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CROSSRAIL, THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, AND THE SOUTHEND TERMINAL
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Professor’s Name
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Introduction
Two diverse but connected ideologies informed the Scottish Parliament's construction in
Holyrood and the Crossrail in London. In the Scottish Parliament, the overriding ideologue is
devolution, a sense of belonging and pride among the Scotts. Simultaneously, the Crossrail's
inception is due to the desire to modernize London and offer efficient transport solutions
befitting a developed modern city. Experts termed the Elizabeth line as the catalyst to the future
of London at the time of inception. Still, the report's source considered the swelling population of
London. The Crossrail project is London's way of responding to the challenges of a modern city.
The project designers envisioned its completion in 2018, but as the norm, megaprojects are
subjects of considerable delays, and the Elizabeth line is no exception (Cuenca, 2020). As a
devolved project commenced in 1999, the Scottish parliament ushered its first members of the
Scottish parliament (MSPs) in September 2004, depicting considerable delay in completing the
project. Scotland solely funded the construction of its parliament independent from the UK as a
symbol of pride (Fraser, 2004). It protected its identity and a sense of national pride to the
Scottish people. In both, the project's delay was a significant challenge because of the projects'
size and is the subject of my report and analysis. Other challenges of these two mega projects
subject to the research include the actual costs surpassing the estimates and completion dates
contravene forecasts at inception. The report will offer an in-depth analysis of the Crossrail and
Scottish parliament projects and submit operational and organizational management
recommendations. Still, the account will evaluate the following challenges of the two projects
and the reasons for their delay. Lastly, the report will apply the Crossrail and the Scottish
Parliament's analytical concepts in the Southend Terminal project, offer recommendations by
comparing the challenges at Holyrood and Crossrail teams, and identify risks of delayed
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completion resulting solutions. My report will provide vital assumptions, reflect on the
procurement options and conduct a literature review or evidence of adequate referenced research.
Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, Edinburgh
The location of the Scottish Parliament was a subject of debate at the start of the project.
After the elections of 1997, the ministers analyzed the available options for the Scottish
Parliament's accommodation (White & Sidhu, 2005). They settled on Edinburgh with cost
estimates of about 10 million British pounds to 50 million. The project officials could not offer
the project's precise cost because of the pending matters of location, new construction or
refurbishing old buildings, and the project's visible procurement approach like the Private
Finance Initiative. After the ministry officials conducted a city-wide search for a suitable
location for the project, in September 1997, they advertised the final list of sites (White & Sidhu,
2005). The list included Leith or Haymarket or refurbishing the St. Andrews House building.
Conversely, the minister approved a temporary accommodation for the Scottish Parliament
during the construction. In October and November 1997, ministry officials commissioned a
leading architectural firm to conduct site studies in the locations (Fraser, 2004). However, the
ministry officials had a change of tune in December 1997 and recommended a third site for
consideration at Holyrood for scrutiny and evolution. Moreover, the ministry officials subjected
the architectural proposals to the public for enhanced transparency, and the result of public
participation informed the choice at Holyrood. Lastly, the ministry hastened and bought the
Holyrood site at the prevailing market value site for the Scottish Parliament.
The ministry conducted an international procurement model to attract designers of repute
befitting the Scottish Parliament's status. The building officials offered the project brief,
including design, space, aims, and building requirements, with a cost estimate of 50 million
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British Pound as the construction budget (Fraser, 2004). They forecasted July 2001 as the
completion date. The Secretary of State chaired, and the panel settled on EMBT/RMJM as the
winners of the design competition (White & Sidhu, 2005). Conversely, the EMBT/RMJM agreed
to the project terms, including timelines, designs, requirements, and costs. The project
management team settled on a construction management model for constructing the building
based on cost consultants and the design team's advice.
Factors Affecting Costs and Timely Delivery
The Scottish Parliament's cost escalated to more than double the initial estimates because
of the design development costs and the corporate body's input for additional design adjustments.
Other reasons for the escalating costs included accruing difficulties in the project, increased
demand for extra space for the project, resolution for additional space with increased cost
implications (Alami, 2016). Still, the Corporate body commissioned an independent body to
review and resolve the project's impending challenges. The independent organ made a resolution
favoring the continuation of the project (Fraser, 2004). However, the additional design
requirements and space's resulting difficulties affected the project's timeliness and cost.
Costs and timeline delivery were the significant casualties of the project's various
changes because the adjustments were cost-intensive and detailed, requiring additional time to
deliver. The Scottish Parliament costed more than the initial 50Million Pound to 108-millionpound depicting a 116% increment (Yakubu, 2020). The project managers and designers
attribute about half the additional costs to the building's size increase. The original plan failed to
offer a reasonable balance space for stairs, circulation, lifts, plant rooms, and void areas. Still, the
increasing number of parliamentarians meant additional space. Lastly, the client approved the
architect's request for functional expansion. The approved design's complexity required
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additional costs and space, affecting both estimates and completion dates (Fraser, 2004). At
inception, the structure was rudimentary at best, but the current model is factored in various
quality and affecting costs and completion deadlines. Still, the last changes have occasioned a
48% increase in the initial plan's size, and the increased modifications justify additional charges
and delays (White & Sidhu, 2005). Other auxiliary prices like road alignments and landscaping
have increased the costs and delayed the project's completion (Chen, 2019). Moreover, the
project's uncertainty is due to additional designs, acquisition of another land for expansion, and
compliance challenges in the project's design stage.
The project management faced many challenges because of client change, complexity,
and dealing with the Corporate Body. The presence of a project management team was a sign of
prudence. However, the project's nature offered more client risks than the contractor because of
the innovative spirit. The competitive nature of procurement was commendable, but risk
management was a missing component in the project's direction, making it challenging to
manage costs and design programs (Yakubu, 2020). Still, the Scottish Office failed in its
mandate of offering an initial comprehensive procurement model. The project lacked a formal
execution plan and value engineering to evaluate accruing changes and their effects on costs and
timeliness (White & Sidhu, 2005). Furthermore, the project lacked a timely reporting model for
charges occasioning a gap between the client and contractor. The presence of a convenient cost
reporting model could have proved efficient in the management of change.
Crossrail Project Analysis
Crossrail is a leading European construction project aiming to modernize the transport
system in London. The project’s megaproject is the Elizabeth line covering over 100km and
about 40 stations and connecting Heathrow to Shenfield via Reading, Abbey, and London
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(Cuenca, 2020). The new rail hopes to 200 million passengers annually (Waite, 2019). The new
rail network promises to enhance transport in England for the growing population and bust the
economy by about 42 billion UK pounds.
The project will hold the promise of being London's full underground line for over 30
years and offers hope for advancement and efficiency in the modern era and the UK's growing
population. The underground line will increase the number of travelers traveling to central
London by about 45 minutes by over 1.5 million (Cuenca, 2020). The project offers new models
in sustainability models through collaborations and community involvement in the project.
Moreover, the project partners with the Building Research Establishment BREEAM to improve
environmental assessments for the underground stations (Topham, 2019). The community is part
of the project, and both the client and the engineers are committed to protecting valuable legacy
and objectives to the community (Worsnop et al., 2016). The development will create 40
stations, two above ground, 42KM of tunnel coverage, 200 meter new trains, eight subsurface
stations, and 40 amiable public amenities around London.
The ambitious project has a mandate from its sponsors to deliver a world-class rail
capable of competently serving London's needs for the next 50 years. The management team's
values include safety, inspiration, respect, collaboration, and integrity (Cuenca, 2020). The
ambitious project requires a committed management team to deliver, and the values they espouse
are integral to the timely delivery of the project. The project sponsors include the UK's DfT and
the Transport Authority of London (Waite, 2019). Both Crossrail and the sponsoring entities
agree with governing their intricate relationships and overreaching roles in delivering the
ambitious infrastructure. Moreover, the agreement aligns each party’s interests, protects
objectives, and offers financier donor confidence (Zidane et al., 2013). The deal covers TfL and
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DFL's relationship as the leading two project sponsors (Worsnop et al., 2016). Conversely, the
sponsors have a detailed objective for the project, including the ensure adherence to the UK laws
in the provision of significant transport and conform with the London mayor's plans, support the
Secretary of Transport, Provide value for money throughout the project (Topham, 2019). Other
objectives include a robust cost control mechanism, achieving the required outputs for 50 years,
transparency, and updating the project to all the stakeholders (Topham, 2020). Moreover, the
project will optimize the cost for the 50 years, align designs with applicable laws of the UK,
implement quality, environmental, safety, security, design, service operation, and commissioning
with the UK's applicable rules.
Factors Affecting Costs and Timely Delivery
The project was operational in 2018 but may delay 2022 because of increasing costs and
occurring software challenges. Other challenges affecting the timely commissioning of the
project include design changes. The line between Berkshire and Essex through central London
will cost additional 16 billion UK pounds from the initial 2billion (Topham, 2020). Other
challenges occasioning the delay include the use of a wrong concrete mixture in 2012. A
professor from the University of Oxford, Bent Flyvbjerg, agrees with the project's prudent
management compared to other developments of its magnitude across the globe (Waite, 2019).
Still, costs have increased, and the budget stands at more than a 15.4billion UK pounds, a
representation of less than a 15.9billion at inception (Topham, 2019). Moreover, the project is
only 9% late, according to Prof Flyvbjerg, depicting a relatively good rating compared to about
48 percent delay of other developments globally (Zidane et al., 2013). Still, the leading case of
delay in the Crossrail project is technology. The integration of the signaling models proved a
challenge and will delay the timely delivery of the project. Still, the Bombardier trains' existing
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software requires additional development and evolution (Waite, 2019). In the past, the project
navigated through civil engineering complexities and is currently facing software challenges.
However, all evidence indicates the project will be ready with a slight delay. The ensuring delay
from the software challenges will cost the London Transport Authority about 20million UK
pounds of revenue.
Recommendations
The project specifications should have been flexible to address arising challenges and
uncertainties. The project brief contains the overall objectives and the vision of the project. It
describes the quality, quantum, and location of the designated building. Moreover, the document
develops a strategic paper into a detailed component of the project. A two-pronged strategy
could have offered alternatives during challenges in the project. Still, such a document advocates
for the stalling of specific features of the project for cost control.
The project lacked consultant incentives for cost control and timely completion. Factors
like value for money are vital in contractor appointments. Affordability as the sole consideration
during a contract's issuance may fail when consultants and constructors more than double the
cots like in the Scottish Parliament (Fraser, 2004). Moreover, the Secretary of State and the
Project management team should have considered partnerships, evidence of skills, and teamwork
as essential components of consultants during the shortlisting process.
The project lacked an execution plan for governing control, strategy, procedures, and
responsibilities. An execution plan with timely updates could have been vital in communication,
and as a performance management tool, failure to finalize such a plan in 1999 affected aspects of
the project. Lastly, the project is evidence of deliberations and compromises during the project
and acts as a vital source of records and ensures the project's timely delivery.
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The project should have better-managed changes from inception because unforeseen
alterations are a leading source of runaway costs. Design changes are a leading source of cost
escalations during project execution (White & Sidhu, 2005). Conversely, such design changes'
sound management offers an effective cost control mechanism while guaranteeing timely
delivery of projects. (Zidane et al., 2013) Although in 2000, the client established control
mechanisms, it was ill-timed, and the previous change mechanism document was vague and
lacked substance.
The client should have incorporated value engineering's role at the design level to offer
an in-depth review of all changes. The process entails continuous design review to speculate the
possible changes to the design and better manage them by reducing costs, improving quality, and
shortening timelines while maintaining project quality (Fraser, 2004). The design review resulted
in admirable changes but was late and lacked the desired impact on the project. The client failed
to instill the value review's significance from the start based on cancellation and failure to
implement the recommendations in 1999 August.
Comparisons of Issues at Holyrood and Crossrail
The leading challenges of megaprojects like the Crossrail and Holyrood include
generalities like decision making, strategy, governance. Others are procurement, uncertainty and
risks, competence, and leadership (Lalic et al., 2013). Still, coordination and supply chain
integrations can potentially determine the success or failure (Fraser, 2004). Lastly, stakeholder
engagement and communication are significant areas capable of determining a project's success
or failure.
In the Crossrail and the Holyrood projects, the delay was a common problem in executing
the tasks. The Crossrail or the Elizabeth line is running behind schedule without an end in sight.
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The delays are attributable to the complexity of the project and management’s handling of such
complexities (Cuenca, 2020). Similarly, the Holyrood project was behind schedule because of
project complexity, the need for additional space, changes in design, and the project's overall
management. Design challenges in the Holyrood project are similar to the Crossrail project's
technological challenges affecting the project's timely delivery (Fraser, 2004). Similarly, the two
projects have experienced price escalations due to various reasons. Crossrail forecasted the
Elizabeth line's completion by December 2018; currently, in 2021, the project is incomplete, and
costs are escalating (Cuenca, 2020). The 15billion UK pounds project has surpassed the
estimates by about 2billion. Similarly, the Holyrood project's price escalated by about 48 percent
because of design changes, additional land acquisition, landscaping, and others (Topham, 2019).
Lastly, both the Crossrail and the Holyrood projects experienced turbulent managerial and
oversight challenges during the constructions' lives.
Challenges of Delivering Megaprojects and Solutions as the Operational Manager
As an operational manager of a Megaproject of constructing the Southend Terminal
worth 400million UK pounds, I recognize the magnitude and similarities between my project and
previous ones like the Crossrail and the Scottish Parliament Holyrood. The project may face
challenges such as a lack of clear goals and success criteria from inception to completion,
strained communication during the project, budgeting challenges, and inadequate team skills
(Purohit et al., 2018). The project may face additional challenges like lack of accountability,
insufficient risk management processes, unrealistic deadlines, and projections (Zidane et al.,
2013). Still, the Southend terminal is likely to suffer from limited engagement and commitment
among project stakeholders.
Solutions as an Operational Manager
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As the Southend Terminal operational manager, I have devised concepts and processes
for solving the possible problems the project may face. Such solutions include using an
enterprise-wide project management office (EPMO) in aligning the strategy and goals of the
project. The EPMO will offer a centralized solution to most challenges of the project, like
communication. The project will still adopt the concept of benefits realization management
throughout the project to remain relevant in the project plan's execution, identification, and
sustenance (Alami, 2016). The team will undertake to bridge the gap between strategy,
formulation, and implementation of the project. Most projects globally are stalling or delaying
because design, formulation, and execution stages are disjointed (Brack et al., 2015). Conversely,
the Southend project will find the perfect blend for tools, personnel, and methodologies of
aligning goals and expectations for a desirable outcome. Donors and clients are a significant
component of the Southend Terminal project, and my team recognizes as much (Romao &
Gomes, 2016). Conversely, the team will maintain and gain both the donor's and the clients'
confidence for the project's duration. Such a close relationship among significant stakeholders of
the project will enhance the speedy resolution of conflicts and offer budgetary guidelines during
the project (Alami, 2016). Technology remains a leading challenge in most projects like the
Crossrail infrastructure has suffered significant setbacks due to technological failures.
Conversely, my team will acquire the right personnel and address looming technical challenges
during the project (Brack et al., 2015). Runaway signals are vital specialized components for the
airport's safety and will get the team's undivided attention by contracting a competent team with
engaging oversight during the project.
Listed Project Assumptions
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Project assumptions are ever-present components of management despite infrastructural
size and magnitude. The Project Management Institute (PMI) defines beliefs as true, accurate, or
certain unjustifiable project elements (Hollingworth, 2008). Still, project assumptions are
expectations likely to occur in the life of a project. The team made assumptions on the project's
vital components like resources, budgets, finances, delivery, project scope, methodology, and
scheduling (Hollingworth, 2008). Resources like a meeting room, supplies will be available as
needed during the life of the project. Other assumptions include a budgetary provision for staff
training, the timely financing of requisite licenses during the project at the agreed costs without
exerting undue pressure on the budget (Lalic et al., 2013). Still, timely delivery of all
consumables during the project is a vital assumption. The team hopes the project will maintain
the scope after all stakeholders append their signatures defining project design and magnitude.
Procurement Options and their Advantages
The Southend Terminal project has three main procurement options available to the team
underrating the task. The procurement option includes general contracting, otherwise known as
the traditional approach (Tiwari et al., 2018). Still, the General contracting strategy separates the
design from the execution or the construction stage. The process always gives the developer the
option of deciding on their preferred design contractors (Romao & Gomes, 2016). Furthermore,
the concept allows the developer to contract the construction contractor to undertake the
construction task. The idea offers separation of roles and specialization by enabling the client to
pick different contractors for both the actual and project designs (Naoum & Egbu, 2015). The
processes have their advantages and will resonate with the suppliers and the entire construction
team. The strategy has benefits like ensuring quality because of specialization. Other advantages
include contracting using the complete designs. The concept offers flexibility to both the
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suppliers and the construction team (Naoum & Egbu, 2015). Still, the idea provides cost and
quality control of the project during its lifespan.
Design and Build is another procurement strategy the Southend clients can embrace. The
concept includes both the construction and the design stages of the project undertaken by one
contractor (Tiwari et al., 2018). It is an efficient approach and cost-effective for most clients.
Still, the strategy offers a single point of communication and limits conflicts during the project
(Buzzetto et al., 2020). Lastly, the Southend clients can use the Construction Management
approach to construct the Scottish Parliament while avoiding its pitfalls. The concept is ideal
among experienced developers and in complex projects. The idea offers different stages of the
project to various contractors to undertake other project tasks (Eriksson, 2016). The processes’
main advantage is cost-effectiveness because it ensures all contract levels undergo a competitive
bidding process to offer value for money.
Literature Review
Decision-Making Behavior
Decision-making is a vital factor in the conception and delivery of megaprojects because it
affects contractor choices, project design, and procurement mechanisms. Front-end decisionmaking behaviors in megaprojects have a bearing on the timely delivery of megaprojects. Still,
such processes determine timely delivery and cost escalations in megaprojects (Munyimi, 2019).
However, my research body departs from the common notion associating project lateness to
technicalities and concentrates on psychological and behavioral factors as core contributors to
delay in delivery. Dominant behavioral factors affecting timely delivery of projects include
optimism bias or delusion, strategic misinterpretation or deception, and escalating commitment.
Firstly, optimism bias or delusion emanates from favorable judgment and advice from
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construction experts eager to win contracts. Such overzealous contractors advance optimism
while circumventing risks and unforeseeable uncertainties. Conversely, professional eagerness is
a result of a psychological condition known as planning fallacy. It leads to project stakeholders
underestimating costs in various components of complex megaprojects such as design,
technological installations, and procurement (Munyimi, 2019). Moreover, planning fallacy
originates from diverse pressure. Such pressure can emanate from influential individuals, donor
organizations, and political bodies. The resulting pressure can potentially force a contractor or a
project expert to manipulate costs and ignore risks and uncertainties. Still, experts under political
and donor pressures can manipulate early projection to impress influential entities in the project.
Such a false forecast to impress donors and other project stakeholders, including taxpayers, is a
subject of a psychological state known as planning fallacy. Moreover, the false perception of
megaproject being too big to fail is a leading factor in giving false projections at the tendering
level. Optimism bias, strategic misinterpretation, and escalating commitment have solutions.
Such solutions include a robust benchmarking background reviewing past projects of similar
magnitude thorough evaluation and assessment of workable solutions and alternatives.
Furthermore, creating contingency plans for uncertainties and risks to address the megaprojects'
challenging aspects is a vital planning exercise. Lastly, investing time and processes capable of
scrutinizing the front to end stages of the project is vital to success.
Strategy, Governance, and Procurement
The second aspects of the research's literature review tackle the definitions of governance,
strategy, and procurement and their roles in megaprojects from the project life cycle's planning
and conception phases. Decision at the conception and planning phases of the project life cycle
affects other life execution stages and closure. Conversely, valuable stakeholders at inception
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and planning include contractors, clients, and donors. Other vital components at the planning and
inception stages are the governance and delivery model. Sponsors, donors, and clients contribute
to project failure because of the inadequate definition of roles and responsibilities during the
project life cycle. Clear definition of roles and responsibilities such as the sponsoring entity,
intermediary client, and the extent of owner influence in the project offers clarity and enhances
down-up communication channels resulting in ease of execution (Hong & Kwon, 2012). Still,
governance-related failures result from limited attention in its design structure and timely
evolution in the project's duration. The balance between formal or hard and informal or soft
structures can potentially affect communication and deliverables during the project (Buzzetto et
al., 2020). Conversely, misunderstandings between project stakeholders' definitions and
overreaching powers are a leading cause of project delay.
In most cases, the procurement mechanisms for acquiring capabilities and capacity from the
market occasion adversarial and transactional relationships within the supply chain and project
stakeholders (Hong & Kwon, 2012). However, such procurement processes' ability to instill a
collaborative and integrative relationship can reduce misunderstandings and improve timely
delivery. Project stakeholders should consider the following in mitigating governance issues
during the life cycle of development. Such factors include designing a system-based governance
model capturing the whole project delivery plan (Eriksson, 2016). Moreover, project
stakeholders should create a governance plan compliant with the organization's workings during
the various evolutionary stages of the project life cycle (Ekstedt, 2019). Lastly, stakeholders
should create a flexible governance model incorporating informal mechanisms for effective
communication and enhanced performance.
Risks and Uncertainty
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This literature review evaluates risks and uncertainty in megaproject with complex technology
like the Crossrail and the Holyrood developments. The review evaluates three vital components,
namely technological novelty, complexity, and flexibility. The use of unproven technology in
recent megaprojects is affecting delivery and costs of developments. Conversely, the application
of novel technology results in cost escalations and delays. New technology presents challenges to
the various levels of the project life cycle. Such a challenge is adaptability (Buzzetto et al.,
2020). Moreover, novel technologies require mutual agreements on adjustments in the use of
dynamic and complex projects. Factors restricting project flexibility include financing,
centralized decision-making, regulatory frameworks, and contracts (Ekstedt, 2019). Additionally,
commercial and donor agreements, technology, and design impede the requisite flexibility in
delivering complex projects. A leading factor in most complex projects is the uncertain
interaction between several moving parts in complex megaprojects and their effect on the
external projects (Buzzetto et al., 2020). Moreover, many dimensions affect the system, such as
regulations, organizational components, information, and technical components. Cures of
complexity in the project life cycle include adequate modularization to mitigate inflation and
schedule deviations (Ekstedt, 2019). Other solutions to addressing complexity include a focus on
simplification within a manageable domain essential for quick risk assessment and mitigations.
Lastly, investing in mutual adjustment strategies to address the megaprojects' uncertainties is
vital to navigating technological developments' technical complexities.
Conclusion
The research has established the acceptance and realization of megaprojects as complete
production systems are missing among stakeholders. The project life cycle from design,
planning, execution, and closure is an elaborate concept making it a production system. Still,
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new research and theory are essential in understanding how various elements impact
megaprojects and their performance in coordinating and delivering project goals and valuable
outcomes to the production line's organization. Future research should evaluate and relate the
successes of other product lines like aerospace and automobile industries to mega infrastructure.
Still, the processes and interdependencies in the aerospace and automobile industries can inform
successes in the execution of megaprojects such as the Crossrail and the Holyrood projects.
Value creation, evolution, organizational boundaries, extent, and transferability across project
life cycle in production industries are informative subject’s future megaproject stakeholders can
explore before commencing new developments.
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