Name
Section
Schedule
Joana Grace L. Allorin
BSA 2 Block A
Tuesday and Friday 2:30 -4:00 PM
Benito Delos Reyes vs. Veronica Alojado
G.R. No. L-5671, August 24, 1910
Facts:
January 1905, Veronica Alojado obtained a loan of P67.60 from Benito Delos Reyes. They agreed
that Alojado would not pay cash but instead work as a servant on Delos Reyes’ house without
remuneration that is until she can pay it in cash.
March 1906, Alojado left servitude from Delos Reyes’ house leaving without paying the loaned
amount and not paying even through the repeated demands of Delos Reyes. Same March 1906, Delos
Reyes filed a complaint for Veronica Alojado to either pay the sum or return to be a servant.
April 1906, the court declared that Veronica Alojado should fulfill his obligation to Delos Reyes
and the cost of the trial. May 1906, Alojado appealed in the Court of First Instance.
Delos Reyes claims that in the periods between January 1905 and March 1906, Alojado received
bits of amount that totaled P11.97, making the total obligation of Veronica P79.57.
Alojado denied the allegations of Delos Reyes prompting that she left the residence of Delos Reyes
for not giving her due wages and that the amount of 11.97 additional loan is totally baseless.
Issue:
Whether or not Delos Reyes has the right to oblige Alojado to remain servant without
remuneration until she pays the whole sum.
Ruling:
No. Delos Reyes’ reason alleging that the loan is untenable, to wit, that Alojado was obliged to
render service in his house as a servant without remuneration whatever and to remain therein so long as
she had not paid her debt, in as much as this condition is contrary to law and morality as based on Article
1255 of the Civil Code. Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and no agreement may subsist
in law in which it is stipulated that any domestic service shall be absolutely gratuitous, unless it be
admitted that slavery may be established in this country through a covenant entered into between the
interested parties, which Philippines is clearly not. When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious
contract and all abuses prejudicial to subordinates and servant, in connection with their salaries and
wages, it will be understood at once that the compact whereby service rendered by a domestic servant in
the house of any inhabitant of this country is to be gratuitous, is in all respects reprehensible and
censurable; and consequently, the contention of the plaintiff, that until the defendant shall have paid him
her debt she must serve him in his house gratuitously is absolutely inadmissible. Therefore, given the
more than a year of Veronica Alojado’s service, she is entitled to a wage of P82 subtracting her loan
amount of P79.57, Delos Reyes in turn must pay Alojado P2.43.
Estate of Orlando Lleonado represented by Winifreda Lleonado
Vs.
Eduardo, Jorge, Feliza Lleonado and Registry of Deeds
GR No. 145736, March 4, 2009
Facts:
The subject of this case is a parcel of land tagged as Lot 249-D-1. The Aforementioned subject is
owned by Cornelio Lleonado (father of Eduardo and Jorge). Then later registered to Eduardo and Jorge’s
name. December 1975, the lot was leased to Cornelio’s nephew, Romeo Lleonado, with lease time of 5
years-renewable. March 1978, Cornelio, Romeo and Orlando Lleonado (Romeo’s cousin) signed into
agreement, wherein Romeo gives Orlando the right for the unexpired portion of the lease agreement with
new terms.
The terms include Orlando having the right to renew the lease for 3 years after the present lease
term on December 1980, another 4 years after 1983 and the property cannot be sold, transferred or
alienated within the time period.
June 1978, the agreement has been mended, some terms were changed such as the lease renewal
periods and term. From 3 years and another 4 years changed to 10 years renewable every 5 years.
Orlando died on November 1983, Winifreda, Orlando’s wife continued to operate the lot which
has a gasoline station constructed. January 1987, Cornelio sold the lot to his children, Eduardo, Jorge,
Virginia and Cornelio Jr. September 1987, Cornelio passed away.
1993, Eduardo voiced out his desire to take over the lot from Winifreda. The latter refused on
repeated occasions. Eduardo filed a complaint in the court. June 1996, Winifreda was ordered to vacate
the lot. Winifreda appealed in the RTC but the case was dismissed. Petitioner Winifreda, as Orlando’s
widow claimed that Cornelio’s sale of the land is a fraudulent and in bad faith of the original agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation in the prohibitory clause in the lease agreement between
Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee.
Ruling:
Yes. When Cornelio sold the lot to his children Eduardo and Jorge, the lease was in full force and
effect, thus, the sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. Given that Cornelio and Orlando
has already passed away doesn’t extinguish the contract. A contract of lease after all is generally
transmissible to the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the death of a
party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights and obligations passed to the heirs of
the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect the period of the lease, both heirs
respecting the original terms. Thus, Cornelio selling the lot within the term period without Orlando and
his heirs knowledge violates the terms agreed in the first place.
Republic of the Philippines
Vs.
PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone) Company
GR No. L-18841, January 7, 1969
Facts:
1947, after the creation of the Bureau of Telecommunications, a government instrumentality of
plaintiff, set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties.
March 1958, the Bureau of Telecommunications, through the Director of Telecommunications,
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radiotelephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from
local residents.
January 1958, the Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT that both parties
enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing
through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. PLDT was
willing given that it receives 50% of the gross revenues.
April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, PLDT Company, to compel
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's
telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because
the parties were not in agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT may be forced to enter into an interconnection contract.
Ruling:
No. The law states that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Both parties should have
freedom to stipulate terms and conditions since it is the essence of our country’s contractual system, and
by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or
undue influence. Although the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that
of the PLDT. However, it cannot be denied that consensuality of the contract should be observed.
Therefore, the Republic can only ease their terms and come up to a consensus with PLDT to achieve a
completion of the contract as any forceful act can void the agreement.
Ramon E. Saura
Vs. Estela P. Sindico
GR No. L-13403, March 23, 1960
Facts:
Both Ramon E. Saura and Estela P. Sindico were contesting for nomination as the official candidate
of the Nationalista Party in the fourth district of Pangasinan in the congressional elections of November
12, 1957. August 1957, the parties entered into a written agreement bearing the same date, containing
among other matters stated therein, a pledge that each aspirant shall respect the result of the aforesaid
convention, i.e., no one of us shall either run as a rebel or independent candidate after losing in said
convention.
In the provincial convention, Saura was elected and proclaimed the Party's official congressional
candidate for the aforesaid district of Pangasinan. However Sindico disregarded the covenant filing on
September 1957, her certificate of candidacy for the same office with the COMELEC, and she openly and
actively campaigned for her election.
October 1957, Saura filed a suit for the recovery of damages which was dismissed on the basis
that the agreement sued upon is null and void, in that (1) the subject matter of the contract, being a public
office, is not within the commerce of man; and (2) the "pledge" was in curtailment of the free exercise of
elective franchise and therefore against public policy.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement was valid for reason that it is made of the public office.
Ruling:
No. Among those that may not be the subject matter of contracts are certain rights of individuals,
which the law and public policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man. Among them
are the political rights conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to, one's right to vote, the right
to present one's candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all the
qualifications prescribed by law obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained away curtailed with
impunity, for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or advantage but for the public good
and interest. In common law, certain agreements in consideration of the withdrawal of candidates for
office have invariably been condemned by the courts as being against public policy, be it a withdrawal
from the race for nomination or, after nomination, from the race for election. In this case, Sindico’s alleged
violation of the "pledge" in question by filing her own certificate o candidacy for a seat in the Congress of
the Philippines and in openly and actively campaigning for her election. Therefore with this reasons,
Sindico filing candidacy even after losing in the convention is valid.
Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University
GR No. L-15127, May 30, 1961
Facts:
1948 – 1949, Emeterio Cui attended preparatory law in Arellano University. Cui finished his law
studies in Arellano University including the first semester of the fourth year. Cui’s uncle, Francisco
Capistrano became dean of the College of Law in Arellano University, severing relationships with Cui and
not accepting his tuition fee for the enrollment of the last semester. Cui enrolled in Abad Santos University
College of Law.
Cui, in the years that he attended Arellano University was awarded with scholarship grants which
warrants him to get his paid tuition fees in the end of the semester. Tuition fees paid from first semester
of the First year to the first semester of the fourth year has been refunded in the amount of 1,033.87 PhP.
Upon graduating in Abad Santos University and in preparation to take the bar exam, Cui needed
to get his transcripts from Arellano University, only that the latter refuses to do so until Cui pays back the
refunded tuition fees.
The scholarship grant included a covenant pertaining to Cui waiving his right to transfer to another
university. Cui paid the sum to get his transcript and take the bar exam however right after filed a
complaint to recover the amount including other damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of the contract between Cui and Arellano University, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid.
Ruling:
No. The stipulation signed herein by Cui is contrary to public policy and thus null and void. In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the
judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers. Under the principles relating to
the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or
uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty. Arellano University letting a student receiving a scholarship
grant sign a waiver limiting his freedom to study is a direct violation. The contract in question would be
repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. As the law states that to make a contract null and void
against public policy, the contract must inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly
to undermine the security of individual rights. This requirement mentioned is present to the current
situation. Thus the contract between Cui and Arellano University is not valid.