Strategic foresight for organizational agility at Nedbank Area Collaboration Marius Oosthuizen and Caren Scheepers It was a crisp winter morning on July 4, 2016 on the Highveld in South Africa. Douglas Lines was in a reflective mood. He only partly noticed the cloudless blue sky, the yellow frosted grass, the bright sunlight reflected in the windows of the Midrand business area. He did, however, take note of the heavy traffic on the N1 – the main artery between Johannesburg and Pretoria, traveling at 10 km per hour, even though rush hour had passed. The drivers’ faces around him looked intent. Lines wondered how the recent economic downturn with South Africa’s GDP at less than 1 per cent had affected them. When Lines reached the Allandale off ramp, he noticed the impressive new Mall of Africa shopping center, the largest in Africa, with Sandton’s skyline in the background. Sandton’s financial district is South Africa’s main economic hub. At that moment, the Gautrain sped past at 160 km per hour. He considered what it would take for these drivers to adopt a new way of traveling. Their dilemma reminded him of a challenge they were facing at Nedbank’s – of adopting new technologies and changing the mindsets of employees to respond better to future trends. Marius Oosthuizen and Caren Scheepers are both Senior Lecturers and are based at Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, Johannesburg, South Africa. On reaching the office, he scribbled down discussion points in preparation for the ad hoc meeting on innovation, a new business-wide push for technology adoption. Lines wondered to himself, “ [. . .] are we innovating fast enough?” He knew the question of innovation was on everyone’s lips these days but wondered if Nedbank had the balance right between adopting new ways of doing business and their strong commitment to relational banking services. Whatever the answer to the question, Lines felt that the bank would need to enhance their collaborative and leadership-orientated culture to sustain their success given the changes afoot in the business environment (See Exhibit 1, Stage 5). Lines considered what Marius Oosthuizen, a scenario-planning expert, shared on scenario-planning methodologies (Konno et al., 2014) that had been used to examine the strategic choices facing Nedbank, in light of contextual trends and industry changes. Scenarios-based planning of this kind used fictitious narratives (Kenney and Pelley, 2014) of the future, or a “rigorous and penetrating description[s] of what is happening or could happen in and around the system [. . .]” (Kahane, 2012, p. 59) within which the business operates. The scenario-building process was understood as a “[. . .] comprehensive approach to institutional strategic management, based on an integrated philosophy of organizational learning” (van der Heijden, 2005, p. 153) and grounded in actual events and observable changes in the environment of business, while taking an exploratory yet plausible view of the future. This approach to strategic planning, which uses plausible (Ramirez and Selin, 2014) stories about the future to undertake a rigorous (Bowman, 2016) “intra-organizational strategizing” process, sought to provide a set of alternative roadmaps (Cheng et al., 2016) for the organization’s future. The scenarios that Marius Oosthuizen offered Lines had used an eclectic combination of scenario-planning methodologies. Lines DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-12-2016-0221 Disclaimer. This case is written solely for educational purposes and is not intended to represent successful or unsuccessful managerial decision-making. The authors may have disguised names; financial and other recognizable information to protect confidentiality. VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018, pp. 1-43, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 1 had to decide how to convey these scenarios and their implications for the organizational capabilities that had to be developed in preparation for the future. Introducing five future scenarios Marius Oosthuizen offered a number of possible futures, based on current trends, Nedbank’s current strategy and probable impending strategic choices. He declared the following: By the late 2020s, the financial services industry in South Africa will have undergone a rapid metamorphosis. The decade since the formulation of the voluntary global regulatory framework Basel III and South Africa’s updated corporate governance regime known as King IV, marked the most disruptive yet unanticipated watershed in the industry’s history. For years, banking executives opined about the potential fallout of the 2008/2009 financial crisis and what it would mean for business. Yet, few appreciated the enormity of the changes that were about to converge on their business models. Many were unprepared. Five scenarios emerge for NEDBANK, one of South Africa’s leading banks, contingent on their strategic response to these trends; 1. Baseline Scenario 1: Opportunity Missed, Talent Walkout; 2. Baseline Scenario 2: Batten Down the Hatches; 3. Alternative Scenario 1: Carpe Diem, Digital Talent Giant; 4. Alternative Scenario 2: Ride the Waves of Change; and 5. Alternative Scenario 3: Be the Change. Encroaching policy has sent the cost of doing business soaring, especially for large banks. While the sector had the historic advantage of becoming highly sophisticated and integrated, especially compared to other middle-income countries outside the advanced industrialized West, South Africa’s cluster of financial services institutions represented a close-knit club of cumbersome silos operating side by side. The quality and diversity of services offered were world class but their reliance on fee-based revenue models left them vulnerable to new entrants. In addition to changing regulatory conditions, the disruptive force of technological advances changed the rules of the game for an industry that had enjoyed extremely high leverage and bargaining power in the economy. At a time when telcos[1], such as Vodafone, and insurance giants, such as Discovery, were applying for banking licenses, the banks were on the one hand struggling to choose between entrepreneurship, innovating in terms of product and service through diversification and intrapreneurship on the other, innovating internally, while sticking to their knitting. The war for talent, specifically in relation to skilled and experienced engineers in information and communications technology, meant that conventional bankers struggled to distinguish fad from fundamentals in terms of the digital technological revolution. Increased complexity in the systems required to offer solutions to the market, meant that deep expertise was growing costly and scarce. The relative isolation of South Africa’s banking industry in the two decades post-apartheid was diminishing at an accelerating pace. Clients now had access to a wider array of providers; fast-growing globalized transactional solutions, such as PayPal, began to emerge and challenged the notion of having “a bank”, causing customers to instead favor the idea of having “access to banking services”, as and when required. The competition from international entrants was compounded by the attractiveness for key talent to migrate toward positions in companies that remunerate senior staff in more stable currencies than the volatile Rand. This “brain drain” had a crippling effect on long-term strategic projects undertaken within the corporate high-rises of yesteryear. PAGE 2 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 From a market development point of view, only a handful of historic players recognized the emerging growth in the small and medium enterprise segments. Those that did, rapidly tailored their world-class governance and procedural rigor to suit the more risk-taking start-up culture of these new clients. (Exhibit 2). Leveraging the legacy anglophone operations and linkages, they developed a set of services that connect small African manufacturers with global and emerging markets. Whereas this bolstered cash flow and customer growth in retail and business banking, losses to the banks from exposure to public sector projects as a result of South Africa’s weakening rating with ratings agencies were severe. Capital projects needed to be more severely scrutinized that ever before. Persistently low savings rates by customers, coupled with relatively higher foreign direct investment inflows in other African countries, caused banks to look northward for more stable and significant returns. Nedbank had taken a particular view of these changes and adapted their strategy accordingly. (Exhibit 4, Strategic Focus Areas). Based on the assessment of the drivers of change discussed below and the current strategic response of Nedbank, the following observations were made by this case study as Marius Oosthuizen remarked. Assessing the strategy of Nedbank against future scenarios Nedbank has selected a particular set of strategic imperatives to pursue, which the bank considers critical to ensuring the future success of the business in the emerging markets of South Africa and Africa. Some of these are demonstrated by the projects undertaken in the context of the Area Collaboration (AC) initiative. The following scenario-planning analysis tested the robustness of Nedbank’s chosen strategy against changing conditions in the external environment of the South African financial services industry. Nedbank has opted to grow the bank through a combination of acquisitions, as well as internal initiatives for organic growth and by committing to their core self-identity as a relational bank.[2] By conceptualizing their core business as such, and wanting to grow their footprint in Africa, Nedbank for instance acquired EcoBank Transactional Inc. (Exhibit 3). The aspiration of EcoBank to be a pan-African bank gave Nedbank exposure to branch-based retail bank operations in 38 countries and across Africa. In South Africa, Nedbank opted to retain the branch as the primary vehicle for delivering banking services to the customer, especially in retail and business banking. Technological solutions and digital platforms were seen as enablers, rather than replacements for branch-based banking services. This selected strategy meant that Nedbank retained their position within the “big bank” family, with the complexity and cumbersome financial services industry obligations that this represented. As opposed to a fundamental redesign of the business model and subsequent operations, Nedbank opted for rightsizing and downsizing where possible, rationalizing the organization around entrenched legacy systems developed in an era of person-to-person banking. Hunting for new business by taking on competitors directly, on the basis of added value and impeccable customer service, Nedbank opted not to look for new strategic alliances or partnerships that could offer more niche solutions to evermore demanding customers. This included aggressively trying to incubate new delivery mechanism internally, especially where technology was concerned. While this delivered flashes of innovative brilliance and first-to-market solutions, such as the emerging big-data merchant platform, this form of innovation proved costly and difficult to maintain given the scarcity of skills and competition for talent. As competitors and new entrant non-traditional competitors brought alternative transactions, borrowing and investment solutions to market, Nedbank consistently performed as a follower in the market, buoyed by quality and a reputation for stability and VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 3 excellence. Leveraging their longstanding capacity for internal human resource development, Nedbank was able to shore up losses in human capital and even served as a consistent source of management and technical skills for the market. The introduction of a collaborative approach to service offering across historic banking silos inadvertently positioned Nedbank to compete well in the small and medium enterprises (SME) business banking segment. However, a comparatively low-risk appetite and costly commitment to thorough enterprise development support for clients meant that the segment was marked by false starts and questions over viability for Nedbank given low rates of return. Further afield, it soon became apparent that Nedbank’s key advantage in Africa, given the alliance with EcoBank, was not access to the low LSM and SME market segments, but was rather their long term positioning for global entrants to the continent. The promise of a rising affluent African middle class remained illusive. Instead, the rise of external linkages to Africa necessitated a re-conceptualization of how Nedbank would make their considerable experience in wealth and investment available through the network in a cost-effective manner. As per the section below, the Nedbank strategy was considered against the backdrop of broad changes in the industry and environment of business. The outcome was a set of five scenarios relating to Nedbank’s performance in the decade ahead. (Exhibit 6) The first two, baseline scenarios 1 and 2, set out future-orientated conjecture about the status quo at Nedbank and forecast their current strategy against the trends. The latter two scenarios, alternative scenario 1 and 2, set out a forecast of what may be possible if Nedbank altered their course through more aggressive adaptation. The scenarios appearing next emerge from the analysis outlined in the final section and arise from an integration of all trends observed, with an emphasis on foreign direct investment (FDI)-based growth or decline in Africa, access to human capital and the adoption of new technologies. All of these point to the need to adjust to a shifting market and imply a reformulation of Nedbank’s business model to sustain performance. Baseline scenario 1: Opportunity missed, talent walkout In this scenario, Nedbank retains their current strategy while current trends persist. When Nedbank CEO Mike Brown stepped up to the podium to present their 2026 results there was a hushed silence in the room. (Exhibit 5). Just over a decade since Brown took the helm, the initial optimism had been replaced by a protracted period of incremental slowdown in results. While Brown had established a reputation as a steady hand and astute banker, the reasons for his long tenure, the unspoken consensus was that a different approach would be required to achieve the performance of the mid 2010s. South Africa’s decade of stagflation had dealt a serious blow to all the major banks, placing particular pressure on the middle range retail segments, pushing customers to revolt against bank charges and popularizing providers of simplified cost effective banking options. Nedbank’s strong growth in deposits was being dampened by a rise in bad debts from the mid and lower segments. Nedbank was not positioned to capitalize on the turbulence in Africa’s fast growing economies either. Low oil prices at the start of the decade did not only deflate growth rates in the likes of Nigeria and Angola sending a knock on effect into consumer markets, but they also temporarily dampened optimism over infrastructure and other capital projects leading to the mothballing of some and five-year delays in many cases. Competitors who shaped their Africa strategy around a public affairs and public-private partnership model were better placed to pick undervalued assets and benefit from the recovery of the oil price. While Banco Unico, of which Nedbank now owns 76 per cent, did perform PAGE 4 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 consistently, this was at a lower than expected rate because of intermittent escalations in country risk. Admittedly, much of Nedbank’s woes were beyond their control as exposure to South Africa’s domestic economic and social turmoil weighed down their otherwise sound market base. Where Nedbank did misstep strategically was in underestimating the three-pronged impact of new entrants, loss of talent and lagging on the technological adoption curve. Accelerated by the toughening environment, the assumed hegemonic position of a bank as a provider of financial services began to dismantle. The cultural shift required to capitalize on this tectonic break was a bridge too far. For the generation of consumers entering the market over the decade, digital technological access to decentralized services was ubiquitous, and none of the conventional banking organizations were nimble enough to take advantage of the change. Baseline scenario 2: Batten down the hatches In this scenario, Nedbank retains their current strategy while trend reversals take place in terms of FDI in Africa and technological adoption rates. When Nedbank CEO Mike Brown stepped up to the podium to present their 2026 results, there was a sense of tentative ease in the room. Just over a decade since Brown took the helm, the initial optimism had been replaced by a protracted period of persistent headwinds and disappointing results. Since Brown had established a reputation as a steady hand and astute banker, the reasons for his long tenure, the unspoken consensus was that his risk-averse long-term approach would still be required to eventually return to the performance of the mid 2010s. South Africa’s inflationary decade had dealt a serious blow to all the major banks, particularly placing pressure on the middle range retail segments, pushing them to revolt against bank charges while providers of simplified cost effective banking options failed to take advantage, due to adverse entry conditions in the industry. Nedbank’s strong growth in deposits, were offset by a rise in bad debts from the mid and lower segments. (See Exhibit 7). While Nedbank was not positioned to capitalize on the turbulence in Africa’s fast growing economies, the bank’s alliance approach stood them in good stead. Low oil prices at the start of the decade did not only deflate growth rates in the likes of Nigeria and Angola, sending a knock on effect into consumer markets, they also severely dampened optimism over infrastructure and other capital projects leading to the mothballing of some and five-year delays in many cases. Competitors who shaped their Africa strategy solely around a public affairs and public private partnership model were hard hit by the downswing and struggled to recover losses when the oil price returned to $70 a barrel. While Banco Unico, of which Nedbank now own 51 per cent, did perform consistently, this was at much lower than expected rates because of the decline in FDI and the sequential effects on consumers. Admittedly, much of Nedbank’s challenges were beyond their control, as exposure to South Africa’s uptick in domestic economic and social turmoil weighed down their historically sound market base. Where Nedbank did misstep strategically was in underestimating the impact of loss of talent and lagging on the technological adoption curve. Accelerated by the toughening environment, the hegemonic position of a bank as a provider of financial services held its own but at the cost of key talent to adjacent industries. The cultural shift required to capitalize on this looming tectonic break was a bridge too far. For the generation of consumers entering the market over the decade, digital technological access to decentralized services was soon to be the natural alternative and none of the conventional banking organizations were nimble or hard-pressed enough to take advantage of the change. VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 5 Alternative scenario 1: Carpe diem, digital talent giant In this scenario, Nedbank adapts their current strategy while current trends persist. When Nedbank CEO Mike Brown stepped up to the podium to present their 2026 results, there was a sense of anticipation in the room. Just over a decade since Brown took the helm, the initial optimism had grown into confidence over a period of persistent capitalization on new innovation to navigate headwinds and sustain results. Brown had established a reputation as a steady hand and astute banker, the reasons for his long tenure, coupled with a knack for mobilizing talent to innovate. The unspoken consensus was now that his two-track approach of “securing the core” and “exploring the periphery” was behind the bank’s sustained performance since the mid 2010s. South Africa’s inflationary decade had dealt a serious blow to all the major banks except Nedbank, who turned the pressure on the middle range retail segments into an opportunity to steer them to a more efficient, simplified and lower cost mode of engagement with the bank. Nedbank’s strong growth in deposits, both from their digital banking highway and pan-African newcomers, offset the unavoidable rise in bad debts from the mid and lower segments. Nedbank was well positioned to capitalize on the turbulence in Africa’s fast-growing economies, the bank’s alliance approach serving as a mechanism to introduce innovative lending solutions to otherwise inaccessible markets. Low oil prices at the start of the decade briefly deflated growth rates in the likes of Nigeria and Angola sending a knock on effect into consumer markets, but only temporarily dampened optimism over infrastructure and other capital projects. The initial mothballing of some and five-year delays in many cases did not deter Nedbank’s increasingly aggressive pivot north. Competitors who shaped their Africa strategy around a public affairs and public-private partnership model from the outset were fierce competition but unable to offer the integrated value which Nedbank did. Banco Unico, now wholly owned by Nedbank, not only performed consistently as expected, but also aided in providing a springboard to Africa’s fastest growing urban center to the north, Dar es Salam, where Nedbank opened the first Nedbank Africa Regional Hub. The hub showcased an integrated financial solutions center aimed as adaptive customer-led solutions powered by a single digital backend that can be accessed from anywhere in the world, a brainchild emerging from Nedbank’s alliance with IBM. Admittedly, much of the temporary setbacks affecting Nedbank were beyond their control as exposure to South Africa’s domestic economic and social turmoil weighed down their historically sound market base, but game-changing innovation offset these effects. Where Nedbank was strategically superior to competitors was in underestimating early on the importance of fostering innovative spaces for talent and by leaping ahead on the technological adoption curve through creative alliances and partnerships. Accelerated by the toughening environment, the hegemonic position of a bank as a provider of financial services was supplanted by the notion that the digital highway could be a social space where services are traded seamlessly. The cultural shift undertaken to capitalize on this otherwise jolting tectonic break could be traced back to the early efforts to collaborate and breakdown silos within the bank. For the generation of consumers entering the fray, Nedbank had become an innovation ally in the pursuit of their ventures on the continent. Alternative scenario 2: Ride the waves of change In this scenario, Nedbank adapts their current strategy while trend reversals take place in terms of FDI and technological adoption rates. When Nedbank CEO Mike Brown stepped up to the podium to present their 2026 results, there was a sense of tentative anticipation in the room. Just over a decade since Brown took the helm, the initial optimism had drifted from confidence to concern over a period of persistent attempts at capitalization on new innovation to navigate headwinds and sustain PAGE 6 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 results. Brown had established a reputation as a steady hand and astute banker, the reasons for his long tenure, coupled with a knack for mobilizing talent to innovate in the face of tough times. The unspoken consensus was now that his two-track approach of “securing the core” and “exploring the periphery” was not viable to sustain performance. South Africa’s inflationary decade had dealt a serious blow to all the major banks including Nedbank, who tried in vain to turn the pressure on the middle range retail segments into an opportunity to steer them to a more efficient, simplified and lower cost mode of engagement with the bank. Nedbank’s initial strong growth in deposits, both from their digital banking highway and pan-African newcomers had dwindled, worsened by the unavoidable rise in bad debts from the mid and lower segments. Nedbank was well positioned to capitalize on the turbulence in Africa’s fast-growing economies, the bank’s alliance approach serving as a mechanism to introduce innovative lending solutions to otherwise inaccessible markets, but the downswing in confidence outweighed gains made. Low oil prices at the start of the decade briefly deflated growth rates in the likes of Nigeria and Angola sending a knock on effect into consumer markets, dampening optimism over infrastructure and other capital projects and causing inflation to soar when the oil price recovered. The initial mothballing of some and five-year delays in many projects disrupted Nedbank’s increasingly aggressive pivot north. Competitors who shaped their Africa strategy around a public affairs and public-private partnership model from the outset offered fierce competition, offering versions of the same integrated value which Nedbank did. Banco Unico, now wholly owned by Nedbank, performed consistently, but there was concern over the sustainability thereof and the impact on the balance sheet. Admittedly, much of the setbacks affecting Nedbank were beyond their control as exposure to South Africa’s domestic economic and social turmoil weighed down their historically sound market base and game-changing innovation failed to offset these effects. Where Nedbank was strategically superior to competitors, was in understanding early on the importance of fostering innovative spaces for talent and by leaping ahead on the technological adoption curve through creative partnerships. Time to market, hamstrung by a commitment to quality service, reduced Nedbank’s edge as competitors developed comparative offerings. Accelerated by the toughening environment, the hegemonic position of a bank as a provider of financial services was supplanted by the notion that the digital highway could be a social space where services are traded seamlessly. New digitally orientated entrants in the telecommunications industry quickly provided for this need. The cultural shift that would have been needed to capitalize on this jolting tectonic break implied a reformulation of the hierarchical silos of banking as it had been known. For the generation of consumers entering the fray, Nedbank held promise as an innovative bank but not an ally in the pursuit of their owner-run enterprises. Lines questioned the rationale for the five scenarios and Marius Oosthuizen revealed the underlying analysis. The four scenarios were built on particular underlying trends identified in the financial services industry. Trends that were beyond the control of Nedbank and would need to be navigated by the bank. Alternative scenario 3: Be the change In this scenario, Nedbank adapts their current strategy to take advantage of the evolving financial services market opportunities in previously “unbanked” segments. When Nedbank CEO Mike Brown stepped up to the podium to present their 2026 results, there was a sense of optimism in the room. Just over a decade since Brown took the helm, the initial optimism had drifted from confidence to creativity and innovation over a period of persistent attempts at capitalization on new market penetration to navigate headwinds and sustain results. Brown had established a reputation as a stealthy innovator and astute banker, the reasons for his long tenure, coupled with a knack for mobilizing talent to VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 7 innovate for “social inclusion” – a new banking model bringing financial services to the unbanked – in the face of tough economic times. The clear consensus was now that his two-track approach of “securing the upper-income segments” and “strengthening the emerging segments” was perhaps the only viable path to sustain performance in an emerging market. This was particularly true of retail banking. South Africa’s inflationary decade had dealt a serious blow to all the major banks including Nedbank, who tried in vain to turn the pressure on the middle range retail segments into an opportunity to steer them to a more efficient, simplified and lower cost mode of engagement with the bank. It quickly became apparent that growth lay in the lower range retail segments more so than any other. Nedbank’s initial strong growth in deposits, both from their digital banking highway and pan-African newcomers had come under pressure until they changed focus, and mitigated the unavoidable rise in bad debts from the mid and lower segments by proactively offering recapitalization when needed. Nedbank was well positioned to capitalize on the turbulence in Africa’s fast-growing economies, the bank’s alliance approach serving as a mechanism to introduce innovative lending solutions to otherwise inaccessible markets, particularly because of their targeting of the public sector wage bills in African nations. Low oil prices at the start of the decade briefly deflated growth rates in the likes of Nigeria and Angola sending a knock on effect into consumer markets, dampening optimism over infrastructure and other capital projects and causing inflation to soar when the oil price recovered. The initial mothballing of some and five-year delays in many projects disrupted Nedbank’s increasingly aggressive pivot north but long-term commitment to SME banking and enterprise development provided a mitigation strategy. Competitors who shaped their Africa strategy around a public affairs and public private partnership model from the outset offered fierce competition, offering versions of the same integrated value which Nedbank did. Banco Unico, now wholly owned by Nedbank performed consistently but there was concern over the sustainability thereof and the impact on the balance sheet. Admittedly, much of the temporary setbacks affecting Nedbank were beyond their control, as exposure to South Africa’s domestic economic and social turmoil weighed down their historically sound market base and game-changing innovation in digital banking alone failed to offset these effects. The key to sustained returns lay in an enterprise development thrust to their SME and entrepreneurship lending. Where Nedbank was strategically superior to competitors, was in understanding early on the importance of fostering innovative spaces for talent internally and by leaping ahead on the technological adoption curve through creative partnerships. Time to market, hamstrung by a commitment to quality service, reduced Nedbank’s edge as competitors developed comparative offerings. Accelerated by the toughening environment, the hegemonic position of a bank as a provider of financial services was supplanted by the notion that the digital highway could be a social space where services are traded seamlessly. While Nedbank was late to this game, the CEO’s responsiveness in recognizing this shift and adapting accordingly was a game-changer for the bank. New digitally orientated entrants in the telecommunications industry quickly provided for this need – and Nedbank was ready to partner. The cultural shift resulted to capitalize on this jolting tectonic break implied a reformulation of the hierarchical silos of banking as it had been known. For the generation of consumers entering the fray Nedbank held promise as an innovative bank and an ally in the pursuit of their owner-run enterprises. Nedbank had shifted their brand to imply a “world-class service, grown in Africa”. This was key to success in urban settings where millions of young Africans were bootstrapping themselves out of poverty through micro-enterprise, backed by Nedbank. Lines questioned the rationale for the five scenarios and Marius Oosthuizen revealed the underlying analysis. The five scenarios were built on particular underlying trends identified PAGE 8 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 in the financial services industry. Trends that were beyond the control of Nedbank and would need to be navigated by the bank. Underlying analysis: Trends shaping the South African financial services industry Marius Oosthuizen used a scenario-planning study by the GIBS Future of Business in South Africa Project on the future of key sectors in the South African economy (Oosthuizen et al., 2015), as input to the formulation of the five scenarios for Nedbank. This study examined the key trends affecting the financial services sector. The study identified the following 17 trends relating to the regulatory environment, the industry, the global financial system and to customer behavior and markets. Regulatory 1. Encroaching policy and regulation affecting the industry. 2. Costly policy affecting the industry. Industry 3. Sophistication of the industry. 4. Positive cluster effect between financial services institutions. 5. Bottlenecks in the IT Industry, especially in terms of infrastructure and human resources which constrain financial services development. 6. Unsustainable capabilities. historic competitive advantages eroded 7. Pocketed skills compared to widespread industry demand. 8. Lack of historic competition from external competitors. 9. A “brain drain” and growing global competition for talent. by technological 10. A limited array of services tailored for SMEs. 11. World-class governance. 12. Risk aversion in terms of business lending. 13. Advantageous English language usage globally. Global financial system 14. National ratings downgrades affecting lending rates. Customers and markets 15. Low rates of savings by customers. 16. Growing FDI in Africa. 17. Proximity to untapped African markets. Considering the following analysis of the relative “impact” and “uncertainty” of these trends on the future development of the financial services industry in South Africa, it emerges that five trends may be considered as critical to exploring alternative scenarios for the future of the industry. These relate to the enablement of developments in the industry through technology, the appetite of the back for SME business banking risk, competition and availability of talent and skills and changes in the rate of foreign direct investment in the region (Figure 1). VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 9 Figure 1 Impact and uncertainty matrix of drivers of change for the financial services industry in South Africa The low uncertainty trends, irrespective of their impact, either high or low, would not require exploration through scenarios because the absence of uncertainty implies that strategic plans may readily be developed to respond. This may seem counterintuitive, but “low rates of savings by customers”, though likely to have a high impact, is not uncertain and unlikely to change. As such, the bank can respond directly to the trend. Comparatively, the highly uncertain prospect of national ratings downgrades and unpredictable choices by key talent to either stay with the bank or not, would be considered “wildcards”, because mitigation and contingency plans may be developed but there is no concrete way of knowing whether they will need to be enacted (Figure 2). Based on the foregoing analysis, the study argued for the need for South African banks to enhance their position relative to competitors by: PAGE 10 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 Figure 2 Future scenarios logic for the financial services industry in South Africa Adapting to an increasingly stringent policy and regulatory regime, particularly in terms of cash reserves, which would drive up the business’ costs of service. Develop organizational agility to offer adaptable service propositions to an increasingly complex market landscape in the face of competition from nimble technologically savvy start-ups and telcos likely to emerge in the continent. Develop a robust business-banking offering to the SME market segment and increase their risk appetite in this segment, in cooperation with enterprise development partners and state initiatives, to unlock the potential of the current drive for home-grown local economic development. Mitigate the risks of unsecured lending by tightening lending criteria in light of a poor economic outlook in the short and medium term. Improve accessibility to African markets through alliances, mergers, acquisition or organic growth, to take advantage of long-term growth prospects in African markets. Importantly, to aggressively explore disruptive technology, in connectivity, virtual communication, big data and predictive analytics, as an enabler of financial services independently of the branch-based banking model. Finally, to consider how the combined advantages of a sophisticated industry cluster in South Africa, high governance standards and English language usage by South African banks can be harnessed to improve the nation’s financial services sectors global competitiveness. In addition to these observations, it was noted that Africa’s youthful demographics, combined with trends in urbanization and rapid economic growth from the informal sector VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 11 to the formal, represented significant market opportunities for retail bank services (Okeahalam, 2008). However, because of the historic void in supporting services, these opportunities were to be found in pockets where longstanding firms did not operate and were not prepared for. The growing need for “inclusive banking” represented an opportunity for banks, but would require a learning curve in terms of brand, product, service and culture. (Arora and Leach, 2005). Although governments in Africa were increasingly alive to this need, the policy environment and regulations in many instances prevented non-traditional banking firms from readily providing financial services to this segment (Claessens, 2006). It meant that a wave of changes, both in terms of public policy and business strategy would potentially converge to provide services to “bank the unbanked” and unlock the bottom-of-the-pyramid market across the continent (Kostov et al., 2014). Recommendations to Nedbank area collaboration First, it ought to be recognized that area collaboration forms an important microcosm of what is required of the larger Nedbank group. By actively growing Nedbank’s middle-market share through the work of area collaboration (AC), Nedbank is bettering its position relative to the policy and regulatory encroachments considered above. (Recommendation “a”) The AC “bank first” approach, whereby the client is approached on the basis of what the bank in its entirety, not merely a single division, but various products and services from various divisions can offer, to some extent introduces a flexibility to the bank’s customer facing value proposition. (Recommendation “b”) It is unclear whether the “micro markets” developed by AC have enhanced the bank’s appetite for an increased risk approach to SME service needs or if these markets are being actively pursued. (Recommendation “c”) Steps taken by Nedbank to tighten their lending criteria for unsecured lending in retail banking, goes some way to demonstrate a response to the poor economic outlook. (Recommendation “d”) Nedbank’s stated strategy for entry into the rest of the African continent certainly positions it strongly to take advantage of future opportunities there. (Recommendation “e”) The introduction of virtual banking services through its Skype-enabled “video banking” service located in select branches, demonstrates an incremental approach to incorporate virtual banking into their service, while maintaining their commitment to a “personal touch”. (Recommendation “f”) In terms of whether Nedbank is harnessing the combined advantages of the industry in South Africa to grow into global markets is beyond the scope of this case, but suffice to say the bank is positioning tactically to be a global contender without seeking risky growth that would outstrip its ability to maintain a quality value proposition. This is illustrated by the strategic decision to grow in Africa through phased acquisition rather than investment in organic growth. While these steps taken by Nedbank, in the analysis of this study, are positive and aligned to the apparent strategic imperatives for the industry, they do not however address the implied underlying uncompetitive cost structures of Nedbank’s longstanding branch-based service model, a challenge shared by all South Africa’s “big four” banks, having made decades of investments in costly and elaborate legacy systems now made redundant by rapid advances in technology. In addressing the 17 trends observed in the financial services industry, the consultants, Marius Oosthuizen and his colleague, Dr. Caren Scheepers, an Organizational Development specialist, recommended to Lines and his team that Area Collaboration takes a leading proactive role in building their organizational agility. This would necessitate a combination of cultural, structural, leadership and product adaptations, retaining a high level of flexibility and remaining market-led. PAGE 12 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 The consultants systematically analyzed the 17 trends and identified particular domains of organizational agility that would be required to weather the storm. Table I below offers the trends, agility domains and particular competencies, as defined by relevant skills, knowledge and attitudes or mindsets that are required to meet the challenges that the trends represent: As Table I illustrates, Nedbank would need to take a leadership role in the industry and with regard to specific competencies. For instance, contextual acumen is required to proactively address trends in the regulatory environment. Leadership in sourcing, developing and sponsorship of top talent represents an amazing opportunity for Nedbank, as is the Innovation leadership role. Analyzing trends in Africa and seizing investment opportunities represent an opportunity for a leadership and pioneering role in Africa. Proactively influencing the spending patterns and leadership in national wealth creation offers huge opportunities to Nedbank as a trusted partner in the development agenda of African nations. Balancing progression and innovation with stability and integrative responsible reporting presents another prospect to Nedbank’s leadership role. These leadership roles are illustrated in Figure 3 below: As Figure 3 illustrates, AC must play a leading role in building Nedbank’s organizational agility domains to address the prominent trends. Capability in Talent leadership for instance as well as Innovation leadership will serve the organization in the long term. The culture of collaboration that the leaders in the different regions, representing a number of area collaboration forums exhibited, is an impressive example of what is possible with collaboration across clusters and as such is a role model to the rest of the organization. The question remains how AC could be playing a leading role in its current format. The consultants, Marius Oosthuizen and Caren Scheepers recommended to Lines and his team that alternative organizational designs or structures would need to be generated to take advantage of the opportunity presented. At the point of the investigation around the end of 2015, the collaborative structure that AC had in place, represented an integrator role that the Area Collaboration Forums in the respective regions or geographical locations played, with the central head office type structure delivering support. Galbraith’s (2008) model on lateral integration provided a continuum from informal collaboration toward an integrator, then a matrix structure and ultimately a separate line organization with full integration. The consultants recommended to Lines and his team that higher levels of integration were required. The next step therefore on the continuum would represent a matrix organization. In some instances, the AC structure already moved in that direction. The consultants recommended that the next step, being a new line organization had to be created to play the leadership in collaboration role. See Figure 4 below for a diagram of the cyclical pattern on lateral integration. AC represents the integrator role and agent in moving Nedbank toward the matrix structure. The consultants recommended the higher form of lateral integration, where a new organization structure is created. In addition to the collaboration aspect, the opportunity to create a new prototype of leadership in innovation is also created by ring fencing the entity from the larger older more bureaucratic segments of the organization. O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) declared that the best means to encouraging explorative innovation is to create a buffer between the innovative new structure to incubate the innovative solutions and the rest of the organization. They called it the “Ambidextrous Organisation”. The consultants Marius Oosthuizen and Caren Scheepers referred to this concept in suggesting the new structure, where there are representatives from the different clusters to create holistic integrative solutions to customers. VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 13 PAGE 14 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 National ratings downgrades affecting lending rates; Low rates of savings by customers Growing foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa; Proximity to untapped African markets 14, 15 16, 17 11; 12 Bottlenecks in the IT Industry; competitive advantages eroded; pocketed skills; “brain drain”; Lack of historic competition; Lack of services’ SMEs World-class governance; Risk aversion in terms of business lending Encroaching and costly policy and regulation affecting the industry; Sophistication of the industry; cluster effect 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Trend Number Global financial system; Customers and markets Customers and markets Industry Industry Regulatory; Industry Type of trend Skills Contextual acumen by gathering “market” intelligence on future policies; Analysis of competitors and industry trends Talent Sourcing, Leadership developing, and Innovation Executive Leadership sponsorship of top talent; Exploration of innovative solutions Governance Proactive leadership; compliance and Risk integrative Leadership reporting; calculating risks National Influencing of Financial/Wealth national spending leadership patterns and wealth/financial discipline education African Analyzing and Leadership synthesizing data on investments in Africa and capitalizing on opportunities Industry leadership Agility domain Table I Financial services industry trends and required organizational agility domains Trends and patterns of investment as well as future opportunities; Insight into spirit of Africa Global rating schemes and proactively influencing indicators; current and projecting spending patterns Basil and King regulation frameworks Disruptive technologies; top talent leadership Relevant Laws and White papers in design phase; Industry life cycles; Bank assurance benefits and concerns Creating a better future for all and concern for national impact of spending patterns; making a lasting and broad difference; spiritual acumen Contributing to prosperity of continent and inquiry into investment opportunities Order and structure to create trust and stability and proactive risk leadership Openness and agility to adapt to new required approaches; agility to respond and be proactive to top talent’s requirements Building networks with current and future decision-makers in government; Update and broaden global contacts over industry and related industries Agility competence required to position organization Knowledge Mindset/attitude Figure 3 Organizational agility leadership domains to address trends in industry Figure 4 Cyclical pattern of lateral integration Other scholars were also referred to by the consultants, such as Jansen et al. (2009) who emphasize the importance of leadership to enable exploration of new innovative solutions. A separate entity would also enable the creation of a culture that is more externally focused and flexible, such as the “Ad hoc culture” described by Cameron and Quinn (2006). Human Resources processes, such as reward systems would need to be aligned to innovation goals, such as promoting employees who innovate. AC’s current focus on geographical areas represents a location-based paradigm, an area or region or province or country. A new way of perceiving the “areas” could be abstract market segments or generations, such as digital generations or Generation Y, or professional groups, such as medical doctors, and their specific needs. The challenge then before the new entity of “Area Collaboration” would be to spearhead the organizational agility domains. This entity will need to have “streams” or centers of excellence in terms of the organizational agility domains, such as Talent leadership, where VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 15 it incubates various work arrangements for top talent to be able to then deliver these solutions to the rest of the Nedbank organization. The handover to the rest of the business from this “prototype” business would then at that point pose its own challenges. The opportunity to experiment and allow an idea to have an incubation period would benefit these innovations greatly. Keywords: Competitive strategy, Corporate strategy, Dynamic capabilities, Strategic management/ planning, Banks/banking, Decision sciences As Lines was leaving his office for the meeting, he contemplated how he would persuade his executive colleagues on his ideas of conquering the challenges that the industry trends presented. Of one thing he was certain, though, he would like to clone or replicate what they were doing at AC, deploying the concept in various ways like locusts into the rest of the business. Notes 1. Telco: vernacular term for telecommunications companies who rely on their dominance of distribution networks, such as fixed line or satellite cellular communication for access to the market. 2. Relational Bank: This term is selected on the basis of interactions with executives, not as an official reference to Nedbank’s own stated strategy. References Arora, S.S. and Leach, J. (2005), “Towards building an inclusive financial sector: lessons from South Africa”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40 No. 17. Bowman, G. (2016), “The practice of scenario planning: an analysis of inter- and intra-organizational strategizing”, British Journal of Management, Vol. 27. Cameron, K.S. and Quinn, R.E. (2006), Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Cheng, M.N., Wong, J.W.K., Cheung, C.F. and Leung, K.H. (2016), “A scenario-based roadmapping method for strategic planning and forecasting: a case study in a testing, inspection and certification company”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 111. Claessens, S. (2006), “Access to financial services: a review of the issues and Public Policy objectives”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 21 No. 2. Galbraith, J.R. (2008), “Organization design”, in Cummings, T.G. (Ed.), Handbook of Organization Development, Sage Publications, Los Angeles, pp. 325-352. Jansen, J.J.P., Vera, D. and Crossan, M. (2009), “Strategic leadership for exploration and exploitation: the moderating role of environmental dynamism”, The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 20, pp. 5-18. Kahane, A. (2012), Transformative Scenario Planning: Working Together to Change the Future, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco. Kenney, S.H. and Pelley, B.A. (2014), “Stories that drive the future: how narratives can improve scenario planning”, Strategy & Leadership, Vol. 42 No. 5. Konno, N., Nonaka, I. and Ogilvy, J. (2014), “Scenario planning: the basics”, The Journal of New Paradigm Research, Vol. 70. Kostov, P., Arun, T. and Annim, S. (2014), “Banking the unbanked: the Mzansi intervention in South Africa”, Indian Growth and Development Review, Vol. 7 No. 2. Okeahalam, C. (2008), “Client profiles and access to retail bank services in South Africa”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 18 No. 4. Oosthuizen, M., Pooe, T.K. and Durrant, K. (2015), Alternative Future Scenarios for South African Mining, Manifacturing and Financial Services, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, available at: www.academia.edu/12323358/Alternative_Scenarios_for_South_African_ Mining_Manufacturing_and_Financial_Services O’Reilly, C.A. and Tushman, M.L. (2004), “The ambidextrous organisation”, Harvard Business Review, April, pp. 74-81. PAGE 16 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 Ramirez, R. and Selin, C. (2014), “Plausibility and probability in scenario planning”, Foresight, Vol. 16 No. 1. Van der Heijden, K.A. (2005), “Option planning”, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, John Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, pp. 273-284. Further reading Harris, G. (2014), “Four blind alleys of scenario analysis”, Strategy & Leadership, Vol. 42 No. 6. Wang, H. and Chang, W. (2001), “Fuzzy scenario analysis in strategic planning”, International Journal of General Systems, Vol. 30. VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 17 Exhibit 1 Figure E1 The business lifecycle Exhibit 2 Figure E2 NEDBANK Dagwood on cultural transformation PAGE 18 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 Exhibit 3 Figure E3 NEDBANK’s Africa footprint via Ecobank Exhibit 4 Figure E4 Building blocks to being the most admired bank VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 19 Exhibit 5 Figure E5 Overview: NEDBANK’s 2014 financial results PAGE 20 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 Exhibit 6 Figure E6 NEDBANK’s long term outlook of South Africa and Africa VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 21 Exhibit 7 Figure E7 Exporting sector expertise to Africa PAGE 22 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 Exhibit 8 Figure E8 NEDBANK’s liquidity risk management framework Corresponding author Marius Oosthuizen can be contacted at: oosthuizenm@gibs.co.za VOL. 8 NO. 1 2018 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 23