay , specially its analysis
portion.
Sample
Essays
Gap between perception and reality in
higher leadership
It took many years to write
this.When I first picked Clausewitz in
1975 , I could barely understand it
till 1981 but the name held immense
fascination .This article was written
only in 2000 , some 25 years after I
had started reading the giant.No
doubt Clausewitz was one of the
greatest philosophers of war.I read
Rapoports edition based on Colonel
F.N Maudes translation of Vom
Kriege.
Agha.H.Amin
Gap between perception
and reality in higher
leadership
I
f there were no gap between "Theory" and
"Practice" or between "Perception" and reality life
would have been a bed of roses! Soldiers would not
have read Clausewitz, Economists would not have
read Keynes, Revolutionaries would not have read
Marx Plekhanov or Mao! There would have been no
great men since no one would have required any
direction! Organisations would have been run on
one-man one vote since no one would have been
required to make decisions or assessments!
Alas this was not so! This is what made a great
philosopher say, "All thinking is indeed Art. Where
the logician draws, where the premises stop which
are the result of cognition —where judgement
begins, there Art begins"! Politics and warfare are
two spheres where intangibles override the tangible!
In short Politics and Warfare require superior
intellects in order to operate successfully since both
cannot be mastered by mathematical formulae or
theorems!
Decision making in war, politics or business is no
mean task as it is mistakenly assumed to be.
Clausewitz was not wrong when he said "Bonaparte
was right when he said that many of the questions
which come before a General for a decision would
make problems for a mathematical calculation not
unworthy of the powers of Newton or Euler.
In this brief article we will discuss the "Perception
and Reality Gap" and those who bridged it! As a
matter of fact the real test of greatness of a man lies
in bridging the perception and reality gap! Every
individual does so in life, however the great men
who have made history bridge larger gaps while the
vast multitude live their life by bridging relative
much smaller gaps!
"Some Examples of "Misperception" and of "How
perceptions changed"
It is hard to believe that of all people a man called
Gandhi urged resident Indians to "think imperially
and was instrumental in organizing a field
ambulance training corps in London"!1 It is another
thing that Gandhi soon had second thoughts and
resigned from the ambulance training corps.
Von Bernhardi a great German thinker, at least so it
was thought before the First World War as early as
1911 wrote "Germany and the Pan Islamists and the
revolutionaries of Bengal would shake the entire
British position"!2 The Pan Islamists and the
Bengalis gave the British a lot of problem in WW
One but the British position was saved by a feigned
composure of nonchalance and by divide and rule
despite the fact that one point in time there were only
15,000 British troops in India!
Mr Jinnah dismissed the "Pakistan Scheme" as a
mad student's scheme but later he fought for the
Pakistan idea and became the first Governor General
of Pakistan. In 1937 Mr Jinnah stated that the Punjab
was a hopeless place and that he would never visit it
again!3 Mr Jinnah visited Punjab many times after
this statement and the famous Pakistan Resolution
was moved in Punjab in 1940.
A general dismissed the draft plan of another
officer stating "The originator belonged to an insane
asylum"!4 The originator in this case was one who
was later known as one of the greatest military
commanders of history i.e. Napoleon Bonaparte!
Guderian in 1940 initially described the Manstein
Plan of taking the main German Panzer Thrust
through the Ardennes as a crime against his tanks!
Later Guderian changed his views. However, this
incident has not been mentioned in Guderian's
autobiography "Panzer Leader"!5
British naval warlords in WW One thought that
their ships could destroy fixed coastal guns with
dimensions of few feet whereas these ships were
designed to fight enemy naval ships at sea whose
average width was about 500 feet long! These
gunnery misperceptions cost the British very dearly
at Dardanelles!6 The reason for this imperial blunder
was not difficult to be located! The British Navy was
under a man "whose military experience extended to
the responsibilities of a lieutenant in 4th Hussars"
i.e. Winston Churchill!7
A general sitting in the Rawalpindi in the second
half of sixties orders an engineer battalion to be sent
to Khunjerab Pass via China by air and assumes that
this battalion would make a road southwards from
Khunjerab while the other people were making a
road northwards in Gilgit-Chilas area. The
assumption being that if there are birds in Khunjerab
an engineer battalion can survive there too. The
layman reader may note that the altitude of
Khunjerab Top is 15,000 feet and snowfalls in JuneJuly are not uncommon. The whole project failed
with fatal casualties, some of the graves of those
indomitable men can be seen near the Khunjerab
Top even today. The unit marched back under the
indomitable Colonel Qidwai to Passu where they
made a makeshift airstrip and were later airlifted by
a C-130 and evacuated!
Gul Hassan Khan advances a line of thinking that
armour was mishandled in 1965 war because nonarmour officers were placed in higher armour
command. This line does not explain why Lee
Meade and Macarthur who were from Engineers
commanded infantry very well. Similarly one of the
finest German tank commanders Rommel was from
infantry.
A military Commander orders that all units must
dig four feet wide and four feet deep "Anti-Wild
Boar Trenches" around each troop shelter without
realising that the wild boar can easily jump across
even five feet wide trenches. The result being some
injured men because they fell at night in their own
anti-wild boar trenches. Incidentally no one was
attacked by any wild boar in the sister brigade of the
formation who did not dig any wild boar trenches
but were located in an area which had a far large
number of wild boars than the formation which had
dug anti-wild boar trenches!
A German army chief in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century insisted that young
commandeered lieutenants participating in the
annual General Staff Exercise known as
"Kriegesspiele". This action aroused "intense
dissatisfaction of many high dignitaries"! Count Von
Schlieffen dismissed this criticism by stating "As
long as they are lieutenants certainly ...fortunately,
however, they have the ambition later on to
command an army, or if the aims are more moderate,
at least an army corps, or to assist a corps
commander as his chief of staff". Thus Schlieffen
insisted on "the necessity of acquainting the future
leaders as early as possible with the future problems
of war.8 Schlieffen's wisdom was realized much
later when many of these lieutenants led the German
Army in WW Two.
A concept is advanced after the 1971 War which
states that tanks can charge through minefields
without much problem simply because one brigadier
who Quixotically thought so was related to a four
star general!
Till today there is debate in the Pakistan Army why
many officers who won MC in WW Two failed later
as senior staff officers or as corps commanders.
Clausewitz asked this question before 1832 when he
said "Almost all the generals who are represented in
history as merely having to attained in mediocrity,
and as wanting in decision when in supreme
command, are men celebrated in their antecedent
career for their boldness and decision"9* or "There
are Field Marshals who would not have shone at the
head of a cavalry regiment and vice versa".10
Reasons for the "Perception and Reality Gap"
Why this gap? It is so because war and politics are
exercises in the field of unknown made further
complicated by presence of a large number of other
factors. The number of participants in both activities
is very large! Thus the difficulty in bridging the gap!
Thus the resultant difficulty in forming correct
assessments, arriving at correct assessments etc!
Some of the reasons which Clausewitz gave may be
summarized as following:a. There is no theory which can guide the
decision maker
War, politics or business in its higher levels is not
regulated by any fixed theory unlike tactics or lower
level business management! Thus Clausewitz's
saying "The conduct of war has no definite limits in
any direction".11*
b. Distance between point of action and the
participant
A participant at a junior level whether a common
soldier, subaltern or company commander is close to
the point of action. The time frame in which he has
to take action is limited. Thus it is easier to win an
MC or be dismissed for cowardice than to win a war
or to be exposed as an incompetent C in C!
c. Speed of development of situation
In strategy things move at a far more slower pace
than tactics. The decision maker whether he is an
army C in C or a corps commander does not have to
perform a mechanical reaction like firing or
advancing or withdrawing or offering a sale package.
He has to plan days months and sometimes years in
advance. Thus the profound truth in Clausewitz's
saying "Much more strength of will is required to
make an important decision in strategy than in
tactics. In the latter we are hurried on with the
moment; a commander feels himself borne along in a
strong current against which he does not contend
without the most destructive consequences, he
suppresses the rising fears and boldly ventures
farther. In Strategy where all goes on at a slower
rate, there is more room allowed for our own
apprehensions and those of others, for objections and
remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable
regrets; and as we do not see things in strategy as we
do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye,
but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the
convictions thus produced are less powerful. The
consequence is that most generals when they should
act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts".
d. Degree of stress involved
The degree of stress involved in war business and
politics is much higher with war being at the top and
business being the second.
e. The intangible concept of "Friction"
The discovery as well as coining of the term
"Friction" was one of the greatest contributions of
Clausewitz to military and political thought.
"Friction" as per Clausewitz was an invisible but
ever present factor that reduces speed of activity in
war. Friction being the sum of confusion, fear,
indecision, incompetence faulty execution or
misunderstanding of orders, bad weather, loss of
commanders in fighting etc. Friction thus makes
even simple movements like walking, walking in
water. This "friction" leads to events "which it was
impossible to calculate".
f. Imperfection of Human Perception
Human perception is not perfect. A decision maker
has to make assessments without seeing things. A
decision maker is neither a magician nor a prophet.
Thus perceptions can be wrong.
g. Moral Qualities cannot be measured
Moral qualities cannot be measured. No military
commander can predict whether the enemy in front
will resist or bolt away, Bravery, Boldness,
Cowardice, Presence of Mind, etc can neither be
measured nor forecasted. The army has some
systems but these are crude. All who pass out of the
military academy successfully box well, pass the
physical tests and written examinations. The ISSB
assesses a candidate in three or five days while an
instructor of cadets assesses cadets in two years.
Even then the human character is so complicated that
many who reach higher positions do it by dodging
the system while in reality they never deserved what
they got. Hence the Mc Clellans, Hookers, Naseers
and Niazis.
h. Presence of Intelligent Forces which oppose
the decision maker
The opposing forces are equally or unevenly
intelligent. There are Fords opposed by GM and
other tycoons. There is the Security Agency "Alpha"
opposed by Security Agency "Bravo". A Napoleon
opposed by a Blucher. A Jinnah opposed by a
Mountbatten or Nehru!
i.. Incompetence of own decision makers at
various levels of command
Faulty execution at lower levels of command in all
three spheres i.e. war, politics and business can lead
to failure or faulty assessments.
j. Want of Resolution
An important factor whose absence or presence can
lead to failure or success. What would have
happened if the Pakistani 1 Corps was led by a man
of Eftikhar's calibre or if the 23 Division in Chamb
was led by a man like General Irshad or the Eastern
Command by someone other than A.A.K Niazi. In
Battle of Gazala in 1942 at one point General
Westphal writes in his book "The German Army in
the West" all of Rommel's major staff officers and
subsidiary commanders thought of surrender. This
was the "Cauldron Battle". Westphal writes that
Rommel dismissed all these suggestions with scorn.
In the end Gazala was a German victory! Replace
Rommel by individual "X" and Gazala rather than
Alalamein may have been the most decisive battle of
the North African War in WW Two.
How to bridge the "Perception and Reality
Gap"
What is the solution to the dilemma! The following
may to some extent compensate:-
The Relative Importance of Theory vis-a-vis
Individual talent of a commander
a. Theory to a relative factor has a limited value.
Theory must educate the leader but it must not
provide cut and dried solutions. We can conveniently
fall back to Clausewitz who gave an answer "given
the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves
that it is simply not possible to construct a model for
the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on
which the commander can rely for support at any
time. Wherever he has to fall back on his innate
talent, he will find himself outside the model and in
conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the
situation will always lead to the consequences we
have already alluded to: talent and genius operate
outside the rules, and theory conflicts with
practice".12 Thus Clausewitz recognises theorie's
importance but tells us that in the final outcome the
real decision requires talent and theory in itself
affords no answer. The best solution is to "identify
talent" and to groom it. Clausewitz thus stated "to
indicate the point at which all lines converge, but
never to construct an algebraic formula for use on
the battlefield". Clausewitz gave us a precise
solution to this highly complex problem when he
said "Even these principles and rules are intended to
provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for
the movements he has been trained to carry out" and
not "to serve as a guide which at the moment of
action lays down precisely the path he must take".13
The greatness of the German General Staff as I
wrote in an article in 1994 was not that it produced a
Manstein but that it discovered a Manstein and
groomed him. In the final analysis organizations
have to surrender to the judgement of one man. This
can lead to both success or failure. The risk has to be
taken.
b. The German General Halder well summed it up
when he said "War is full of imponderables and
surprises. Only a commander who can depend on his
own ingenuity and that of his men will be able to
make the improvisations dictated by the moment and
master situations not described in the manuals".
Halder went further adding "True, in order to do this,
he will have to know exactly what it is he wants to
do....". Thus Halder concluded "The attempt to find a
recipe for every single situation with which the
lower echelons may be confronted, occasionally
results in a cut-and-dried recipee" far more detailed
than is needed".14 As a matter of fact this is the
difference between the British Way of Warfare
which both Indian, Pakistani and to a great extent the
Bangladesh Army inherited and the German way of
warfare. Thus the military failures in 1965, 1971 and
later!
c. Creation of systems which assess the decision
making capabilities of individuals at higher levels. In
third World Countries this is severely limited by
powerful interest groups, parochialism and nepotism.
Then there is a kinship of higher ranks and they feel
that anybody who has reached a particular rank does
not require any further testing! In my thirteen years
service I highlighted this anomaly in many articles
published in the Citadel and Pakistan Army Journal.
I don't think that anyone in the army use to read both
of these publications!
CONCLUSION
Its best to quote Clausewitz once again:"Searching rather than inventive minds,
comprehensive rather than such as have a special
bent, cool rather than fiery heads are those to which
in time of War we should prefer to trust the welfare
of our women and children, the honour and safety of
our fatherland".15 "Men who are difficult to move
but on that account susceptible of very deep feeling".
Men the effect of whose feelings is "like the
movement of a great body, slower but more
irresistible".16
End Notes
1Pages 127 & 128 -India and the World War OneEdited by S.D Pradhan -Article titled Congress
Leadership in Transition by Stanley Wolpert
-Columbia University-1978.
2Page-266- Fidelity and Honour-Lieut Gen S.L
Menezes-Viking -New Delhi-1991. Taken from
Bernhardi's book Germany and the next War.
3Page-311 -Mian Fazal I Hussain-A Political
Biography- Azim Hussain-London 1966.
4Quoted by Great Captains-Napoleon- Theodore
Ayrault Dodge-In Four Volumes-Printed by Mifflin
Company-1904-7. The remark was made by General
Kellerman.
6Page-150-The Great War at Sea-1914-1918Richard Hough-Oxford University Press-1986.
7Page-85-Ibid.
8Page-271 & 272-The German Army- Herbert
Rosinki- (edited with an introduction by Gordon
(Craig)- Pall Mall Press-London-1966.
9Page-260-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited
By Anatol Rapoport. Pelican Books 1976. Reprinted
by National Book Foundation on orders of Mr
Bhutto and distributed in the army in 1976.
10 Page-198-Ibid.
11Page-182-Ibid.
12Page-140-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited
and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter ParetPrinceton University Press-Princeton-New Jersey1976. Reprinted by NBF under express instructions
of Mr Bhutto in 1976 and distributed in the Armed
Forces.
13Page-141-Ibid.
14Pages 8 & 9-Military Effectiveness-Volume
Three-Allen and Unwin-USA-1988.
15Page-158 -On War edited by Rapoport.
16Page-149.Ibid.
The Military Decision
maker and
Realism, Heroism, Bravery,
Boldness or Cowardice in
History
‘H
eroism’ and ‘realism’, ‘bravery’ or
‘cowardice’ are powerful words pregnant with
multiple meanings and thus often misunderstood in
common discussion. This is not exactly an article but
a cursory examination of how certain individuals in
various stages of world history made remarkable
achievements by being ‘Heroic’ ‘Realistic’ etc.
The ‘Hero’ is a man who does not surrender in face
of overwhelming odds and thus emerges ‘victorious’
or is perceived by posterity to have been morally
victorious despite having been physically destroyed.
Khalid Bin Waleed, Napoleon, Alexander, Churchill
etc may be grouped in the first category and Joan of
Arc, Syed Ahmad Shaheed may be grouped in the
latter category. All these men did well and are even
today well known figures in history.
We will first examine the issue in relation with the
fact ‘Whether the hero had an exact knowledge and
sufficient time’ to assess decisions that he made and
which ultimately elevated him to the pedestal of a
hero in history! This is important but very often
forgotten or not understood at all by many. We will
take the ‘Rebels’ or the ‘Freedom Fighters’ of 1857
as an example. All existing facts as we know them
today prove that these ‘Rebels’ never really
understood the real power and potential of the
English East India Company. The Rebellion began
not because of any deliberately pre-planned
conspiracy but as a series of spontaneous reactions
against a ‘perceived attack on caste and religion’. It
was a mechanical reaction and those who took it felt
that ‘Rebellion’ was the only option. These were the
common soldiers of the Bengal Army led by the
more hot headed Ranghar and Hindustani Pathan
Muslims of the Bengal Cavalry. The 3rd Light
Cavalry rebels. A spontaneous decision, sparked by
court martial of 80 of their colleagues in a manner
that was perceived as unjust. The execution was
‘Tactically Brilliant’! A rebellion on Sunday at the
evening service time when the Europeans were most
vulnerable, followed by the seizure of Delhi! I would
say that the decision was even strategically brilliant
since Delhi was the political heart of India and one
of the strongest fortress cities of India. The Sepoys
so far did exceedingly well! They proved that they
were superior in terms of ‘Resolution’ and ‘Intellect’
to many who later planned very Quixotic schemes
executed in all three Indo-Pak Wars and till the
Kargil Affair to date! Full stop here! The Sepoys
never appreciated the naval potential of Britain and
never understood that a country who could survive a
French Revolution or armies led by world class
military geniuses could not be defeated simply by
seizure of Delhi! Despite all this the Meerut Cavalry
troopers of 3rd Light Cavalry took a brilliant
decision, once we keep in mind their knowledge of
the external world, their nominal education and their
subjective life experiences! Those men were heroes,
far superior to most post-1857 Muslim politicians
and this includes all who have been on the scene to
date!
An answer was provided by General Jang Bahadur
the military ruler of Nepal to Sir Colin Campbell in
March 1858. The situation was as following; the
British had almost won the Sepoy Rebellion and
were about to assault Lucknow which had been in
Sepoy hands since July 1857. Jang Bahadur had led
a Nepali Gurkha army to assist the British and his
army was part of the force tasked to assault
Lucknow! Jang Bahadur told Colin Campbell as
soon as he joined him with his army ‘had he not
visited England he would have been fighting against
the British instead of with them! The readers can
now compare the difference! The Sepoys were
‘Heroic’ but they were ‘Heroic’ because they unlike
Jang Bahadur had never visited England. Delhi was
the ultimate city for these brave albeit naive
Rohtakis from villages like Kalanaur and Kanar!
It appears that the British realised that the Indians
needed to be educated about the reality of the British
Empire. Warburton records such an incident in his
beautiful ‘Eighteen Years in Khyber’. This was
when Warburton arranged a visit of the Khyber
Maliks to Calcutta and Bombay so that it may widen
their horizon and make them less ambitious in their
plans to fight against Britain. The exercise it appears
was not very successful since the Khyber Afridis
once again rebelled in 1897! Heroism is good but the
hero is different from a stock broker or a banker! His
calculations are in terms of moral values which he
perceives as more sacred than material gains. The
hero lives after his death while the businessmen dies
everyday despite living much longer than the hero,
but goes on suffering indignities to gain greater
dignity as that great man Bacon said! I remember an
incident of a great bureaucrat as narrated by one of
his relatives! The old fox, an ex-ICS and at that time
a very senior man in a political government that once
ruled Pakistan comes home and proudly tells his
wife ‘Oh dear you know today what happened! Mr
Prime Minister abused me! Oh dear he uses the
particular word that he used only for those with
whom he is very intimate’!
Ranjeet Singh was a great realist. At the height of his
power a courtier asked him ‘Sir you should attack
the English East India Company’s territory’. Ranjeet
replied dismissing his sycophant advisors’ I may
advance with my army as far as Aligarh but then the
Englishmen would destroy me’. A fine assessment
by a man who had not been to any War College or
Defence College!
Syed Ahmad Khan was another great realist! In
Bijnor he restrained the Indians from attacking
English civilians and non-combatants and from
joining the anti-British camp at a time when the
Hindus of Bijnor were in full rebellion against the
English Company! It was very unheroic and
opportunistic as some may say! But the Syed had his
reasons! Deep inside his heart was a conviction that
the British would win and in the long-term the
rebellion would do more harm to the Muslims than
good! The Syed was much condemned by many
Muslims after the rebellion as an ‘Ibnul Waqt’ but
the Syed atoned for his ‘unheroic’ behaviour by
establishing the MAO College Aligarh. Opportunism
is excusable if the end result is positive, but this
unfortunately is not the case in most ‘scenarios’. The
Syed is remembered for his educational
achievements today and not for any business empire
that he left. He would have been a smaller hero had
he died fighting against the British at Bijnor! He had
a strategic vision and would have been an excellent
Chief of General Staff or more had he been alive
today in any Indo-Pak Army!
Now compare the Syed with later Muslim leaders.
He advised the Muslims to desist from identifying
themselves with Egyptian, Turk or Afghan Muslims
in the period 1878-1898. The Turks were too far to
be of any help to the Indian Muslims! The Egyptians
too insignificant and again too far and the Afghans
were the worst predators who had shamelessly
looted the Indian Muslims during the period 173959. This golden advice was forgotten by outwardly
more educated Muslims in 1920 when the Khilafat
Movement was launched!
Isoruku Yamamoto later famous as Admiral
Yamamoto was another great realist. He had studied
at Yale and Harvard in between his military career
and understood the limits of US military
effectiveness! He counselled repeatedly against war
with the US but his advice was over ruled by the
more powerful Japanese Army and Japan went into a
suicidal war that finally concluded with a nuclear
holocaust at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Clausewitz makes a very fine distinction between
types of courage and boldness and the level of
command! Clausewitz put the lesson by using a
beautiful example! Clausewitz thus stated ‘If a
young man to show his skill in horsemanship leaps
across a deep cleft, then he is bold; if he makes the
same leap pursued by a troop of head chopping
Jannisaries he is only resolute. But the further off the
necessity from the point of action, the greater the
number of relations intervening which the mind has
to traverse in order to realize them’. As a matter of
fact strategic decision making is more difficult since
the time period is much greater than in tactical
encounters and a much greater mind is required. This
explains why ‘Military Crosses’ or ‘Military Cross
Bars’ failed in East Pakistan. These men had earned
fame imported from junior positions and did not
deserve the ranks that they reached. In the final
summing up their bad luck was the fact that a war
broke out and they were exposed while their
successors since 1971 have been far more lucky!
They have not seen crisis or as Ikram Sehgal
recollects his reply to late General Iqbal about actual
war experience. ‘They have not heard a shot fired in
anger’!
In my humble capacity I saw how perceptions are
distorted during the Gulf war. The seniormost
decision makers in our military thought that it would
be a prolonged affair! I was at the School of Armour
Nowshera. The Allied attack had not yet commenced
and this was December 1990. I think it was Colonel
Moin Rauf one of our senior instructors who said
that the Iraqis would not last for more than a week!
This was at a time when many far more senior
people had totally different opinion. Moin Rauf I
think had been to Fort Knox for a course and kept
his eyes open. This scribe’s father who had been to
Fort Belvoir in 1964 said that how could Iraq defeat
USA once it had miserably failed to defeat Iran in far
more advantageous circumstances in 1980! All this
was crystal clear but all those who were something
had ridiculous perceptions. Pakistan was lucky that
Ghulam Ishaq Khan saw things more realistically
and restored some sanity in the higher decision
making echelons!
Unfortunately we have had too many meteors who
came and disappeared but no great man with the
slow solid but massive presence of a heavenly body
in Clausewitzian terms! This is our tragedy!
Mediocrity which as the saying brilliantly puts it
‘knows nothing higher than itself’ has been
institutionalised on both sides of the Radcliffe Line!
God help us! An Anglo Saxon westernised Nadir
Shah to spread fire and sword may not be a remote
possibility!
‘Realism’ ‘Courage’ ‘Vision’ and ‘Opportunism’ all
have their limits and uses. We hope that those who at
the moment are sitting on the pinnacles of power
will understand this and will act in a judicious
manner! The tide of history as Machiavelli says can
be manipulated with if dykes are built in time ! In
case this is not done it becomes irreversible and
destroys anything that comes in its way!
The original article Orders and Obedience was written in
Pakistan Military Academy Kakul while I was in first term
to assist my old class fellow CQMS Aamir (64 Long
Course) my class fellow from Saint Marys Academy
Lalazar thn in fourth term in writing his military essay.
The first draft was sent to Pakistan Army Journal for
publication in October 1989.The editor Colonel I.D Hassan
asked me to complete endnotes and finally the article was
published in Pakistan Army Journal in March 1991 when
Lt Col Syed Ishfaq Naqvi was the editor.
How organization can improve or deteriorate
decision making and its practical effects on outcome
of a battle.
\
BOOK
REVIEWS
BY Agha
Humayun
Amin
1999-2008
A HISTORYOF THEPAKISTAN
ARMY-BRIAN CLOUGHLEY
(REVIEWED BY MAJOR A.H
AMIN-RETIRED)
MARCH 1999
Brian Cloughley’s book on the Pakistan Army is a
welcome addition to the extremely limited number of
books on the Pakistan Army.The fact that such a book
was not written by a Pakistani soldier or a civilian
scholar does not paint a very bright picture about the
state of history writing,or to be more specific military
history writing in Pakistan.
Brian Cloughley has the singular advantage of having
served for a relatively long period in Pakistan as a UN
Official and as a military attache.In addition he is also
a soldier and thus his perception of military affairs is
different from a scholar who is a civilian and thus
suffers from certain limitations which can only be
overcome by extraordinary analytical ability and
painstaking hard research.Brian Cloughley has made
an honest attempt to present things as they are or as
he percieved them to be with whatever facts he could
lay hands to and the result is a relatively significant
work on Pakistani military history with reference to on
ground military performance of the Pakistan Army in
three Indo Pak wars.On the whole Cloughley’s
account is fairly balanced and the layman reader can
form a fairly continuous picture of the progress of the
Pakistan Army from 1947 to date.The initial history of
the Pakistan Army however is given a broad brush
treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and
military legacy is totally ignored.This leaves the
reader with an impression that the Pakistan Army was
an entity created in 1947 and all that it did from 1947
onwards had little connection with the pre 1947 British
Colonial policy and the military experience of the
Indian Army in the two world wars.The 1947-48
Kashmir War where the Pakistan Army got its baptism
of fire as the independent army of a sovereign country
is hardly discussed.Thus important military
controversies like the Operation Venus Controversy
etc are not discussed at all.The conduct of Kashmir
War by the Pakistani civilian leadership and and its
resultant impact on the army’s perception of the
civilian leadership is not discussed.The British
recruitment policy and their irrational advocacy of the
"Martial Races Theory" is not discussed at all.The
impact of the conservative British military heritage on
the intellectual development of the post 1947
Pakistani military leadership is totally ignored.The
Ayub period has been given a relatively more detailed
treatment and the conduct of 1965 war is reasonably
detailed and the analysis of military operations is
objective,critical and thought provoking.No serious
effort is however made to explain why the Pakistan
Army failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough
despite having technically superior equipment as well
as numerical superiority in tanks.
The 1971 war which was more of a one sided show
and a war in which Indian victory in the Eastern
Theatre in words of Field Marshal Mankekshaw was a
"foregone conclusion" keeping in view the
overwhelming Indian numerical superiority1 ,has been
discussed in much greater detail than 1965 war.This
is a serious draw back since 1965 deserved more
space because it had more lessons keeping in view
the fact that both sides employed their strategic
reserves.The post 1971 history of the army has been
given a better treatment and enables the layman
reader to understand many aspects of the present
state of confrontation in the Sub Continent.
There are many factual and analytical errors in the
book which were entirely avoidable and were not
beyond the author or the publishers control.The
publisher shares a major responsibility in ensuring
accuracy of facts while analytical errors or analytical
drawbacks are more within an authors sphere of
responsibility.15 Lancers was not raised in 1948-50
but in 19552.Iskandar Mirza was not from the ICS
(Indian Civil Service) but the Indian Political
Service3.The author has asserted that Ayub Khan
was "gallant in combat" 4but there is no record of it in
terms of gallantry awards or mention in
despatches.On the contrary Ayub was accused of
tactical timidity in Burma5.
Akhnur has been mentioned as the only road link to
Kashmir6 whereas Akhnur ,as a matter of fact was
the only road link to Poonch Valley only.The Indian 50
Para Brigade was not moved on 7th September to
relieve the 54 Brigade as asserted on page-87 but
made its appearance in the 15 Division area only on
10th September and that too in the Hudiara Drain
area7.On page-96 the author states that 13 Dogra in
4 Indian Mountain Division area captured Bedian but
was driven out by 7 Punjab’s counter attack the next
day.In reality 13 Dogra never attacked Bedian ,nor
was Bedian defended by 7 Punjab.
Bedian was defended by 7 Baluch and attacked by 17
Rajput.Further Bedian was not attacked by a unit from
the 4 Mountain Division but by a unit of 7 Indian
Division which failed to capture it in the first
place8.Jassar was not defended by a Pakistani Tank
Troop as written on page-110 but by the whole 33
Tank Delivery Unit9.The Jassar operation did not
result in release of a whole Indian tank regiment but
release of two infantry battalions and a squadron
minus10.4 FF was not part of 6 Armoured Division as
stated on page-117.
The whole "Order of Battle" of the Pakistan Army on
the Western Front as given on page-225 is
incorrect.Formations of the I Corps have thus been
shown as formations of 11 Corps and vice versa.8
Armoured Brigade which was a part of 1 Corps has
been shown as part of 4 Corps.Rahimuddin Khan has
been promoted to Zia’s son in law on page-275
whereas Ejaz ul Haq was Rahim’s son in law.
Aziz Ahmad the famous civil servant has been
described as Aziz Ali9a.The order of battle of the
Pakistan Army on page-284 has also some factual
errors;eg Pakistan Army does not have any
mechanised infantry divisions whereas the author has
shown two divisions as mechanised divisions.One
tank unit allotted to Pakistan in 1947 ie the 19
Lancers has not been listed at all in the list of
armoured units allotted to Pakistan10.
The author rightly wonders why some military
commanders guilty of timidity in Khem Karan were not
immediately sacked!But he fails to mention that one of
them was promoted to the rank of major general few
years after the war.His analysis of the Khem Karan
operations is considerably thought provoking.But the
major reason for failure of the Khem Karan offensive
ie poor initial planning which led to traffic congestion
and poor engineers effort and delayed the
concentration of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division
has not been discussed at all.
The author however rightly points out that failure to
carry out thorough reconnaissance was one of the
major reasons of failure of the Pakistani armoured
thrusts failure in Khem Karan.However his assertion
that the Indians had considerable reserves to contain
Pakistan Army even if it had achieved a breakthrough
is not based on material facts.India did have its 23
Mountain Division,but this formation was nowhere
near Khem Karan when the Pakistani offensive was
launched.In any case a Mountain Infantry division
could have been of little value against the Pakistani 1
Armoured Division.The analysis of the tank battles in
Sialkot is not comprehensive and lacks depth.
The authors assertion on page-120 that the ad hoc
force under direct command of the I Pakistani Corps
forced the Indians back to the border is not
correct11.The 24 Brigade which did so was a part of
the 15 Division and 25 Cavalry the tank unit which in
the words of Indians stopped them acted on orders of
its commanding officer alone and 1 Corps
Headquarter had little idea of what 25 Cavalry did in
stopping the Indians till the evening of 8th September.
The author has not mentioned 25 Cavalry at all which
in words of the Indian Armoured Corps’s historian;
was the unit whose " performance was certainly
creditable because it alone stood between the Indian
1st Armoured Division and its objective,the MRL
Canal 11a" and stopped the 1st Indian Armoured
Division on 8th September,all by itself.The authors
reproduction of the Indian writer Verghese’s views
that the Indian 1st Armoured Division dashed forward
rashly is not based on facts.The Indian advance was
fairly balanced and it was halted on 8th September
not because the Indians had completely committed
their armour but because the Commander 1st
Armoured Brigade lost his nerve because of false and
unsubstantiated reports of his flanks being under
counter attack at a time when both the advancing
Indian tank regiments had committed a total of only
three squadrons with three squadrons uncommitted
and the Indian 1st Armoured Division had a third tank
regiment totally fresh and in a position to easily
outflank the Pakistani armour in Gadgor area12.
The author has also not discussed at all the Indian
armours total lack of activity on 9th and 10th
September.This inactivity at a time when there was
just one tank regiment to oppose five Indian tank
regiments was the main reason for the Indian main
attack’s failure in Sialkot Sector.The treatment of the
1971 war is far more detailed than 1965 war.All the
emphasis is however on the Eastern Theatre where
the Indian victory in words of the Indian Chief was a
foregone conclusion.The author has highlighted
actions of bravery at small unit level and has shown
that the Pakistan Army put up a good show in East
Pakistan as far as the junior leadership was
concerned.The battles on the Western Theatre have
however been largely ignored and the battle of
Chhamb which was described by the Indians as "the
most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war 13" has
not been discussed in much detail.
Major General Eftikhar was the finest commander at
the operational level as far as the Pakistan Army is
conerned and any history of Pakistan Army is
incomplete without discussing Eftikhar’s brilliant
opearational leadership in Chhamb.Eftikhar was one
of the only two Pakistani senior commanders praised
by the Indian military historians.One Indian military
historian described him as one who "showed skill and
determination in carrying out his mission" .14The
analysis of the Bhutto period is quite comprehensive
and the personality of Mr Bhutto and his attitude
towards the army has been described quite
correctly.The sycophantic persoanlity of Zia has
however been given a generous treatment and many
of Zia’s well known antics to please Mr Bhutto like
orders to all officers of Multan Garrison to line up their
wives to greet Mr Bhutto’s cavalcade passing through
the Fort Colony have not been discussed at all.
No Mard i Momin except one solitary EME officer
Major Kausar had the moral courage to disobey this
illegal order and Zia immediately got him dismissed
from the army.
The intelligence and
operational failure in Siachen
on part of the ISI and the
formation responsible for the
defence of Siachen as a result
of which the Indians were
able to infiltrate 35 miles
inside Pakistani territory have
not been discussed at all.
On the contary General Pirdad who was the formation
commander during the Siachen debacle has been
praised as an admirable officer15.The authors
assertion that English language was neglected during
the Zia era is not based on facts.I was a cadet in Zia’s
tenure at the Pakistan Military Academy.Any cadet
who failed in English was not promoted to the next
term and English teaching and examination standards
were very tough.The crux of the problem was the
overall deteriorating English standards in Pakistan
following Bhuttos nationalisation of educational
institutuins and the relatively poor material joining the
army in the post 1971 era.
The post Zia era has been covered in a very incisive
manner.The authors assertion that the "Director
infantry" was a post that any infantry officerw ould
welcome is incorrect.Mahor General Zahir Ul Islam
Abbasi was posted as Director Infantry following a
diasastorous Charge of the light Brigade type attack
in Siachen which he had ordered without prior
approval of his next senior operational headquarter. in
which one of the Pakistani units suffered unnecesarily
high casualties including the death of a brigade
commander.The authors criticism of the ISI is
forthright,accurate and thought provoking.In this
regard he has shown courage in criticising a top
heavy agency whose much trumpeted reputaion is not
matched by actual on ground performance and which
suffers from a tendency to embark on private
wars.Brian Cloughley has done a remarkable job in
writing a fairly critical history of the Pakistan
Army.Most of the factual errors were avoidable but
something which should have been taken care of by
the publishers who knew that the author was a
foreigner and did not have the time to cross check or
recheck all the facts because of not permanently
residing in Pakistan.
The author appears to be too much of a gentleman to
critically analyse many of the Quixotic blunders of
Indo Pak military history. Nevertheless Brian
Cloughley’s book has filled a void in Indo Pak military
history by at least constructing a continuous and fairly
comprehensive picture of one of third worlds
important armies.Regardless of the fact whether any
one may agree or disagree with Cloghley’s
analysios.the book by and large retains the position of
a book which is compulsory for any layman or
foreigner doing research on the Pakistan Army.
BEHIND THE SCENES
Major General Joginder Singh
(Retired)
Lancer International -New
Delhi-1993
273 Pages-Fifteen Sketch Maps. ISBN-1-897829-205
Price-Hardbound-380/- Indian Rupees- (Not including
postage)
Reviewed by A.H Amin
August 2000
When I saw this books short description on LANCER
BOOKS promotional leaflet I immediately ordered one
through Bharat Verma's London UK office.I was very
excited and thought very seriously that this book
would be a really fine magnum bonum type of an
effort on the Indian Army.At that time I was writing my
book Pakistan Army till 1965 and hoped that this book
would be a tremendous help.Following are my
personal observations written in late 1999.“Behind the
Scenes”, setting aside other factors discussed in the
succeeding paragraphs still is a welcome addition to
the limited number of books available on the Indo Pak
wars. Major General Joginder Singh possesses the
distinction of being an insider in the higher Indian
command and staff echelons in the period 1958-65
and his analysis carries the weight of authority of a
man who saw how various operational and higher
command decisions were taken from close quarters.
Major General Joginder Singh the author was
commissioned in the 5th Battalion 14th Punjab
Regiment more popularly known as “ Ali Baba’s (its
commanding officers designation) Forty Thieves”
British Indian Army in 1937 after having joined the
army through the “Y Cadet Scheme”. Joginder saw
military action in the British operations against the
Frontier tribes in the late 1930s. He attended the 1945
Army Staff Course at Quetta, served in various
command and staff appointments including a stint at
the Indian Ministry of Defence, command of an
Infantry Battalion (7 Punjab), Commander 80 BrigadeNowshera Sector), Deputy Commandant Infantry
School, Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps during the
Sino-Indian War, GOC 5 Infantry Division and Chief of
Staff of the Western Command under three
successive GOC in chiefs. The last assignment
included 1965 War after which Joginder finally retired
in 1967.The book is divided into five parts and covers
the entire modern post-1947 Indian military history
with maximum space devoted to the 1965 conflict
while smaller tracts are devoted to the 1971 War,
Interwar years followed by a small section dealing
with the more recent developments.
The first part dealing with “National Strategy” feels
that strategic insight is sadly lacking in India’s higher
decision making echelons. He feels that politicians
leading India are short-sighted and self- centred and
feels that Indian higher leadership lacks the qualities
necessary to attain India’s position of natural
leadership in Asia.Joginder discusses in considerable
detail his experiences as 80 Infantry Brigade
Commander where he first advanced the possibility
that Akhnur bridge by virtue of being the sole link to
Poonch Valley and the fact that it was defended by
the weak 191 Infantry Brigade defending Chamb
Sector represented a serious imbalance in Indian
defensive posture in South Kashmir and that it was
most likely that Pakistan Army in case of war may
capture it with ease using a force of an armoured
brigade infantry division. Joginder states that a
divisional exercise was held based on this scenario in
April-May 1956 but the only outcome was that “GOC
26 Division was asked to proceed on pension” (Page28) while no other changes were made in operational
plans or organisational structure till 1965. The layman
readers may note that shortly before the September
1965 War the Indian High Command did agree to
upgrade the Chamb Brigade to a Divison in August
1965 but at the time of Grand Slam Chamb was
defended only by an infantry brigade and a squadron
of light tanks. Joginder devotes a small chapter to his
experiences as Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps
responsible for Indian Occupied Kashmir and
discusses his recommendations which included
creation of an infantry division to defend Chamb,
construction of a bridge on Chenab at Riasi as an
alternative to Akhnur bridge stationing of an
independent armoured brigade in Jammu area and
stationing of an infantry division size force as 15
Corps Reserve. None of the recommendations were
followed by Joginders bosses !
The author’s discussion of Sino-Indian War is not
much different from the other much known
discussions in various well circulated books, so it is
pointless to burden the readers with repetition of
much discussed issues.The most valuable albeit
controversial part of the book is the one dealing with
the authors experiences as Chief of Staff of the
Western Command before and during 1965 war. The
author had a high opinion of his first GOC Western
Command who died in a helicopter crash in 1963
along with four general officers and an airforce air
vice marshal. Joginder also had a very high opinion
about his second GOC Manekshaw. It was during this
period as the author discusses that the Western
Command carried out a detailed appreciation dealing
with a future Indo-Pak conflict and recommended an
offensive posture with attack aimed at isolating
Lahore (going for Balloki Headwork’s) and Sialkot
(from Jammu-Samba area) and against the Mangla
Dam-Mirpur area were planned.
It was during this period that the Western Command’s
proposals for opening a second front across the
international border Joginder states that the Army
Chief Chaudhry accepted the idea of opening a
second front in case of war across the international
border. Joginder, however, noted that by 1964 Nehru
incapable of taking any decisions due to bad health
and indifferent mental state while defence held a very
low priority with Nehru’s successor Shaastri. Thus the
1964 memorandum prepared by the Western
Command was simply filed away.
Joginder felt that General Chaudhri was not assertive
in presenting the Indian political leadership with the
true defence requirements.The controversial part of
the book begins once Lieutenant General Harbaksh
Singh enters the scene as the third boss of the author
as GOC Western Command in November 1964. It
appears that there was a personality clash between
Joginder and Harbaksh while Harbaksh’s book “War
Despatches” published before Joginder’s book
indicates that Harbaksh did not have a very high
opinion about Joginder.Joginder states that Harbaksh
wanted to base India’s main defence on River Bias
while abandoning the entire territory from the
international border till Beas.
While it is impossible to confirm or deny this assertion
it seems highly improbable that Harbaksh could hold
such an opinion whether one takes Harbaksh as an
Indian or a Sikh.Joginder states that at a conference
held in May 1965 the GOC of 1st Indian Armoured
Division advanced the thesis that the most likely axis
of Pakistani main attack was Patti-Harike -Beas
Bridge. It was this conference that the Indian Chief as
per the author agreed to deploy an armoured brigade
in Khem Karan area to meet the Pakistani armoured
threat emanating from Kasur area. Harbaksh Singh as
per the author thought otherwise giving a higher
priority to a Pakistani frontal threat in the Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor. Harbaksh Singh on the other hand states in
his book that he had appreciated before the war that a
Pakistani armour threat from Kasur towards the Beas
bridge was most likely.
There is no way in which Joginder’s assertions can be
proved or disproved.Joginder’s approach towards
Harbaksh Singh while discussing almost all aspects of
the 1965 war is hostile to the point of being irrational.
Thus he defends Major General Nirinjan Prasad who
was sacked for exhibiting timidity and cowardice by
Harbaksh Singh. Joginder thinks that Niranjan was
sacked not because he was irresolute but because he
was a difficult subordinate. Again it is not possible to
agree or disagree with Joginder about this assertion.
However, Niranjan’s sacking was even justified by
very neutral and dispassionate Indian military
historians like Major Praval. There is one fact which
stands out in 15 Division’s conduct on 6th, 7th and 8th
September, i.e its conduct keeping in view its
numerical superiority in infantry and the degree of
surprise that it had achieved on 6th of September was
not commensurate with the overwhelming advantages
that it enjoyed.
As a matter of fact many Pakistani defenders of
Lahore who were interviewed by this scribe were
surprised at the lack of initiative exhibited by the 15
Division in its operations on the 6th of September
1965. No one can deny the fact that two infantry
brigades of this division bolted away in face of
Pakistani counterattacks and that this led to a serious
operational crisis on the 8/9 September once the 96
Brigade was brought forward to check the conditions
of near rout. I am not implying that the Indians were
non- Martial as many Pakistanis earnestly believe
since it is a fact that a Pakistani unit from the Punjab
Regiment opposite Barki also bolted away. What I am
merely trying to point out is the fact that there was
something seriously wrong with 15 Indian Division at
divisional as well as brigade level. However, Joginder
denies it and sees Niranjan as an angel of a man
since Harbaksh sacked him.Niranjan was also called
Dhoti Parshad in Indian Army.
Joginder asserts that he gave a suggestion that the
BRB should be crossed at Barki , after the main
Indian attacks against Lahore had failed on 6-9th
September , but does not explain how it could have
been successfully done, keeping in view the net
performance of all Indian brigades of 7 and 15
Division tasked to contact the BRB, was pathetic by
all definitions. He asserts that he also suggested that
the 26 Indian Division should bypass Sialkot and
capture Sambrial west of Sialkot but does not explain
how an infantry division would do so when an
armoured division supported by two infantry divisions
had failed to capture even Chawinda which was
hardly 11 miles from the border.
The author asserts that Harbaksh Singh took no
interest in the main Indian attack i.e the 1 Corps
operations opposite Chawinda but does not explain
why it was so. Was it due to some inter arm rivalry or
because Harbaksh was not interested that India
should win the war?The author’s conclusion that there
was no worthwhile higher direction in 1965 war as far
as the Indian Army is concerned stands out as one of
the most credible conclusions of the book. His
assertion that the 1965 War was a show of some “20
Lieutenant Colonel and their units and about seven
regiments of the armoured corps....” is valid for both
the armies conduct in 1965.Joginder flatly denies that
General Chaudhri ever asked Harbaksh Singh to
withdraw to the Beas River.
General Kaul whose book was published many years
before Harbaksh Singh’s “War Despatches” had also
made a similar accusation (i.e that such a withdrawal
was suggested by Chaudhri). I came across a similar
assertion in another book by an Indian Colonel H.C
Karr’s book. It appears that Chaudhri did discuss
something with Harbaksh about re-adjusting his
position but since there is nothing on record,
therefore, only a Prophet or a Jinn may ever know
about what exactly happened. The possibility that
Joginder dismisses this incident since Harbaksh
Singh had written that it occurred cannot be denied
since “opposition for opposition’s sake” is one of the
cardinal attributes of the Sub Continental psyche.
The author agrees that the main failure at Chawinda
occurred in the handling of 1st Indian Armoured
Brigade on the 8th September 1965 but has spent far
more energy in painting Harbaksh Singh as the main
reason for the Indian failure all over the book. In this
regard it appears that the book had the support of the
Indian military establishment who were outraged by
Harbaksh very frank and forthright remarks about the
mishandling of Indian Army at various levels in the
1965 War. In this regard the book stands out as more
of a “Rejoinder” to Harbaksh’s “War Despatches” than
a study carried out in a detached manner with the aim
of correctly analysing the 1965 War.
The author gives no explanation why the Indians
wasted two complete days doing nothing following
their failure at Gadgor on the 8th of September. This
was the most critical phase of war for the Pakistanis
when they were off balance and it was possible for
the Indian armour to regain its freedom of manoeuvre
by outflanking the Pakistani force opposite them. The
situation after 10/11 September when the Pakistani
1st Armoured Division started reinforcing the 6th
Armoured Division was totally transformed. The major
Indian failure occurred on 8th 9th and 10th September
and was entirely because of indecisiveness and lack
of resolution in pressing forward on behalf of the
Indian 1 Corps/1 Armoured Division/1st Armoured
Brigade Commander.The author has also discussed
1971 War in brief but here his criticism is very mild
about the higher direction in the war. Indian Western
Command Chief Candeth has acknowledged in his
book that had the Pakistanis attacked in late October
1971 all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would
have been blown into winds. This proves that the
plans to invade East Pakistan were not as sound as
they appeared and that the Indian plan was only
carried out successfully since Yahya was irresolute
enough not to launch a counteroffensive in the
Western Front as had been planned before 1971 War.
Joginder does not explain how establishment of the
Bangladesh strategically helped India in the long run
since Bangladesh is militarily stronger than the old
East Pakistan and is not an Indian satellite as Indians
had envisaged.
Even Indian thinkers are divided about the strategic
success of the 1971 War! Was it fought to add
another feather to the Durga Devis cap or to liberate
the Bengalis ! Indira’s conduct after the 1971 War
does not paint a very bright picture about her
motivation to start the 1971 War. Even if the aim was
to help the Bengalis it failed since major killings by the
Pakistan Army whatever their quantum took place in
April-June 1971 and by November 1971 the situation
was far different from that of June 1971. Genocide
was committed but the Indians came not with a
missionary’s motive to help the oppressed but for
other reasons. Wars are not fought for missionary
purposes alone and 1971’s only enduring legacies are
“a more aggressive and militarily viable Pakistan
eager to vindicate its honour” and the creation of a
smaller ethnic state which proves that after a decade
or two all provinces of present day Indo Pak are
tomorrow’s full time members of the UNO!
In this regard the 1971 war as far as India was
concerned was a strategic failure and only a symbolic
success! It would have been a success only if India
had the resolution to overrun West Pakistan or to at
least recapture Pakistan held Kashmir.Joginder has
not discussed anywhere the relative failure of the
Indian command system especially with reference to
the Western Command. A dispassionate glance at the
conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars proves that the Indian
command system is too unwieldy and keeping in view
the frontage, location of formations and their number
it is very difficult for any man whether it is Harbaksh or
Manekshaw to effectively command anything like the
Western Command as it is and as it was in 1965 and
1971 wars.
Joginder’s hero Manekshaw had nothing to do with
actual operational command of any corps division or
command in any of the three Indo Pak wars. The
Indian failure at Chamb in 1971 which was criticised
by Joginder definitely had a connection with the
confusion in the Indian GHQ as the narratives of
Candeth and Gurcharan Singh prove. Joginder does
not explain why Chamb, which was adequately
defended in 1971, lost to Pakistan in 1971. It was a
command failure and had a deeper connection with
the divisional commanders personality and handling
of armour than with anything at brigade or unit level
where the Indian 191 Brigade was brilliantly led and
managed to hold three infantry brigades supported by
three tank regiments for more than two days.
An interesting revelation of the book is the fact that
Ayub Khan commanded the Chamar Regiment and
was under fire in WW Two and seen as not fit to
command a battalion of his parent regiment Punjab
Regiment.How should we analyse the Indian Army’s
failure in 1965 or how should I put it as a Pakistani?
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh
Joginder sees the hand of Harbaksh Singh in all
Indian failures in 1965! This, however, is too simplistic
an approach. There were deeper reasons for the
Indian (as well as the Pakistani) failure to function as
dynamic entities beyond unit level in 1965. The Indian
Army of 1965 was like the Austrian Army of 1809. It
consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but
was severely handicapped since rapid expansion
since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, despite being
impressive on paper had not made the Indian military
machine really effective because of poor training at
divisional and brigade level. It was numerically strong
but organisationally ineffective having dashing young
leaders but tactically and operationally inept brigade
divisional and corps commanders from the older pre1947 commissioned generation whom were initially
supposed not to go beyond company level, had the
transfer of power not taken place in 1947.
The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1
Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war
was a newly raised formation whose corps
commander and armoured divisional commanders
were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. The
Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the
case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had
experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two
and did not understand the real essence of armoured
warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to
the failures in achieving a decisive armour
breakthrough in both sides. It was a failure of
command as well as staff system where even the staff
officers on both sides were too slow for armoured
warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than
miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather
than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield
was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North
African experience where the Japanese and Germans
frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra
sensitive about their flanks. These were men who
thought in terms of security rather than speed.
Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having
been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented
British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life.
It was this British system in which every senior
commander was more interested in doing the job of
those one step junior to him that led to the lack of
dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level.
They were trained that way and there behaviour as far
as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be
taken in this context. How could one man, an army
commander responsible for three corps is made
responsible for failures that occurred at battalion
brigade and divisional level!Once I heard about
Joginder’s book in 1998, I had very high expectations
and was convinced that a man who has been the
Chief of Staff of the Western Command will be the
best judge of 1965 War. In this regard the book was a
big disappointment since instead of analysing Indian
military history it is more of a proof that Joginder
Singh was a very fine staff officer and that Harbaksh
Singh was a horrible man! Joginder’s book is a
welcome addition to the limited number of first
hand/direct participant accounts on 1965 War. The
fact that the writer has made some controversial
assertions and has made an effort to write a rejoinder
to Harbaksh Singh’s more famous “War Despatches”,
however, does not diminish the historical value of the
book, at least for the Pakistani readers of military
history.
I still maintain that the book thus retains the status of
“must be read and indispensable books” on the list of
all keen students of Indo Pak military history.
However, his anti-Harbaksh bias should be taken with
a pinch of salt. In addition his discussion of what
could have been done must be viewed in relation to
the relatively pathetic performance of both the armies
in all three wars. The under employment of Pakistan
and Indian Armies in all three wars have a deep
connection with the conservative British colonial
legacy. Harbaksh and various other actors were a
product of that system and were relatively better or
perceived to be better than their contemporaries and
thus elevated to the higher command ranks. It was
the outmoded system that proved to be a failure in all
three wars. Individuals were just the tip of the iceberg.
History of The Baloch
Regiment 1820-1939-The
Colonial Period-Major General
Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired) Published by Baloch
Regiment Centre,
Abbottabad; Printed by
Central Army Press
Rawalpindi (First Edition,
1998.)
Reviewed by A.H AMIN
October 2001
The two volumes on the history of the Baloch
Regiment are a welcome edition to the extremely
short list of books on Pakistani Military History. The
first volume covers the period from 1820 to 1939
while the second volume covers the period from 1939
to 1956. Major General Rafiuddin Ahmed took to
military writing at an early stage in his military career
and came to be regarded as an accomplished military
writer by the time he reached colonel rank in the mid
early 1970s. This scribe read a bunch of one of his
excellent writeups on German Airborne Warfare in
1975-76 at Quetta. These were presented to my
father by then Lieutenant Colonel Rafi and as far as I
recollect the general was then an instructor at the
command and staff college Quetta. The writers father
in laws family were active members of Aligarh Old
Boys Association Rawalpindi .The readers may note
that the most active members of this association
included a prominent Baluchi Brigadier Gulzar
Ahmad, and most meetings of the association were
held at this scribes grandfathers residence in
Rawalpindi , which now houses the Darya Abad Girls
School. A major qualification of General Rafi is that in
essence he is not a member of the “Typical Prototype
Generals Trade Union” having been promoted to
general rank a little late ! Before we proceed further it
is important to caution the layman reader about the
immense odds that a military writer confronts once he
writes a regimental history ! Writing a regimental
history of an infantry regiment consisting of many
battalions which participated in many wars including
two world wars spread over an 180 years period is a
gigantic undertaking ! It is but natural that any such
enterprise cannot be perfect or free of factual as well
as analytical errors ! In addition it must be
remembered that Indo Pak and this includes India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka is not a
“History Friendly” Region and “Intellectual Honesty” is
the rarest commodity in all official quarters whether
civil or military in this entire region of intellectual
darkness. Organisations as well as political parties
are run on the basis of personal interest rather than
national interest and at least two Indo Pak Wars were
triggered by individuals who were motivated by
egoistic and personal rather than nationalistic
motivations disguised in high sounding slogans! The
readers must also note that General Rafi’s history is
one which although not an official history was
“officially sponsored” in terms of financial support and
thus the general, as happens with all official or
officially supported intellectual ventures, even in far
more advanced western countries, was allowed to
proceed in a certain officially prescribed course which
did not allow him to be too critical in conduct of
operations of the post 1947 period involving “Sacred
Cows” of the Pakistani military establishment. In the
first volume however the general has been more
critical since those who called the shots then are now
patronless skeletons, little more than footnotes of
history and their conduct can be criticised. The
general has however made an effort to do some
critical analysis “in between the lines” which is
reasonable! At places he has been uncritical but the
first volume is certainly better since history is easier to
be written when the actors have long been dead and
are in no position to cause any mental or physical
discomfiture to the historian in question!The military
history of various battalions of the regiment has been
covered in an excellent manner linking the unit’s role
with the overall military situation. The narrative is
most interesting since the author has included various
incidents from unit histories involving details of battle
actions in which gallantry awards were won or
accounts dealing with military personalities. The
author does not hesitate from giving his opinion on
various historical aspects and this makes the
narrative more interesting. The battle accounts are
supported by excellent maps although credits for most
have not been mentioned in the acknowledgement
section. The photographs and paintings are of
excellent quality and make the book very interesting
to read. The author has taken pains to highlight the
role of the Baluchis in various remote campaigns in
East Africa in the late 1890s. Many in Pakistan were
not aware of these campaigns. The acounts dealing
with the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 and the First World
War are extremely well done . The analysis integrates
the pure military history aspect with the Indo Pak and
particularly Indo Muslim point of view. It is a difficult
exercise since the Indian Army was a mercenary
army and employed to fight against the freedom
fighters! The writer has managed to highlight the
performance of the Baluch Regiment and has also
been symapthetic to the Freedom Fighters. For some
reason he did not have any sympathy with the Sindhi
Hurs, but this shall be discussed in the next review of
volume two.The strangest part of the work is absence
of an introduction or a foreword by any retired or
serving Baluchi officer! This perhaps is an indication
of the lack of importance that we attach to anything
connected with intellectual activity! The emphasis
remains on self projection, personal advancement
and personal fortune building ! We have a large
number of so called illustrious retired officers! One
visit to ’Pindi, Islamabad or Lahore is enough to prove
their existence in terms of material progress! But what
is their intellectual contribution to posterity in terms of
transferring conceptual and intellectual experiences!
Nil! All did exceedingly well on paper but have nothing
to pen down! Ayub the longest serving chief wrote a
book but that book had little to do with military history!
Yahya was held in detention till he died and wrote
little or we know little about what he wrote! The breed
of Attique, A.I Akram etc is extinct! The lack of three
or four pages written by any senior officer, serving or
retired, and the Baluch Regiment did produce many
generals(!) as opening remarks in General Rafi’s
history is without doubt an irrefutable proof of our
intellectual bankruptcy!The first volume contains
factual errors which were entirely avoidable had the
writer relied simply on three or four standard books on
Indian Military history. The Safavids were overthrown
not by Nadir Shah (Page-8) but by the Ghilzai
Pathans from Afghanistan, who were previously
Persian subjects and who in turn were overthrown by
Nadir Shah in 1726. The Marhattas reached the
outskirts of Delhi not in 1738 (Page-9) but in 1737
(Refers-Page-436-Oxford History of India-Percival
Spear-1937 and Page-294-Later Mughals-Volume
Two-William Irvine-Calcutta-1921-22). The assertion
that “An Afghan power arose in Kabul” (Page-Nine
and Ten) is also incorrect. Ahmad Shah Abdali was
crowned as the first king of Afghanistan at Kandahar
in 1748 at the age of 23 and captured Kabul later but
kept his capital at Kandahar till his death and is buried
in Kandahar. Ahmad Shah did not begin his career as
a Mughal adversary (Page-Nine) but as a soldier in
Nadir Shah’s army and later made his entry into real
power politics once he plundered Nadir Shah’s
treasure in the chaotic situation after Nadir’s
assasination by his Qizilbash generals. Ahmad Shah
Abdali annexed Punjab not in 1754 (Page-10) but in
1751-52 (Refers-Page-434-The Cambridge History of
India-Volume Four-The Mughal Period-Edited by
Wolsely Haig and Richard Burn). The assertion that
Ahmad Shah Abdali won the gratitude of Muslims and
Hindus alike for defeating Marathas is also debatable.
The target of both the Afghans and the Marathas
were the rich and in this regard they did not give
anyone a waiver simply because he was a Muslim or
a Hindu! As a matter of fact Abdali proclaimed by
Iqbal as a great hero mercilessly subjected Muslim
Delhi and Muslim Punjab to merciless slaughter,
rapine and plunder and his deeds are a frequent
subject of even poetical works of Muslim poets like
Waris Shah and Mir Taqi Mir! The layman reader may
note that the loot that this so called soldier of Islam
gathered in 1757 alone from Muslim Delhi was carried
from Delhi to Afghanistan by 28,000 transport animals
! (Refers-The Pursuit of Urdu Literature-Ralph
Russell-Zed Books-London -1997-Distributed by
Vanguard Books-Lahore). Delhi was captured by
Lake not in 1805 (Page-11) but September 1803. The
writer has supported 1st Punjab’s claim (Page-30) of
being the 3rd Battalion of Coastal Sepoys which in
reality was the result of Lord Roberts decision to
replace Madrasis with Punjabi manpower in the
period 1885-1893. It is an indisputable fact that the
post 1885 Punjabi manpower had nothing to do with
the pre 1885 battlehonours of the 2nd, 6th,16th, 22nd
and 24th Madras Native Infantry which to date they
claim as their own. The men of 3rd Battalion of
Coastal Sepoys were not the ancestors of the post
1885 manpower of 1st Punjab. Technically the First
Punjabi claim is right but historically and ethnically no
one can deny the fact that some two third of the
manpower of the Madras Infantry of pre 1885 was
South Indian Hindu. The 1st Punjabis should thank
Lord Roberts for getting the pre 1885 Battle Honours
won by a regiment which consisted of some two third
Madrasi Hindus and one third Muslims of mixed
ancestry. Lord Hastings tenure lasted not from 181423 (Page-38) but from 1813-1823 having begun from
13th October 1813 (Refers-Page-238-A Popular
History of British India-W. Cooke Taylor-1854Reprinted Mittal Publications-Delhi-1987). The
assertion that the “British Government in India tried to
salvage its position through swift retaliation “(Page41) i.e teaching Afghans a lesson is incorrect. The
actual happenings were as following. The British
Governor General Ellenborough was irresolute and
simply wanted to withdraw the Bengal and Bombay
Armies from Kandahar and Jalalabad. His generals i.e
Nott and Pollock were more resolute and knew well
by their experience of having Jallalabad and
Kandahar successfully that the predominantly Hindu
sepoys of the Bengal and Madras Armies and a
smaller nucleus of British regiments could still teach
the Afghans some parting lesson by once again
capturing Kabul. It was resolution on part of both
these indomitable generals that the British recaptured
Kabul once again in Seprember 1842 and then
withdrew the Bengal and Bombay Armies via the
longer route i.e Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul-JalalabadKhaibar. (Refers-Pages-269 and 270- A History of the
British Army-Volume XII-1839-1852-Hon J.W
Fortescue-Macmillan and Co Limited-London-1927
and Refers-Page-407-Cooke Taylor-Op Cit). The
Governor General had initially given simple orders to
withdraw from Afghanistan in May 1842. It was under
military pressure that he agreed to a withdrawal after
recapturing Kabul ! The statement that “In January
1843 Amir Dost Mohammad returned to Kabul”
(Page-41) is misleading and implies that this “Amir”
was fighting some kind of war of liberation. As a
matter of fact this Amir had surrendered to the East
India Company’s troops on 3rd November 1840 and
living a comfortable life as a state prisoner with a
large number of wives at Ludhiana . He was released
not because of the myth in Afghanistan that he was
exchanged for British prisoners (who had a matter of
fact been released in 1842 by a British punitive
column) but simply because Ellenborough had
decided to follow a policy of good will as the Afghans
had not harmed the British non combatant hostages.
The British losses at Battle of Miani are described as
heavy (Page-50) although they were not relatively
heavy (about 62 Killed and 194 wounded) once
compared to British Indian Battles of that time like
Assaye, Chillianwalla etc. The writer states that there
were very few all Muslim battalions in Indian Army
except the three Baluch Battalions (Page-61). The
Bengal Army had six All Muslim infantry Battalions in
1893 i.e the 5th, 12th, 17th, 18th, 33rd and 40th.I was
unable to find footnote one in the main text of chapter
six. This probably was a printing error. The spellings
of Fortescue are not “Fortesque”. Delhi was
garrisoned not by six infantry regiments on 11th May
1857 (Page-80) but by three i.e the 38th, 54th, and
74th Bengal Native Infantry. There were no British
detachments in Delhi (Page 80) but few British
ordnance personnel serving as technical staff in the
magazine. Detachment in strict military terminology
means a subunit in between an infantry section or
platoon. The writer states that there were Bengal
Army units in Sindh (Page-81). This is incorrect since
there were no Bengal Army units in Sindh in 1857.
The two native units i.e 14 and 21 Native Infantry
were Bombay Army units. The two Bengal Army units
bearing numbers 14 and 21 Bengal Native Infantry
were at Peshawar and Jhelum respectively. 14 NI
rebelled and was destroyed while 21 NI remained
loyal, survived the rebellion and still survives as a unit
of the Indian Army.Both the Bombay Army units in
Sindh in 1857 however had a large number of
Hindustanis and one of them i.e the 21 Native Infantry
did rebel .Bengal Army was withdrawn from Sindh
after 1850 and the area was a part of Bombay
Presidency. Nicholson was not a captain from the
British Army (Page-86) but from the private Bengal
Army of the English East India Company. The term
“Maratha Army” ( Page-95,104 etc) is misleading.The
Gwalior Contingent led by Tantia Topi consisted of
Hindustani (Refers -The Revolt in Central India-185759-Intelligence Branch-Army Headquarters- Simla1908.) troops serving in Gwalior state and hardly had
any Marathas. The only other troops that Tantia led
consisted of Hindustani regiments of Bengal Army
stationed in Central India or the Doab. The Sepoy
Rebellion had some Maratha leaders but very few
Maratha soldiers since the largely Maratha Bombay
Army never rebelled.It is incorrect that the caste basis
was abolished and enrolment of Brahmins was
discouraged (Page-112) in the post 1857
reorganisation . As a matter of fact there were no
class basis in the companies of the pre 1857 Bengal
Army and all classes were mixed in each company .
On the other hand companies were recruited strictly
on “One Class” or “One Caste” basis in the
reorganised post 1857 Bengal Army. After 1857 more
loyal than the king loyalists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan
became self styled consultants on the policy of divide
and rule and suggested to their British masters that
the rebellion of 1857 had started because “
Government certainly did put the two antagonistic
races into the same regiment, but constant
intercourse had done its work and the two races in a
regiment had almost become one. It is but natural and
to be expected, that a feeling of friendship and
brotherhood must spring up between the men of a
regiment, constantly brought together as they are.
They consider themselves as one body and thus it
was that the difference which exists between Hindoos
and Mahomeddans had, in these regiments, been
almost entirely smoothed away. “( Refers- Page-66Causes of the Indian Revolt-1858-Sayyid Ahmad
Khan- Written after 1857 rebellion and presented to
Lord Canning the Governor General) As late as 1885
there were “caste companies” as well as companies
based on “ethnic classes” or “ethnic class cum
religion”.Thus there were at least 25 “Hindustani
Hindu Brahman Infantry Companies” in the Bengal
Army out of total 352 regular infantry companies
(Refers-Pages-406 & 407-A Sketch of the
Services of the Bengal Army up to year 1895-Lieut
F.G Cardew-Office of the Superintendent Government
Printing Press-Calcutta-1903).The assertion that the
first contingent consisting of Indian troops west of
Suez consisting of 126 Baluchistan Infantry in 1878
(Page-129) is also incorrect.The first Indian troops
were employed west of Suez Canal was in 1801
(when the Suez Canal had not been excavated)
(Refers-Pages 74 & 75-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op
Cit). These consisted of troops of Bengal and Bombay
Armies. There is no doubt that the first Indian VC was
won by the Baluch Regiment. However the writer
should have mentioned that Indians became eligible
for this award only from 1911. Lettow Vorbeck
complimented 11 Baluch but the odds that Lettow
Vorbeck faced were a hundred time greater than any
Indian British or South African troops.The readers
may note that Lettow Vorbeck with just maximum
3,500 white troops and maximum 12,000 native
troops kept at bay some 300,000 British South African
Colonial and Indian troops inflicting 15,000 battle
casualties on the allies , some 700,000 disaeses
casualties , one camp followers are included and a
financial loss of 350 Million US Dollars finally
withdrawing into Portueguese East Africa .(RefersPages-183 & 184-Concise History of WW ONEBrig Vincent.J.Esposito-Pall Mall Press-London-1965)
.Lettow did not surrender till the end and did so only
once he heard that Germany had concluded an
armistice with the allies!The assertion that
Afghanistan took advantage of the British involvement
in the Great War(Page-217) and attacked British India
is also incorrect.The Afghans missed the golden
period in WW One once India was defended by a total
of just 15,000 British troops (Refers -Page-479Cambridge History of India-Volume Six ) .Once they
attacked the British the war was already over and the
British had reinforced India. The most serious
drawback of the book is the fact that exact class
composition of each battalion in WW One and in the
period 1919-39 has not been given.The readers must
note that errors are a natural part of any historical
work.The resource starved and intellectually barren
Pakistani society is not “Research friendly”.Pakistani
scholars cannot hire research associates like
Churchill could.It is a one man show and once one
man does it , it is but natural that more errors will be
committed. Nevertheless the writer did a
commendable job.His achievements have to be
viewed in the relative dimension. What is the
contribution of our senior retired officers to military
writing? Nominal ! In this regard General Rafi’s history
is a positive contribution ! At least he has made a
significant attempt to add something to the limited
amount of analytical and factual data of Pakistani
military history. I remember a letter I received from
General Tirmizi in reply to a tactical paper that I had
sent him.Tirmizi wrote “ I have not studied the concept
but I do commend your effort for taking so much pain
and coming up with something thought providing”.
General Rafi’s work is thought provoking provided it is
read. What he states may not be totally convincing
but it will hopefully cause some ripples and perhaps
will spur some lazier minds to make another
intellectual endeavour ! A vain hope , but one which
we must entertain ! The printing is excellent and the
quality of paper excellent. General Rafi has made a
landmark effort in military history writing. His work has
filled a serious void in Pakistani military history. We
wish him best of luck with the third volume and hope
he will be more forthright in dealing with Pakistani
military history which has been promiscuously mixed
with myths and fantasies.
History of The Baloch Regiment 1939-1956
Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired)
- Published by Baloch Regiment Centre, Abbottabad;
Printed by Central Army Press Rawalpindi
(First Edition, 2000)
Columnist Maj Gen (Retd) RAFIUDDIN AHMED’s
book is reviewed by AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN.
The second volume of Baloch Regiment history is a
welcome addition to the extremely limited number of
books on Indo-Pak military history. Maximum part of
the volume deals with the Second World War.
The author has laid greater stress on the general
military history of the Second World War than on
Baloch Regiments’ role in it. This appears to have
been done since limited material was available on the
regimental histories of the Baloch units which
participated in the war and the fact that the Baloch
Regiment was relatively a much smaller regiment
than the Punjab or the FF Groups.
The first chapter contains a good description about
the organisation of the Baloch Regiment. The details
pertaining to units raised during World War Two are
sketchy. A casual remark states that “new classes
and areas were included” but no specific figures have
been given.
The portions dealing with events of Second World
War are excellent for the layman readers. The author
has also dealt with the political aspects of Indian
perceptions about the Second World War, with
special stress on the difference between Muslim
League and Congress Party positions.
The descriptions about circumstances in which
various gallantry awards were won in WW Two are
very well written. Yahya Khan’s escape is described
in a very interesting manner, however, the author has
not discussed the Axis Camp Commandant’s warning
to Yahya about having him shot once he was caught
escaping before his final successful escape. This
incident has been mentioned in one of Shaukat Riza’s
books (The 1965 War). The author made a passing
reference to General Messervy’s getting captured by
the Germans in North Africa while giving his
designation but not name. Had he mentioned his
name the narrative may have been more interesting
since Pakistan Army’s first C in C was a German
prisoner for some time as a general officer before he
escaped (the Germans not knowing that they had
captured the British general officer commanding a
British armoured division).
The author’s treatment of 1947-48 War could have
been more extensive. He has once again quoted
Fazal Muqeem’s criticism of Liaquat about calling off
Operation Venus but has not given detailed reasons
as to how it may have succeeded when the Indian
Army in December was well poised to meet it. Even
the Pakistani official account of 1970 written many
years later refutes Fazal Muqeem’s criticisms. Rafi
should have been more critical and should have given
a dispassionate and concrete analysis rather than
repeating Muqeem’s criticism. It should not have been
difficult for the author to analyse the detailed pros and
cons of the projected operation Venus. This
discussion would certainly have added meat to the
bones i.e. reproduced judgement of Fazal Muqeem
Khan. It is fifty two years now from 1948. One
wonders whether the 1948 war would ever be
properly analysed or not!
The volume contains some minor factual errors. The
German Blitzkrieg struck across Western Europe not
in June 1940 (Page-16) but in May 1940. Rajauri was
not captured by a brigade group (Page-206) but by a
tank squadron of Central India Horse by a surprise
attack through a nala. The infantry brigade later joined
the tank squadron after Rajauri had been captured.
The book contains extremely elaborate and detailed
appendices dealing with various aspects of Baloch
regiment history. The research scholars, very rare in
Pakistan, will find these particularly useful.
The second volume on the whole is a fine contribution
to Pakistani military history. We hope that the book
will cover many blanks in Pakistani military history.
We hope that General Rafi will be more forthright,
critical and blunt in his third volume which covers the
1965, and 1971 wars.
--
231
Crossed Swords , Pakistan,Its Army,and the Wars WithinShuja Nawaz , Oxford University Press,Pakistan , 2008700
pages; 13 black and white photographs, 6 maps; ISBN13:
978-0-19-547660-6ISBN10: 0-19-547660-3
Book Review
A.H Amin
Crossed Swords is the latest addition to the list of books
dealing with Pakistan Army . Written with an eye on the
Western audience by a Pakistani who has settled in USA the
book is a welcome addition to books on Pakistan Army.It
contains some new sources and some new information
232
.Unfortunately most of the information is anecdotal and the
narrators are extolling their own performance.
The author's viewpoint is somewhat subjective as he is a
brother of one of the ex chiefs of Pakistan Army General Asif
Nawaz.
The book contains some factual errors , some possibly typing
errors,expected from Oxford University Press Pakistan which
has a reputation of doing this.Some errors are however
historical and factual and were entirely avoidable.On page 8
3rd Light Cavalry of Meerut fame is written as 3rd Light
Infantry and on page 9 becomes 3rd Light Cavalry.On page
22 Ayub Khan is placed in Assam regiment though Ayub's
battalion officer Joginder Singh specifically stated that Ayub
Khan was in Chamar Regiment in WW Two.On page 426
Naseerullah Khan Babar is promoted to lieutenant general
and similar fate befalls Major General Sarfaraz Khan on page
223.13 Lancers becomes 13 Cavalry on page 305.On page
470 he changes the ethnicity of Sardar Balakh Sher Mazari a
Baloch Seraiki by calling him a Punjabi , an honour that no
Baloch would like to have.
A far more serious error Shuja makes while discussing the
ethnic composition of Pakistan Army on page 570.He states
that Sindhis and Baluchis are 15 percent of Pakistan
Army.This is a serious distortion of history.The term Muslim
Sindhi and Baluchi abbreviated to MS & B was given to
Ranghar/Kaimkhani/Khanzada Rajout recruitment in Pakistan
Army in 1950s.The aim was to rationalise the recruitment of
Ranghars in Pakistan Army.Later the usuper Zia in order to
appease the Sindhis created the Sindh Regiment but Sindhis
as far as my resaech reveals are far less than
233
Ranghars/Kaimkhanis/Khanzada Rajputs in the army.The
Ranghars are a significant class in fightig arms being some at
least 35 % of armour and distinct from Punjabis.The Baloch
are hardly represented in the army.As a matter of fact the
Pakistan Army has such a reputation in Balochistan that no
Baloch would like to join it.All thanks to General Musharraf,Zia
and ZA Bhuttos policies.
These are expected errors and more so from Oxford
University Press Pakistan known for changing authors
photograph with those of their uncles on jackets of books as
they did with Colonel M.Y Effendi in his book Punjab Cavalry
published by Oxford University Press in 2007.The old prince
narrated to me the sad story when I met him and was also
quite cheesed off by the fact that the princess running the
Oxford Pakistan is too arrogant to meet any author or to even
discuss anything on telephone.
It is significant to note that so disgusted did Effendi become
with this Ameena Syed of Oxford that he withdrew his books
rights from Oxford University Press Pakistan.Its possible that
Effendis book was deliberately sabotaged by Ameena Syed
as her brother brigadier Javed Hussian was with Effendi in the
tank corps and both did not get along well.
The above errors are insignificant.However Shuja has made
some asertions which can be classified as serious errors or
even distortion of history.On page 71 he asserts that calling
off of Operational Venus by Pakistan's civilian government
was one of the reasons why the 1947-48 war failed.I state this
because the sub title of the chapter is " Why the War
Failed".On the other hand he fails to point out the major fatal
decision when the Pakistani government refused to allow the
armoured cars of 11 PAVO Cavalry to assist the tribesmen in
234
breaking through to Srinagar.Those who are not familiar
should know that the main reason why the tribals failed to take
Srinagar was because Indian armour counterattacked them
and destroyed them at Shalateng.This fact was discussed by
Brig A.A.K Chaudhry also in his book.Operation Venus plan
came much later.At that time the Indian Army was well
established in Kashmir and well poised to meet any
threat.Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any
written accounts of their war experiences. General Iqbal who
participated in the war and later on rose to the rank of full
general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long
after the Kashmir War made one very thought provoking
remark about the Kashmir War in an article in the Pakistan
Army Green Book 1992. This particular publication was sub
titled 'Year of the Senior Field Commanders'. Iqbal wrote;
'During 1948 Kashmir Operations I saw one senior officer
sitting miles behind the frontline and counting availability of
mules and rations. He had relegated the fighting to a senior
battalion commander .In 1963 once Major General Fazal I
Muqueem Khan in his book The Story of Pakistan Army .Fazal
thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her greatest
hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it
was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that opportunity
pass. Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of pressing
advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly
neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason,Pakistan's
reluctance to accept the risks of continuing the war,cost her
Kashmir at that time. It was a risk worth taking."
The Pakistani attack force collected for Operation Venus
consisted of about six infantry battalions and two armoured
regiments. To oppose this the Indians had two infantry
brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80 Infantry Brigade) .In
addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area
235
i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse . In addition the
Indians also possessed more than 10 other armoured
regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or
Western UP and could move to Kashmir. We shall see in
1965 how Pakistani armour functioned and the reader can
keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how Pakistani
armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus;
had it been ever launched!Fazal does not explain how capture
Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of
Indian hold over Kashmir,apart from temporary severing of the
line of communication to Poonch.Greater part of the Central
India Horse was at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while
Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was also within striking
range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair!
Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to
Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan Army.He merely
said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom of
cease-fire'.
Lately in an article General K.M Arif adopted a more rational
viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of 1948 was
mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position to
fight it successfully summing it up by stating ; 'It is too
hazardous a risk to fight a war on ad hoc basis'.There is no
doubt that Pakistan was in a favourable position to win the
Kashmir War at least till the first week of November. Mr
Jinnah exhibited great Coup de Oeil when he ordered Gracey
to employ two brigades and advance with one brigade each
towards Jammu and Srinagar. But Mr Jinnah was unlucky in
possessing no one like Patel and his Prime Minister and his
entire Cabinet proved to be an undoubted failure at least as a
war cabinet! Mr Jinnah's decision not to have a Pakistani C in
C although taken in the best interest of the country and the
Army as Mr Jinnah saw it ensured that the British acting C in
236
C procedurally blocked the execution of Mr Jinnah's orders in
October to attack Kashmir. Pakistan was unlucky in having a
man like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence.Mirza did
not advise Mr Jinnah correctly and the fact that he had hardly
served in the Army and did not understand military affairs
further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister
remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as
they were when they were in high school. It is incorrect to
criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December 1948
the Indian position was much more secure than in 1947.Liaqat
can be criticised for not ever visiting Kashmir while the war
was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in pressurising
Gracey in October 1947 to order the Army to attack
Kashmir.Had a Pakistani C in C been appointed even in
December or in March 1948 the Indians may not have held on
to Poonch-Nowshera area at least. Had Major Masud been
allowed with his armoured cars on Domel-Baramula Road
despite Ghazanfar Ali and Sher Khan's objections;Srinagar
may have been captured by the Tribesmen by first week of
November 1947. The Indians were lucky in having
comparatively more regular army officers who led from the
front and is evident from higher officer casualties among
Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the
Pakistan Army.
The treatment of 1857 is also very superficial.The author
states that the Bengal Army which rebelled some 80 % were
Purbias (page.7) , but fails to point out that the vast majority of
cavalry which led the rebellion notably at Meerut i.e 3rd Light
Cavalry which actually captured Delhi was Muslim and mostly
Ranghar Muslim.His use of the term British for the pre 1858
period is also factually incorrect as India till 1858 was ruled by
the English East India Company using mostly its private
Bengal Army ,Madras Army,Bombay Army , its private
237
European regiments and some regiments on rent from British
Army to conquer ventire India.
In discussion of Martial Races Theory the author totally
ignores the fact that Punjab Loyalty in 1857 to the British was
one of the main reasons why martial races theory was
evolved.This is a simple point noted even by British writers
like Philip Mason.The author also fails to note the politically
important fact that the English East India Company's army
was the knight in shining armour which saved the Muslims of
Punjab and settled areas of present Pashtun NWFP from the
Sikhs who were using Muslim Mosques as stables gunpowder
magazines and plastering their walls with cowdung.Perhaps
this fact did not suit the martial races ruled by a 10 %
minority,the Sikhs in the Punjab and settled Pashtun areas for
more than four decades in Punjab and some two decades in
modern NWFP's settled districts.
The author talks about martial races theory and thinks that
martial races theory was all about Punjab and Frontier as it is
now but perhaps does not know that one of martial races
theory's most famous exponent Major General Macmunn
regarded the Khanzada Rajputs of Firozpur Jhirka as the
finest fighting race in India.
The author also fails to note that the Sikhs were in majority in
the fighting arms till First World War and were reduced to a
minority by being replaced with Punjabi Muslims after First
World War because the Punjabi Muslims were regarded as
phenomenally loyal , even against Muslims by the British.Thus
the author conveniently ignores two important developments
of WW One i.e the Singapore rebellion of 129th Light Infantry
by Ranghar Muslims and the tribal Pashtun mutinies against
238
British as a result of which tribal Pashtun recruitment was
reduced to the gain of Punjabi Muslims.
In discussion of Ayub Khan the author totally ignores
allegations about Ayub's tacfical timidity in Burma.This
incident was discussed by three writers of the time.Major
General Joginder Singh of Indian Army who was Ayub's
battalion mate , Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was an ex Indian
Army officer and Major General Sher Ali Khan.In an article
Brigadier Nur Hussain a reliable authority did state that Ayub
Khan was close to General Gracey because they drank
together.
The authors discussion of old officers is also partial.On page
31 he notes that Brigadier Gul Mawaz got an MC , a medal
which many earned but fails to note that Major General Akbar
Khan won a DSO which is higher in scale than MC.On page
33 he states that " Akbar Khan who gained notoriety in
Kashmir ....." .Akbar Khan was the pioneer of Kashmir war but
Shuja thinks that he was notorious.A strange assertion.
Mr Jinnah's historic decision of creating two infantry battalions
of Bengalis is also not all discussed by the author.It may be
noted that Ayub Khan refused to expand the East Bengal
Regiment till 1966 as a result of which the Bengalis were
further alienated for not being given the due share in the
armed forces.this decision was reversed by Yahya Khan in
1966 but by then it was too little too late.
The authors analysis of origin of officer corps is also
superficial.He fails to note the 50 % ranker quota that the
British kept for Indian rankers in the officers selected for IMA
Dehra Dun in order to keep the Indian officer corps slavish
and backward.
239
The author does note the fact that Pakistani SSG captured
Indian War Plan on Samba Kathua road before the war
actually started but fails to note the fact that it was Pakistan's
Military Intelligence led by Director Military Intelligence
Brigadier Irshad who refused to give any serious thought to
this discovery and dismissed it as an Indian ruse.This was
revealed to this scribe in an interview by Major General
Naseerullah Khan Babar in March 2001.
The most serious distortion of history committed by Mr Shuja
Nawaz is on page 226 when he gives the credit of 25
Cavalry's action of 8th September 1965 at Gadgor to Brigadier
Abdul Ali Malik.The authority he quotes is Farouk Adam , then
a very junior officer and not in 24 Brigade Headquarter.
It must be clarified that a good military historian or analyst's
prime motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write
"what men did" rather than what "they ought ideally to have
done" or what "someone later with the benefit of hindsight
tried to portray , what they had done". Thus the analysis of
Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any
inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and
unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately
separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. History as
Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a
free country and ours has been continuously under civil or
military dictators since 1958.
I maintain as one great master of English prose said that "all
history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence
is romance"!
Battle of Chawinda was thus not romance! What many in this
country wrote and was outwardly military history was
240
essentially "Romance"! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth
promiscuously mixed with reality!Chance plays a key role in
battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role!
Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in
front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also
did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance
saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were
created! I repeat "Heroes were created" ! The hero had to be
from the Salt Range however ! At least Shuja Nawaz wants it
this way !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was
"casualties" ! These were deliberately hidden since these
would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have
discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on
parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in
the biggest military blunder "Operation Gibraltar"! This is Top
Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no
mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not
national interest but to preserve or more important to "guard
reputations"
Now lets talk about the broad front deployment that Shuja
Nawaz refers to .There is no doubt that the "broad front
deployment" was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier
Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar
also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland
when both contending fleets were running towards each other
at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and
what actually happened even today is hard to understand,
whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight!
Shuja Nawaz here in his 600 page book offers no tangible
proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with
what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to "do
241
something" as clearly stated by an authority no less than
Pakistan Army's official historian Major General Shaukat
Riza,apparently not from Jhelum or from North of Chenab by
a twist of fate .There is no doubt that Nisar did something
without the least clue of what was in front of him. The
important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting
paralysed into inertia and inaction! The "Do Something" order
by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry should not
have been glorified to something higher by Shuja Nawaz
simply on authority of an article written by a person who was a
company 2IC in an infantry battalion of 24 Brigade and that
too only in 1992.This is a serious historical failing.At least in a
military historian but is the Oxford University Press Pakistan
run by professionals.One may ask Colonel M.Y Effendi.
The same words of Brig A.A Malik " Do Something" were
repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan Army
Journal in 1997. Perhaps Shuja Nawaz did not read all the
accounts of direct participants.Perfectly excusable as he is
based in USA.But not good military history certainly.The fact
is that the 25 Cavalry on 8th September 1965 was functioning
in a vacuum.Brig A.A Malik had no clue about armour warfare
and Nisar had no higher armour headquarter to guide him.. 24
Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun
and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which
was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few
miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire
Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an extraordinary
situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since
Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do
something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know
what was in front of him and acted boldly and
unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he
may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is
242
speculation and some part of history always remains
unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and
deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which
took place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours
was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two
leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus
the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated "The Armoured
Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in
the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy
had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its
paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It
took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move.
This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th
Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate
had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile
gains had been irretrievably lost" (Refers-Pages-393 &
394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh
Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians
acknowledged "This regiment's (25 Cavalry) performance was
certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st
Indian Armoured division and its objective, the MRL canal".
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
This is not the only source.Major Shamshad a direct
participant has already stated on record that SJs were
awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single
man was killed on both sides! Here he refers to Major Farouk
Adam.This reminds me of an incident in armour school
Nowshera in 1991.I was an instructor in Tactical Wing.The
Senior Instructor incharge of the Young Officers Tactical
course asked us , " Should we give an Alpha Grade" . My lone
reply was that no Sir , since Armour School gives Alpha to
sons of generals only .This was a norm then .The Infantry
School where I did the junior tactical course but later on it
243
started giving alphas after 1985 to oblige some sons of
generals.But that is how Pakistan Army is.
The historical fact remains that 25 Cavalry was part of 24
Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th
September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On
9th and 10th September no fighting took place as Indians had
withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th
September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade
was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there
was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be
classified as one characterised by "absence of clear and
precise orders"!
Shaukat Riza's book is basically a compilation of existing
facts. It has historical value since Riza was allowed access to
official records.Shaukat had no axe to grind . Shuja Nawaz by
his own confession is a close relative of A.A Malik.
Shuja also forgets Brig A.A Malik's request to withdraw when
Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September
and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was
brought to light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by
the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General
K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book
Khaki Shadows.
Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as
I know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at
Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was launched
thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter
published in Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered
enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area.
Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when
244
it disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of
Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF
but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.
Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in
terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps suffered less
casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.
A.A Maliks poorly planned counterattacks leading to bloody
casualties for Pakistan Army were also discussed by Major
General Fazal i Muqeem in his book on 1971 war.
On page 233 while discussing the main Pakistani offensive
the author fails to point out that the Pakistanis had a 7 to 1
superiority in tanks and yet they failed.Further he fails to point
out the fact that major failure of Paskistani 1st Armoured
Division occured ion the 4th Brigade where its commander
Brigadier Bashir ordered its tank regiments every night to
return to leaguer at their start point every night thus
abandoning all territory they had gained during the day.
In the treatment of Chamb Operation of 1971 the most
significant decision of Major General Eftikhar to switch from
North to South is not discussed at all.This was one of the
most landmark operational decisions in history of Pakistan
Army.The author also fails to highlight the cowardly action of
then Brigadier Rahimuddin Khan in not joining 111 Brigade on
pretext of dealing with Shiekh Mujibs trial.This great warrior
later rose to full general in Pakistan Army.
Shuja also gives no thought in his worthy analysis to Pakistan
Army's launching a pre-emptive attack on India in September
1971.This if done in the words of Indian Commander Western
Command General Candeth would have thrown all Indian
245
plans to attack East Pakistan to the winds . (Refers-The
Western Front -Candeth).
In the chapter dealing with Z.A Bhutto Shuja does not discuss
the cadrisation plan proposed by ZA Bhutto and his tasking of
Pakistan Army's Military Operations Directorate to implement
it.This plan if implemented would have reduced the standing
army in size and enabled the Pakistani government to spend
more money on training.This plan was scrapped by Zia in
1977.
On page 477 he states that “ Abbasi was the man who had
been removed from his command in the Kargil area of
Kashmir…………after having undertaken an unauthorized and
costly foray into Indian held territory in 1990‿.Now this comes
straight from a man who repeatedly claims nearly total access
to all direct participants.
Now the facts of the above situation. Poor General Abbasi
had done nothing in Kargil.
First the use of the word Kargil by Shuja Nawaz is
unwarranted and irrelevant and above all totally out of context!
Abbasi’s command was not just Kargil only but a much larger
area i.e. the entire Northern Areas of Pakistan.
Second the foray he Shuja refers to was not launched in 1990
but in 1992 when Shuja Nawaz’s very own brother was the
army chief!
Third the foray was not as unauthorized as claimed by Nawaz.
Abbasi was commanding the FCNA, part of 10 Corps
Rawalpindi and his corps commander Lieutenant General
G.M Malik,a man of extreme ambition had a tacit
246
understanding with Abbasi that in case he succeeds he was a
part of the team and if Abbasi failed G.M did not knew about
the attack ! A very typical and known phenomenon in all
armies, organizations and bureaucracies all over the world.
Fourthly poor Abassi’s unauthorized foray was not in Kargil
but in Siachen an area far away from Kargil.
Lastly Abbasi had been packed off to the FCNA in late 1990 a
time when snow made any foray in Kargil or Siachen
impossible. This happened once Abbasi expressed
disagreement with the then corps commander 4 Corps Lahore
Alam Jan Mehsud.The incident was narrated by this scribe to
then Brigadier Salahuddin Tirmizi (later lieutenant
general).Alam Jan thought that Abbasi should be posted to
FCNA where he could catharsize his spirit of Jihad on those
snowy rocky icy pinnacles of Siachen Glacier.Catharsize he
did, with disastrous and bloody results in 1992.Not 1990 as
this privy to inside sources in the army claims. And that too
when his brother was army chief.A sad reflection on how an
operation was mounted by an overzealous divisional
commander, with secret authorization of his direct superior
corps commander, while keeping a so called professional
army chief in absolute darkness ! A sad but logical end to the
career of Abbasi who was a more upright and internally
motivated general officer and shoulders above most of the
general officers that I saw in my army service.
Shuja Nawaz repeats the above assertion again on page.509
when he states that “among the many attempts to gain
advantage at Kargil was a failed attempt in 1990 by……Major
General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi‿.
On the same page again Shuja once again repeats the same
247
totally incorrect assertion “without clearance from the army
chief General Mirza Aslam Beg,Abbasi launched an attack on
the LOC‿ .Poor Beg the target practicing range of Shuja
Nawaz had no connection with Abbasi’s ill fated attack in 1992
! Beg had retired in August 1991.
Burhanuddin Rabbani promoted or demoted to Mullah
Burhanuddin Rabbani by Shuja Nawaz on page.479 was the
president of Afghanistan in 1992 and not “subsequent‿ to
1994 as stated by Shuja.
In footnote.2 on page.502 Shuja Nawaz has forcibly thrust the
honour of being Chief of Staff 12 Corps on General Kakar,
when he states that Kakar served as Chief of Staff of 12
Corps at Quetta under Rahimuddin (famous for not joining his
command in Chamb in 1971 thus making his then
commanding general Major General Eftikhar state that he
would court martial this man after the war. To Rahimuddin’s
good luck Eftikhar embraced martyrdom in the war and
Rahimuddin survived).This is a factual error as 12 Corps at
Quetta did not exist at that time. This corps was raised
somewhere in 1985 when Rahimuddin was already the
chairman joint chiefs.
In the same footnote Shuja Nawaz states that Kakar was
wounded at Chawinda in 1965 war .When the 1965 war
started Kakar was at intelligence school in Murree.This
assertion of Kakar being wounded while possible is
questionable .Its possible that Kakar joined his unit in later
part of the war.
On page.508 Nawaz states that “one of the first actions in
1948 Kashmir war was the securing of Kargil heights by
248
Pakistani forces.This is a serious factual error. The first major
action of the 1947-48 Kashmir war was the attack on
Muzaffarabad in October 1947 and the seizing of heights near
Kargil happened much later in May 1948 by the Eskimo Force
of Gilgit Scouts under Captain Shah Khan (later an air force
officer).As a matter of fact Kargil itself was captured by the
Gilgit Scouts and they had then captured Zojila Pass and
advanced across it. But all this happened much later after
October 1947.
Good in details, written from the relative calm and safety of
USA, this book possibly written with good intentions, got lost
in the woods of details and failed to present the broad picture.
Many Bhagwans of military history reviewed it and failed to
find any fault with it!
On page 471 Shuja glorifies General Kakar for having no
liking for politics.He ignores the fact that Kakar was not
groomed for higher ranks and was promoted because of
ethnic biases.Simply because a Pashtun president was
comfortable with a harmless compatriot.He also fails to note
that General Kakar acted against Nawaz Sharif not because
Kakar was a democrat but simply because he feared Nawaz
as a threat to his chair of army chief.General Musharraf has
himself acknowledged in his book that General Kakar was
parochial and was favouring Pashtun officers.No compliment
to an army chief who is supposed to be a much bigger
man.No wonder that Kakar had been packed off to a
backwater in Quetta by General Baig.Becoming chief was
something that a man of Kakar's mediocre intellect could
never have imagined but this happened only because of party
baazi in the army and the fact that Ghulam Ishaq Khan
249
wanted a Pashtun brother.Fair enough in a backward and
tribal medievaal society like Pakistan !
It is my conviction based on a deep study of that period,that if
Kakar would have been the army chief in 1996 and 1997
General Musharraf or any non Pashtun officer would never
have become the army chief ! Why ? Simply because
Musharraf was not a Pashtun ! Here it must be noted that
Jahangir Karamat ,Kakar's successor was miles above Kakar
in intellect as well as professionalism.Though a Punjabi he
was not from the more parochial tract of area between
Chenab and Indus and thus a man with a broader outlook.Its
a tragedy of the Pakistan Army that he became a victim of a
conspiracy made successful by his own brother officers in ISI ,
that too because there was that parochial net during that time
between the then prime minister and the boss of the prime
inter service security agency.
The author lauds caretaker premier Moin Qureshi's role in
making the state bank independent but forgets Qureshi's most
controversial release of advance to Bayinder Turkey for
Islamabad Peshawar Motorway while also stating that this
project was uneconomical.This gained nothing but total loss
for Pakistan as Bayinder repatriated many million dollars
without doing anything and later successfully sued Pakistan
for huge damages in International Court of Justice at Hague.
On page 480 Shuja extols Talibans wild west justice in
hanging Afghan President Dr Najeeb but fails to note the
allegation that Pakistani agencies were suspected to be
behind the assasination of Mulla Borjan the most popular and
independent leader of the Taliban.
250
On page 481 Shuja quotes Benazir to prove that General
Kakar was a brilliant strategist.What did Benazir know about
strategy and what strategy did Kakar ever successfully
execute other than removing a Punjabi Kashmiri prime
minister against decision of supreme court just to assist a
fellow Pashtun president.What is Shuja trying to prove .
In discussing tenure of General Jahagir Karamat Shuja
ignores totally the Ukrainian tank deal commissions.Nawaz
Sharif the then prime minister tasked ISI to launch an
investigation.Major General Zulfiqar then in ISI was tasked to
investigate.He went to Ukraine and Azerbaijan and compliled
a thick volume on the whole transaction and commissions
taken.This was used by Nawaz later and one of the reasons
why Karamat quickly stepped down.The information was
given by a staff officer from Corps of Engineers of major rank
with DG ISI of that time and confirmed by an Intelligence
Bureau officer.It is strange that Shuja Nawaz who seems to
know everyone who matters fails to discuss this serious
issue.Or perhaps he succumbed to the conspiracy of
silence.Karamat was betrayed by his brother officers and that
too just out of selfish motives to please the then prime
minister.Not out of any national motives.
As an officer who served from 1981 to 1988 how would I sum
up the Pakistan Army.
1981 to 1983 a cheap emphasis on being good Muslim,
growing a beard to get a good report from Zia.Further Zia
used religion to get dollars.This was the basic motivation.
Begs time saw for the first time a tradition of some criticism
being accepted.An effort was made to introduce the culture of
intellectual honesty in the army.
251
Asif Nawaz time saw emphasis on starch but no change in the
army.We did not see any professional change in Asif Nawaz's
Asif Nawaz's time other than introduction of peak cap in the
uniform
Kakars time saw parochialism par excellence with a chief at
the head who used to count cherries in his garden and was
upset when some guards ate some.( This first hand account
was given to me in Okara in June 1993 when Kakar was the
army chief and at the height of his power by a Lieutenant
Colonel Feroz , an officer from FF Regiment , whose unit
provided Kakars guard while he was a corps commander in
Quetta) .A petty man elevated to the highest rank.No wonder
he was non political because in the heart of his hearts he
must have thanked his stars that he became a four star
general.An authority no less than General Musharraf has
stated in his book that KAKAR WAS PAROCHIAL . In this
case Musharraf has hit the nail right on the head.
Karamat I did not see in service and did not serve with so I
cannot comment but is reported to be a mild man.Musharraf
as I saw him as a major general was flashy,extrovert,egoistic
but dynamic.The present army from what I learn from serving
officers is again business as usual.Nothing much to write
about.The agencies off course play the usual games for
money and for their own naukri and Islam being misused for
operational reasons.
252
The most serious criticism of Shuja's analysis is in treatment
of Islamic fundamentalism in the army.Shuja on page 585
consoles the audience of his book that Islamic
fundamentalism is still not a threat in Pakistan Army.Shuja
ignores the more dangerous fact that the army has misused
Islam as a slogan to mobilise the populace to achieve its
narrow institutional agenda.This is more dangerous than
being Islamist.Now this policy may go out of control.Right from
Zia in 1977 the army generals used Islam as a slogan to fight
a proxy war in Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan.Events may
prove that this would be the undoing of Pakistan as it stands
in its present form.Now Pakistan is perceived in the west as
part of the problem and not the solution.Particularly its army
and intelligence agencies are seen as the heart of the
problem.India is continuously preparing for a war although a
low intensity one and no solution has been achieved in
Kashmir.Afghanistan is increasingly hostile and a strange but
logical Indian-Russian-Iranian-NATO un declared strategic
alliance has come into place in Afghanistan against
Pakistan.All these are serious developments.The coming ten
years may vindicate this assertion.
The Pakistan Army and its generals may be remembered in
history as one of the reasons for Balkanisation of Pakistan.Not
a good omen for Pakistan.The army's involvement in
Pakistan's politics and government is now a serious reason of
imbalance for Pakistan's political system.No hope appears in
sight as we hear rumours that the agencies are still active in
destabilising Pakistan's own elected government.
Shuja has burnt his midnight oil.He has compiled and
collected all the facts in a nice way but his analysis has been
shallow.We expected something far more profound than
this.600 pages written in vain.
253
Military Control in Pakistan-The
Parallel State ,Mazhar Aziz
Price: $150.00 , ISBN: 978-0-415-43743-1 ,Binding: Hardback
Published by: Routledge ,Publication Date: 24th October 2007
,Pages: 160
Mazhar Aziz's book on military and politics in Pakistan is a
new addition to books dealing with civil military relations in
Pakistan.
Mazhar Aziz Mazhar Aziz (PhD, University of Nottingham,
2006) is a former Pakistani civil servant and an independent
scholar with research interests in democracy and political
representation, civil-military relations and foreign policy.
He is an outsider to the Pakistani military having observed it
as a civil servant who at times are junior partners in the civil
military nexus in Pakistan barring few exceptions like the old
254
fox Ghulam Ishaq or the half military half civilian Iskandar
Mirza.
Aziz in words of a reviewer "introduces the concept of
institutional path dependency. According to him, the
institutional innovations of the formative years of Pakistan's
history (1947-54) created a form of path dependency that has
been responsible for thwarted democratisation, military
intervention and post-military withdrawal crises." Aziz however
fails to define this concept of " Institutional Path" precisely and
also fails to connect it with the negative British colonial military
legacy particulary the British Imperial policy in Punjab from
1849-1947.
Under the British the Punjab the preferred British recruiting
area for the army from 1857 till 1947 had a special status.It
was a non regulation province where the deputy
commissioner was far more powerful than in any British
province and most of the initial deputy commissioners were ex
army.It was a province where the feudals and the British had
a special relationship.It was a province where the vast bulk of
British intelligence resources were employed as its location
was the most strategic in entire British India.It was a province
which had the closest link and the largest contribution to the
British war effort as far as 1857 ,First World War and Second
World War were concerned.
255
While the Indian Army and notably the Punjabis , and most
particularly the Punjabi Muslims were the closest collaborators
of the British immediately after partition the Pakistani Army
particularly its pro British generals were the most valuable
political asset of the British.The Pakistani generals led by
Ayub Khan soon out of personal ambition became the self
styled guardians of Pakistans territorial and ideological
boundaries.Ayub Khan with open support of civil servants like
Ghulam Mohammad and the military cum civil servant
Iskandar Mirza on his own started negotiating with USA and
boasted that the US Director CIA was his best friend.At this
point in time Ayub was propelled to do so by personal
ambition and by the declared intention of safeguarding
Pakistan and the army's institutional interests on the pretext of
acquiring US weapons.In this case he was however not
alone.The initial move for US aid was made by Mr Jinnah and
later by Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad.From 1954
onwards however Ayub was picked out by USA as USA's best
bet.India was too large to be manipulated and India's
Congress too formidable a party to be messed with.In
Pakistan however manipulation was simpler because of the
pre partition feudal military civil service connection.Thus in
case of Ayub the mafia was not military alone but civil military
West Pakistani feudal with Punjabis in lead and all conspiring
to reduce the Dravidian Bengalis politically.What followed was
a joint conspiracy by the army with a linguistically Punjabi
chief in league with Punjabi feudals and civil servants to
snatch legitimate political power from the Bengalis.Mazhar
Aziz misses this point or has practiced selective distortion.
The Yahya takeover of 1969 was the most credible
intervention by the army done out of national
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interests.General Yahya did make an honest attempt to
introduce direct franchise and provincial
autonomy.Unfortunately he failed because all of pakistan's
rulers starting from Jinnah had mishandled the Bengalis and
the situation became unmanageable.
Zia on the other hand acted out of personal motives because
he feared that Bhutto wanted to sack him and the top army
generals feared Bhutto who was a popular leader.Again a
case of class interests rather than institutional interests.
Aziz misses the point that the army or its top clique was used
by the USA to achieve its geopolitical ends in Pakistan.Every
military takeover in Pakistan had some link with USA or
became a servile instrument to further US geopolitical
objectives.
Aziz also fails to note that initial military takeovers were more
personality oriented while starting from Zia the army's
generals very correctly called the trade union of generals
acted out of class interests.After 1977 it became the stated
objective of the Pakistan Army's top generals and its
intelligence agencies to destroy all independent political
leadership in Pakistan.Thus every political party was
penetrated and every effort made to destroy independent
political leadership.The Punjab again was the centre of these
efforts and the emergence of Nawaz Sharif in 1988 was the
high point of these covert efforts.
257
General Zia's successor General Beg did hold the elections of
1988 but failed to control the ISI pursuing a parallel policy or
simply ignored what it was doing thus destabilisng and
removing the first PPP government in 1990.In 1990 Mr Nawaz
Sharif was the best choice of the army's ruling clique but he
was removed in 1993.In this case again the matter was not
entirely or even 50 % institutional but a collusion of a Pashtun
president and a Pashtun army chief to remove a Punjabi PM
who was becoming too assertive.Their natural choice was a
Sindhi lady .This move again was unconstitutional and
motivated by personal and ethnic motivation rather than
institutional motivation.
In 1999 the Musharraf coup was again motivated by personal
considerations rather than any institutional
considerations.Many generals supported Musharraf because
they had been fired by Nawaz Sharif notably General
Mahmud Corps Commander Rawalpindi.
After 2001 however Musharraf got a great opportunity to play
the role of USA's best collaborator.Again a continuation of the
Punjab loyalty to British of 1857 and Ayub loyalty to USA in
the Cold War or Zia loyalty to USA in 1979-1988.
258
It would be more correct to describe the army in Pakistan as a
mixture of institutional and class loyalty with personal
motivation and ambition of the army chief as the main
catalyst.The army is divided into many classes and the real
culprits are the top 150 or 200 generals around the
chief.Their ambition distorts the whole scenario and their
selfish actions cannot be called institutional interests.
Unless their is total defeat as happened to the Russian Army
in 1917 the hegemony of the army signified by these top 150200 windbag generals would continue come what may !
Now how to bell the cat.Only defeat in war can reduce the
army's role in Pakistan.The same happened in Russia in 1905
and 1917.In Turkey in 1918.In Japan in 1945,Alone the
Pakistani politicians cannot do it.They are the test tube babies
of many army intelligence agencies.
It appears that change is round the corner.The army is facing
internal fractures.Its lower ranks for the first time in its history
were involved in at least two major assassination attempts
against the army chief and these included many soldiers from
Musharraf's own SSG commandos.The army is being
challenged by Islamists and its credibility is being
reduced.Conventional war is out but the secret war at covert
levels continues.India intelligence knows that the war never
ended and so does the Pakistani intelligence.For the first time
in West Pakistan's hopeless history the army is being
challenged in NWFP and Balochistan and the threat has not
259
been contained.This is an ethnic war as its a Punjabi Army
with junior Pashtun auxillaries like the Yusufzais and Khattaks
fighting the Baloch and tribals .
The army is trying to sell itself to USA as its best bet but it
appears that the USA has decided that some structural
changes are needed in the Pakistan Army.
The bottom line however is not the Pakistani generals but US
policy , at least at the Defence Department,State
Department,CIA and DIA level.They want the Pakistani
generals.They do not trust the Pakistani politicians and that's
the main reason why the Pakistani generals and only the top
20 are guarding their class interests .A small class by
numbers but very influential and destructive.
Only defeat in war or Balkanisation will reduce the role of
Pakistani generals.Mazhar misses this point.
To conclude Aziz fails to present a comprehensive case for
the Instutional path theory although he makes many
repetitions in the core 100 pages of his book.
AHMED RASHID
260
Descent into Chaos , Ahmed
Rashid, Allen Lane,2008.ISBN No .
978-1-846-14175-1
Book Review
A.H Amin
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Ahmed Rashid acquired fame and became darling of the west
when his book on Taliban was published in 2000 or
so.Descent into Chaos is another bestseller as far as
publishing statistics is concerned.It is a tragedy that the
West,guardian of the present worlds intellectual property
projects what suits its political and social interests and stifles
what it finds “ politically unacceptable”.Seen in this
background what Ahmed Rashid writes is acceptable to the
west.Possibly because what he says fits hand in glove with
western perceptions about how to shape the future.
As normal the book has some factual errors.Some
insignificant some not so insignificant and some which not
have escaped the sagacity of a known Afghanistan hand like
Ahmed Rashid.
The Ghilzai revolt started not in 1701 as stated on page.7 but
in 1709.The Durranis did not move the capital to Kabul in
1772 as stated on page.7 but in 1774 if we agree with Sayed
Qasem Reshtia a great Afghan historian or 1775 if we believe
Louis Dupree who is concerned the most reliable western
historian.On page.8 Ahmed Rashid states that the British tried
to conquer Afghanistan three times.This is not correct.It
happened twice if we include the English East India Company
and once if we include the Second Afghan War of 1878-80.In
the Third Afghan War it were the Afghans who tried to attack
India and miserably failed and the British launched some very
local offensive actions at Spin Boldak and Khyber Agency to
push back the Afghans.On page.9 Rashid promotes Major
General Naseerullah Babar to lieutenant general rank.On
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page.11 he states that for first time in 300 years the Afghan
capital Kabul fell in non Pashtun hands once Ahmad Shah
Masud captured it.This is quite incorrect.The first time
Afghanistan’s capital fell in Non Pashtun hands was once the
Persian Qazalbash Nadir Shah captured Kandahar the then
capital of Ghiljai Pashtuns on 24 March 1738 some 224 years
before 1992 and Kabul on 29 June 1738 again some 223
years and some 10 months before April 1992.In any case we
must remember that Kabul was a Hindu province for a long
time in twelfth century and a Mughal Indian province for some
200 plus years long before 1992.On page 17 Rashid states
that the Pakistani FC managed Pakistani artillery and
communications.This is factually incorrect.The FC hardly has
any artillery and the Afghans did not require any training in
communications.In any case the Afghans had a much larger
number of ex Afghan Army gunners with Mujahideen quite
capable of handling all types of artillery guns of Soviet vintage
available in Afghanistan.Rashid seems to be very friendly with
US officials who throughout his narrative keep on telling him
so many things,like on page.18 US officials tell him that Al
Qaeda was responsible for USS Cole.On page.34 Rashid
states that “ the British conquest of Northwest India was
aimed solely at providing security from marauding Afghan
Baloch and Pashtun tribes” .This assertion is factually
incorrect.The British company English East India Company’s
conquest of North West India comprising modern Pakistan
was done in response to invasion of Sikhs of British territory in
1845.At that time the Sikhs were controlling all major Pashtun
cities like Peshawar,Bannu ,Kohat,D.I Khan etc so the
question of the Pashtun, Afghan or Baloch simply does not
arise.Musharraf was not commissioned in the field artillery as
stated on page.45 but in the “ Self Propelled Artillery”.On
page.45 Rashid states that in 1971 Musharraf commanded an
SSG Commando unit which went behind the enemy lines.In
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2002 I interviewed Musharrafs Commanding Officer in 1971
Brigadier Iqbal Nazir Warraich who confirmed that Musharraf
was a sub unit commander under him and Musharraf’s sub
unit was not used behind enemy lines.On page.52 Rashid
states that the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was the
ISI’s investigative arm.This is also factually incorrect.The NAB
was an independent public body which was not independent
and not connected to ISI in any organizational sense.On
page.73 Rashid calls Burhanuddin Rabbani a Panjsheri Tajik
which is not correct.Rabbani was from Badakhshan
province.On page.79 Rashid states that the ISI chief
(Mahmood) was forced to resign.This is incorrect.Mahmood
was simply removed and never resigned and to date draws
his pension from the army to which an officer who resigns his
commission is not entitled.On page 186 Rashid reduces the
distance from Kabul to Kandahar to 190 miles which is not
correct.On page 193 Rashid states that the Mazar Kabul line
was financed by World Bank.This is not correct since this
electric transmission line was a gift of Government of India to
Afghanistan.Karachi port had not serviced transit trade for
Afghanistan since 1950s as stated on page 192 but for a long
time before that dating back to the Kalhora,Talpur and British
times.There was a famous incident of a ship carrying
armaments for Afghanistan by the British so that King
Amanullah was militarily weakened against Afghan rebels in
late 20s.On page.259 Rashid states that the ISI was meeting
Taliban leaders in Command and Staff College Quetta.This is
quite funny and ridiculous.Why should the ISI meet insurgents
in an academic institution with which it has no connection
rather than in a safe house.Probably Rashid was trying to be
humorous.On page.261 Rashid indicates that Afghan
ministers gave up their foreign passports.My inquiries while
permanently based in Kabul from June 2004 till todate
indicate that this assertion is not correct.On page.274 Rashid
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places the Mahsud tribe in North Waziristan whereas
Mahsuds main area is South Waziristan Agency.On page 275
Rashid states that a murdered man’s body was found in
military handcuffs.This is a unique discovery .My inquiries
reveal that there is no such object as military handcuffs.The
military buys handcuffs from the open market.On page 331
Rashid states that the Afghan Tajikistan border is 750 miles
whereas my inquiries reveal that it may be about a 100 mile
less.
Factual errors done with we move on to the more serious
assertions of Rashid.On page.4 Rashid dismisses Mullah
Omar as a itinerant preacher who could not claim the
pedigree of Karzais.On page.13 Rashid again ridicules Mullah
Omar for being born without social status or pedigree. I find
this distinctly snobbish coming from the pen of a leftist Ahmed
Rashid.Probably in his old age he has become class
conscious.On page 6 Rashid states that easy to pass through
the country has been impossible to conquer.Now this is a
relative statement.For more than 200 years most parts of
Afghanistan were provinces of Mughal and Saffavid
Empires.The Mughals actually had a Hindu Rajput Governor
in Kabul.
On page 19 Rashid passes sweeping judgment on Talibans
when he says that Osama Bin Laden had a clear strategy in
mind to isolate them from the world.A more balanced and
scholarly approach may have been used.Rashid cites no
supporting sources.
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Some of Rashids conclusions about Pakistan are quite
accurate.Like Pakistan as a state being grappled with an
acute sense of insecurity.The army’s monopolization of power
in Pakistan in the name of national security.His analysis of the
Pakistani military mindset is penetrating and brilliant.His
exposure of of the military links of the likes of Maliha Lodhi
and Shaukat Aziz is again a breath of fresh air.Rashids
revelations about the Pakistani intelligence agency ISIs
negative role in Pakistani politics is bold and accurate to the
dot.One may not agree with how the USA downsized the
Afghan intelligence.My inquiries reveal that some of the most
brilliant officers of the indomitable Khad were removed just
because the American advisors wanted to severely reduce
Russian influence.Rashids analysis of US firm Louis Burger is
incomplete and not wholly correct.Louis Burgers failures in
delay in building of schools was because of unprofessional
sub contracting procedures and because of the fallacious
policy of hiring only Afghan NGOs to do the job instead of
commercial firms.Most of these NGOs were owned by political
appointees and haphazardly formed to siphon the fruits of US
aid.I saw the whole process myself as the Vice President of
an Afghan NGO which was building schools and clinics for
Louis Burger in 2004 and 2005 in Helmand ,Ghazni and
Kunduz.Rashid does not have his facts correct when he
states that Louis Burger had just 9 schools and 2 clinics ready
in end of 2005.The number was much larger than this.Even in
this case some Afghan NGOs like CDU did extremely well.
Rashids conclusion that the ISI was no longer in control of the
monster of extremism that it created are valid but
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incomplete.What about the CIA and the Saudi intelligence the
real fathers of extremism ?
On page 223 Rashid states that Pakistani artillery gave
covering fire to Taliban militants infiltrating Afghanistan.This is
an illogical and implausible assertion.The Talibans do not
need covering fire because a very large part of Afghanistan
Pakistan border is unmanned.The most important stretch in
Helmand and Nimroz has hardly any Afghan NATO or US
presence at all.
Rashid is harsh on the Americans,the Pakistanis as well as
the Afghans.However he presents no tangible
recommendations to remedy the situation.
His analysis ignores some important ground realities.First that
the USA came to Afghanistan to achieve certain strategic
objectives.Its aim was not altruistic or missionary.Thus the low
per capita aid figure to USA.The US objective at least till 2008
has been to maintain control of about 15 plus military/air
bases .The US troop strength is far below the minimum
necessary to even ensure security in Afghanistan.
The control of Afghanistan still lies with the pre 1992
bureaucracy trained by the Soviets.This includes the army,the
civil services,the police which was a real bastion of the leftists
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and above all the foreign ministry and the intelligence .All
despite various reductions and purges by the USA and
NATO.The Northern Alliance cadres on whom the USA tried
to rely dod not simply have enough trained and educated
recruits.Thus the important division in all Afghan Government
in between the Maslakis ( professionals) and the Wasta dars
(those who came without sufficient qualifications).
Rashid also ignores the fact that Pakistan’s Islamic extremism
is not the result of a sudden flight but a logical result of misuse
of religion by all major Muslim leaders since 1858.
Rashids subject matter is vast and the complexities with which
he is trying to deal are vast in magnitude and their
dimensions.Rashid’s analysis is subtle and thought provoking
but marred by his extreme bias against the Taliban.This leads
him repeatedly to make pre conceived statements and
sweeping judgements.
Nevertheless Rashids analsyis is thought provoking and can
be immensely instrumental as a catalyst in inspiring more
research on the subject.My fear is that Rashid’s present work
is more a commercial venture with one eye on audience in the
west.This is not the idealistic Rashid reporting from Kabul for
the Far Eastern Economic Review.But as they say “ things do
not change,we change”.
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One may not agree with Rashids assertion about Central Asia
being the new bastion of Al Qaeda.With Russia fast moving in
and re-asserting it may be more difficult for the Al Qaeda to
gain ascendancy in Central Asia.The provisional centre of
gravity of the Al Qaeda lies in non state actors in Pakistan and
the Arabian Gulf.It is going to be a long bloody war for the
USA to alter this particular strategic situation.
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